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^MEUNIVERy/A       ^clOSANCEI 


A  TREATISE 


ON    THE 


LAW  OF  NEGLIGENCE 


BY 


THOMAS   G.  SHEARMAN 

AND 

AMASA  A.  REDFIELD 

FIFTH  EDITION 

SUBSTANTIALLY     REWRITTEN 


IN  TWO  VOLUMES 

Vol.  I 


NEW  YORK 

BAKER,  VOORHIS   &   COMPANY 

1898 


Copyright,  1869,  1870,  1874,  1880,  1888.  1898, 
By  THOMAS  G.  SHEARMAN  and  AMASA  A.  PEDFIEI.D. 


WEED-PARSONS      PRINTING     COMPANY 

PRINTERS   AND    ELECTROTYPERS 

ALBANY,    N.  Y. 


M  3  S  5" 


v. 


PREFACE  TO  FIFTH  EDITION. 


The  last  edition  of  this  treatise  (published  ten  years  ago  and 
long  since  out  of  print)  was  so  entirely  rewritten  and  remodeled, 
as  to  be  a  new  book.  It  has  not  been  necessary  to  make  such 
a  radical  revision,  in  preparing  the  present  edition ;  but  the 
number  of  new  decisions  made  within  the  last  ten  years  has 
been  so  enormous,  and  the  extension  and  changes  of  the  law 
thereby  made  so  great,  that  almost  every  section  even  of  this 
edition  has  been  rewritten ;  and  some  chapters  have  been 
entirely  recast.  This  has  been  especially  the  case  with  regard 
to  the  chapters  on  Master  and  Servant ;  the  law  of  which  has 
been,  in  most  American  states,  very  much  unsettled  until 
within  the  last  five  or  ten  years. 

The  first  edition  of  this  book  contained  613  sections,  in  673 
pages ;  the  fourth  edition  contained  772  sections,  in  1226  pages  ; 
the  present  edition  contains  788  sections,  in  1336  pages.  But 
as  a  smaller  type  has  been  now  used,  the  real  increase  in  matter 
is  fully  one-third  over  the  last  edition,  or  equivalent  to  over 
four  hundred  pages  of  new  matter.  The  first  edition  cited 
about  4700  cases;  the  fourth  edition  over  10,000 cases;  and  the 
present  edition,  over  16,000  cases,  or  nearly  four  times  the 
original  number.  On  a  close  calculation,  not  less  than  40,000 
citations  of  these  cases  appear  in  the  notes,  on  different  perti- 
nent points.  Very  many  cases  not  appearing  in  the  official 
reports  are  cited  from  the  volumes  of  the  National  Reporter 
system,  and  all  officially  reported  cases  appearing  in  duplicate 
in  that  series  have  been  cited  from  it  as  well  as  from  the  official 
series,  for  the  benefit  of  practitioners  who  may  lack  facilities 
of  reference  to  the  official  reports  of  foreign  states. 

The  total  amount  of  matter  in  the  present  edition  is  therefore 
fully  three  times  as  much  as  that  contained  in  the  first  edition, 
and  nearly,  not  quite,  a  third  more  than  that  contained  in  the 
last  edition.     Nevertheless,  this  result  has  come  about  in  spite 

[i] 

1 


11  PREFACE. 

of  the  utmost  effort  to  compress  statement,  to  avoid  repetition 
and  to  exclude  unnecessary  citations.  So  far  from  having  any 
desire  to  make  the  book  large,  it  has  been  the  constant  aim  of  the 
authors  to  reduce  it  to  the  smallest  size,  consistent  with  the 
greatest  usefulness.  More  than  20,000  reported  decisions  (for 
the  most  part  omitted  altogether  from  the  official  reports), 
have  been  excluded,  as  being  unnecessary ;  because,  on 
examination,  they  were  found  to  be  mere  re-affirmations  of 
some  general  principle,  already  amply  illustrated  by  cited 
cases  in  the  same  jurisdiction,  and  the  facts  involved  were  not 
sufficiently  novel  to  justify  expanding  the  notes  to  the  great 
length  which  their  citation  would  involve.  To  the  end,  also, 
of  condensing  the  text,  a  number  of  sections  have  been  left 
out  or  consolidated  with  other  sections;  but  it  is  believed  that 
no  omission  has  been  made  which  will  detract  from  the  sub- 
stantial value  of  the  book. 

With  the  exception  of  fifteen  or  twenty  Scotch  cases,  there 
is  not  a  single  citation  in  these  volumes  which  has  not  been 
verified  by  reference  to  the  original  reports. 

It  was  originally  intended  to  include  within  the  scope  of  this 
work  all  the  law  of  Negligence,  considered  as  a  tort,  and  to 
exclude  everything  else;  and  it  is  only  by  reference  to  this 
that  the  general  plan  of  the  book  can  be  readily  understood. 
It  was  found,  however,  that  the  dividing  line  between  tortious 
negligence  and  breach  of  contract  was  uncertain  in  several 
important  branches  of  business;  and  therefore  the  entire  law 
of  Negligence,  whether  tortious  or  not,  with  reference  to 
attorneys,  bankers,  passenger  carriers,  physicians  and  tele- 
graphs, was  included.  On  the  other  hand,  the  subject  of 
Shipping  was  omitted,  partly  because  that  subject  has  been  so 
fully  covered  by  numerous  treatises,  and  partly  because  it  is 
governed  by  admiralty  law,  while  this  work  was  intended  to 
deal  only  with  the  common  law,  as  modified  by  statute.  The 
responsibility  of  carriers  of  goods  was  not  considered,  because 
they  are  generally  liable  as  insurers,  unless  protected  by 
special  contract.  The  chapter  of  Damages  was  added  because 
there  was  not,  when  the  first  edition  of  this  book  appeared, 
any  treatise  on  that  special  subject,  which  stated  the  law 
concerning  damages  in  cases  of  negligence,  in  a  convenient 
form  or  in  entire  harmony  with  the  theory  of  this  treatise. 


INTRODUCTION. 


It  must  be  conceded  that,  in  a  scientific  Code  of  civil  law, 
there  would  be  no  separate  chapter  on  Negligence.  The  very 
first  definition  of  negligence  shows  that  a  strictly  scientific 
arrangement  of  the  law  would  call  for  a  statement  of  rights 
and  duties,  rather  than  of  the  facts  which  show  neglect  to 
perform  those  duties  or  to  respect  those  rights. 

Nevertheless,  a  great  mass  of  judicial  decisions  had  clus- 
tered themselves  under  the  general  title  of  Negligence,  long 
before  this  or  any  other  book  had  been  planned  under  that 
title ;  and  the  number  of  such  cases  is  constantly  increasing. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  various  editions  of  this  book,  not 
less  than  forty  thousand  reported  cases  have  been  examined, 
nearly  all  of  which  had  a  direct  bearing  upon  some  question 
of  negligence.  After  throwing  out  thousands  of  these,  as 
obsolete  or  repetitious,  there  remain  16,000  cases  in  these 
volumes,  over  6,000  of  which  are  from  reports  published  within 
the  last  ten  years.  We  leave  others  to  estimate  the  vast 
number  of  unreported  cases  which  must  have  been  tried  within 
the  same  period.  It  is  manifest  that  there  is  an  enormous  and 
increasing  amount  of  such  litigation,  and  that  it  demands  treat- 
ment as,  practically,  a  separate  department  of  the  law. 

There  is  much  lamentation  over  the  continual  increase  of 
negligence  suits;  and  the  courts  have  sometimes  expressed 
impatience  with  it.  Indeed,  it  has  become  quite  common  for 
judges  to  state,  as  the  ground  of  decisions,  the  necessity  of 
restricting  litigation.  Reduced  to  plain  English,  this  means 
the  necessity  of  compelling  the  great  majority  of  men  and 
women  to  submit  to  injustice,  in  order  to  relieve  judges  from 
the  labor  of  awarding  justice.  We  venture  to  suggest  that,  if 
justice  were  more  certainly  and  promptly  rendered,  there 
would  be  much  less  disposition  to  resist  just  claims  or  to  push 
unjust  ones.     It  is  because  so  many  erroneous  decisions  are 

[iii] 


IV  INTRODUCTION. 

still  made,  and  because  court  proceedings  are  so  full  of  com- 
plexities and  delays,  that  unjust  suitors  are  encouraged  to  take 
the  chances  of  law,  as  if  it  were  a  lottery. 

There  is  no  difficulty  in  accounting  for  the  multiplication  of 
negligence  cases.  All  men  fail  a  hundred  times  to  use  the 
proper  degree  of  care  and  diligence  in  the  performance  of 
some  duty,  where  they  fail  once  to  perform  the  duty  itself. 
And  while  total  failure  to  perform  a  contract  usually  causes 
legal  injury  to  one  person  only,  carelessness  in  the  attempt  to 
perform  it  usually  injures  more  than  one  person,  if  it  injures 
any.  Then  the  rapid  advance  of  civilization,  with  all  its 
inventions  and  delicate  complexities,  immensely  increases  the 
number  and  importance  of  duties  and  the  difficulty  of  fully 
performing  them.  Finally,  while  the  measure  of  damages,  in 
cases  of  contract,  is  generally  capable  of  easy  computation,  the 
measure  of  damages  for  mere  negligence  in  the  attempted 
performance  of  a  duty  is  in  most  cases  incapable  of  exact  com- 
putation and  must  be  settled  by  compromise.  It  is  inevitable 
that  a  very  large  proportion  of  such  cases  should  be  referred 
to  the  compromise  of  a  jury. 

It  is  indeed  to  be  regretted  that  the  prosecution  of  negli- 
gence claims  has  so  largely  become  a  mere  trade,  conducted 
on  shares,  by  lawyers  whose  runners  are  eager  in  their  pursuit 
of  clients.  But  this  is  mainly  due  to  the  unfortunate  and 
unnecessary  construction  put  upon  the  New  York  Code  of 
Procedure,  at  an  early  day,  and  followed  almost  everywhere, 
by  which  the  courts  shirked  the  duty  of  control  over  their 
officers,  and  allowed  lawyers  to  practice  extortion,  under  the 
name  of  free  contract.  The  only  remedy  is  for  the  courts  to 
resume  supervision  over  contracts  between  client  and  counsel, 
and  to  confine  fees  to  a  reasonable  amount. 

The  fact  must  also  be  recognized  that  an  immense  amount 
of  fraud  and  perjury  is  resorted  to  in  preparing  and  prose- 
cuting negligence  claims.  The  temptation  to  overstate  the 
actual  injury,  even  in  well-founded  actions,  is  very  strong; 
and  the  manufacture  of  fictitious  claims  has  become  a 
regular  business.  The  prejudice  of  ordinary  juries  against 
defendants  in  such  actions,  especially  when  wealthy  corpora- 
tions are  the  defendants,  has  been  commented  upon  in  scores 
of  judicial  opinions  and  illustrated  in  thousands  of  cases. 


INTRODUCTION.  V 

These  considerations,  we  believe,  have  led  the  courts  in 
many  cases  to  lay  down  general  rules  of  law,  intended  to 
restrict  claims  for  negligence  within  narrow  limits.  But  this 
seems  to  us  unjust  and  unwise.  A  rule  of  law,  framed  with 
intent  to  make  fraudulent  claims  difficult,  may  easily  make 
just  claims  impossible.  The  true  remedy  is,  on  the  part  of 
the  courts,  to  use  resolutely  the  power  of  ordering  new  trials, 
in  unsatisfactory  cases,  and  on  the  part  of  great  corporations, 
to  meet  all  just  claims  with  such  manifest  fairness  as  to  estab- 
lish a  reputation  for  willingness  to  do  what  is  just  and  fair, 
without  compulsion.  We  have  known  instances  in  which 
the  adoption  of  such  a  policy,  in  place  of  the  opposite  one,  has 
made  it  very  difficult  for  any  plaintiff  to  recover  a  verdict 
against  railway  companies  thus  acting. 

After  making  the  fullest  allowance  for  all  wrongs  done 
by  the  prejudices  of  jurors  and  the  frauds  of  claimants,  it  is 
certain  that  the  maintenance  of  the  right  of  private  action  for 
damages  in  cases  of  negligence  is  essential  to  the  welfare  of 
the  entire  community.  It  is  the  only  effective  protection 
which  society  has  against  wholesale  destruction  of  life  and 
property,  through  the  reckless  indifference  of  men  to  the 
rights  and  safety  of  others.  This  recklessness  is  shown  by  all 
men  occasionally,  by  most  men  frequently,  and  by  vast  num- 
bers of  men  habitually. 

The  gigantic  development  of  power  for  harm  as  well  as 
good,  in  the  modern  use  of  steam,  electricity  and  explosives* 
placed  increasingly  under  the  control  of  irresponsible  servants, 
whose  duties  make  them  so  familiar  with  danger  that  they 
cease  to  appreciate  it,  has  made  it  impossible  to  protect  society 
against  their  errors  by  criminal  prosecutions,  if  for  no  other 
reason  than  that  the  courts  could  not  be  multiplied  suffi- 
ciently to  meet  the  situation. 

The  concentration  of  these  powers  in  the  hands  of  corpora- 
tions makes  the  very  idea  of  restraint  by  criminal  law  absurd. 
One  private  action  for  damages  involves  a  penalty  more  severe 
than  ten  public  prosecutions. 

Private  actions  for  negligence,  therefore,  answer  a  great 
public  purpose  and  render  a  public  service,  such  as  can  be  ren- 
dered in  no  other  way.  Damages,  recovered  in  such  actions, 
are  the  only  punishment  which  is  feared  by  those  who  control 


yi  INTRODUCTION. 

the  tremendous  forces  now  daily  used  in  business;  and  nearly 
all  the  progress  which  is  made  in  reducing  the  dangers  of 
these  forces  is  due  to  the  fear  of  those  damages. 

The  stubborn  resistance  of  business  corporations,  common- 
carriers  and  mill-owners  to  the  enforcement  of  the  most  mod- 
erate laws  for  the  protection  of  human  beings  from  injury,  and 
their  utter  failure  to  provide  such  protection  of  their  own 
accord,  ought  to  satisfy  any  impartial  judge  that  true  justice 
demands  a  constant  expansion  of  the  law  in  the  direction  of 
increased  responsibility  for  negligence,  instead  of  attempts, 
unfortunately  too  common,  to  restrict  such  responsibility  by 
introducing  new  exceptions. 

The  law  of  master  and  servant,  in  its  relation  to  the  law  of 
negligence,  affords  perhaps  the  most  striking  example,  within 
the  last  half  century,  of  gross  injustice  done  by  this  disposition 
to  restrict  responsibility  and  suppress  litigation. 

A  small  number  of  able  judges,  devoted,  from  varying 
motives,  to  the  supposed  interests  of  the  wealthy  classes,  and 
caring  little  for  any  others,  boldly  invented  an  exception  to 
the  general  rule  of  masters'  liability,  by  which  servants  were 
deprived  of  its  protection.  Very  appropriately,  this  exception 
was  first  announced  in  South  Carolina,  then  the  citadel  of 
human  slavery.  It  was  eagerly  adopted  in  Massachusetts, 
then  the  centre  of  the  factory  system,  where  some  decisions 
were  then  made  in  favor  of  great  corporations,  so  preposterous 
that  they  have  been  disregarded  in  every  other  state,  without 
even  the  compliment  of  refutation.  It  was  promptly  followed 
in  England,  which  was  then  governed  exclusively  by  landlords 
and  capitalists.  And  when  the  fifteen  judges  of  Scotland 
unanimously  declared  that  it  had  never  been  the  law  of 
Scotland,  four  English  law  lords  reversed  their  decision. 

The  final  piece  of  judicial  legislation  was  enacted  in  the 
famous  case  of  Wilson  v.  Merry,  where,  by  the  wholly  irrele- 
vant dictum  of  two  superannuated  law  lords,  the  doctrine  of 
"  vice-principal  "  was  abolished.  This  led  to  a  reaction.  As 
the  courts,  while  asserting  unlimited  power  to  create  new  and 
bad  law,  denied  their  power  to  correct  their  own  errors,  the 
legislature  intervened,  and  to  a  large  extent  the  whole  defense 
of  "common  employment"  has  been  taken  away  in  Great 
Britain.     And  now,  not  a  single  voice  is  raised  in  Great  Britain 


INTRODUCTION  Vll 

in  justification  of  the  doctrine  once  enforced  by  the  unanimous 
opinions  of  the  English  courts.  The  infallible  Chief  Justice 
Shaw  and  Chancellor  Cairns  have  fallen  so  low,  on  this 
point  at  least,  that  "  there  are  none  so  poor  as  to  do  them 
reverence." 

The  results  of  this  combination  of  boldness  in  making  bad 
law  and  timidity  in  undoing  it  have  been  most  disastrous. 
Great  corporations,  finding  that  diligence  and  humanity  only 
increased  their  liabilities,  naturally  selected  officers  who  were 
careful  not  to  know  too  much  about  the  faults  of  servants  or 
of  implements.  The  loss  of  life  and  the  amount  of  human 
suffering  which  have  ensued  from  the  want  of  adequate 
pressure  upon  the  great  carrying  companies  to  protect  their 
servants  from  injury  in  their  service  have  been  appalling. 

Most  American  courts  have  sought  to  multiply  exceptions 
to  the  great  exception,  and  have  refused  to  follow  the  English 
House  of  Lords  in  its  blind  zeal  for  the  exemption  of  capital 
from  responsibility.  Indeed,  outside  of  Maine,  Massachusetts, 
New  York,  New  Jersey  and  Mississippi,  American  courts  have 
been  as  much  in  advance  of  English  courts,  in  this  respect,  as 
American  legislatures  have  lagged  in  the  rear  of  the  British 
parliament. 

For  it  is  a  fact,  not  to  be  denied,  that  the  legislature  of 
Great  Britain,  for  the  last  half-century,  has  been  constantly  in 
advance  of  nearly  every  American  legislature  in  protecting 
from  the  rapacity  and  oppression  of  unscrupulous  masters  not 
only  the  public  at  large,  but  also  their  servants,  and  especially 
women  and  children.  All  our  statutes  giving  a  right  of 
action  for  death,  limiting  hours  of  labor,  restricting  the  forced 
labor  of  women  and  children,  requiring  precautions  against 
unhealthy  conditions  in  places  of  work,  prohibiting  "  pluck-me 
stores"  and  providing  for  the  enforcement  of  such  laws  by 
government  inspection,  were  in  substance  copied  from  British 
statutes.  There  is  probably  not  one  state  in  the  entire  Union 
which,  even  yet,  has  a  code  of  labor  laws  as  favorable  to  labor- 
ers as  that  of  Great  Britain  ;  while  there  is  certainly  not  one  in 
which  those  laws  are  so  faithfully  enforced. 

With  each  successive  edition  of  this  treatise  more  and  more 
freedom  has  been  used  in  criticising  decisions  of  even  the 
highest  courts.     The  conflict  of  opinions  among  these  courts 


Vlll  INTRODUCTION. 

makes  this  absolutely  necessary  in  some  instances,  and  justi- 
fiable in  all.  Judges  are  not  infallible.  Not  only  does  their 
present  disagreement  prove  this;  it  is  far  more  signally  illus- 
trated by  the  unanimous  condemnation,  in  one  generation,  of 
the  unanimous  decisions  of  a  previous  one.  The  truth  is,  that 
every  good  statute  affecting  a  general  rule  of  law  is  passed  to 
correct  either  a  previous  bad  statute  or  a  previous  bad  judicial 
decision.  The  doctrine  of  stare  decisis,  which  seldom  stands 
in  the  way  of  a  court  of  last  resort,  when  its  passions  or  preju- 
dices are  involved,  is  constantly  used  as  an  excuse  for  refusing 
to  recognize  changed  social  conditions,  where  the  plainest 
justice  requires  it. 

There  should  be  much  less  hesitation  than  there  is,  in  courts 
of  last  resort,  in  acknowledging  previous  mistakes  and  overrul- 
ing their  own  erroneous  decisions.  And  if,  instead  of  making 
new  iron  rules  (which  must  in  time  become  obsolete  and 
oppressive),  legislatures  would  devise  some  method  by  which 
the  courts  could  declare  that  to  be  law  which  is  known  to  be 
justice,  without  disturbing  contracts  or  operating  retroactively, 
the  whole  law  might  be  vastly  improved.  We  believe  this  to 
be  possible,  but,  unfortunately,  far  from  probable.  Legisla- 
tures are  unwilling  to  relinquish  powers  which  they  are  unable 
to  use;  and  judges  are  reluctant  to  assume  new  duties. 

Nevertheless,  within  the  narrow  limits  allowed  to  them  by 
precedent,  American  judges  have  upon  the  whole  made  for 
themselves  an  honorable  record  by  their  decisions  upon  these 
questions.  It  is  particularly  noteworthy  that,  even  after 
allowing  for  some  recent  reactionary  decisions,  the  general 
tendency  of  the  Federal  courts  has  been  towards  a  liberal 
interpretation  of  the  law  of  negligence  in  favor  of  the  public, 
and  especially  of  servants.  This  is  all  the  more  remarkable 
and  commendable,  because  Federal  judges  are  not  merely 
entirely  independent  of  the  popular  vote,  but  never  owe 
their  appointment  to  what  is  usually  spoken  of  as  popular 
influence. 

From  the  tone  of  these  remarks,  and  indeed  from  the  gen- 
eral tone  of  these  volumes,  it  might  not  unreasonably  be 
inferred  that  the  authors  were  engaged  in  prosecuting  claims 
upon  negligence  against  corporations.  That  inference,  how- 
ever, is   not  at  all  justified  by  the  facts.     The  personal  and 


INTRODUCTION.  IX 

professional  interests  of  the  authors  are  almost  exclusively  on 
the  side  of  great  corporations  and  of  defendants  in  negligence 
cases.  The  writer  of  this  introduction  has  only  twice  in  his  life 
been  counsel  for  the  plaintiff  in  a  negligence  case  ;  while  both 
the  authors  have  been  counsel  for  defendants  in  many  such 
cases.  The  views  here  expressed  are  the  result  of  an  impartial 
study  of  the  whole  situation,  while  constantly  engaged  in 
the  professional  service  of  railway  companies  and  other 
corporations. 

The  truth  is  that  equal  and  exact  justice,  in  all  these 
matters,  is  in  the  long  run  as  much  for  the  interest  of  business 
corporations  as  it  is  for  the  interest  of  those  who  deal  with 
them.  If  their  agents  are  permitted  to  be  reckless  in  their 
treatment  of  customers  or  of  fellow-servants,  they  inevitably 
become  reckless  in  their  treatment  of  the  corporate  property. 
Indeed,  it  seldom  happens  that  a  railway  servant's  negligence 
inflicts  injury  upon  any  one,  without  at  the  same  moment 
inflicting  serious  injury  upon  the  railway  property.  And, 
although  it  may  seem  hard  to  make  the  railway  company 
suffer  for  injury  to  a  stranger,  as  well  as  for  loss  of  its  own 
property,  experience  shows  that  this  double  liability  is  none 
too  much,  indeed  not  enough,  to  secure  a  careful  administra- 
tion of  such  property. 

March  15,  1898.  T.  G.  S. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


Part  I.  General  Principles. 

II.  Liabilities  arising  out  of  Personal  Relations. 

III.  Public  Corporations  and  Officers. 

IV.  Public  Ways. 
V.  Carriers. 

VI.  Personal  Services. 
VII.  Management  of  Property. 
VIII.  Measure  of  Damages. 


PART  I. 

GENERAL  PRINCIPLES. 


Chapter  I.  Negligence  in  General. 
II.  Proximate  Cause. 

III.  Degrees  of  Negligence. 

IV.  Questions  of  Fact  and  Law. 
V.  Evidence. 

VI.  Contributory  Negligence. 
VII.   Parties. 
VIII.  Deceased  Persons. 


CHAPTER  I. 
NEGLIGENCE  IN  GENERAL. 

VOL.    I — PACK. 

Sec.     1.  Negligence  variously  defined 2 

|  V  2.  Difficulty  of  exact  definition 3 


xii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

VOL.    I— PAGE. 

SEC.     3.  Definition  of  actionable  negligence 3 

4.  Negligence  and  concurring  damage  distinguished... 3 

■">.  AnaW-Ms  of  a  cause  of  action  on  negligence 4 

6.  Dr.  Wharton's  definition  reviewed    .  .    4 

7.  Election  between  intended  and  unintended  injury 5 

8.  Duty,  an  essential  element         6 

9.  The  duty  must  be  to  use  care 7 

10.  Tlie  duty  must  be  legal  not  merely  moral 8 

11.  No  unreasonable  duty  required 9 

12.  In  determining  duty,  regard  to  be  had  to  era 10 

13.  Violation  of  duty  imposed  by  statute  or  ordinance 11 

13a.  Regulations  for  public  benefit  only 14 

14.  A  personal  duty  cannot  be  delegated 14 

15.  No  negligence  where  there  is  no  breach  of  duty 15 

16.  Inevitable  accident 16 

17.  Apparent  exceptions  to  rule  as  to  inevitable  accident 18 

18.  What  is  not  inevitable  accident 19 

19.  Absence  of  intent  to  produce  damage =  20 

20.  Distinction  between  negligence  and  fraud 20 

21.  Defendant's  anticipation  of  injury  not  essential 21 

22.  Election  between  cotnract  and  tort 22 

23.  Damage  an  essential  element 23 

24.  Damage  must  be  special  to  plaintiff 24 

24a.  Right  to  recover  over 24 


CHAPTER  II. 

PROXIMATE  CAUSE. 

SEC.  25.  Breach  of  duty  must  cause  the  damage 26 

26.  Breach  of  duty  must  be  the  proximate  cause 27 

27.  Breach  of  statutory  duty 28 

28.  Natural  and  continuous  sequence,  defined 29 

29.  Foreseen  and  unforeseen  consequences  of  negligence 31 

30.  Extraordinary  consequences  of  negligence 32 

31.  Intervening  cause,  breaking  connection 34 

32.  Intervening  cause  must  be  either  a  superseding  or  a  respon- 

sponsible  cause 36 

33.  Superseding  cause  and  inevitable  accident,  distinguished. . .  37 

34.  Intervening  responsible  cause,  not  superseding 37 

35.  Intervening  cause  illustrated 38 

36.  Intervening  cause  must  be  culpable 39 

37.  Intervening  cause  must  be  a  free  agent 40 

38.  Intervener  not  culpable,  if  ignorant  of  facts 41 

39.  Superior  force  concurring  with  defendant's  negligence  ....  42 

40.  Superior  force  concurring  with  defendant's  delay 44 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS  Xlll 

CHAPTER  III. 
DEGREES  OF  NEGLIGENCE. 

VOL.    I— PAGE. 

SEC.  41.  The  theory  of  two  degrees  of  negligence 47 

42.  Its  impracticability  in  modern  affairs 48 

43.  Unsatisfactory  tests  of  "  ordinary  care" ...  49 

44.  Necessity  of  an  exceptional  degree  of  care 50 

45.  The  requirement  just  and  reasonable        51 

46.  •'  Utmost  care,"  when  required. 52 

47.  Three  degrees  of  care  required 54 

48.  Correlative  degrees  of  negligence 55 

49.  "  Gross,"  "ordinary  "  and  "  slight'"  negligence  defined 56 

50.  Standard  of  ' '  great  care  "  stated  57 

51.  Application  of  the  rule  to  passenger  carriers 57 

CHAPTER  IV. 

QUESTIONS  OF  FACT  AND  LAW. 

Sec.  52.  Negligence,  a  question  of  mingled  law  and  fact 60 

53.  Province  of  court  and  jury 61 

54.  Questions  proper  for  the  jury  .. . 64 

55.  Proximate  cause,  when  question  for  the  jury 67 

56.  When  question  should  not  be  left  to  the  jury  : 68 

CHAPTER  V. 

EVIDENCE. 

Sec.  57.  Plaintiff's  burden  of  proof  . .    72 

58.  What  will  shift  burden  to  defendant 76 

59.  Presumptions  of  negligence 78 

60.  Illustrations  of  presumptive  negligence 79 

60a.  Admission  and  declarations  80 

60b.  Other  similar  accidents  82 

60c.  Subsequent  repairs 84 

CHAPTER  YI. 

CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 

Sec.  61.  General  rule 87 

62.  Contributory  negligence  under  statutory  claims 90 

63.  Reason  of  rule. 93 

64.  When  no  defense 94 

65.  Fault  must  be  that  of  injured  party  or  his  agent 96 

66.  Doctrine  of  "  identification." 97 

66a.  Stranger's  contributory  fault  no  excuse  for  plaintiff's 100 

67.  Husband  and  wife 101 

68.  Knowledge  of  principal,  when  imputed  to  agent.. 102 


XIV  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

VOL.    X— PAGE. 

SEC.    69.  Knowledge  of  agent,  when  imputed  to  principal 102 

TO.  Contributory  negligence  of  children 103 

71.  Negligence  of  parent,  in  parent's  action 103 

73.  Parents  must  be  actually  in  fault 105 

73.  Degree  of  care  required  from  child 106 

7:i<r.  Age  of  discretion 110 

74.  Imputation  of  parent's  negligence ;  New  York  rule 115 

7").   New  York  rule  criticised 117 

76.  Imputed  negligence  ;  Illinois  rule 118 

77.  Identification  of  child  and  custodian. . 118 

78.  True  rule  ;  no  imputation  of  parental  negligence 118 

79.  No  imputed  negligence,  if  child  careful 120 

80.  Imputed  negligence  ;  limitations  of  rule 120 

81.  Imputed  negligence  ;  parent  must  be  acting  as  such 120 

82.  Imputed  negligence  ;  parent  must  be  negligent  in  fact 121 

83.  Imputed  negligence  ;    age  of  child 121 

84.  Imputed  negligence ;  lunatics,  etc  122 

85.  Plaintiff  not  prejudiced  unless  actually  in  fault 123 

86.  Plaintiff  not  prejudiced  by  want  of  more  than  ordinary 

care 125 

87.  Ordinary  care  defined 127 

88.  Care  required  of  infirm,  etc 130 

89.  Effect  of  mistaken  judgment  under  sudden  alarm 131 

90.  Duty  of  looking  and  listening 134 

91.  Effect  of  defendant's  advice  or  invitation 135 

92.  Plaintiff  not  bound  to  anticipate  negligence 137 

93.  Plaintiff's  fault  must  contribute  to  injury 140 

94.  Plaintiff's  fault  must  proximately  contribute  to  injury 143 

95.  Negligence  increasing  damages  only,  no  bar 145 

96.  Plaintiff's  fault  need  not  be  cause  of  injury 146 

97.  Effect  of  technical  trespass 147 

98.  Technical  trespass,  no  bar 150 

99.  Defendant's  later  negligence  ;  rule  in  Davies  v.  Mann 150 

100.  Illustrations  of  rule 155 

101.  Plaintiff  last  in  fault 156 

102.  Comparative  negligence 156 

103.  Rule  in  Georgia,  Florida  and  Tennessee 158 

104.  Plaintiff's  violation  of  statute 159 

105.  Plaintiff's  fault  in  representative  capacity 1G3 

106.  Burden  of  proof  ;  conflict  of  decisions 103 

107.  Burden  of  proof  on  plaintiff 164 

108.  Burden  of  proof  on  defendant 166 

109.  Burden  ought  to  be  on  defendant 168 

110.  Presumption  against  negligence  ;  how  over-balanced 169 

111.  What  proof  of  care  sufficient. 171 

112.  Inference  from  circumstances 173 

113.  Pleading:  absence  of  fault 174 

11 1.  Questions  of  fact  and  law 175 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XV 

CHAPTER   VII. 
PARTIES  TO  ACTIONS  FOR  NEGLIGENCE. 

VOL.    I— PAGE. 

Sec.  115.  Persons  directly  or  indirectly  injured 180 

116.  Who  may  sue  on  breach  of  contract  182 

117.  Liability  for  selling  dangerous  goods 185 

118.  Private  actions  upon  public  obligations 186 

119.  Reversioners  and  inortagees 187 

120.  Landlords  and  tenants 188 

120a.  Railroads 190 

121.  Infants  and  lunatics 192 

122.  Who  are  jointly  liable 193 

123.  Who  are  not  jointly  liable 195 

CHAPTER    VIII. 

DECEASED  PERSONS. 

Sec.  124.  No  common-law  remedy  for  injuries  causing  death 196 

125.  The  statutory  remedy 198 

126.  The  English  statute  (Lord  Campbell's  act) 198 

127.  American  statutes  . 198 

128.  Peculiar  statutes  200 

129.  Cumulative  statutes 201 

130.  [Omitted] 203 

131.  Action  ;  when  brought  where  injury  occurred 203 

132.  Action  ;  when  may  be  brought  in  another  state 204 

133.  Who  may  bring  action 206 

134.  For  whose  benefit  action  may  be  brought.    .    209 

135.  No  action  without  surviving  statutory  beneficiary 209 

136.  Illegitimates  ;  when  entitled  to  benefit  of  the  statute 210 

137.  Pecuniary  injury  ;  how  far  essential  to  action ...  211 

138.  Miscellaneous  points 213 

139.  Effect  of  survival  statutes 213 

140.  Effect  of  re/eases  and  settlements 215 


X\i  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

PART  II. 

LIABILITIES  ARISING  OUT  OF   PERSONAL 
RELATIONS. 


Chapter  IX.   Liability  of  Masters  for  Servants. 
X.  Liability  of  Masters  to  Servants. 
XI.  Liability  of  Servants. 


CHAPTER  IX. 
LIABILITY  OF  MASTERS  FOR  SERVANTS. 

VOL.    I— PAGE. 

SEC.  141.  General  rule  of  liability 218 

142.  Principle  of  the  rule 218 

143.  [Omitted] 220 

141.  Agency  necessary  to  create  responsibility 220 

145.  Master's  liability  for  servant's  acts  under  implied  authority,  222 

146.  Master  liable  for  acts  in  course  of  employment 224 

147.  What  acts  are  within  employment 225 

148.  Master  not  liable  for  acts  outside  of  employment 228 

149.  [Omitted] 229 

150.  Liability  for  servant's  willful  acts 229 

151.  Ostensible  authority  for  willful  acts 231 

152.  [Omitted] 233 

153.  Willful  acts  ;  when  consequence  of  negligence 233 

154.  Liability  for  negative  results  of  willful  act 234 

155.  Disobedience  of  master's  orders. .    236 

156.  [Omitted] 237 

157.  Liability  for  sub-agents  or  strangers 237 

158.  Implied  liability  of  owner  of  vehicle 238 

159.  Ownership  of  other  property;  how  far  implies  liability 239 

160    Who  is  to  be  deemed  a  master 240 

161.  Nominal  master  when  not  liable 243 

162.  Liability  for  servant  hired  out 244 

163.  Liability  of  trustees  for  employee's  acts 245 

164.  Who  is  a  "  contractor  " 246 

165.  When  contractor  and  when  servant 247 

166.  Effect  of  employer's  control  over  contractor 249 

167.  Effect  of  right  of  dismissal 250 

168.  Employer  not  liable  for  contractor's  negligence 251 

169.  Negligence  of  subcontractor  and  part-contractor 252 

170.  [Omitted] 254 

171.  Employer  liable  for  persons  selected  by  him 254 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XVU 


VOL.    I — PAGE. 


Sec.  172.  Liability  for  servant  compulsorily  employed  — pilots 254 

173.  Liability  of  owner  for  persons  employed  on  land 255 

174.  Liability  of  employer  for  his  own  fault 257 

175.  Employer  liable  for  act  contracted  for 259 

176.  Omission  of  duty  not  excused  by  contracting  to  have  it 


done. 


260 


CHAPTER  X. 
LIABILITY  OF  MASTERS  TO  SERVANTS. 

Sec.  177.  Limitations  of  master's  liability  to  servant 263 

178.  Reason  assigned  for  rule  265 

179.  The  real  reason 267 

180.  The  general  rule 268 

181.  Who  are  servants 271 

182.  Volunteer,  when  considered  servant 272 

183.  Who  is  a  volunteer  assistant 273 

184.  Master  does  not  insure  against  risks  274 

185.  What  risks  servants  assume 276 

185a.  What  risks  servants  do  not  assume  281 

185b.  What  facts  servants  may  presume 283 

186.  Risks  assumed  under  special  orders 286 

186a.  Risks  of  service  outside  of  ordinary  employment 289 

187.  Master  liable  for  his  own  negligence 291 

188.  Concurrent  negligence  292 

189.  Degree  of  care  required  of  master 293 

190.  Duration  of  master's  duty  and  exemption 295 

191.  Duty  to  select  competent  fellow-servants 297 

192.  Evidence  of  negligence  in  employment  of  servant 299 

193.  Duty  to  employ  sufficient  force 303 

194.  Duty  to  provide  proper  instrumentalities 304 

194a.  Duty  of  inspection  and  repair 308 

195.  Limits  of  master's  liability  for  instrumentalities 311 

196.  Master's  duty  as  to  instrumentalities  not  his  own  property  319 

197.  Illustrations  of  master's  liability 320 

198.  Low  bridges 324 

198a.  Low  bridges  ;  contributory  fault 326 

199.  Low  bridge  cases  limited 327 

200    [Omitted] 328 

201.  Other  dangerous  projections 329 

202.  Master's  duty  to  prescribe  and  enforce  rules 330 

203.  Master's  duty  to  guard  and  warn  against  unusual  risks 332 

203a.  Duty  of  supervision 336 

204.  Delegation  of  master's  personal  duties 337 

205.  Illustrations  of  n  on -transferable  duties 340 

206.  What  is  sufficient  notice  to  master 344 

207.  Contributory  negligence 34a 

207a.  What  is  not  contributory  negligence 350 

[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  I  — b.] 


Xviii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

VOL.    1— PAGE. 

Si  >  .  -JuT/i.  Disobedience  of  rules  and  orders 353 

208.   Basis  of  imputed  assumption  of  risks  from  master's  neg-  357 

ligence 358 

809.  Servanl  accepting  employment  with  notice  of  defects 359 

309o.  Servant  continuing  with  notice  of  defects 363 

210.  Effect  of  refusal  to  repair 364 

21 1.  True  rule  as  to  effect  of  servant's  knowledge 366 

211a.  Special  risks  incurred  under  coercion 366 

212.  Test  of  servant's  prudence 367 

213.  Excusable  omissions  of  usual  care 369 

214.  Notice  of  defect,  without  notice  of  danger,  immaterial 371 

215.  Effect  of  master's  promises  and  assurances 377 

216.  Presumption  as  to  servant's  knowledge 379 

217.  Means  of  knowledge  ;  duty  to  investigate 383 

218.  Application  of  rule  to  minors 386 

219.  Special  duties  of  masters  to  minors 389 

219a.  Inexperienced  servants 391 

220.  Servant's  knowledege  of  master's  personal  defects 392 

221.  Servant's  duty  to  warn  and  complain 394 

222.  Burden  of  proof 396 

223.  What  is  sufficient  proof 401 

224.  Who  are  f ellovv -servants 402 

225.  Who  are  not  fellow-servants 404 

226.  American  rule  ;  vice-principals  not  fellow-servants 405 

227.  British  rule  ;  no  vice-principals 406 

228.  British  rule  criticised 407 

229.  British  rule  condemned  at  home 408 

230.  Who  are  vice-pirncipals  ;  general  managers 411 

231.  Who  are  vice-principals  ;  New  York  rule 413 

232.  Principle  of  New  York  decision  generally  accepted 415 

233.  In  what  duties  servants  act  as  vice-principals 423 

233a.  Examples  of  who  are,  or  are  not,  vice-principals . .  425 

233o.  Peculiar  local  rules 428 

234.  Servants  must  be  in  common  employment 429 

235.  Common  employment ;  general  rule 430 

236.  Who  are  in  common  employment  under  general  rule 431 

237.  Who  are  not  in  common  employment 431 

238.  Common  employment ;  association  rule 434 

239.  Illustrations  of  common  employment 436 

240.  [Omitted] 436 

241.  Illustration  of  fellow-servant    in    common    employment 

under  all  rules 436 

241a.  Effect  of  statutes  and  codes 440 

2411*.  Statutes  of  general  application 441 

241c.  Statutes  applying  to  railroad  companies 443 

241d.  Exemption  from  liability  by  special  contract 446 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XIX 

CHAPTER  XL 
LIABILITY  OF  SERVANTS. 

VOL,    I— PAGE. 

SEC.  242.  Servant's  liability  to  master 456 

243.  Servant  not  liable  to  third  person  for  nonfeasance 456 

244.  Servant  liable  to  third  person  for  misfeasance 458 

245.  Servant's  liability  to  fellow-servants 460 

246.  Liability  of  shipmasters 461 

247.  Servant  not  liable  for  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant 462 

248.  Joint  liability  of  master  and  servant 462 


PART  III. 

PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS  AND  OFFICERS. 


Chapter    XII.  Municipal  Corporations. 

XIII.  Public  Officers. 

XIV.  Incorporated  Public  Trustees. 


CHAPTER  XII. 
MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 

SEC.  249.  The  state  cannot  be  coerced  by  suit 464 

250.  Extent  of  state's  immunity 466 

251.  Liability  of  state  by  its  own  consent 466 

252.  [Consolidated  with  §  253] 467 

253.  Municipal  corporations  as  state-agencies 467 

254.  Statutory  test  of  corporate  liability 469 

255.  Public  and  private  functions  of  corporations 471 

256.  Liability  of  counties,  towns,  etc.,  generally 472 

257.  Liability  of  counties  in  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  Indiana 

and  Iowa  477 

258.  Liability  of  New  England  towns 479 

259.  Common-law  liability  of  New  England  towns 483 

260.  [Consolidated  with  §  291] 484 

260a.  Maintenance  of  jails,  etc 484 

261 .  Statutory  liability  for  mob  violence 485 

262.  Adoption  and  execution  of  laws  and  ordinances 487 

263.  Discretionary  powers  —  granting  licenses 492 

264.  [Omitted] 494 


X\  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

VOL.    I — PAGE. 

BBC.  865.  Supplying  water  and  apparatus  for  extinguishing  fires 494 

866.  Providing  for  public  health 497 

867.  Providing  public  schools  498 

868.  [Consolidated  with  §  858J 499 

26!).  [Consolidated  with  §262] 499 

270.  [Consolidated  with  §  2621  499 

271.  Devising  plan  of  public  improvement 499 

873.  Error  of  judgment  distinguished  from  negligence 500 

878.  [Consolidated  with  §  272] 503 

274.  Planning  inefficient  or  injurious  drainage 503 

275.  Duty  to  remedy  defects  in  plan 507 

276.  Discretion  in  the  application  of  limited  funds 508 

277.  [Consolidated  with  §  374] 509 

278.  How  far  professional  advice  will  excuse  defect  in  plan. . .  509 

279.  Statutory  directions  as  to  plan . , 510 

280.  [Consolidated  with  §  281] 511 

281.  Liability  for  breach  of  ministerial  duties 511 

282.  [Consolidated  with  §  281] 514 

283.  Damage  consequent  on  authorized  act 514 

284.  [Consolidated  with  §  334] 516 

285.  Municipal  lands  and  structures 516 

286.  Management  of  water  and  gas  service 520 

287.  Maintenance  and  repair  of  sewers 521 

288.  [Consolidated  with  §  258] , 525 

289.  Implied  liability  for  non-repair  of  streets 525 

290.  [Consolidated  with  §  367] 528 

291.  Implied  liability  for  negligence  of  agents 528 

292.  [Consolidated  with  §  291] 533 

293.  [Consolidated  with  §  291] 533 

294.  [Consolidated  with  §  291] 533 

295.  Departments  of  government,  not  agents  of  city 533 

296.  When  departments  are  city's  agents 534 

297.  [Omitted] 535 

298.  Independent  contractors  not  agents 535 

299.  Liability  limited  to  matters  within  jurisdiction 537 

300.  [Consolidated  with  §  299] 539 

301.  Recovery  over  by  corporation  540 

CHAPTER  XIII. 
PUBLIC  OFFICERS. 

Sec.  302.  Immunity  of  political  officers 542 

303.  Immunity  of  judicial  officers 543 

304  to  309.  [Omitted] 546 

310.  Quasi-judicial  officers,  how  far  protected 547 

311.  [Consolidated  with  §  310] 549 

312.  Non-judicial  public  officers  classified 549 

313.  Negligent  performance  of  ministerial  duties 549 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXI 

VOL.    I — PAGE. 

Sec.  314.  Liability  for  nonfeasance 551 

315.  [Consolidated  with  §  313] 552 

316.  [Consolidated  with  §  314] 552 

317.  Presumption  in  favor  of  officer 552 

318.  [Consolidated  with  §  313] 553 

319.  Liability  for  negligence  of  subordinates 553 

320.  [Omitted] 554 

321.  Liability  of  post-niasters  for  subordinates 554 

322.  Liability  of  army  and  navy  officers 555 

323.  Public-school  officers  and  boards 556 

324.  [Consolidated  with  §  340] 557 

325.  Liability  of  government-contractors 557 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

INCORPORATED  PUBLIC  TRUSTEES. 

Sec.  326.  Former  rule  of  liability  of  statutory  trustees 559 

327.  Present  rule  of  liability  in  England 560 

328.  Incorporated  administrative  boards 562 

329.  Voluntary  corporations  performing  public  functions 563 

330.  Trustees  not  liable  when  agents  only 564 

331.  Trustees  of  public  charities 565 


PART  IV. 

PUBLIC  WAYS. 


Chapter  XV.  Highways. 

XVI.  Turnpike  Roads. 

XVII.  Bridges. 

XVIII.  Canals. 

XIX.  Construction  and  Maintenance  of  Railroads. 

XX.  Railroad  Injuries  to  Animals. 

XXI.  Railroad  Injuries  to  persons. 


CHAPTER  XV. 

HIGHWAYS. 

Sec.  332.  Highways  are  public  works  568 

333.  What  are  highways  within  the  rule    570 


Xxii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

VOL.    I — PAGE. 

184.    \V lun  liability  in  respect  to  highway  attaches 572 

334a.  Obligation  dependent  on  jurisdiction  of  structure 576 

885.  Liability  pending  construction  of  way 577 

330.   When  obligation  ceases 578 

337.   No  common-law  duty  to  repair  highways 579 

33*.  Statutory  liability  for  defective  ways 580 

339.  Implied  liability 583 

340.  Liability  of  road-officers 584 

341 .  Contract  obligations  to  repair 586 

342.  [Consolidated  with  §  359] 586 

343.  Obligations  of  abutting  owners  as  to  highway 586 

344.  [Omitted] 590 

345.  Joint  and  several  liability  for  defective  way 590 

346.  Defects  in  way  concurring  with  other  causes 591 

347.  [Omitted] 594 

348.  Duty  to  rebuild  destroyed  highway 594 

349.  [Consolidated  with  §  356] 595 

350.  What  are  statutory  ' '  defects  " 595 

351.  Defects  in  margins  of  way. .    598 

352.  When  whole  width  must  be  passable 600 

353.  Sidewalks  and  street-crossings 601 

354.  Overhanging  roofs,  awnings,  trees   etc 603 

355.  Objects  on  highway  likely  to  frighten  horses 605 

356    Duty  to  guard  and  light  defective  highway 608 

357.  [Consolidated  with  §  359] 612 

358.  Authorized  interference  with  highway 613 

359.  Liability  of  licensee  of  use  of  street 616 

360.  [Consolidated  with  §  359]  620 

361.  Obstructions  incident  to  building  operations 620 

362.  Obstructions  incident  to  traffic 622 

363.  Obstructions  from  natural  causes 624 

364.  [Consolidated  with  §  363] 629 

365.  Individual  liability  for  wrongful  obstruction 630 

366.  [Consolidated  with  §  367] 631 

367.  Ground  of  liability  for  defective  ways  631 

368.  Actual  notice  of  defect 635 

369.  When  notice  will  be  implied 639 

370.  Who  may  maintain  action 644 

371.  Damages  must  be  special    646 

372.  [Omitted] 647 

373.  Notice  of  injury  preliminary  to  action 647 

374.  Defenses    649 

375.  Contributory  negligence 650 

376.  Traveler's  knowledge  of  defect 654 

377.  Care  required  in  traveling  at  night, 659 

378.  Defect  in  plaintiff's  carriage,  harness  or  horses  660 

379.  Unskillful  or  improper  driving 662 

380.  Negligent  stowing  and  excessive  weight  of  load 664 

381.  Sunday  traveling 665 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XX111 

VOL.    T — PAGE. 

SEC.  382.  [Consolidated] 665 

383.  [Consolidated] 665 

384,  Action  over  against  third  person 666 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
TURNPIKE  ROADS. 

VOL.  II — PAGE. 

Sec.  385.  Turnpikes  are  highways 669 

386.  Maintenance  of  road 669 

387.  Statutory  liability  for  non-repair 

388.  Re-appropriation  of  road  by  the  public 671 

389.  Effect  of  change  of  control 672 

CHAPTER  XVII. 
BRIDGES. 

SEC.  390.    ^ndges  distinguished  from  highways 673 

391.  [Consolidated  with  §  390] 674 

392.  Approaches  to  bridges ....  674 

393.  Abutments  and  railings 675 

394.  By  whom  bridge  was  repairable 676 

395.  Bridge  across  navigable  stream 677 

396.  Management  and  protection  of  draw-bridges 678 

397.  Toll-bridges 679 

CHAPTER  XVIII. 

CANALS. 

Sec  398.  State  canals •  • .  680 

399.  Obligation  of  canal  companies  to  navigators 680 

400.  Construction  of  canals 681 

401.  Maintaining  bridges,  locks,  etc ....  681 

402.  Maintaining  embankments,  etc 682 

403.  Repair  of  towing-path  and  fencing  canal 683 

404.  Duties  of  boat-owners 683 

405.  [Omitted] 684 

CHAPTER  XIX. 
CONSTRUCTION  AND  MAINTENANCE  OF  RAILROADS. 

SEC.  406.  Track,  road-bed,  bridges,  etc 685 

407.  What  dangers  must  be  provided  against 686 

408.  Railroads  on  highways 688 

409.  [Omitted] 690 

410.  Accessories  of  railroads 690 

411.  [Omitted] 693 


Xxiv  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

VOL.   II— 1' AUK. 

Sec.  412.  Rights  of  compensated  land-owners 693 

413.  Obligations  of  lessor  or  lessee 694 

414.  Interference  with  highway 696 

415.  Restoration  of  roads  and  bridges 698 

4  Hi.  Road-bridges  over  railroads 699 

417.  Highway  crossing  at  level 701 

417a.  Other  crossings  at  level 704 

CHAPTER  XX. 
RAILROAD  INJURIES  TO  ANIMALS. 

Sec.  418.  English  rule  as  to  keeping  animals  in 707 

419.  Where  English  rule  does  not  prevail 710 

420.  Unequal  operation  of  common-law  rule 713 

421.  Statutory  regulations 714 

422.  Application  and  validity  of  statutes 718 

423.  When  fences  must  be  put  up 719 

424.  Fences  must  be  ' '  sufficient " 720 

425.  Fences  must  be  maintained 722 

426.  Frightening  animals  on  fenced  roads 725 

427.  Duty  to  signal  to  cattle 728 

428.  Care  towards  trespassing  cattle 729 

429.  Checking  or  stopping  train 731 

430.  Checking  speed  for  trespassing  cattle 734 

431.  Statutory  rules  as  to  checking  speed 735 

432.  Presumption  as  to  negligence 738 

433.  When  animal  is  rightfully  on  track 739 

434.  Where  fences  are  not  required 741 

435.  Fences  and  cattle-guards  in  towns    745 

436.  Injury  must  be  owing  to  defect  in  fence 746 

437.  Effect  of  adjoining  owner's  agreement 748 

438.  Employment  of  adjacent  owner  to  build  fence 750 

439.  Adjacent  owner's  option  to  build  fence 750 

440.  Compensated  owner  of  land  cannot  recover 751 

441.  Company's  agreement  to  fence 751 

442.  Grants  of  right  of  way 753 

443.  Who  may  enforce  contract  to  fence 703 

444.  Liability  where  one  company  uses  another's  track 753 

445.  Liability  of  lessees  of  road 754 

446.  Liability  of  other  parties 755 

447.  Application  of  fence  laws  to  personal  injuries 756 

448.  For  what  injuries  company  is  liable 756 

449.  Who  entitled  to  benefit  of  statute 758 

450.  Notice  of  defect,  when  to  be  given 759 

451.  Contribtuory  negligence  on  fenced  roads 760 

451a.  Contributory  negligence  on  unfenced  roads 761 

452.  Owner's  willful  conduct 766 

453.  Rule  in  Illinois,  etc 767 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXV 

VOL.   II — PAGE. 

SEC.  454.  Rule  in  Maryland  and  Georgia J67 

455.  Degree  of  care  in  maintaining  fence 

456.  Company's  action  against  owner v 

CHAPTER  XXI. 
RAILROAD  INJURIES  TO  PERSONS. 

SEC.  457.  Care  required  to  avoid  injury  to  persons 771 

458.  Illustrations  of  want  of  care 773 

459.  Negligence  of  other  persons  or  companies 775 

460.  Rate  of  speed   ™ 

461.  Care  required  of  railroads  on  and  near  highways <80 

462.  [Transferred  to  §  485a] 78*" 

463.  Care  required  at  highway  crossings. . .  o 782 

464.  Care  required  at  other  crossings 788 

464a.  Intersecting  railroads J9^ 

465.  Care  of  stationary  cars  and  engines 793 

466.  Gates,  flagmen  and  watchmen. 794 

466a.  Duty  to  maintain  fences 797 

467.  Neglect  of  statutory  precautions 798 

468.  Omission  to  ring  or  whistle  at  crossings 802 

469.  Presumptions  in  such  cases 805 

470.  Who  entitled  to  benefit  of  statutes 807 

471.  Trains  running  backwards 

472.  Contributory  negligence 8j0 

473.  What  is  not  contributory  negligence. 812 

815 

474.  Fractious  horse 

475.  Crossing  track  in  view  of  train 816 

476.  Duty  to  look  and  listen 

477    When  failure  to  look  and  listen  excused 826 

478.  Obstructions  to  view °^ 

479.  Crossing  when  highway  is  blocked 835 

480.  Traveling  along  the  track 837 

481.  Infirm  persons 

481a.  Children 84* 

481b.  Deceased  persons • °  ' 

482.  Effect  of  contributory  negligence  on  statutory  liabilities. .  848 

483.  Duty  to  avoid  effects  of  contributory  negligence 850 

484.  Duty  to  anticipate  contributory  negligence 885 

485.  Evidence  of  negligence ||60 

485a.  Street  cars • 

485b.  Electric  and  cable  cars 

485c.  Street  cars  ;  contributory  negligence 868 


XXVi  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

PART  V. 

CARRIERS. 


Chapter  XXII.  Carriers  of  Passengers. 
XXIII.  Telegraphs. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 
CARRIERS  OF  PASSENGERS. 

VOL.   II — PAGE. 

SEC.  486.  Obligations  of  carrier  not  merely  in  contract 875 

487.  Who  are  common  carriers  of  passengers 876 

488.  Who  deemed  passengers 877 

489.  Who  not  passengers 880 

490.  When  relation  begins  and  ends  882 

491.  Liability  to  free  passengers     885 

492.  Who  are  not  free  passengers 886 

492a.  Quasi  passengers 887 

493.  Ejection  of  Passengers 889 

494.  Carrier  not  insurer 896 

495.  Degree  of  care  required 897 

496.  Application  of  the  rule  requiring  great  care      901 

497.  Obligation  as  to  vehicle 902 

498.  Exceptions  as  to  certain  vehicles  905 

499.  Carrier's  liability  for  the  condition  of  the  road 906 

500.  Liability  for  acts  of  strangers 907 

501.  When  ordinary  care  only  required 908 

502.  Liability  in  case  of  divided  ownership 910 

503.  Accidents  beyond  carrier's  line 912 

504.  Limitation  of  liability  by  notice  or  contract 913 

505.  Validity  of  restrictions  on  liability 914 

506.  Approaches,  accommodations,  etc 917 

507.  [Consolidated  with  §  490] 920 

508.  Negligence  in  starting  and  stopping 920 

509.  Duty  to  passengers  alighting 924 

510.  Duty  to  assist  passengers  in  getting  on  and  off 927 

511.  Duty  to  maintain  guard  against  egress 930 

512.  Duty  to  preserve  order 930 

513.  Liability  for  servant's  malicious  acts 934 

513a.  Passengers  on  freight  trains 936 

514.  Obligations  of  stage-coach  proprietors 939 

515.  Obligations  of  carriers  by  steam  vessels 941 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXV11 

VOL.   II — PAGE. 

Sec.  516.  Presumption  of  negligence 942 

517.  Presumption  of  negligence,  how  rebutted 946 

518.  Evidence 947 

519.  Contributory  negligence 950 

520.  Getting  on  and  off  moving  vehicle 954 

521.  Getting  on  and  off  in  other  cases 961 

522.  Statutes  as  to  platforms,  etc 966 

523.  Passengers  in  improper  place 967 

524.  Changing  places  on  train 974 

525.  Crossing  tracks 976 

526.  Care  of  passengers'  personal  effects 978 

527.  [Omitted] 982 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 
TELEGRAPHS. 

SEC.  528.  Nature  of  the  business 983 

529.  Its  peculiarities 984 

530.  Risks  to  which  it  is  exposed 984 

531.  Statutory  regulations 985 

532.  Obligations  not  merely  in  contract 987 

533.  [Consolidated  with  §  536] 987 

534.  Telegraph  companies,  common  carriers 987 

535    Reasons  for  considering  them  such 989 

536.  Obligation  to  furnish  telegraphic  facilities 990 

537.  Responsible  only  for  negligence 991 

538.  Unlawful  messages , 991 

539.  Degree  of  care  required 993 

540.  Duty  as  to  receiving  messages 994 

540a.  Duty  as  to  delivery 995 

541.  Messages  must  not  be  altered 997 

542.  Evidence  of  negligence 998 

543.  To  whom  company  is  responsible 1000 

544.  Connecting  lines 1003 

545.  Power  to  make  regulations 1004 

546.  Certain  reasonable  rules  considered 1005 

547.  Certain  unreasonable  rules  considered 1006 

548    Notice  of  rules  necessary 1008 

549.  Customer  must  actually  know  the  rule . .  1009 

550.  Limitation  of  liability  by  mere  notice 1009 

551.  Limitation  of  liability  by  contract 1010 

552.  Proof  of  special  contract 1011 

553.  Validity  of  contracts  exempting  from  liability  generally. .  1012 

554.  Validity  of  other  stipulations 1014 

555.  Effect  of  stipulations 1017 

556.  Evidence  under  special  contract. 1020 

556a.  Contributory  negligence 1021 


xxvm 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


PART  VI. 

PERSONAL   SERVICES. 


Chapter      XXIV.  Attorneys  and  Counsellors. 
XXV.   Bankers  and  Bill  Collectors. 
XXVI.   Clerks  and  Recording  Officers. 
XXVII.   Notaries  Public. 
XXVIII.   Physicians  and  Surgeons. 
XXIX.   Sheriffs  and  Constables. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 
ATTORNEYS  AND  COUNSELLORS  AT  LAW. 

VOL.  II — PAGE. 

SEC.  557.  The  relation  of  attorney  and  client 1023 

558.  Degree  of  skill,  etc. ,  required  of  an  attorney 1025 

559.  General  rule  of  liability 1026 

560.  When  liable  for  gross  negligence  only 1028 

561.  Liability  to  summary  jurisdiction  of  court  1028 

562.  Obligation  not  dependent  upon  compensation  1029 

563.  Retainer  implies  professional  employment  only 1030 

564.  Advice  of  counsel,  how  far  a  protection  to  an  attorney. . .  1031 

565.  Negligence  a  question  for  the  jury 1031 

566.  Burden  of  proof 1032 

567.  Negligence  in  instituting  proceedings 1032 

568.  Obligation  to  proceed  in  the  cause 1034 

569.  Conduct  of  cause 1034 

570.  Obligation  to  take  collateral  proceedings 1036 

571.  [Consolidated  with  §  569]  1037 

572.  Proceedings  after  trial  1037 

573.  Compromising  suit  or  judgment 1038 

574.  Negligence  in  conveyancing  and  searching  titles 1039 

575.  Negligence  in  keeping  and  investing  money 104 1 

576.  Liability  for  disclosing  privileged  communication 1041 

577.  Liability  for  partners  or  agents 1042 

CHAPTER  XXV. 
BANKERS  AND  BILL  COLLECTORS. 

SEC.  578.  Who  are  bankers 1043 

579.  Obligation  to  use  care 1043 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXIX 

VOL.  II — PAGE. 

Sec.  580.  Duty  to  present  bill  for  payment  or  acceptance 1044 

580a.  Duty  to  remit  proceeds  of  collection 1046 

581.  Duty  to  give  notice  of  dishonor  of  bill 1047 

582.  Liability  for  negligence  of  sub-agents.  1049 

583.  Exceptions  to  the  rule 1052 

584.  Personal  liability  of  sub-agents 1054 

585.  Collection  by  notary 1054 

586.  Who  may  sue  for  banker's  negligence 1056 

587.  Banker  not  bound  to  sue  upon  paper 1057 

587a.  Burden  of  proof 1057 

588.  Special  deposits 1059 

589.  Liability  of  directors 1061 

CHAPTER   XXVI. 
CLERKS  AND  OTHER  RECORDING  OFFICERS. 

SEC.  590.  General  rule  of  liability 1062 

591.  Illustrations  of  the  rule 1062 

592.  False  certificates,  and  mistakes  in  recording  1064 

593.  Liability  of  towns  for  negligence  of  their  clerks 1065 

CHAPTER    XXVII. 
NOTARIES  PUBLIC. 

SEC.  594.  General  rule  of  liability  for  negligence 1066 

595.  [Consolidated  with  §  594] 1067 

596.  [Consolidated  with  §  585]    1067 

597.  Standard  of  care  in  presenting  and  protesting  bills 1667 

598.  Illustrations  of  liability 1068 

599.  Giving  notice  of  dishonor  of  bills 1069 

600.  Negligence  must  be  direct  cause  of  indorser's  discharge. . .  1069 

601 .  Defenses  by  notary 1070 

602.  Liability  for  defective  acknowledgments 1070 

CHAPTER   XXVIII. 
PHYSICIANS  AND  SURGEONS. 

Sec.  603.  Right  to  recover  for  services 1072 

604.  Obligation  of  unpaid  physician 1073 

605.  Obligation  of  paid  physician 1073 

606.  Degree  of  skill  required 1074 

607.  He  is  bound  to  have  skill 1075 

608.  Standard  of  skill  not  absolute 1076 

609.  Testsofskill 1077 

610.  Character  of  disease  may  determine  degree  of  skill 1078 

611.  And  so  may  the  habits  and  tendencies  of  the  patient 1079 


XXX  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

VOL.  II — PAGB. 

Sec.  612.  Physicians  not  liable  for  errors  of  judgment  1079 

613.  Duty  of  continuing  in  attendance 1080 

614.  Evidence  of  negligence  and  burden  of  proof 1081 

615.  Contributory  fault 1083 

CHAPTER    XXIX. 
SHERIFFS  AND  CONSTABLES. 

SEC.  616.  Common-law  liability 1084 

617.  Sheriff  must  owe  a  duty  to  plaintiff 1084 

618.  Liability  for  misconduct  of  deputy 1085 

619.  Diligence  in  executing  process 1086 

620.  Inadequacy  of  levy 1088 

621.  Safe-keeping  of  property 1089 

622.  Duty  as  to  sale  of  property 1089 

623.  Liability  for  not  returning  writ ;  and  false  return 1090 

624.  Liability  for  insufficient  sureties 1091 

625.  Liability  for  escape 1092 


PART  VII. 

MANAGEMENT  OF  PROPERTY. 


Chapter  XXX.  Care  of  Animals. 

XXXI.   Driving  and  Riding. 
XXXII.    Fences. 

XXXIII.  Fire. 

XXXIV.  Explosives,    Machinery    and    Miscellaneous 

Cases. 
XXXV.  Gas  and  Electrical  Works. 
XXXVI.   Land  and  Structures. 
XXXVII.   Water  and  Water-courses. 


CHAPTER  XXX. 
CAEE  OF  ANIMALS. 

Sec.  626.  Owner's  liability  for  injuries  committed  by  animals 1094 

627.  Owner's  liability  for  animal's  trespass 1096 

628.  Owner's  notice  of  disposition  of  animal 1097 

629.  Presumption  of  notice  of  disposition 1099 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXXI 

VOL.  II — PAGE. 

Sec.  630.  What  deemed  sufficient  notice 1 101 

631.  What  kind  of  notice  necessary 1 102 

632.  Sufficient  evidence  of  notice 1103 

^633.  Keeping  infectiously  diseased  animals 1106 

*^  634.  Animals  running  at  large 1108 

635.  Who  will  be  deemed  owner  of  animal .  1110 

636.  Ownership  of  animal  ;  how  proved 1112 

v^  637.  Imputed  knowledge  of  animal's  habits 1113 

638.  Separate  owners,  when  jointly  liable 1114 

^  639.  Contributory  negligence 1115 

640.  Driving  trespassing  animals  off  land 1117 

641 .  Negligence  in  impounding  cattle 1119 

642.  [Omitted] 1119 

643.  Injuries  to  a  dog  fighting  another 1119 

CHAPTER  XXXI. 

DRIVING  AND  RIDING. 

SEC.  644.  Management  of  horses  and  vehicles 1120 

t-'  645.  Examples  of  negligence 1121 

646.  Rate  of  speed 1123 

647.  Injuries  from  driving  vicious  or  runaway  horses 1125 

648.  [Consolidated  with  §  647] 1126 

649.  Rule  of  the  road 1126 

650.  [Consolidated  with  §  649] 1127 

-  651.  Persons  on  wrong  side  assume  risk 1127 

652.  Application  of  rule  of  the  road 1 128 

653.  Cycling 1129 

^654.  Contributory  negligence 1131 

CHAPTER  XXXII. 
FENCES. 

SEC.  655.  English  common-law  rule  as  to  fences 1137 

656.  Peculiar  American  common-law  rule 1138 

657.  Statutory  regulations 1138 

658.  Effect  of  contract  to  maintain  fences 1139 

659.  Who  entitled  to  protection  of  animals  by  fence 1140 

660.  Who  entitled  to  protection  against  animals  by  fence 1141 

661.  Who  are  liable  for  defects  of  fence 1141 

662.  Injuries  to  animals  from  insufficient  fence 1142 

663.  Injuries  by  animals  from  insufficient  fence 1142 

664.  Division  fences 1143 

CHAPTER  XXXIII. 

FIRE. 

SEC.  665.   Fire  accidentally  kindled  on  one's  own  land 1145 

666.  Liability  for  spread  of  fire 1147 


XXxii  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


VOL.    II  —  PAGE. 


Sec.  667.  Proximate  cause  of  injury .  — 1 152 

668.  Fire  purposely  kindled 1153 

6G9.  Fire  kindled  to  clear  land 1155 

670.  Firing  other  land 1156 

671.  Statutory  liability 1157 

672.  Fire  communicated  from  locomotives 1158 

673.  Duty  to  use  approved  appliances 1160 

674.  Other  neglect  than  want  of  approved  appliances 1162 

675.  Evidence  of  origin  of  fire 1164 

676.  Burden  of  proof 1167 

677.  [Omitted] 11"2 

678.  Combustibles  on  right  of  way 1172 

679.  Contributory  negligence  1175 

680.  Negligent  use  of  adjacent  land 1178 

681.  [Consolidated  with  §  680] 1181 

682.  [Consolidated  with  §  679] 1181 

CHAPTER  XXXIV. 
EXPLOSIVES,  MACHINERY,  AND  MISCELLANEOUS  CASES. 

Sec.  683.  Management  of  machinery 1182 

684.  Who  may  complain  of  negligent  management 1184 

685.  Statutory  duty  to  fence  machinery 1184 

686.  Negligent  use  of  fire-arms,  etc 1184 

687.  [Consolidated  with  §  686] 1187 

688.  Negligent  use  of  fire- works,  etc 1187 

688a.  Blasting 1188 

689.  Storing  of  dangerous  material H90 

690.  Vendors  and  bailors  of  dangerous  material 1191 

691    Pharmacists,  opticians,  etc 1193 

CHAPTER   XXXV. 

GAS  AND  ELECTRICAL  WORKS. 

Sec.  692.  Duty  in  construction  and  manufacture 1194 

693.  Duty  of  inspection  and  repair 1195 

694.  [Consolidated  with  §  693] 1198 

895.  Contributory  act  of  stranger 1198 

696.  Defense  of  contributory  negligence 1198 

697.  Negligence  of  company's  servants 1199 

698.  Electrical  works 1199 

CHAPTER  XXXVI. 

LAND  AND  STRUCTURES. 

SEC.  699.  Obligation  of  owner  of  land 1202 

700.  Liberty  in  use  of  premises 1203 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXXU1 

VOL.  II — PAGE. 

SEC.  701.  Interference  with  lateral  support 1804 

701a.  Owner's  absolute  liability 1207 

702.  Dangerous  structures 1209 

L^     702a.  Violation  of  building  laws  :  fire  escapes  .     1212 

703.  Liability  to  travelers  on  adjoining  highway 1214 

704.  Liability  to  business  visitors 1217 

705.  Liability  to  person  entering  under  bare  license 1220 

706.  Owner's  liability  to  his  invited  guest 1224 

707.  Unusual  or  improper  use  of  land  or  buildings 1226 

708.  Landlord's  liability  for  defects  arising  after  lease 1226 

709.  Liability  to  tenant  for  defects  at  date  of  lease 1229 

709a.  Liability  to  strangers  for  defects  at  date  of  lease 1231 

710.  Liability  of  partial  lessor 1232 

711.  [Consolidated  with  §  709] 1234 

712.  Tenant,  when  not  liable 1234 

713.  Tenant,  when  liable 1235 

714.  [Consolidated  with  §343] 1236 

715.  [Consolidated  with  §  703] 1236 

716.  Miner's  absolute  liability 1236 

717.  Miner's  liability  for  negligence 1237 

718.  Liability  for  condition  of  unfinished  buildings 1238 

719.  Trap-doors,  hoist  ways,  hatchways,  etc 1238 

719a.  Passenger  elevators. 1240 

720.  Traps  for  trespassers 1242 

721.  Dripping  water  and  snow 1243 

722.  [Consolidated  with  §709] 1244 

723.  Occupants  liability  for  leakage 1244 

724.  Liability  where  landlord  and  tenant  are  both  in  fault 1245 

725.  Wharfingers,  etc 1246 

726.  Inspection  of  wharves 1248 

727.  [Omitted] ■ 1249 


CHAPTER  XXXVII. 

WATER  AND  WATER  COURSES. 

SEC.  728.  Artificial  collections  of  water 1250 

729.  Rights  of  riparian  owners 1252 

730.  Erection  of  dams 1255 

731.  Overflowing  the  banks  of  streams 1256 

732.  Care  in  construction  and  maintenance  of  dams 1257 

733.  Diversion  of  water-course 1258 

734.  Fouling  of  streams  and  wells 1260 

735.  Drainage  of  surface  water 1262 

736.  Interference  with  water 1264 

737.  Obstruction  of  navigation 1266 

738.  Obligation  to  remove  wrecks 1267 

[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  I  —  c] 


XX.\iv  TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 

PART  VIII. 

CHAPTER  XXXVIII, 
MEASURE  OF  DAMAGES. 

I.  Damages  Generally. 

VOL.   II — PAGE. 

SEC.  739.  General  rule  of  damages 1268 

740.  Uncertainty  ;  how  resolved 1270 

741.  Damages  which  might  be  avoided 1271 

742.  Disease  resulting  from  injury 1272 

743.  Future  damage 1275 

744.  Loss  of  profits 1276 

745.  Speculative  or  illegal  profits  not  allowed 1278 

746.  Recovery  not  to  exceed  value  of  property 1279 

747.  Interest  as  damages 1279 

748.  Exemplary  damages 1280 

749.  Exemplary  damages  against  masters 1283 

749a.  Damages  against  municipal  corporations 1285 

II.  Damage  to  Property. 

750.  Damage  to  real  property 1286 

751.  Damage  to  personal  property 1290 

752.  Damage  to  animals  1291 

753.  Damages  against  attorneys 1292 

753a.  Telegraph  damages 1293 

754.  Telegraph  damages  limited  by  want  of  notice 1295 

755.  Telegraph  damages  in  particular  cases 1297 

756.  Social  telegrams 1301 

757.  Statutory  penalties 1303 

III.  Damage  to  the  Person. 

758.  Damages  for  personal  injuries 1304 

759.  Expenses  of  cure 1 306 

760.  Loss  of  time 1308 

761.  Bodily  and  mental  suffering 1311 

761  a.  Ejection  of  passengers 1313 

762.  Circumstances  of  parties  1315 

763.  Damages  in  favor  of  husband,  master,  etc 1316 

764.  [Consolidated  with  §  763] 1317 

765.  Insurance,  etc.,  not  deducted  from  damages 1318 

IV.  Damages  for  Death. 

766.  Damages  in  case  of  death,  general  rule 1319 

767.  Peculiar  statutes 1321 

767a.   Actions  on  surviving  rights 1323 

768.  For  whose  benefit  recovery  allowed 1324 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XXXV 

VOL.   II — PAGE. 

Sec.  769.  What  is  pecuniary  damage 1324 

770.  Expenses  incurred  by  death 1327 

771.  Loss  of  parent 1328 

772.  Loss  of  child 1329 

773.  Loss  of  husband  or  wife 1330 

774.  Loss  of  collateral  relatives 1332 

775.  Damages  for  death,  how  ascertained 1333 

776.  Statutory  limitations  of  amount 1336 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


[References  are  to  sections.] 


Aaron  v.  Broiles,  262 

Abbett  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54,  56 

v.  Johnson  county,  256,  257. 
Abbitt  v.  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207a, 

471 
Abbot  v.  Gore,  676,  678 

v.  McCadden,  773 
Abbott  v.  Jackson,  713 

v.  Johnstown,  etc.  R.  Co.,  459 

v.  Kalbus,  426 

v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 735 

v.  Kerswell.  619 

v.  Kimball.  621 

v.  Macfie,  34 

v.  Smith,  582 

v.  Wolcott,  379 
Abel  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co.,  202, 

203 
Abeles  v.  Bransfield,  115 

v.  Western  IT.  Tel.  Co. ,  754 
Abend  v    Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co., 

2076,  238,  241 
Abendroth  v.  Greenwich,  254. 
Abernethey  v.  Van  Buren,  379 
Abilene  v.   Cowperthwait,  353,  356, 

358 
Abraham  v.  Reynolds,  178,  225,  234, 

706 
Abrahams  v.  California  Powder  Co., 
117 

v.  Deakin,  145 
Achtenhagan  v.  Watertown,  376 
Acker   v.    Alexandria,   etc.    R.   Co., 
120a 

v.  Anderson,  S76 

v.  New  Castle,  274 
Acme  Coal  Min.  Co.  v.  Mclver,  207, 

209a 
Adams  v.  Adams,  641 

v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 

v.  Carlisle,  8,  107 

v.  Chicopee,  363 

v.  Cost,  148 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  132 

v.  Fletcher,  703 

v.  Hall,  G28,  638 


Adams  v.  Hannibal,  etc  R.  Co.,  518 

v.  Hemenway,  686 

v.  Iron  Cliffs  Co.,  239 

v.  Lancashire,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 

v.  Natick,  356 

v.  New  Jersey  Steamb.  R.  Co., 
5:26 

v.  Salina,  748 

v.  Spangler,  620 

v.  Young,  30,  666 
Adasken  v.  Gilbert,  2416 
Adkins  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  216 
Adolph  v.  Central  Park,  etc.  R.  Co., 

480,  485a 
Adsit  v.  Brady,  118,  313,  338 
Aerkfetz  v.  Humphreys,  203,  207 
<3Stna  Insurance  Co.  v.  Alton  City 

Bank,  582,  585 
Agnew  v.  Corunna,  355 
Agricultural,  etc.  Assn.  v.  State,  772 
Agricultural    Bank  v.    Commercial 

Bank,  585 
Ahern  v.  Kings  countv,  256 

v.  Oregon  Tel  Co.,  359,  698 

v.    Steele,    119,   120,   343,    708, 
709a,  725 
Aiken  v.  Telegraph  Co..  543,  553 

v.   Western  U.  Tel.   Co.,  543, 
555 
Ainley  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  764 
Aireton  v.  Davis,  622 
Aitcheson  v.  Madock,  569 
Aitken,  Matter  of .  561 
Akerly  Lumber  Co.  v.  Rauen,  194 

v.  White,  709 
Akers  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410, 
484 

v.  Overbeck,  117,  690 
Akersloot  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co. ,  508 
Akridge  v.  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.,  741 
Alabama,  etc.  R.   Co.  v.  Anderson, 
477 

v.  Arnold,  748 

v.  Blivens,  432 

v.  Carroll,  129,  131 

v.  Chapman.  421,  480 


XXXY111 


TABLE    OF    CASKS. 


Alabama,  etc.  R.Co.  v.  Davis.  G6,  520 
v.  Frazier,  493,  518,  749 
v.  Fulghum,  131 
v.  1  [arris,  150 
v.  Hawk.  60a,  518,  523 
t.  Hill.  742 
t.  Joins.  429 
v.  McAlpin,  457 
v.McAlpine,  47,  419,  429,430, 

431,  451a 
v.  Moody,  11,  428 
v.  Phillips.  460 
v.  Powers,  429 
v.  Roach,  2076 
v.  Sellers,  5C9,  748,  749 
v.  Summers.  461 
v.  Waller.  189 
G.  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Hill,  518 
v.  Linn,  464 
v.  Richie.  209a 

Midland  R.  Co.   v.  McDonald, 
2076 
Alamango  v.    Albany  county,    250, 

256,  260 
Alaska,  The,  124,  132 

Mining  Co.  v.  Whelan,  64 
Albany  v.  Cunliff.  8  334a 

v.  Watervliet,  354 
Albee  v.  Flovd  Co.,  392,  393 
Albers  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  554 
Albert  v.  Albany  R.  Co.,  71 

v.  BleeckerSt.  R.  Co.,  634,  645, 

654.  751 
v.  Northern,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58,  675, 

676 
v.  State,  133.  726 
v.  Sweet.  464a 
Alberts  v.  Vernon,  369 
Albina  Ferry  Co.  v.  The  Imperial,  737 
Albion  v.  Hetrick,  66,  114,  376 

Lumber  Co.   v.  De  Nobra,  486 
Albrecht  v.    Milwaukee,  etc.  R.   Co. 
241c 
v.  Queens  Countv,  256 
Albritton  v.  Huntsville,  289,  369 
Albro  v.  Agawam  Co.,  226 

v.  Jaquith,  245 
Alcorn  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207b 
v.  Philadelphia,  291 
v.  Sadler,  729 
Alden  v.  Minneapolis,  274 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  45,  497 
Aldrich  v.  Concord,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60c 
v.  Gorham,  346 
v.  Monroe.  647 
v.  Pelham.  272 
v.  Tripp.  286 
Aldridge  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co. ,  16 
v.   Midland  Furnace  Co.,  60a, 
189 
Alexander  v.  Big  Rapids,  356 
v.  Card,  303 
v.  Central  Lumber  Co.,  216 


Alexander  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 424 
v.  Humber,  18,  743,  761 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2076, 

219a 
v.  Macauley,  619 
v.  Milwaukee,  274.  283 
v.  Mount  Sterling.  53. 
v.  New  Castle,  346 
v.  Oshkosh,  367 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  131 
v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co..  476 
v.  Vicksburg,  265 
v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  753a, 
755 
Alexandria,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  459 

v.  Herndon,  506,  510 
Alford  v.  Metcalf,  186a 
Alger  v.  Boston,  291 

v.  Lowell,  93,  114,  122,  346 
v.  Mississippi,  etc.  R.  Co.,  419 
Allan   v.   State   Steamship   Co.,    57, 

605,  691 
Allard  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  676 
Allaway  v.  Wagstaff,  701,  716 
Allegheny  City  v.  Campbell,  285 
Allegany  county  v.  Broadwater,  377 
Allegheny  county  v.  Gibson,  261 
Allen  v.    Boston,    etc.   R.    Co.,    287, 
295,  449 
v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  359 
v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  406, 

410 
v.  Chippewa  Falls,  271,  274,  363 
v.  Deming,  104 
v.  Goodwin,  232 
v.  Hancock,  378 
v.  Hayward,  14.  165,  168,  173, 

278 
v.  Johnston,  704 
v.  Logan  City,  209a 
v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co. ,  476 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  764 
v.  Merchants'  Bank,  581,  582, 

585.  599 
v.  New  Gas  Co..  222 
v.  Smith  Iron  Co.,  195 
v.  Southwestern  R.  Co.,  145 
v.  State.  313 
v.  Suydam,  572a 
v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  195 
v.  Willard,  8,  57,  111,  165,  166, 

169 
v.  Williamsburgh  Sav.  Bank, 

588 
County  v.  Creviston,  369,  380 
Allenderv.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  31, 

506.  508,  510 
Allentown  v.  Kramer,  274 
Allerton,  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90, 
476 
etc.  Co.  v.  Egan,  184,  208 
Allis  v.  Columbian  University,  704 
Allison  v.  Richmond,  299 


References}         TABLE     OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections.         XXXIX 


Allison  v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  17G, 

690 
Allyn  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Alperin  v.  Earle,  707,  710 
Alpern  v.  Churchill,  680 
Altnow  v.  Sibley,  256 
Alton  v.  Gilmanton,  569 

v.  Hope,  262 

v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  116,  486 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh.  419 

v.  Deitz,  408 
Altorf  v.  Wolfe,  157,  765 
Altvater  v.  Baltimore,  291,  295 
American  Ex.  Co.  v.  Haire.  598 

Express  Co.  v.  Sands,  505 

Steamboat  Co.  v.  Chase,  132 

Tel.  Co.  v.  Walker,  588 

U.  Tel  Co.  v.  Daugherty,  553 

Waterworks  Co.  v.  Dougherty, 
93,  761 
Americus  v.  Chapman,  356 

R.  Co.  v.  Luckie,  103 
Amerine  v.  Porteus,  719a. 
Ames  v.  Broadway,  etc.  R.  Co.  74, 

v.  Gilman,  557 

v.  Jordan, 162 
Amiable  Nancy,  The,  744 
Amick  v.  O'Hara,  640 
Ammerman  v.  Wyoming  Canal  Co. , 

389 
Amsbey  v.  Hinds,  336 
Amsterdam    Knitting  Co.,  v.   Dean, 

729 
Amy  v.  Supervisors,  313 
Anchor  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dobbs  Ferry, 

274 
Andersen  v.  N.  Y.  &  Cuba  S.  S.  Co., 

719 
Anderson    v.    Akeley   Lumber  Co., 
211a 

v.  Alton  Nat.  Bank,  582 

v.  Bath,  355,  378 

v.  Bennett,  232,  233 

v.  Brownlee,  243 

v.  Buckton,  627,  633 

v.  Cape  Fear  Steamb.  Co.,  672 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60c,  108, 
425,  451a,  480,  766,  775 

v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  508 

v.  Dickie,  120 

v.  Duckworth,  215 

v.  East,  262,  354,  702 

v.  Hervey,  113 

v.  Johett.  591 

v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  195 

v.  Milliken,  310 

v.  Minneapolis  St.  R.  Co.,  485 

v.  Minnesota  etc.  R.  Co.,  197 

v.  Morrison,  114,  218 

v.  Northern  Mill  Co  .  1856 

v.  Northern  Pac.  Lumber  Co., 
215 

v.  Pyper,  497 


Anderson  v.  Roberts,  303 

v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  518 

v.  Scholey,  495,  514,  516 

v.  Scully"  404 

v.  Standard  Gas  Co.,  693 

v.  Steamboat  Co.,  256 

v.  Thunder  Bay  Boom  Co.,  730, 

731 
v.  Wasatch,    etc.   R.  Co.,   58, 

676 
v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  552 
v.  Wilmington,  263,  287,  289 
Andre  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  434 
Andreson  v.   Ogden  Union  R.   Co., 

203 
Andrews  v.  Boedecker,  141,  164 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  137 
v.  Green.  155 
v.  Hartford,  etc.  R.  Co.,   135, 

139 
v.  Hawley,  562 

v.  Mason  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  426 
Andrist  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  524 
Angell  v.  Hill,  655 

v.  Simmons,  641 
Anglin  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 
Angus  v.  Dalton,  701 
v.  Lee,  718 
v.  Radin,  627 
Anheuser-Busch   Brewing  Ass'n   v. 

Peterson,  734 
Anna  Maria,  The,  744 
Annacker  v.  Chicago,    etc.  R.   Co., 

466,  485 
Annapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.   v.   Baldwin, 
418,  456 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gantt,  58,   666, 
675,  676 
Anne  Arundel  County  v.   Duckett, 
257,  262,  281 
v.  Duval,  291.  298,  368 
Annett  v.  Foster.  166 
Anniston  Pipe  Works  v.  Dickey,  195 
Anon.,  731 

Anselment  v.  Daniell,  644 
Ansteth  v.  Buffalo  R.  Co.,  489 
Anthony  v.  Adams,  299 
v.  Glens  Falls,  363 
v.  Lapharn,  729 
v.  Leeret,  195 
Antisdel  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425, 

455 
Appel    v.    Buffalo,    etc.  R.  Co., 

209a,  216 
Apple  v.  Marion  county,  876 
Applebee  v.  Percy,  630 
Appleby  v.  Erie  Bank,  588 
Appleton   v.  Water  Commissioners, 

291 
Arcade  File  Works  v.  Juteau,  203 
Archer  v.  Ft.  Wayne,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  458,  506 


xl 


•.   ]        TABLE    OF    CASES.       [are  to  sections. 


Antic  Firo  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin,  61,  65 
Arden  v.  Tucker,  577 
Arent  v.  Squire,  57 

A  rev  v.  Newton,  379 
Argus  v.  Sturgis,  :5Tt! 
Arizona  Lumber  Co.  v.  MoonejT,  195 
Arkadelphia  Lumber  Co.  v.  Bethea, 
185 

v.  Windham,  289 
Arkansas  Tel   Co.  v.  Ratteree,  698 
Arkerson  v.  Dennison,  195,  197 
Armbruster  v.  Auburn  Gas  Co.,  693 
Armour  v.  Czischki,  772 

v.  Hahn,  184,  239,  241 
Armstrong  v.  Ackley,  369 

v.  Beadle,  131 

v.  Cooley,  155 

v.  Forg,  219 

v.  Medburv,  702.  704 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  490 

v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  464. 

v.  Oregon,   etc.   R.  Co.,   2336, 
238 

v.  Toler,  104 

county  v.  Clarion  county,  301 
Armsworth  v.  Southwestern  R.  Co., 

775 
Arn  v.  Kansas  City,  274 
Arnold  v.  Blaker,  343 

v.    Delaware,    etc.    Canal  Co., 
185,  195 

v.  Foot,  729 

v.  Henry  county,  256 

v.  Hoi  brook,  343 

v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61 

v.  Norton,  632 

v.  Phila.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 

v.  Robertson,  574,  753 

v.  San  Jose,  258,  289 
Arnot  v.  Bingham,  580a 
Arrowsmith  v.  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

120a,  413,  492 
Artbur  v.  (. oboes,  262 
Arthurs  v.  Chatfleld,  655 
Artusy  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  481 
Art/,  v.  Chicago,  etc  R.  Co.,  66,  93, 

102,  4o3,  476 
Aryman  v.  Marshalltown,  369 
Ash  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  133 
Ashby  v.  White,  310 
Ashford  v.  Thornton,  124 
Ashley  v.  Port  Huron,  274,  287 

v.  Root,  22 
Ashworth  v.  Stanwix,  187 
Askew  v.  Hall,  254 
Aspegren  v.  Kotas.  640 
Assop  v.  Yates,  209a 
Aston  v.  Heaven,  494,  694 

v.  Newton,  334,  351 

v.  Nolan,  701 
Atchison  v.  Challiss,  262,  274 

v.  Dullam,  16,  686 


Atchison  v.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co., 667 

v.  King,  289,  367 

v.  Twine,  2(51 
Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ayers,  57 

v.  Bailey,  73 

v.  Bales,  58,  666 

v.  Baty,  422 

v.  Bell,  427 

v.  Betts,  419 

v.  Brassfield,  58.  241c 

v.  Brown,   493 

v.  Campbell,  410 

v.  Cash,  436 

v.  Chance,  758,  761 

v.  Cochran,  158 

v.  Davis,  430 

v.  Dickerson,  761a 

v.  Elder,  436 

v.  Farrow,  180 

v.  Feehan,  54 

v.  Frier,  508 

v.  Gabbert,  453 

v.  Gants,  493 

v.  Gibson,  676 

v.  Hague,  467,  473,  485 

v.  Henry,  102, 145, 417,  513,  749 

v.  Hill,  478 

v.  Hughes,  519,  520,  775 

v.  Huitt,  115,  674,  750 

v.  Johns,  458 

v.  Johnson,  489,  523 

v.  Koehler,  241c 

v.  Lannigan,  185a 

v.  Led  better,  195 

v.  Lindley,  513a 

v.  Loree,  426 

v.  Love,  198 

v.  McClurg,  463 

v.  McGinnis,  761 

v.  McKee,  60c,  185b,  197,  203a 
2  5,  233a,  238 

v.  Midgett.  215,  761 

v.  Miller,  359 

v.  Moore,  204,  205,  233 

v.  Morgan,  102 

v.  Myers,  196,  233a 

v.  Napole,  133,  206 

v.  Parsons,  417a 

v.  Penfold,  196 

v.  Plaskett,  479 

v.  Plunkitt,  94 

v.  Priest,  481 

v.  Reesman,  2076,  466a. 

v.  Riggs,  453 

v.  Roach,  503 

v.  Rowan,  198,  199 

v.  Sadler,  215 

v.  Schroeder,  211a 

v.  Seeley,  238 

v.  Shaft,  421,  453 

v.  Shean,  477 

v.  Smith,  74 

v.  Stanford,  28,  675 


References']  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


xli 


Atchison  v.  Todd,  481a 

v.  Townsend,  478,  482 

v.  Wagner,  189 

x.  Walz,  467 

v.  Weber,  137 

v.  Willey,  739 

v.  Wilson,  223,  771,  773     . 

v.  Winston,  189 

v.  Zeilcr,  189 
Athens  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Rucker,  731 
Atkinson  v.  Abraham,  114,  719 

v.  Goodrich  Tr.  Co.,  30,  31,666 

v.  Illinois  Milk  Co.,  644. 

v.  Mott,  655 

v.  Newcastle  Water  Co. ,  9 

v.  Oelsner,  645 
Atlanta  v.  Buchanan,  368,  375 

v.  Champe,  369 

v.  Martin,  363 

v.  Milam,  353 

v.  Perdue,  353,  367 

v.  Wilson,  346,  356 
Atlanta  Cotton  Co.  v.  Speer,  190,  230 
Atlanta  Oil  Mills  v.  Coffey,  706,  751 
Atlanta  R.  Co.  v.  Keeny,  761a 
Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ayers,  65,  103 

v.  Ayres,  62 

v.  Dickerson,  508,  520 

v.  Gravitt,  71,  470 

v.  Hudson,  424 

v.  Johnson,  743 

v.  Kimberly,  168 

v.  Leach,  85 

v.  Smith,  111.  219 

v.  Venable.  138 

v.  Walker,  60a,  104 

v.  Wood,  703,  761 

v.  Wyly,  103 
Atlantic  Factory  Co.  v.  Speer,  705 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Burt,  430 

v.  Dunn,  749 

v.  Griffen.  419,  431 
Atlas  Engine  Works  v.  Randall,  73, 

203,  218 
Attaway  v.  Cartersville,  291 
Attorney-General  v.  Bradford  Nav. 
Co.,  401 

v.  Brown,  249 

v.  Royal  College  of  Physicians, 
603 
Atwater  v.  Canandaigua,  262,  274 
Atwell  v.  Keluff,  313 
Atwood  v.  Atwater,  303 

v.  Bangor,  274 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  144 
Atz  v.  Newark  Lime  Co.,  195 
Au  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 

769 
Auchmuty   v.    Ham,   123,  628,   635, 

626,  638 
Aufdenberg  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

519,  520 
Augerstein  v.  Jones,  195 


Augusta,  The,  172 

v.  Cone,  358 

v.  Hafers,  369 

v.  Hudson,  108,  285,  346 

v.  Lombard,  728 
Augusta  Factory  v.  Barnes,  219,  233 

v.  Davis,  772 

v.  Hill,  203 
Augusta  R.  Co.  v.  Andrews,  97 

v.  Glover,  518 

etc.    R.    Co.    v.    Killian,    54, 
225 

v.  McElmurry,  103,  468 

v.  Randall,  748,  756 

v.  Renz,  87,  523 
Aurandt  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56 
Aurora  v.  Bitner,  334a 

v.  Brown,  606 

v.  Colshire,  334 

v.  Dale,  376 

v.  Hillman,  93,  367,  368,  369 

v.  Pulfer,  262,  375 

v.  Reed,  274 

v.  Seidelman,  356 

R.  Co.  v.  Grimes,  107 
Austin  v.  Appling,  217 

v.  Carter,  340 

v.    Chicago,   etc.    R.  Co.,  678, 
679,  741 

v.  Colegate,  367 

v.  Great  Western,  etc.  R.  Co., 
61,  491 

v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  478 

v.  New  Jersey  Steamboat  Co., 
18,  94,  99,  100 

v.  Ritz,  289,  334,  351,  368,  375, 
745 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Beatty,  47,  89 

v.  Groethe,  241c 

v.  Saunders,  428 
Avegno  v.  Hart,  652 
Averitt  v.  Murrell,  669,  671 
Avery  v.  Bowden,  56 

v.  Maxwell,  655 

v.  People,  640 

v.  Syracuse,  343,  369 
Avey  v.  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a 
A  villa  v.  Nash,  202 
Aycock  v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108, 
678 

v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99, 
427,  429 
Aycrigg  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co.,  147, 

148 
Ayer  v.  Starke}',  671 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  542 
Ayers  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2336 

v.  Russell,  3<»3,  612 
Ayles  v.  Southeastern  R.  Co.,  517 
Aylesworth  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

407,  419,  425,  451a 
Ayrault  v.  Chamberlin,  577 

v.  Pacific  Bank,  582,  585 


xlii 


References]         TABLE     OP'    CASES.        {are  to  sections. 


A vi«-s  v.  Hammondsport,  363 
v.  Western  R.  Co.,  210 
Aznoe  v.  ( lonway,  054 

Babbage  v.  Powers  343.  703,  708 
Babbitt  v.  Bumpus.  5.V.) 
Babcock  v.  FitchburgR.  Co.,  50,673. 
675.  076 
v.  Gifford.  340 
v.  Guilford.  373 
v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  194a,  223, 
383,  2416 
Baber  v.  Broadwav,  etc.  R.  Co.,  151 
Babson  v.  Rockport,  86.  346,  370,  379 
Bachelder  v.  Heagan,  57 
Bacon  v.  Boston,  258,  262,  353,  358 

v.  Benchley,  310 
Baddeley  v.  Granville,  62 
Bagley  v.  Consolidated  Gas  Co. ,  185 
Bagnall  v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  728, 

736 
Bahr  v.  Lombard,  60,  223 
Baikie  v.  Chandless,  559 
Bailie  v.  Augusta  Savings  Bank,  582 
Bailey  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  750 
v.  Hartford,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  426 
v.  Lawrence  county,  256 
v.  New  York,  285,  286,  291,  295, 

732 
v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53,  194a, 

204,  223,  233 
v.  Wiggins,  303 
v.  Merrell.  690 
Baird  v.  Daly,  60c,  244 

v.  Pettit,  234.  236,  237 
v.  Ratcliff,  557 
v.  Sbipman,  243 
v.  Williamson,  717,  736 
Bajus  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 
Baker  v.  Allegheney,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197 
v.  Bolton,  124 
v.  Byrne,  719 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  190,  222, 

484 
v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  483 
v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73,  73a 
v.  Greenfield,  337 
v.  Kansas    City,   etc.    R.  Co., 

458 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  23,  508, 

519,  520 
v.  Maryland  Coal  Co.,  114 
v.  Morris,  144 
v.  North  East,  355 
v.  Pendergast,  92 
v.  Portland,  93,  110,  379 
v.  Robbins,  418 
v.  State.  249 
v.  Tibbetts,  706 
v.  Wentworth,  606 
v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91 
v.  Westmoreland,  etc.  Gas  Co. 
108,  696 


Balcom  v.  Dubuque,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99, 

419,  432 
Baldwin  v.  Bank  of  Louisiana,  585 
v.  Barney.  104 
v.  Calkins,  731 
v.  Casella,  630 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197,  459 
v.  Ensign,  365,  634 
v.  Fairhaven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  490, 

512 
v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  493 
v.  Green,  336 
v.  Greenwood  Tump.  Co.,  85, 

346 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.   R.  Co.,  195, 

217,  230,  232 
v.  U.  States  Tel.  Co.,  503,  534, 

544,  555,  741,  754 
v.  Western  R.  Co..  739,  758 
v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  755 
Balhoff  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  197, 

233a 
Baldridge  Bridge  Co.  v.  Cartrett,  346, 

378 
Bales  v.  Wingfield,  619,  622 
Ball  v.  El.  Paso,  376 

v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  674 

v.  Herbert,  333 

v.  Winchester,   256,   291,    337, 

338,  370 
v.  Woodbine,  262 
Ballard  v.  Hitchcock  Mfg.  Co.,  194a, 
195 
v.  Tomlinson.  734 
Balle   v.   Detroit    Leather  Co.,   203, 

209a 
Ballou  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195, 
459 
v.  Farnum,  163,  413 
v.  State,  251,  287 
Balsbaugh  v.  Prazer,  557 
Balsley  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  459 
Baltimore,  The,  61 

v.  Appold,  729,  735 

v.  Brannon,  375 

v.  Holmes,  85,  114,  376 

v.  Marriott,  108,  363,  371 

v.  Pendleton,  289 

v.  Pennington,  257,  358 

v.  Poultney,  261 

v.  Baker,  257 

v.  Schnitker,  287 

Breweries  Co.  v.  Ranstead,701a 

Elevator  Co.  v.  Neal,  236 

etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Bahrs,  57,  457 

v.  Bambrey,  493 

v.  Barger,  513,  749 

v.  Baugh,  230.  232,  233,  233a 

v.  Blocher,  749 

v.  Boteler,  93,  114,  414,  760 

v.  Brady,  178. 

v.  Camp,  192,  233a 

v.  Colvin,  472 


References}        TABLE    OF    CASES.        [«*  to  sections. 


xliii 


Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.    v.  Country- 
man, 750 
v.  Depew,  87,  476 
v  Fifth  Baptist  Ch.,  274,  701a, 

742 
v.  Fitzpatrick,  479 
v.  Fryer,  71 
v.  Griffith,  478 

v.  Henthorne,  191,  192,206,760 
v.  Kane,  520,  521 
v.  Kemp,  74i 
v.  Kreiger,  434,  455 
v.  Lamborn,  418.  454 
v.  Leathers,  207a 
v.  McClellan,  423 
v.  McDonnell,  13,  73,  74,  99 
v.  McElroy ,  423 
v  Mackey,  195,  196,  197,  769 
v.  Mulligan,  99.  428 
v.  Mvers,  521,  522 
v.  Noell,  516 
v.  Paul,  413 
v.  Reaney,  94,  701 
v.  Reynolds,  233a 
v.  Rowan,  189,  198 
v.  Schwindling,  73,  481a 
v.  Shipley,  58,  674,  762 
v.  Stanley,  771  I 

v.  State,    60a,    72,  73,  93,  100, ! 

209a,  480,  490,  520,  525,  769 
v.  Strickler,  198 
v.  Sulphur  Spring,  39 
v.  Swann.  498,  516,  517 
v.  Then,  775 
v.  Thomas,  426,  448 

v.  Walborn,  13,  478 

t.  Warr,  192 

v.  Whitacre,  108,  476 

v.  Whittaker,  114 

v.  Whittington,  113,  202 

v.  Wightman,  51,  495,  516 

v.Wilkinson,  521,523 

v.  Wood.  437 

v.  Woodruff,  672 

v.  Worthington,  466 

v.  Sherman,  480 

Traction  Co.v.Appel,  485a,  485c 

v.  Wallace,  481,  485c 
Baltimore     Trust     Co.     v.    Atlanta 
Traction  Co.,  241 

etc.  Road  v.  Cason,  523 

etc.  Tump.  Co.,    v.  Bateman, 
279,  346 

v.  Cassell,  94,  257,  378.  386 

v.  Crowther,  257,  386 

v.  Leonhardt,  516 

v.  Parks,  386 

v.  State,  374,  771 
Baltzer  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89, 

207a 
Bamberger  v.  Citizens'   R.   Co.,  71, 

73a,  485 
Bamford  v.  Turnley,  701a 


Bancroft  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65, 

139,  208,  521,  767a 
Banister  v.  Wakeman,  303 
Bank  v.  Bossieux,  589 

v.  Brainerd  School  District,  256 
v.  Butler,  585 
v.  Marston,  598 
v.  Mott,  617 
v.  Planters'  Bank,  250 
Bank  of  Antigo  v.  Union  Trust  Co., 
582 
California  v.  Western  U.  Tel. 

Co.,  589 
Clarke  Co.  v.  Gilman,  580a 
Hanover  v.  Kenan,  587a 
Kentucky  v.   Adams  Ex.  Co., 

210 
Kentucky  v.  Wister,  249 
Lindsborg  v.  Ober,  582,  584,  585 
Louisville  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 

582 
Mobile  v.  Huggins,  580,  581 
New  Hanover  v.  Kenan,  581 
Rochester  v.  Gray.  585 
Rome  v.  Curtiss,  623 
Scotland  v.    Dominion  Bank, 

580a 
U.  S.  v.  Goddard,  581 
Utica  v.  McKinster,  579,  586 
Van  Diemen's  Land  v.  Bank  of 

Victoria,  580 
Washington  v.    Triplett,    580, 
582,  584 
Banks  v.  Highland  St.  R.  Co.,  64 

v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  185b,  217 
Bannagan  v.  Dist.  of  Col.  262,  287 
Bannon  v.  Lutz,  54.  217,  223 

v.  Romiser,  750 
Barada  v.  Carondelet,  313 
Barbee  v.  Reese,  94 
Barber  v.  Abendroth,  726 

v.  Essex,  108,  336,  358 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  406, 

468,  482 
v.  Roxbury,  350 
Barbour  v.  Ellsworth,  266,  299 
v.  Horn,  256,  249a 
count v  v.  Brunson,  256 
Bard  v.  Penn.  Tr,  Co.,  523 

v.  Yohn,  147 
Bard  well  v.   Jamaica,  367,  390,  393, 
741 
v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
Barker  v.  Loomis,  840 
v.  Paulson,  54 
v.  Savage,  61,  114,  353,  654 
v.  Worcester,  104 
Barkley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  475. 
485 
v.  Wilcox,  735 
Barley  v.  Cbicago.  etc.  R.  Co.,  458 
Barlow  v.  McDonald,  639 
v.  Scott,  179 


xliv 


K,r, 


«]         TABLE     OF    CASES.        \flre  to  sections. 


Barnard  v.  Leigh,  623 

v.  Poor,  (iii"> 

v.  Shirley,  784 

v.  Ward,  619 
Barnes  v.  Chapin,  634 

v.  Chicopee,  856 

v.  District    of  Columbia,  249, 
353,  285,  289.  291,  296 

v.  Hannibal.  274 

v.  Hurd,  115,  644 

t.  Keene,  763 

v.  Marcus,  375,  376 

v.  Martin,  115 

v.  Means,  606,  607 

v.  Newton,  58,  353 

v.  Shreveport  R.  Co.,  73a,  457, 
485c 

v.  Smith,  592 

v.  Snowden,  375 

v.  Ward,  343,  703 

v.  Willett,  625 
Barnett  v.  Johnson,  333 

v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  203 
Barney    v.    Hannibal,    etc.    R.    Co., 
481a.  705 

v.  Keokuk.  332 

v.  Lowell,  258,  291 

v.  Prentiss,  550 

Boat  Co.  v.  New  York,  291 
Barnowski  v.  Helson,  58 
Barnum  v.  Terpen ning,  634,  639 

v.  Vandusen,  627,  633,  635,  659 
Barr  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  427 

v.  Kansas,  287,  346,  368,  374, 
375 

v.  Stevens,  371 
Barracouta,  The,  686 
Barre  v.  Reading,  64,  493 
Barrett  v.  Brooks,  257 

v.  Dolan,  656,  664 

v.  Hammond,  367,  369 

v.  Third  Avenue  R.  Co.,  31,  65, 
66 

v.  Maiden,  etc.  R.  Co.,  628,  635 

v.  Market  St.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Smith,  646 

v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  1,  73 

v.  Walworth.  355 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  555 
Barringer  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 

474 
Barron  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  417, 
426 

v.  Detroit.  285 
Barry  v.  Arnoukl,  313 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207b 

v.  Lowell,  287 

v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  145 

v.   N.   Y.   Central  R.   Co.,  73, 
417a.  464,  481a,  705 

v.  St   Louis,  168 

v.  Terkildsen.  343.  375 
Barstow  v.  Berlin,  86,  353,  477 


Barstow  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  112,236 
Barthold  v.  Philadelphia,  285 
Bartholomew  \.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co., 

508. 
Bartlett  v.  Baker.  726. 

v.  Boston  Gas  Co.,  35,  695 

v.  Crozier,  314,  340 

v.   Dubuque,  etc.  R.  Co.,  417, 
425, 434 

v.  Harksett,  355 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  547 
Barton  v.  Goran,  608 

v.  McDonald,  334a,  365 

v.  Montpelier.  334,  351.  363,388 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  477 

v.  Pepin  County  Agricul.  Soc, 
705. 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56 

v.  Springfield.  87,  89 

v.  Syracuse,  274,  281,  287 

v.  Reid.  178.  180,  235,  289 
Bartonshill  Coal  Co.  v.  McGuire,  46, 

142.  218,  235,  236.  239 
Barwick    v.    English    Joint    Stock 

Bank,  145 
Bass  v.  Cantor,  588 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,   60a, 
419,  672,  676 
Bassett  v.  Fish,  92.  256,  323,  329 

v.  Godschall,  310 

v.  St.  Joseph,  289,  334 
Bastable  v.  Syracuse,  274 
Batchelder  v.  Heagan,  668,  669 
Batchelor  v.  Fostescue,  65 

v.  Planters'  Bank,  589 
Bateman  v.  Black,  333 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  etc.  R.  Co.,  60c 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  540a 
Bates  v.  Fremont,  etc.  R.  Co.,  432 

v.  Horner.  291 

v.  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73 

v.   N.  Y.  &  New  England  R. 
Co.,  468,  474 

v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  505 

v.  Rutland,  291 

v.  Westborough,  287 
Battersby  v.  New  York,  363 
Batterson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  216 
Battishill  v.  Humphrey,  467 
Battle  v.    Wilmington,  etc.  R.    Co., 

465 
Batto  v.  Chandler,  619 
Batton  v.  South,  etc.  Ala.  R.  Co.,  512 
Batty  v.  Duxbury,  358 

v.  Fout,  574 
Bauer  v.  Indianapolis,  606 

v.  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.,  468 

v.  Rochester,  298 
Baughman  v.  Shenango,  etc.  R.  Co., 

94,  408 
Baugus  v.  Atlanta,  258 
Baulec  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  56,  191,  lflfl 
Bauman  v.  Campau,  262 


References}         TABLE     OF     CASES.        [ire  to  sections. 


xlv 


Baumgartner  v.  Mankato,  408 
Baxendale  v  McMurray,  734 
Baxter  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57,  422 

v.  Chicago,  355 

v.  Dominion  Tel.  Co.,  534 

v.  Roberts,  203 

v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  654 

v.  Tavlor,  119 

v.  Winooski  Co.,  8,  256,  258 

v.  Winooski  Turnp.   Co.,  371, 
3S7 
Bay  City,  etc.    R.  Co.  v.  Austin,  446 
Bayley  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  466 

v.  Manchester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64, 
145,  151 
Baylor  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  198 
Bay  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris,  73a 
Beach,  The  Wm.  N.,  737 

t.    Bay  State  Steamboat  Co., 
124,  131 

v.  Elmira,  274 

v.  Furraan,  303 

v.  Leahy,  256,  267 

v.  Parmeter,  652 
Beal  v.  Lowell,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
Beale  v.  Railway  Co.,  748 
Beall  v.  Athens*  355 

v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  201b 
Beals  v.  See,  121 
Bean  v.  Oceanic  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  197 

v.  Western  N.  C.   R.  Co.,  188, 
194a,  216 
Beanstrom  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co., 

476 
Bear  v.  Allentown,  274 
Beard  v.  Conn.  R.   Co.,  410,  490,  502 

v.  Murphy,  701,  728 
Beardsley  v.  Smith,  256,  258 

v.  Swann,  758 
Beasley  v.  Western  IT.  Tel.  Co.,  756 
Beardstown  v.  Smith.  375 
Beasley  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  539, 

541.  549,  554.  556a 
Beatty  v.  Gilraore,  53,  61,  108 
Beatrice  v.  Knight,  274 

v.  Learv,  273,  274,  735 

v.  Reid,  359 
Beatty  v.  Central  Iowa  R.  Co.,  410, 

414 
Beauchamp  v.  Saginaw  Mining  Co. , 

11,  37,  6Sba,  742 
Beaulieu  v.  Fin^lam,  17.  605,  668 

v.  Portland  Co..  56,  57,  58,  222 
Beaupre  v.  Pac,  etc.  Tel.  Co  ,  754 
Beazan  v.  Mason  City,  289 
Bechdolt  v.   Grand  Rapids,   etc.   R. 

Co.,  434 
Becht  v.  Corbin.  112 
Beck  v.  Carter,  98,  343,  703,  704,  705 

v.  Dvson.  633 

v.  German  Klinik.  613 

v.  Kitanning  Water  Co.,  265 

v.  Portland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  467 


Becke  v.  Missouri   Pac.  R.  Co.,  66, 

460 
Becker  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 
v.  Keokuk  Water-works,  265 
v.  Janinski,  604 
v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  556 
Beckerle  v.  Weiman,  651,  654 
Beckford  v.  Montague,  623 
Beekman  v.  Consolidation  Coal  Co., 
209a 
v.  Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co.,  139 
Beckwith  v.  N.   Y.   Central  R.  Co., 
114 
v.  Oatman,  691 
v.  Shordike,  627 
v.  Whalen,  335 
Bedell  v.  Berkev,  704 

v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  672,  676 
Bedford  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58, 
675 
v.  Neal,  376 

R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  114,  207 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rainbolt,  516 
Beecher  v.  Derby  Bridge  Co.,  749a 
Beehler  v.  Daniels,  705,  719 
Beekman   v.   Saratoga,  etc.  !R.    Co., 

333 
Beebe  v.  Ayres,  493 
Beems  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92 
Beers  v.  Arkansas,  249 

v.  Hendrickson,  573 
v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  53,  61,  86 
93,  99,  107,  114 
Beesley  v.  Wheeler  Co.,  195,  232 
Beeson  v.  Busenbark,  241c 

v.  Green  Mt.  Min.  Co.,  764 
Beetz  v.  Brooklyn,  358 
Beggs  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  666, 

675 
Behling    v.    Southwest  Penn.    Pipe 

Lines,  666 
Behm  v.  Armour,  197 

v.   Western   U.  Tel.    Co.,  540, 
754 
Beilfus  v.  N.  T.,  Lake  Erie,   etc.   R. 

Co.,  233 
Besiegel  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  13, 
56,  86,  417,  466,  469,  477,  485 
v.  Seymour,  373 
Belair  v.    Chicago,  etc.    R.   Co.,  91, 

215,  222 
Belding  v   Black  Hills,  etc.  R.   Co., 
139 
v.  Black  Hills,  etc.  R.  Co.,  767a 
v.  Johnson,  128 
Belford  v.  Canada  Shipping  Co.,  190 
Belk  v.  People.  35,  654 
Belknap  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  'Co.,  749, 
762 
v.  Trimble,  729 
Bell  v.  McClintock.  16,  732 

v.  West  Point,  289 
Bellefontaine,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey,  58 


xl 


VI 


Rtftreuces]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        \flre  to  sections. 


Bellefontaine,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hunter, 
463,  475 

R.  Co.  v.  Reed,  419,  434 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  Sr.,  71, 

•ITti 
v.  Snyder,  Jr..  38,71,  77,  78 
BeUemire  v.  Bank  of  U.  S.,  582,  585, 

Bellinger  v.  Craigue,  006,  607 

\.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  733 
Bellows  v.  Pennsylvania,  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  203 

v.  Sackett,  721 
Bellune  v.  Wallace,  119 
Belt  v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  131 
Belton  v.  Baxter,   114,  375,  475,  652, 

654 
Beltz  v.  Yonkers,  367,  369,  375 
Belvea  v.  Minneapolis,    etc.  R.  Co., 

7.39 
Bemis  v.  Arliugton,  355 

v.  Connecticut,  etc.  R.  Co.,  46, 
429,  449,  463 
Bemiss  v.  New  Orleans,  etc,  R.  Co., 

523 
Bemis  v.  Temple,  354 
Bemus  v.  Howard,  613 
Benage  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

2076 
Benedict  v.  Goit,  385 
Benfield  v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  195 
Bengtson    v.   Chicago,   etc.   R.    Co., 

185,  209a 
Benjamin  v.  Holyoke  R.  Co.,  485b 

v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  359 
Benmore,  The,  57 
Benn  v.  Null,  180,  195 
Benner  v.  Atl.  Dredging  Co. ,  688a 

Livery,  etc.  Co.,  v.  Busson,  491 
514 
Bennet  v.  Moita,  172 
Bennett  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  73a 

v.  Brooks,  104 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  418,  436 

v.  Dutton,  487 

v.  Fifield,  355 

v.  Greenwich,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197 

v.  Ives,  244 

v.  Kelly,  343 

v.  Lock  wood,  28 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  704 

v.  Lovell,  355 

v.  Marion,  749a 

v.  N.  Jersey  Transp.  Co.,  66 

v.  New  Orleans,  262 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  472, 
473 

v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  Co., 
521 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  207a, 
216,  223 

v.  Peninsula  Steam  P.  Co.,  487 

v.  Scutt,  669 


Bennett  v.  Standard  Glass  Co.,  194a 

v.  Syndicate  Ins.  Co.,  54 

v.  Truebody,  164 

v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425 

v.  Whitney,  313,  314 
Bennison  v.  Walbank,  609 
Benoit  v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  647 
Bensel  v.  Lynch,  625 
Benson   v.   Baltimore  Traction   Co., 
705 

v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  483 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  729,735 

v.  Maiden,  etc.  Gas  Co.,  744 

v.  Suarez,   708 
Benthall  v.  Seifert,  735 
Bentley  v.  Atlanta.  341 

v.  Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co.,  480,  484 

v.  Phelps,  813 
Benton  v.  Boston  Hospital,  266 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  107,  476 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64 

v.  Craig,  569 
Benware  v.  Pine  Valley,  373 
Benzing  v.  Steinway,  31,  194,    197, 

204. 
Bequettev.  People's Tr.  Co.,  86 
Berberich  v.  Ebach,  169 
Berea  Stone  Co.,  v.  Kraft,  233& 
Barg  v.  Boston,  etc.  Min.  Co.,  230 

v.  Milwaukee,  87,  377 

v.  Parsons,  61,  168,  688a 
Bergerv.  Minneapolis  Gas  Co.,  701a. 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 
Bergman  v.    St.   Louis,    etc.  R.  Co., 

471 
Bergquist  v.  Chandler  Iron  Co.,  185a. 

v.  Minneapolis,  239 
Bergstrom  v.  Staples,  231 
Berlin  v.  Gorham,  281 
Bernard  v.  Richmond,  etc.    R.    Co., 

672 
Bernardi  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  203 
Bernauerv.  Hartman  Steel  Co.,  165 
Bernhard  v.  Reeves,  709 

v.  Rensselaer,  etc.  R.    Co.,  53, 
54,  463 

v.  Western  Pa.  R.  Co.,  516 
Bernina,  The,  06 
Berrigan  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co  ,  202 
Berry  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  413 

v.  Missouri,  Pac.  R.  Co.,  523 

v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  65 

v.    Pennsylvania    R.    Co.,  114, 
476 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.   Co.,  449 
Bertha  Zinc  Co.   v.  Martin,    47,   195, 

205 
Besel  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co. ,  202,  241 
Bess  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.   R.  Co.,  151 
Bessant  v.  Gt.  Western  R.  Co.,  424 
Bessex  v.  Chicago,   etc.  R.  Co.,  108, 
194,  205. 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         We  to  sections. 


xlvii 


Bethea  v.  Raleigh,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  451a 

Bethel  v.  Otis,  686 

Bethje  v.  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57 

Bethlehem  v.  Haus,  287 

Betts  v.  Gloversville,  274,  363 

v.  Norris,  620 
Betz  v.  Limingi,  343 
Beuhring  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co., 

241 
Bevard  v.  Hoffman,  803,  310 
Bevier  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co. , 

57 
Bevins  v.  Ramsey,  591 
Beyel  v.  Newport  News,  etc.  R.   Co., 

482 
Beynon  v.  Garrat,  623 
Beynon  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  478 
Bibb  v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  166, 168, 

181 
Bibby  v.  Carter,  713 
Bickford  v.  Darcy,  569 

v.  Richards.  22 
Biddle  v.  Hestonville,  etc,  R.  Co.,  64 
Bidelman  v.  State,  251,  334a 
Bid  well  v.  Murray,  338,  380 
Bielenberg  v.  Montana  Union  R.  Co., 

422 
Bieling  v.  Brooklyn,  254.  354 
Bier  v.  Jefferson ville,  etc.  R.  Co., 241 
Bierbach  v.   Goodyear  Rubber  Co., 

114,  654 
Bierbauer  v.  N.  Y.   Central  R.  Co., 

137,  769,  775 
Bierhaus  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  540, 

549.  754,  755 
Biering  v.  Gulf.  etc.  R.  Co.,  676 
Big  Creek  Stone  Co.  v.  Wolf,  194,  203 
Bigelow  v.  Nickerson,  132 

v.  No.  Missouri  R.  Co. ,  421 
v.  Randolph,  256,  258,  259,  267, 

286  337 
v.  Reed,  61,  93,  96,107,  654 
v.  Rutland,  86,  107,  379 
v.  Weston,  3o0,  851 
Biggs  v.  Huntington,  289.  338,  351 

v.  West  Newton,  376 
Bignell  v.  Clarke,  641 
Bilbee  v.  Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  466 
Bileu  v.  Paisley,  146,  588 
Bill  v.  Norwich,  367 
v.  Smith,  111 
Billings  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  675,  678 
v.  Lafferty,  591 
v.  Worcester,  363,  367 
Billman  v.  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

30.  426 
Billows  v.  Moors,  183 
Bills  v.  Ottumwa,  86 
Bin  ford  v.  Johnston,  36,  686 
Binks   v.   South   Yorkshire   R.,    etc. 

Co..  408 
Bird  v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  479 

v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  517 


Bird  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39 
v.  Holbrook   97.  705,  720 
v.  Long  Island  R.  Co. ,  194a,  499 
Birge  v.  Gardiner,  64,  73,  78,  97,  703, 

705 
Birkbeck  v.  Stafford,  569 
Birket  v.  Williams,  655 
Birkett  v.   Knickerbocker   Ice  Co., 
73,  137,  645,  772 
v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  553 
v.   Whitehaven,    etc.    R.    Co., 
459,  503 
Birmingham  v.  Dorer,  115,  763 
v.  Lewis,  356,  374,  761 
v.  McCary,  298 
v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  497, 

499 
v.  Starr,  369,  375.  376 
v.  Tayloe,  362,  367 
Birmingham  R.    Co.    v.   Allen,    186, 
197,  2416 
v.  Clay,  520 
v.  Hale,  508,  516 
v.  Smith,  508 
Birmingham,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowers, 
88,  483 
Mineral  R.   Co.  v.  Harris,  432, 

451a 
Water  Works  Co.  v.  Hubbard, 

146,  689 
Union    R.    Co.  v.  Alexander, 
359 
Birney  v.  N.  Y.  &.  Washington  TeL 

Co.,  534,  537,  547,  548,  555 
Bisaillon  v.  Blood,  78 
Bischoff  v.  People's  R.  Co.,  495 
Bishop  v.  Bedford  Charity,  708 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  429 
v.  Ely,  122,  644 
v.  Goshen,  353,  363 
v.  North,  672 
v.St.  PaulR.  Co.,  742 
v.  Williamson,  321 
Bissell  v.  Michigan  Southern,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  700 
v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  492,  504, 
505,  551 
Bitner  v.  Utah  Cent.  R.  Co  ,  468 
Bittle  v.  Camden,  etc.  R.  Co.,  426 
Bizzell  v.  Booker,  670 
Bjbjian  v.  Woonsocket  Rubber  Co., 

241 
Bjorman  v.  Ft.  Bragg  Redwood  Co., 

214 
Black  v.  Aberdeen,  etc.   R.  Co.,  678 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  16 
v.  Columbia,  265,  289 
v.  Maitland,  708 
v.  Manistee,  376 
v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  508 
Blackman  v.  Gardiner  Bridge,  758 

v.  Simmons.  639 
Blackmore  v.  Toronto  R.  Co.,  488, 493 


xl 


Vlll 


TABLE    OF    CASKS. 


[lire  to  sections. 


Blackstock  v.  X.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co., 

1 1.  164,  155,  248,  547 
Blackwoll  v.  Lynchburg,  etc.  R.  Co., 
89,  688o,  775 

v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  Co.,  482 

v.  Wis  wall,  144 
Bladton  v.  Dold,  223 
Blaechinska  v.  Howard  Mission,  etc. 

115,  703,  700 
Blagrave  v.  Bristol  Water  Co..  8 
Blaine  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  419. 
Blair  v.  Deakin,  734 

v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  ITS!,  492,  505 

v.  Grand  Rapids,  etc.  R.  Co., 
470 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co..  421 

v.  Perpetual  Ins.  Co.,  254 
Blaisdell  v.  Portland.  335 
Blaiser  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  95 
Blake  v.  Ferris.  168,  173,  174,  699 

v.  Lowell.  308 

v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  ISO,  191, 
235,  241 

v.  Midland  R.  Co..  766,  773 

v.  Newfield,  352,  356 

v.  Pontiac,  260.  291 

v.  St.  Louis,  289 

v.  Thirst,  167 
Blakely  v.  Devine,  274 
Blakeley  v.  Troy.  363,  369 
Blakemore  v.  Bristol,  etc.  R.  Co.,  637 
Blaker  v.  N.  J.  Midland  R.  Co.,  470 
Blakeslee   v.    Consolidated    R.    Co., 

585c 
Blamires  v.  Lancashire,  etc.  R.  Co.,  9 
Blanchard  v.  Baker,  729,  733 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  467, 
480,  482 

v.  New  Jersey,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93 

v.  Stearns,  310 
Bland  v.  Shreveport  R.  Co.,  206 
Blank  v.  Livonia,  307,  369 
Blanton  v.  Dodd,  185a 
Blatt  v.  McBarron,  705 
Blaustein  v.  Guindon,  362 
Blenkiron  v.  Gr.  Central  Gas  Co.,  696 
Blessington  v.  Boston,  358 
Bleyl  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  417 
Bliss  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  Tel.   Co.,  539 

v.  Deerfield,  334,  335 

v.  Johnson,  729 

v.  Rice.  730 

v.  South  Hadlev.  72,  73a,  370 

v.  Wilbraham,  53,  378 
Blizzard  v.  Danville,  287 
Block  v.  Milwaukee  St.  R.  Co.,  54 
Blodgett  v.  Bartlett,  520 

v.  Boston,  370,  379,  258 

v.  Royalton,  334 
Blomquist  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233 
Blood  v.  Nashua,  etc.  R.  Co.,  733 

v.  Savre,  303 


Blood  v.  Spaulding,  661 

v.  Tyngsborough,  86,  379 
Blood  Balm  Co.  v.  Cooper,  117 
Bloomington  v.  Annett,  367,  369 

v.  Bay,  333 

v.  Legg,  367,  369 

v.  Perdue,  86 

v.  Rogers,  376 
Bloor  v.  Delafield,  86,  355 
Blossom  v.  Do.id,  210,  552 
Blount  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  481& 
Bloxham  v.  Florida  Cent.  R.  Co.,  249 
Bloyd  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  203a. 

228,  233.  233a 
Blue  v.  Aberdeen,  etc.   R.   Co.,  666, 
.       678 

v.  Briggs,  244 
Bluedorn  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  13, 

55,  213 
Blum  v.  So.  Pullman  Car-  Co.  526 
Blumb  v.  Kansas  City,  167,  173,  298 
Blunt  v.  Aiken,  708 
Blv  v.  Whitehall,  368.  375,  377 
Blyhl  v.  Waterville,  272 
Blyth  v.  Birmingham  Water  Co.,  2, 
11,  16,  1U,  407.  728  * 

v.  Topham,  703 
Blythe  v.  Denver,  etc.  R.  Co..  16 
Board   of   Education    v.  Mobile,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  417 
Boatwright   v.  Northeastern   R.  Co., 

180,  233,  233a 
Boden  v.  Demwolf,  190 
Bodge  v.  Philadelphia,  285 
Bodkin  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  739 
Boehm  v.   Duluth,  etc.  R.   Co.,  493, 
513a 

v.  Mace,  719a 
Boettger  v.  Scberpe  Iron  Co.,  217 
Bogard  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 
Bogart  v.  Delaware,  etc   R.  Co  ,  406 
Bogenschutz  v.  Smith,  209a,  221 
Boggess  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co., 

493,  513a 
Boggs  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  476 
Bohan  v.  Avoca,  274 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  471 

v.  Port  Jervis  Gas  Co.,  701a 
Bohanan  v.  Peterson,  561 
Bohen  v.  Waseca,  289,  354. 
Bohl  v.  Carson,  580 
Bohn  v.  Havemeyer,  203 
Boick  v.  Bissell,  654 
Boikens  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 

508 
Boing  v.  Raleigh  and  Gaston  R.  Co., 

752 
Bolan  v.  Williamson.  321 
Boland  v.  Missouri R.  Co.,  16,  73,73a, 

99.  654 
Bolch  v.  Smith,  684 
Boldt  v.  Murrav.  608.  611 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  239 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [«>"«  to  sections. 


xlix 


Boiingbroke  v.  Swindon,  135 
Bolinger  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  461 
Bollinger  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  479 
Bolton  v.  Calkins,  66S) 

v.  Colder,  649,  652 

v.  Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  New  Rochelle,  262,  287 
Bomar  v.  Louisiana,  etc.  R.  Co.,  196 
Bonafous  v.  Walker,  616 
Bonce  v.  Dubuque,  etc.  R.  Co.,  107, 

516 
Bond  v.  Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  417a, 
455 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co,,  473 

v.  Smith,  107.  376,  704 

v.  Ward,  620 

v.  Wilder,  622 
Bonebrake   v.    Huntington    county, 

369,  380 
Boniface  v.  Relyea.  158,  169 
Bonnell  v.  Bowman,  619 
Bonner  v.  Bryant,  182 

v.  Glen,  523 
Bonner  v.  Grumbach.  516 

\.  Mayfield,  407 

v.  Wingate,  39,  107 
Bonnet  v.  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  216 
Bonney  v.  Bush  wick  R.  Co.,  508 
Bonsall  v.  Lebanon,  343 
Boom  v.  Reed,  613 

v.  Utica.  299 
Boon  v.  Allegheny,  etc.  P.  R.  Co.,  54 
Boone  Co.  v.  Mutchler,  31 
Booth  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  122,  187, 
188,  193,  204,  205 

v.  Merriam,  709 

v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  688a 

v.  Woodbury,  254 
Boothby  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  55 
Boots  v.  Washburn,  340 
Borchardt  v.  Wausau  Boom  Co.,  731 
Borgman  v.  Omaha,  etc.   R.  Co.,  233 
Bormann  v.  Milwaukee.  185 
Borman  v.  Sangren,  708 
Born  v.  Alleghenny,  etc.  Plank-road 

Co  ,  B89 
Borschart  v.  Tuttle,  61 
Borst  v.   Lake    Shore,    etc.    R.   Co., 

436,  451,  473 
Borup  v.  Nininger,  582 
Bosozzi  v.  Harris,  629 
Boss  v.  Litton.  G54 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  499 
Boster  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.   R.  Co., 

486 
Boston  Belting  Co.  v.  Boston,  274 

v.  Crowlev,  285 

v.  Grav.  708,  713 

etc.  R.  Co.,  v.  Boston,  333 

v.  O'Reilly.  60,  760a 

etc,  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Munson, 
738 
Boswellv.  Barnhart,  181.  773.  775 

[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  I—  d.] 


Bostwick.  Ex  parte,  336 

v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39,  40 

v.  Barlow,  B40 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99, 
428 
Bos  well  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  505 
Bosworth  v.  Swansey,  104 
Bott  v.  Pratt,  13 
Bottomley  v.  United  States,  317 
Bottoms  v.  Seaboard  R.  Co.,  73a,  99, 

484 
Boucher  v.   New   Haven,    263,    353, 

358,  367,  369 
Bougher  v.  Scobey,  566 
Bouknight  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co., 

413 
Boulder  v.  Fowler,  286 

v.  Niles,  289 
Boulton  v.  Crowther.  283,  326 
Bourdier  v.   Morgan's,  etc.    R.    Co., 

735 
Bourget  v.  Cambridge,  346 
Bourgo  v.  White,  719a 
Bourne  v.  Diggles,  562,  566 
Bouwmeester  v.  Grand  Rapids,  etc. 

R.  Co. ,  458,  463,  480,  483 
Bowcher  v.  Noidstrom,  245 
Bowe  v.  Hunking.  708,  709 
Bowen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 

v.  Detroit  R.  Co.,  408 

v.  Flanagan,  645 

v.  Huntington,  353 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.    Co.,  477, 
517 

v.  St.  Paul.  etc.  R.  Co.,  676 

v.  State,  251,  39S,  401 
Bower  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  478 

v.  Peate.  176 
Bowers  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co,, 
196,197,  231,  2416 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  206 
Bowes  v.  Boston,  128,  338,  355 
Bowles  v.  Lane,  767a 

v.  Rome.  etc.  R.  Co.,  772 
Bowling  v.  Arthur,  585,  599 
Bowling  Green  Saw  Bk.  v.  Todd,  561 
Bowman  v.  Cornell.  623 

v.  Tallman,  558,  559,  565,  567 

v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.  430,  433, 
435 

v.  Woods,  607,  609 
Bowne  v.  Hyde,  573 
Bowser  v.  Wellington,  654 
Bowsley  v.  Speer,  735 
Bowyer  v.  Burlew,  634 
Box  v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  455 

v.  Jubb,  729 

v.  Kelso,  680 
Boxford  v.  Essex,  348 
Boyce  v.  California  Stage  Co.,  487,  516 

v.  Cheshire  R.  Co.,  675 

v.  Fitzpatrick,  188 

v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  92,  506 


1 


References]         TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Boyd  v.  Conklin,  729,785 
v.  Harris,  L85 

v.  Insurance  Patrol,   123,  255, 
881 

v.  Oddous,  113 
Boyland  v.  New  York,  262,  299 
Boyle  v.  Hazleton,  367 

v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
430 

v.  N.  Y.  &  N.  England  R.  Co., 
185 
Bovnton  v.  Rees,  730 
Brabbits  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  206 
Brabham  v.  Hinds  countv,  256 
Brace  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  333,  435 

v.  YTale,  730 
Bracey  v.  Carter,  5~>9 
Brackenbury  v.  Pell,  572 
Brackenridge  v.  Fitchburg,  378 

v.  McFarlane,  557 
Brackett  v.  Lubke,  165 

v.  Norton,  573 
Bradbee  v.  London,  362 
Bradbury  v.  Benton,  334,  335 
Bradford  v.  Anniston,  346,  368,  369 

v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  90,  492a 

v.  Downs,  95 
Bradley  v.  Andrews,  16 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  417,  463 
467 

v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57,  434 

v.  Fisher,  303 

y.  Fort  Wavne,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56, 
508 

v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  506 

v.  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.,   195, 
233 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  91, 160, 
180,  1856,  202 

v.  Sattler,  772 

v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  523 
Bradshaw  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

186,  209« 
Bradstreet  v.  Everson,  577,  582,  587a 
Bradt  v.  Walton,  563 
Brad  well  v.  Pittsburgh,   etc.  R.  Co., 

07.  87,  108,  359 
Brady  v.  Ball,  655 

v.  Chicago,  401 

v.  Little  Miami  R.  Co.,  580 

v.  Lowell,  258,  353 

v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  606 

v.  New  York,  254 

v.  Old  Colonv  R.  Co.,  516 

v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Bragg  v.  Bangor,  367 
Brailey  v.  Southborough,  258,  338 
Braine  v.  Spaulding.  566 
Bramwell  v.  Lucas,  575 
Branch  v.  Macon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  249 
Branch  Bank  v.  Knox,  580 
Brand   v.   Schenectady,  etc.   R.  Co., 
93.  96,  457,  463,  472 


Brandenburg  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
449 

Brann  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410 

Branuan  v.  Kokomo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66, 
66a 

Brann  v  Chicago,  R.  Co.,  194a,  205 

Brannock  v.  Elmore,  168,  175,  688a 

Branson  v.  Labrot,  705 

Brash  v.  Steele,  773 

Brashears  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  531, 
540a 

Bransom  v.  Labrot,  73,  97 

Brant  v.  Plumer.  371 

Brass  v.  Maitland.    690 

Brassell  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R,  Co.,  477, 
521,  525 

Brawn  v.  Laurens  county,  393 

Bray  v.  Latham,  742 

v.  Wallingford,  258 

Brayton  v.  Fall  River,  258,  735 

Braxton  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R,  Co.,  467 

Brazier  v.  Bryant.   561 

Brazil,  etc.   Coal  Co.   v.  Cain,  233 
v.  Gaffney,  218 
Coal  Co.  v.  Hoodlet,  185a 

Breckenf elder  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  477 

Breckenridge  v.  Bennett,  705 
v.  Hicks,  215 

Breen  v.  Field,  209a 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co. ,  516 

v.  St.  Louis  Cooperage  Co. ,  195 

Breese  v.  U.  S.  Tel.  Co.,  534,537,  547, 
552,  553 

Brehm  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  39, 
516 

Breig  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  215 

Brember  v.  Jones,  654 

Bremner  v.  Williams,  497 

Brendlinger  v.  New  Hanover,  363 

Brennan  v.  Ellis,  176 

v.  Fairhaven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84, 

148 
v.  Friendship,  110 
v.  Front  St.  R.  Co.,  213 
v.  Gordon,  219a,  233,  233a 
v.  Limerick  Union,  266 
v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  2076 
v.  Molly  Wilson  Co.,  133 
v.  St.  Louis,  334 

Brenstein  v.  Mattson,  90 

Brent  v.  Kimball,  628,  640 

Brentner  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425 

Bresnahan  v.  Michigan  Central,  64, 
480 

Brevig  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  493 

Brewer  v.  Crosby,  628 

v.   N.   Y.,   Lake  Erie,   etc.   R. 
Co.,  492,  504 

Brewster  v.  Davenport,  262 

Briant  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,   678, 
680 

Brezee  v.  Powers,  703 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.  [arc  to  sections. 


li 


Brice  v.  Bauer,  630 
Brick  v.  Bosworth,  212 

v.  Rochester,  etc.   R.  Co.,  231 
Brickell  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.Co., 

66a,  476,  477 
Brickman  v.  South  Car.  R.  Co.,  197 
Bricker  v.   Phila.,   etc.   R.  Co.,  486, 

488 
Bridge.  Matter  of.  334 
Bridge  v.  Grand  Junction  R.  Co.,  86, 

93 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Newberry,  232 

v.  Williams,  397 
Bridge  Proprietors  v.  Hoboken  Co., 

390 
Bridger  v.  Asheville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73, 

73a,  410,  760 
Bridges   v.    North    London    R.   Co., 
57,  59.  509,  520 

v.  Perry,  621 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194a 

v.  North  London  R.  Co.,  57,  59 
Briegel  v.  Philadelphia,  267,  287 
Brien  v.  Bennett,  490 
Briggs  v.  Dearborn,  621 

v.  Guilford.  61,  348 

v.  Klosse,  701 

v.  Minneapolis  St.  R.  Co.,  28 

v.  Newport  News  and  M.  V. 
Co.,  219 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  765 

v.  Oliver,  59 

v.  Taylor,  606,  618 

v.  Titan,  233 

v.  Union  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Wardell,  303 
Brigham  v.  Foster,  557 
Bright  v.  Barnett  Co.,  216 
Brighthope  R.  Co. v.  Rogers,  674,  675 
Brightman  v.  Bristol,  261 

v.  Grinnell,  641 
Brignoli  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  758 
Brill  v.  Eddy,  99 
Brinkerhoff  v.  Bostwick.  589 
Brine  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co. ,  359 
Brinkley  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Cooper,  705 
Brinkman  v.  Bender.  113 
Brinkmyer  v.  Evansville,  255,  265 
Briscoe  v.  Alfrev,  626 

v.  Bank,  249. 
Bristol,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Collins,  243,  503 

v.  Johnson,  256 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Tucker,  416 
British  Cast  Plate  Co.   v.   Meredith, 
326 

Mutual  Inv.Co.  v.  Cobbold.  574 
Britton  v.  Atlanta,  etc.  R   Co.,  512 

v.  Cummington,  99,   356,  370, 
378 

v.  Grand  Rapids  R.  Co.,  508 

v.  Great  Western,  etc.  Co.,  685 

v.  Great  Western  Cotton  Co., 
9,  62,  214 


Britton  v.  Green  Bay  Water  Co.,  118, 
265 

v.  Niccolls,  585 

v.  Street  R.  Co.,  760 
Broadwell  v.  Kansas  City,  298 

v.  Swigert,  61 

v.  Wilcox,  663 
Broburg  v.  Des  Moines,  353,  369 
Brock  v.  Barnes,  566 

v.  Copeland,  639 

v.  Connecticut,  etc.  R.  Co.,  424 

v.  Gale,  745 

v.  Hopkins,  591 
Brockbank  v.  Whitehaven,  115. 
Brockert  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  120a 
Broderick    v.    Detroit  Union  Depot 

Co.,  186a,  190,  194 
Brodeur  v.  Valley  Falls  Co.,  226,  235 
Brodie  v.  Carolina  Midland  R.  Co., 

510,  521 
Brohl  v.  Lingeman,  144 
Bromley  v.  Birmingham,  etc.  R.  Co., 

108 
Bronson  v.  Coffin,  419,  443 

v.   Southburv,  72,  73,   78,  356, 
393 
Brown  v.  Skowhegan,  388,  251,  370 
Brooke  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197 

v.  Ramsden.  209a 

v.  Winters,  734 
Brookfield  v.  Remsen,  623 
Brooklyn  v.   Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co., 

341,  408,414 
Brooks  v.  Boston,  332,  370,  739 

v.  Boston,  etc.  P..  Co.,  114 

v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  469 

v.  Day,  574 

v.  Hart,  649,  651 

v.  Lincoln  St.  R.  Co.,  485c 

v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.   Co.,  434, 
436,  455 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  2076 

v.  Schwerin,  115,  654,  760 

v.  Somerville,  298,  358,  368 

v.  Tavlor,  628 
Brookville  v.  Arthurs,  122,  289,  384 

Turnp.  Co.  v.  Pumphrey,  306 
Brooksville  v.  Pumphrey,  346 
Broschart  v.  Tuttle,  101,  654 
Brosnan  v.  Sweetzer,  719 
Brosman  v.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  198, 

216 
Brotherton     v.    Manhattan     Beach 

Imp.  Co.,  704 
Brouillette  v.  Con.  River  R.  Co.,  110 
Broult  v.  Hanson,  652 
Brow  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  160 
Brower  v.  New  York.  285 
Brown  v.  Atlanta,  367 

v.  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.,  676 

v.  Barnes.  520 

v.  Bo  wen,  731 
v.  Brooks,  679 


lii 


Rtftrtncts\        TABLE    OF    CASES.       \»re  to  sections. 


Brown  v.  Brown,  209a 

v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  13,  139, 

467,  67f>.  (>Tti.  678 
v.  Byroads,  207 
v.   Cayuga,   etc.   R.  Co.  413, 

709a 
v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  Ill 
v.  Chicago,   etc.  R.  Co.,  731, 

742.  74.") 
v.  Collins,  1G.  17,  701 
v.  Congress  St.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  1, 

57. 
v.  Dean.  734 

t.  Dist.  of  Columbia,  289 
v.  Duplissis,  359 
v.  Elliott,  723 
-v.  European,  etc.  R.  Co.,  74, 

114 
v.  Fairhaven,  122,  301,  394 
t.  Giles,  627 
v.  Glasgow,  334 
v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  114 
v.  Guyandotte,  260,  291 
v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  408, 

413,  417 
v.  Howard,  574,  575 
v.  Howe,  121 
v.  Tllius,  93,  696,  734 
v.  Jefferson,  376 
v.  Jefferson  County,  257 
v.  Kendall,  16 
v.  Lent,  247 
v.  Lester,  591 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207b, 

481,  484 
v.  Lynn,  61,  92,  97 
v.  McAllister,  701a 
v.  Mallett,  738 
v.  Marshall,  691,  742 
v.  Maxwell,  61,  180 
t.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  112, 

425,  476 
v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  676 
v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  93,  408, 

463,  477,  495 
v.  N.  Y.  Gas  Co.,  692 
v.  Nichols,  562 
v.  Postal  Cable  Co.,  553 
v.  Providence,  etc.  R.  Co.,  412 
v.  Purdy,  612 
v.  Purviance,  147 
v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  513a 
v.  Robins,  701 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  484 
v.  Scofleld,  395 
v.  Skowhegan.  388,  251,  370 
v.  Sennett,  241a 
v.  Sherer,  73a 
v.  Smith,  310 

v.  South  Kenebeck  Soc,  104 
v.  Sullivan,  93,  99 
v.  Susquehanna  Boom  Co.,  11 
v.  Vinal  Haven,  266 


Brown  v.  Watson,  371,  749a 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,    545, 

754 
v.  Winona,  205 
v.  Wysong,  343 
Brownell  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  60a 
Browning  v.  Hanford,621 
v.  Owen  county,  299 
v.  Springfield,  256,  289 
v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  188,  775 
Brownlee  v.  Alexis,  369 
Brownlow    v.    Metropolitan    Board, 

359 
Brozekv.  Steinway  R.  Co.,  654 
Bruce  v.  Baxter,  566 

v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  132, 
133 
Bruker  v.  Covington,  110 
Brumble  v.  Brown,  587a 
Brumfield   v.   Western  U.  Tel.  Co., 

540a 
Brummit  v.  Furness,  669 
Brunell  v.  Hopkins,  671 
Brunner  v.  American  Tel.  Co.,  148, 
365 
v.  Blaisdell,  57 
Brunette    v.   Chicago,    etc.   R.  Co., 

475 
Brunker  v.  Cummins,  703 
Brunswick  v.  Braxton,  289 

etc.  Co.  v.  Rees,  702,  713 
etc.  R.  v.  Clem,  2076 
Brunswig  v.  White,  690,  772 
Brusch  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  523 

v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  672 
Brusso  v.  Buffalo,  175,  176,  298,  373, 

654 
Bruswitz  v.  Netherlands  Steam  Nav. 

Co.,  39,  502 
Bryan  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  505 
Bryant  v.  American  Tel.  Co.,  555, 
754.  755 
v.  Biddeford,  104,  334,  351,  388 
v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  680 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  488 
v.  Randolph,  345,  359,  373 
v.  Rich,  146,  154,  513 
v.  St.  Paul,  266 
v.  Westbrook,  299 
Brydges  v.  Walford,  623 
Brydon  v.  Stewart,  187,  190,  194,  197 
Brymer  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co..  184 

195,  223 
Bryson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 
Buchanan  v.  Barre,  285 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  473 
v.  Duluth,  287 
Bucher  v.  Cheshire  R.  Co.,  104 

v.  Fitchburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  104 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  89,  509, 
520 
Buchanan  v.  West  Jersey  R.  Co.,  85 
Buck  v.  Biddeford,  351,  352,  367 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         We  to  sections. 


liii 


Buck  v.  Glens  Falls,  363 

v.  Webb.  493 
Buckalevv  v.  Tennessee  Coal  Co.,  181, 

767 
Buckbee  v.  Brown,  725,  726 
Bucki  v.  Cone,  157 
Buckland  v.  Conway,  557 
Buckley  v.  Gee,  639 

v.  Cunningham,   723 

v.  Gould,  etc.  Mining  Co.,  241 

v.  Gray,  562 

v.  Guttapercha  M'f'g  Co..  218, 
219 

v.  Knapp,  762 

v.  Leonard,  626,  628,  629,  632 

v.  New  Bedford,  274 

v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  490 
Buckmaster  v.  Great  Eastern  R.  Co. , 

504 
Buckner  v.  Richmond,  etc.   R.  Co., 

222 
Budd  v.  United  Carriage  Co.,  516 
Buddin  v.  Fortunato,  115 
Buddenberg  v.  Chouteau  Tr.  Co.  ,  129 
Buddington  v.  Bradley,  729 

v.  Shearer,  628,  635,  638 
Bueck  v.  Lindsay.  654 
Buel  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  89,  519 
Buelow  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  476 
Buenemann  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co., 

506 
Buesching  v.    St.    Louis    Gas  Light 

Co.,  58,  108,  362,  703,  712 
Buffalo  v.  Holloway,  174,  301,  356,  384 

v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
467 

etc.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Buffalo,  299 
Burnt  v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  486,  490, 

503 
Buffum  v.  Harris,  735 
Buford  v.  Grand  Rapids,  274 

v.  Houtz,  419,  656 
Bulkley  v.  N.  Y.  &  N.  Haven  R.  Co., 

57,  422,  451a 
Bull  v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 
Bullard  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.,  518 
Bullington  v.  Newport  News,  751 
Bullitt  v.  Clement.  303 
Bullock  v.  Babcock,  121 

v.  Durham,  368,  374 

v.  New  York,  346,  376 

v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92 
Bulmer  v.  Gilman,  558,  565 
Bulpit  v.  Matthews.  655 
Bunch  v.  Edenton.  289,  346,  356 
Buncombe  Turp.  Co.  v.  Baxter,  385 
Bunderson  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co., 

735 
Bundschuh  v.  Mayer,  635 
Bunnell   v.  Berlin  Iron   Bridge  Co., 

io.  m\ 

v.  Rio  Grande  W.  R.  Co..  451a 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  192 


Bunt  v.  Sierra,  etc.  Co.,  185,  207 
Bunting  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  64, 
476 

v.  Hogsett,  66 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co  ,  417a 
Bunyan  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  485c 
Burbank  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  410, 
492a 

v.  Pillsburv,  443 

v.  West-Walker  Ditch  Co.,  105 
Burch  v.  Hardwicke,  291 
Burchfield  v.  Northern  Cent.  R.  Co., 

445 
Burdick  v.  Babcock.  323 

v.  Cheadle,  709 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  750 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  197 

v.  Worrall,  649,  651,  654 
Burford  v.  Grand  Rapids,  262 
Burg  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.   Co.,   467, 

480 
Burger  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  479 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  433 
Burges  v.  Wickham,  497 
Burgess  v.  Davis  Sulphur  Ore  Co., 
60b,  215 

v.  Gray,  165 
Burghart  v.  Gardner,  562 
Burgin  v.    Richmond,    etc.    R.  Co., 

520 
Burk  v.  Campbell,  623 
Burk  v.  Delaware,  etc.,  Canal  Co., 

464 
Burke  v.  Broadway,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71 

73 
Burke  v.  Daley,  664 

v.  De  Casto.  etc.  Co.,  162 

v.  Elliott,  313 

v.  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  680, 
750 

v.   N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
110,  472,  485 

v.  Parker,  185 

v.  Shaw,  148 

v.  Svracuse,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  192, 
207 

v.  Trevitt,  322 

v.  Witherbee,  606,  189,  195,  673 
Burkett  v.  Bond,  111 
Burley  v.  Bethune,  303 
Burling  v.  111.  Central  R.  Co.  463 
Burlington,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  v.  Crockett, 
193,  207,  233,  2336 

v.  Franzen,  419 

v.  Koonce,  417 

v.  Webb,  451a 

v.  Westover,  666,  676,  678,  679 
Burnard  v.  Haggis,  121 
Burnell  v.  West  Side  R.  Co.,  185 
Burnham  v.  Butler,  645 

v.  Strother,  637 
Burnet   v.   Burlington,  etc.,  R.  Co., 

99,  483 


IV 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [arc-  to  sections. 


Burnett  v.  Contra  Costa  County,  256 

v.  Western  V.  Tel.  Co.,  531 
Burnham  v.  Byron,  258 

x.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  509 
Burn*  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  195 

v.  Cork,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  45, 51, 497 

v.  Bradford,  367,  369 

v.  Elba.  114.  858,  289,  367,  374 

v.  Glens  Falls,  etc.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.   Grand  Rapids,  etc.  R.  Co., 
132 

v.   Kansas  City,  etc.    R.   Co., 
413. 

v.  McDonald,  166,  168 

v.  North  Chicago,  etc.  Mill  Co., 
466 

v.  Norton.  303 

v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  197 

v.  Pethcal,  245 

v.  Poulson,  146,  147 

v.  Sennett,  195,  224,  232,  241 

v.  Washburn.  241b 

v.  Yonkers,  356 
Buron  v.  Den  man,  322 
Burr  v.  Beers,  118,  543 

v.  Plymouth,  351,  363 
Burrell  v.  Uncamphor,  367 

v.  Uncapher,  31,  367 
Burrill  v.  Augusta,  265 

v.  Eddy.  225 
Burroughs  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  672 
Burrows  v.  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61,  520 

v.  Lake  Crystal,  369 

v.  March  Gas  Co.,  31,  35,  65, 
695 
Burt  v.  Douglas  Co.  R.  Co.,  524 

v.  Horner,  587 

v.  Wrigley,  699 
Burton  v.  Chattanooga,  274 

v.  Fulton,  310,  313 

v.  McClellan,  671 

v.  No.  Missouri  R.  Co.,  421 

v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  Co.,  426 

v.  Tannehill,  119 

v.  West  Jersey  Ferry  Co..  515 

v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  766 
Bush  v.  Barnett,  516 

v.  Brainard,  433,  720 

v.  Geneva,  363,  368 

v.  Portland,  274 

v.  Steinman,  168,  173,  699 
Bush  by  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  Co., 

1856,  194,  205 
Bussell  v.  Steuben,  256 
Bussian  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

426 
Bussy  v.  Donaldson,  172 
Busteed  v.  Parsons,  303 
Butcher  v.  Hyde,  704 

v.  Providence  Gas  Co.,  693 

v.  West  Virginia,  etc.  R.  Co., 
482 
Bute  v.  Potts,  614 


Butler  v.  Ashworth,  258,  340 

v.  Chicago, etc.  R.  Co.,  241c,  424 

v.  Cushing,  59,  702 

v.  Kent,  371,  739 

v.  Malvern,  368 

v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  60a,  764 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  408, 

463, 464 
v.  Oxford,  369,  378 
v.  Peck,  735 
v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  519, 

5^3 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
v.  Steinway  R.  Co.,  493 
v.    Townsend,     195,    197,    224, 
239,  699 
Butman  v.  Hussey,  733 
Butner  v.  Western  U.   Tel.  Co.,  543, 

756 
Butterfield  v.  Forrester,  86.  379 

v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476,  481 
Button  v.  Frink,  57,  107,  647,  649 

v.   Hudson  River  R.   Co.,   61, 

65.  94,  99,  102,  110. 
v.  Kinnitz,  747 
Butts  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Buxendin  v.  Sharp,  629 
Buxton  v.  Northeastern  R.   Co.,  418, 

459,  466a,  503 
Buzzell  v.  Laconia  Manf'g  Co.,  107, 

184,  194,  197,  222 
Byerly  v.  Anamoso.  334,  356 
Byrne  v.  Boadle,  59,  60,  158,  159 
v.  Farmington,  274 
v.  N.   Y.   Central  R.   Co.,   73, 

414 
v.  Kansas  City,   etc.,  R.  Co., 

61,  144,  464a,  483 
v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co. ,  644, 

649 
v.    Minneapolis,    etc.    R.    Co., 

729,  750 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.   Co.,  464, 

468.  471,  48la 
v.  Syracuse,  341,  375,  377 
Byrnes  v.  Cohoes,  274 

t.  N.   Y.,    Lake  Erie,   etc.   R. 

Co.,  195,  202 
v.  Palmer.  574 

Cable  v.  Cooper,  303 

Cablett  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  97 

Cadden    v.    American    Steel    Barge 

Co.,  195 
Cadwell  v.  Arnheim,  647 
Cagger  v.  Lansing,  56 
Cagney  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 
Cahill  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  481 

v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66, 
470,  477,  484 

v.  Eastman,  17,  701a 

v.  Hilton.  207a,  223 

v.  Lay  ton,  97 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         tare  to  sections. 


lv 


Cahn  v.   Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  538, 

753a,  755 
Cahoon  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  426 
Cain  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R  Co.,  493 

v.  Syracuse,  262,  281,  354 
Cairncross  v.  Pewankee,  355,  376 
Cairo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Murray,  451a,  453 

v.  Stevens,  735 

v.  Woolsey,  453 
Cake  v.  Cannon,  619 
Calder  v.  Chapman,  335 

v.  Hacket,  303 

v.  Smallev,  120,  709a 

v.  Walla  Walla,  363 
Calderwood    v.    North   Birmingham 

R.  Co.,  520 
Caldwell  v.  Murphy,  495,  523 

v.  N.  J.  Steamboat  Co.,  45,  51, 
57,  60,  495,  497,  515 

v.  Shepherd,  557 

v.  Slade,  713,  719 
Calkins  v.  Barger,  16,  669 

v.  Hartford.  606 
Call  v.  Butterick,  734 

v.  Mitchell,  303 
Callagan  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91 
Callahan  v.  Bean,  73a.  74 

v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  160 

v.  Eel  River  R.  Co.,  73 

v.  Morris,  258 

v.  Warne,  54,  61,  112,  690 
Callaway  v.  Mellett,  493 
Callett  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
Calumet  Iron  Co.  v.  Martin,  107,  113 
Calvert  county  v.  Gibson,  257 
Calwell  v.  Boone.  291 
Camden  Co.  v.  Belknap,  210 
Camden,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Baldauf,  550 

v.  Hoosey,  523 
Cameron  v.  Brvan,  630,  748 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  192 

v.  Reynolds,  618 

v.  Union  Tr.  Line,  743,  525 
Camp  v.  Barney,  163 

v.  Hartford,  etc.  Stmb.  Co.,  505 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  550 

v.  Wood,  704,  709,  710 
Campbell   v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57 

v.  Bear  River  Co.,  16,  47 

v.  Bovd,  705 

v.  Bridwell,  419 

v.  Brown,  628 

v.  Cook,  230,  2336,  241c 

v.  Eveleth,  219a 

v.  Goodwin,  676 

v.  Harris,  181,  764 

v.  Kalamazoo,  289,  338 

v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  483 

v.  Kinraid.  562 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194 

v.  Lunsford,  207.  701 

v.  Montgomery,  261,  289,  295 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  675,  670 


Campbell  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  474, 
485 
v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  150 
v.  Page,  637 
v.  Perkins,  486 
v.  Phelps,  248,  618 
v.  Portland  Sugar  Co.,  122,  248, 

492a,  704,  725 
v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  513,  526 
v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  475 
v.  Seaman.  701a 
v.  Somerville,  301 
v.  Stakes,  121 

v.  Stillwater.  346,  355,  358,  647 
v.  Trimble,  635 
v.  Webb,  303 
v.  U.  S.  Foundry  Co.,  675 
Co.  v.  Roediger,  192 
Canada  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  McLaren,  676 
Canadian  Pac.   R.  Co.  v.  Johnston, 

233a 
Canandaigua  v.  Foster,  384 
Canavan  v.  Stuyvesant,  707 
Candee  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 
483 
v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  503 
v.  Western  U.  Tel.    Co.,   547, 
553,  754 
Candelaria  v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co., 

480 
Candiff  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  150, 

513a 
Canefox  v.  Crenshaw,  657 
Canfield  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  150, 

359    749 
Caniff  v.  Blanchard  Nav.  Co.,  404 
Cannavan  v.  Conklin,  120,  725 
Canning  v.  Williamstown,  749a,  761 
Cannon  v.  Midland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  506 
Cannons  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  754 
Canterbury  v.  Attorney-General,  665 
Cantlonv.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  672.  674, 

676 
Cantwell  v.  Appleton,  375 
Capen  v.  Foster,  310 
Capper  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233, 

239 
Carbine  v.  Bennington,  etc.  R.  Co., 

198 
Card  v.  Case,  629 

v.  Eddv,  207a 
v.  Ellsworth,  89,  355 
v.  N.  Y.  and  Harlem  R.  Co., 
100,  428,  484 
Carey  v.  Berkshire,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65, 124 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 
v.  Lawless,  321 
Carhart  v.  Auburn  Gas  Co.,  692 
Cark  v.  Lebanon,  355 
Carle  v.  Bangor,  etc.  R.  Co.  241a 
Carleton  v.  Caribou,  346 

v.  Franconia  Iron,  etc.   Co., 
704,  726 


hi 


References]         TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


CarlUe  v.  Parkins,  629 
Carlin   v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94, 
107,  480 

Carlisle  v.  Brisbane,  66 

v.  Sheldon,  ♦  >T 
Carlon  v.  Ireland,  20 
Carlson  v.  North  West.  Tel.  Co. ,  203a, 
228,  232,  233 
v.  Oregon,   etc.,    R.   Co.,   185, 

406,  775 
v.  Phoenix  Bridge  Co.,  195 
v.  Sioux  Falls,  185 
v.  Stocking,  164 
Carlton  v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co., 

428.  429 
Carlvon  v.  Lovering,  734 
Carman  v.  New  York,  155,  299 

v.  Steubenville,  etc  R.  Co.,  175 
Carmi  v.  Ervin.  66 
Carmichael  v.  Bank  of  Penna.,  597 
Carniody  v.  Boston  Gas  Co.,  693 
Carner  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  750 
Carney  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90,476 

v.  Marseilles,  374 
Carpenter  v.  Blake,  605,  606,  607,  612, 
614 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  459,  500 
v.  Central  Park,  etc.,  R.  Co., 

408 
v.  Cohoes,  8.  334a,  392 
v.  Eastern  Trans.  Line,  49 
v.  Latta,  639 

v.  Mexican  Nat.  R.  Co.,  217 
v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  526 
v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  761a 
v.  Washington,  493 
Carples  v.  N.   Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co., 

739 
Carpue  v.  Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  45 
Carr  v.  Ashland,  373 

v.  Eel  River,  etc.  R.  Co.,  508, 

520 
v.  Northern  Liberties,  262,  274 
v.  North  River  Const.  Co.,  471 
v.  Sheehan.  704 
v  United  States,  249 
v.  West  End  R.  Co.,  110 
Carraher  v.    San    Francisco  Bridge 

Co.,  426.  464,  466 
Carrier  v.  Dorrance,  56 
Carrico  v.  West  Va.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93, 

99,  176.  499.  516,  519 
Carrington  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
64.  484 
v.  St.  Louis,  285,  368 
Carroll  v.  East  Tennessee,  V.   &  G. 
Rv.  Co..  207 
v.  Interstate  Tr.  Co..  523 
v.  Minnesota,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64. 

470 
v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  522,  523 
v.  Rigney,  713 


Cairoll  v.  St.  Louis,  262 

v.  Staten  Island  R.  Co.,  13,  45, 
51,  92,  93,  104,  486,  494,  497, 
515 
v.  Weiler,  636,  638 
v.  Willcutt,  241o 
v.  Williston,  195 
Carruthers  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

195 
Carskaddon  v.  Mills,  705 
Carson  v.  Federal  St.  R.  Co.,  485c 

v.  Leathers,  157,  510 
Carstairs  v.  Taylor,  16,  708 
Carsten  v.  No.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  761a 
Carter  v.  Bennett,   557 

v.  Boston,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  359 
v.  Columbia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108, 

688 
v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  748 
v.  Kansas  City  R.   Co.,  497 
v.  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  61,  64 
v.  Oliver  Oil  Co.,  194a,  213 
v.  Rahway,  289 
v.  Tallcott,  559,  573 
v.  Towne,  34,  56,  686 
Carterville  v.  Cook,  346 
Carthage  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Andrews,  760 
Cartter  v.  Cotter,  219a 
Cartwright  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

521 
Carver  v.    Detroit,    etc.    Plank-road 

Co.,  54 
Carville  v.  Westford,  356 
Cary  v.  Chicago,  298 

v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  503 
v.  Curtis,  249 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  421 
Case  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  407 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  452, 

466 
v.  Northern  Central  R.  Co.,  58, 

676 
v.  Perew,  18,  404 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425 
v.  Terrell,  249 
v.  Waverlv,  289.  369 
Casement  v.  Brown,  166,  168,  737 
Casey  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  218 
v.  Fitchburg,  376 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233b, 

238 
v.  Maiden,  375 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  110 
v.  Smith,  74 

v.  Tama  county,  257,  390 
Cashill  v.  Wright,  49 
Casparey  v.  Portland,  291 
Cass  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53 

v.  Dicks,  735 
Cassadav  v.  Boston  &  Albany  R.  Co., 

216.  2416 
Cassida  v.  Oregon  R.  etc.  Co.,  484 
Cassidy  v.  Stockbridge,  350,  351 


References}  TABLE     OF    CASES.         We  to  sections. 


lvii 


Cassidy  v.  Angell,  108 

v.  Le  Fevre,  744,  750 

v.   Maine   Central  R.  Co.,  91, 

233 
v.'bld  Colony  R.  Co.,  735 
v.  Poughkeepsie,  287 
Castalia  Trout   Club  Co. ,  v.  Castalia 

Sporting  Club,  733 
Castle  v.  Durvee,  318,  322,  686 

v.  Parker,  718 
Castro  v.  Bennet,  568 
Caswell  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  473 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  680 
v.  St.    Mary's,    etc.  Road  Co., 

363 
v.  Worth,  62,  685 
Catawissa  R.  Co.    v.  Armstrong,  52, 

64,  99,  225,  480 
Catharine,  The,  v.  Dickenson,  61 
Catlett  v.  Young,  62 
Caton  v.  Sedalia,  346 
Catron  v.    Nichols,  669 
Cauley  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73 
Caulfield  v.  Bullock,  310 
Cavanagh  v.  Boston,  299 
v.  Dinsmore,  147 
v.  Ocean  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  131 
Caverly  v.  McOwen,  559 
Cavillaud  v.  Yale,  562 
Cawfield  v.  Ashevile  R.  Co.,  508 
Cayzer  v.  Tavlor,  46,  65,  188,  194, 197 
Cecil  v.  Pacific  R  Co.,  436 
Center  v.  Finnev,  645 
Centerville  v.   Woods,   93,  289,  346, 

384 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Attaway,  92 
v.  Brantley,  189 
v.  Brewer,  145 
v.  Brunswick,  etc.  R.  Co.,  13, 

104,  467 
v.  Chapman,  207 
v.  Coggin,  56 
v.  Combs,  504 
v.  Curtis,  13 
v.  De  Bray,  233,  233a 
v.  Dixon,  479 
v.  Feller,  88,  477,  481 
v.  Freeman,  114 
v.  Glass,  463,  483 
v.  Gleason,  103,  408 
v.  Golden,  481a 
v.  Green.  520. 
v.  Ingram,  429 
v.  Keegan,  194 
v.  Kent,  16 
v.  Lanier,  61 
v.  Lee.  431 
v.  Letcher,  492a 
v.  Mason,  107 
v.  Miles,  522 
v.  Mitchell,  103 
v.  Moore.  54.  61,  762 
v.  Morris,  120a 


Central  R.  Co.  v.  Murray,  750 

v.  Nash,  103 

v.  Newman,  64,  103 

v.  Passmore,  185a 

v.  Peacock,  154 

v.  Perry,  87,  488,  510 

v.  Phinazee,  93 

v.  Raiford,  470,  480 

v.  Roberts,  486 

v.  Rouse,  773 

v.  Rylee,  73,  464 

v.  Ryles,  194 

v.  Sears.  60a 

v.  Serfass,  761 

v.  Sims,  185 

v.  Small,  58 

v.  Smith,  103,  480,  508. 

v.  State,  368 

v.  Stoermer,  225 

v.  Summerford,  428 

v.  Thompson,  103,  769,  775 

v.  Thomas,  519 

v.  Van  Horn,  93,  509 

v.  Vaughn,  484 

v.  Denson,  484 

Branch    R.    Co.  v.   Andrews, 
371 

Branch,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hotham, 
53,54 

Branch  R.  Co.  v.  Lea,  453 

Pass    R.    Co.    v.    Chatterson, 
749 

v.  Kuhn,  122 

v.  Rose,  520 

v.  Stevens,  96 

Ohio    R.    Co.    v.    Lawrence, 
419,  429,  460 

Texas  R.  Co.  v.  Nycum,  485 

Trust    Co.  v.  East  Tennessee 
R.  Co.,  2076 

v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  183 

v.   Wabash,   etc.  R.  Co.,  407, 
410 

U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Swoveland,  536, 
753a 
Centralia  v.  Baker,  375 

v.  Krouse.  88,  376 

v.  Scott,  86,  378 
Cesar  v.  Karutz,  709 
Chacey  v.  Fargo,  36,  369 
Cbadbourne  v.  New  Castle,  261 
Chaddock  v.  Plummer,  34 
Chadeayne  v.  Robinson,  735 
Chadron  v.  Glover,  334a,  373 
Chadwick  v.  McCausland,  334 
Chaffee  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  477, 
525.  654 

v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  56,  483, 
519,  52G 
Chalkley  v.  Richmond,  287 
Chamberlain  v.    Enfield,    60b,    346, 
350.  355 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  180 


lviii 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        \flre  to  sections. 


Chamberlain  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
99  434 

v.  Oshkosh,  363 

v.  Wheatland,  378,  647 
Chamberlin  v.  Morgan,  615 
Chambers  v.  Matthews,  657,  659 
Champaign  v.  Forrester,  287 

v.  Patterson,  334,  353 
Champion,  v.  Crandon,  271,  274 
Champlain  v.  Pen  Yan,  354 
Champlin  v.  Pen  Yan,  281 
Chandler  v.  Fremont  county,  257 

v.  How  land.  730 

v.  Lazaras,  721 

v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  133 
Chapel  v.  Smith,  733 
Chapin  v.  Walsh,  707 
Chaplin  v.  Hawes,  649,  651 
Chapman  v.  Chapman,  564 

v.  Cook,  351,  356 

v.  Copeland,  733 

v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  191,  192 

v.  Macon,  369 

v.  Milton.  334a,  338,  367 

v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  31,  102 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  425 

v.  Rochester,  255,  274,  734 

v.  Rose,  20 

v.  Rothwell,  704 

v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  206 

v.  State,  249,  725 

v.  Thornburgh,  617 

v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  756,  761 
Charlebois   v.  Gogebic,    etc.   R.  Co., 

137.  168 
Charles  v.  Taylor,  167,  235 
Charliss  v.  Rankin,  701 
Charlock  v.  Freel,  166,  298,  359 
Charlwood  v.  Greig,  632 
Chartiers  v.  Phillips,  378 

Gas  Co.  v.  Lynch,  168 

etc.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Nester,  343 
Chase  v.  Burlington  and  N.  R.  Co., 
207« 

v.  Cabot,  etc.  Bridge  Co.,  397 

v.  Chase,  419,  657 

v.  Heanev,  574,  592 

v.  Lowell.  350,  354 

v.  Maine  Central  R,  Co.,  107 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  61,  95, 
750 

v.  Oshkosh,  262,  351 

v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  756 
Chasemore  v.  Richards.  729 
Chataign  v.  Bergeron,  686 
Chatfield  v.  Wilson,  700 
Chattanooga  v.  State,  332 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  412 

v.  Clowdis,  472,  769,  775 

v.  Huggins,  51,  495 

v.  Liddell,  502,  748 

v.  Whitehead,  159 
Chats  worth  v.  Ward,  369 


Chatterton  v.  Frankfort,  384 
Chavanne  v.  Frizola,  581 
Chedsey  v.  Canton,  258 
Cheeney  v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  203,  233 
Cheetham  v.  Hampson,  120,  708 
Cheeves  v   Danielly,  37,  735 
Chenango  Bridge  Co.  v.  Lewis,  395 
Cheney  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  463, 

471 
Chenery  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  97,  464 
Chenowith  v.  Chamberlin,  597 
Cherokee,  etc.   Coal  Co.  v.  Britton, 
717 

Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Limb,  772 

Packet  Co.  v.  Hilson,  492a 
Cherry  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 

503 
Chesapeake,   etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Clowes, 
524 

v.  Dyer  County,  415 

v.  Foster,  62,  482 

v.  Hafner,  198 

v.  Lash,  217 

v.  McDowell,  185,  221 

v.  McMichael,  2336 

v.  Osborne,  413 

v.  Reeves,  508 

v.  Wells,  493 

v.  Yost,  62 
Chesley  v.  Mississippi,  etc.  Boom  Co., 
47 

v.  Thompson,  115 
Chesson  v.  Roper  Lumber  Co.,  233a 
Chevallier  v.  State,  249 
Chewning  v.  Ensley  R.  Co.,  476 
Chicago  v.  Apel,  356 

v.  Babcock.  375 

v.  Bixby,  353 

v.  Crooker,  353 

v.  Crosby,  343 

v.  Dalle,  369 

v.  Gallagher,  272,  356 

v.  Herz,  353 

v.  Hesing,  71,  356 

v.  Hoy,  355.  367 

v.  Joney,  167 

v.  Johnson.  356 

v.  Keefe,  137,  370 

v.  Kelly,  749a 

v.  Langlass,  353,  749a 

v.  McCarthy,  353,  369 

v.  McDonald,  356 

v.  McGiven,  53,  353,  367 

v.  McGraw,  299 

v.  McLean.  761 

v.  Major,  71,  73a,  134,  135,  137, 
368,  766,  775 

v.  Martin,  289,  334a,  749a 

v.  Morse  375 

v.  O'Brennan,  709a 

v.  O'Brien,  343 

v.  Powers,  369 

v.  Robbins,  24a,  168,  175,  285 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


lix 


Chicago  v.  Schmidt,  346 
v.  Starr,  T6a 
v.  Stearns,  102 
v.  Turner,  299 
v.  Wright,  356,  393,  396 
Bottling  Co.  v.  McGinnis,  147 
Brick  Co.  v.  Reinneiger,  219 
Brick  Co.  v.  Sobkowiak,  215, 

230 
Cab  Co.  v.  McCarthy,  645 
Citv  R.  Co.  v.  Henry,  762 
Coal  Co.  v.  Norman,  221,  222 
etc.  Coal  Co.  v.  Peterson,  241d" 
Forge  Co.  v.  Van  Dam,  215 
Packing  Co.  v.  Rohan,  209a 
etc.   Smelting    Co.    v.  Collins, 

207 
R.  Co.  v.  Gillam,  773 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  493 
v.  Armstrong,  195 
v.  Arnol,  513a 
v.  Artery,  190 
v.  Avery,  49,  196  410 
v.  Baltz,  673 
v.  Barnes,  441,  668 
v.   Barrie,    100,   425,  428,  430, 

436 
v.    Bayfield,    186,    186a,    203a, 

219/233 
v.  Beatty,  217 
v.  Becker,  71,  73 
v.  Bednorz,  485 
v.  Bell,  110,  472,  476,  490 
v.  Bert,  480 
v.  Bills,  64 
v.  Bixby,  100 
v.  Blevins,  206 
v.  Blumenthal,  516 
v.  Bockoven,  705 
v,  Boggs,  13,  463 
v.  Bolton,  521 
v.  Bradfield,  429 
v.  Brannegan,  451a 
v.  Bryant,  489 
v.  Burger,  680 
v.  Byrum,  495,  520 
v.  Camp,  485c 
v.  Campbell,  434 
v.  Carpenter,  467 
v.  Casey,  148 
v.  Cauffman,  100,  419,  427,  455, 

483 
v.  Caulfield,  457,  761 
v.  Chambers,  61,  180,  417a 
v.  Champion,  1856 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  113 
v.  Clampit,  58.  676 
v.  Clark,  53,  102  111,  181,  429 
v.  Clough,  473,  477 
v  Coss,  479 
v.  Crisman,  27,  62,  478 
v.  Cross,  525 
v.  Dannel.  451 


Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Delcourt,  520 
v.  Dewey,  479 
v.  Dickson,  154,  194a,  426,  485, 

513a,  523 
v.  Diehl,  423 
v.  Dillon,  417 
v.  Doherty,  493 
v.  Donahue,  86,  99 
v.  Dougherty,  468 
v.  Doyle,  241 
t,  Drake,  508 
v.  Dumser,  421 
v.  Dunn,  426 
v.  Dunleavy,  460 
v.  Eininger,  73a,  466,  470 
v.  Fenn,  427,  626 
v.  Few,  195 
v.  Finch,  450 
v.    Fisher,    49,    53,    457,    472, 

478 
v.  Flexman,  154,  513 
v.  Florens,  463. 
v.  Flynn,  202,  2076 
v.  Frazer,  490,  506 
v.  George,  51,  516 
v.  Gertsen,  476 
v.  Gilbert,  675,  678 
v.  Goebel,  471 
v.  Gomes,  461,  475 
v.  Goss,  94 
v.  Govette,  673,  676 
v.  Grablin,  99,  4i0,  466a,  484 
v.  Gregory,  73,  199 
v.  Gretzner,  463,  476,  485 
v.  Gross,  233 
v.  Hague,  521 
v.  Hans,  434,  435 
v.  Harney,  71,  191 
v.  Harris,  451a 
v.  Harwood,  90,  102 
v.  Hatch,  475 
v.  Hawk,  505 
v.  Hazzard.  61,  498 
y.  Hedges,  64,  4816 
v.  Heinrich,  426 
v.  Henderson,  427 
v.  Hinds,  478,  4816 
v.  Hines.  113,  1856,  217,  761 
v,  Hogarth,  100,  463,  483 
v.  Hotz,  27 
v.  Houston,  476,  482 
v.  Howard,  189,  222,  241 
v.  Hunerberg,  742 
y.  Hoyt,  238 
v.  Hunt,  673 
v.  Ingraham,  485c 
v  Jackson,  194,  197,  204,  216 
v  Jacobs,  475 
v.  James,  421 
v.  Johnson,  198,  199,  484 
v.  Jones,  419,  429 
v.  Keefe.  238 
v.  Kellam,  419,  463 


lx 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        {are  to  section,. 


Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kennedy,  455 
v.  Kerr.  18!),  195,  203 

v.  Kneirim,  I94a,  217,  233a 

v.  Krueger,  465 

v.  Landauer,  509,  517,  520 

v.  Lane,  400,  470 

v.  Lee,  90,  93,  102,  461,  478 

v.  Legg,  428 

v.  Levy,  107 

v.  Lewis,  -195.  499 

v.  Logue,  73a,  481a 

v.  Lonergan,  197 

v.  Lowell,  521.  525 

v.  Luebeck,  477,  478 

v.  Lundstrom,  203a,  233,  2336 

v.  McAra,  500 

v.  McArthur,  461 

v.  McBride.  666 

v.  McCarthy,  413 

v.  McCulloch,  772 

v.  McDaniels,  113,  427,  468 

v.  MeGraw,  209a 

v.  McLallen,  52 

v.  McLaughlin,  73,  241e,  484 
v.  Matthews,  199 

v.  May,  232,  233 

v.  Means,  520 

v.  Meech,  410 

v.  Metcalf,  417,  751 

v.  Miller,  88,  89 

v.  Moranda.  232,  235,  238,    762 

v.  Morris,  135,  137   766 

v.  Morton,  425 

v.  Murphy,  180,  241 

v.  Murray,  73 

v.  Nash,  451a 

v.  Nelson,  461,  478 

v.  Netolicky,  467, 4816,  485 

v.  O'Brien,  238 

v.  Olson,  480 

B.,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Oleson,  54 

etc.   R.  Co.  v.   Ostrander,  673 

675,  676 
v.  Parkinson,  89 
v.  Patchin,  57,  419 
v.  Payne,  766 
v.  Peacock  493 
R.  Co.  v.  Pelletier,  493,  512 

^67?'  C°'  V'  Penne11'  666>  676- 

v.  Perkins,  466,  467 

v.  Peterson,  1856 

v.  Pillsbury,  512 

v.  Pontius,  241c 

v.  Pratt,  195 

v.  Prescott,  91,479 

v.  Prouty,  483 

v.  Quaintance,  673 

v.  Ransom,  122 

v.  Ray  burn.  7 

v.  Reid.  425 

v.  Robinson,  403,  478,  485 

v.  Rolvink,  123 


Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co.    v.    Ross     177 
178,  224,  233,  233a 
v.  Rung,  206 
v.  Russell,  199,  406 
v.  Ryan,  47,  87,  99,  460,  476 
v.  Sanders,  464 
v.  Scates,  520 
v.  Seirer,  450 

v.  Shannon,    137,  238,  457,  775 
v.  Sharp,  471,  477 
•v.  Simonson,  680 
v.  Sims,  451a 
v.  Smith,  64,  680,  750 
v.  Snyder,  237 

v.  Spilker,  67,  87,  106,  460,  485- 
v.  Spring,  473 
v.  Stafford,  180. 
v.  Stahley,  241c 
v.  Starmer,  467,  478,  758 
v.  State,  249 
v.  Still.  463,  481,  485 
v.  Stumps,  73,  465,  484,  485 
v.  Sullivan,  191,  192 
v.  Swett,  191,  194,  238,  769,  775 
v.  Sykes,  56,  91,  473 
v.  Taylor,  193,  197,  202,  238 
v.  Tilton,  478 
v.  Triplett,  65,  88,  468,  483 
v.  Trotter,  11,  516 
v.  Utley,  419,  421,  424 
v.  Walsh,  471 
v.  Warner,  410,  761 
v.  West,  64,  151 
v.  Whipple.  413 
v.  White,  408 
v.  Whitton,  132 
v.  Wilcox,  73a,  78,  218 
v.  Willard,  493 

v.  Williams.  478,  666,  668,  675 
v.  Wilson,  477 
v.  Woodworth,  419 
v.  Wymore,  54,  99,  100,  484 
v.  Young,  233a 
v.  Youngs,  497 
Chick  v.  Newburv  county,  333 
Chickering  v.  Robinson,  303 
Chicopee  Bank  v.  Philadelphia  Bank 

580 
Chidsey  v.  Canton,  337,  338,  749a 
Child  v.  Boston,  287 
Childrey  v.  Huntington,  346 
Childs  v.  Boston,  275 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  463 
v.  West  Troy,  351 
Chiles  v.  Drake,  686 
Chilton  v.  Carbondale,  376 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  771 
China  v.  Southwick,  16 
Chipman  v.  Palmer,  123 
Chisholm  v.  Atlantic  Gas  Co.,  693 
v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  455 
v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  457 
v.  State,  111,  375,  398,  401 


References]         TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


lxi 


CLittenden,  Matter  of,  561 
Choate  v.  San  Antonio,  etc.  R. Co.,  508 
Choliette  v.  Omaha,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  502 
Cholmondeley  v.  Clinton,  577 
Chope  v.  Eureka,  258,  289,  337 
Chopin  v.  Badger  Paper  Co.,  219 
Chouteau  v.    Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co., 
421 

v.  Rowse,  313 
Chown  v.  Parrott,  569,  573 
Christensen  v.  Union  Tr.  Line,  485 
Christian  v.  Columbus,  etc.  R.  Co., 
150,  769 

v.  Illinois   Central   R.  Co.,  99, 
484 

v.  Railway  Co.,  190 
Christie  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410 

v.  Griggs,  491,  497,  516 
Christy  v.  Douglas,  557 
Christman  v.  Bruce,  310 
Christner  v.  Cumberland,  etc.  Coal 

Co.,  13 
Chrystal  v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  13,  73a, 

467 
Church  v.  Cherry  field,  57,  352,  363 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207,  493 

v.  Mumford,  562 

of  the  Ascension  v.  Buckhart, 
702 

of  Ascension  v.  Buckhart,  343, 
702 
Churchill  v.  Brooklyn  Life  Ins.  Co., 
572 

v.  Fewkes,  323 

v.  Holt.  21a,  65,  384 

v.  Rosebeck,  93 
Cicero,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Meixner,  102, 

520 
Cielfield  v.  Browning,  217 
Cincinnati  v.  Penny,  274 

v.  Stone,  166.  175,  291,  298 

etc.  R.  Co.    v.  Barber,  203 

v.  Barker,  666.  680 

v.  Butler,  92,  107.  460,  482 

v.  Carper,  91,  148,  488,  520 

v.  Chester,  115,  766 

v.  Claire,  414 

v.  Clark,  233a 

v.  Conley,  190 

v.  Farra,  478 

v.  Gaines.  426 

v.  Grames,  114,  215,  478 

v.  Hoffhines,  440 

v.  Howard,  62,  87,  485 

v.  Kassen,  99 

v.  Lang,  186a 

v.  McMullen,  58,  132,  204,  233a 

v.  Madden,  186a 

v.  Margrat.   233a,  241c 

v.  Mealer,  197 

v.  Palmer,  2336 

v.  Parker,  436 

v.  Ridge,  437,  455 


Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sampson, 
198,  198a 

v.  Smith,  53,  100,  430 

v.  Smock,  675,  680 

v.  Snell,  525 

v.  Stanley,  451a 

v.  Stonecipher,  421 

v.  Street,  451a 

v.  Waterson,  64,  419,  437,  658 

v.  Whitcomb,  46,  485a,  485c 

v.  Wood,  451a 

v.  Wright,  73,  73a,  144.  476 
Circleville  v.  Neuding,  176,  298 
Ciriack  v.  Merchants'  Woolen  Co.,  218 
Citizens'  Bank  v.  Howell,  585,  598 

Coach  Co.  v.  Camden,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  485a 

Gas  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  693 

Loan  Asso'n  v.  Friedley,  559 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Foxley,  54 

R.  Co.  v.  Hobbs,  741 

v.  Ketcham,  359 

v.  Lowe,  772 

v.  Spahr,  520 

v.  Willoeby,  493,  748,  749 

St,  R.  Co.  v.  Steen,  485c,  746 

v.  Twiname,  495,  521,  764 
City  Nat.  Bank  v.  Clinton  Co.  Nat. 
Bank,  581,  587a 

R.  Co.  v.  Findley,  508 

v.  Jones,  99 

v.  Lee,  523 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moores,  144 
Claflin  v.  Wilcox,  644 
Clague  v.  New  Orleans,  291 
Clairain  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  223 
Clampit  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  464, 

483,  485 
Clancy  v.  Bvrne,  120,  708 

v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  485c 
Clanin  v.  Fagan,  626 
Clapp  v.  Ellington,  380 

v.  Kemp,  160,  165 

v.    Minneapolis,    etc.    R.   Co., 
185a.  775 
Clapper  v.  Waterford,  60a,  334,  374 
Clara,  The,  61 
Clara  Killam,  The.  18 
Clardv  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425 
Clare  "v.  National  City  Bank,  159, 166 
Clarendon  Land  Co.  v.  McClelland, 

633 
Clarey  v.  Wiley.  635 
Clarissy  v.  Fire  Department,  265,  295 
Clarita.  The,  18,  86,  160 
Claridge  v.  South  Staffordshire  Tr. 

Co..  115 
Clark  v.  Adair  county,  256 

v.  Adams,  640 

v.  Barnes,  209a 

v.  Barrington,  378 

v.    Binghamton,    etc.    Bridge 
Co.,  283 


lxii 


References]         TABLE    OF    CASES.        l*re  to  sections. 


Clark  v.   Boston,  etc.  R.   Co.,  451a, 

467,  -»77 

v.  Chambers,  34,  65,  73,  74 

v.  ( Ihicago,  363 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  371,  516 

v.  Chambers,  684 

v.  Corinth,  348,  363 

v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  522 

v.  Epworth,  289,  368 

v.  Foot,  669 

v.  Foxcrof  t,  623 

v.  Fry,  175,  289 

v.  Koehler,  146 

v.  Lebanon,  346 

v.  Lincoln  county,  256 

v.  Liston,  195 

v.  Lockport,  289 

v.  Manchester,  705,  767a 

v.  Marshall,  574 

v.  Merchants',  etc.  Trans.  Co., 

v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  466 

v.  Miller,  313,  314 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  217, 

468,  476 

v.  Nevada  Land,  etc.  Co.,  743 

v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
207 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  478 

v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  39 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  198 

v.  Rochester,  274 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  201,  241 

v.  Shoe,  etc.  Co.,   85 

v.  Starin,  145 

v.  State,  252 

v.  Tremont,  373 

v.  Vermont,  etc.  R.  Co.,  168, 
423 

v.  Walt  ham,  370 

v.  Washington,  291 

v.  Westcott,  761 

v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  430 

v.  Wilmington,  283 

v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.  99 

v.  Waltham,  285 
Clarke  v.  Anderson,  723 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  678 

v.  French,  734 

v.   N.    Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  64.  150 

v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  89 

v.  Rhode  Isl.  El.  Light  Co.,  705 

v.  Richmond,  375 

v.  Holmes,  211,  215 
Clarkin   v.    Biwabik   Bessemer   Co., 

689,  705 
Clarksville,  etc.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Atkin- 
son, 385 
Clatsop  Chief,  The,  233 
Clay  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  137 

v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co..  23 

v.  Wood,  654 


Clayards  v.  Dethick,  86,  89,  92 

v.  Forrester,  86 
Claybaugh   v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  185,  203 
Clay  burgh  v.  Chicago,  118 
Clayton  v.  Brooks,  376 
Clear  Lake,  etc.  Co.  v.  Lake  county, 

261 
Cleary  v.  Phila,  etc.  R.  Co.,  475 
Cleaveland  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
429 

v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  676 
Clegg  v.  Dearden,  717 
Cleghorn  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,230, 
749 

v.  Taylor,  702 
Clemence  v.  Auburn,  272,  279,  353, 

363 
Clemmens  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co., 

55,  666 
Clement  v.  Canfield,  444,  445,  457 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.   Co.,   549, 
552,  555 
Clements  v.  La.  Electric  Co.,  13,  87, 

111 
Clendinen  v.  Black,  557 
Cleveland  v.  Bangor,  350 

v.  Bangor  St.  R.  Co.,  408 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  56 

v.  King,  367. 

v.  N.  J.  Steamboat  Co.,  28,  367, 
487,  488,  496,  511 

v.  Spier,  12 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adair,  481,  481a, 
484 

v.  Ahrens,  431 

v.  Beckett,  493 

v.  Baddely,  467 

v.  Brown,  194,  195,  207a,  230, 
425 

v.  Crawford,  65,  108,  114,  476, 
477,  478 

v.  Corrigan,  73 

v.  Curran,  492,  505 

v.  De  Bolt,  421 

v.  Doerr,  485 

v.  Elliott,  94,  99,  419.  432,  662 

v.  Keary,  203a,  233,  233b 

v.  Harrington,  13,  473 

v.  Keely,  461,  473,  479 

v.  Ketcham,  492 

v.  McConnell,  435 

v.  Manson.  78 

v.  Mara.  60a 

v.  Martin,  190,  194 

v.  Maxwell,  513a 

v.  Newell,  516 

v.  Rice,  427 

v.  Rowan,  111,  770 

v.  Schneider,  91,  160 

v.  Scudder,  451a 

v.  Sloan,  60a,  194a,  217 

v.  Stephenson,  484 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


lxiii 


Cleveland  v.  Sutherland,  760 

v.  Swift,  425 

v.  Tartt,  481a,  484 

v.  Terry,  47,  61,  87,  88,  92,  94, 
457,  463,  481 

v.  Walrath,  526 

v.  Walter,  198 

v.  Wynant.  606,  426,  474 

Provision  Co.  v.  Liinmermaier, 
719 

Rolling  Mill  Co.   v.   Corrigan, 
219 
Cleves  v.  Willoughbv,  708 
Clifford  v.  Atlantic  Cotton  Mills,  708 

v.  Dam.  120,  359,  365,  368,  375 

v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  180,  235, 
241 

v.  Davis,  703 
Clifton  v.  Hooper.  619 
Cline  v.  Crescent  City  R.  Co.,  31,  289 
Clinton  v.  Boston  Beer  Co.,  73a,  77 

v.  Cedar  Rapids,  etc.  R.   Co., 
332 

v.  Howard,  365 
Clodfelter   v.  State,  249 
Clopp  v.  Mear.  719 
Clothier  v.  Webster,  327 
Clough  v.  Hoffman,  719 
Cloughessey  v.  Waterbury,  363,  373 
Clow  v.  Pittsburgh  Traction  Co.,  516 
Clulow  v.  McClelland,  380 
Clune  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  674 
Cluney  v.  Cornell  Mills,  207 
Clussman  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  704 

v.  Merkel,  573 
Clyde  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 
Coal  Creek  Min.  Co.  v.  Davis,  189,  195, 

f>35    9;Jg     OQQ 

Coal  Co.V  Estievenard,  207,  209a 

v.  Jones,  209a 
Coal  Run  Coal  Co.  v.  Jones,  717 
Coale  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,   58, 

675 
Coan  v.  Marlborough,  287 
Coates  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  110 

v.  Canaan,  376 

v.  Missouri,  etc.    R.  Co.,    666, 
676,  679 
Cobb  v.  Columbia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  154 

v.  Cit.  Western  R.  Co.,  512 

v.  Kansas  Citv,  etc.  R.  Co.,  423 

v.  Portland,  291 

v.  Standisb,  86,  851,  356,  379 
Cobden  v.  Kendrick,  576 
Coburn  v.  Muskegon  B.  Co.,  737 
Cochran  v.  Dinsmore,  57 

v.  Miller.  748 
Cochrane  v.  Frostburg,  262 

v.  Little.  558 

v.  Maiden,  291 
Cockerham  v.  Nixon,  631.  632 
Cockle  v.  South  Eastern  R.  Co.,  521 
Cockrum  v.  Williamson,  340 


Coddington  v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co., 
51,  495 

v.  Davis,  585 
Codner  v.  Bradford,  334 
Cody  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  England  R.  Co., 

519 
Coe  v.  Piatt,  685 

v.  Wise,  326 
Coffee  v.  N.  Y. ,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  231,  2416 
Coffield  v.  Harris,  661 
Coffin  v.  Palmer,  373,  377 
Cofield  v.  McCabe,  150 
Coggin  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  160 
Coggswell  v.  Baldwin,  628 

v.  West  St.  R.  Co.,  499,  502,  523 
Coglan  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  82 

v,  Dinsmore,  581 
Cogswell  v.  Lexington,  351,  356 

v.  N.  Y.,  New    Haven,     etc. 
R.  Co.,  750 

v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  88,480 
Cohen  v.  Dry  Dock,  etc.  R.  Co.,  150 

v.  Hume.  3:>3 

v.  New  York,  263,  358 
Cohens  v.  Virginia   249 
Cohn  v.  Kansas  City,  376 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  466 
Cohoes  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 

333 
Coit  v.  Sheldon,  562 
Coke  Co.  v.  Roby,  230 
Colburn  v.  Richards,  729 
Colby  v.  Wiscasset,  758 
Colchester  v.  Brook,  100 
Colden  v.  Thurber,  334 
Cole  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  186a 

v.  Fisher,  355.  686 

v.  Goodwin,  210,  550 

v.  Medina.  262,  289 

v.  Muscatine,  283 

v.  Nashville,  262,  263 

v.  Newburyport,   355 
Colegrove  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  122 

v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  31,  93, 
96 
Colelli      v.     N.     J.     Concentrating 

Works,  702 
Coleman  v.  Chester,  289 

v.  Flint,  etc   R.  Co.,  435 

v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  415 

v.    Second  Ave.    R.   Co.,   523, 
524 

v.  Southeastern  R.  Co .,  519 

v.   Wilmington,    etc.   R.    Co., 
194a,  233a 
Coles  v.  Burns,  634 

v.  Clark,  119 
Colfiwell  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  519 
Coif  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  201,  216 
( '.ill'ax  Coal  Co.  v.  Johnson,  194a 
Colgrove  v.  Smith,  176,  359 
Coll.t t  v.  London,  etc.  R.  Co.,  492 


Ixiv 


Rt/ertncts]         TABLE     OF    CASES.         [■■>:■  to  sections. 


Collett  v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  45 
Colley  v.  Westbrook,  367,  3(59 
Collier  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  412 
v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  414 
V.  St.-iiihar.lt.  204,  241 
Collins  v.  Alabama,  etc.  R.  Co.,  150 
v.  Bristol,  etc.  R.  Co.,  544 
v.  Chatiers  Valley  Gas  Co.,  734 
v.  Council  Bluffs,  363,  742 
v.  Crimmins,  195 
v.  Davidson,  89 
v.  Dodge.  375,  758 
v.  Dorchester,  60ft,  356 
v.  Leafey,  356,  362 
v.  McDaniel,  591 
v.  Middle  Level  Com.,  34 
v.   N.    Y.    Cent.   R.   Co.,    673, 

675,  676,  679,  765 
v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  704 
v.  Philadelphia,  274,  287 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  235,  241 
v.  So.  Boston  R.  Co.,  77 
v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  506 
v.  Waltham.  274 
CoUis  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  481a 
Collyer  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  180,  195,204 
Colman  v.  Anderson,  303 
Coloman  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  492a 
Colorado  Coal  Co.  v.  Carpita,  207 

Coal,  etc.  Co.  v.  Lamb,  230,  772 
Electric  Co.   v.  Lubbers,  186a 
Land  Co.  v.  Hartman,  751 
Mortg.  Co.  v.  Rees,  31,60b,  719a 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Holmes,  61 
v.  Nay  Ion,  233,  233a 
R.  Co.  v.  Ogden,  184,  186 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Martin,  241 
Midland  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  212, 
233 
Colrick  v.  Swinburne,  729,  733,  750 
Colt  v.  Noble,  581 

v.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  508 
Colton  v.  Beardsley,  313 

v.  Onderdonk,  689a 
Columbia,  The,  132 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Farrington,  672 
Columbus  v.  Jacques,  334a 
v.  Ogletree.  367.  368 
v.  Sims,  356,  760 
v.  Strassner,  367,  376,  759 
etc.  R  Co.  v.  Arnold,  233 
v.  Bradford,  113,  114,  213 
v.  Bridges,  207,  769 
v.  Erick,  194a.  241c 
v.  Farrell,  506,  509 
v.  Powell,  146,  488 
v.  Webb,  184,  204,  222,  241 
Colvin  v.  Holbrook,  243 
v.  Peabody,  688 
v.  Sutherland,  702. 
Combs  v.  Purrington.  654 
Comer  v.  Consol.  Mining  Co.,  222 


Comerford  v.  Dupuy,  656 

Comes  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  678 

Comings  v.    Hannibal,  etc.    R.    Co., 

423 
Commercial  Bank  v.  Barksdale,  585, 
597 

v.  Rowland,  580a 

v.  Union  Bank,  243,  580,  582, 
584,  5S6 

v.  Varnum,  585,  597 
Comm'l  U.   Tel.  Co.   v.  N.  E.  Tele- 
phone Co. ,  536 
Comminge  v.  Stevenson,  122,  689 
Commissioners  v.  Duckett,  340 

v.  Martin,  337 

etc.  v.  Rose,  573 
Commonwealth  v.  Bartlett,  623 

v.  Boston,  358 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  107,  128, 
135,  466,  525 

v.  Bowman,  333 

v.  Bridge  Co..  395 

v.  Central  Bridge  Co.,  356 

v.  Charlestown,  334,  395 

v.  Deerfield,  332,  374,  392 

v.  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  332,  359 

v.  Fisk,  333 

v.  Forrest,  653 

v.  Green,  256 

v.  Hopkinsville,  332,  337 

v.  Josselvn,  104 

v.  Knox*  104 

v.  Lightfoot,  620 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  104 

v.  Low,  334 

v.  McCoy.  623 

v.  Magee,  623 

v.  Matlack,  249 

v.  Milliman,  332 

v.  Nashua,  etc.  R.  Co.,  332,  359 

v.  New   Bedford   Bridge  Co., 
396 

v.  Newbury,  334 

v.  Newburyport,  332 

v.  Old  Colony,  etc.  R.  Co.,  332 

v.  Passmore,  362 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  415 

v.  Petersham,  334 

v.  Rodes,  249 

v.  Sampson,   104 

v.  Springfield,  258 

v.  Thompson,  609 

v.  Vermont,  etc.  R.  Co.,   332, 
359,  492 

v.  Wilkinson,  385 

v.  Worchester  Turnp.  Co.   389 

Bank  v.  New  York.  291 
Comstock  v.  Des  Moines  R.  Co.,  434, 

436 
Conant  v.  Griffin,  762,  766 
Conaty  v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  477,  485a 
Condict  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  33,  40 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         \are  to  sections. 


lxv 


Condict  v.  Jersey  City,  258,  2S9,  295 
Condifl  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85 
Condon  v.  Mo.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  205 

v.  Sprigg,  7u9a 
Condran  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  489 
Cone  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  26,  188 
Cones  v.  Benton  county,  256,  257 

v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4816 
Confer  v.   N.   Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  674 
Congdon  v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  418 

v.  Cooper,  618 

v.  Norwich,  363,  376 
•Conger  v.  St.  Paul.  etc.  R.  Co.,  513 
Congrave  v.  Southern  Pacific  R.  Co., 

241a 
Congress  Spring  Co.  v.  Edgar,  628,  629 
Congreve  v.  Morgan,  175,  365,  367 

v.  Smith,  14,  120,  175,  365,  367, 
703 
Conhocton  Road    v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  709a 
Conklin  v.  School  District,  256 

v.  Thompson,  121,  262,  355,  688 
Conlan  v.  X.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  233 
Conley  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  458 

v.  Portland,  233 
Conlon  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  207a 

v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194 
Conn  v.  May,  671 
Conneaut  v.  Naef,  376 
Connecticut    Life   Ins.    Co.  v.   New 

Haven  R.  Co.,  28, 115,  124 
Connell  v.  Chesapeake,    etc.  R.  Co., 
51 9 

v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co. ,  756 
Connelly  v.    Hamilton  Woolen   Co., 
216 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 

v.  New  England  R.  Co.,  525 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  93,  112, 
475 
Conners  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co., 
99,  139 

v.  Hennessey,  173 
Connerton   v.  Delaware,    etc.    Canal 

Co.,  4816 
Connolley  v.  Davidson,  237 
Connolly  v.  Boston,  104 

v.  Crescent  City  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Eldredge,  185 

v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  54, 
73a,  104,  654 

v.  Trenton  R.  Co.,  475 

v.  Waltham,  54,  222 
Connor  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  114 

v.  Electric  Traction  Co.,  13.  61, 
467 

v.  State.  750 
Connors  v.  Adams.  314 

v.  Morton,  192.  210 
v.  New  York.  202   296 
Conover  v.  Commonwealth.  621 

[Law  of  NEG.  Vol.  I  —  e.] 


Conrad  v.  Gray,  192 

v.  Ithaca,  28,  289,  291,  328,  356 

v.  Western   U.    Tel.    Co.,    544, 
554 
Conradt  v.  Clauve,  704 
Conroy  v.  Gale,  313,  325 

v.  Iron  Works,  91 

v.  Vulcan  Iron  Works,  215 
Consol.  Coal  Co.  v.  Bruce,  1856 

v.  Clay,  209a,  235 

v.  Haenni,  186a 

v.  Wombacher,  113,  233 

Gas  Co.  v.  Crocker,  99,  693,  696 

Ice  Machine  Co.  v.  Keifer,  122 

Mining  Co.  v.  Clay,  195,  221 

Tr.  Co.  v.  Hone,  770 

v.  Reeves,  654 

Traction  Co.  v.  Scott,  73a,  90, 
485c 
Consumers'  Gas  Co.  v.  Perrego,  693 
Content  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co., 

185 
Continental,  The,  61 
Continental,   etc.  Co.    v.   Stead,    92, 
463,  476 

Nat.  Bank  v.  Nat.  Bank  Com- 
monwealth, 555 
Cenverse  v.  Walker,  97,  705 
Conway  v.  Furst,  168,  173,  207 

v.  Grant,  639 

v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  195 

v.  Jefferson,  370 

v.  Jett,  622 

v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.,  508 
Conyers  v.  Postal  Tel.  Co.,  531,  539 
Cook  v.  Anderson,  665 

v.  Atlanta,  374,  376 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  484 

v.  Champlain  Transp.  Co.,  53, 
61,  85,  680 

v.  Charlestovvn,  355 

v.  Gourdin,  39 

v.  Harris,  334 

v.  Macon,  291 

v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  112 

v.  Milwaukee,  258, 287,  353,  363 

v.  Montague,  355,  713 

v.  Morea,  635 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  56 

v.  Parham,  180 

v.  Pickrel,  639 

v.  Rhodes,  577 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  204,  214, 
230 

v.    Wilmington    Electric    Co., 
359 
Cooke  v.  Baltimore,  etc,  R.  Co. ,  485a 

v.  Bait.  Tr.  Co.  4856,  485c 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  359 

v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  154 

v.  Waring.  626.  632,  633 
Coolbroth  v.  Maine  Central  R.  Co., 
1S5 


lxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Cooley  v,  Brainerd,  422 

v.  Freeholders,  etc.  -'."it! 
Coolidge  v.  Rome,  etc.  It.  Co.,  675 
Coombs  v.  New  Bedford  Card  Co., 
46,  74 
v.  New  Bedford  Cordage  Co., 

203.  218,  219 

v.  Purrington,  353,  375 

v.  Topham,  378 
Coomes  v.  Houghton,  148 
Coon  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.   Co.,  180, 

241 
Coontz  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  194a 
Cooney  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  207 
Coonley  v.  Albany,  262 
Cooper,  Matter  of,  303 

v.  Butler,  217 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  189,  202 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60a 

v.  Delavan,  557 

t.  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  489. 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  471, 
477,  766,  772 

v.  McJunkin,  323 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  180 

v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194a, 

204,  205,  233 

v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Waterloo,  343 
Coops  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  137, 

207 
Coots  v.  Detroit,  185a,  265,  370 
Coopwood  v.  Baldwin,  561 
Cope  v.  Hampton  Co.,  54,  56 
Copeland  v.  Draper,  637 
Coplev  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  107 
Coppins  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  188, 

191,  192 
Corbalis  v.  Newberry,  393 
Corbett  v.  Troy,  363 
Corbin  v.  American  Mills,  160,  165 
Corby  v.  Hill,  705 

Corcoran  v.   Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 
202,  241 

v.  Gas  Co..  215 

v.  Holbrook,  194,  197,  226,  230 

v.  Peekskill,  60c 
Cordell  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  112, 

114,  468,  478 
Core  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  191,  192 
Cork  v.  Blossom,  702 
Corlett  v.  Lavenworth,  89,  376,  379 
Corlin  v.  West  End  R.  Co.,  520 
Corliss  v.  Smith,  631 

v.  Worcester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  767a 
Cornelius  v.  Appleton.  376 
Cornell  v.  Detroit  R.  Co.,  474,  485a 

v.  Skaneateles  R.  Co.,  417a 
Corning  v.  Southland,  618,  623 

v.  Troy  Iron  Works.  729 

Cornish  v.  Farm  Building  Ins.  Co.,  54 

Cornman  v.  Eastern  Counties  R.  Co., 

407,  410,  496,  506,  713 


Cornwall  v.  Sullivan  R.  Co.,  418 

v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108 
Corona  v.  Galveston,  etc.  R  Co.,  2336 
Correll  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  92 
Corrigan  v.  Union  Sugar  Refinery, 

150 
Corry  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  419 
Corsi  v.  Maretzek,  609 
Corson  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  192 
Cortland  Co.  v.  Herkimer  Co. ,  60a 
Corts  v.  Dist.  of  Columbia,  363,  376 
Corwin  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co.,  62, 
421,  437,  440,  445,  449,  451a, 
452 
Cosby  v.  Commonwealth,  303 
Cosgrove  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  426, 
469,  474,  475 

v.  Ogden,  74,  82,  146 

v.  Pitman,  192 
Cosner  v.  Centerville,  376 
Coster  v.  Albany,  249 
Costikyan  v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
Cosulich  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  16,  55, 

57,  665,  666,  683 
Cotchett  v.  Savannah,  etc.,  R.  Co., 

523 
Cothran  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  744,  753a 
Cottv.  Lewiston  R.  Co.,  415 
Cotter  v.  Lindgren,  162,  298 
Cotterell  v.  Jones,  562 
Cotterill  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85 
Cotton  v.   N.  Y. ,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  417a 

v.  Wood,  8,  56,  645,  654 
Cottrell  v.  Finlayson,  561 

v.  Marshall  Infirmary,  11 
Couch  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233, 
233a 

v.  Steel,  9 

v.  Watson  Coal  Co.,  60c 
Coughtrv  v.  Globe  Woolen  Co.,  141 

v.'Williamette  St.  R.  Co.,  474 
Coullard  v.  Tecumseh  Mills.  219a 
Coulter  v.  American  Exp.  Co.,  89 

v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  467 

v.  Pine,  380,  765 
Counsell  v.  Hall,  215 
Counter  v.  Couch,  104.  644 
Countryman  v.  East  Tennessee,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  61 
Coupe  Co.  v.  Maddick,  148 
Coupland  v.  Hardingham,  120,  343 
Courson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  452 
Court  v.  Coroner,  256 
Courtney  v.  Baker,  146 

v.  Cornell,  204 
Courvoisier  v.  Raymond,  762 
Cousins  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  147, 
421,  435 

v.  Paddon,  559 
Couts  v.  Neer.  702 
Covert  v.  Valentine,  733 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


lxvii 


Covington  v.  Bryant,  61,  356 

v.  United  States,  etc.  R.  Co., 
122,  334a,  406 

v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  520 

Co.,  v.  Kinnev,  256 

R.  Co.  v.  Packer,  763 

Transfer  Co.  v.  Kelly,  66 
Cowan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  188, 
194a 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  419 
Cowden  v.  Wright,  115 
Cowen    Lumber  Co.  v.  Western  U. 
Tel.  Co..  553 

v.  Sunderland,  709 
Cowhill  v.  Roberts,  190 
Cowles  v.  Balzer,  657,  663,  664 

v.  Kidder,  731,  732 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197, 
222,  233 
Cowley  v.  Colwell,  672 

v.  Sunderland,  285,  683 
Cowperthwaite,  v.  Sheffield,  585 
Cox  v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  434 

v.  Burbridge,  627,  628,  629,  634 

v.  Livingston,  568 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  434 

v.  Sullivan,  559 

v.   Westchester  Turnpike  Co., 
57.  375 
Coxe  v.  Robbins,  655,  664 
Coxon  v.  Gt.    Western  R.  Co.,   243, 

503 
Coy  v.  Utica,  etc.  R.  Co.,  457 
Coyle  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  633 

v.  Conway,  633 

v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  466 

v.  Pierrepont,  162 
Coyne  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  213,  223 
Cracker  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  513 
Craddock  v.  Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co. 

475 
Craft  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  207a, 
484 

v.  Parker,  117 
Crafter  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  56, 502 
Crafton  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  433 
Crafts  v.  Boston,  112 
Craig  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  192 

v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co..  476 

v.  Sedalia,  289,  334 

v.  Watson,  575 
Craighead  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  496 
Cragie  v.  Hadley,  589 
Crain  v.  Petrie,  033 
Craker  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  154, 

749 
Cram  v.  Met.  R.  Co.,  73,  520 
Cramer  v.  Burlington,  60c,  93,  114 

v.  Oppenstein,  623 
Crandall    v.    Goodrich   Transp.  Co., 
25,  57,  666 

v.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  476 


Crandall  v.  Loomis,  713 

v.  Mcllrath,  192 
Crandell  v.  Eldridge,  664 
Crane  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207 

Elevator   Co.  v.  Lippert,  114, 

742 
v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  478 
v.  Northfield,  53 
v.  Warner,  624 
Cranston  v.  N.   Y.   Central  R.  Co., 

470 
Cratty  v.  Bangor,  104 
Craven  v.  Smith,  180,  188,  212,  214 
Crawford  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 
478 
v.  Georgia  R.  Co. ,  51 
v.    N.  Y.  Central  R.   Co.,  435, 

451a 
v.  West  Side  Bank,  588 
v.  William,  634 
Crawfordsville  v.  Bond,  274,  368 

v.  Smith,  355 
Crawley  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  429 
Crawson  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  756 
Creamer  v.  West  End  R.  Co.,  485c, 

490 
Crebarry  y.  National  Transit  Co.,  207 
Creed  v.  Hartmann,  14,  175,  375 
v.  Kendall.  72 

v.   Pennsylvania,  etc.  R.  Co., 
61,  99,  488,  523 
Cregan  v.  Marston,  194a,  195 
Cregin  v.  Brooklvn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  764, 

768,  713 
Creighton  v.  Kaweah  Canal  Co.,  729 
Cremer  v.  Portland,  86 
Crenshaw  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
434 
v   Ullman,  166,  175 
Cressey  v.  Northern,  etc.  R.  Co.,  418, 

421,  451a 
Crest  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  675 
Crew  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57 
Crilly  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  209a 
Crine  v.  East  Tenn.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  513a 
Crispin  v.  Babbitt,  177,  180,  203,  231, 

233 
Crissey  v.  Hestonville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  508 
Criswell  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co., 

203a,  233 
Crittenden  v.  Wilson,  731 
Crocheron  v.  North  Shore,  etc.  Ferry 

Co.,  496 
Crocker  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co., 
646 
v.  McGregor,  60b 
Croft  v.  Alison,  146,  151,  153 
Crofts  v.  Waterhouse,  494 
Crogan  v.  Schiele,  703 
Cromarty  v.  Boston,  353 
Crommelin  v.  Coxe,  89 
Crompton  v.  Lea,  717 
Cronin  v.  Delavan,  86,  333 


b 


.Will 


References!         TABLE     OF    CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


in. nk  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  47,  672 
Cronkite  v.  Wells,  546 
Crooker  v.  Bragg,  733 

v.    Hutchinson,   568,   570,   572, 
7  ')'■'> 
Crookshank  v.  Kellogg,  56 
Croom  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  510 
Crosby  v.  Ilungerford,  619 
Cross  v.  California  St.  Cable  R.  Co., 
485c 

v.  Elmira,  373 

v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  761a 

v.  Kent,  121 

v.  Koster,  343,  702 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  521 

v.    Kansas   Citv,   etc.  R.    Co., 

v.  Kistler,  588 

v.  Williams.  623 
Crossley  v.  Lightowler,  729,  734 
Crouch  v.  Charleston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108, 

306 
Crouse  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  581,  587a 
Crow  v.  Mechanics',  etc.  Bank,  587 
Crowell  v.  Sonoma  county,  256 
Crowhurst  v.  Amersham  Board,  17 
Crowley  v.  Appleton,  219a 

v.  Cutting,  1856,  2416 

v.  Pacific  Mills,  219a 

v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  124,  131 
Crown  v.  Orr,  184,  185,  216,  218 
Crowther  v.  Yonkers,  356,  375,  377 
Crozier  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  525 

v.  Read,  634 
Cruden  v.  Fentham,  649,  654 
Crum  v.  Conover,  25 
Crumpley  v.   Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co., 

108,  129,  468 
Crusselle  v.  Pugh,  144,  709 
Crutchfield  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 

197,  208 
Crystal  v.  Des  Moines,  352 

Ice  Co.  v.  Sherlock,  203a,  233 
Cuddeback  v.  Jewett,  408 
Cuddy  v.  Horn,  66,  122 
Cuff  v.  Newark,  etc.  R.  Co,,  26,  167, 

173,  699 
Culbertson  v.  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co. 
477, 052 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  472 
Cullen  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
476,  482 

v.  Lord,  637 

v.  National  Roofing  Co.,  2076 

v.  Norton,  203a,  231 
Cullman  v.  McMinn,  379 
Culp  v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  426 
Culver  v.  Streator,  291 
Cumberland  v.  Willison,  274,  291 

etc.  Iron  Co.  v.  Scally,  54,  56 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fazenbaker,  65 

v.  State,  — 

Valley  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  22,406 


Cuming  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  759.  763 
Cumisky  v.  Konosha,  375,  376. 
Cumming  v.    Brooklyn   R.    Co.,    79, 

417,  463,  468 
Cummings  v.  Bannon,  574 

v.  Center  Harbor,  379 

v.  National  Furnace  Co.   59,  93 

v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  128 

v.  Riley,  635 

v.  Worcester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
Cummins  v.  Presley,  99 

v.  Seymour,  262,  272 

v.  Syracuse,  61,  377 
Cunard  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Carey,  225 
Cunningham  v.  Bucklin,  310 

v.  Denver,  367 

v.   International   R.    Co.,    164, 
173. 699 

v.  Lyness,  64,  102,  113 

v.  Macon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  249 

v.  Merrimac  Paper  Co.,  207 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  717 
Curl  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  493 
Curley  v.  Harris,  191,  225 

v.  Illinois  Cent.    R.  Co.,    133, 
466 
Curran  v.  Arkansas,  249 

v.  Boston,  260 

v.  Merchants'  Mfg.  Co.,  218 

v.  Warren  Chem.,  etc.  Co.,  57 

v.  Weiss,  723 
Currier  v.  Boston  Music  Hall,  704 

v.  Lowell,  358 

v.  Ogdensburg,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  359 
Curry  v.  Buffalo,  254 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62,  421, 
436 

v.  Mannington.  289 
Curtain  v.  Somerset,  702 
Curtin  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  756 
Curtis  v.  Avon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  110 

v.  Dineen,  160 

v.  Kiley.  176 

v.  Leavitt,  579 

v.  Mills,  689 
Curtiss  v.  Ayrault  733 

v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53, 
499,  516,  758 
Cushing  v.  Adams,  359,  361 
v.  Bedford,  291 
v.  Boston,  367 
v.  The  Fraser,  61 
Cusick  v.  Adams,  8,  705 

v  Norwich,  369 
Cutting  v.  Marlor,  589 
Cuyler  v.  Rochester,  299 

Dabney  v.  State  Bank,  251 
Dacey  v.  Old  Colonv  R.  Co.,  54 
Daggett  v.  Cohoes,  274.  287 
Dahl  v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  54 
Dahlstrom  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
13,  472,  479,  484 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         \*re  to  sections. 


lxix 


Daigle  v.  Lawrence  Mfg.  Co.,  185 
Dailey  v.  Dismal  Swamp  Canal  Co., 

743 
Daily  v.   Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  483 

v.  Worcester,  356 
Dalay  v.  Savage,  709a 
Dale  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,   60c, 
516 
v.  Humfrey,  179 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  210, 

214  215 
v.  Syracuse,  358,  375 
v.  Webster  county,  350,  376 
Daley  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  128, 194a 
v.  Norwich,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71,  78, 

87,  93,  97 
v.  Quick,  709 
v.  Schaaf,  186,  187 
Dallas  v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 
v.  Scliultz,  287 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spicker,  108 
Dairy  mple  v.  Meade,  333 
Dalton  v.  Denton,  725 
v.  Favour,  686 
v.   Receivers  of  Atlantic,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  163 
v.  Salem.  373 

v.    Southeastern  R.    Co.,    137, 
769,  770 
Daly  v.  Butchers  &  Drover's  Bank, 
582,  583 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  676 
v.  Detroit  C.  R.  Co.,  472 
v.  Hinz,  74 

v.  New  Jersey  Steel  Co.,  137 
v.  Sang,  191,  192 
Dalyell  v.  Tyrer,  160,  162 
Dampman  v.  Penna.  R.  Co.,  516 
Damon  v.  Boston,  356 

v.  Scituate,  104,  379,  654 
Damont  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 

89 
Damour  v.  Lvons,  92,  274 
Dana  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  202, 

205 
Danaher  v.  Brooklyn,  255,  266 
Danbury.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Norwalk,  299 
Danenhoffer  v.  State,  323 
Daniel  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.    Co., 
233a,  241 
v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  8,  25, 

57,  92,  417,  494,  500 
v.  Petersburg:  R.  Co.,  154 
v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  754 
Daniels  v.  Athens,  392,  393 
v.  Ballentine.  40 
v.  Clegg,  86,  379,  644,  649 
v.  Denver,  289 
v.  Hart,  459 
v.  Lebanon, 377 
v.  N.  Y.    &  New   England  R. 

Co..  73 
v.  Potter,  120 


Daniels  v.  Savannah,  etc.  R.  Co.,  137 
v.  Staten   Island,   etc.  R.  Co., 

13,  60c,  476 
v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  194a 
v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  510 
Danner  v.  So.  Carolina  R.  Co.,  108, 

419,  432 
Danolds  v.  State.  251 
Dantzler  v.  De  Bardeleben  Coal  Co., 

246 
Danville  v.  Makemson,  356 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  410 
etc.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  66, 
375,  377,  386 
Dargan  v.  Mobile,  291 
Darling  v.  Bangor,  274 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  430 

v.  N.    Y.,  Providence,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  201 
v.  Thompson,  732 
v.  Westmorland,  369 
Darlington   v.  New   York,  254,  261, 

285,  363 
Darmstetter  v.  Movnahan,  176 
Darracott  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co., 

185,  2076 
Darrigan  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  England 
R.  Co.,  205,  233,  233a 
v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.   R. 
Co.,  180 
Darrington  v.  State  Bank,  250 
Dartmouth  Spinning  Co.  v.  Achord, 

185 
Dartnell  v.  Howard,  575 
Dascomb  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  469 
Dashner  v.  Mills  countv,  256 
Daub  v.  Northern  Pac.'R.  Co.,  233 
Daube  v.  Tennison.  78 
Daughertv  v.  Herzog,  702 
Daughtery  v.  Am.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  754, 

755 
Dauntley  v.  Hyde,  569 
Dave  v.  Morgan's  La.  R.  Co.,  493 
Davenport  v.  Brooklvn  R.  Co.,  521 

v.  Ruckman,  88,   120,  281,  365, 
375,  481,  709a.  712 
Daves  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  232,  245 
Davey  v.  Chamberlain,  122 
v.  Jones,  585 

v.  London,  etc.  R.  Co.,  477 
v.  Southwestern  R.  Co.,  477 
Davi  v.  The  Victoria,  225 
David  v.  Southwestern  R.  Co.,  771 
Davidson  v.  Cornell,  214 
v.  Davidson,  57 
v.  Monkland  R.  Co.,  61 
v.  Nichols,  690 
v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  484, 

485 
v.  Portland,  104 
v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  758 
Davies  v.  England.  219a 
v.  Huebner,  336 


lxx 


Re/ertncts\         TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


Davies  v.  Mann,  99,  646,  651 

v.  Pel  ham  Hod  Elevating  Co., 
207 
Davis,  The,  249 

v.  Augusta  Factory, 218 

v.  Baltimore,  etc.  li.  Co.,  185 

v.  Bangor,  350 

v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  434 

v.  Button.  191 

v.  California  St.  R.  Co.,  3T6 

v.  Campbell,  640 

v.  Central  Congregational  Soc, 

706 
v.  Central  R.   Co.,    194a,   230, 

233 
v.  Charlton,  355 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  26,  28, 
97,  407,  464,  495,  499,  505,  516, 
521 
v.  Clinton  Water  Works  Co., 

118,  265 
v.  Corrv,  369 
v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  180, 192, 

221 
v.  Dudley,  370,  378 
v.  Evans,  701a 
v.  Fuller,  729 
v.  Garrett,  40 
v.  Getchell,  730 
v.  Graham,  215 
v.  Guarnieri,  690 
v.  Guilford,  378 
v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 
v.  Hill,  356 
v.  Jackson,  334 
v.  Jerkins,  396 
v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  478 
v.  Kingston,  363 
v.  Knoxville,  260 
v.  Lamoile  Turnp.  Co.,  258 
v.  Lamoile  Plank-road,  336,  386, 

387 
v.  Leominster,  358 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  524 
v.  Michigan  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  365 
v.  Montgomery,  262 
v.  New  England  R.  Co.,  132, 

133 
v.  New  York,  332 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  93,  476, 

477 
v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 

185b.  207a,  2416 
v.  N.  Y.  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 

223 
v.  Nuttallsburg  Coal  Co.,  2076 
v.  Omaha,  358 
v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94 
v.  Somerville.  104 
v.  Vermont  Central  R.  Co.,  39, 

204 
v.  Wabash  R  Co.,  429 
v.  Walker,  633 


Davis  v.  Winslow,  730 
Dawe  v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Dawkins  v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  148 
Dawson  v.  Lawley,  563 

v.  Manchester,  etc.   R.  Co.,  497 

v.  Merchants'  Bank,  619 

v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  418,  449 

v.  Sloane,  719a 
Dax  v.  Ward,  569 
Day  v.  Akeley  Lumber  Co.,  60c,  672 

v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co..  150 

v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Day,  340.  345,   394 

v.  Highland  St.  R.  Co.,  104 

v.  Milford,  350 

v.  Mt.  Pleasant,  356 

v.  New  Orleans  R.  Co.,  419 

v.  Reynolds,  117,  592 
Dayharsh  v.  Hannibal,   etc.   R.   Co., 

230,  233 
Dayton  v.  N   Y.,  Lake  Erie,   etc.  R, 
Co.,  449 

v.  Pease.  274.  278,  281,  289,  291 

v.  Robert,  729 

v.  Rutherford,  733 
Dealey  v   Muller,  73a 
Dean  v.  Braithwaite,  644 

v.  Brock,  243 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  675 

v.  Gridley,  313 

v.  New  Milford,  257 

v.  Omaha,  etc.  R.  Co.,  449 

v.  St.  Paul  Union  Depot  Co., 
154 

v.  Sullivan  R.  Co.,  466a 
Deane  v.  Clayton,  97,  640 

v.  Roaring  Fork  Light  Co. 
Deans  v.  Wilmington,   etc.,    R. 

484 
Dearborn  v.  Dearborn,  566,  570, 
753 

v.  Union  Nat.  Bank,  588 
De  Baker  v.  Southern  Cal.    R. 

273 

Dibbins  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  475 
Debevoise  v.  N.   Y.,   Lake  Erie,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  131,  132 
Debolt  v.  Carpenter,  333 
DeCamp  v.  Sioux  City,  31,  346 
Decker  v.  Gammon,  365,  627,  634 

v.  Scranton,  363 
Dederichs  v.  Salt  Lake  City  R.  Co., 

473 
Deeds   v.  Chicago,   etc.    R.    Co.,   99, 

2076 
Deery  v.  Camden,  etc.  R.  Co.,  521 
Defer  v.  Detroit,  274 
Defiance  Water  Co.  v.  Olinger,  701a 
Deford's  Case,  298 
Deford  v.  State,  168 
DeForest  v.  Jewett.  185,  209 
DeForrest  v.  Wright,  168 
DeFrance  v.  Spencer,  669,  671 


22? 
Co., 

572, 


Co., 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


lxxi 


Degg  v.  Midland  R.  Co.  182,  183 
DeGinther  v.  New  Jersey  Home,  etc., 

702a 
Degnan  v.  Jordan,  207 
De  Graff   v.  N.   Y.  Central,  etc,  R. 

Co.,  57,  184,  217 
De  Groot  v.  United  States,  249 
De  Ham  v.  Mexico  R.  Co. ,  131 
De  Haven  v   Kensington  Nat.  Bank, 

588 
Dehority  v.  Whitcomb,  709 
Dehring  v.  Comstock,  60 
Deisen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.   Co.,  760, 

775 
Deitrich  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a 
Dekalb  county  v.  Cook,  341 
De  Kay  v.  Chicago,   etc.  R.  Co.,  525 
Delafield  v.  Illinois,  249 
Delahousaye  v.  Judice,  735 
Delamatvr  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

509,  519,  520 
Delaney  v.  Hilton,  206 

V.Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54, 
90,  464 

v.  Penna.  R.  Co.,  725 

v.  Rochereau,  705 
Delano  v.  Case,  589 
Delassus  v.  United  States,  317 
Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co.  v.  Carroll, 
230 

v.  Goldstein,  400,  735 

v.  Lee,  399 

Iron  Works  v.  Nuttall,  195,  203 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashley,  492, 513a, 
523 

v.  Cadow.  481 

v.  Converse,  417,  461,  485 

v.  Hefferan,  475 

v.  Jones.  773 

v.  Salmon,  27,  31,  666,  678 

v.  Shelton,  417 

v.  Toffey,  108 

v.  Trautwein,  104,  486,  506 

v.  Walsh,  493 
Delger  v.  St.  Paul,  289 
Delhi  v.  Youmans,  735 
Delie  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  742 
Dells  v.  Stollenwerk.  147 
Delmonico  v.  New  York,  274,  291 
De  Loge  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co..  54 
De  Lozier  v.  Kentucky  Lumber  Co., 

219 
Delphi  v.  Evans,  283 
Delude  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  185b,  188 
Delzell  v.  Indianapolis  R.  Co.,  408 
Deming  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  40 

v.  Merchants'  Cotton  Press  Co. , 
40 

v.  The  Argonaut,  719 
Demitz  v.  Benton,  662 
De  Montmorency  v.  Devereaux,  567 
Dempsev  v.  N  Y.  Central R.  Co., 410 

v."  Rome,  369,  376 


Den  v.  Hill,  317 
Denby  v.  Miller,  362 
Denison  v.  Lincoln,  639 

v.  Sanford.  376 

v.  Seymour,  246 
Denman  v.  Johnston,  646 
Denman  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99 
Dennett  v.  Wellington.  379 
Dennick  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  132 

v.  Railroad  Co  .  65 
Denning  v.  Gould,  197 
Dennis  v.  Harris,  679 

v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  516 
Dennison  v.  Seymour,  515 
Denny  v.  Manhattan  Co.,  243 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  40 
Denslow  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co., 

733 
Denton  v.  Kernochan,  723 
Denver  v.  Aaron,  368 

v.  Capelli,  274 

v.  Clements,  334 

v.  Dean,  368 

v.  Dunsmore.  281,  289 

v.  Saulcev,  373 

v.  Solomon,  350,  699,  709a 

v.  Williams,  291 

Consolidated    Electric    Co.  r. 
Simpson,  359 

Electric  Co.  v.  Simpson,  60 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  DeGraff,  675 

v.  Dotson,  750 

v.  Driscoll,  233,  233a 

y.  Gustafson,  161.  477 

v.  Harris,  742,  749 

v.  Henderson,  419 

v.  Lorentzen,  759 

v.  Morton,  60c,  666 

v.  Outcalt,  422 

v.  Robbins,  55 

v.  Robinson,  429 

v.  Ryan,  13,  108,  476 

v.  Simpson,  197 

v.  Wilson,  137 

v.  Woodward,  516 

Tramway  Co.  v.  Cloud,  486, 748 

v.  Dwver,  488,  491 

v.  Nesbit,  185 

v.  Reid,  46,  516,  523 
Deny  v.  Correll,  638 
Derby  v.  Kentucky  R.  Co.,  198 

Bank  v.  Landon,  619 
Dermont  v.  Detroit,  274 
DeRoufigny  v.  Peale,  569 
Deltozas  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  521 
Derr  v.  Lehigh  V.  R.  Co.,  185 
DeRutte  v.  N.  Y.,  Albany,  etc.  Tel. 

Co.  503,  532,  537,  544 
Derwort  v.  Loomer,  51,  495,  514 
Deslettes  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  Tel.  Co., 

543 
Detroit  v.  Blackebv.  258,  289 

v.  Chaffee,  298,  343,  384 


Ixxii 


tees]         TABLE    OF    CASES.        {are  to  sections. 


Detroit  v.  Corey,  287,  291,  358 
v.  Put  nam,  289 
etc    K.  Co.  v.  Havt.  424 
v.  Van  Stein  burg,  58,  107 

Detwiler  v.  Lansing,  834,  356 

Deutsch  v.  A  heirs.  70S 
De  Vau  v.  Pa.,  etc.  Canal  Co.,  56 
Deverill  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  56 
Deville  v.  Southern,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85 

v.  So.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  474 
Devine  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co., 241ft 

v.  Savannah,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  207 
Devitt  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  198,  208 
Devlin  v.  Gallagher,  13,  58 

v.  Smith,  38,  184,  189 
Dewald  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co. , 

521 
Deweese  v.  Meraruec  Iron  Co.  188 

v.  Meramec  Mining  Co.,  203 
Dewey  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195, 
196,  233a 

v.  Leonard,  669 
Dewire  v.  Bailey,  87.  92 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  490,  523 

De  Woolfe  v. .  £61 

Dexter  v.  Canton  Toll-bridge  Co.,  380 
Deyo  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  494,  517 
Deyoe  v.  Saratoga  Springs,  291 
De  Young  v.  Irving,  219 
Diamond  v.  Brooklyn,  369 

v.  Northern  Pae.  R.  Co.,  678 

Brick  Co.  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  451 

Iron  Co.  v, 

Match  Co. 

Mill  Co.  v 
Diana,  The,  172 
Dibble  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co.,  140 
Dick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  56,  235 
Dicken  v.    Liverpool  Salt  Co.,  73a, 

705 
Dickens  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co 

769 

Dickerson  v.  Wason,  580a 
Dickey  v.  Maine  Telegraph  Co.,   25, 

851,  359 
Dickins  v.  N.   Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  135, 

768 
Dickinson  v.  Bovle,  39 

v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  136 

v.  Port  Huron,  etc.  R.  Co.,  406 

v.  Worcester,  735 
Dickson  v.  Hollister.  93,  702,  703,  742 

v.  Kewanee  Electric  Light  Co., 
361,  370 

v.  McCoy,  365,  628,  634 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  66 

v.  Omaha,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94,  217, 
466a 

v.  Parker,  656 

v.  Reuter'sTel.  Co.,  543 

v.  Waldron.  145,  150 
Diebold  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  480 


Giles,  1855 

v.  New  Haven,  274 

Groesbeeck,  587a 


56, 


Dieboldt  v.  U.  S.  Baking  Co.,  207 
Diehl  v.  Lehigh  Iron  Co.,  207 
Diehm  v.  Cincinnati,  267 
Dietrich  v.  Northampton,  370 
Digby  v.  Kenton  Works,  102 
Dillaye  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  498 
Dillingham  v.  Anthony,  154 

v.  Fields.  359 

v.  Harden,  217 

v.  Parker,  478 

v.  Pierce,  492a 

v.  Snow,  303 

v.  Teeling,  506 
Dillon  v.  Acme  Oil  Co.,  734 

v.  Hunt,  765 

v.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  184 

v.   Washington   Gaslight   Co., 
359 
Dimes  v.  Petley,  99 
Dimock  v.  Suflield,  351,  355,  379 
Dim  mitt  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  500 
Dingley  v.  Star  Knitting  Co.,  223 
Dinnihan  v.  Lake  Ontario  Imp.  Co., 

704 
Dirmeyer  v.  O'Hern,  758 
Disbrow  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  478 
Distler  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  520 
District  of  Columbia  v.  Armes,  606, 
369 

v.  McElligott,  91,  215,  289 

v.   Washington   Gaslight    Co., 
384 

v.  Woodbury,  249,  263,  289,  367, 
560,  758 
Ditberner  v.  Rogei's,  162 
Ditchett  v.  Spuyten,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93, 

114,  445,  708 
Dittrich  v.  Detroit,  369,  376 
Dixon  v.  Baker,  274 

v.  Bell,  35,  116,  686 

v.  Board  of  Works,  283 

v.  Brooklvn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  359, 
521 

v.    Chicago,   etc.   R.  Co.,  203, 
237,  238 

v.  Pluns,  702 

v.  Ranken,  180 

v.  San  Antonio,  367 

v.  Wachenheimer,  702 

v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  196, 
553 
Dlauhi  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  482 
Dobbin  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233 
Dobbins  v.  Brown,  16,  57,  223 
Dobbyn  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co,,  668 
Dobiecki  v.  Sharp,  458,  477,  506,  519, 

704 
Dockertv  v.  Hutson,  639 
Dodd  v/Holme,  701 
Doel  v.  Sheppard,  685 
Dodge  v.  Boston,  etc.  S.  S.  Co.,  487, 
490.  519 

v.  Granger,  265,  295 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.  {are  to  sections. 


lxxiii 


Doggett  v.  111.  Central  R.  Co.,  523 

v.  Richmond,  etc.   R.   Co.,  28, 
93,  94.  99,  432,  460,  667,  679 
Doherty  v.  Sweetzer,  645 

v.  Waltham,  S56 
Dohn  v.  Dawson,  361 
Doing  v.  N.  Y..  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co., 

194,  194a,  202 
Dolan  v.   Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
90.  14G,  466,  476 

v.  New  burgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  444, 
452 
Dolfinger  v.  Fishback,  626 
Dollard  v.  Roberts,  710,  763 
Doller  v.  Union  R.  Co. ,  485c 
Dolph  v.  Ferris,  627 
Dolrey  v.  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co.,  449 
Dominguez  v.  Orleans  R.  Co.,  408 
Donahoe  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  1856, 
203 

v.  Wabash,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  85 
Donahue  v.  Drowne.  207a 

v.  Enterprise  R.  Co.,  630 

v.  Kendall,  710 

v.  State,  334,  705 
Donald  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  448 
Donaldson  v.  Boston,  368 

v.  Haldane,  558,  562,  575 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54, 
99,  112 

v.  Mississippi,  etc.  R.  Co,,  137, 
775 

v.  Wilson,  708 
Donham  v.  Wild,  621 
Donnegan  v.  Erhardt,  466a 

499,  500 
Donnelly  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476, 
705 

v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co,  66a,  475 

v.  Brown,  195 

v.  Fitch,  606 

v.  Hufschmidt,  244,  759 

v.  Jenkins,  719,  723 

v.  Tripp,  299 
Donner  v.  Ogilvie,  709 
Donoho  v.  Vulcan  Iron  Works,  370 
Donohue  v.  New  York,  274 

v.  State,  8 

v.  Syracuse,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  367 
Donovan  v.  Board  of  Education,  267, 
295,  319,  329 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  675 

v.  Hannibal,   etc.  R.  Co.,  421, 
451a 

v.  Hartford  St.  R.  Co.,  57,  490 

v.  Laing,  161 

v.  McAlpin.  267,  319 

v.  Oakland  R.  Co.,  176 
Dooley  v.  Meriden,  363.  376 

v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  480,  484 

v.  Sullivan.  356.  358 
Dooner  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 

196,  197,  207a,  213 


Doran  v.  East  River  Ferry  Co.,  488, 
491 

Dorchester   Bank   v.    New   England 
Bank,  !  82 

Dore  v.  Milwaukee,  283 

Dorlon  v.  Brooklyn,  291 

Dorman  v.  Ames,  709a 

v.  Broadway  R.  Co.,  483,  485 
v.  Kane,  111 

Dorn  v.  Oyster  Bay,  363,  369 

Dornin  v.  McCandless,  619 

Dorr  v.  McCullough,  114 
v.  Simerson,  735 

Dorrance  v.  Commonwealth,  619,  622 

Dorrity  v.  Rapp,  701 

Dorsey  v.  Racine,  373 

Dosdall  v.  Olmsted  county,  256 

Doso  v.  Billington,  750 

Doss  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  492a 

Doster  v.  Charlotte  St.  R.  Co.,  426 

Dotton  v.  Albion,  369 

Dougan  v.   Champlain  Transp.  Co., 
606,  60c,  87,  367,  496 

Dougherty  v.  Amer.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  543 
v.  Bunting,  371 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
v.  Missouri  R.  Co.,  61,  495,  508 
v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194a 
v.  West  Superior  Iron  Co. ,  112, 
186,  211a 

Doughty  v.  Penobscot,  etc.,  Co.,  233 

Douglas  v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  675 

Douglass  v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  427 
v.  Placerville,  254 
v.  Stevens,  95 

Doulon  v.  Clinton,  307 

Doupe  v.  Genin,  710 

Dow  v.  Rowe,  618 

Dowd  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  2416 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  513a 

Do  well  v.   Burlington,   etc.   R.  Co., 
185 
v.  Gen.  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  61,  99 
v.  Guthrie,  57,  686,  688 

Dovvling  v.  Allen,  219,  209a,  230 

v.   N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  73, 
481a 

Downer  v.  Lent,  310 

v.  Madison  Co.  Bank,  600 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  334 

Downes  v.  Harper  Hospital,  331 

Downev  v.  Hendric,  523 
v.  Sawyer,  203,  218 

Downing  v.  Herrick,  303 

Downs  v.  High  Point,  287 

Dows  v.  Cobb,  22 

Dox  v.  Postmaster-General,  321 

Doyle  v.  Baird,  207a 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  469,  472 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  18 
v.  Detroit  Omnibus  Co.,  645 
v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  190 


Ixxiv 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        \flre  to  sections. 


Doyle  v.  Lynn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  10-4 

v.  Pennsylvania,  etc.  R.  Co., 
lit 

v.  St.  Paul.  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  709 
Drais  v.  1  [ogan,  572 
Drake  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  333 

v.  Kilev,  94 

v.  Lady  Ensley  Coal  Co.,  734 

v.  Lowell,  333,  350,  352,  353 

v.  Mount,  61,  626 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  2076 

v.  N.  Y.  Lackawanna,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  731 

v.  Penna.  R.  Co.,  521 

v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61, 
441 

v.  Rogers,  336 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  186 
Dressell  v.  Kingston,  298 
Drew  v.  Coulton,  310 

v.  Hicks,  735 

v.  New  River  Co. ,  359 

v.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  73a,  115, 
510 

v.  Sutton,  258,  356 
Driess  v.  Friederich,  758,  762 
Drinkwater  v.  Dinsmore,  759 
Driscoll  v.  Carlin,  146,  334,  336,  374 

v.  Fall  River,  192 

v.  New  York,  110 

v.  Norwich,  etc.  R.  Co.,  413 
Drisscoll  v.  Scanlon,  148 
Dritt  v.  Snodgrass,  323 
Drommie  v.  Hogan,  31 
Drovers'   National  Bank  v.    Anglo- 
Am.,  etc.  Co.,  583 
Drury  v.  Worcester,  335 
Dry  mala  v.  Thompson,  204,  205 
Duame  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  471, 

477 
Dubach  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  359 
Dube  v.  Lewiston,  232 
Dublin,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Slattery,  54, 

87,  89.  464,  476 
DuBois  v.  Decker,  95 

v.  Decket,  604,  612,  615 

v.  Kingston,  57,  110,  358,  367 
Du Boise  v.  N.  Y.  Central R.  Co., 463, 

485 
Dubuque,  etc.  Ass.  v.  Dubuque,  375 

Wood.    etc.  Co.  v.    Dubuque, 
40,  739 
Duckworth  v.  Johnson,  137,  766,  769 
Dudley  v.  Bolles,  649 

v.  Camden,  etc.  Ferry  Co.,  92, 
94.  526 

v.  Camden,  etc.  R.  Co.,  487 

v.  Front  St.  R.  Co.,  508 

v.  New  Orleans  Canal  Co.,  386 

v.  Smith,  514 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  531 
Dufer  v.  Cully,  629 


Duff  v.  Budd,  47 
Duffees  * .  Judd,  604 
Duffy  v.  Baltimore,  261 

v.  Chicago,   etc.   R.    Co.,  472, 
476 

v.  Dubuque,  354,  369,  370 

v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co.,  419, 
437,  443 

v.  Upton,  217 
Dugan  v.  Bridge  Co.,  395,  737 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108 
Duggan  v.  Hansen.  627,  663 
Duggins  v.  Watson,  61,  146,  154 
Duke  v.  Kansas   Citv,  etc.  R.  Co., 
436 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  759 
Dumas  v.  Stone,  209a 
Dumont  v.  Kellogg,  729 
Dun  v.  Seaboard,  etc.  R.  Co.,  519 
Dunbar  v.  Boston,  291 
Duncan  v.  Bancroft,  733 

v.  Buffalo,  363 

v.  Breithaupt,  557 

v.  Findlater,  168,  326 

v.  Klinefelter,  625 

v.  Rome  R.  Co.,  485c 

v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  753a 
Dunckle  v.  Kocker,  627 
Duncombe's  Case,  343 
Dundas  v.  Lansing,  368,  369,  376 
Dundee  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Hughes,  574 
Dundon  v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc. 

R.  Co  ,  4(56 
Dungan  v.  Read,  22 
Dunham's  Appeal,  53 
Dunham  Towing  Co.  v.  Dandelin,  89 
Dunkirk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mead,  449 
Dunlap  v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  2076 

v.  Reliance,  516 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 

v.  Monroe,  317,  319,  321 
Dunleavey  v.  Stock  well,  669 
Dunn  v.  Barnwell,  350,  355 

v.  Brown  county,  256 

v.  Brown  Co.  Agr.  Soc,  706 

v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  61,  488, 
523 

v.  Kyle,  589 

v.  New  Haven    Steamb.   Co., 
525 

v.  Wilcox  county,  256 
Dunnigan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  455 
Dunning  v.  Bird,  640 
Dunsback  v.  Hollister,  365,  371,  701a 
Dupen  v.  Keeling,  562 
Du  Pratt  v.  Lick,  173 
Dupuy  v.  Union,  338 
Durant  v.  Palmer,  108,  352,  353,  712 
Durbin  v.  Oregon  R.  Co.,  90,  476 
Durden  v.  Barnett,  629 
Durfee  v.  Johnstown  R.  Co.,  413 
Durgin  v.  Kennett,  664 

v.  Lowell,  356 


References}  TABLE     OF    CASES.         [are  to  sections.  lxXV 


Durgin  v.  Munson,  202 

v.  Neal.  343 
Durham  v.  Goodwin,  627 
Durkee  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  518 
Durkin  v.  Sharp,  203a,  204,  233a 
Durrell  v.  Johnson.  108 
Duryee  v.  New  York,  747 
Dush  v.  Fitzhugh,  103 
Duthie  v.  Washburn,  367,  375 
Button  v.  Weare,  104,  363 
Duval  v.  Hunt,  133,  230,  772,  774 
Duvall  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  426 

v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  476 
Duxbury  v.  Vermont  Cent.  R.   Co., 

414 
Dwight  v.  Elmira,  etc.  R.  Co.,  750 
Dwinell  v.  Abbott,  114,  466 
Dwindle  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 

154,  490.  513 
Dwyer  v.  American  Exp.  Co.,  232 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  679,  766 

v.  N.  Y.  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
90 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  211 

v.  Woulfe,  23,  574,  602 
Dyer  v.  Depui,  731 

v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  66,  93,  417 

v.  Talcott,  107 

v.  Woodbury,  619 
Dygert  v.  Bradley,  10,  16 

ads.  Crane,  623 

v.  Schenck,  14,  279,  365,  374, 
390 
Dysinger  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co., 

185 
Dyson  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  England  R. 

Co.,  463 
Eads  v.  Gains,  701 

v.  Marshall,  346 

v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  493,  513 
Eager  v.  Barnes,  577 
Eagle  v.  Kabrick,  762 

Bank  v.  Chapin,  581 

Packet  Co.  v.  Defries,  60 
Eakin  v.  Brown,  120,  123,  712 
Eames  v.  Patterson,  657 

v.  Salem,  etc.  R.  Co.,  449 
Earhart  v.  Youngblood,  628 
Earing  v.  Lansingh,  649 
Earl  v.  Camp,  303 

v.  Crouch.  705 

v.  Van  Alstine,  626,  629 
Earlev.  Hall,  119,  699 
Earp  v.  Falkner,  633 
Easley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  472 
Eason  v.  East  Tenn.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  481a 
Easter  v.  Hall,  168 

v.  Little  Miami  R.  Co.,  437 
Eastland  v.  Fogo,  334 
Eastman  v.  Amoskeag  Mfg.  Co.,  737 

v.  Clackamas  county,  256 

v.  Curtis,  185h 

v   Judkins,  621 


Eastman  v.  Lake  Shore  R.  Co.,  207& 

v.  Meredith,  256,    258,  285,  337 

v.  Sanborn,  742 
Easton  v.  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 

v.  Neff,  262 

v.  Waters,  493 
Eastwood  v.  Retsof  Min.  Co  ,  202 
East  Haddam  Bank  v.  Scovil,  582,  585 
East  Line,   etc.   R.  Co.  v.  Rushing, 
508 

v.  Scott,  186a,  192,  2076 
East  Omaha  R.  Co.  v.  Godola,  523 
East  River  Bank  v.  Kennedy,  573 
East  Saginaw  R.  Co.  v.  Bohn,  46,  77, 

84 
East  St.  Louis  R.  Co.  v.  Allen  60a 

v.  Eisentraut,  733 

v.  Gerber,  444 

v.  Hightower,  195 

v.  Jenks,  481a 

v.  O'Hara,  461,  467 
East  St.  Louis  Storage  Co.  v.  Crow, 

207 
East  Tenn.    Coal    Co.  v.    Harshaw, 

481a 
East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Aiken, 
11,  102,  195 

v.  Bayliss,  47,  419,  430 

v.  Bridges,  203,  2075 

v.  Conner,  520,  521 

v.  Daniel,  428 

v.  De  Armond,  233,  238 
East  Tenn.,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Duffield, 

91,  210 
East  Tenn  esse,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Duggan, 
103 

R.  Co.  v.  Fain,  103,  472,  483 

v.  Feathers,  470 
East  Tenn.,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fleetwood, 

513 
East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Green, 

523 
East  Tenn.,   etc.  R.  Co.  v.   Gurley, 
192,  207a,  235 

v.  Hall,  666 
East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hart- 
lev,  485 

v.  Head,  209a 

v.  Hesters,  666,  676 

v.  Holmes,  520 

v.  Hughes,  520 

v.  Hull,   102 

v.  Kane,  410 

v.  King,  493,  748 

v.  Kornegay,  475 

v.  Lee,  748 

v.  Lilly.  135 
East  Tenn.,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McClure,76<D 
East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Maloy. 
133 

v.  Markens,  66a 

v.  Massengill,  520 

v.  Miller.  517 


XXVI 


References]         TABLE     OF    CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


East  Tennessee,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Reyn- 
olds, L95 
v.  Rush,  285,  241 

t.  St.  John,  99,  483 
East  Tenn.,    etc.    R.    Co.    v.   Scales, 

431,  469 
East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 

60ri,  207b,  233a 
East  Tenn..  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  222 
East    Tennessee,     etc.     R.     Co.     v. 
Swaney,  469 

R.  Co.  v.  Turvaville,  203 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Watson,  506 

v.  Watters,  419,  448 

v.  Winters,  13 

v.  White,  458,  469 

v.  Wright,  53 
Eastern  Ky.  R.  Co.  v.  Powell,  480, 484 
Eaton  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  31,  65, 
486,  500 

v.  Crips,  646,  654 

v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61 

v.  European,  etc.  R.  Co.,  168 

v.  Fairburv  Waterworks  Co., 
265 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  466 

v.  Manitowoc  Co.,  253 

v.  Oregon  R.  Co.,  679 

v.  Winnie,  633 
Eccles  v.  Darragh,  361 

v.  Stephenson,  562 
Eckensberger  v.  Amend,  654 
Eckerd  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  509, 

759 
Eckhart  v.  Wickwire,  343 
Eckert  v.  Long  Island  Co.,  85 
Ecliff  v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73,  489 
Eddy  v.  Adams,  195 

v.  Bodkin,  215 

v.  Dulaney,  432 

v.  Elliott,'493 

t.  Evans,  419,  427 

v.  Kinney,  664 

v.  Lafayette,  432,  672,  676,  678, 
679,  751 

v.  Prentice,  194a 

v.  Rider,  493 

v.  Rogers,  209a 

v.  Wallace,  520 
Eden  v.  Lexington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  124 
Edenville  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  334 
Edgar  v.  Costello,  124 
Edgerly  v.  Concord,  253,  265 
Edgerton  v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co., 
61,  488,  502,  513a,  516,  523 
v.  New  York,  295 
Edmonson  v.  Moberly,  274,  734 
Edmundson   v.    Pittsburgh,   etc.    R. 

Co.,  173 
Edrington  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

673 
Edsall  v.  Howell,  750 

v.  Vandemark,  644,  645 


Edson  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  27,  426,  427 
Edwards  v.  Beebe,  751 

v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  444 

v.  Cahawba,  550 

v.  Carr,  31 

v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  735 

v.  Dickinson,  321 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  421 

v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co.,  144, 

704,  709 
v.  Jones,  157 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  493 
v.  Lord,  57,  495 

v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451 
v.  Pocahontas,  260 
v.  Three  Rivers,  368,  369 
Ef ron  v.  Wagner  Car  Co. ,  526 
Egan  v.  Dry  Dock,  etc.  R.  Co.,  683 
Egenor  v.  N.  Y.  &  Rockaway  Beach 

R.  Co.,  412 
Egerer  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  332 
Eggleston   v.  Columbia  Turnp.  Co., 

386 
Ehrgott  v.  New  York,  26,  28,  30,  55, 
255,    281,   289,    296,    346,  739, 
740,  742,  749a,  754,  760 
Ehmcke  v.  Porter,  215 
Ehrisman  v.  East  Harrisburg  R.  Co., 

485c 
Eichel  v.  Senhenn,  634,  639 
Eichhorn  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  510 
Eichler  v.  St.  Paul  Furniture  Co.,  195 
Eighmie  v.  Rome,  etc.   R.  Co.,   666, 

678 
Eikenberry  v.  Bazaar,  256 
Eilert  v.  Green  Bay,  etc.  R.   Co.,  463 
Eisenberg  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.    Co., 

705 
Eisenbrey  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  119 
Ekendahl  v.  Hayes,  218 
Elbin  v.  Wilson,  310 
Elder  v.  Bemis,  161 

v.  Lykens  Valley  Coal  Co.,  30, 
734 
Eldridge  v.  Atlas  S.  S.  Co.,  186,  186a, 
233 
v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  89,  519 
Eleanor,  The,  322 
Elgin  v.  Kimball,  274 

v.  Renwick,  86.  377 
Hyd.  Co.  v.  Elgin,  750 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Raymond,  72 
Eliason  v.  Grove,  748 
Elizabethtown,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Combs, 

334 
Elkhardt  v.  Ritter,  346 
Elkington  v.  Holland,  574 
Elkins  v.  Boston,    etc.  R.  Co.,  73,  87, 
476.  481 
v.  McKean,  38,  117 
v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  194,  196 
Ell   v.    Northern    Pac.    R.    Co.,  232, 
241a 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.         lxXVU 


Elledge  v.  National  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 

241a 
Ellet  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39, 113, 

517 
Ellinger  v.  Phila.,   etc.  R.  Co.,   500 
Ellington  v.  Beaver  Dam  Co.,  235, 

238 
Elliott  v.  Carlson,  705 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56,  207, 
241a 

v.  Concord,  358 

v.  Field.  122 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  729 

v.  Hall,  38 

v.  Herz,  628 

v.  Newport  R.  Co.,  519 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Northeastern  R  Co.,  701 

v.  Oil  Citv,  274 

v.  Philadelphia,  291 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65,  194 

v.  Western  IT.  Tel.  Co.,  543 
Ellis  v.  Duncan,  735 

v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  485 

v.  Amer.  Tel. Co.,  534,  537,  545, 
553 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90, 
463,  476 

v.  Loftuslron  Co.,  627 

v.  Lynn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  485& 

v.  McNaughton,  361 

v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
197,  410 

v.  Peru.  376 

v.  Portsmouth,  etc.  R.  Co.,  676 

v.  Sheffield  Gas  Co.,  175 

v.   Southwestern    R.    Co.,    61, 
451a 
Ellison  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  413 
Ells  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  435 
Ellsworth  v.  Campbell,  562 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  416 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  488,  493 

v.  Lord,  703 
Elmer  v.  Locke,  188,  194a,  241 
Elmore  v.  Drainage  Comr's,  256 

v.  Hill,  54,  619 

v.  Overton,  323 
El  Paso  county  v.  Bish,  256 

v.  Causey,  285 
Elster  v.  Springfield.  11 
Elting  v.  East  Chester,  285 
Elwood  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  543 
Ely  v.  Des  Moines,  375 

v.  Niagara  county,  261 

v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114 

v.  Rochester,  737 

v.  Thompson,  303 
Elyton  Land  Co.  v.  Mingea,  66,  376 
Elze  v.  Baumann,  645 
Emblen  v.  Mvers.  74K 
Emhler  v.  Wallkill,  334a.  354 
Embrey  v.  Owen,  729,  730 


Emerson  v.  Lowell  Gas  Co. ,  606,  692, 

693 
Emery  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  742 

v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114 
Emma  Oil  Co.  v.  Hale,  209a 
Emmerlingv.  Graham,  600 
Emmerson  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

434 
Emmons  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

750 
Emory  v.  Minneapolis  Exposition,  704 
Emporia  v.  Schmidling,  36,  376 
Engel  v.  Breitkreitz,  108 
Engel  v.  Eureka  Club,  175 

v.  Smith,  719 
Engelhardt  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 

192 
Engine  Works  v.  Randall,  203a 
England  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
Engle  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58 
English  v.  Brennan,  159 

v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  359 
v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  467 
Engstrom  v.  Ashland  Iron  Co.,  194, 

197 
Enk  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  525 
Ennis  v.  Gray,  698 
Enright  v.  Atlanta,  110,  369 

v.  San  Francisco,  etc.  R.  Co., 

424,  451a 
v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 
Ensign  v.  Livingston  county,  256 
Ensley  R.  Co.  v.  Chewning,  468 
Entwistle  v.  Feighner,  60a 
Eppendorf  v.   Brooklyn  R.   Co.,  87, 

510,  520 
Erd  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  674,  680 

v.  St.  Paul,  375,  376 
Erickson  v.  Twenty-third  St.  R.  Co., 
54 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,   100, 

203,  483 
v.  Duluth.  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 
Erie  v.  Caulkins,  298 

v.  Magill,  87,  376 

v.    Schwingle,     108,   285,    289, 

358,  368,  374,  376 
Iron  Works  v.  Barber,  740,  744 
R.  Co.  v.  Decker,  675 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Schuster,  73 
Tel.  Co.  v.  Grimes,  93,  754 
Ernst  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  53,  86, 

91.92.  Ill,  466,  468,  477 
Erwin  v.  Blake,  573 

v.  Neversink    Steamboat   Co., 

772 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a 
Eshleman  v.  Martic.  750 
Esrey  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.   Co.,  475, 

483,  484 
Ess  v.  Truscott,  597 
Rstelle  v.  Lake  Crystal,  358 
Estes  v.  Troy,  334 


lxxviii  ""-]     TABLE  OF  CASES-     iarg  t0  seetiom' 


Eswin  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 

Ethridge  v.  Philadelphia,  289 

Eufaula  v.  Simmons,  274,  750 

Euler  v.  Sullivan,  701a 

Eureka  Co.  v.  Bass,  215 

Eustace  v.  Jahns,  343 

Evans  v.  Adams  Express  Co.,  6o4 
v    American  Iron  Co.,  218 
v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co..  181 
v.  Chamberlain,  1856,  192,  217 
v.  Chessmond,  717 
v.  Concord  R.  Co.,  13,481b 
v.  Davidson,  145 
v.  Foster,  303 
v.  Huntington,  367 
v.  Kevstone  Gas  Co.,  60b,  693, 

750 "  t,     r* 

v.   Lake  Shore,    etc.    R.    Co  , 

466 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241c 

v.  McDermott,  628 

v.  Merriweather,  729 

v   Nevvland,  125 

v.  Rudv,  526,  751 

v.  Thurston,  619 

v.  Utica,  86,87,  375,  376 

v.  Watrous.  559.  569,  573 

etc.  Brick  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  467 

Evanston  v.  Fitzgerald,  353 

v.  Gunn,  285 

Evansville  v.  Decker,   255,  262,  271, 

272,  274 

v.  Wilter,  369 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Barbee,  424 

v.  Barnes,  185,  489 

v.  Baum,  230 

v   Carvener,  21,  376,  408 

v.  Cates,  493 

v.  Crist,  408 

v.  Darting.  512 

v.  Duel.  222 

v.  Duncan,  521 

v.  Griffin,  97,  705 

v.  Guyton,  191,  192 

v.  Henderson,  185,  218,  241 

v.  Hiatt,  85.  113,  480 

v.  Holcomb,  203 

v.  Krapf,  207,  485 

v.  Lowdermilk,  61,  102. 

v.  Maddux,  219a 

v.  Marohn,  482 

v.  Mosier,  417a,  455 

v.  Ross,  422 

v.  Willis,  434 

v.  Wolf,  71,  74 

Evarts  v.  Kiehl.  303 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99 

Everett  v.  Hydraulic  Co.,  16, 17,  701a, 

732 

v.  Los  Angeles.  653 

v.  Los  Angeles  R.  Co.,  480.  480c 

v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  489 


Evers  v.  Hudson  River  Bridge  Co., 
363 
v   Long  Island  City,  289 
v.  Philadelphia  Traction  Co., 
73a,  485c 
Evertson  v.  Sutton,  303 
Evison  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  485 
Eviston  v.  Cramer,  749 
Ewald  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  190, 

241 
Ewan  v.  Lippincott,  225 
Ewen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co..  65,  /3a 
Ewing  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  419, 
435,  453 
v.  North  Versailles,  55 
v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  761 
Excelsior  Brick  Co.  v.  Haverstraw, 
336 
Electric  Co.  v.  Sweet,  698 
Exchange  Bank  v.  Sutton  Bank,  581 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Delaware,  etc. 

Canal  Co.,  399,  725 
Nat  Bank  v.  Third  Nat.  Bank. 
382,  578 
Explorer,  The,  131 
Eyre  v.  Jordan,  709 


Fabens  v.  Mercantile  Bank,  582,  585, 

598 
Faber  v.  Carlisle  Mfg.  Co.,  232 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  467,  478 
Face  v.  Ionia.  334a 
Factors,  etc.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Werlem,  61 
Fagundes  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  241 
Fahey  v.  Harvard,  367,  384 
Fahn  v.  Reichart,  669 
Fahy  v.  Fargo,  581,  587a 
Failing  v.  Fargo.  587a 
Fair  v  Philadelphia,  271,  274,  287 
Fairbank  Canning  Co  v.  Innes,  185a 
Fairbanks  v.  Haentzche,  203 

v.  Kerr,  28.  35,  55 
Fairchild  v.  Bentley,  629 

v.  California  Stage  Co.,  51,  495, 
516 
Fairfield  v.  Baldwin,  617 
Fairlawn  Coal  Co.  v.  Scranton,  287 
I  Fairmount  Cemetery  v.  Davis,  21 7 

etc  R.  Co.  v.  Stutler,  116,  486, 
508 
Fake  v.  Addicks,  630,  639 
Fales  v.  Cole,  664 

v.  Dearborn,  652 
Falkiner  v.  Great  Southern,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  510 
Fall  River  Works  v.  Fall  River,  334 
Fallon  v.  Boston,  47,  375 

v.  Central  Park,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  8<J 
v.  O'Brien,  365,  634 
Falls  v.  San  Francisco,  etc.  R.  Co., 
502.  506 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Oconto  River  Imp. 
Co.,  729 


References']  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.  lxxix 


Falvey  v.  Northern  Transp.  Co.,  550 

Fanjoy  v.  Seales,  707 

Farber  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  151 

Faren  v.  Sellers,  122,  166,  233 

Faris  v.  Hoberg,  705 

Farisb  v.  Reigle,  51,  486,  495,  514,  516 

Farley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  417 

v.  New  York,  263,  358,  370 

v.  Philadelphia,  350 

v.  Picard,  639 

v.  Philadelphia  Traction  Co., 
497 
Farlow  v.  Kelly,  519 
Farly  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.R.  Co.,  444 
Farman  v.  Ellington.  313,  340,  367 
Farmer,  The,  v.  McCraw,  61,  94 
Farmers'  Bank  v .  Champlain  Transp. 
Co.,  503,  544.  550 

v.  Chester,  313 

v.  Newland,  580a,  583,  587a 

v.  Owen,  584 

etc.  Bank  v.  Third  Nat.  Bank, 
580 
Farnham  v.  Camden,  etc.  R.  Co.,  505 
Farnum  v.  Concord,  350,  351 
Farquar  v.  Roseberg,  289 
Fare  r.  Spartenburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  413 
Farrand  v.  Marshal,  701 
Farrant  v .  Barnes,  690 
Farrar  v.  Greene,  87,  346,  375,  378 
Farrell  v.  Oldtown,  350 
Farrelly  v.  Cincinnati,  8,  739 
Farrer  v.  Greene,  87 
Farris  v.  Cass  Ave.  R.  Co.,  483 
Farve  v.  Louisville,  etc  R.  Co.,  460 
Farwell   v.    Boston  &  Worcester  R. 

Co.,  178,  180,  ,35,  241 
Fash  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  408,  480 
Fassett  v.  Roxbury,  114 
Fassion  v.  Landrey,  365 
Faulkner  v.  Aurora,  262 

v.  ErieR.  Co.,  191. 
Fauvia  v.  New  Orleans,  261 
Favor  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410,426 
Favre  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  113, 

519 
Fawcett  v.  Dole,  310 

v.  York,  etc.  R.  Co.,  418,  449 
Fay  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410 

v.  Parker,  61,  741 

v.  Prentice,  721 
Feather  v.  Reading,  353 
Feaver  v.  Montreal  Tel.  Co.,  543 
Federal  St.,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gibson,  494 
Fee  v.  Columbus,  368 
Feeley  v.  Pearson  Cordage  Co.,  209a, 

.     214 
Feeney  v.  Long  Island  R.   Co.,  466, 

477,  74:5 
Fehnrich  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 

73a,  473 
Feital  v.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  104,  120a. 
503,  516 


Felch  v.  Allen,  207 

v.  Concord  R.  Co.,  99,  481,  484 
Felder  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 
Felice  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  203 
Fell  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  467 

v.  Brown,  557 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  493 
Fellows  v.  Gilhuber,  709 
Felt  v.  Yicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  735 
Felton  v.  Aubrey,  73,  481a 

v.  Deall,  144 
Feltham  v.  England,  195,  227 
Fenaille  v.  Coudert,  559,  574 
Fenderson  v.  Atlantic  City  R.  Co., 

195,  223 
Fennell  v.  Seguin  St.  R.  Co.,  662 
Fenneman  v.  Holden,  88 
Fennimore  v.  New  Orleans,  285 
Fent  v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,   30,  666, 

674 
Fenton,  Matter  of,  561 

v.  Dublin  Steam  Packet  Co., 
162 

v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  485a 
Ferguson  v.  Columbus,  etc.  R.  Co., 
73,  78 

v.    Firmenich   Mfg.    Co.,    734, 
750 

v.  Hubbell,  164,  666,  669 

v.  Kinnoull,  122 

v.  Virginia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  417a 

v.  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.,  408 
Fernandez   v.    Sacramento,   etc.  R. 

Co..  94,  114 
Fernow  v.  Dubuque,  etc.   R.  Co.,  441 
Fero  v.  Buffalo,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  85,  86, 

680 
Ferren  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  194 
Ferris  v.  Aldrich,  719,  719a 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  449 

v.  Union  Ferry  Co.,  511 

v.  Carson  Water  Co.,  265 
Ferriss  v.  Berlin  Machine  Works,  215 
Ferriter  v.  Tyler,  323 
Ferry  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  500,  516 
Fertich  v.  Michener,  323 
Fettritch  v.  Dickenson,  480 
Ficken  v.  Jones.  58,  634 
Fickle  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  436 
Fiedler  v.  S.  Louis,  etc.  R  Co.,  483 
Field  v.  Apple  River  Log  Co.,  737 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62 

v.  Gibbs,  562 

v.  Lelean,  179 

v.  N.  Y.   Central  R.   Co.,  58, 
675.  676 
Fiero  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.   R.   Co., 

213 
Fife  v.  Oshkosh.  343.  368 
Fifield  v  Northern  R.  Co.,  187,  194 

v.  Phoenix,  262 
Fik   Hon    v.    Spring    Valley  Water 
Co  ,  680 


lx 


XXX 


References]        TABLE    OP"    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Filbert  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 

195 
Filburn  v.  People's  Palace  Co.,  629 
Filer  v    N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  54,  87, 

91,  92,  519,  520  743,  760 
File-  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91 
Fillebrown  v.  Hoar,  761 
Filliler  v.  Phippard,  17,  665,  668 
Fillmore  v.  Booth,  659 
Finch  v.  Board,  etc.,  267 

v.    Board  of    Education,   295, 
329 

v.  Karate,  582,  584,  587a 
Findlay  v.  Russell  Wheel  Co.,  232 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  554 

Brewing  Co.,  v.  Bellman,  703 
Fines  v.  Sillery,  192 
Fink  v.  Evans,  427 

v.  Coe,  110 

v.  Desmoines  Ice  Co. ,  194 

v.  Missouri  Furnace  Co. ,  73a 

v.  Potter,  51 

v.  St.  Louis,  298,  358 
Finklestein  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 

461,  471,  481a 
Finlayson  v.  Chicago,  etc.    R.    Co., 
480 

v.  Utica  Mining  Co.,  195 
Finley  v.  Bradley,  656 

v.  Hudson  R.  Co.,  489 

v.  Langston,  670,  671 
Finn  v.  Adrian,  376 
Finnegan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  490 

v.  Fall  River  Gas  Works  Co., 
114,  693,  696 

v.  Moore,  356 
Finnell  v.    Delaware,    etc.    R.    Co., 

197,  207 
Finney  v.  Curtis,  628 
Firkins  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60a 
Firmstone  v.  Wheeley,  736 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Denver, 
584 

v.  City  Nat.  Bank,  583 

v.    Fourth    Nat.     Bank,    583, 
587,  587a 

v.  Graham,  49 

v.  Ocean  Nat.  Bank,  24,  588 

v.  Mansfield  Savings  Bank,  582 

v.  Rex,  588 

v.  Sprague,  579,  582,  592 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.    Co.,   543, 
739,  753a,  754 

v.  Zent,  588 
Firth  v.  Bowling  Iron  Co.,  661,662, 

701a 
Fischer  v.  Langbein,  567 
Fish  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  666,  675 

v.  Dodge,  118,  120,  709a 

v.  Ferris,  121 

v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  2076 

v.  Kellv.  562 

v.  Skut,  628,  636 


Fisher  v.  Boston,  265 

v.  Cambridge,  379 
v,  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  185 
v.  Clark,  633 
v.  Cook,  144,  719 
v.  Farmers'  Loan,  etc.  Co.,  428 
v.  Franklin,  380 
v.  Golladay,  690 
v.  Gordon,  619 
v.  Jansen,  719,  758,  760 
v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  144, 154 
v.  Monongahela  R.  Co.,  478 
v.  New  York,  373 
v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  427 
v.  Prowse,  343 

v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  495 
v.  Thirkell,  365,  703,  708 
v.  Vanmeter,  622 
v.  West  Virginia,  etc.  R.  Co., 
510,  523 
Fishkill  v.  Fishkill  Plank  Road  Co., 

256 
Fisk  v.  Havana,  334 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  201,  2416 
v.  Framingham  Mfg.  Co.,  708 
v.  Wait,  92 
Fiske   v.    Forsythe,    etc.    Bleaching 

Co.,  54 
Fitch  v.  New  York,  262,  263 

v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  676,  680 
v.  Scott,  569 
Fitts  v.  Cream  Citv  R.  Co. ,  57 
Fitz  v.  Boston,  350\  352 
Fitzgerald  v.  Binghamton,  374 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  239 
v.  Binghamton,  254 
v.     Connecticut    Paper     Co., 

185a,  209a,  211a,  214 
v.  Honkomp,  232 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  199 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71,  74, 

418,  424,  466a 
v.  Weston,  60a,  93,  110 
Fitzpatrick   v.  Garrison   Ferry  Co., 
683 
v.  Slocum,  254 
Flack  v.  Green  Island,  334 
Flagg  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451 
v.  Hudson,  346 
v.  Millbury,  104 
v.  Worcester,  273, 283,  287.  299 
Flaherty  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

81,  66 
Flanders  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  201 
v.  Meath,  103 
v.  Norwood,  367 
Flannagan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 
Flannegan    v.    Chesapeake,    etc.   R. 

Co.,  233a 
Flannery  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
"512 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  750 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


lxxxi 


Flansburg  v.  Basin,  632 

Flattes  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 27, 93, 

429,  467 
Fleck  v.  Union  R.  Co.,  523 
Fleckenstein    v.    Dry-Dock,  etc.    R. 

Co.,  485a 
Fleeming  v.  Orr,  626,  629 
Fleet  v.  Hollenkemp,  46,  691 
Fleischner  v.  Pacific  Cable  Co.,  540, 

555,  755 
Fleming  v.  Beck,  28 

v.  East  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  488, 

492 
v.  Davis,  729,  733 
v.  Manchester,  275 
v.  Northampton  Bank,  589 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 
v.  Suspension  Bridge,  286 
v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  733 
Flemming  v.  Western  Pacific  R.  Co., 

112,  476 
Fletcher  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54 
v.  Barnett,  378 

v.  Boston,  etc..  R.  Co.,  47,  502 
v.  Braddick,  172 
v.  Ellsworth,  356 
v.  FitchburgR.  Co.,  478 
v.  Peto,  225 
v.  Rylands,  9,  17,  668 
Fletchers  v.  Bradlev,  618 
Flike  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  188,  193, 

204,  231 
Flinn  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  412, 
672,  673,  675,  676 
v.  Phil..   Wilm.,   etc.  R.   Co., 
504,  519 
Flint  v.  Gloucester  Gas  Co.,  695 

v.  Nor%vich,   etc.  R.  Co.,  410, 

426,  512 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lull.  62,  419,  434 
Flitterling  v.   Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 

450 
Floette  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  181 
Flood  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  217 
Flora  v.  Naney,  334a,  376 
Flori  v.  St.  Louis,  67,  256,  271 
Florida  v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  526 

Central,    etc.    R.   Co.    v.  Wil- 
liams, 88,  103 
R.  etc.  Co.  v.  Webster,  523 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  26,  463, 

483 
So.  R.  Co.  v.  Hirst,  64,  523,  748. 
Flournoy  v.  Jeffersonville.  303 
Flower  v.  Bolingbroke,  572 

v.  Penn..  etc.  R.  Co.,  481a,  492 
Floyd  v.  Nangle,  569 

v.  Philadelphia,    etc.    R.    Co., 
466 
Floytrup  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.,  510 
Fluker  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  144 
Flynn  v.  Beebe,  184 

v.  Campbell,  216 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  —  f .] 


Flynn  v.  Canton  Co.,  14.  257,  343 
v.  Central  R.  Co.,  457 
v.  Eastern  R.  Co  ,  479 
v.  Gallagher,  60 
v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  186,  204, 

215 
■v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  676 
v.  Neosho,  376 
v.  San  Francisco,  etc.  R.  Co., 

94,  666,  678,  680 
v.  Taylor,  362 
Foels  v.  Tonawanda,  369,  741 
Fogarty  v.  Finlav,  594,  602 
Fogassi  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  521 
Fogg  v.  Nahant,  346.  379 
Foley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  203 

v.  Jersey  City  Electric  Co.,  216 
v.  New  York,  373 
v.  Pettee  Machine  Works,  203 
v.  Trov,  363 
v.  Wveth.  701 
Follman  v.  Mankato,  66,  274 
Folsom  v.  Lewis,  120 

v.  Underbill,  334 
Fones  v.  Phillips,  203,  233 
Fontaine   v.    Southern  Pac.  R.  Co., 

120a,  444,  445 
Foot  v.  Wiswall,  246,  515 
Fopper  v.  Wheatland,  652 
Foran  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  478 
Forbes  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  458 

v.   Escambia  county,   256,  266 

v.  Lee  Conservancy  Board,  262 

Ford  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197,  417 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  91,  204, 

211,  214,  233a 
v.  Kendall  School  District,  267 
v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195, 

202,  203 
v.  Lyons,  195 
v.  Parker,  321 
v.  Perkerson,  617 
v.  Southwestern  R.  Co. ,  496 
v.  Umatilla  Co.,  94,  108,  367 
Fordham    v.  Brighton,  etc.  R.    Co., 
89 
v.  London,  etc.  R.  Co.,  519 
Fordyce  v.  Briney,  194,  202,  207a 

v.  Edwards,  207a,  211,  216,  217 
v.  Jackson,  492,  500 
v.  Lowman,  185a 
v.  McCants,  772 
v.  Manuel,  761a 
v.  Merrill.  506 
v.  Nix,  513 
Forker  v.  Sandy  Lake,  375 
Forks  v.  King.  376.  379 
Forney  v.  Geldmacher,  647 
Forster,  Matter  of,  561 
Forsyth  v.  Atlanta,  262 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  521 
v.  Hooper,  165 
Fort  v.  Orndoff ,  744 


XXXI 1 


Refer*Hces\         TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Fori  v.  Whipple,  004,  230,  248 

Fort  Covington  v.  U.  States,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  750 
Fort  Edward,  etc..  Plank  Road  Co. 

v.  Payne  385 
Fort  Hill  Stone  Co.  v.  Orm,  180 
Fort  Plain  Bridge  Co.  v.  Smith,  395 
Fort  Scott,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Karracker, 
676 

v.  Sparks,  513a 

v.  Tubus,  679,  750 
Fort  Smith  v.  York,  289,  337 

Oil  Co.  v.  Slover,  185 
Fort  Wavne  v.  Breese,  376 

v.  Coombs,  287,  368 

v.  DeWitt,  367.  369 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gruff,  217 

v.  Herbold.  434 

v.  Hinebaugh.  445,  446 

v.  O'Keefe,  448 

v.  Woodward,  452 
Fort  Worth  v.  Crawford,  262,  285 

R.  Co.  v.  Ferguson,  41B 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Floyd,  773 

v.  Graves,  201 

v.  Hyatt,  497 

v.  Kennedy,  495 

v.  Mackney,  61 

v.  Measles,"  73 

v.  Peters.  233b 

v.  Robertson,  758 

v.  Viney,  508 

v.  Wallace,  676,  750 
Fortin  v.  Easthampton,  369 
Forward  v.  Pittard,  16 
Fosberry  v.  Waterford,  etc.  R.  Co., 

416 
Fosburg  v.  Phillips  Fuel  Co.,  195,  232 
Foshay  v.  Glen  Haven,  355 
Foss  y.  Boston,  etc.  R. Co.,  521 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  473 
Foster  v.  Chattanooga,  265 

v.  Dixfield,  111 

v.  Essex  Bank,  150,  589 

v.  Goddard,  649 

v.  Holly,  100 

v.  Jack,  557 

v.  Minn.  Central  R.  Co.,  241 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  230 

v.  Pusey,  185,  209a,  219a,  232, 
233 

v.  Si.  Louis,  274 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R  Co.,  436, 448 

v.  Swope,  702 
Foulkes  v.  Metropol.  Dist.  R.  Co.,  502 
Fournet  v.  Morgan's  etc.    S.    S.  Co., 

115 
Fowle  v.  Alexandria,  255.  263 
Fowler   v.   Athens  Waterworks  Co., 
265 

v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108, 
523 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  235,  241 


Fowler  v.  Linguist,  346,  351,  367 

v.  Lock,  181 

v.  Mott,  272,  333 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  476 

v.  Sargent,  607 

v.  Strawberry  Hill,  334a 

v.  Western   TJ.  Tel.    Co.,  537, 
545,  554 
Fowlkes  v.  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  140 
Fox  v.  Borkey,  57,  761 

v.  Buffalo  Park.  706 

v.  Chicago,   etc.  R.   Co.,  207b, 
213 

v.  Glastenbury,  86,  87  107  212, 
376 

v.  Jones,  558,  567 

v.  New  York,  285,  496,  506,  521 

v.  Northern  Liberties,  291 

v.  Peninsular  Lead  Works,  203 

v.  Sackett,  92,  376 

v.  Sand ford,  180 

v.  Spring  Lake  Iron  Co.,  194a 
Foxworthy  v.  Hastings,  343,  363 
Foy  v.  London,  Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co., 

91,  509,519 
Frace  v.  N.   Y.,   Lake  Erie,   etc.  R. 

Co. ,  30,  53,  666 
Fraker  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  180 
Frammell  v.  Little,  635 
France  v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 
Francis  v.  Cockrell   704 

v.  Kansas  City,    etc.   R.   Co., 
207b,  210,  211,215 

v.  New  York  Steam  Co.,  519 

v.  Schoellkop,  750 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  554,  756 
Francisco  v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
Frank  P.  Lee,  The,  13 

v.  Conradi,  708 
Franke  v.  St.  Louis,  92,  702 
Frankel  v.  New  York,  367 
Frankford,  etc.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Phil. 

&  Trenton  R.  Co..  672,  673 
Frankfort  Bridge  Co.  v.  Williams,  386 
Frankland  v.  Cole,  569 
Franklin  v.  Harter,  110,  375 

v.  Low,  321 

v.  Smith,  602 

v.   Southeastern  R.    Co.,    115, 
137,  679 

v.  Southern  Cal.  R.  Co.,  525 

v.  Winona,  etc.  R.  Co.,  188 

Turnp.  Co.  v.  Crockett,  386 
Franz  v.  Mulligan,  710 
Frary  v.  Allen,  256 
Fraser  v.  Freeman,  150 

v.  Red  River  Lumber  Co.,  195 

v.  Tupper,  666 
Frauenthal  v.  Western  TJ.  Tel.  Co., 

531 
Frazer  v.  Kimler,  626 

v.  Lewiston,  258 

v.  South,  etc.  Ala.  R.  Co.,  483 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.      IxXXUl 


Frazer  v.  W.  U.  T.  Co.,  753a 
Frazier  v.  Georgia  R.  Co. ,  133 

v.  New  Orleans  Gas,  etc.  Co., 

585    599 
v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  192,  209a,  226 
Freburg  v.  Davenport,  274 
Freeh  v.  Philadelphia,    etc.  R.  Co., 

57,  108,  480,  483,  485 
Fredenburg  v.  Northern  Cent.  R.  Co., 

194,  197 
Frederick  v.  Lansdale,  287 

v.  Marquette,  etc.  R.  Co.,  493 
Fredericks  v.  Northern  Cent.  R.  Co., 

500 
Freeberg  v.  St.   Paul  Plow  Works, 

207 
Freelove  v.  Cole,  557 
Freeman  v.  Duluth,  etc.  R.  Co.,  466, 
476 
v.  Glens  Falls  Paper  Mill  Co., 

13,  719 
v.  Western  IT.  Tel.  Co. ,  753a. 
Freemantle  v.  London  &  Northwest- 
ern R.  Co.,  672,  675,  680 
Freeport  v.  Isbell,  262,  356 

v.  Marks,  249 
Freer  v.  Cameron,  704,  719 
Freidman  v.  Mathes,  313 
Fremont,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crum,  750 
v.  Harlin,  750 
v.  Marley,  735,  747.  750 
v.  Pounder,  448,  455 
French  v.  Anils,  195 

v.  Brunswick,  107,  111,  367 

v.  Camps,  333 

v.   Conn.   River  Lumber  Co., 

750 
v.  Donaldson,  401 
v.  Taunton  Br.  R.  Co.,  87,  464, 
466,  477 
Frericks  v.  Bermes,  758 
Frey  v.  Lowden,  53 
Frick  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  72, 78, 

483 
Friedman  v.  Gold,  etc.  Tel.  Co.,  536 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  60a 
Friel  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  195 
Friend  v.  Hamill,  310 

v.  Ingersoll,  760 
Frier  v.    Delaware,    etc.    Canal   Co., 

674,  675 
Friess  v.  N.  Y.   Central  R.  Co.,  463, 

466,  468 
Frink  v.  Coe,  495,  514,  749 
v.  Potter,  89,  497,  519 
v.  Schrover,  743 
v.  Scovei,  623 
Frith  v.  Bowling  Iron  Co.,  39 
Fritsch  %'.  Allegheny.  289 
Fritts  v.  Now  England  R.  Co.,  426 
Fritts  v.  Jenner,  54 

v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207b 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  433 


Frizell  v.  Cole,  485 

Frobisher  v.  Fifth  Ave.  Tr.  Co.,  497, 
520 

Fromm  v.  Ide,  22 

Frost  v.  Belmont,  254 

v.  Berkeley  Phosph.  Co.,  701a 
v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  464 
v.  Portland,  348,  350 
v.  Waltham,  110,  375,  376 

Frostburg  v.  Dufty,  274 

Frostbury  v.  Hitchins,  289 

Fry  v.  Derstler,  115 

Fuchs  v.  St.  Louis,  287 

v.  Schmidt.  118,  703 

Fulks,  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 

Fuller  v.  Atlanta,  274 
v.  Bennett,  69 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  113 
v.  Chicopee  Mfg.  Co. ,  728 
v.  Citizens'  Nat.  Bank,  57,  164, 

165 
v.  Grand  Rapids,  298 
v.  Hyde  Park,  375 
v.  Jackson,  334a.  368,  369,  742 
v.  Jewett,  194,  194a,   197,  204, 

233,  705 
v.  Naugatuck  R.  Co.,  53,  115, 
508 

Fulliam  v.  Muscatine,  352,  376 

Fulsom  v.  Underbill.  376 

Fulsome  v.  Concord,  346 

Fulton  v.  Tucker,  343,  384 

Bag,  etc.  Mills  v.  Wilson,  207b, 

241d 
county  v.  Rickel,  257 
Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Baldwin,  118, 

313,  325.  341 
Iron  Works  v.  Kimball,  380 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Butler,  472 
St.  R.  Co.  v.  McConnell,  359 

Fultz  v.  Wycoff ,  633 

Funk  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  241c 

Funston  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  463, 
478 

Furlong  v.  Carroll,  668 

Furley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  633 

Furman  St.,  Matter  of,  283 

Furnell  v.  St.  Paul,  289,  353 

Furnish  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  494, 
516 

Fusili  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. ,  481 

Futch  v.  Walker,  625 

Gaasbeck  v.  Saugerties,  356 
Gabrielson  v.  Waydill,  233 
Gadsden  R   Co.  v.  Causter,  93,  495, 

521 
Gaffney  v.  Brown,  704 

v.  Inman  Mfg.  Co.,  207 
Gage  v.  Pontiac,  etc.  R.  Co.,  415 
Gagg  v.  Vetter,  54 
Oagnon  v.  Seaconnet  Mills,  185a 
Gahagan  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92, 479 


lxxxiv 


References}         TABLE     OF     CASES.         {are  to  sections. 


Gahan  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co..  756 
Gaillard  v.  Smart,  569,  573 
Gailor  v.  Herrick,  256 
Qalbraith  v.  West  End  R.  Co..  49,654 
Galon  v.  Civile  Plank  Road  Co.,  256 
Galena,  etc   R.  Co   v.  Crawford,  421 

v.  Dill.  53,  463.  468 

v.  Fav,  60a.  495,  524 

v.  Gr'iiien,  436 

v.  Jacobs,  102 

v.  Looniis,  27,  469,  482 

v.  Rae,  155 

v.  Yarwood,  53,  495,  516,  519 
Galesburg  v.  Benedict,  369 
v.  Hall,  376 

Electric  Co.  v.  Manville,  426 
Gall  v.  Funkenstein,  562 
Gallagher  v.  Bowie,  495,  514,  761 

v.   New  England  R.  Co.,  421, 
436 

v.  Piper,  227 
Gallaher  v.  Thompson,  605>607 
Gallena  v.  Hot  Spring,  etc.   R.  Co., 

151,493 
Galligan  v.  Metacomet  Mfg.  Co..  705 
Gallin  v.  London  &  Northw.  R.  Co., 

505 
Galloway  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  1, 
410,  492a 

v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  178 
Galpin  v.  Chicago,   etc.  R.   Co.,  57, 

418,  676 
Galveston  v.  Barbour,  258,  763 

v.  Gonzales,  384 

v.  Hemmis,  370,  376 

v.  Posnainsky,  258,  289,  346 

v.  Smith,  369 

Land  Co.  v.  Levv,  702 

Oil  Co.  v.  Morton,  705 

City  R.  Co.  v.  Hewitt,  483 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Arispe,  185,  192 

v.  Brocken,  90 

v.  Cooper.  521 

v.  Delehanty,  205 

v.  Downey,  751 

v.  Drew,  209a,  210,  230 

v.  Duelm,  460 

v.  Faber,  192,  241 

v.  Garteiser,  413 

v.  Home,  750 

v.  Kutac,  66,  67,  476 

v.  Lempe.  185 

v.  Long,  496 

v.  Matula,  463,  472 

v.  Moore,  73,  78 

v.  Norris,  238 

v.  Ryan,  88 

v.  Rvon,  484 

v.  Smith.  2336 

v.  Sweeney.  2076 

v.  Templeton.  194a 

v.  Thornsberrv,  759 

v.  Waldo,  241c 


Galveston  v,  Ware,  741 

v.  White.  359 

v.  Worthv,  767,  775 
Galvin  v.  Gualala  Mill  Co.,  671 

v.  New  York,  31,  107,  111,  112, 
114,  181,  207a,  285 

v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  189,  207 
Gambert  v.  Hart,  558,  559,  565 
Gamble  v.  Hine,  219 

v.  St.  Louis,  334 
Gammage   v.    Atlanta,   etc.  R.  Co., 

4816. 
Gandy  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  58,  676 

v.  Jubber,  120 
Gangewer  v.  Phila.,  etc.  R.  Co., 475 
Ganiard  v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  87, 

490,  521 
Gannon  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  181 
Gardner  v.  Bennett,  60a 

v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 

v.  Heartt,  19,  20,  119 

v.  Michigan  Cent.   R.  Co.,  54, 
194 

v.  New  Haven,  etc.  Co. ,  489 

v.  Smith,  421,  423,  446,  451a 

v.  State,  323 

v.  Ward,  310 
Gardiner  v.  Johnston,  274 
Garfield  v.  Douglass,  303 
Garland  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  483 

v.  Towne,  17,  343 
Garlinghouse  v.  Jacobs,  276.  313,  338 
Garmon  v.  Bangor,  46,  68,  86,  644 
Garner  v.  Green,  333 
Garnett  v.  Slater,  334 
Gamier  v.  Porter,  669 
Garrahy  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 

233 
Garratt  v.  Canandaigua,  271,  274 
Garrett  v.  Cbicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58, 
114,  680 

v.  Freeman,  668 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  555,  755 
Garris  v.  Portsmouth,  etc.  R.  Co.,  16, 

419 
Garrison  v.  Barnes,  635 

v.  New  York,  285 
Garry  v.  Lafayette,  299 
Gartland  v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  218 
Gartside  Coal  Co   v.  Turk,  218 
Garwood  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  729 
Gas  Fuel  Co.  v.  Andrews,  692 
Gaston  v.  Mace,  737 
Gaston  v.  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.,  749 
Gates  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  191 

v.  Fleischer.  607 

v.  Latta,  688a 

v.  Neal,  310 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.    Co.,   214, 
416 

v.  Southern  Minn.  R.    Co.,   189 

v.  State.  219a 
Gaughan  v.  Philadelphia,  375 


References}         TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections.        IxXXV 


Gaul  v.  Rochester  Paper  Co. ,  216 
Gautret  v.  Egerton,  401,  705 
Gavett  v.  Manchester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89, 

520,  523 
Gavigan  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

186 
Gavin  v.  Chicago,  370 
Gavitt  v.  Jackson,  343 
Gay  v.  Cambridge,  367,  373 

v.  Essex,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73 

v.  Wadley,  429 

v.  Winter,  65,  108,  111,  112 
Gayettev.  Fitchburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  222 
Gavford  v.  Nichols,  173 
Gaylor  v.  Hunt,  303 
Gaylord  v.  New  Britain,  363 
Gaynor  v.  Old  Colony,  etc.  R.   Co., 

53,  54,  107,  490,  525 
Gearns  v.  Bowery  Sav.  Bank,  588 
Geddis  v.  Bann  Reservoir,  283 
Gee  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  60,  65, 

85,  89,  92 
Geer  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  415 

v.  Darrow,  165 
Geiselman  v.  Scott,  85,  615 
Geismer  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

155 
Geloneck  v.  Dean  Pump  Co.,  194 
General  Steam  Nav.  Co.   v.  British, 

etc.,  Nav.  Co.,  160 
Gen.  Steam  Xav.  Co.  v.  Mann,  61 
Genenz  v.  De  Forest,  632 
Geneva  v.  Brush  Electric  Co.,  384 
Genung  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  England  R. 

Co.,  675.  676.  678 
Geoghegan  v.  Atlas  Steamship  Co., 

57,  131 
Geogheghan  v.  N.  Y..  New  Haven, 

etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
George  &  Richard,  The,  133 
George  v.  Fisk,  39 

v.  Haverhill,  89 

v.  Skivington,  38,  116 
Georgia  It.  Co.  v.  Berry,  750 

v.  Brown,  241c 

v.  Burke,  429 

v.  Carr,  467 

v.  Daniel.  470,  4S3 

v.  Doughertv,  493,  749 

v.  Eskew,  95,  493 

v.  Fisk,  431 

v.  McDade,  103 

v.  Mayo,  408 

v.  Middlebrooks,  432 

v.  Miller,  241c 

v.  Nelms   195,  241c 

v.  Nevvsome,  154,  426 

v.  Olds,  493 

v.  Parks,  432 

v.  Pittinan,  103 

v.  Thomas,  426 

v.  Wood,  151 

\.  Wynn,  135 


Georgia  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  440 

v.  Asmore,  493 

v.  Davis,  108 

v.  Dougherty,  493 

v.  Hallman,  207 

v.  Harris,  432 

v.  Neelv,  99,  103,  419,  428 

v.  Oaks,  187 

v.  Parks,  359 

v.  Rhodes,  180,  216 

Central  R.  Co.  v.  Phinazee,  413 

Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Evans,  113, 
463 

Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  201,  2075 

v.  Dooley,  241d 

v.  Hughes,  66,  516 

v.  Lee,  476 

v.  Love,  516 

v.  Money,  448 

v.  Propst,  114 

v.  Underwood,  519 
Georgetown  v.  Alexandria  Canal  Co., 

333 
Geraghty  v.  New,  1 1 5 
Gerald  v.  Boston,  375 
Geraty  v.  Nat.  Ice  Co.,  645 
Gerdes  v.  Christopher  Foundry  Co., 

362 
Gerety  v.  Phila.  R.  Co.,  477 
Gerhard  v.  Bates,  28 
Gerhardt  v.  Boatman's  Savings  Inst., 

585 
Geritv  v.  Haley,  106 
Gerlach  v.  Edelmever,  60,  160,  162, 

225 
Germaine  v.  Muskegon,  376 
German  Amer.  Bank  v.  Auth,  589 

Nat.  Bank  v.  Burns,  583 

Theo.  School  v.  Dubuque,  271, 
274 
Gerren  v.   Hannibal,    etc.,    R.   Co., 

435 
Germantown  Pass.  R.  Co.  v.  Brophy, 

519 
Gerrish  v.  Edson,  624 

v.  New  Haven  Ice  Co.,  231,  233 
Gessley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  471 
Gettwbrth  v.  Hedden,  701 
Getty  v.  Hamiin,  374 
Gheens  v.  Golden,  113 
Gherkins  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

484 
Gianfortone  "^    New  Orleans,  261 
Gibbon  v.  Coggon,  0 1 9 
Gibbons  v.  Phoenix,  376 

v.  United  States.  249 

v.  Wilkesbarre  R.  Co.,  89,  485c 

v.  Williams,  73a.  74 
Gibbs  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  426 

v.  Liverpool  Docks,  327 
Giblin  v.  McMullen,  49 
Gibnev  v.  Lewis,  748 

v.  State,  30,  85 


lxx: 


XVI 


Rtftrtncts\  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


Gibraltar  Sanitary  Commissions  v. 

Orfila,  254 
Gibson  v.  Denton.  702 
v.  Emerson,  257 

v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  178, 185,  198,  209 

v.  Huntington,  370 

v.  Leonard,  27,  52,  685,  705,  719 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  215 

v.    Northern  Central    R.   Co., 
204 

v.  Oregon  Short  Line,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  202 

v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  184,  194 
Gier  v.  Los  Angeles  R.  Co.,  192 
Giger  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  455 
Gilbersou,  Ex  parte.  558 
Gilbert  v.  Beach,  174 

v.  Boston,  375 

v.  Guild,  219a 

v.  Roxbury,  363 

v.  Savannah,  etc.  R.  Co.,  735 

v.  Trinity  House,  327 

v.  Schwenck,  115 

v.  West  End  R.  Co.,  496 

v.  Williams,  559,  568.  569 
Gilbertsonv.  Forty- second  St.  R.  Co., 

758, 761 
Gilbraith  v.  Littiech,  336 
Gilchrist  v.  South  Omaha,  356 
Giles  v.  Diamond,  etc.  Co.,  702 

v.  School  District,  256 
Gill  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  419,  437 

v.  Homrighausen,  212 

v.  Longher,  567 

v.  Middleton,  708 

v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  493 
Gillenwater  v.  Madison,  etc.  R.  Co., 

234,  486,  491 
Gillerly  v.  Madison,  287 
Gillespie  v.  Lincoln,  265 

v.  McGowan,  58.  703 

v.  Newburgh.  85,  90,  375,  476 

v.  Palmer,  310 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  16 
Gillett  v.  Johnson,  729 

v.  Kinderhook,  274 

v.  Western  R.    Co.,   408,    751, 
752 
Gilliam  v.  Roddick,  313 
Gilligan  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  115,  739 
Gillingham  v.  Christen,  668 
Gillis  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co. ,  449 

v.    Pennsylvania  R.   Co.,  410, 
418,  492*«,  705 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.    Co.,  547, 
553 
Gillison  v.  Charleston,  274 
Gilloon  v.  Reilly,  710 
Gillrie  v.  Lockport,  363 
Gillshannon  v.  Stoney  Brook  R.  Co., 

61,  239 
Gillum  v.  Sisson.  97 
Gilman  v.  Deerfield,  89 


Oilman  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  191,  203a, 
239 

v.  Hovev,  574 

v.  Laconia,  256,  370 

v.  Noyes,  55 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spencer,  27 
Gilmartin  v.  New  York,  299 
Gilmore  v.  Brooklyn  Heights  R.  Co., 
516 

v.  Driscoll,  701 

v.  Federal  St.  R.  Co.,  485b 

v.Oxford  Iron  Co.,  232 

v.    Philadelphia,   etc    R.    Co., 
490 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co..  205 
Gilpatrick  v.  Biddeford,  274 
Gilson  v.  Collins.  242 
Gilsinger  v.  Saugerties  Water  Co., 

729 
Ginna  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  523 
Ginnon  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  519 
Giraudi  v.  Electric  Imp.  Co.,  698 
Gisson  v.  Schwabacher.  194 
Gist  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  753a 
Given  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  540, 

540a 
Givens  v.  Briscoe,  573 

v.  Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co.,  139 

v.  Paris,  291 
Gladman  v.  Johnson,  630 
Glascock  v.  Central  Pac.  R.   Co.,  476 

482 
Glasier  v.  Hebron,  356 
Glass  v.  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480, 

484 
Glassey  v.  Hestonville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

56,  71,  73a 
Glazebrook  v.  West  End  R.  Co.,  485a 
Gleason  v.  Amsdel,  157, 

v.  Boehm,  61 

v.  Bremen,  107,  375 

v.  Clark,  568.  569 

v.  Excelsior  Mfg.  Co.,  114,  209 

v.  Kellogg,  559 
Gleeson  v.  Brummer,  107 

v.    Virginia    Midland  R.  Co., 
407, 516 
Glendening  v.  Sharp,  476 
Glenn  v.  Winters,  117 
Glezen  v.  Rood,  624 
Glidden  v.  Moore,  634 
Glossen  v.  Gehman,  194a 
Glossop  v.  Pole,  623 
Glover  v.  Dwight  Mfg.  Co.,  219 

v.  Mersman,  702 
Gluck  v.  Ridgewood  Ice  Co.,  725 
Glushing  v.  Sharp,  466.  477 
Goddard,  Matter  of,  343 

v.  Austin,  617 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 

v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,    151, 
154.  513,  749 

v.  Mcintosh,  376 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         \*re  to  sections.    lxXXVU 


Godeau  v.  Blood,  632 
Godfrey  v.  Gibbons.  618 

v.  Kings  county,  256 
Godfroy  v.  Dalton,  564 

v.  Jay,  566,  569,  570 
Godly  v.  Hagerty,  709 
Goeltz  v.  Ashland,  289,  346 
Goetchens  v.  Matthewson,  310 
Goff  v.  Chippewa  River,  etc.  R.  Co. , 
207 

v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  145 

v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  132, 198, 
219 
Goins  v.  Moberly,  353 
Gold  v.  Philadelphia,  371 
Goldberg  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  521 
Golden  v.  Clinton.  369 

v.  Newbrand,  150 
Goldie  v.  Werner,  185a 
Goldrick     v.     Bristol     Co.     Savings 

Bank,  588 
Goldstein  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  87 
Goldthwait  v.  Haverhill  R.  Co.,  209a 

v.  East  Bridgewater,  350 
Goltzv.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  217 
Gonzales  v.  Galveston,  346 

v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co.,  54, 
481,  520,  521 
Gooch  v.   Asso.   for  Relief  of  Aged 
Females,  331 

v.  Bowyer,  702 

v.  Stephenson,  664 
Good  v.  Altoona,  734 
Goodale  v.  Tuttle,  735 
Goode  v.  Martin,  632 
Goodes  v.  Boston.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  209 
Goodenough  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 

478 
Goodin  v.  Des  Moines,  333,  353 
Goodfellow  v.   Boston,  etc.   R.  Co., 
225,  477 

v.  New  York,  368 
Goodhart   v.   Pennsylvania  R.    Co., 

743.  758.  759.  760 
Goodloe  v.  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  513 
Goodman  v.  Gay,  634 

v.  Harvey,  20 

v.  Simonds,  20 

v.  Walker,  558.  564 
Goodno  v.  Oshkosh,  759 
Goodnow  v.  Walpole  Emery  Mills,  185 
Goodrich  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co., 
472,  763 

v.  Chicago,  262 

v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
194a,   196.  209a,  217 

v.  Starr,  623 
Goodridge  v.  Washington  Mills  Co., 

216 
Goodsell  v.  Hartford,  etc.  R.  Co.,  124, 
767 

v.  Taylor.  487,  719r* 
Goodwin  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 


Goodwin  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  480 

v.  Hersom,  605 

v.  Nickerson,  133 

v.  Smith,  623 
Gordon  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  606 

v.  Cummings,  704,  710,  719 

v.  Farrar,  310 

v.  Grand  St.  R.  Co  ,  519 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  429 

v.  Peltzer,  120.  703 

v.  Reynolds'  Card  Co. ,  219 

v.  Richmond    108,  375 
Gorham  v.  Gross,  17 

v.   Kansas   City,  etc.    R.   Co., 
197,  743 

v.  Springfield,  281 
Gore  v.  Brazier,  574 
Gorman  v.  McArdle,   13,   185b,  222, 
702a 

V.Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  219a 

v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  419 
Gormley  v.  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  235,  241 

v.  San  ford,  735 
Gorton  v.  Erie  R.  Co  ,  482 
Goshen  v.  England,  95,  369 

v.  Myers  289.  334,  394 

Turnp.  Co.  v.  Sears,  346,  355, 
386 
Gosport  v.  Evans,  367,  376 
Gothard  v.  Alabama,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64, 

89,  99,  478 
Gottlieb  v.  N.  Y. ,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  459 
Gottsberger  v.  New  York,  295 
Gottwald  v.  Bernheimer,  647 
Gough  v.  Bryan,  115 
Gould  v.  Bangor,  etc.  R.  Co.,  448 

v.  Booth,  274 

v.  Boston  Duck  Co.,  729 

v.  Gt.  Northern  R.  Co.,  434 

v.  McKenna,  61,  93,  95,  741 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  668 

v.  Slater  Woolen  Co.,  690 

v.  Topeka,  255,  272 
Gourdier  v.  Cormack,  144,  173,  702 
Government  St.  R.   Co.  v.  Hanlon, 

73,  78 
Governor  v.  Allen,  249 

v.  Carter,  620 

v.  Dodd,  591 

v.  Justices,  etc.,  256 

v.  Powell,  620 

v.  Wiley,  591 
Gowen  v.  Glaser,  673,  675 

v.  Harley,  185,  207,  223 
Gozler  v.  Georgetown,  283 
Grabenheimer  v.  Budd,  619 
Grabrues  v.  Klein,  654 
Gradin  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  488 
Graeff  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.    R.   Co., 

494.  497 
Graff  v.  Dotroit  Citv  R.  Co.,  485c 

v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 


lxxxviii 


Rtf*r*ncts\ 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[are  to  sections. 


Greatz  v.  McKenzie,  688a 
Graham  v.  Albert  Lea,  334a 
v.  Boston.  370 
v.  Chicago,  St.   Paul,  etc.   R. 

Co..  L95 
v.   Delaware,    etc.  Canal  Co., 

448 
v.  Newburg  Coal  Co.,  215 
v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  225 
v.  Payne,  029,  632,  639 
v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  61 
v.  Toronto,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61 
Grahlman    v.  Chicago,  etc.   R.    Co., 

455 
Gram  v.    Northern   Pacific  R.   Co., 

108,  113.  666.  678 
Gramm  v.  Boener,   107,  606,  608,  615 
Granby  v.  Michigan   Cent.    R.    Co., 

428 
Grandona  v.  Lovdal,  701a 
Grand  Rapids  v.  Wyman,  57,  258,  369 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  475,  477 
v.  Judson,  57 
v.  Monroe,  418,  425 
Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  v.  Cummings, 
188 
v.    Ives,  53,  61,   99,   466,   467, 

485a 
v.  Jennings,  765 
v.  Latham,  24a 
v.  Richardson,  53,  675,  680 
v.  Siebald,  414 
v.  Stevens,  488 
v.  Walker,  495 
Granger  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  475 
v.  Pulaski  county,  256 
v.  Seneca  Falls,  272 
Grangier  v.  Hughes,  561 
Grannis  v.  Branden,  614 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  1856 
v.  Cummings,  671 
Grant  v.  Baker,  108 

v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  479 

v.  Brooklyn,  356 

v.  Erie,  262,  265 

v.  Kuglar,  737 

v.  Ludlow.  47 

v.  Newton,  22 

v.    Pennsylvania,     etc.    Canal 

Co.,  223 
v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  499 
v.  Ricker,  635 
v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  195 
v.  Varney,  195 
Gratoit  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  472 
Grau  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co,,  448 
Gravelle  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

197,  233 
Graver  Tank  Works  v.  McGee,  209a 
Graves  v.  Brewer,  185 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425 
v.  Rochester,  296 
v.  Santway,  607 


Graves  v.  Shattuck,  354,  370,  652 

v.  Thomas,  97,  703 
Graville  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  523 
Graw  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  40 
Gray  v.    Boston   Gaslight  Co.,   24a, 
120,  343 
v.  Brackenridge,  557 
v.  Brooklyn,  254 
v.  Central  R.  Co.,  747 
v.  Coombs,  97,  720 
v.  Danbury,  416 
v.  Emporia,  367 
v.  Harris.  343.  705,  728,  732 
v.  McDonald,  64 
v.  Pullen,  122,  176 
v.  Rochester,  etc.  R  Co.,  523 
v.  Scott,  73,  472,  473 
v.  Schribei ,  735 
v.  Wass,  573 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  538 
Grayson  v.  Lynch,  633 

v.  Wilkinson,  569 
Grayville  v.  Whitaker  393 
Greany  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  112, 

114,  476,  477 
Greasly  v.  Codling,  371 
Great  Falls  Co.  v.  Worster,  731 
Great  Northern  R.  Co.  v.  Harrison, 

486,  488,  491 
Great  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Bacon,  437 
v.  Blake,  459,  503 
v.  Braid.  406,  407 
v.  Geddis,  27,  427 
v.  Haworth,  374,  680 
v.  Miller,  493,  749 
v.  Morthland,  57,  419,  436 
Greeley  v.  Federal  St.  etc.  R.  Co.,  408 

irrigating  Co.  v.  House,  728 
Green  v.  Banta,  204 

v.  Birge,  122,  701 

v.  Burke,  121,  313 

v.  Clarke,  22 

v.  Cross,  209a 

v.  Dan  by,  350,  352,  363 

v.  Dixon,  575 

v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  99 

v.  Harrison  county,  256 

v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  124, 

764,  768 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  484 
v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  186, 

208,  211,  215 
v.  New  York,  254 
v.  Portland,  359 
v.  State,  251 
county  v.  Eubanks,  256 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bresmer,  209a 
Greenberg  v.  Kingston,  334 

v.  Whitcomb  Lumber  Co., 219a, 
245 
Greene  v.  Linton.  705 
Greenfield   v.   Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co., 
675,  676,  750 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.      l.XXxix 


Greenland  v.  Chaplin,  28,  61,  100 
Greenleaf  v.   Dubuque,  etc.  R.  Co., 
209a 

v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54,  111, 
207a,  213,  222 
Greenough  v.  Gaskell,  576 
Green   Ridge  R.    Co.   v.  Brinknian, 

666,  676 
Greensboro  v.  McGibbony,  289 
Greenwald  v.  Marquette,  etc.  R.  Co., 

241 
Greenway  v.  Conroy,  218 
Greenwell    v.    Washington    Market 

Co.,  719a 
Greenwood  v.  Callahan,  114 

v.  Louisville.  265,  289 

v.  Phila.,etc.  R.  Co.,  477 

v.  Westport,  285 
Greer  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233b 
Gregg  v.  Wvman,  104 
Gregor  v.  Cadv,  708 
Gregory  v.  Adams.  258,  370,  380 

v.  Brown,  303 

v.  Bush,  735 

v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  484 

v.  Lay  ton,  668,  672 

v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
760 

v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  146 

v.  Woodvvorth,  107,  109,  113 
Gresham  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

482 
Grey  v.  Mobile  Trading  Co.,  58,  113 
Grethen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 
Grider  v.  Tally,  310 
Gridley  v.  Bloomington,  343,  365,  384 
Grier  v.  Sampson,  652 
Gries  v.  Zeck,  628 
Griffen  v.  Auburn,  606,  376 

v.  Colver,  744 

v.  Glen  Mfg.  Co.,  213 

v.  Johnson,  369 

v.  New  York.  262,  367,  376 

v.  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 

v.  Sanbornton,  8,  338,  371 

v.  Willow,  53 
Giffin  v.  Boston  &  Alb.  R.  Co.,  206 

v.  Ganawav,  620 

v.  United  El.  Light  Co.,  698 
Griffith  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66a 
482 

v.  Follett,  310 

v.  Lewis,  712,  728 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  509,  521 

v.  Utica,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  523 
Griffiths  v.  Clift,  645 

v.  Earl  Dudlev,  140,  178 

v.  Gidlow,  180,  209a 

v.  London,  etc.  Docks  Co.,  222 

v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  410 

v.  Wolfram.  245 
Griggs  v.  Fleckenstein,  61,64,66,  94, 
104,  634,  645 


Grigsby  v.  Chappell,  386,  397 

v.  Clear  Lake  Water  Co.,  709a 
Grill  v.  Gen.  Iron  Screw  Co.,  48 
Grimes  v.  Eddy,  633 
v.  Keene,  286 

v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  488,  490 
Grimm  v.  Greenbush,  363 
Grimmelman  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co., 

222 
Grimmell  v.  Chicago,   etc.    R.  Co., 

429,  430 
Grimsley  v.  Hawkins,  60 
Grindev  v.  MacKechnie,  703 
Grinnell  v.  Tavlor,  634 
Grippen  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  61, 

63,   64,   92,  93,   96,   417,   460, 

463,  468,  471,  484 
Grisim  v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  518 
Griswold   v.   Chicago,  etc.,   R.  Co., 

492a 
Griveaud  v.  St.  Louis  Cable,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  407 
Groesbeck  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

4816 
Groff  v.  Ankenbrandt,  709a 

v.   Duluth  Imperial  Mill  Co., 

207 
Grondin  v.  Duluth,  etc.  R.  Co.,  434 
Groner  v.  Delaware,  etc.   Canal  Co., 

476 
Gross  v.  Pennsylvania,  etc.  R.  Co., 

146 
v.  Portsmouth,  295 
Grosse  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  434 
Grossenback  v.  Milwaukee,  353 
Grosso  v.  Delaware,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  124 
Grostick  v.  Deti-oit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90, 

476 
Grote  v.  Chester,  15,  278 

v.  Chester,  etc.  Co.,  406,  497 
Grotenkemper  v.  Harris,  766 
Grotsch  v.  Stein  way  R.  Co.,  742 
Grove  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  421 

v.  Fort  Wayne,  289,  352 
Grows  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  475 
Grube  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  192 

v.  St.  Paul,  265 
Grumbine  v.  Washington,  291 
Grundy  v.  Janesville,  369 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  429, 

432 
Gschwend  v.  Millvale,  375 
Gubasco  v.  New  York,  354 
Guelich  v.  Nat.  State  Bank,  582 
Guenther  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114, 

484 
Guerdes  v.  Christopher  Foundry  Co., 

376 
Guerdon  v.  Corbett.  56 
Guggenheim   v.  Lake   Shore,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  463.  472,  478 
Guichard  v.  New.  61,  73a,  719a 
Guille  v.  Swan,  35,  122 


xc 


References}         TABLE     OF     CASES.         [fire  to  sections. 


Guilloz  v.   Ft.  Wayne,  etc.  R.  Co. 

485a 
Guinard  v.  Knapp  Co.,  217 
Guldseth  v.  Carlin,  702 
Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  477 

v.  Barnett.  493 

v.  Benson,  672,  678 

v.  Blohn,  2336 

v.  Box,  426,  474 

v.  Breitling,  468 

v.  Campbell,  513a 

v.  Cash,  421,  451a 

v.  Childs,  419 

v.  Compton,  763,  767,  772 

v.  Cusenberry,  668 

v.  Dawkins,  522 

v.  Donahoo,  735 

v.  Donnelly,  215 

v.  Fox,  99 

v.  Finley,  773 

v.  Gasscamp,  376 

v.  Geer,  553 

v.  Gierse,  89 

v.  Greenlee,  467 

v.  Hamilton,  479 

v.  Harriett,  209a 

v.  Helsley,  735 

v.  Hodges,  51,  463 

v.  Hudson,  421 

v.  Jackson, 185,  195 

v.  Jones,  219 

v.  Jordon,  521 

v.  Keith,  421 

v.  Killebrew,  494,  519 

v.  Kirkbride,  493 

v.  Kizziah,  185,  188,217 

v.  Levy,  538,  543,  756 

v.  Loonie,  753a,  754 

v.  Lowe,  680 

v.  McGowan,  60c 

v.  McLean,  679 

v.  McWhirter,  73 

v.  Miller,  537 

v.  Montgomery,  417 

v.  Moore,  749 

v.  Ogg,  434 

v.  Pendry,  473 

v.  Pettis,  194a 

v.  Pomeroy,  407 

v.  Pool,  750 

v.  Redeker,  197 

v.  Rowland,  678 

v.  Ryan,  2076 

v.  Shieder,  478 

v.  Smith,  457 

v.  Southwick,  770,  773 

v.  Styron,  73 

v.  Taylor,  407 

v.  Trott,  761 

v.  Washington,  419,  428,  441 

v.  Wells,  189,  2336 

v.  Williams,  217 

v.  Wilson,  492,  500 


Gulf,  etc.  R  Co.  v.  Witte,  666 

etc.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  756 
Gullett  v.  Lewis,  573 
Gullikson  v.  McDonald,  260,  291 
Gulline  v.  Lowell,  370 
Gulliver  v.  Blauvelt,  365 
Gulzoni  v.  Tyler,  502,  518 
Gumb  v.  Twentv-third  St.  R.  Co.,  760 
Gumbel  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  676 
Gumz  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
Gunderson  v.  Northwestern  Elevator 

Co..  73 
Gunn  v.  Ohio  River  R.   Co.,  99,  481a 
Gunter  v.  Graniteville  Mfg.  Co.,  184, 

204,  232 
v.  Wicker,  94,  99 
Gurley  v.  Missouri  Pac.   R.  Co.,  464 

479 
Gustafsen  v.  Washburn,    etc.    Mfg. 

Co.,  2416 
Guta  v.  Lake  Shore,   etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Guthrie  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  205 

v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co. ,  206 
Gutridge   v.   Missouri    Pac.    R.   Co , 

194a,  410 
Gwathney  v.   Little    Miami   R.  Co., 

413,  708 
Gwinnell  v.  Earner,  709a 
Gwynn  v.  Duffield,  691 

Haack  v.  Fearing,  686 
Haas  v.  Balch,  186,  215 

v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 
v.  Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co  ,  2076, 

213.  476 
v.  Grand  Rapids,   etc.  R.  Co., 

62,  417,  478 
v.  Missionary  Society,  331 
Haase  v.  Oregon  R.  Co. ,  489 
Hachel  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  525 
Hackett  v.  Middlesex  Mfg.  Co. ,  719a 
v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co. ,  164 
Hackford  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  113, 

472,  476 
Haden  v.  Sioux  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99, 

241c,  758 
Hadley  v.  Baxendale,  754 
v.  Tavlor,  343,  703 
v.    Western  U.    Tel.  Co.,  531, 
754 
Haehl  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  151,  775 
Haesley  v.  Winona,  etc.   R.  Co.,  73 
Haetsch  v.  Chicago,  etc.    R.  Co.,  476 
Hafford  v.  New  Bedford,  265 
Hagan  v.  Chicago,    etc.    R.   Co.,  673, 
675,  676 

v.  Providence,  etc.  R.  Co.,  749 
Hager  v.  Southern  Pac.   R.  Co.,  482, 

485 
Haggerty  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Thomson,  709a 
Hagins  v.    Cape  Fear    R.   Co.,    180, 
233a 


References}  TABLE     OF    CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


XC1 


Hagood  v.  Southern,  249 

Hahn  v.  So.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  410,  426 

Haight  v.  Keokuk,  862 

v.  New  York,  266,  295 
Haile  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  761 
Haines  v.  Hall,  737 

v.  Lewiston,  373 

v.  Roberts.  701,  706 

v.  Schultz,  749 

v.  Welch,  731 
Hale  v.  Columbia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 

v.  Dutant,  708 

v.  Huntley,  621 

v.  Johnson,  165 

v.  Smith,  57,  107,  112 

v.  Weston,  371 
Haley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94 

v.  Earle.  93 

v.  Jump  River  R.  Co.,  217 

v.  Keim,  224 

v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  139,  235 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  675 
Hall  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  51 

v.  Connecticut  River  Steamb. 
Co  ,  495,  749 

v.  Corcoran,  104 

v.  Galveston,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  206 

v.  Hollander,  115 

v.  Johnson,  204 

v.  Lacy,  737 

v.  Manchester,  333,  334,  353 

v.  Man  son,  353,  377 

v.  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  151,  493 

v.  Norwalk,  258,  259,  338 

v.  Ogden  City  R.  Co.,  55,  99, 
485c.  654 

v.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  205 

v.  Pickard,  644 

v.  Rankin,  691 

v.  Ripley,  104,  379,  646 

v.  Smith,  14,  340 

v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410 

v.  Tillson,  725 

v.  Unity,  351 
Halley,  The,  172 
Hallahan   v.  N.  Y.,   Lake  Erie,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  518,  519 
Halloran  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  435 
Hallower  v.  Henlev.  194 
Halpin  v.  Kansas  City,  289,  356,  369 

v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  525 
Halstead  v.  New  York,  299 
Halverson    v.    Minneapolis,    etc.   R. 

Co.,  424 
Ham   v.    Delaware,  etc.    Canal  Co., 
480,  488,  493.  525 

v.  New  York,  255,  267,  285,  295, 
723 
Haman  v.  Omaha  R.  Co.,  493 
Hamden  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co., 

415 
Hamilton  v.  Caledonia  R  Co.,  488 

v.  Cutts,  574 


Hamilton  v.  Des  Moines,  etc.  R.  Co.. 
750 

v.  Feary,  709 

v.  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  219 

v.  Great  Falls  R.  Co.,  495,  516 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  133 

v.  McPherson,  95,  741 

v.  Morgan's  S.  S.  Co.,  73a,  139, 
471 

v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
60a. 

v.  Rich  Hill  Coal  Co.,  211 

v.  State,  336 

v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  492a 

v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Walla  Walla,  230 

county  v.  Mighels,  256,  285 
Hamlin  v.  Yazoo,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  58 
Hamm  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  478 
Hammack  v.  White,  644,  647 
Hammargran  v.  St.  Paul,  60c 
Hammill  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

481 
Hammon  v.  Southeastern  R.  Co.,  680 
Hammond  v.  Melton,  629 

v.  Mukwa,  49,  85,  378 

v.  St.  Pancras,  11 

v.  Schiff,  701 

County  v.  Johnson,  194 

v.  Mason,  194 
Hampson  v.  Taylor,  110,  334,  363,  376 
Hampton  v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  518, 

526 
Hance  v.  Cayuga,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61,  455 
Hancke  v.  Hooper,  605 
Hancock  v.  Walsh,  251 

v.  York,  738 
Hand  v.  Baynes,  40 

v.  Brookline,  286 

v.  Klinker,  362 
Handyside  v.  Powers,  35,  55 
Haney  v.  Kansas  City.  18 

v.  Pittsburgh  R.  Co.,  213 
Haniford  v.  Kansas  City,  358,  368 
Hankins  v.  N.  Y..  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co..  205,  231,  233,  233a 

v.  Watkins,  16,  18,  19,  686 
Hankinson  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co 

468 
Hanks  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  464 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  510 
Hanley  v.  Huntington,  334 
Hanlon  v.  Ingram,  669 

v.  Keokuk,  376 

v.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.,  54, 
99 

v.  South  Boston  R.  Co.,  467 
Hanly  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co..  194, 

195 
Hanna  v.  Chattanooga,  etc.  R.  Co., 
lsi 

v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  132 

v.  Granger,  232 


xen 


References]  TABLE     OF    CASES.         {are  to  sections. 


Hanna  v.  Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co., 
461a 

Hannah  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co., 

194a,  207a.  218 
Hannaher  v.  St.   Paul,  etc.  R.  Co., 

407,  412 
Hannem  v.  Pence,  343,  701a 
Hannibal,  etc.    R.  Co.   v.   Fox,   202, 
208a,  205,  233 
v.  Husen,  633 
v.  Kenney,  419,  456 
v.  Martin,  49l«,  502,  523 
v.  Swift,  486 
Hannigan  v.  Union  Warehouse  Co., 

181 
Hannon  v.  Agnew,  310,  330 

v.  St.  Louis  county,  285,  286 
Hanover,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Coyle,  481 
Hanrahan  v.  Cochran,  646 

v.  Manhattan  Co.,  606,  519 
Hanrathy  v  Northern  Central  R.  Co. , 

180,  184,  209a 
Hans  v.  Louisiana,  249 
Hansan  v.  So.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  417a, 

457,  481 
Hanscom  v.  Boston,  338,  367 
Hanselman  v.  Carstens,  614 
Hansley  v.  Janesville,  etc.    R.    Co., 

748 
Hanson  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  417, 
426 
v.  Eastern,  etc.  R.  Co.,  749 
v.  European,  etc.  R.  Co.,  154 
v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
v.  Schneider,  189 
Hanvey  v.  Rochester,  299 
Harbor  v.  Kallager,  367 
Hard  v.  Vermont,  etc.  R.  Co.,  180, 

184,  189 
Hardcastle  v.   South  Yorkshire  R., 

etc.  R.  Co.,  343,  403,  703 
Hardegg  v.  Willards,  146 
Hardenburgh  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co., 

493 
Harder  v.  Minneapolis,  373 
Harding  v.  Boston,  166 
v.  Fahey, 16 
v.  Hale,  334 
v.  Jaspar,  334 
v.  Townshend,  765 
Hardrop  v.  Gallagher,  702 
Hard  wick  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  519 
Hardy  v.  Brooklyn,  254,  262,  279 
v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  225 
v.  Keene,  291,  354 
v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  518,  740, 

743 
v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  231 
v.  N.T.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  493 
v.  North  Carolina  Cent.  R.  Co. , 
180,  193.  407 
Hare  v.  Mclntyre,  245,  688a 
Hargis  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  474 


Hargreaves  v.  Deacon,  8,  97,  705 

Harkin  v.  Crumbie,  710 

Harkins  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  Traction 

Co.,  73a 
Harkness  v.    Western    U.  Tel.  Co., 

542,  553 
Harlan  v.  Lumsden,  617,  618 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  24,  25 
Harley  v.  Buffalo  Car  Mfg.  Co.,  195 

v.  Eutawville  R.  Co.,  428 
Harlinger  v.  N.   Y.  Central  R.  Co., 

137,  151,  769,  772 
Harlow  v.  Humiston,  279.  365 
Harman  v.  Tappenden,  310 
Harmond  v.  Pearson,  738 
Harper  v.  Milwaukee,  258,  287 

v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  132 
Harr  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  217 
Harrell  v.    Albemarle,   etc.    R.  Co., 

426 
Harrigan  v.  Brooklvn,  353,  375 

v.  Clarksburg,  338 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  209a 

v.  Wilmington,  274,  287,  367 
Harriman  v.  Boston,  369 

v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  484, 
688 

v.  Stowe.  244 

v.  Wilkins,  618 
Harrington  v.  Binns,  572 

v.  Buffalo,  363 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  449 

v.  Fuller,  618 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  192 

v.  Ward,  313 
Harris,  The  C.  P.,  726 

v.  Atlanta,  291 

v.  Cameron,  34 

v.  Commercial  Ice  Co.,  654 

v.  Fisher,  635 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  513a 

v.  Hewitt,  185a 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  150 

v.  Mabry,  148 

v.  McNamara,  129, 164,  167,  168 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 

v.  Newbury,  373 

v.  Nicholas,  150 

v.  Perry,  719,  723 

v.  Ryding,  716 

v.  School  District,  256 

v.  Shebek,  219 

v.  Simon,  688a 

v.  Stevens,  492a 

v.  Thompson,  332 

v.  Vigo  county,  257 

v.  Uebelhoer,  66a 
Harrisburg  v.  Saylor,  278 
Harrisburgh,  The,  124,  132 

v  Taylor,  298 
Harrison  v.  Adamson,  656 

v.  Baltimore.  266 

v.  Berkley,  28 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         We  to  sections. 


XC111 


Harrison  v.  Brega,  593 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  178,  179,  187 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  428 

v.  Collins,  298 

v.  Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.,  186 

v.   Detroit,    etc.   R.    Co.,   221, 
230,  233 

v.  Fink,  493,  519 

v.  Great  Northern  R.   Co.,  65, 
122,  728 

v.  Redden,  303 

v.  Sutter,  769 

v.  Washington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
Harroun  v.  Brush  El.  Light  Co.,  698 
Hart  v.  Albany,  332,  333 

v.  Bridgeport,  261 

-v.  Brooklyn,  367 

v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  759 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  466 

v.  Cole,  710 

v.  Delaware,  etc.  Co.,  114,  725 

v.  Devereux,  92,  482 

v.  Frame,  559,  564,  567 

v.  Grinnell.  704 

v.  Hill,  333 

v.  Hudson,  587 

v.  Hudson  River  Bridge  Co., 
54,  57,  58.  107,  112,  114,  396 

v.  Lancashire,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60c 

v.  Naumberg,  195 

v.  N.  Y..  etc.  Dock  Co.,  233 

v.  Red  Cedar,  376,  377 

v.  Rvan,  701 

v.  Washington  Park  Club,  626 

v.  Western  R.  Co.,  666 

v.   Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  556 
Harter  v.  Morris,  24,  5(i6 
Hartfield  v.  Roper,  10,  73,  73a,  74,  75, 

84 
Hartford  v.  Northern  Pac,  R.  Co., 
232,  241c 

v.  Talcott.  13a,  343 

etc,  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson,  179 

county  v.  Hamilton,  257 

v.  Wise,  257,  289 
Hartiganv.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  133 
Hartley  v.  Harriman,  629 
Hartshorn  v.  Chaddock,  750 
Hartstein  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  753a 
Hartwig   v.    Bay    State    Shoe    Co., 
181,  207 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57,  473 

v.  N.  P.  Lumber  Co.,  202 
Harty  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  470,  480 
Hartzall  v.  Sill,  730 
Hartzig  v.  Lehigli  Val.  R.  Co.,  513a 
Harvard  College  v.  Stearns.  371 
Harvey  v.   Alturas  Gold   Min.  Co., 
215 

v.  Dunlop,  10.  16 

v.  Hillsdale.  291 

v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
192,  233a,  235,241 


Harvey  v.  Virginia,  249 
Harwood  v.  Bennington,  etc.  R.  Co., 
421 
v.  Lowell,  338,  749a 
Haskell  v.  New  Bedford,  258,  274 

v.  No.  Adirondack  R.  Co.,  750 
v.  Penn  Yan.  368 
Hass  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  S.  S.  Co., 

234 
Hassa  v.  Junger,  61 
Hassenyer  v.  Mich.  Central  R.  Co., 
86,  212 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  379 
Hastings   v.    Central   Crosstown  R. 
Co.,  523 
v.  Halleck,  559,  569,  572 
v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  497 
Hasty  v.  Sears,  241 
Hatch  v.  Dwight,  731 
v.  Fogerty,  559 

v.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co. ,  283, 
395 
Hatcher  v.  Dunn,  313 
Hathaway  v.  Des  Moines,  230 

v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

56 
v.  Hinton,  340 
v.  Illinois  Cent.    R.    Co.,   192, 

232 
v.  Tinkham,  626 
v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  74 
Hathorn  v.  Richmond,  607 
Hatt  v.  Nay.  192.  221 
Hatter  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  185 
Hattermann  v.  Siemann,  1 17 
Hatton  v.  Holmes,  602 
Hauch  v.  Hernandez,  672 
Haugen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  666, 

678 
Haugh  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  158. 

185b,  217 
Haughey  v.  Hart,  343,  703 
Hauser  v.  Central  R.  Co.  of  N.  Jer- 
sey, 485 
Hausman  v.  Madison,  363 
Haven  v.  Pittsburg  Bridge  Co.,  376 
Havener  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  756 
Havens  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  469,  482 
Haverly  v.  McClelland.  591 

v.  State  Line,  etc.  R.  Co..  55, 
679 
Hawes  v.  Fox  Lake,  355 
Hawker  v.  Baltimore,    etc.    R.   Co., 

467 
Hawkeye  Lumber  Co.  v.  Diddy,  019 
Hawkins  v.  Front  St.    R.    Co.,  516, 

523.  764 
v.  Great  Western  R.  Co..  178 
v.  Johnson,  185a 
v.  Phythian,  119 
Hawks  v.  Northampton,  350,  408 

v.  Winans,  520 
Hawley  v.  Atlantic,  356 


XC1V 


References]         TABLE    OF    CASES.        \flre  to  sections. 


Hawley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  87 
v.  Gloversville,  368 
v.  Northern  Central  R.  Co.,  91, 
186,  209a,  215 
Hawksworth  v.  Thompson,  122,  248 
Hawver  v.  Whalen,  14,  359 
Hawxhurst  v.  New  York,  298,  345 
Haxton  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.    R.  Co., 

4'14 
Hay  v.  Cohoes  Co.,  9,  688a 
Haycroft  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

54,  73,  476,  477 
Hayden  v.  Attleborough,    334,   356, 
393 
v,  Clark,  365 

v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  478 
v.   Smithville    Mfg.    Co.,   184, 
194,  218,  683 
Hayes  v.  Cambridge,  338 

v.  Bush,  etc.  Mfg.  Co.,  73,  207b 
v.  Forty-second  St.  R.  Co.,  56 
v.  Michigan  Central  R.  Co.,  8, 

9,  27.  57,  88.  442,  466a,  481 
v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  120a, 

477 
v.  Norcross,  73a 
v.  Oshkosh,  265 
v   Porter,  313,  016 
v.  R.  R.  Co.,  392 
v.  Waldron,  729,  730,  734 
v.  West  Bay  City,  14,  368 
v.  Williams,  54,  133,  773 
Hay  good  v.  Justices,  etc.,  256 
Hayman  v.  Hewett,  629 
Hayne  v.  Rhodes,  559,  575 
Haynes,  Matter  of,  574 

v.  East  Tennessee  R.  Co.,  202 
v.  Tunstall,  619 
Hays  v.  Gainesville  R.  Co.,  99 
v.  Gallagher,  58 
v.  Kennedy,  16 
v.  Millar,  142 
v.  Miller,  669 
Hay  ward  v.  Merrill,  102 
Haywood  v.  Charlestown,  334 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  466 
Hazard  v.  New  England  Ins.  Co.,  179 

v.  Robinson,  731 
Hazard  Co.  v.  Volger,  764 
Hazeltine  v.  Concord  R.  Co.,  676 
Hazen  v.  West  Superior  Lumber  Co., 

203 
Hazelhurst    v.    Brunswick    Lumber 

Co.,  216 
Hazlett  v.  Commercial   Nat.    Bank, 

580a, 
Hazman  v.  Hoboken  Land,  etc.  Co., 

511 
Hazzard  v.  Council  Bluffs,  286,  287, 

375 
Heacock  v .  Sherman,  359,  390 

v.  State,  398 
Headen  v.  Rust,  419 


Healey  v.  City  Pass.  R.  Co.,  151 

v.  New  York,  93 
Heaney  v.    Long  Island  R.  Co.,  56, 

463,  467,  476,  478 
Heard  v.  Hoi  man,  744 
Hearne  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  90, 

475 
Heath,  Matter  of,  310 
v.  Barman,  385 
v.  Met.  Exhibition  Co.,  709 
v.  Stewart.  460 
v.  Williams,  731 
Heaven  v.  Pender,  1,  8,  38, 116 
Heave}' v.  Hudson,    etc.   Paper  Co., 

218 
Heazle  v.  Indianapolis,    etc.  R.  Co., 

494 
Hebbard  v.  Berlin,  350 
Hebron  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co..  429 
Hecht  v.  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  140 
Hector  v.  Boston  El.  Light  Co.,  698 

Min.  Co.  v.  Robertson,  64 
Heddles  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  467, 

761 
Hedin  v.  Suburban  R.  Co.,  485c 
Hedges  v.  Kansas  City,  67 
Hedley  v.  Pinkney  S.  S.  Co.,  227 
Heeg  v.  Licht,  17,  689,  701a 
Heeney  v.  Sprague,  13,  13a,  343 
Hefferen  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  195, 

218 
Hegan  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  485a, 

652 
Hegeman  v.  Western  R.  Co.,  14,  45, 

410,  497 
Heidenheimer  v.  Ellis,  747 
Heidenwagv.  Philadelphia,  298,  361 
Heil  v.  Glanding,  61,  62,  99,  748,  758 
Heimann  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  554 
Heine  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233 
Heinemann  v.  Heai'd,  57 
Heininger  v.  Gt.  Northern  R.  Co., 

426 
Heinlein  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  490, 

492a 
Heintze  v.  New  York,  118 
Heirn  v.  McCaughan,  115 
Heissenbuttel  v.  New  York,  285 
Heizer  v.  Kingsland,  etc.   Mfg.  Co., 

117 
Heland  v.  Lowell,  379 
Helena  v.  Thompson,  272.  274 
Helfenstein  v.  Medart.  185,  207b 
Helfrich  v.  Ogden  R.  Co.,  201 
Heller  v.  Abbott,  451a,  452 
v.  Sedalia,  265 
v.  Stremmel.  253 
Helm  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  182 

v.  O'Rourke,  185b 
Helmke  v.  Stetler,  629 
Heltonville  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fields,   185b, 

207a 
Hembling  v.  Grand  Rapids,  346,  369 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         {are  to  sections. 


xcv 


Heinmingway    v.    Chicago,    etc.    R. 

Co.,  510,520 
Henavie  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  654 
Hencke  v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  495 
Henckes  v.  Minneapolis,  363 
Hendershott  v.  Ottuniwa,  289 
Henderson   v.   Chicago,   etc.  R.  Co., 
417,  455 
v.  Covington,  256 
v.  Davis,  M34 
v.  Minneapolis,  274 
v.   Philadelphia,    etc.    R.  Co., 

58 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  479 
v.  Sandefur,  262 
v.  Stevenson,  504 
v.  Walker,  24lc 
v.  Williams,  203 
Co.  v.  Phila.  &  Reading R.  Co., 
675,  676 
Hendrick  v.  Cook,  733 

v.  Ilwaco  R.  Co.,  129 
v.  Walton,  129 
Hendricks  v.  Johnson,  729 
Hendricksen  v.  Meadows,  704,  719 
Hendrikson   v.    Great   Northern    R. 

Co.,  4816,  482 
Hendrix  v.  St.  Joseph,  etc.  R.  Co., 

449 
Henkel  v.  Murr,  708,  709,  710 
Henley  v.  Lyme  Regis,  281 
Hennessey  v.  Brooklvn  R.  Co.,  81 

v.  New  Bedford,  291 
Hennies  v.  Vogel,  115 
Henning  v.  Caldwell,  477 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  359 
Henry  v.  Brackenridge  Lumber  Co., 
57 
v.  Cleveland,   etc.   R.   Co.,  97, 

674 
v.  Dennis,  35,  39 
v.  Dubuque,  etc.  R.  Co.,  419 
v.  Klopfer,  645,  761 
v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194a, 

241 
v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  735 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  28,  55 
v.  So.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  28,  30,  666, 

675 
v.  Staten  I.  R.  Co. ,  241 
v.  Wabash  W.  R.  Co.,  197 
Henshaw  v.  Noble,  243 
Hepburn  v.  Philadelphia,  359 
Hepfel  v    St.  Paul,  etc.,  R.  Co., 73a, 

99. 
Herdt  v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
Herlisch  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Heriot's  Hospital  v.  Ross,  331 
Hermann  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 

124 
Hermans  v.    N.  Y.   Central  R.  Co., 

478 
Heme  v.  So.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  678 


Herold  v.  Meyers,  656,  662 

v.  Pfister,  218 
Herr  v.  Lebanon,  378 
Herrick  v.  Gary,  633 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  131 

v.  Sullivan,  647 
Herring  v.  Dist.  of  Columbia,  274 

v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57, 
93,  480 
Herrington  v.  Corning,  262 

v.  Lansingburgh,  175,  298 

v.  Phoenix.  369 
Herron  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  542, 

543.  555.  754,  755 
Hersom's  Case.  303 
Herstine  v.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  516 
Heslop  v.  Metcalfe,  568 
Hess  v.  Lupton.  720 

v.  Pegg,  254 

v.  Rosenthal.  194 
Hesser  v.  Grafton,  376 
Hession  v.  Wilmington,  287 
Hetfield  v.  Towslev,  303 
Hetrich  v.  Deadlier,  729,  730 
Hett  v.  Pun  Pong,  572 
Heucke  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54, 

60c 
Hewev  v.  Nourse,  668 
Hewett  v.  Swift,  244,  248 
Hewison  v.  New  Haven,  262,  350,  355 
Hewitt  v.  Eisenbart,  759 

v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  209a,  221 

v.  Walker,  659 
Hewlett  v.  George,  766 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co..  536,  546 
Hexamer  v.  Webb,  144,  164,  165,  168 

173,  361 
Hey  v.  Philadelphia,  346 
Hevmann  v.  Cunningham,  618 
Heywood  v.  Hildreth,  623 
Hiatt  v.  Des Moines,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410 
Hibbard  v.  Thompson,  61 ,  99,  615,  741 

v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  547,  553 
Hickenbottom  v.  Delaware,  etc.   R. 

Co.,  508 
Hickey  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61,  473, 
523 

v.  N.Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  114, 463 

v.St.  PaulR.  Co.,  485c 

v.  Taaffe,  195,  218,  219 

v.  Waltham,  350 
Hickman  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 
113 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  521 
Hickok  v.  Hine,  736 

v.  Pittsburgh,   281,  289,   328, 
358 
Hicks  v.  Dorn,  325 

v.  N.  Y..  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co..  463,  468,  477 

v.  Pacific,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73,  458 
Hide  v.  Thornborough,  701 
Higert  v.  Greencastle,  353 


XCV1 


««»]        TABLE    OF    CASES.       [«»-*  to  wrfww 


Higgins  v.  Boston,  378 

v.  Butcher,  124 

v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  132,  133 

v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  Canal  Co. , 
1(5,  402 

v.  Deeney,  74 

v.  Dewey,  21.  30,  666,  669 

v.  Glens  Falls,  353,  375 

v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  522 

v.  Kendrick,  621 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  238 

v.  New  Orleans,   etc.    R.  Co., 
505 

v.    Watervliet  Turnpike,    etc. 
Co.,  150,  151,  493 
Higgs  v.  Maynard,  144 
High  v.  Carolina  Cent.  R.  Co.,  483 
Highland  Ave.  R.  Co.  v.  Burt,  508 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Donovan,  523 

v.  Sampson,  467,  483,  485c 

v.  Walters.  2416 

v.  Winn,  7 
Higley  v.  Gilmer,  606 
Hildreth  v.  Lowell,  299 
Hill  v.  Allen,  559 

v.  Applegate,  97 

v.  Balls,  633 

v.  Boston,  256,   258,   267,   281, 
285,  337 

v.  Charlotte,  262,  355 

v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  729 

v.  Concord  R.  Co.,  449 

v.  Featherstonhaugh,  559 

v.  Fond  du  Lac,  384a 

v.  Gust,  46,  114,  219 

v.  Livingston,  394 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  419 

v.  New  Haven,  108 

v.  New  York,  262 

v.  Ninth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  516,  518 

v.  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co.,  680 

v.  Portland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  426 

v.  Rensselaer  county,  261 

v.  Schneider,  688a,  701a 

v.  Seekonk,  375,  379 

v.  Sewell,  617,  619 

v.  Smith,  283 

v.  State,  340 

v.  Supervisors,  etc.,  337 

v.  Tionesta,  376 

v.  United  States,  249 

v.  West  End  R.  Co  ,  508 

v.  Western  U  Tel.  Co..  554, 754 
Hillard  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  434 
Hiller  v.  Sharon  Springs,  367 
Hilliard  v.  Pdchardson,  168,  173,  699 
Hilliker  v.  Coleman,  733 
Hillman  v.  Newington,  66 
Hilsdorf  v.  St.  Louis,  291 
Hilsenbeck  v.  Guhring,  710 
Hilton  v.  Granville   716 

v.  Whitehead,  716 


Hilts  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  192 
Himmerman  v.  Satterlee,  333 
Hinckley  v.  Emerson,  629 
Hindal  v.  Blades,  624 
Hinckley  v.  Cape  Cod  R.  Co.,  107, 
111,  112,  476 

v.  Horazdowski,  218 

v.  Krug,  23 

v.  Penobscot,  104 

v.  Somerset.  356,  369 
Hindman  v.  Oregon  R.  etc.  Co.,  421, 
451a 

v.  Timme,  355 
Hine  v.  Gushing,  666,  702 

v.  Wooding,  657 
Hiner  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  343 
Hines  v.  Charlotte,  262 

v.  Lock  port,  258,  262,  374 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  185a 
Hinken  v.  Iowa  Central  R.  Co.,  476 
Hinkle  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  463, 

464,  476 
Hinman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  421 
Hinshaw  v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  521 
Hinz  v.  Starin,  702,  704 
Hipkins   v.    Birmingham    Gas    Co., 

692,  693 
Hirsch  v.  New  York,  etc.  R.  Co.,  525 
Hissong  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.   Co., 

241c 
Hitchcock  % .  Burgett,  605,  607 
Hitchins  v.  Frostburg,  273 
Hite  v.  Blanchford.  633 

v.  Whitley  county,  256 
Hixon  v.  Lowell,  258,  333,  350 
Hixson  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Hoadley  v.  Northern  Tr.  Co.,  40 
Hoag  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  28, 
30,  666 

v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.   Co., 
66a,  67 
Hoagland  v.  Culvert,  313 
Hoar  v.  Maine  Central  R.  Co.,  61,  525 

v.  Merritt,  195 
Hoard  v.  Peck,  115 
Hoben  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  96 
Hobbs  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233a 

v.  Stauer,  195,  197 
Hoboken  Land,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hoboken, 
729 

v.  Lally,  92 
Hoby  v.  Built,  568 
Hockett  v.  State,  536 
Hockstedler  v.  Dubuque,  etc.  R.  Co., 

674 
Hocum  v.  Weitherick,  108,  113 
Hodge  v.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  412,  731 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  425 
Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  299 

v.  New  Hanover  Tr.  Co.,  521 

v.  Percival,  60c,  719a 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  468 
Hodgkins  v.  Chappell,  606 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.  [are  to  sections. 


XCV11 


Hodgkins  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  241 

v.  Rockport,  323,  367 
Hodgkinson  v.  Ennor,  734 

v.  Fernie,  322 
Hodgson  v.  Lynch,  619 
Hodnett  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  137, 

774 
Hodsoll  v.  Stallebrass,  115 
Hoehn  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
Hoey  v.  Dublin,   etc.  R.  Co.,  191,  215 

v.  Felton,  28 

v.  Natick,  367 
Hoff  v.  West  Jersey  R.  Co.,  673 
Hoffman  v.  Adams,  219 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,675,  676, 
679 

v.  Clough,  216 

v.  Dickinson.  186,  215 

v.  N.   Y.    Central  R.    Co.,    64, 
150,  151,  473,  513,  525 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  748 

v.  Tuolumne  Water  Co.,  16,  732 

v.  Union  Ferrv  Co.,  114 
Hofnagle  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  8, 

34 
Hogan  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  180 

v.  Kentucky  Union  R.  Co.,  414 

v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  56,  60 

v.  Northfield,  60?> 

v.  Smith,  19r> 

v.  Tyler,  481b 
Hoge  v.  Raymond,  123 
Hogele  v.  Wilson,  216 
Hogenson  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.    R.  Co., 

735 
Hogg  v.  Martin,  565 

v.  Zanesville  Canal  Co.,  333 
Hoffgatt  v.  Biglev,  313 
Holbrook  v.  Utica,  etc.  R.  Co.,  25, 57, 

107,  516,  519 
Holbrow  v.  Wilkins,  602 
Holcomb  v.  Danby,  104 
Holdane  v.  Cold  Springs,  333 
Holden  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  178,  197 

v.  Liverpool  Gas  Co.,  113 

v.Rutland,  etc.  R.  Co., 423,  662, 
664 

v.  Shattuck,  365,  634,  657 

v.    Winn.    Lake    Cotton    Co.. 
729 
Holder  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.   Co.,  431, 
448 

v.  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  140 
Hole  v.  Sittingbourne  R.  Co.,  14,  176 
Holker  v.  Parker,  573 
Holladay  v.  Marsh,  659,  664 
Hoi  lady  v.  Kennard,  39 
Holland  v.  Bartch,  653 

v.  Brown,  770 
v.  Sparks,  97 

v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  192 
Hollenbeck  v.  Berkshire  R.  Co.,  139, 
767« 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  —  g.] 


Hollenbeck  v.  Johnson,  626 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  223 

v.  Winnebago  county,  255,  256, 
285 
Hollender  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 

468 
Holley  v.  Torrington,  122 

v.  Winoski  Turnp.  Co.,  393 
Holliday  v.  Marsh,  659 

v.  St.  Leonard's,  326 
Hollingsworth  v.    Saunders   county, 

256 
Hollis  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  755 
Holloran  v.  Union  Iron  Co.,  209a 
Hollowav  v.  Lockport,  376 
Holly  v.* Boston  Gas  Co.,  47,  53,  74, 

77,  81,  092,  693 
Holman  v.  Boston  Land  Co., 668, 672, 
679 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  27,  62, 
427,  467 

v.  Tovvnsend,  338,  363,  371 
Holmes  v.   Allegheny  Tr.  Co.,  508, 

521 

v.  Carolina  Cent.  R.    R.  Co., 
748,  749 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  480 

v.  Clarke,  91 

v.  Corthell,  371 

v.  Drew,  703 

v.  Hamburg,  367 

v.  Mather,  647 

v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  704,  705 

v.  Onion,  162 

v.  Paris,  367 

v.  Peck,  559 

v.  South.  Pac.  Coast  R.  Co., 
476,  483 

v.  South.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  101 

v.  Union  Tel.  Co.,  144 

v.  Wakefield.  64,  493 
Holmgren  v.   Twin  City  R.   T.  Co., 

485c 
Holsman  v.  Boiling  Spring  Bleach- 
ing Co. ,  734 
Holstine  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64 
Holt  v.  Spokane,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60c 

v.  Whatley,  108,  113 
Holton  v.  London,  etc.  R   Co.,  514 

v.  Waller,  709 
Holtzman  v.  Hoy,  614 
Holyoke  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  499, 

758 
Holzmann  v.  Monell,  719 
Homan  v.  Liswell,  616 

v.  Stanley,  -59.  703 
Homer  v.   Everett,  704 

v.  Watson,  736 
Homestake  Mining  Co.  v.  Fullerton. 

12,  185a 
Hommert  v.  Gleason,  310 
Honegsberger  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co., 
71,73,74,75 


XCV111 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         We  to  sections. 


Honey  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67 
Honlahan  v.  New  American  File  Co., 

219 
Honner  v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.,  180 
Honsee  v.  Hammond,  729,  734,  750 
Hood  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  503,  544 
Hook  v.  Worcester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57 
Hooker  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  483 

v.  Miller.  97 

v.  New  Haven,  etc.  Co.,  733 

v.  New  Haven,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
399,  402 

v.  Rochester,  274 
Hooper  v.  Goodwin,  313 

v.  Johnstown,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a, 
414 

v.  Snead  Iron  Works,  195 
Hoosier  Stone  Co.  v.  McCain.  185 
Hoover  v.  Beech  Creek  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Heim,  115 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  675 
Hope  v.  Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.,  195 
Hopkins  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  115, 
748,  749,  758,  764 

v.  Rush  River,  376 

v.  Utah  N.  R.  Co.,  108 

v.  Willard,  573 

Bridge  Co.  v.  Burnett,  185 
Hopkinson  v.  Knapp,  etc.  Co.,  Ill, 

772 
Hoppe  v.    Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,    13, 

72,  467 
Hopper  v.  Reeve,  644 
Hopping  v.  Quin,  559,  567 
Horan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207a, 

2076 
Horey  v.  Haverstraw,  335 
Horn  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  421 

v.  Baltimore,  283,  299 

v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  482 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  531 
Hornbeck  v.  Westbrook,  256 
Hornbein  v.  Blanchard,  635 
Home  v.  Meakin,  637 

v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Pudil,  303 
Horner  v.  Coffey,  258 

v.  Nicholson.  197 

v.  Watson,  717 
Hornsbv  v.  Eddy,  241c 
Horton'v.  Ipswich,  367,  376 

v.  Nashville,  262 

v.  Norwalk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  104 

v.  Sullivan,  735 

v.  Taunton,  355.  378 

v.  Trompeter,  376 
Hortsman  v.  Covington,  etc.  R.  Co., 

412 
Hosack  v.  College  of  Physicians,  254 
Hosic  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185a, 

186,  197 
Hoskins   v.    Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
481,  485 


Hoskins  v.  Phillips,  562 

Hoskinson  v.  Cent.  Vt.  R.  Co.,  666, 

675 
Hosmer  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  505 
Hot  Springs  R.  Co.  v.  Dial,  182 

v.  Newman,  429 
Hotel  Ass'n  v.  Walter,  114,  719 
Hoth  v.  Peters.  56,  108,  233 
Houck  v.  Wachter,  8,  371 
Houfe  v.  Fallon,  287 

v.   Fulton,    258,  333,  334,  346, 
375,  379,  390,  393,  395 
Hough  v.  Railroad  Co.,  108,  205 

v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91,  187, 
189,    194,  197,  204,    208,   210, 
211,  214,  215 
Houghkirk  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal 

Co.,  137.  466.  769,  775 
Houghtaling  v.  Shelly,  346 
Houghton  v.   Chicago,    etc.  R.  Co., 

478 
Houlden  v.  Smith,  303 
Houlihan  v.    Connecticut   River  R. 

Co.,  133.  185a 
Hounsell  v.  Smyth.  97,  703,  705 
Hourigan  v.  Nowell,  117 
Housatonic  R.  Co.  v.  Knowles,  456 
House  v.  Houston  Water  Works  Co., 
265 

v.  Metcalf,  606,  709a 

v.  Montgomery  county,  257 
Houser  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  232 
Houseman  v.   Girard,  etc.  Asso.,  8, 

117 
Houston   v.   Brush,    159,    194,   194a, 
197,  205,  223,  702 

v.  Culver,  203 

v.  Gate  St.  R  Co.,  492a 

v.  Isaacks,  368,  375 

v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 

v.  Traphagen,  703 

v.  Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  460. 
480 
Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Boehm,  758 

v.  Brin,  47,  464a 

t.  Boiling,  489,  523 

v.  Carson,  463 

v.  Clemmons.  61,  523,  524 

v.  Conrad,  185 

v.  Cowser,  108 

v.  Devainy,  525 

v.  Dunham,  194a,  205 

v.  Fowler,  186a 

v.  Gorbett,  51,  102,  146 

v.  Hampton,  181,  225 

v.  Leslie,  742 

v.  McNamara,  216 

v.  Marcelles,  204 

v.  Meyers,  207 

v.  Miller,  218 

v.  Moore,  61.  522 

v.  Nixon,  467 

v.  Oram,  205 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [««  to  sections. 


XC1X 


Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Parker,  407 

v.  Reason,  93 

v.  Richards,  476 

v.  Richart,  408,  743 

v.  Rider,  235 

v.  Simpson,  73,  78,  410,  434 

v.  Smith.  53,  480,  484 

v.  Stewart,  146.  478 

v.  Svmpkins   93,  483 

v.  Washington,  488,  513 

v.  Willie,  758 

v.  Wilson,  467 

v.  Woodlock,  485c 
Houston  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Autrey,  408 

v.  DeLesdernier,  359 
Hovell  v.  Howell,  177 
Hover  v.  Barkhoof.  313,  314,  340,  374 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  131 
Howard  v.  Benton,  700 

v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co.,  774 

v.  Grover,  607,  612 

v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 479 

v.  North  Bridgewater,  350,  351 
352 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  463 

v.  San  Francisco,  265 

v.  Union  Freight  R.  Co.,  359 

v.  Worcester,  267 
Howard   county   v.   Legg,   257,  272, 

369 
Howard  Oil  Co.  v.  Davis,  758 

v.  Farmer,  186 
Howd  v.  Miss.  Central  R.  Co.,  194a, 

226 
Howe  v.  Castleton,  380 

v.  Mason,  303 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 477 

v.  Newmarch,  151 

v.  New  Orleans,  262 

v.  Ohmart,  35,  706 

v.  Plainfield,  367 

v.  Sinclair,  120a 

v.  Young,  645 
Howell  v.  McCoy,  729,  734 

v.  Ransom,  566 

v.  Young,  574,  575 
Howells  v.  Landore  Co. ,  227 
Howenstein  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  13 
Howes  v.  Rose,  690,  691 
Howitt  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co., 

54 
Howland  v.  Edmonds,  373 

v.  Vincent,  703 
Howser  v.  Cumberland,  etc.  R.  Co., 

485 
Howsmon    v.   Trenton    Water    Co., 

265 
Hoy  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  673 

v.  Sterett,  729,  730 
Hoye  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  466 
Hoyer  v.  North  Tonawanda,  367 
Hoyle  v.   Excelsior  Steam  Laundry 
Co.,  210 


Hoyleman  v.  Kanawha,  etc.  R.  Co., 

661 
Hoyt  v.  Hudson,  56,    108,    114,  262, 
274,  729 
v.  Jeffers,  30,  666,  668,  675 
v.  N.   Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co..  87,  472 
Hrebik  v.  Carr,  510 
Hubbard  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  417, 
478 
v.  Concord,  353,  376 
v.  Switzer,  591 
Hubbart  v.  Phillips,  562 
Hubbel  v.  Virogua,  263 
Hubbell  v.  Yonkers,  356,  367 
Huber  v.  Wilson,  203 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  432 
Hubert  v.  Bedell,  639 

v.  Gi-oves,  371 
Hubgh  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 

65,  124 
Huchting  v.  Engel,  121 
Huckshold  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

469 
Hudson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60c 
v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

213 
v.  Johnson,  573 
v.  OceanS.  S.  Co.,  195 
v.  Roberts,  629,  631 
v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  479 
Huerzeler  v.  Central,  etc  R.  Co.,  72 
Hueyv.  Gahlenbeck,  719 
Huff  v.  Ames,  78,  218,  223 
v.  Austin,  683 
v.  Ford,  160,  161 
v.  Poweshiek  county,  257 
Hufford  v.  Grand  Rapids,  etc.  R.  Co., 

151,  493 
Huffman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  192 

v.  San  Joaquin  county,  256 
Hughbanks  v.  Boston  Inv.  Co.,  165 
Hughes  v.    Baltimore,  etc.   R.  Co., 
191,  262 
v.  Bingham,  336 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  506 
v.    Delaware,   etc.    Canal  Co., 

478 
v.  Fond  du  Lac,  368,  373 
v.  Hannibal  etc.  R.  Co.,  419, 

448 
v.  Lawrence,  363 
v.  McCoy,  303 
v.  Macfie,  73 

v.  Monroe  county,  256,  266 
v.  Muscatine,  53,  61 
v.  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  435 
v.  Providence,  etc.  R.  Co.,  279, 

359 
v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  497 
v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  755 
Hughlett  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
521 


Rt/trences]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        IV«  to  sections. 


Ilulni  v.  Missouri  Pao.  R.  Co.,  209a, 

216 
Huizega  v.  Cutler,  etc.  Lumber  Co., 

7(H) 
Hulbert  v.  Topeka,  133 
Hulehan  v.  Green  Bay,  etc.  R.  Co., 

MM.  L94a,  205 
Hulett  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 
Hull  v.  East  Line,  etc.  R.  Co.,  509. 
v.  Hall,  194 

v.  Kansas  City,  346.  379 
v.  Richmond,  334,  337,  352,  353 
Hume  v.  New  York,  281,  354,  367 

v.  Oldacre,  122 
Humes  v.  Knoxville,  283 
Hummel  v.  Seventh  St.  Terrace  Co., 

700 
Humphrey  v.  Douglass,  640 
v.  Hathorn,  619 
v.  Wait,  708 
Humphreys   v.    Armstrong   Co.,   92, 
256,  376 
v.  Mears,  326 
Humphries  v.  Brogden,  716 
Hun  v.  Cary.  589 
Hund  v.  Geier,  71 
Hundhausen  v.  Bond,  175,  359 
Hungerford  v.  Bent,  709,  709a 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  219a 
Hunn  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  188, 

203a,  230,  233,  775 
Hunsaker  v .  Borden,  256 
Hunt  v.  Hoboken  Land,  etc.  Co.,  744 
v.  Lowell  Gas  Co.,  606,  61,  95, 

693 
v.  Missouri  R.  Co. ,  31 
v.  New  York,  255,  287,  369 
v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  166 
v.  Pownal,  346,  355,  356,  378 
v.  Salem,  370 
v.  Vanderbilt,  168 
Hunter  v.  Caldwell,  565,  567 

v.  Columbia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  413 
v.  Cooperstown,   etc.    R.    Co., 

91.  519,  520 

v.  Phillips,  619 

v.  Windsor,  593 

v.  Weston,  334 

Huntingdon,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Decker, 

191,  230 
Huntington  v.  Rumnill,  753 
Huntley  v.  Bulwer,  559 
Huntoon  v.  Trumbull,  67 
Huntress  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  466, 

4816 
Hurd  v.   Rutland,   etc.   R.  Co.,   418, 

452 
Hurdman   v.    Northeastern    R.   Co., 

728 
Hurlbut  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  506 

v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2076 
Hurley  v.  Bowdoinham,  369 

v.  N.  Y.,  etc.  Brewing  Co.,  742 


Hurst  v.  Burnside,  86 

v.  Detroit  R.  Co.,  137,  766 
Hurt  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.   Co.,    102, 
510 

v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  491 
Hussey  v.  Coger,  231,  233 
Husson,  Matter  of,  561 
Hustede  v.  Atlantic  Refining  Co.,  725 
Huston  v.    Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co., 
419,  443 

v.  Iowa  county,  257 

v.  Mitchell,  573 
Hutching  v.  Littleton,  367 
Hutchins  v.  Brackett,  321.  325 

v.  Priestly,  etc.  Co.,  719 

v.  St.  Paul.  etc.  R.  Co. ,  766 
Hutchinson  v.  Boston  Gas  Co.,  693 

v.  Brand,  625 

v.  Concord,  350 

v.  Cummings,  708 

v.  Granger,  731 

v.  Methuen,  53 

v.  Guion,  91 

v.  Olympia,  289 

v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  250 

v.  York,  etc.  R.  Co.,  180 

v.  Ypsilanti,  363 
Hutnsing  v.  Bousquet,  310 
Hutson  v.  King,  703 

v.    New  York,  281,    313,    334, 
358,  374 
Hutton  v.  Windsor,  90,  769 
Huyett  v.   Phil.,   etc.    R.    Co.,   672, 

675, ,676 
Hvams  v.  Webster,  359 
Hyatt  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  215 

v.  N.    Y.,   Lake  Erie,  etc.   R. 
Co.,  448 

v.  Rondout,  262,   289,  356,  374, 
393 
Hyde  v.  Jamaica,  108,  258.  334 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  480 

v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  131 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  78 

Park  v.  Gay,  104 
Hydraulic  Works  v.  Orr,  73,  705 
Hyer  v.  Chamberlain,  429 
Hyman  v.  Nye,  514 
Hynes  v.  San  Francisco,  etc.  R.  Co., 
466a 

Iaicher  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 

480 
Iba  v.  Hannibal,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  435 
Ide  v.  Bremer  Co.  Bank,  580 
Ihl  v.  Forty-second   St.  R.  Co.,  73, 

73a,  74,  79.  137,  769 
Ikard  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co..  756 
Ilfrey  v.  Sabine,  etc  R.  Co.,  39 
Illick  v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co..  185 
Illidge  v.  Goodwin,  35,  629,  634 
Illingsworth  v.  Boston  El.  Light  Co., 

698 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


CI 


Illinois 


Central  R.  Co.  v.  Able,  89, 
521 

Arnold,  425 
.  Axley,  513a 
Baches,  408 
Baker,  429 
Barron,  459 
Beard,  417a 
Bentley,  415 
Bowles,  207 
Buckner,  88,  474,  481 
Carraher,  419,  705 
Copeland,  503 
Cox,  238 

Cragin,  57,  58,  93,  111,  114, 
472 

Crider,  422 
Davidson,  519 
Dick,  62,  104,  464,  476 
Dickerson,  425,  455 
Finney,  436 
Frazier,  678 
Frelka,  459 
Gilbert,  137,  203,  470 
Goddard,  475 
Godfrey,  64,  480 
Goodwin,  435 
Grabill,  459 
Hal!,  480 
Hammer.  749 
Harris,  194a 
Heisner,  407 
Hobbs,  509 
Hunter,  133,  241c 
Hutchinson,  461,  480,  481 
Jewell,  191,  217,221 
Kanouse,  444 
King,  144 
Larson,  471 
Latham,  151 
Latimer,  493 

McClelland,  666,  672,  676,  679 
McKav,  679 
McKee,  451a,  455 
Meachem,  513a,  523 
Middlesworth,  100,  428 
Miller,  7:]"),  750 
Mills.  672,  676,  678 
Minor,  512 
Morrissey,  192 
Murphy,  467 
Neer,  203.  2076 
Noble.  100,  428 
Nowicki.  Ill,  112 
O'Connell.  410 
O'Keefe,  523 
Person,  427 
Pendergrass,  139 
Phelps,  27.  427,  428,  435 
Phillips,  60,  184,  410 
Price.  319a,  410 
Read.  178,  505 
Sheehan,  512,  513 


Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Slater,  72, 
73,  463,  485,  772 
v.  Slatton,  490,  520 
v.  Spence,  233,  233a, 775 
v.  Stassen,  207 

v.  Swearingen,  425,  438,  451a 
v.  Swisher,  185 
v.  Sutton,  60a 
v.  Varnadore,  481a 
v.  Wall,  410 
v.  Welch,  199,  205 
v.  Weldon,  771 
v.  Winslow,  207 
Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Benton,  24 
v.  Ebert,  481 
v.  Finnigan,  95 
v.  Gillis,  27 

v.  Hetherington,  13,  480 
v.  Hoffman,  99,  471 
v.  Patterson,  207 
v.  Schultz,  92,  473 
Illinois  Steel  Co.  v.  Schymanowski, 

186 
Ilott  v.  Wilkes,  720 
Ilwaco,  etc.  Nav.  Co.  v.  Hedrick,  73, 

410 
Imhoff  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  490 
Imler  v.  Springfield,  274,  287 
Imperial  v.  Wright,  334 
Improvement  Co.  v.  Munson,  56 
Ince  v.  East  Boston  Ferry  Co.,  112 
Independence  v.  Ott,  123 

v.  Yakel,  384 
Indermaur  v.  Dames,  704,  719 
Indiana  v.  Woram,  249 
Indiana  Car  Co.  v.  Parker,  205,  232, 

233,  758 
Indiana  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnhart,  13 
v.  Burdge,  7,  19 
v.  Craig,  672 
v.  Greene,  111,  114,  475 
v.  Hammock,  476 
v.  Overman,  113,  666 
v.  Overton,  7 
v.  Quick,  434,  430 
v.  Sawver,  434 
v.  Schertz,  448 
v.  Snyder,  206.  233a 
v.  W  heeler,  463 
Indiana  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Gapen,  434 
v.  Hudelson,  464 
v.  Leamon.  417a 
Indianapolis  v.  Caldwell,  94 
v.  Hufter,  272 
v.  Cook,  377 
v.  Emmelman,  370 
v.  Kingsbury,  334 
v.  MeClure,  334 
v.  Murphy,  369 
v.  Scott.  356,  369 
Indianapolis  \\.  Co.,  Rutherford,  519 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adkins,  455 
v.  Beaver,  492 


Cll 


References}         TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Birney, 

740.  741 

v.  Blackman,  408 

v.  Bonnell.  424 

v    Bush,  ?58 

v.  Caldwell,  418 

v.  Caudle.  107,  430,  436 

v.  Crandall,  434 

v.  Elliott,  422 

v.  Galbreath,  461 

v.  Guard,  434 

v.  Hall.  425 

v.  Harter,  435 

v.  Horst,  81,  108,  495 

v.  Irish,  424 

v.  Johnson,  241 

v.  Keeley,  137 

v.  Kinney,  434 

v.  Logan,  425 

v.  Love,  184,  194 

v.  McBrown,  448 

v.  McClaren,  480,  483 

v.  McClure,  428 

v.  Marshall,  424 

v.  Means,  57 

v.  Meek,  449 

v.  Mustard,  752 

v.  Oestel.  434 

v.  Ott,  215 

v.  Paramore,  58,  674 

v.  Pettv,  437 

v.  Pitzer,  481a 

v.  Robinson,  451  ft 

v.  Shinier,  419,  451a,  455 

v.  Snelling,  425 

v.  Solomon,  445 

v.  Stables.  102,  468 

v.  Stout,  65,  87,  89,  133 

v.  Thomas,  417a,  434,  455 

v.  Toy,  184 

v.  Truitt,  425,  450 

v.  Watson,  56,  215 

v.  Wright,  451a, 

Union  R.  Co.  v.  Cooper,  154 
v.  Neubacher,  466 

Water  Co.  v.  American  Straw- 
board  Co.,  734 
Indig  v.  Nat.  City  Bank,  583 
Ingalls  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.,  99 

v.  Bills.  45,  51,  65,  89,  494,  497, 
519 
Ingersoll  v.  Randall,  178 
Ingebregtson  v.  N.   D.  Lloyd,  S.  S. 

Co.,  1856,  194a,  195,  233a 
Ingerman  v.  Moore,  219a 
[ngwersen  v.  Rankin,  708 
Inland,  etc.  Coasting  Co.   v.  Tolson, 

93,  99.  108 
Inman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  419 

v.  Elberton  R.  Co.,  674,  675 

v.  Potter,  723 

v.  Reck,  100 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Seaver,  55 


Insurance  Co.  v.  Tweed,  26,  55,  666 
International,   etc.  R.   Co.   v.  Arias, 
219a 

v.  Bell,  189 

v.  Cock,  498 

v.  Cooper,  148,  513 

v.  Eckford,  54,  120a,  521 

v.  Garcia,  88.  101,  481,  749 

v.  Graves,  476 

v.  Hall,  202 

v.  Halloran,  16,  407 

v.  Hester,  89 

v,  Hinzie,  2076,  241d 

v.  Hughes,  448 

v.  Kern  an.  196,  204 

v.  Kindred,  114,  139 

v.  Kuehn,  64,  475,  485 

v.  McDonald,  463,  767 

v.  Miller,  749 

v.  Mulliken,  510 

v.  Neff,  473,  477 

v.  Neira,  471 

v.  Prince,  523 

v.  Ryan,  238 

v   Smith,  463,  483,  493,  509 

v.  Telephone  Co.,  748 

v.  Tim  merman,  676 

v.  Welch,  495 
Internat.  Ocean  Tel.  Co.  v.  Saunders, 

543,  75(5 
Interstate,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox,  215 
Ireland  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  672 

v.    Oswego,    etc.    Turnp.    Co., 
356,  386 
Ireson  v.  Pearman,  574 
Irey  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  475 
Irion  v.  Lewis,  303 
Irish  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  91 

v.  Rockford,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 
Iron  R.  Co.  v.  Mowery,  516,  519 
Ironton  v.  Kelly,  176,  291 
Irvine  v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  202,  213 

v.  Wood,  120,  365,  368,  709a,  712 

v.  Fowler  &  Wood,  120 
Irwin  v.  Richardson,  731 

v.  Sprigg,  108,  343,  709a 
Isaacs  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  154,  513 
Isabel  v.  Hannibal,   etc.   R.  Co.,  71, 

72,  99,  483 
Isbell   v.   New   Haven,   etc.  R. 

93,  99,  428,  430 
Island  Coal  Co.  v.  Risher,  188 
Isola  v.  Weber,  776 
Israel  v.  Clark,  497 
Ivay  v.  Hedges,  707 
Ivens  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co 
Iveson  v.  Moore,  371 
Ivorv  v.  Bank  of  Missouri,  580 

*  v.  Deer  Park,  53,  334,  338,  346, 
356,  374 

Jacaud  v.  French,  570 

Jacker  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  55 


Co., 


480 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


cm 


Jackman  v.  Mills   734 
Jackson  v.  Allegheny  City,  285 
v.  Bartlett,  573 
v.  Bellevieu,  355,  378 
v.  Boone,  367 
v.  Buena  Vista,  377 
v.  Chicago,    etc.   R.   Co.,   4^7, 

672 
v.  Crilly,  523 
v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  211a 
v.  Grand  A  v.  R.  Co.,  495 
v.  Greene  county,  256 
v.  Greenville,  375 
v.  Hartwell,  256 
t.  Hyde,  56 
v.  Kiel,  362,  750 
v.  Nashville,  etc.  Ry.  Co. ,  417a 
v.  Pittsburgh,  etc/R.  Co.,  131 
v.  Pool,  369 
v.  Rutland,  etc.  R.   Co.,   430, 

449 
v.  Schmidt,  361,  748 
v.  Second    Ave.    R.    Co.,    150, 

151 
v.  Smithson.  629-,  634 
v.  Wagner,  350 

v.  Wisconsin  Tel.  Co.,  39,  698 
v.  Union  Bank.  582,  585,  598 
Co.  v.  Nichols,  60a 
Jacksonville  v.  Drew,  298 
v.  Lambert,  274 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  412 
v.  Garrison,  432 
v.  Peninsular  Land,  etc. 
Co.,    28,  58,  666,   672, 
673.  674,  675,  680 
v.  Prior,  42  ,  455 
v.  Southworth,  20 
v.  Wellman,  432 
Jacoboski  v.  Grand  Rapids,  etc.  R. 

Co  ,  56 
Jacobs  v.  Bangor,  376 

v.  Humphrey,  622 
v.  McDonald,  619 
Jacobsen  v.  Cornelius,  11 
Jacobsmeyer  v.  Poggemoeller,  636 
Jacobsohn  v.  Belmont,  580 
Jacobson  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  471 
Jacoby  v.  Ockerhausen,  631 
Jacques  v.  Bridgeport  R.  Co.,  745 
Jafre  v.  Harteau,  683,  708,  709 
Jager  v.  Adams,  49 

v.  Coney  Island,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 
Jagger  v.  German  Amer.  Bank,  581 
James  v.  Emmet  Mining  Co.,  241 
v.  Harrodsburg,  262 
v.  Portage.  333 
v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  767 
v.  San  Francisco,  258,  298,  356, 
375 
Jameson  v.  Taylor,  618 
Jamieson  v.  N.  Y.   &  Rockaway  R. 
Co.,  675,  747 


Jammison  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co., 

518 
Jansen  v.  Atchison,  289,  343 
Janny  v.    Great   Northern    R.    Co., 

513a 
Janvier  v.  Vandever,  622 
Jaques  v.  Great  Falls  Mfg.  Co.,  194a, 

230,  231,  233a 
Jaquinta  v.  Citizens'  Tr.  Co.,  481a 
Jardine  v.  Cornell,  493 
Jarman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 
Jarrett  v.  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
Jarvis  v.  Brooklyn  El.  R.  Co.,  506 
Jayne  v.  Sebewaing  Coal  Co.,  207 
Jean  v.  Pennsvlvania  Co.,  735 
Jefferis  v.  Phila.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  680 
Jefferson  v.  Bradv,  108 

v.  Chapman,  102,  176,  356,  368, 

377 
county  v.  St.  Louis  county,  256 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  749 
Jeffersonville  v.  Louisville,  etc.  Ferry 
Co.,  285 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  99,  435 
v.  Avery,  436 
v.  Bowen,  71,  74 
v.  Dunlap,  421,  434,  448, 

452 
v.  Goldsmith,  97 
v.   Hendricks.   133,    494, 

495,  508,  520 
v.  Hendrickson,  89 
v.  Huber,  434 
v.  Lyon,  436,  451a 
v.  Nichols,  437,  451a 
v.  Parkhurst,  435 
v.  Peters,  434 
v.  O'Connor,  336 
v.  Ross,  62 
v.  Stout,  89 
v.  Sullivan,  425,  438 
v.  Underhill,  451a 
Jeffrey  v.  Bastard,  624 

v.  Bigelow,  630,  633 
Jeffry  v.  Keokuk,  etc.  R.  Co.  87 
Jeffs  v.  Rio  Grande,  etc.  R.  Co.,  55 
Jenkins  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  472 

v.  Hooper  Irrigation  Co.,  728 
v.  McGill,  623 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 
v.  Turner,  418 
v.  Waldron,  310 
v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  735 
Jenks  v.  Wilbraham,  378,  741 
Jenne  v.  Sutton,  262 
Jenner  v.  Joliffe.  313,  616,  621 
Jenney  v.  Brooklvn,  265,  287 

Electric  Co.  v.  Murphy,  209a 
Jennings  v.  Albion,  378 
v.  Burton  Co.,  635 
v.  Iron  Bay  Co.  195 
v.  McConnell,  566 
v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  676 


CIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES.       [»re  to  sections. 


Jennings  \.  St.  Joseph,  etc.  R.  Co., 
434 

v.  si.  Louis, etc.  R. Co., 476, 477 

v.  Tacoma  H.  Co.,  1856,  207 

v.  Van  Schaick,  859,  375,  703 
Tlit 

v.  Wayne.  85 
Jennison  v.  Kirk,  283 
Jensen  v.  Barbour,  165 

v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  476 

v.  Waltham,  291 
Jersey  City  v.  Kiernan,  258,  287 
Jesperson  v.  Phillips.  668. 
Jessen  v.  Sweigert,  120 
Jesser  v.  Gifford,  119 
Jessup  v.  Osceola  count v,  374 

v.  Sloneker,  243 
Jeter  v.  Haviland,  573 
Jetter  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  13,  93,  467 
Jewell  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61,  520 

v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  157 

v.  Parr,  56 
Jewett  v.  Keene.  767a 

v.  Klein,  90 

v.  New  Haven.  265 
Jewhurst  v.  Syracuse,  334a,  356 
Job  v.  Harlan.  628 
Jobe  v.  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Joch  v.  Dankwardt,  53,  192,  761 
Jochem  v.  Robinson,  362 
Joel  v.  Morison,  147 
Johanns  v.  National  Accident  Soc, 

520 
Johanson  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  482 

v.  Howells,  626 
John  v.  Bacon,  506 
Johns  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  502 

v.  Stevens,  731 
Johnson,  Ex  parte,  189 

v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  58 

v.  Alston,  5C9 

v.  Ashland  Water  Co.,  182 

v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co..  412, 735 

v.  Barber,  150,  244,  671 

v.  Belden,  93,  313,  325 

v.  Bellingham  Bay  Imp.  Co., 

113,  194 

v.  Boston,  225 

v.  Boston  Towboat  Co.,  194a 

v.  Bruner,  53,  187 

v.  Canal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99,  480 

v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195, 

2076.  460,  476 
v.  Chicago,   etc.    R.    Co.,  73a, 

114.  451a,  455,  667,  676,  735, 
750 

v.  District  of  Columbia,   271, 

274 
v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

223 
v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  197,  206 
v.  Friel.  359 
v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66,  410 


Johnson  v.  Haverhill,  350 
v.  Hoi voke,  752 
v.  Hovey,  207,  2076 
v.   Hudson  River    R.   Co.,  94, 

107,  109,  111,  457,  461,  485a 
v.  Husband,  54 
v.  Irasburgh,  104 
v.  Jordan,  735 

v.  Lake  Superior  R.  Co. ,  481 
v.  Lewis.  709a,  729,  730,  753 
v.  Lindsay,  225,  227 
v.  Long  Id.  R.  Co.,  775 
v.  Lowell,  363 
v.  McMillan,  703,  708 
v.  Louisville,  etc.   R.  Co.,  93, 

475 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  606,  369, 

760 
v.    Minneapolis,    etc.    R.    Co., 

451a 
v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  54,  56 
v.  Netherlands  Nav.  Co.,  225 
v.  New  Orleans,   291 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  40,  47 
v.  Northern  Pac.   R.  Co.,  486, 

672,  676,  743 
v.  N.  W.  Tel.  Co..  31 
v.  Patterson,  97.  720 
v.  People,  104 
v.  Philadelphia,  346 
v.  Ramberg.  704 
v.  Reading  R.  Co.,  485c 
v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  116, 

178,  197 
v.  St.  Paul,  369 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  201, 

241c 
v.    Salem  Turnpike    Co.,  408, 

387,  389 
v.  Spear,  159 

v.  Steam  Gauge  Co. ,  213,  702a 
v.  Tacoma  Lumber  Co.,  708 
v.  Tillson,  102 
v.  Wells.  761 

v.  WestChester.  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  554 
v.  Whitefield,  850 
v.  Wing,  655,  664 
v.  Winona,  etc.  R.  Co.,  51,  495 
Johnston  v.  Gwathney,  623 
v.  Hastie,  164 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  222 
v.  Sutton,  302 
Johnstown     Cheese      Mfg.     Co.,    v. 

Veghte,  729 
Joliet  v.  Conway,  762 
v.  Harwood,  175 
v.  McCranev.  369 
v.  Schufelt  378 
v.  Vertey,  262,  356 
v.  Weston,  "69 
Joliet  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  441 
v.  Velie,  196 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


cv 


Jolley  v.  Hawesville,  261 
Jolliffe  v.  Brown,  432 
Jolly  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207 
Jones,  Matter  of,  5(51 
v.  Adams,  729 
v.  Alabama    Mineral    R.    Co., 

223 
v.  Albany.  373 
v.  Andover,  104,  113,  334 
v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  506, 

520 
v.  Belt,  645 
v.  Bird,  359 
v.  Blair,  625 
v.  Boston,  350 
v.  Boyce,  519 
v.  Carev,  632,  635.  639 
v.  Chantry,  175,  361 
v.  Chicago,    etc.    R.    Co..   424, 

425,  429,  519,  520,  521 
v.  Columbia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  419, 

432 
v.  Crow,  734 
v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

477 
v.  Fay,  611 

v.  Festeniog  R.  Co.,  668,  672 
v.  Florence  Mining  Co.,  219a 
v.  Galena,  etc.  R.  Co.,  422 
v.  Glass.  151 
v.  Granite  Mills,  195 
v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  186, 

219 
v.  Lancaster,  340 
v.  Lewis,  559 
v.  Liverpool,  171 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62 
v.  Loving.  249 
v.  McMinimy,  175 
v.  McGuirk,  621 
v.  Malvern  Lumber  Co.,  222 
v.  New  Haven,    118,   256,  259, 

350,  354 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 

58,  114,  184 
v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co.,  93, 

428.  432 
v.  Old  Dominion  Cotton  Mills, 

218 
v.  Owen,  626 
v.  Perry,  632 
v.  Roberts,  203 
v.  Robertson,  735 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Packet  Co., 

195,  216 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  225, 

492.  505.  735 
v.  Seligman,  446 
v.  Sheboygan,  etc.  R.  Co.,  453 
v.  Sherwood,  628 
v.  Snow,  855 
v.  State.  636 
v.  Sutherland,  207 


Jones  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  508 

v.  Troy,  363 

v.  United  States,  251 

v.  Utica.  etc.  R.  Co.  73,  764 

v.  Vroom,  605 

v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  735 

v.  Waltham,  358 

v.  Werden,  303 

v.  Westerhausen,  334 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co. ,  556 
Jordan  v.  Asheville,  108 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  477. 

v.  Cincinnati,  etc..  R.  Co.,  133 

v.  Crump,  97.  720 

v.  Gallup,  622 

v.  Lassiter.  670 

v.  N.  Y.  &  New  Haven  R.  Co., 
104.  502 

v.  Peckham,  368 

v.  St.  Paul.  etc.  R.  Co.,  735 

v.  Wells.  192 

v.  Wyatt,  669 
Joslin  v.  Grand  Rapids  Ice  Co.,  171, 

760 
Joslyn  v.  Detroit,  289 

v.  King,  588 
Joy  v.  Winnisimmet  Co.,  494 
Joyce  v.  Martin,  709a 

v.  Worcester,  185 
Joyner  v.  Great  Barrington,  351 

v.  So.  Carolina  R.  Co.,  432 
Jucker  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  742 
Judah  v.  McNamee,  603 
Judd  v.  Ballard,  686 

v.  Cushing,  666,  702 
Judge  v.  Cox,  632 

v.  Meriden,  262,  287 
Judice  v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  748 
Judkins  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  207 
Judson  v.  Giant  Powder  Co.,  689 

v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  476, 
482 

v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  61 

v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  415 

v.  Olean,  195 
June  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  483,  490 
Jung  v.  Stevens  Point,  11  i,  375 
Jungnitsch   v.    Michigan    Iron   Co., 

191,  192 
Junior  v.  Missouri  Electric  Co.,  207 
Justice  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  232 
Jutte  v.  Hughes,  701a,  728 

Kaare  v.  Troy  Steel  Co.,  185,    195, 

209a 
Kaes  v.  Mo.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  449 
Kahl  v.  Lene,  117 

v.  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  131 
Kahle  v.  Hobein,  669 
Kahn  v.  Love.  708 
Kaillen    v.    Northwestern    Bedding 

Co.,  219 
Kain  v.  Larkin,  62,  64 


CV1 


References]         TABLE     OF     CASES.         i»re  to  sections. 


K;iin  v.    N.   Y.   &  New  England    It. 
('...,472 

v.   Smith,   114,   120,  120a,  122, 
186,  210,  214,  215 
Kaiser  v.  ilirth.  709,  712 
Kalbfleisch  v.   Long  Island  R.  Co., 

85,  679 
Kalbus  v.  Abbott,  474 
Kalembach  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 

451 
Kalis  v.  Shattuck,  708,  709 
Kane  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91 
466.  477 

v.  Johnson,  745 

v.  Mitchell  Transp.  Co.,  775 

v.  N.  Y.  Elevated  R.  Co.,  332 

v.  N.  Y.,    New    Haven,    etc. 
Co.,  743 

v.  Northern  Cent.  R.  Co.,  213 

v.  Mitchell  Transp.  Co.,  225 

v.  Savannah,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207& 
Kankakee  Electric  R.  Co.  v.   Lade, 
426 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Horan,  119,  750 

Water  Co.  v.  Reeves,  701a 
Kennenberg  v.  Alpena,  363 
Kansas  City  v.    Berminghani,    289, 
358 

v.  Bradburv,  368 

v.  Brady,  291 

v.  Lemen,  291 

v.  Manning,  353 

v.  Slangstrom,  122,  287,  733 
Kansas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Berry,  489 

v.  Brady,  679 

v.  Burton,  207,  207a,  2416 

v.  Butts,  676,  678 

v.  Cook,  407,  476,  484,  750 

v.  Cranmer,  99,  483 

v.  Cravens,  427 

v.  Cutter,  133 

v.  Dorough,  520 

v.  Dye,  207b 

v.  Fite,  748 

v.  Fitzsimmons,  73,  410 

v.  Flynn,  91 

v.  Hammond,  202 

v.  Kier,  748 

v.  Kirksey,  197,  419 

v.  Landis,  453 

v.  Little,  230 

v.  Lundin,  407 

v.  McDonald,  464a 

v.  Mower,  422 

v.  Peavey,  102,  178,  221 

v.  Phillibert,  108 

v.  Pointer,  102,  108,  471 

v.  Riley,  393 

v.  Rogers,  750 

v.  Ryan,  189,  195 

v.  Sanders,  767 

v.  Salmon,  65,  233 

v.  Spencer,  421,  424 


Kansas,  etc.   R.    Co.  v.  Stoner,    122, 
464a 
v.  Twombly,  114 
v.  Webb,  195,  246 
v.  Whipple,  73,  99 
v.  White,  523 
v.  Wiggins,  451a 
v.  Wood,  451a 
Kansas,  etc.  Coal  Co.  v.  Brownlie, 

192 
Karl  v.  Maillard,  719 
Karr  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  421 

v.  Parks,  72,  73a,  83,  89,  115 
Karseu  v.  Milwaukee,    etc.    R.    Co., 

676 
Kates  v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  526 
KaurTman  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co., 
114 
v.  Maier,  207 
Kavanagh  v.  Brooklyn,  274,  299 
Kavanaugh  v.   Janesville,  115,  376, 

764 
Kaveney  v.  Troy,  363 
Kay  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  10,  47, 

72,  78,  458,  463,  766 
Kean  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93, 
472 
v.  Detroit,  etc.  Mills,  186,   192 
Keane  v.  Waterford,  363 
Kearney  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  139, 
767a 
v.  London  &  Brighton  R.  Co., 

59,  60 
v.  N.  J.  Central  R.  Co.,  413 
v.  Thoemanson,  274 
Electric  Co.  v.  Laughlin,  185a, 
203,  219a 
Kearns  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  216 

v.  Sowden,  654 
Keatis  v.  Cadogan,  709 
Keating  v.  Cincinnati,  274 

v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  7,  518 

v.  Kansas  City,  262 

v.  Michigan  Central  R.  Co., 91, 

148 
v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  519,  521 
v.  Stevenson,  699 
Keatley  v.    Illinois    Cent.    R.    Co., 

241c 
Keats  v.  National  Heeling  Mach.  Co., 

203 
Keech  v.    Baltimore,    etc.    Co.,  418, 

454 
Keefe  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  490 

v.  Chicago,    etc.    R.    Co.,    99, 
207 
Keegan  v.  Kavanagh   186 

v.  Western    R.   Co.,    180,  194, 
197 
Keeley  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  494 

Brewing  Co.  v.  Parnin,  355 
Keenan  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  137,  772 
v.  Edison  Electric  Co.,  221 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         {are  to  sections. 


CV11 


Keenan  v.  Gutta  Percha  Man'fgCo., 
680 
v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 

2076 
v.  Southworth,  321 
Keffe  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73, 

683.  705 
Kehoe  v.  Allen,  195 
Kehler  v.  Schvvenk,   186,  186a,  195, 

218 
Keightlinger  v.  Egan,  639 
Keil  v.  Charters  Co.,  749 
Keim  v.  Union  R.,  etc.  Co.,  13,  467 
Keital  v.    St.   Louis    Cable,    etc.    R. 

Co.,  414 
Keith  v.  Easton  350,  355 
v.  Howard,  310 
v.  Keir,  155 
v.    New   Haven,    etc.   R.   Co., 

192,  231 
v.  Pinkham,  523 
v.  Walker  Iron  Co.,  223 
Kell  v.  Nainby.  .S77 
Kelleher  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

201 
Keliher  v   Connecticut,  etc.  R.  Co., 

434 
Keller  v.  Gaskill,  219,  222 
v.  Gilman,  764 
v.   N.   Y.  Central  R.   Co.,  56, 

137 
v.  Sioux,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60a 
Kelley  v.  Cable  Co. ,  230 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114 
v.  Columbus,  703 
v.  Fond  du  lac,  376 
v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  475 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  410 
v.  Milwaukee,  262 
v.  Ryus,  194 

v.  Silver  Springs,  etc.  Co.,  185 
Kellney    v.    Missouri    Pac.    R.    Co., 

116,  482 
Kellogg  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  55, 
92,  606,  678,  680 
v.  Gilbert.  573 
v.  Janesvffle,  289 
v.   N.  Y.   Central  R.  Co.,  114, 

476,  477 
v.  Northampton,  334 
Kelly  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Co.,  218 
v.  Bemis,  803 
v.  Brooklyn    Heights  R.  Co., 

485c 
v.  Cohoes  Knitting  Co.,  703 
v.  Columbus,  856 
v.  Doodv.  375,  376 
v.  Duluth,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  472 
v.  Erie  Tel.  Co.,  204 
v.  Hannibal,   etc.  R.  Co.,  57, 

58.  114 
v.  Hendrie,  480 
v.  Howell,  174 


Kelly  v.  Johnson,  181 

v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  502,  506 
v.  New  York,    144,    165,    166, 

168,  173,  298 
v.  N.  Y.  &  Sea  Beach  R.  Co., 

56,  57,  497 
v.  Shelby  R.  Co.,  203 
v.  So.  Minnesota  R.  Co.,  417 
v.  Tilton,  629,  639 
v.  Twenty-third  St.  R.  Co.,  774 
v.  Union  R.  Co. ,  99 
Kelsay  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  476 
Kelsey  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  666, 
678 
v.  Glover,  350,  352,  356,  375 
v.  Jewett,  25,  57 
v.  Staten  Island  Rapid  Transit 
R.  Co.,  478 
Kelty  v.  Second  Nat.  Bank,  580 
Kelver    v.    N.    Y.    Central    R.   Co., 

434 
Kemmish  v.  Ball,  633 
Kemp  v.  Burt,  558,  567 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  553 
Kemper  v.  Louisville,  742 
Kenady  v.  Lawrence,  373 
Kendall  v.  Albia,  272,  376,  758,  759 
v.  Boston,  58,  705 
v.  Brown,  614 
v.  Council  Bluffs,  257 
v.  Kendall,  654 
v.  Stokes,  313 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  531, 
554 
Kendrick  v.  Fowle,  672,  680 
Keng    v.    Baltimore,    etc.    R.    Co., 

114 
Kenna  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  207 
Kennard    v.    Burton,    71,    87,    107, 

652,  654 
Kennayde  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  476 
Kennedy  v.  Broun,  557 
v.  Cecil  Co. ,  94 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194a 
v.  Cumberland,  334 
v.  Lake  Superior,  etc.  R.  Co., 

185a,  207 
Lansing,  358 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  185,209a, 

241 
v.  New  York,  285,  725 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 

115 
v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  216 
v.    Ryall,    141,    246,    313,   515, 

690 
v.   Standard    Sugar  Refinery, 
767a 
Kennet's  Petition,  283 
Kennett  v.  Durgin,  630 

v.  Engle,  628 
Kenney  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  13, 
476. 478,  675,  676 


cvm 


TABLE    OK    CASES.        [are  io  sections. 


Kenney  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  492, 

504,  505 
Kennon  v.  Gilmer,  514,  631,  758 
Kenny  v.  Barns,  ?'2:> 

v.  Cunard  Steamship  Co.,  195, 
238 
Kensington  v.  Wood,  273 
Kent  v'.  Dawson  Bank,  583 
v.  Lincoln,  60o,  373 
v.  Wilmington,  3G7 
Kentucky,  etc.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Quin- 
kert,  508.  519 
Hotel  Co.  v.  Camp,  73a,  719a 
Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Ackley, 

v.  Biddle,  761 

v.  Conner,  432 

v.  Gastineau,  73a 

v.  Smith,  102,  461 

v.  Talbot,  432 

v.  Thomas,  61,  102,  108,  523 
Kenworthv  v.  Ironton,  376,  393 
Ken  von  v.  Western  U.   Tel.  Co.,  755 
Keokuk  v.  Dist.  of  Keokuk,  343,  384 

Packet    Co.    v.    Henry,    492a, 
521 
Kepperly  v.  Ramsden,  168 
Kern  v.  De  Castro  Sugar  R'f'g  Co., 

28,  195 
Kerns  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  216 
Kerr  v.  Forgue,  73 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  133 

v.  O'Connor,  628,  638 

v.  West  Shore  R.  Co.,  737 
Kerrigan  v.  Hart,  55 

v.  South  Pac.  R.  Co.,  503 
Kersey  v.  Kansas,  etc.   R.  Co.,  192, 

241 
Kershan  v.  Gates,  637 
Kerwacker    v.    Cleveland,    etc.    R. 
Co.,  61,  63,  99,  100,  102,  419, 
656 
Kesee  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  679, 

680 
Kesler  v.  Smith,  766 
Kessel  v.  Butler,  760 
Kessler  v.  Lockwood,  632,  635 
Kester  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  756. 
Ketcham  v.  Colin,  175 
Keutgen  v.  Parks,  75 
Kevern  v.  Providence  Min.  Co.,  188 
Kewanee  v.  Depew,  89.  102 
Keves  v.  Bank  of  Hardin,  579 

v.  Marcellus.  352,  356 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  761 
Keyser  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  458, 

466«.  481a,  483 
Kevstone  Bridge  Co.    v.  Newberry, 

235 
Kibele  v.  Philadelphia,  286,  287,  369, 

693 
Kidder  v.  Barker.  623 

v.  Dunstable.  346,  644 


Kid  well    v.    Houston,    etc.   R.   Co., 

204 
Kieffer  v.  Hummelstown,  346 
Kiernan  v.  New  York,  356 
Kies  v.  Erie,  265,  272 
Kilbane  v.  Westchester  R.  Co.,  654 
Kiley  v.  Kansas  City,  262,  354,  369 

v.  Western    U.   Tel.  Co.,   534, 
550,  553,  755 
Killea  v.  Foxon,  195 
Killian  v.  Augusta,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197 
Killien  v.  Hyde,  89 
Killion  v.  Power,  723 
Kilroy  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
225 

v.  Foss,  207 
Kimball  v.  Bath,  356,  358 

v.  Boston,  370 

v.  Conolly,  592 

v.  Cushman,  161 

v.  Davis,  619 

v.  Perry,  618 

v.  Rutland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  550 
Kimbro  v.  Edmondson,  622 
Kimbrough  v.  State,  386 
Kimmer  v.  Weber,  197,  224,  230,  241 
Kincaid  v.  Hardin  county,  255,  256, 
257 

v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.   Co., 
410 
Kinchelo  v.  Priest.  579 
King  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co..  218 

v.  Ford,  686 

v.    Ford   River    Lumber    Co., 
219a 

v.  Fourchy,  567 

v.  Liver  more,  169 

v.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.,  53 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,   144. 
173 

v.  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410,  512 

v.  Orser,  618 

v.  Oshkosh,  358 

v.  St.  Landry,  256 

v.  Thompson,  110 

v.  Tiffany,  733 
Kingsbury  v.  Dedharn,  355 
Kingsley  v.  Bloomingdale,  378 
Kinnaird  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  734 
Kinnard  v.  Willmore,  619 
Kinnev  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  178,  232, 
505 

v.  Corbin,  207 

v.  Crocker,  466 

v.  Folkerts,  743,  758,  760 

v.  Louisville  R   Co.,  512 

v.  Tekemah.  334a 

v.  Troy,  363 
Kinnion  v.  Davies,  629 
Kinnison  v.  Carpenter,  303 
Kinsev  v.  Jones,  340 
Kinsley  v.  Lake  Shore  R.  Co.,  526 

v.  Morse,  376 


References]         TABLE    OF     CASES.        {are  to  sections. 


C1X 


Kipperly  v.  Rarusden,  107 
Kirby  v.  Boylston,  etc.  Asso.,  14,  343, 
710 

v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  244 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  531 
Kirk  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  235 

v.  Glover,  573 

v.  Homer,  353,  369 

v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  433 
Kirkpatrick  v.  Knapp,  343 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  53,  204 
Kirksey  v.  Pryor,  619 
Kirtley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co..  484 
Kissenger  v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co. , 

466 
Kistler  v.  Thompson.  716 
Kistner  v.  Indianapolis,  26,  262,  289 
Kitchell  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  73a 
Kitchen  v.  Carter,"  56,  702 
Kittredge  v.  Bellows,  619 

v.  Elliott,  628,  632 

v.  Milwaukee,  258 
Klanowski  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co., 

92.  471 
Klatt  v.  Milwaukee,  356,  369 
Klauder  v.  McGrath,  122 
Kleiber  v.  People's  R.  Co.,  89 
Klein  v.  Dallas,  258,  289,  368 

v.  Jewett,  490,  525,  758 

v.  Thompson.  759 
Klenberg  v.  Russell,  634 
Klepsch  v.  Donald,  688a,  767,  773 
Kline  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  64,  151, 
493,  520 

v.  W.  IT.  Tel.  Co.,  756 
Kling  v.  Buffalo.  363,  376 

v.  Kansas  City,  334 
Klipper  v.  Coffey,  104 
Klochinski   v.   .Shores  Lumber  Co., 

232 
Klutts  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  31 
Knahtla  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  55, 

232 
Knapp.  Matter  of,  561 

v.  Sioux  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  31, 
89,  197,  758 
Knauss  v.  Brua,  713 
Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  v.  De  Hass, 

632 
Knight  v.  Abert,  418,  655,  703,  705 

v.  Albemarle,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56 

v.  Brown,  !'.','> 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  672,  675 

v.  Cooper.  184,  207b 

v.  Fox,  169 

v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
448 

v.  Pontchartrain  R.  Co.,  65 

v.  Portland,    etc     R.    Co.,    45, 
495,  499,  505 

v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 
Knightlinger  v.  Egan,  631 
Knights  v.  Quarles,  574 


Knightstown  v.  Musgrove,  66,  289 
Knisley  v.  Pratt,  685 
Knoop  v.  Alter,  702 
Knott  v.  Wagner,  686 
Knour  v.  Wagoner,  640 
Knowles  v.  Crampton,  61,  645 

v.  Muller,  632 

v.  Muscatine,  336 

v.  Norfolk  R.  Co.,  493,  749 
Knowlton  v.  Bartlett,  618 

v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  104 

v.  Pittsfield,  350 
Knox  v.  Hall  Steam  Power  Co.,  719a 

v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
39 

v.  Pioneer  Coal  Co.,  207 

county  v.  Montgomery.  257 
Knoxville,  etc..  R.  Co.  v.  Acuff,  61, 

140.  482,  483 
Knoxville  v.  Bell.  289 
Knupfle  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice   Co., 

13.  340 
Kobe  v.  No.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  434 
Koch  v.  Ashland,  363,  376 

v.  Sackman  In  v.  Co.,   175,  750 
Koelsch  r.  Philadelphia  Co.,  35,  287, 

690,  693 
Koester  v.  Ottumwa,  289 
Kohn  v.  Lovett.  97,  703 

v.  McNulta,  196.  197 
Kokomo  v.  Mahan,  274 
Kolb  v.  Klages,  632 

v.  O'Brien,  313 
Kollock  v.  Madison,  289,  341,  359 
Kolsti   v.   Minneapolis,  etc.   R.   Co., 

53,  73 
Koney  v.  Ward,  639 
Koons  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71, 
73,  410 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  541 
Koontz  v.  Oregon  R.  Co.,  675,  676 
Koppf  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  412 
Kornetzski  v.  Detroit,  367 
Korrady  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

137,  475.  482 
Korte  v.  St.  Paul  Coal  Co.,  703 
Kosmak  v.  New  York,  287 
Kountz  v.  Brown,  748 
Kramer  v.  Market  St  R.  Co,  133 
Krans  v.  Baltimore,  287 
Krantz  v.  Rio  Grande  R.  Co.,  513 
Kranz  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  194,  233 
Krause  v.  Davis  county,  257 

v.  Morgan,  207a 
Kraut  v.  Frankfort.  31 
Krebs  Mftf.  Co.  v.  Brown,  751 
Krebs  v.   Minneapolis,  etc    R.    Co., 

451a 
Kreger  v.  Bismarck,  299 
Kreig  v.  Wells.  73a 
Kreis  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  484 
Krenzar  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co., 
481a 


ex 


References}         TABLE    OF     CASKS.        \  <•:■  to  s-rthns. 


Krenziger  v.  Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co., 

763 
Krev  v.  Schlussner,  719 
Krippner  v.  Biebl,  666,  669 
Kroener  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207a 
Krogg  v.  Atlanta,  etc.   R.  Co.,  60a, 

230 
Krogstad  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co., 

223 
Krom  v.  Schoonmaker,  121 
Krov  v.  Chicago,   etc.   R.  Co.,  186, 

209a,  221 
Krueger  v.  Bronson,  86 
Kruse  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 
Krzvwoszvnski  v.  Consol.  Gas  Co., 

697 
Kucera  v.  Merrill  Lumber  Co.,  73a, 

185a 
Kudick  v.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  202, 

241 
Kuhn   v.  Chicago,   etc.  R.    Co.,  99, 

451a 
v.  Jewett,  30,  666 
v.  Walker,  379 
Kuhnen  v.  Union  R.  Co.,  485a,  4856, 

485c 
Kuhns  v.  Wisconsin,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60c 
Kumler  v.  Junction  R.  Co.,  224,  241 
Kunimel  v.   Germania   Sav.    Bank, 

588 
Kunz  y.  Troy,  73,  281,  296,  346,  369 
Kurz  Ice  Co.  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.   R. 

Co.,  676,  678 
Kutner  v.  Fargo,  749 
Kuttner  v.  Lindell  R.  Co.,  66 
Kwiotkowski    v.    Chicago,    etc.    R. 

Co..  476 
v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  481b 
Kyle  v.  Southern  Electric,  etc.  Co., 

359 
Kvne  v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  74, 

355,  359 
Kyser  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.   R.  Co., 

434,  436 

Lacas  v.  Detroit  R.,  520,  759 
Lackawanna,  etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Chene 
with.  466a,  500 
v.  Doak,  58,  672,  675 
Lackin  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 

434 
Lackland  v.  North  Missouri  R.  Co., 

359,  362 
La  Clef  v.  Concordia,  260 
Lacon  v.  Page,  353 
Lacour  v.  New  York.  273,  744 
Lacroy  v.  N.  Y. ,   Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  202,  2076,  217 
Lacy  v.  Winn.  653 
Ladd  v.  Foster,  89.  766 
v.  French,  340 

v.  New  Bedford,   etc.  R.  Co., 
184,  189,  497 


Ladonceur  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co., 

476 
La  Duke  v.  Exeter,  346 
Laethem  v.  Fort  Wayne,  etc.  R.  Co., 

485a 
Lafayette  v.  Allen,  265 

v.  Larson,  367 

v.  Nagle,  274 

v.  Timberlake,  262 

v.  Weaver,  60c 
Lafayette,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  102, 
460,  463 

v.  Huffman,  74. 

v.  Shriner,   418,   430,   434,  435, 
451a 
Lafferty  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  448 
Laffin,  etc.  Powder   Co.  v.  Tearney, 

689.  701a 
Lafflin  v.  Buffalo,  etc.   R.  Co.,  606, 

195,  502,  510,  519,  673 
Lafittev.  New  Orleans  R.   Co.,  145, 

513 
La  Flamme  v.  Detroit,   etc.  R.  Co., 

451a 
La  Grange  v.  Southwestern  Tel.  Co. 

555,  556 
Lagrone  v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  226 
Lahey  v.  Central  Park  R.  Co.,  485c 
Laicher  v.  New  Orleans  R.  Co.,  88 
Laing  v.  Colder,  516,  739 
Laird  v.  Pittsburgh  Tr.  Co.,  493 

v.  Otsego,  355,  373 
Lake  v.  Milliken,  28,  31,  55,  122,  378 

v.  Mining  Co.,  186 
Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Acres,  486 

v.  Bradford,  473,  484 

v.  Bell,  232 

v.  Carson,  459 

v.  Clark,  678 

v.  Cloes,  761a 

v.  Craig,  197 

v.  Cruzen,  675,  678 

v.  Helmerick,  675 

v.  Kirts,  675 

v.  Kneadle,  434 

v.  McHenry,  194a 

v.  Mackey,'  73,  479 

v.  Matthews,  7 

v.  Mays,  493 

v.  Middlecoff,  675 

v.  Mugg,  769 

v.  Zoffinger,  468 
Lake  Roland   R.    Co.  v.  McKewen, 

485a 
Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bodemer, 
49,  64,  484 

v.  Boyts,  66 

v.  Brown,  518a,  523 

v.  Clemens,  479 

v.  Franz,  463,  466 

v.  Hart,  90 

v.  Hessions,  137 

v.  Hundt,  458 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


CXI 


Lake  Shore,  etc.   R.  Co.  v.  Johnsen, 
102,  743 
v.  Johnson,  463 
v.  Knittal,  185,  2076 
v.  Lavalley,  193,  233 
v.  McCormick,  184,  195 
v.  Mcintosh.  415,  473 
v.  Miller,  69.  88,  107 
v.  Murphy,  2U2 
v.  Parker,  93,  95 
v.  Pinchin,  473,  479 
v.  Prentice,  749 
v.  Rosenzweig,  151,  742,  749 
v.  Saltzman,  495 
v.  Spangler,  178 
v.  Stupak.  191,  192,  209 
v.  Sunderland,  472 
Lake  Side,  etc    R.  Co.  v.  Kellv,  673, 

676 
Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.  v.  Erickson, 

144,  174.  207a 
Lakin  v.  Oregon  Pac    R.  Co.,  157 

v.  Willamette  Val.  etc.  R.  Co., 
413 
Lamar  county  v.  Clements,  334 
Lamb  v.  Lvon,  497 

v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  426 
Lambert  v.  Pembroke,  334a,  369 

v.  San  Iford,  573 
Lambsth  v.  Joffrion,  621 

v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co.,  519, 
520,  523 
Lambkin  v.  Southeastern  R.  Co.,  39 
Lamline  v.  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  508 
Lammert  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  473 
Lam  pert  v.  Laclede  Gas  Co.,  118 
Lampkin  v.  Louisville,    etc.  R.  Co., 

513 
Lamoreux  v.  Luzerne  county,  257 
Lamotte  v.  Boyce,  216 
Lanark  v.  Dougherty,  102 
Lancaster  Canal  Co.  v.  Parnaby,  285, 

399 
Lancaster   v.  Conn.   Mut.    Life  Ins. 

Co..  175,701 
Landa  v.  McDermott,  644 
Landolt  v.  Norwich,  363 
Landon  v.  Humphrey,  606,  607 
Landridge  v.  Levy,  38 
Landru  v.  Lund,  358,  703 
Landsberger  v.    Magnetic   Tel.    Co., 

755 
Lane  v.  Atlantic  Works,  13,  31,  35, 
99,  107,  122 
v.  Brvant,  60a 
v.  Cotton,  319,  321 
v.  Crombie,  107,  375 
v.  Crosby,  303 
v.  Hancock,  338,  350,  356,  367, 

369 
v.  Hitchcock.  119 
v.    Kansas  City,   etc.    R.   Co., 
433 


Lane  v.  Minnesota  Agric.  Soc,  62& 
v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  93 
v.  Syracuse,  345 
v.  Wheeler,  346 
v.  Woodbury,  256,  267 

Laney  v.  Chesterfield  County,  62, 
375,  376 

Lang  v.  Holiday  Creek  R.  Co.,  417 
v.  N.  Y. ,  Lake  Erie,  etc.    R. 
Co.,  151,  763 

Langan  v.  Atchison,  353,  376 
v.  Iron,  etc.  R.  Co.,  492a 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90,  92 

Langdon  v.  Potter,  573 

Lange  v.  Benedict,  303 

v.  Schoettler.  766,  767 

Langford  v.  United  States,  249,  251 

Langhoff  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
13,  467 

Langin  v.  N.  Y.  &  Brooklyn  Bridge 
Co.,  499 

Langley  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co., 
531 

Langlois  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  466a 
v.  Cohoes,  370 

Lanigan  v.  N.  Y.  Gas  Co..  696 

Laningv.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  91, 
191,  192,  194,  204,  208,  215, 
230 

Lannen  v.  Albany  Gas  Co.,  81,  697 

Lanphier  v.  Phipos,  558.  606 

Lansing  v.  Coney  Isl.  R.  Co.,  495 
v.  Smith,  8,  365,  371,  737 
v.  Stone,  665 
v.  Toolan,  258,  271 

Lapham  v.  Curtis,  16,  17,  701a 
v.  Rice,  345 

La  Pierre  v.  Chicago,  etc  R.  Co., 
185,  209a 

Lapointe  v.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  516 

Laporte  county  v.  Ellsworth,  380 

Lappread  v.  Detroit.  368 

Lapslev  v.  Union   Pac.   R.    Co.,  66, 
"  468 

Laramie  county  v.  Albany  county, 
254 

Larich  v.  Moies.  216,  233 

La  Riviere  v.  Pemberton,  65 

Larkin  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66 
v.  O'Neill,  60&,  704 
v.  Saginaw  county.  256 

Larmore  v.  Crown  Point  Iron  Co.,  8, 
97,  705 

Larock  v  Ogdensburgh,  etc.  R.  Co., 
144 

Larrabee  v.  Sewall,  86 

Larsh  v.  Des  Moines,  368,  376 

Larson  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  60 
v.  Grand  Forks,  289 
v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  241c 
v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co..  167 
v.  St    Paul,  etc.    R.    Co.,  185, 
207 


CX11 


References}        TABLE    OF    CASES.       [«»•«  to  sections. 


Larson  v.  Tobin.  361 

Larue  v.  Farron  Hotel  Co.,  709a 

Lary  v.  Cleveland,   etc.  R.  Co.,  97, 

705 
Larzalere  v.  Kirchgessner,  767 
Lasala  v.  Holbrook.  701 
La  Salle  v.  Porterrield,  367 

v.  Thorndike,  762 
Lasky  v.  Canadian  Pac.   R.  Co.,   54, 

184.  230,  233,  233a 
Lassiter  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  556 
Lasure  v.  Graniteville  Mfg.  Co.,  220 
Latch  v.  Rumner  R.  Co.,  517 
Latham  v.  Roach,  704 
Lathrop  v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  336 
Latremouille  v.  Bennington,  etc.  R. 

Co..  209a.  221,  223 
Lattin  v.  Smith,  303 
Latty  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  434 
Laude  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  449 
Laue  v.  Madison,  369 
Laugher  v.  Pointer,  173,  699 
Laughlin  v.  Eaton,  115 

v.  Street  R.  Co. ,  53 
Laumier  v.  Francis,  735 
Laurel  v.  Blue,  291 
Lavallee  v.  St.  Paul.  etc.  R.  Co.,  241c 
Laverenz  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93, 

477 
Laverone  v.  Mangianti,  628 
Laverv  v.  Manchester,  346 
Law  v.  Ewell,  557 

v.  Kingsley,  334a,  343 
Lawler  v.  Baring  Boom  Co.,  16 
Lawlor  v.  French,  630 
Lawless  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co., 

87,  204,  214 
Lawrence  v.  Combs,  659 

v.  Fox,  118,  543 

v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  395 

v.  Green,  487,  516,  519 

v.  Hagemeyer,  1856,  215 

v.  Harrison,  572,  576 

v.  Jenkins,  39 

v.  McCalmot,  587 

v.  McGregor,  40 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  436 

v.  Mt.  Vernon,  334,  350 

v.  New  Bedford,  358 

v.  Potts,  568 

v.  Sherman,  313 

v.  Stonington  Bank,  582 
Lawrenceburgh  v.  Wesler,  336 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Montgomery,  61, 
523 
Laws  v.  No.   Carolina,  etc.    R.  Co., 

419 
Lawson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  492, 
523 

v.  Merrill.  60,  719 

v.  Seattle.  265 

v.  State.  619 

v.  Truesdale,  185,  197,  207a 


Lawton  v.  Ervvin,  619 

v.  Giles,  676 

v.  Little  River,  etc.  R.  Co.,  489 

v.  Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8 
Lawyer  v.  Smith,  671 
Lax  v.  Darlington,  89 
Lay  v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  416 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99 
Layne  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  419,  430 
Lazarus  v.  Toronto,  721 
Lazell  v.  Kapp,  654 
Leak  v.  Rio  Grande,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54 
Leake  v.  Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co.,  476 
Leame  v.  Bray,  18,  644 
Learned  v.  Tangeman,  729 
Learoyd  v.  Godfrey,  704,  705 
Leary  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185,  210, 
211a 

v.  Woodruff,  725 
Leather     Manufacturers'     Bank     v. 

Morgan,  588 
Leavenworth  v.  Hatch,  66 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Forbes,  100 

v.  Rice,  87,  468,  476 
Leavenworth  Lodge  v.  Byers,  700 
Leavitt  v.  Terre  Haute  R.  Co.,   426 

467,  474 
Lebanon  v.  McCoy,  186,  209a,  217 

v.  Olcott,  283 

Light  Co.  v.  Leap,  159,  692 
Le  Balm  v.  N.  Y.   Central  R.   Co., 

2076 
Le  Baron  v.  Joslin,  107,  654 
Le  Beau  v.  Telephone,  etc.  Co.,  375 
Lechman  v.  Hooper,  116 
Lechner  v.  Newark,  653 
Le  Clare  v.  St.  Paul,  etc,  R.  Co.  91 
Lederman  v.   Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 

73a,  485 
Ledgerwood  v.  Webster  City,  368 
Ledig  v.  Germama  Brewing  Co.,  645 
Ledyard  v.  Jones,  619,  623 

v.  Ten  Eyck,  333 
Lee  v.  Ayrton,  572 

v.  Barkhampsted,  350,  358,  367 

v.  Burk,  633 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  185 

v.  Detroit,  etc.  Works,  180 

v.  Dixon,  567 

v.  Hardeway,  619 

v.    Minneapolis,    etc.    R.    Co., 
421,  424,  451a 

v.  Publishers'  Co.,  114,  719a 

v.  Riley,  365,  627 

v.  Sandy  Hill,  299 

v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  214 

v.  Troy,  etc.  Gas  Co.,  109,  111, 
113,  114 

v.  Union  R.  Co.,  37,  355 

v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  689,  693 

v.  Western  U.   Tel.   Co.,    541, 
543 

v.  Woolsey,  186,  213 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


cxm 


Leebrick  v.  Republican  Val.,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  424 
Lee  county  v.  Yarbrough,  256 
Leeds  v.  Amherst,  740 

v.  Met.  Gas  Co.,  740,  760 
v.  Richmond,  298 
Le  Forest  v.  Tolman,  132,  628 
Legg  v.  Britton,  140 
Lehigh  Bridge  Co.  v.  Lehigh  Coal, 
etc.  Co.,  16 
county  v.  Hoffors,  262,  274 
etc.  Coal  Co.  v.  Hayes,  214 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Greiner,  94 
Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Jones,  60a 
Valley  R.   Co.  v.  McKeon,  55, 
666 
Lehman  v.  Brooklyn,  58,  73a 

v.   Brooklyn  R.   Co..  761,  766, 
769 
Lehman  Co.  v.  Siggeman,  186 
Lehn  v.  San  Francisco,  274 
Lehr  v.  Steinway,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
Leiber  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  750 
Leidlein  v.  Meyer,  735 
Leigh  v.  Omaha  R.  Co.,  630 
v.  Omaha  St.  R.  Co.,  56 
v.  Westervelt,  332 
Leighton  v.   Sargent,  605,   612,  614, 

761 
Leishman   v.  Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co., 

54 
Leistritz  v.   American  Zylonite  Co., 

218 
Le  Lievre  v.  Gould,  8 
Leman  v.  New  York,  299 
Le  May    v.    Canada    Pac.    R.   Co., 
241a 
v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  464 
Lemmon  v.  Chanslor,  51,  516 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425 
Lemon  v.  Hayden,  334 
Lendberg   v.   Brotherton   Iron  Min. 

Co.,  207 
Lennon  v.  Rawitzer.  57 
Lent  v.   N.   Y.   Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 

87.  524 
Lentz  v.  Carnegie,  750 
Lenz  v.  Aldrich,  710 
Lenzen  v.  New  Braufels,  265 
Leonard  v.  Collins,  187,  189 

v.  Columbia  Nav.  Co.,  132 
v.  FitchburgR.  Co.,  752 
v.  N  Y.,  Albany,  etc.  Tel.  Co., 
529,  532,   534,   537,  544,  754, 
755 
v.  Storer,  708,  710 
Leoni  v.  Taylor,  256 
Leopard  v.   Chesapeake,  etc.  Canal 

Co..  401 
Leopold  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 

54 
Lepnick  v.  Gaddis,  705.  706 
Le  Roy  v.  Blauvelt.  622 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  — h.] 


Lesan  v.  Maine  Central  R.  Co.,  90, 

476 
Leslie  v.  Lewiston,  71,  74 

v.  Pound,  120 

v.  Rich  Hill  Coal  Co.,  717 

v.  Wilson,  22 
Lessard  v.  Stram.  729,  735 
Lesser  v.  Wunder,  602 
Lester  v.  Pittsford,  25,  53,  57,  108 
Lettis  v.  Horning,  635 
Levenson  v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  526 
Leviness  v.  Post,  146 
Levy  v.  Campbell,  495 

v.  New  York,  262 

v.  Salt  Lake  City,  286,  289 
Lewark  v.  Carter,  618 
Lewenthal  v.  New  York,  274 
Lewis  v.  Atlanta,  367 

v.    Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
91,  488,  493,  520 

v.  Eastern  R.  Co. ,  458 

v.  Emery,  191 

v.Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  28 

v.  Fremont,  etc.  R.  Co.,  428 

v.  Gamage,  573 

v.  Hughes,  689 

v.  London,  etc.  R.  Co.,  509,  520 

v.  Montgomery,  2416 

v.  New  Orleans,  291 

v.   N.    Y.,  Lake   Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  417,  468 

v.  N.  Y.,  New  England,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  215 

v.  N.  Y.  Sleeping  Car  Co.,  525 

v.  Palmer,  303 

v.  Puget  Sound  R.  Co. ,  480 

v.  Raleigh,  260 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  205 

v.  Samuel,  559 

v.  Schultz,  669,  671 

v.  Seifert,  185,  202,  232,  233a 

v.  State,  249,  250,  251,  260 

v.  Stein,  734 

v.  Terry,  117 
Lexington,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Huffman, 

127 
Leydecker  v.  Brintnall,  710 
Leyden  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co. ,  436 
Libbv  v.  Maine  Central  R.  Co. ,  407 
*  v.  Scherman,  185a,  1856,  233 
Lichtenberger  v.  Merriden,  353 
Liddle  v.  Keokuk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  445 
Lienau  v.  Dinsmore,  587a 
Liermann  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  87 
Light  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  186 
Lilienthal  v.  Campbell,  313 
Lilly  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  135 

v.N.  Y.  Central R.  Co.,  188,197 
Lillstrom  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  417 
Lily  v.  Boyd,  753 
Limekiller  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co., 

132,  133 
Liming  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  679 


CX1V 


Reference^         TABLE     OF    CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


Limpus  v.  London  Omnibus  Co.,  145, 

146 
Linch  v.  Pittsburgh  Tr.  Co.,  523 
v.  Sagamore  Mfg.  Co.,  186 
Linck  v.  Scheffel.  632,  639 
Lincoln  v.  Barre,  53 

v.  Beck  man.  760 
v.  Boston,  262,  358 
v.  Buckmaster,  20 
v.  Calvert,  356.  368 
v.  Detroit,  287 
v.  Hapgood,  303,  310 
v.  Power,  376 

v.  Saratoga,  etc.  R.  Co.,  760 
v.  Smith,  353,  369 
v.  Walker,  108.  289 
v.  Woodward,  369 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sutherland,  735 
Rapid  Transit  Co.  v.  Nichols, 
89.  359 
Lindall  v.  Bode,  223 
Lindeberg  v.  Crescent  Min.  Co.,  186a 
Lindeman  v.   N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  91 
Lindholm  v.  St.  Paul,  262 
Lindley  v.  Polk  County,  256 
Lindsay  v.  Connecticut,  etc.  R.  Co., 
57 
v.  Winn,  653 
Lindsey  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
v.  Danville,  764 
v.  Des  Moines,  367 
v.  Leighton,  699,  710 
Lindvall  v.  Woods,  195,  232,  233 
Line  v.  Taylor,  628,  632 
Lineoski  v.  Susquehanna  Coal  Co., 

221,230 
Linfield  v.  Old  Colony  R.   Co.,  417, 

463,  467 
Link  v.  Phila.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 

v.  Sheldon,  606 
Linnehan  v.  Rollins.  165,  166 
v.  Sampson,  85,  630,  639 
Linsley  v.  Bushnell,  365,  758 
Linton  Coal  Mining  Co.  v.  Persons, 

185,  207a 
Lion,  The,  172 
Lipe  v.  Blackwelder,  640 
Lipfeld  v.   Charlotte,    etc.    R.    Co., 

413 
Liscomb  v.  New  Jersey  R.  Co.,  506 
Lissa  v.  Goodkind,  723 
Litchfield  v.  Vernon,  332 
Littaur  v.  Narragansett  Pier  R.  Co., 

476 
Little  v.  Barreme,  322 

v.  Carolina  Cent.  R.  Co.,  483 

v.  Dusenberrr,  502 

v.  Hackett,  66 

v.  Lathrop,  655.  659 

v.  McAdaras.  708 

v.  Madison.  263,  355 

v.  Summerlee  Iron  Co.,  182 


Little  v.  Superior,    etc.    R.  Co.,    99, 
485a 
v.  Wirth,  710 
Littlefield  v.  Brown.  625 

v.  Norwich,  369 
Littlejohn  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  491, 

502 
Little  Miami  R.   Co.   v.  Fitzpatrick, 
204 
v.  Stevens,  224,  226,  2336 
v.  Wetmore,  150 
Little   Rock,    etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Barry, 
233a 
v.  Cagle,  196 
v.  Chapman,  731,  735 
v.  Dick,  99 

v.  Duffey,  184,  194a,  216 
v.  Eubanks,  108,  178 
v.  Finley,  419 
v.  Harrell,  516 
v.  Havnes,  484 
v.  Henson,  432,  463 
v.  Holland,  432,  463 
v.  Lawton.  492a 
v.  Miles.  492.  523 
v.  Moseley,  204,  217 
v.  Payne,  432 
v.  Perrv,  S6 
v.  Tankersly,  520 
v.  Townsend,  178,  184 
v.  Trotter,  429 
v.  Turner,  432 
v.  Voss,  217 
Little  Rock  v.  Willis,  274,  291 

etc.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Davis,  757 
Littleton  v.  Bacon,  55 

v.  Richardson,  355,  384 
Little  wood  v.  New  York,  140 
Lively,  The,  744 
Livermore  v.  Camden  county,  289 

v.  Freeholders,  etc.  256 
Livezey  v.  Schmidt,  735 
Livingston  v.  Adams,  729,  732 
v.  Cox,  577 
v.  Radcliff,  573 
Lloyd  v.  Albemarle,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99, 
463 
v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
v.  Lloyd,  741 
v.  New  York,  254.  287 
v.  Ogleby,  652 
v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  434 
v.  St.  Louis,    etc.  R.  Co.,  62, 
484 
Loar  v.  Heinz,  340 
Lobdell  v.  New  Bedford,  367,  368 
Loberg  v.  Amherst,  352.  358 
Lock  v.  First  Div.  etc.  R.  Co.,  61 
Locke  v.  St.  Paul.  etc.  R.  Co.,  418 

v.  State.  398 
Lockhart  v.  Lichtenhaler,  66 

v.   Little   Rock,    etc.,    R.  Co., 
120a,  207a,  413 


References}         TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


CXV 


Lockwood  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
463 
v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
137,  769 
Locust,  etc.  Iron  Co.  v.  Gorrell,  717 
Loeb  v.  Attica,  104 
Loeber  v.  Roberts,  668 
Loeser  v.  Humphrey,  645,  742 
Loewer  v.  Sedalia,  393 
Lofdahl  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

480 
Lofrano    v.    N.    Y.    &    Mt.    Vernon 

Water  Co..  219a 
Loften  v.  Vogles,  65 
Loftus  v.  Union  Ferry  Co.,  606,  367, 

496,  511 
Logan  v.  Gednev,  419 

v.  New  Bedford,  356 
v.  N.  Carolina  R.  Co.,  233,  413 
v.  People,  334 
v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  675 
v.  W.  U.  Tel   Co.,  756 
Logansport,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Caldwell, 

436 
Logansport  v.  Dick,  175,  298 

v.  Justice,  368,  369 
Logue  v.  Link,  639 
Lohr  v.  Phillipsburg,  367,  368,  369 
Loker  v.  Brookline,  105,  340,  352,  363 
Lombar  v.  East  Tawas,  374 
Lombard  v.  Chicago,  353 
v.  Lenox,  761 
v.  Oliver,  310 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Christian,  518 
London  and  Northwestern  R.  Co.  v. 

Skerton,  416 
Long  v.  Coronado  R.  Co.,  2C7,  209a 
v.  Milford,  96 
v.  Morrison,  607 
v.  Orsi,  559,  567 
Longenecker     v.     Pennsylvania    R. 

Co.,  108 
Longmeid  v.  Holliday,  116 
Longmore  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co., 

521 
Loomis  v.  Pearson,  39 

v.  Terry,  97,  98,  628,  629,  632, 
639 
Looney  v.  Joliet,  368 
v.  McLean,  710 
Loop  v.  Litchfield,  117 
Loper  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co..  756 
Lopez  v.  Cent.,  etc.  Mining  Co.,  108, 

216 
Loranger  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

195 
Lord  v.  Carbon  Iron  Co.,  717 

v.  Pueblo  Smelting  and  Refin- 
ing Co.,  207 
v.  Wormwood,  640.  659,  600 
Lorence  v.  Ellensburgh,  367 
Lorentz  v.  Robinson,  186,  187 
Lorillard  v.  Monroe.  338 


Lorillard  v.  Monroe  county,  256,  262, 

291 
Lorimer  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  11, 

241a 
Loring  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 
207 

v.  Worcester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  675 
Lorman  v.  Benson,  333 
Lortz  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.   Co.,  478, 

481,  481b 
Los  Angeles  Cemetery  Ass'n  v.  Los 

Angeles,  274 
Losee  v.  Buchanan,   16,  17,  60,  668, 
683,  70Ja 

v.  Clute,  8,  117 

v.  Watervliet  R.  Co.,  508 
Lothrop  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  207 
Loucks  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  461 

463,  474,  478 
Loughlin  v.  State,  231,  233a 
Loughran  v.  Des  Moines,  742 
Louis  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  675 
Louisiana  v.  Jumel,  249 

v.  New  Orleans,  254,  261 
Ijouisville  Canal  Co.  v.  Murphy,  108, 
401,  705 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ballard,  46,  418, 
427,  429,  513.  749 
Louisville  v.  Baker,  54 

v.  Banks,  198 

v.  Bean,  135 

v.  Belcher,  422,  440 

v.  Berg,  524 

v.  Berkey,  188,  202 

v.  Berry,'  773 

v.  Binion.  219a 

v.  Bisch,  523 

v.  Black,  483,  676 

v.  Boland,  203 

v.  Bowler,  233 

v.  Brantley,  2336 

v.  Breckenridge,  493 

v.  Breedlove,  191 

v.  Bryant,  2076 

v.  Burke,  139,  480 

v.  Campbell,  195 

v.  Case.  66,  758 

v.  Caudle,  445 

v.  Cavens,  2336,  235 

v.  Cayce.  509 

v.  Clarke.  769 

v.  Cockerel,  410 

v.  Cochran,  429 

v.  Coleman,  461 

v.  Collins,  99,  2336 

v.  Commonwealth,  463 

v.  Coniff,  62 

v.  Conrad,  493 

v.  Coulton,  222 

v.  Crawford,  90,  480 

v.  Creek.  66,  67 

v.  Crunk,  492a.  508,  520 

v   Davis.  IS).  241d" 


CXV1 


References]         TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Depp,  520 
v.  Douglass,  154 
v.  Dunkin,  04 
v.  Earl,  207a 
v.  Ellis,  493 
v.  Etzler,  439 
v.  Faylor,  505 
v.  Fleming.  103,  481,  510 
v.  Filbern,  180 
v.  Foley,  2076,  217 
v.  Fox,  93.  518 

v.  Frawley,  104,  219,  219a,  760 
v   French,  460,  478 
v.  Gaines,  493 
v.  Goetz.  108.  114 
v.  Goodbar,  455 
v.  Govver,  53 
v.  Greer,  748 
v.  Gutenkunz,  94 
v.  Hackman.  417 
v.  Hailey,  513a 
v.  Hairstown,  480 
v.  Hall,  87,  198.  199 
v.  Hanning,  1856,  2076 
v.  Hart,  434,  678 
v.  Hawthorn,  225 
v.  Hays,  735 
v.  Hendricks,  516 
v.  Hinder,  195 
v.  Hodge,  415,  735 
v.  Holsapple,  509,  520 
v.  Howard.  103,  468 
v.  Hurst,  434 
v.  Hurt,  7,  93,  99 
v.  Jackson,  748 
v.  Johnson,  493 
v.  Jones,  57,  516,  742 
v.  Katzenberger,  526 
v.  Kelly,  185a,  524 
v.  Kelsey,  432 
v.  Kenley,  188,  206,  221 
v.  Kingman.  488,  499 
v.  Krey,  484 

v.  Krinning,  30,  666,  680 
v.  Lahr,  232 
v.  Lee,  470,  520 
v.  Lockridge,  107 
v.  Logan,  493 
v.  Lohges,  483 
v.  Lucas,  410,  506 
v.  McCorkle,  676 
v.  McCoy,  47,  457,  495 
v.  McEwan,  512,  518 
v.  Malone,  675,  676 
v.  Markee,  2076 
v.  Martin,  233a 
v.  Melton,  458.  469 
v.  Miller,  216,  674.  675,  678 
v.  Milton.  418,  442 
v.  Mitchell,  675 
v.  Moore,  233a 
v.  Mothershed,  207,  2076 
v.  Natchez,  etc.  R  Co.,  676 


Louisville, etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Nitsche,  666. 
668 
v.  Northington,  742 
v.  Orr,  1856,  189,  222,  241d,  767 
v.  Ousler,  427 
v.  Park,  495 
v.  Pearson,  2076 
v.  Pedigo,  516 
v.  Petty,  195 
v.  Phillips,  433,  480 
v.  Pitt,  135 
v.  Posey,  431 
v.  Potts,  471 
v.  Raines,  213 
v.  Reagan,  185a,  2076,  410 
v.  Reese.  676 
v.  Reidmond,  431 
v.  Red,  54 
v.  Rice,  428,  431 
v.  Richards,  476 
v.  Richardson,  60a,  2076,  2416 
v.  Ricketts,  521 
v.  Ritter,  495,  499 
v.  Robertson,  235 
v.  Robinson.  180,  236,  241 
v.  Santford,  113 
v.  Schmetzer,  480 
v.  Schmidt.  426,  451,  461 
v.  Sears,  73a,  485 
v.  Shanklin,  336 
v  Shanks,  72,  93 
v.  Sheets.  238 
v.  Shivell,  89 
v.  Sickings  519 
v.  Simmons,  421,  432 
v.  Smith,  432 
v.  Snyder,  31 ,  495,  497 
v.  Spain,  436 
v.  Sparks,  750 
v.  Spenn,  678 
v.  Stanger,  426 
v.  State,  359 
v.  Stommell,    62,    65,    90     107, 

476,  478,  482 
v.  Stone,  461 
v.  Stutts,  185,  195 
v.  Sullivan,  493 
v.  Sumner,  441 
v.  Taylor,  676 
v.  Thomas,  436,  448 
v.  Thompson,  471,  488 
v.  Trammell.  767 
v.  Treadway,  506 
v.  Utz,  207a,  2076 
v.  Wade,  493 
v.  Ward,  204,  2076,  217 
v.  Watson,  64 
v.  Weams,  11,  51 
v.  Webb,  73a.  101,  482 
v.  Whitesell,  62,  451a 
v.  Williams,  196,  451a,  483,  484 
v.  Wilson,  2076 
v.  Wolfe,  94,  506,  519,  748 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         {are  to  sections. 


CXV11 


Louisville,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Wood,  91, 
151,  508,  513,  758 

v.  Woods,  54,  2076 

v.  Wright,  198,  772 

v.  Yniestra,  108 

v.  Zink,  434 
Louisville,  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Mask,  508 

&  N.  R   Co.  v.  Hawkins,  217 

etc.  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Wallace,   207 

etc.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Nashville,  etc. 
Turnp.  Co..  385 
Lounsberry  v.  Bridgeport,  115 
Love  v.  Atlanta,  266 

v.  Hall,  568 

v.  Raleigh,  299 
Lovegrovev.  Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57, 

241 
Loveland  v.  Gardner,  702 
Lovejoy  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  201 

v.  Dolan,  652 
Lovell  v.  Howell,  216 
Lovenguth  v.  Bloomington,  86,  375, 

376 
Lovett  v.  Salem,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a,  83, 

99,  473 
Lovingston  v.  Bauchens,  158 
Low  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  725,  726 
Lowe  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,   207a, 
2076,  775 

v.  Guard,  702 

v.  Salt  Lake  City,  97.  98,  285 
Lowell  v.  Boston,  etc.   R.  Co.,  24a, 
173,  384,  414,  699 

v.  Glidden,  384 

v.  Moscow,  335 

v.  Proprietor  of  Locks  &  Canais, 
401 

v.  Short,  365,  384 

v.  Spaulding,  343,  353 
Lower  v.  Franks,  615 

v.  Segal,  133 
Lowery  v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  408 

v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  26,29,  30, 
37,  60,  355,  426,  676 

v.  Rowland,  750 

v.  Western  U.  Tel  Co., 739,  753a 
Lowry  v.  Guilford,  569 

v.  Thompson,  249 
Loyd  v.  Columbus.  299 
Luby  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  60a, 

518 
Lucas  v.  Coulter,  708 

v.  Mich.  Central  R.  Co.,  749 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61 

v.  New    Bedford  R.  Co.,  492a, 
508,  520 

v.  N.  Y   Central  R.  Co.,  135 

v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  122 
Lucco  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  197 
Lucey  v.  Ingram,  172 

v.  Hannibal  Oil  Co.,  207,  209a 
Lucy  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  512 


Lucia  v.  Meech,  Otil 
Lucot  v.  Rodgers,  735 
Ludlow  v.  Fargo,  289,  368 

v.  Yonkers,  744 
Luebke  v.  Berlin  Mach.  Works,  209a, 
218 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  202 
Luede  v.  Mukwa.  378 
Luedtke  v.  Jeffery,  649,  654 
Luke  v.  Brooklyn,  261 
Lukin  v.  Godsall,  750 
Lumbly  v.  Backus  Mfg.  Co.,  363 
Lumley  v.  Caswell,  '217 
Lumpkin  v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  207 
Lund  v.  Hersey  Lumber  Co.,  197 

v.  Tyngsborough,  60a,  355,  375 
Lundeen  v.  Livingston  Electric  Light 

Co.,  354 
Lundquist  v.  Duluth  R  Co.,  241 
Lunt  v.  Northwestern R.  Co.,  466,  473 
Luther  v.  Winnisimmet  Co.,  729,  735 

v.  Worcester,  363 
Lutton  v.  Vernon,  367,  375 
Luttrell  v.  Hazen,  146,  155 
Lutzv.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  129 
Luvenguth  v.  Bloomington,  86,   375, 

376 
Lux  v.  Haggin,  729 
Lyberg  v.  Northern  Pac   R.  Co.,  215 
Lyddy  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  13 
Lyendecker  v.  Martin,  619 
Lygo  v.  Newbold,  705 
Lyman  v.  Amherst,  376 

v.  Edgerton.  592,  593 

v.  Gipson,  659 

v.  Hampshire,  122,  376 

v.  Union  R.  Co.,  485a 
Lyme  Regis  v.  Henley,  118 
Lynch  v.  Allyn,  1856,  203,  2416 

v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Commonwealth,  557, 559,620 

v.  Cowell,  569,  573 

v.  Davis,  609 

v.  Erie,  376 

v.  Gravson,  633 

v.  Hubbard,  343 

v.  Knight,  761 

v.  McNally,  628,  631,  639 

v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  71,  73, 
73a,  129,  145 

v.  New  Rochelle,  346,  485c 

v.  New  York,  93,  262,  274,  275, 
375 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  499, 
500 

v.  Nurdin,  31,  34,  35,  73,  219 

v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  113 

v.  Smith,  73,  74,  79 

v.  St.  Joseph,  etc.  R.  Co.,  464. 
484 

v.  Stone,  402 

v.  Willard,  557 

v.  Wilson,  574 


CXV111 


References]         TABLE    OF    CASES.         {are  to  sections. 


Lynds  v.  Clark,  702 
Lynn  v.  Adams,  340 
Lyon  v.  Cambridge,  356 

v.  Logansport,  353,  375 
Lyons  v.  Boston  Towage  Co.,  185 

v.  Brookline,  370 

v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  135, 
137 

v.  Desotelle,  104 

v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  31,  86 

v.  Merrick,  365,  627,  634,  635 

v.  Rosenthal,  58,  60 
Lyttle  v.  Chicago,   etc.   R.  Co.,  195, 
206,  207a,  215 

McAdams  v.  Sutton,  628 

McAdoo  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 

46,  480 
McAdory  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

775 
McAllen  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  753a 
McAllister  v.  Albany,  358 

v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 
v.  Clement,  23,  602 
v.  Hammond,  644 
McAlpin  v.  Powell,  73,  97,  702a,  707 
McAndrew  v.  Electric  Tel.  Co.,  547, 

550,  553 
McAndrews  v.   Burns,   180,  234,  236 
v.  Collerd,  9 

v.  Montana  Union  R.  Co.,  215 
McArthur  v.  Green  Bay,  etc.  R.  Co., 
104 
v.  Pease,  623 
v.  Saginaw,  258,  289 
McAuley  v.  Boston,  363 
McAunich  v.  Mississippi,  etc.  R.  Co., 

93,  523 
McBride  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  Ill 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  233 
McCabe  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410 

v.  O'Connor,  121,  699,  709a 
McCafferty  v.  Spuvten,  etc.  R.  Co., 

173,  175 
McCaffrey   v.    Twenty-third    St.    R. 

Co.,  56 
McCahill  v.  Detroit  R.  Co.,  73a,  523 

v.  Kipp,  35,  122,  629,  634 
McCaig  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  57,  60 
McCaldin  v.  Parke,  59,  606,  725,  726 
McCall  v.  Chamberlain,  421,  445 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  476 
McCalla  v.  Multnomah  county,  256 
McCallum  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  468, 
477 
v.  McCallum.  207 
McCampbell  v.    Cunard  S.    S.   Co., 

209a.  216,  233 
McCamus  v.  Citizens'  Gas  Co.,  359 
McCandless  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
57.  414,  436 
v.  McWha.  430,  605,  606,   608, 
615 


McCann  v.  Newark  etc.  R.  Co.,  55 
v.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  73a 
v.  Tillinghast,  150 
v.  Waltham,  295 
McCaraher  v.  Commonwealth,  592 
McCarragher  v.  Rogers,  60t»,  73,  194a, 

218,  223 
McCarroll  v.  Kansas  City,  358 
McCarten  v.  Flagler,  703 
McCarthy  v.  Boston,  291,  299 
v.  Boston  Duck  Co.,  57 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  131 
v.  Far  Rockaway,  287 
v.  Foster,  705 
v.    New    England  Order,   etc. 

137 
v.  Oshawa,  353 
v.  Portland,  165,  258  338,  370, 

379 
v.  Syracuse.  703 
v.  Young,  636 
McCarty  v.  Lockport,  363 
McCaskill  v.  Elliott.  629,  631 
McCaslin  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

520 
McCaughey  v.  Providence,  291 

v.  Tripp,  291 
McCauley  v.  New  York,  647 
v.  Smith,  719 

v.  Tennessee  Coal,  etc.  Co.,  523 
McCawley  v.  Furness,  etc.  Co.,  178 
McCerren  v.   Alabama,  etc.  R.  Co., 

426 
McCharles   v.    Horn    Silver    Mining 

Co.,  209a,  222 
McChesney  v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  185b. 

233a 
McClain  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  87,  408, 

472,  485c 
McClallen  v.  Adams,  612 
McClarey  v.   Sioux,  etc.  R.  Co.,  40, 

375 
McClarnev  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

194a,  197 
McCleary  v.  Frantz,  686 
v.'Kent,  174 
v.  Lowell,  104 
McClellan  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  667 
McClelland  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
472 
v.  Scroggin,  668 
McClenaghan  v.  Brock,  494,  685 
McCleneghan  v.  Omaha,  etc.,  R.  Co., 

731,  741 
McCloskey  v.   Chautauqua  Ice  Co 
645 
v.  Moies,  338,  363 
McClung  v.  Dearborne,  146 
McClure  v.  Red  Wing,  274 

v.  Sparta,  353 
McConnell  v.  Dewey,  256 
McCool  v.  Galena,  etc.  R.  Co.,  437 
v.  Grand  Rapids.  379 


References']  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


CX1X 


McCootnbs  v.  Akron,  274 
McCord  v.  High,  313 

v.  Ossining,  351 
McCorrnack  v.  Sornberger,  665 
McCorniick  v.  Burt,  323 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425 

v.  Horan,  735 

v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  412, 

427 
v.  Monroe,  375 
v.  Washington,  380 
v.  Winters,  735 

Machine  Co.  v.  Burandt,  215, 
719 
McCoster  v.  Long  Island,  etc.  R.  Co., 

231 

McCoull  v.  Manchester,  263,  286,  358 

McCoun  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  158 

McCoy   v.    California,    etc.    R.    Co., 

451a 

v.   Philadelphia,    etc.    R.    Co., 

113,  749 
v.  So.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  449,  450, 
451a 
McCready  v.  South   Carolina  R.  Co., 

672,  676 
McCrearv  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  417 
McCreery  v.  Willett,  625 
McCue  v.  National  Starch  Co.,  219a 
McCullom    v.     Blackhawk    County, 

257.  333 
McCullough  v.  Shoneman,  144 
McCully  v.  Clarke,  53,  57,  665 
McCummins  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

676 
McCutcheon  v.  Homer,  262,  289 
McDade  v.  Chester,  262 
McDaniel  v.   Highland   Ave.  R.  Co., 

523 
McDernaott  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
408 
v.  Iowa  Falls  R.  Co.,  185a,  207 
v   Kentucky  Cent    R.  Co.,  484 
v,  Kingston.  358.  368 
McDonald  v.  Ashmead,  334a 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Chicago,    etc.   R.   Co.,    480, 

50(5  510 
v.  Eagle  Mfg.  Co.,  230 
v  Illinois  Cent.  R  Co.,  509 
v.  International,    etc.   R.   Co., 

460,  482 
v.  Jodrey,  629 
v.    Kansas   City,    etc.   R.    Co., 

521 
v.  Lockport,  384 
v.  Long  Isl.  R.  Co.,  508,  521 
v.  Mallorv,  131 

v.  Mass.  Gen.  Hospital,  266,  331 
v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  206 
v.  Montgomery  R.  Co.,  93,  516, 

520,  523 
v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  136 


McDonald  v.  Savov,  111 
v.  Toledo,  363 
v.  Toledo  R.  Co.,  485a 
v.  Toledo  St.  R.  Co.,  359 
McDonnel  v.  Elias  Brewing  Co.,  654 
McDonough  v.  Lanher,  190 

v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  520 
v.  Milwaukee,   etc.  R.  Co.,  434 
v.  Virginia  City,  262,  289 
McDougall  v.  Campbell,  557 

v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108,  111 
v.  Salem,  370 
McDowell  v.  N.   Y  Central  R.  Co., 

425 
McDuffie  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

478 
McElligott  v.   Randolph,   190,    203a, 

207a.  232 
McElrov  v.  Albany,  291 

v.  Nashua,  etc.  R.  Co.,  413,486, 
495,  502 
McEniry  v.  Waterford,  etc.  R.  Co., 

241 
McFadden  v.  Kingsbury,  340 

v.  Santa  Anna,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67 
McFarland  v.  Benton,  591 
v.  Crary,  577 
v.  Swiart,  702 
McFee  v.  Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  748, 

.49 
McGaffigan  v.  Boston,  369 
McGahan  v.   Indianapolis  Gas  Co., 

693 
McGarry  v.  Loomis,  74.  79,  370 

v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co.,  630, 
631 
McGatrick  v.  Wason,  104,  161,  197 
McGearty  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co. ,  502 
McGeary  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  73a 
McGee  v.  Boston  Cordage  Co.,  194, 
194a 
v.  Consolidated  R.  Co.,  485c 
v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  509, 
513 
McGettigan  v.  Potts,  701 
McGhee  v.  Drisdale,  493 

v.  White,  477 
McGibbon  v.  Baxter,  668 
McGill  v.  Compton,  705 
v.  Monette,  115 
v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  478 
McGilvray  v.  West  End  R.  Co.,  513 
McGinityV  New  York,  367 
McGinley  v.  Levering.  232 
McGinness  v.  Canada  So.  Bridge  Co., 

195,  197 
McGintv    v.    Athol     Keservoir    Co., 

195 
McGlynn  v.  Brodie,  209a 
McGoldrick  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  375,  721 
McGonigle  v.  Canty,  203 
v.  Kane,  197 


cxx 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         We  to  sections. 


McGovern   v.    Central  Vermont    R. 
Co.,  54,  203,  212,  280 

v.  Columbus  Mfg.  Co.,  241c 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  73,  90, 
4G6,  471,  473,  477,  481a 
McGowan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  28, 
187 

v.  Larsen,  737 

v.  St.  Louis  Ore,  etc.  Co.,  775 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52 

v.  International,  etc.  R.  Co., 
766,  767 
McGrail  v.  Kalamazoo,  369 
McGrath  v.  Bloomer,  61,  337 

v.  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  104 

v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  434 

v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  53,  57 

v.  Merwin,  104 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  13,  62, 
87,  96,  417,  459,  466,  467 

v.  N.  Y.   &  New   England  R. 
Co.,  2076 

v.  N.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  13 

v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  216 

v.  Walker,  703,  709a 
McGraw  v.  Marion,  291 
McGregor  v.  Boyle,  262 

v.  Brown,  623 
McGrell  v.  Buffalo  Office  Bldg.,  719a 
McGrew  v.  Stone,  16,  21,  28,  46 
McGuerty  v.  Hale,  60a,  195 
McGuiness  v.  Butler,  73 

v.  New  York,  285 
McGuinness  v.  Worcester,  363,  377 
McGuire  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a 

v.  Grant,  144,  160,  701,  750 

v.  Hudson  R.  R.  Co.,  476,  477 

v.  Ringrose,  629 

v.  Spence,  370,  375,  703,  709a 

v.  Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  72, 
461 
McHenry  Coal  Co.  v.  Snedden,  748 
McHugh  v.  Schlosser,  775 
Mcllvaine  v.  Lautz,  663 
Mclntire  v.  Plaisted,  640 

v.  Roberts,  35,  719 

St.  R.  Co.  v.  Bolton,  183 
Mcintosh  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  112 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  185 

v.  Slade,  172 
Mclntyre  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  91, 
137,   473,  519,   520,  524,  769, 
771 

v.  Trumbull,  618 
McKaig  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  233a 
McKay  v.  Buffalo,  291 

v.  Southern  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  122, 
359 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  754 
McKee  v.  Bidwell,  58,  60c,  355 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  203 

v.   Delaware,  etc.    Canal  Co., 
729,  731 


McKellar  v.  Detroit,  289,  353,  363 
McKeller  v.  Monitor,  96,  367,  369 
McKelvey  v.  Chesapeake,  etc  R.  Co., 

215 
McKenna  v.  Baessler,  667 

v.  Martin,  712 

v.  St.  Louis,  265 
McKenzie  v.  Oheetham,  709 

v.  Northfield,  376 
McKeon  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  150 
McKernan  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  493 
McKillop  v.  Duluth  St.  R.  Co.,  408 
McKimble  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  107 

521 
McKinley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  154, 

425 
McKinney  v.  Chicago, etc.  R.  Co., 481 

v.  Irioh  Northern  R.  Co.,  187 

v.  Jewett,  555 

v.  Neil,  89,  514,  516 

v.  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  445,  446 

v.  Western  Stage  Co.,  115 
McKinnie  v.  Kilgallon,  719a 
McKinnon  v.  Noreros;,   )  I 
McKinster  v.  Bank  of  Utica,  580.  581 
McKissock  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58 
McKone  v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  506 

v.  Wood,  635 
McKonkey  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  460 
McKune  v.  Santa  Clara  Lumber  Co., 
478 

v,  Santa  Clara  Valley  Mill,  60 
McLane  v.  Sharpe,  494,  652 
McLaren  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  492a 

v.  Canada  Cent.   R.  Co.,  679 

v.  Williston,  209a 
McLarney  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  213 
McLaughlin  v.  Ar infield,  13,  702a 

v.  Bangor,  749a 

v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  359 

v.  Corey,  363,  760 

v.  Phila.  Traction  Co.,  374,  376 
McLaury  v.  McGregor,  90,  377 
McLean  v.  Blue  Point  Co.,  241a 

v.  Burbank,  514 

v.  Fiske  Wharf,  etc.  Co.,  708 

Co.  Coal  Co.  v.  McVey,  772 
McMahon  v.  Davidson,  31,  60,  66,516 

v.  New  York,  79,  83,  135 

v.  Northern   Cent.    R.  Co.,  73, 
74,  108,  479 

v.  Port  Henry  Ore  Co.,  210,  215 

v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  118,  408, 
341 
McManus  v.  Carmichael,  333 

v.  Crickett,  151 

v.  Finan,  656 

v.  Lancashire,  etc.  R.  Co.,  505 

v.  Woolverton,  644 
McMarshall  v.  Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co., 

477,  481 
McMaster  v.  111.  Central  R.    Co.,  235 

v.  Montana  R.  Co.,  429 


References] 


TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


CXX1 


McMellen  v.  Union  News  Co.,  218 
McMillan  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co., 
73 
v.  Eastman,  319 
v.  Federal  St.  R.  Co.,  748 
v.  Union  Brick  Co.,  189 
Marble  Co.  v.  Black,  89 
McMullan  v.  Edison  Electric  Co.,  698 
McMullen  v.  Carnegie  Bros.   &  Co., 
196 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  481a 
McMurtray  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

520 
McNaier  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  759 
McNally  v.  Cohoes,  367,  369 
v.  Colwell,  665 
v.  Kerswell,  619 
McNamara  v.  Clintonville,  346 

v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  513a 
v.  Logan,  217 
v.  MacDonough,  195,  241a 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  4816, 
482 
McNarra  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  679 
M'Naughton   v.  Caledonian  R.   Co., 

61,  94 
McNeal  v.  Pittsburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  474 
McNeil  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  216 
McNerney  v.  Reading,  353 
McNeven  v.  Arnott,  705 
McNevins  v.  Lowe,  606,  607 
McNish  v.  Peekskill,  356,  377 
McNown  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  472 
McNulta  v.  Enoch,  508,  509 

v.  Lockridge,  4816 
McNutt  v.  Livingston,  590,  591 
McPadden  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  11,  494 
McPeak  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  520 
McPhee  v.  Scully,  192,  207a,  2416 
McPheeters  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co., 

419 
McPherson  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

197,  771 
McPheters  v.  Moose  River  Log  Co., 
735 
v.  Page,  244 
McQueen  v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61, 
239 
v.  "Elkhart,  363 
McQuigan  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 

207 
McQuilken  v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  74, 

108,  112 
McQuillan  v.  Seattle,  377 
McRickard  v.  Flint,  13,  467,  719 
McRose  v.  Bottyer,  336 
McSberry  v.  Canandaigua,  333,  368 
McTeer  v.  Lebow,  303 
McVee  v.  Watertown,  73a,  369 
McVeety  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  489 
McVoy  v.  Knoxville,  93 


Mc Williams  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92 

v.  Hopkins,  572 
Macbeath  v.  Ellis,  573 
Macaulay  v.  New  York,  87,  654 
Mace  v.  Reed,  486,  749 
Mack  v.  Bensley,  730 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
Mackay  v    N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  87, 

477,  478 
Mackersy  v.  Ramseys,  582 
Mackey  v.    Baltimore,   etc.   R.   Co., 
2076 

v.  Vicksburg,  705 
Mackie  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  425 

v.  West  Bay  City,  373,  375 
Mackin  v.  Alaska  Refrigerator  Co., 
195,  219 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co..  204,  226, 
231 

v.  People's  R.  etc.  Co.,  510 
Macomber  v.  Nichols,  333.  395 

v.  Taunton,  351.  358,  367 
Macon  v.  Macon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  254 
Macon,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  62, 99, 103, 
454,  463 

v.  McConnell,  679 

v.  Maves,  459,  502 

v.  Sester,  419 

v.  Vaughn,  436,  437 

v.  Wynn 
Mad  River  R.  Co.  v.  Barber,  178,  180, 
184,  208,  214,  2336 

v.  Butler,  215. 
Madden  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co., 
230,  233,  235,  241 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197 

v.  Occidental  S.  S.  Co.,  223 

v.  Port  Royal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  510 
Maddox  v.  Randolph  county,  373 
Madison  v.  Baker,  369 

county  v.  Brown,  257,  376 

R.  Co.  v.  Bacon,  180 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Whiteneck,  421 
Magarity  v.  Wilmington,  274,  289 
Magee  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Oregon  R.,  etc.  Co.,  493 

v.  North  Pac.  R.  Co.,  207a 

v.  Troy,  358 
Magie  v.  Cutts,  606 
Maginnis  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  460, 

463 
Magner  v.  Truesdale,  476 
Magoffin  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  129, 

492 
Magoon  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  479 
Magor  v.  Chad  wick,  734 
Maguire  v.  Cartersville,  734 

v.  FitchburgR.  Co.,  112 

v.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  87 
Mahar  v.  N.  Y..  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  520 
Maher  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R  Co.,  476 

v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  199 


CXX11 


References}        TABLE    OF    CASES.       \are  to  sections. 


Maher  v.  Central  Park,  etc.  R.  Co., 
Ill,  521 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  60 
v.   Winona,   etc.  R.  Co.,   426, 
434,  448 
Mahler  v.  Norwich,  etc.  Tr.  Co.,  131 
Mahogany  v.  Ward,  346 
Mahoney  v.   Atlantic,    etc.    R.   Co., 
413,  459 
v.   Dore,   114,   197,    209,    209a, 

211a 
v.  Libbev,  343,  705 
v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  87,  376 
v.  N.  Y.  &  New   England  R. 
Co.,  241?) 
Mahanoy  v.  Soholly,  257 
Maier  v.  Randolph,  146 
Mailhot  v.  Pugh,  729 
Mairs  v.  Manhattan  Real  Est.  Ass'n, 

701a.  728,  747 
Maker  v.  Slater  Mill  Co.,  13,  702a 
Malcolm  v   Fuller.  231,  241b 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  508, 
523 
Maiden,  etc.  R.    Co.   v.   Charleston, 

301,  345 
Maley  v.  Shattuck,  322 
Mali  v.  Lord,  145,  151 
Mallach  v.  Ridley,  145 
Mallory  v.  Griffey,  108 
Malloy  v.  Hibernian  Sav.  Soc,  703 
v.  Staten  Isl.  Rapid  Tr.  R.  Co., 

725 
v.  Walker,  368,  378 
Malmsten  v.  Marquette,  66 
Malone  v.  Boston  &  Alb.  R.  Co.,  484 
v.  Hathaway,  204,  226,  230,  231 
v.  Hawley,  194.  217,  223 
v.  Knowfton,  627 
v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  525, 
761a 
Maloy  v.  Port  Royal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241c 
v.  St.  Paul,  376 
v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  88 
Maltby  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  417 
Manchester  v.  Hartford,  333,  353,  367 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fullarton,  426 
v.  Wallis,  418,  449 
Mancuso  v.    Cataract    Construction 

Co.,  195 
Mandel  v.  Wheeler,  207 
Manderschid  v.  Dubuque,  289 
Mandeville  v.  Reynolds,  317 
Mangam  v.  Brooklyn  R.   Co.,  54,  72, 

73,  74,  82 
Mangan  v.  Atterton,  34.  73,  74,  684 
Manger  v.  Shipman,  629 
Mangerton,  The,  92 
Manhattan  Tr.  Co.  v.  New  York.  726 
Manier  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  554, 

753a 
Manley  v.  St.  Helen's  Canal  Co.,  365, 
396,  401 


Manley  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  475, 

477 
Manly  v.   Wilmington,   etc.  R.  Co., 

73,  99 
Mann  v.  Delaware,    etc.   Canal  Co., 
191,  204,  230,   233a 
v.  Oriental  Print  Works,  186a, 

226 
v.  Phila.  Tr.  Co.,  523 
v.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co.,  406, 

417 
v.  Weiand,  66,  632 
v.  Williamson,  656 
Car  Co.  v.  Dupre,  758 
Manning  v.  Adams,  161 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  209 
v.  Hogan,  195 
v.  Lowell,  274 
v.  Wilkin,  564 
Manser  v.  Eastern  Counties  R.  Co., 

497 
Mansfield  v.  Moore,  334a,  367,  368 

Coal,  etc.  Co  v.  McEnery,  65, 
87,  222,  766 
Manson  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  457 
Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Morrissey,  208, 

215 
Manville  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 
v.  Western   U.  Tel.    Co.,    553, 
555,  755 
Man  well  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co., 

451,  455 
Manzoni  v.  Douglas,  56,  647 
Marble  v.  Ross,  87,  97,  102,  103,  639 

v.  Worcester,  31,  346,  355 
March  v.  Portsmouth,  etc.    R.    Co., 

395 
Marean  v.  N.  Y.,  Susquehanna,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  209 
Mareau  v.  Vanatta,  639 
Marden  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  475 
Marfell  v.  New  So.  Wales  R.  Co.,  434 
Marietta,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stephenson, 

449,  451a,  634 
Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  362 
Marin i  v.  Graham,  371 
Marion  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.    Co.,  64, 
758 
County  v.  Riggs,  256 
Mark  v.  Hudson  River  Bridge  Co., 
86.  740 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  477 
Markel  v.  Western  IT.  Tel.  Co.,  543, 

755.  757 
Market  v.  St.  Louis,  353 
Markham  v.  Houston,  etc.  Naviga- 
tion Co.,  66 
Markin  v.  Priddy,  418,  655,   656,  664 
Marks  v.  Lonsr  Isl.  R.  Co.,  760 

v.  Petersburg  R.  Co.,  475,  481 
v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  233 
Marpesia,  The,  57 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.  CXX111 


Marquet  v.  La  Duke,  629 

Marquette,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spear,  679 

Marr  v.   Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,   553, 
741 

Marrier  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  147 

Marriott  v.  Baltimore,  262 

Mars   v.    Delaware,    etc.  Canal  Co., 
35,  154 

Marseilles  v.  Rowland,  390 

Marsel  v.  Bowman,  637 

Marsh  v.  Bancroft,  624 
v.  Benton,  87 
v.  Branch  Road,  388 
v.  Chickering,  195,  215,  217 
v.  Hand,  144,  635,  636 
v.  Herman,  195 
v.  Jones,  629.  635 
v.  N.  Y.  &ErieR.  Co.,  440 
v.  Whitmore,  559 

Marshall  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60a 
v.  Cohen,  713 
t.  Heard,  709 
v.  Hosmer,  618 
v.  Ipswich,  351,  356 
v.  Nagel,  573 
v.  Schricker,  52 
v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  136 
v.  Wei  wood,  17,  683,  701a 
v.  York,  etc.  R.  Co.,  22,  486 

Marsland  v.  Murray,  73a 

Martin  v.  Brooklyn,  291,  368 

v.  California  Cent.  R.  Co.,  207a 
v.  Columbia,   etc.    R.  Co.,  23, 

506 
v.  Dufalla,  702 
v.  Georgia  R.  Co. ,  480 
v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  676 
v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co. ,  410 
v.  Kehoe,  476 

v.  Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207a 
v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  675 
v.  N.   Y.   &  New  England  R. 

Co.,  30,  666.  676 
v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60a 
v.  North  Star  Works,  31 
v.  N.  Y.,  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co., 

666 
v.  Pettit,  56,  710 
v.  Riddle,  735 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  40 
v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  508,  521 
v.  Simpson,  721 
v.  Stewart,  439,  451a 
v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  672 
v.  Towle,  60c 
v.  Temperely,  172 
v.  Tribune  Asso.,  169 
v.  Western  Un.  R.  Co.,  676,680 
v.  Western  U.  Tel.   Co.,    544, 
754 

Martinez  v.  Gerber,  115 

Marty  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 


Marvin  v.  Chicago,   etc.   R.  Co.,  666, 
667 

v.  Maysville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  133 

v.  Miller,  205 

v.  New  Bedford,  369 

v.  Western  U.   Tel.    Co.,   545, 
547 

Safe  Co.  v.  Ward,  8,  118,  258 
Marwedel  v.  Cook,  704,  710 
Maryland  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Neubeur, 

90,  476,  477 
Marzetti  v.  Williams,  753 
Mason  v.  Cotton,  729 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  481,  484 

v.  Ellsworth,  368,  749a 

v.  Hill,  729,  733 

v.  Hutchings,  624 

v.  Keeling,  631 

v.  Minneapolis  R.  Co.,  483 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  64,  480 

v.  Morgan,  027 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  186, 
196,  2076,  230 

v.  Tower  Hill  Co.,  58 
Massengale  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co., 

554 
Massie  v.  Peel  Coal  Co.,  207 
Massoth  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 

13,  114,  467,  476,  477 
Masters  v.  Troy,  363,  373 

v.  Warren,  758 
Masterson  v.  Macon  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.    R.   Co. , 
66,  359,  415 
Masterton  v.  Mount  Vernon,  263,  760 
Mateer  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  196 
Mather  v.  Rillston,  189, 194,  203,  207a, 

219a 
Mathews  v.  Case,  233 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  676, 
6S0,  765 

v.    Winooski  Turnp.   Co.,  385, 
389 
Mathis  v.  Carpenter,  619 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  554 
Matlock  v.  Strange,  303 
Matson  v.  Maupin,  634 

v.  Port  Townsend  R.  Co.,  481a 
Matta  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Matteson  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  115 

v.  Strong,  639 
Matthews  v.   Atlantic,  etc.   R.  Co., 
480,  483 

v.  Bonsee,  684,  705 

v.  Cedar  Rapids,  375 

v.  DeGroof.  708 

v.  Kelsev,  362 

v.  Phila",  etc.  R  Co.,  480 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62 

v.Warner,  61,  95,741 
Mattimore  v.  Erie,  93,  362,  369 
Mattise  v.  <  \>nsuruers'  Ice  Co.,  185a, 
""".  233,  233a 


CXXiV 


References]         TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections 


Mactoon  v.   Freemantle,  etc.  R.  Co., 

070 
Matz  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  523 
Matzer  v.  N.  Y.  Central R.  Co.,  97. 
Mau  v.  Morse,  719a 
Mauch  Chunk  v.  Kline,  303 
Mauerman  v.  Siemerts,  114 
Maull  v.    Wilson,  005 
Maultby  v.  Leavenworth,  377 
Maumus  v.  Champion,  04 
Maury  v.  Talmadge,  495, 514 
Maus  v.  Springfield,  370 
Maverick  v.  Eighth  Avenue  R.  Co., 

51,  495 
Max  Morris,  The  v.  Curry,  01 
Maxey  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  482 
Maxim  v.   Champion,   272,  340,  350, 

307 
Maximillian  v.  New  York,  253,  255, 

200,  281,  289,  295 
Maxwell  v.  Mcllvoy,  321 
May  v.  Burdett,  17,  020,  029 
v.  Princeton,  113 
v.  Central  R.  Co. ,  480 
v.  Smith,  219,  219a 
v.  Whittier  Mach.  Co.,  241b 
Mayberrv  v.  Concord  R.  Co.,  449 

v.  Kelly,  303 
Mayer  v.  Hutchinson  Bdg.  Co.,  244 
v.  Laux,  702a 

v.  Thompson,   etc.    Bdg.    Co., 
122,  148 
Mayes  v.  Chicago,   etc.  R.   Co.,  217, 

408 
Mayhew  v.  Boyce,  049 

v.  Burns,  133,  700 
Maynard  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57, 
418,  428,  430 
v.  Buck,  53 

v.  Norfolk,   etc.    R.    Co.,    419, 
449 
Maynell  v.  Saltrnarsh,  371 
Mavpole  v.  Forsyth,  701 
Mavo  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Ill,  112, 
525 
v.  Spartenburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  070 
v.  Wright,  014 
Mavor,  etc.  v.  Mayberrv,  343 
v.  O'Donnell,  298* 
v.  Sheffield,  289,  333,  334,  307 
May  wood  v.  Logan,  709 
Mazetti  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  408 
Mead  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 
v.  Derby,  258,  334 
v.  New  Haven,  255,  291 
Meador  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

215 
Meadville  v.  Erie  Canal  Co.,  257 
Meagher  v.  Cooperstown,  etc.  R.  Co., 

53.  485 
Meara  v.  Holbrook.  103,  413 
Mears  v.  Boston,  etc   R.  Co.,  207a 
Meares  v.  Wilmington,  289,  291 


Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Earp,  583 

v.  Merchants'  Bank,  580,  598, 
GOO 
Mechanicsburg  v.  Meredith,  336 
Mechesney  v.  Unity,  376 
Meddaugh  v.  N.  Y.,  Ontario,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  478 
Meegan  v.  McKay.  628 
Meehan  v.  Morewood,  150 
Meek  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  197 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  92,480, 
482 
Meeker  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  448 
Meeks  v.  Southern  Pac.   R.  Co.,  73, 

74,  483 
Meesel  v.  Lynn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
Meeteer  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  743 
Megargee  v.  Philadelphia,  380 
Meggett  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  753a 
Megow  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  675 
Mehan  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co.,  87, 

214 
Mehegan  v.  N.  Y.    Central   R.    Co., 

475 
Meibus  v.  Dodge,  73,  639 
Meier  v.  Morgan,  187 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  12,  45, 

495 
v.  Shrunk,  630,  034,  639 
Meinzer  v.  Racine.  274 
Meister  v.  Lang,  721 
Meixell  v.  Morgan,  735 
Melchert  v.  Amer.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  538 
Melhado  v.  Poughkeepsie  Trans.  Co., 

515 
Melhop  v.  Seaton,  619 
Mellen  v.  Morrill,  709 

v.  Western  R.  Co.,  395,  412 
Mellor  v.  Merchants'  Mfg.  Co.,  207, 
2416 
v.    Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  488, 
492 
Mellors  v.  Shaw,  56,  187,  197 
Meloy  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185a, 

197,  467 
Melsheimer  v.  Sullivan,  639 
Melzer  v.  Peninsular  Car  Co.,  219a 
Memphis  v.  Kimbrough,  285 
v.  Lasser,  :J91 
v.  Overton,  333 
v.  Waterworks  Co.,  358 
Memphis  Packet  Co.  v.  McCool,  516 
v.  Nagel,  749 
v.  Pikey,  133,  513 
Memphis,  etc. ,  R.  Co.  v.  Askew,  184 
v.  Blakenv,  419 
v.  Copeland,  62,  102,  479 
v.  Graham,  2076 
v.  Hembree,  95 
v.  Jobe,  96 
v.  Jones,  432 
v.  Kerr,  419 
v.  Lvon,  429 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


cxxv 


Memphis,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Sanders,  458 

v.  Stringfellow,  520 

v.  Thomas,  207 

v.  Whitfield,  509,  510,  758 

v.  Womack,  464,  472 
Menard  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60c, 

485 
MendeU  v.  Wheeling,  265,  286 
Menger  v.  Laur,  654 
Menomonee  River,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
waukee, etc.  R.  Co.,  56,  673, 
675 
Mentzer  v.  Armour,  193 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  543,  756 
Mercer  v.  Corbin,  653 

v.  Woodgate,  343 
Merchants'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Goodman, 
583 

Bank  v.  Spicer,  580 
Mercier  v.  Mercier,  56 
Meredith  v.  Reed,  026 

v.   Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480, 
483 
Mergenthaler  v.  Kirby,  705 
Meridian  v.  Hyde,   376 
Merkle  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  476 
Merrifield  v.  Lombard,  734 

v.  Worcester,  258,  274,  734 
Merrigan  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  13, 

60c.  466 
Merrill,  Matter  of,  459 

v.  Claremont,  346 

v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  490,  518 

v.  Hampden.  350,  367,  375 

v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  23, 
753a 

v.  Wilbraham,  358 
Merrimann  v.   Phillipsburg,  376 
Merritt  v.  Brinkeroff,  730 

v.  Earl.  16  104 

v.  Fitzgibbons.  362 

v.  Lambert,  557 

v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  520 

v.  Parker,  729 

v.  Read,  303 
Merryman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.   Co., 

73a 
Mersey  Docks  v.  Cameron,  327 

v.    Gibbs,    14,   176,    254,     281, 
319,  326,  327,  725,  726 
Mertz  v.  Detweiler,  614 
Merwin  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  496,  523 

v.  Rogers.  303 
Merz  v.  Brooklyn,  254 
Meservey  v.  Lockett,  649 
Messenger  v.  Dennie.  73a,  90,  654 

v.  Pate.  685 
Messerole  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  525 
Metallic  Cashing  Co.  v.  Fitchburg  R. 

Co.,  464 
Metcalf  v.  Baker,  758 


Metcalf  v.  Hetherington,  326 

v.  Cunard  S.  S.  Co.,  705 
Metropolitan  Asyl.  Dist.  v.  Hill,  283 
Metropolitan  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson,  54 

v.  Johnson.  90,  4S5c,  760,  764 

v.  Moore,  488 

St.  R.  Co.  v.  Powell,  66 
Metz  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  120a,  163, 
413 

v.  Soule,  249 
Metzgar  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  673 
Metzger  v.  Schultz,  709a 
Mexican  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Lauricella, 
500,  516 

v.  Shean,  196 

Nat.  R.  Co.  v.  Mussette,  35 
Meyer  v.  King,  690 

v.  Lewis,  644 

v.  Midland,  etc.  R.  Co.,    100, 
460,  483 

v.  No.  Missouri  R.  Co.,  435 

v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  53,  64,  493 

v.  People's  R.  Co.,  94 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  495, 
496,  512 

v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  488 

v.  Tacoma  Water  Co.,  733 

v.  Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  676 
Michael  v.  Alestree,  122 

v.  Roanoke  Mach.  Works,  185&, 
207a 

v.  Stanton,  160 
Michaels  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  39, 

40 
Michels  v.  Syracuse,  368 
Michigan  Central  R.  Co. v.  Austin,  216 

v.  Dolan,  180 

v.  Smithson,  196,  197 
Michigan  City  v.  Ballance,  367 

v.  Boeckling,  358,  367,  368,  369 
Michigan,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Coleman,  57, 
107,  115 

v.  Lautz,  113 

v.  Leahy,  61 
Mickee  v.  Wood  Mach.  Co.,  216 
Mickles  v.  Hart,  618 
Middlesex  Co.  v.  Lowell,  734 
Middlestadt  v.  Morrison,  646 
Middleton  Co.  v.  Roycroft,  719a 
Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Daykin,  449 

v.  Fisher,  443 
Milarkey  v.  Foster,  365,  371 
Miles  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
508 

v.  Worcester,  267 
Milford  v.  Holbrook,  350,  384 
Milium  v.  Sharp,  359 
Millard  v.  Jenkins,  303 
Milieu  v.  Fandrve,  640 

v.  Fawtrey.  640 
Miller  v.  Boone  county.  356,  393,  743 

v.  Chatterton,  737 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195485, 


CXXV1 


References]         TABLE     OF     CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Miller  v.  Church,  709a 
v.  Cohen,  647 
v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

509 
v.  Hancock,  710 
v.  Kimbray,  630 
v.  Lapham,  729 
v.  Laubach,  735 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66a 
v.  Iron  county,  256,  262 
v.  Mc Williams,  256,  258 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  760 
v.  Mariner's  Church,  95,  741 
v.  Martin,  668 
v.  Miller,  729 

v.  Minnesota,  etc.  R.  Co.,  168 
v.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.,  203a, 

204,  230,  232 
v.  Morristown,  274 
v.  N.   Y.   Central  R.  Co.,  114, 

460 
v.  N.  Y.,  Lackawanna,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  144 
v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 

413 
v.   Ocean  Steamship   Co.,  60c, 

495,  496,  516.  523 
v.  Rochester  Pav.  Co. ,  68 
v.  Rucker,  310 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  519 
v.  St.  Paul,  356,  358 
v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  195, 

232,  233a,  241 
v.  Strivens,  645 

v.  Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co.,  482 
v.  Truesdale,  476 
v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  186,  207, 

233 
v.  Wilson,  574 
v.  Woodhead.  705 
Millidgeville  v.  Cooley,  289 
Millagan  v.  Wedge,  173 
Milliken  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  543 
Milliman  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 

93,  508 
v.  Oswego,  etc.  R.  Co.,  440 
Mills  v.  Armstrong,  66 

v.  Brooklyn,  262.  274,  275 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  676,  679 
v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  633 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  521 
v.  Orange,  etc.  R.  Co.,  457 
Milne  v.  Smith,  174 
Milton  v.   Hudson  River  Steamboat 

Co.,  95,  741 
Milwaukee  v.  Davis,  262,  334,  356,  377 
Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Arms,  47 
v.  Finney,  150,  154,  518 
v.  Hunter,  408,  474 
v.  Kellogg,  26,  30,  55,  666 
Minard  v.  Mead,  118 
Miner  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co., 

65,  208 


Minick  v.  Troy,  373,  375 
Minneapolis  Mill  Co.  v.  St.  Paul,  729 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Beckwith,  422 
Minnikuyson  v.  Dorsett,  562 
Minor  v." Sharon,  92,  709 
Minter  v.  Crommelin,  317 
Minty  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  180 
Mississinewa  Min.  Co.  v.  Patton,  692, 

693 
Mississippi  v.  Johnson,  313 

Cotton-Oil  Mills  Co.  v.  Ellis,  203 

Ins.   Co.  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co,.  672,  680 

Logging  Co.  v.  Schneider,  185, 
203 

Mills  Co.  v.  Smith,  734 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mason,  63,  99 
Missouri  Furnace  Co.  v.  Abend,  107, 
215 

etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Bradshaw,  451a 

v.  Cook,  492 

v.  Davidson,  671 

v.  Edwards,  73 

v.  Hogan,  222 

v.  Kirchoffer,  467 

v.  Leggett,  436 

v.  Miller,  492a 

v.  Palmer,  429 

v.  Prickryl,  666 

v.  Rogers,  102 

v.  Russell,  512 

v.  Simmons,  490 

v.  Thomas,  417 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Baier,  54,516 

v.  Barber,  135,  196 

v.  Bartlett,  673,  676,  679 

v.  Bradshaw,  424 

v.  Brown,  53,  480 

v.  Cady,  676 

v.  Callahan,  518 

v.  Crenshaw    217 

v.  Cullers,  666,  667,  676 

v.  Donaldson,  675 

v.  Dunham,  428,  444 

v.  Eckel,  434 

v.  Finley,  633 

v.  Gednev,  428 

v.  Gill,  448 

v.  Henry,  133 

v.  Holcomb,  513a 

v.  Humes,  422,  749 

v.  Ivy,  505 

v.  Johnson,  16,  470,  748 

v.  Jones,  160 

v.  Kaiser,  761a 

v.  Keyes,  733 

v.  Kincaid.  679 

v.  Lehmberg,  214,  410 

v.  Lee,  472,  478 

v.  Lewis,  133,  195,  197 

v.  Long,  506 

v.  Lyd'e,  189,  762 

v.  McCally,  241c 


References]  TABLE     OF    CASES.         \*re  to  sections.       CXXV11 


Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  McCanahan, 
493 

v.  McElyea,  194a 

v.  Martino,  493 

v.  Moffatt,  467 

v.  Morrow,  421 

v.  Moseley,  114,  480 

v.  Patton,  191 

v.  Platzer,  672 

v.  Porter,  480 

v.  Renfro,  412 

v.  Roads,  449 

v.  Shuford,  49,  748 

v.  Soniers,  201,  217 

v.  Stevens,  427 

v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  666,  667 

v.  Watson.  113 

v.  White,  85,  219a 

v.  Williams,  2336 

v.  Wilson,  430,  453 

v.  Wortham.  510 
Mitchell  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  464,484 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.,  107,  516 

v.  Clapp,  628 

v.  Clinton,  108 

v.  Grassweller,  147 

v.  Harmony,  244 

v.  Keene,  719 

v.  Marker,  719a 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  476 

v.  Phila.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  481a 

v.  Prange,  088a 

v.  Robinson,  230 

v.  Rochester,  R.  Co.,  761 

v.  Rockland,  256,  266,  299 

v.  Southern  Pac.    R.  Co.,  516, 
523 

v.  TacomaRy.  Co.,  99,  485c 

v.  Tacoma  R.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  481a 

v.  Turner,  57,  378 

v.  Western  R.  Co.,  508,  516 
Mixter  v.  Imperial  Coal  Co.,  223 
Moakler  v   Williamette  Val.  R.  Co., 

519 
Mobile  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brame,  124 
Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ashcrof  t,  60a,  518 

v.  Caldwell.  427,  432 

v.  Clanton,  242 

v.  Crenshaw,  73 

v.  Davis,  467 

v.  Godfrey.  223 

v.  Gray,  676,  678 

v.  Hoi  born,  58,  207a,  2416 

v.  Hudson,  57,  419,  456 

v.  Kimbrough,  431 

v.  Malone,  457 

v.  Massey,  233 

v.  Seaes,  151 

v.  Smith.  232,  241 

v.  Stroud,  480 

v.  Thomas.  52.  57,  180 

v.  Watlv,  99,772 

v.  Williams,  419,  421 


Mobley  v.  Clark,  580 
Mochler  v.  Shaftsbury,  652 
Moe  v.  Smiley,  128 
Moebus  v.  Becker,  16,  686 

v.    Herrmann,    73,  485a,   645, 
654 
Moeller  v.  Brewster,  207 
Moellering  v.  Evans,  701,  750 
Moffatt  v.  Tennev,  767 
Moffitt  v.  Asheville.  260 
Mohawk  Bank  v.  Broderick,  580 
Mohney  v.  Cook,  104 
Moir  v.  Hopkins.  165 
Molair  v.  Port  Royal  R.  Co.,  428 
Molaske  v.  Ohio  Coal  Co.,  219 
Mollie  Gibson  Mining  Co.  v.  Sharp, 

203,  772 
Molloy  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  151 
Monaghan  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 

233a 
Monahan  v.  Worcester,  192 
Monies  v.  Lynn,  338,  363,  368 
Monk  v.  New  Utrecht,  271,  276,  337, 

340 
Monmouth  Min.  Co.  v.  Erling,  194a 
Monongahela  v.  Fischer,  93 

Bridge  Co.   v.   Kirk,  283,  395, 
737 

City  v.  Fischer,  352 
Monroe  v.  Collins,  310 

v.  Lattin,  114 

County  v.  Flynt,  256 
Monson,  etc.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fuller,  728 
Montieth  v.  Finkbeiner,  710 
Montfort  v.  Hughes,  244,  248 

v.  Schmidt,  654 
Montgomery  v.  Alabama,    G.  S.  R. 
Co.,  484 

v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
94 

v.  Koester,  632 

v.  Lansing  Electric  R.  Co.,  484 

v.  Locke,  729 

v   Muskegon  Co.,  675 

v.  Scott,  53 

v.  Townsend,  274 

v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  421 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  554 

v.  Wilmington,    etc.    R.    Co., 
419,  429 

v.  Wright,  289,  376 
Montgomery  Co.  Bank  v.  Albany  City 
Bank,  243,  580,  581,  582,  584, 
Montgomery  Gas  Co.  v.  Montgomery, 

etc.  R.  Co.,  93,  108,  413 
Montgomerv,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Boring,  509 

v.  Mallette,  495,  516,  742 

v.  Stewart,  520 
Monticello  v.  Fox,  274 
Montrion  v.  Jefferys,  558 
Moodv  v.  Hamilton  Mfg.  Co.,  233 

v.  McClelland,  701 

v.  McDonald,  748 


CXXV111 


References]         TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


Moody  V.Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  452 

v.  New  York,  285 

v.  Osgood,  56,  57,  646,  652,  759, 
762 

v.  Ward,  686 
Moon  v.  Ionia,  368 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  206 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233, 
233a,  2336 
Mooney  v.  Connecticut  River  Lum- 
ber Co.,  194a,  223 

v.  Lloyd,  557 

v.  Trow  Directory  Co.,  649 

v.  Williams,  303 
Moor  v.  Ames,  303 

v.  Veazie,  333 
Moore  v.  Abbot,  378 

v.  Cass,  49 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  61,  108,  463, 
475 

v.  Chicago,    etc.    R.    Co.,   431, 
676,  678,  729 

v.  Columbia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Clear  Lake  Water  Works, 
729 

v.  Des  Moines,  495,  516 

v.  Edison  Electric  Co.,  519 

v.  Floyd,  619 

v.  Gadsden,  13,  14,  343,  467 

v.  Goedel,  123,  723 

v.  Gt.  Northern  R.  Co.,  471 

v.  Huntington,  289 

v.  Kalamazoo,  367,  369,  741 

v.  Kansas    City,    etc.    R.  Co., 
355,  485a 

v.  Kenockee,  369 

v.  Keokuk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4816 

v.  Levert,  664 

v.  Logan  Iron,  etc.  Co.,  709 

v.  Louisiana  Nat.  Bank,  580 

v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  54,  145 

v.  Minneapolis,  353 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  54,  476 

v.  Norfolk  etc.  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co,  64,  71, 
185 

v.  Platteville,  368 

v.  Richmond,  289,  367,  368,  375 

v.  Sanborn,  150,  333 

v.  Shreveport,  107 

v.  Wabash,  etc.  Canal,  371 

v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  230 

v.  Webb,  734 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  531 

v.  Westervelt,  56,  621 

v.  White,  657 
Moorman  v.  Wood,  558,  566,  567 
Morain  v.  Devlin,  121,  699 
Moran  v.  Brown,  195 

v.  Eastern  R.  Co..  203 

v.  Harris,  187,  209a 


Moran  v.  Hollings,  767a 

v.  Palmer,  351 

v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  262,  705 

v.  Racine  Wagon  Co.,  60,  195 
Morange  v.  Mix,  592 
Morbach    v.    Home    Min.   Co.,  1856, 

215 
Mordecai  v.  Solomon,  568 
Moreland  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  51, 
495,  502 

v.  Leigh,  623 

v.  Mitchell  County,  257,  393 
Morey  v.  Newfane,  254,  256,  338 
Morgan  v.  Bowes,  688a 

v.  Bowman,  167 

v.  Carbon  Hill  Co.,  207 

v.  Cox,  686 

v.  Dudley,  303 

v.  Fremont  County,  257,  368 

v.  Giddings,  567,  570 

v.  Hallowell,  356 

v.  Hudson  Riv.  Ore  Co.,  202 

v.  King,  333 

v.  Morley,  289 

v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  97,  705 

v.  Pritchett,  257 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  334 

v.  Roberts,  569 

v.  Smith,  164,  225 

v.  So.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  763,  764, 
767 

v.  Tener,  582 

v.  Vale  of    Neath  R.  Co.,  178, 
180,  239 

v.  Van  Ingen,  598 

v.  Gaisford,  644 
Morning  Light,  The  61 
Morrell  v.  Peck,  60c,  375,  393 
Morrill  v.  Deering.  367 

v.  Graham,  558 
Morris  v.  Brown,  8 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99,  132 

v.  Council  Bluffs,  274 

v.  East  Haven,  111 

v.  Eighth  Ave  R.  Co.,  522 

v.  Euf  aula  Nat.  Bank,  580,  580a 

v.  Fraker,  419 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56, 
85 

v.  Litchfield,  356 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  Co.,  496,  500 

v.  N.  Y.  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co., 
488 

v.  Piatt,  16 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  434 

v.  Strobel,  etc.  R.  Co.,  702 

v.  Switzerland  county,  256,257 

v.  Westminster  Bank,  589 

Canal  Co.  v.  Rverson,  16,  402 

etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Haslan,  88,  476, 
481 
Morrisey  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  481a 

v.  Hughes,  188,  194 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.  [are  to  sections.  CXX1X 


Morrissey  v.  Providence,  etc.  R.  Co., 
27,  466a 
v.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co.,  91,  99 
Morrison  v.  Broadway  R.  Co.,  508,  520 
v.  Coleman,  737 
v.  Cornelius,  656,  662 
v.  Davis,  28,  40 
v.  ErieR.  Co.,  75 
v.  General  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  93 
v.  Lawrence,  262,  299 
v.  Long  Isl.  R.  Co.,  760 
v.  Metropolitan  Tel.  Co.,  719a 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  Ill 
v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  436 
v.  Shelby  county,  376 
Morrow  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  433 

v.  Sweeney,  705 
Morse  v.  Belfast^  352 
v.  Boston,  363 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  449 
v.  Crawford,  121 
v.  Minneapolis  R.  Co.,  606,  60c 
v.  Richmond,  351,  355 
t.  Rutland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  449 
v.  Sweenie,  313 
v.  Worcester,  274,  287 
Morseman  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  759 
Morss  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  Co. ,  443 
Morton  v.  Crane,  303 

v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194,217, 

233a 
v.  Gloster.  104 
v.  Smith   343 
Mose  v.  Hastings,  etc.  Gas  Co.,  693 
Mosely  v.  Jamison,  686 
Moser  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 
Moses  v.  Louisville,  etc.   R.  Co.,  490 
v.  So.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  419,  434 
Mosher  v.  St.  Louis   etc.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Smithfield,  107 
Moshier  v.   Utica,  etc.   R.  Co.,  413, 

672 
Mosier  v.  Beale.  628 
Moskovitz  v.  Lighte,  645 
Moss  v.  Augusta,  291 

v.  Cu turnings,  313 
v.  Johnson,  184,  489 
v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  192 
Mott  v.  Cherryvale  Water,  etc.  Co., 
265 
v.  Consumers'  Ice  Co.,  142, 154 
v.  Havana  Bank,  587a 
v.  Hudson  River  R.   Co.,  122, 
464 
Motey  v.  Pickle  Marble,  etc.  Co.,  28 
Mouat  Lumber  Co.  v.  Wilmore,  675 
Moulton  v.  Aldrich,  90,  92,  645 
v.  Gage,  217 
v.  Jose,  617 
v.  Moore,  630 
v.  Norton,  618 
v.  Sanford.  122,  346,  355 
v.  Scarborough,  626 


Mound  Citv  Paint  Co.  v.  Commercial 
Nat.  Bank,  578,  581 
v.  Conlon.  146 
Mt.  Carmel  v.  Guthridge,  356 
Mt.  Veruon  v.  Brooks,  353,  374,  375 
Mower  v.  Leicester,  256,  258,  337 
Mowrey  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  91 
Mowrv  v.  Chaney,  115 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  553,  754 
Moye  v.  Wrightsville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  429 
Movlan  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  500 

521 
Moynahan  v.  Wheeler,  626 
Movnihan  v.  Hills  Co.,  185a,  194,  204, 

232 
Muckle  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  749 
Muehlhausen  v.  St.  Louis  R.  Co. ,  489 
Mueller  v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  13 

v.  Ross,  379 
Muhl  v.  Southern,  etc.  R.  Co.,  136 
Mulcairns  v.  Janesville.  286,  762 
Mulchahey  v.  Washburn  Car  Wheel 

Co.,  139 
Mulchey  v.  Methodist,  etc.  So.,  248 
Muldoon  v.  Seattle  R.  Co.,  505 
Muldownev  v.   Illinois,   etc.   R.  Co., 

56,  89,  207,  217,  221 
Muldrow  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  750 
Mulhado  v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  R.   Co., 

508,  521 
Mulhern  v.  Lehigh  V.  Coal  Co.,  192 
Mulherrin  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 

64,  128 
Mulholland  v.  Samuels,  598 
Mullan  v.  Philadelphia  S.  S.  Co.,  226, 
230,  234 
v.  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.,  512 
Mullany  v.  Spence,  683,  705 
Mullen  v.  Glens  Falls,  355 
v.  Owosso,  376,  379 
v.  Rainear,  707 

v.  St.  John,  58,  59,  &\  159.  343 
Muller  v.  McKesson,  203,  628,  639 
v.  Minken,  710 
v.  Newburgh,  369 
Mullett  v.  Mason,  633 
Mulligan  v.  Crimmins,  222 
v.  Curtis.  72,  73a,  74 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  476 
v.  Rockaway  Beach  R.  Co.,  154 
Mullin  v.  California  Horseshoe  Co., 

209a.  218 
Mullins  v.  Blaise,  688 
Mulvehill  v.  Bates,  147 
Mulvey  v.  R.  I.  Locomotive  Works, 

204,  226 
Mumford  v.  Oxford,  119 
Munch  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  425 
Muncie  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Mavnard,  474, 

485c 
Mundle  v.  Hill  Mfg.  Co.,  208,209a,  214 
Mundv  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.   R. 
Co.,  407,  731,  733 


cxxx 


References}         TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  section*. 


Munger  v.  Tonawanda  R.  Co.,  61,  86, 

97.  418 
Muuk  v.  Watertown,  275,  279 
Munn  v.  Pittsburgh,  334 

v.  Reed,  02,  73,  628,  639 
Munro  v.  Pac.  Coast  Dredging  Co., 
688a,  767 
v.  Gates,  731 
Murch  v.  Concord  R.  Co.,  61,413 

v.  Western  N.  Y.,  etc.  R.  Co., 
480 
Murdock  v.  Boston,   etc.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Warwick,  378 
Murfreesboro,  etc.  Co.  v.  Barrett,  386 
Murgatroyd  v.  Robinson,  734 
Murphy,  Matter  of.  310 

v.  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.,  519 

v.  Boston  &  Albany  R.  Co. ,  233 

v.  Boston,  etc  R.  Co.,  417a 

v.  Brooklyn,  334 

t.  Buffalo,  373 

v.  Caralli,  161 

v.  Central  Park  R.  Co.,  150 

v.  Chicago,  283 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49, 107, 

111,  679 
v.  Comm'rs  of  Emigration,  295 
v.  Crossan,  184, 194a 
v.  Dean,  61 
v.  Gloucester,  356 
v.  Greeley,  223 
v.  Hays,  60,  719a 
v.  Kelly,  735 

v.  Nassau  El.  Light  Co.,  645 
v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  139,767 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 

92,  185,  207a,  770 
v.  Orr,  645,  654 
v.  Pollock,  192 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  192,  520 
v.  Smith,  227 
v.  Union  R.  Co  ,  493 
v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  201 
v.  WeidmanCo.,  654 
v.   Wilmington,   etc.    R.   Co., 
480 
Murray  v.  Archer,  699 
t.  Currie,  161,  162 
v.  Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.,  223 
v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  481 
v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108,  207a, 

2076 
v.  Knight,  197 
v.  Lardner,  20 
v.  McShane,  343,  702 
v.  Mo.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  467,  759 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  11,  425 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  238 
v.  So.  Carolina,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57, 

180,  241.  419.  432 
t.  The  Charming  Betsy,  322 
v.  Usher,  243.  380.  770 
v.  Young,  028,  629 


Murtaugh  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
25,  185a,  211 

v.  St.  Louis,  266 
Muse  v.  Stern,  160 
Musick  v.  Dold  Packing  Co.,  222 
Musselman  v.  Galligher,  115 
Musser  v.  Lancaster  St.  R.  Co.,  410 
Muster  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  203 
Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Dake,  592 
Myers  v.  Baltimore,   etc.  R.  Co..  475, 
476 

v   Burns,  744 

v.  Dodd,  655.  657 

v.  Fritz,  730 

v;  Hinds,  653 

v.  Holborn,  605 

v.  Hudson  Iron  Co.,  185a,  194a 

v.  Kansas  City,  112,  356 

v.  Meinrath,  104 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Parker,  627 
Myhan  v.   Louisiana   Electric,    etc. 

Co.,  698 
Mynard  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co.,  555 
Mynning  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54, 

107,  114,  481,  769 
Mytton  v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  243 

Nadau  v.  White  River  Lumber  Co., 

219 
Nagel  v.  Missouri,   etc.   R.  Co.,   73, 
73a 
v.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co. ,  31 
Nagle  v.  Allegheny  Valley  R.    Co., 
73,  73a 
v.  California  So.  R.  Co.,  521 
Naglee  v.   Alexandria,  etc.  R.  Co., 

163 
Nail  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185a, 

233 
Nalley  v.  Hartford  Carpet  Co.,  60c 
Naltner  v.  Dolan,  575 
Nance  v.  Newport  News,  etc.  R.  Co., 

201 
Nanticoke  v.  Warne,  67 
Nappanee  v.  Ruckman,  743 
Narragansett,  The,  744 
Nash  v.  N.  Y.  Central,   etc.  R.  Co., 
90,  464,  476 
v.  Sharpe,  760 
v.  Swinburne,  569 
Nashua  Iron  Co.  v.  Worcester,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  24a 
Nashville  v    Brown,  289 
v.  Sutherland,  287 
Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Anthony,  429 
v.  Carroll,  62,  235.  238,  459 
v.  Comans,  421,  457 
v.  Eakin,  131 
v.  Elliott,  178,  219 
v.  Handman    216.  232,  241 
v.  Hembree.  25,  428,  429. 
v.  Hughes,  434 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         W"  to  sections.  CXXX1 


Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  184, 
235 

v.  McDaniel.  91,  233 

v.  Messino,  51,  499 

v.  Morrow,  421 

v.  Nowlin,  62 

v.  Prince,  139,  769 

v.  Sadler,  448 

v.  Smith,  65 

v.  Sprayberry,  132 

v.  Starnes,  154 

v.  Thomas,  431 

v.  Troxlee,  429 

v.  Wheless,  233a,  241 
Nason  v.  Boston,  363 

v.  West,  57 
Natchez,   etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McNeil,  428 
Nathan  v.  Charlotte  St.  R.  Co.,  99 
National  Bank  v.  Graham,  588 

Park  Bank  v.  Seabrook  Bank, 
580a 

Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  British  Nav. 
Co.,  172 

Syrup  Co.  v.  Carlson,  212 
Nations  v.  Johnson,  249 
Navastota  v.  Pearce,  258 
Nave  v.  Alabama,  etc.  R.  Co.,  484 

v.  Flack,  704 
Naylor  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 

v.  Salt  Lake  City,  369 
Neal  v.  Gillett,  64,  121 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  239 

v.  Price.  619 
Neanow  v.  Uttech,  104,  645,  654 
Nebraska  City  v.  Campbell,  285,  289, 

760 
Necker  v.  Harvey,  225,  244 
Neddov.  Ticonderoga,  376 
Needham  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  131, 
133.  138 

v.  King,  669 

v.   Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49, 
1^4.  209a 

v.  San  Francisco,  etc.  R.  Co., 
11,  63,  99.  483 
Needles  v.  Howard,  22 
Neff  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  199 

v.  WeUesley,  260,  375,  481 
Nehr  v.  State,  634 
Nehrbas  v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108, 

476 
Neier  v.  Mo.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  461 
Neighbour  v.  Trimmer,  303 
Neilon  v.  Marinette,  etc.  Paper  Co., 

218 
Neilson  v.  Hillside  Coal  Co.,  207a 
Neiman  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 

478 
Neimever  v.  Weverhaeuser.  181 
Nelling  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Industrial  Mfg.  Co.,  217 
Nelson  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61,  99 

v.  Burrows,  589 


Nelson  v.  Canisteo,  281,  289,  334,  335 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  209a 

v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  132 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Ill,  216 

v.  Chicago,  M.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241c 

v.  DuBois,  222 

v.  Duluth,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 

v.  Totterall,  597 

v.  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  133, 
140 

v.  Godfrey,  703 

v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  431a 

v.  Harrington,  008 

v.  Helena,  108 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  773, 
775 

v.  St.  Paul  Plow  Works,  223 

v.  Vermont,  etc.  R.  Co.,  413, 459 
Nesbit  v.  Garner,  66 
Nesbitt  v.  Greenville,  367 
Netherland-Am.  Steam.  Co.  v.  Hol- 
lander, 763 
Nettersheim  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

4816 
Netzer  v.  Crookston,  287,  374 
Neudcerffer  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  476 
Nevera  v.  Sears,  203 
Neville  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241c 
Nevins  v.  Bav  State  Steamb.  Co. ,  550 

v.  Peoria,  273,  274,  28.  367 
New  Albany,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Aston,  449 

v.  McCulloch,  113,  374 

v.  McNamara,  428,  430 

v.  Maiden,  437 

v.  Tilton,  422 
New  Bedford  v.  Taunton,  291 
New  Hampshire  Sav.  Bank  v.  Var- 

num,  618 
New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Blessing, 
481 

Steamboat  Co.   v.  Vanderbilt, 
61,  93,  744 
New  Jersev  Express  Co.  v.  Nichols. 
56',  63,64.  86,  10$,  112,  114,  760 

R.  Co.  v.  Pollard,  516 

v.  Kennard,  519 

v.  Morgan,  493 

v.  Young.  188,  207a,  209a,  215 

Steamboat  Co.  v.  Brockett,  493 

Nav.  Co.  v.  Merchants'  Bank, 
22,  210 

Trans.  Co.  v.  West,  88 

Traction  Co.  v.  Danbech,  488 
v.  Gardner,  494 
New  Kioa  v.  Craven,  260 
New  Orleans  v.  Abbagnato,  261 

Ins  Asso.  v.  Harper,  123 
New  Orleans,  etc.   R.   Co.  v.    Bour- 
geois. 429 

v.  Burke,  512,  749 

v.  Burkett.  429 

v.  Field.  419 

v.  Hughes,  191,  205,  226 


CXXX11 


References]         TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hurst, 
486 
v.  J  opes,  154 
v.  Mitchell.  90 
v.  Norwood,  161 
v.  Statham,  508,  510 
v.  Thomas,  523. 
v.  Thornton,  426 
New  Pittsburgh  Coal  Co.  v.  Peter- 
son, 232. 
New  World  v.  King,  495 
New  York  v.  Bailev,  173,  271,    285, 
699 
v.  Bradv,  298,  301,  384 
v.  Corliss,  708 
v.  Diinick,  301,  384 
v.  Furze,  281,  287,  368 
v.  Workman,  265 
New  York  Biscuit  Co.  v.  Rouss,  203, 

219 
New  York,  etc.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 295 
New  York  Min.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  194a 
New  York,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cooper,  66 

v.  State,  416 
New  York  Cent.  R.  Co.  Lockwood, 

492,  505 
New  York,  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Blumenthal,  513a 
v.  Doane,  509 
v.  Grand  Rapids,  etc.  R.   Co., 

4  54a 
v.  Mushbrush,  492a 
v.  Woods,  508 
v.  Zumbaugh,  424 
New  York  &  Erie  R.  Co.  v.    Skin- 
ner, 97,  418,  456 
New  York,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Atlantic  Refg.  Co.,  92 
v.  Ball,  523 
v.  Bennett,  493 
v.  Leaman,  468 
v.  Lvons,  209a,  221,  520 
v.  Middlecoff,  674 
v.  Steinbrenner,  66,  142 
v.  Winter,  493 
New  York  &  New  England  R.  Co.  v. 

Hyde,  241 
New  York,  Phila.,  etc.  Co.  v.  Kellam, 
476 
v.  Thomas,  678 
New  York,  Susquehanna,  etc.  R.  Co. 

v.  Marion,  199 
New  York  &  Brooklyn  Sawmill,  etc. 
Co.  v.  Brooklyn,  255,  285,  291 
New  York  Rubber  Co.  v.  Rothery,  729 
New  York  &  Washington  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Dryburg,  532,  537,  541,  543, 
546,  755 
Newall  v.  Bartlett,  725 
Newark,   etc    R.    Co.   v.  Block,  54, 

475,  485a,  485c 
Newberry  v.  Getchell  Co.,  760 


Newbert  v.  Cunningham,  624 
Newbold  v.  Mead,  86 
Newcomb  v.  Boston  Protective  Dept., 
104,  265,  331 

v.  Montgomery  county,  392 

v.  Van  Lile,  647 
Newdall  v.  Young,  705 
Newell  v.  Smith,  503 

v.  Woolfolk,  688a 
Newhall  v.  Ireson,  729 
Newhard  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  463 
Newhart  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  214 
Newhouse  v.  Miller,  654 
Newkirk  v.  Milk,  633 
Newlin  v.  Davis,  257 
Newman  v.  Phillipsburg  R.  Co.,  78 

V.  Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  431 
Xewnan  v.  Washington,  557 
Newport  v.  Miller,  367,  369 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.    Dentzel,    233a, 
2336 
Newport  News,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Camp- 
bell, 207b 

v.  Deuser,  483 

v.  Howe,  233a 

v.  Stewart,  463 
Newson  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  92, 

471 
Newstrom  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.    R.  Co., 

485 
Newton  v.  Bronson,  597 

v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  498,  519, 
521 
Ney  v.  Troy,  363 
Niantic  Min.  Co.  v.  Leonard,  238 
Niblett  v.  Nashville,  289 
Nichol  v.  Canada  Southern  R.  Co., 

735 
Nicholds  v.  Crystal  Plate  Glass  Co., 

185a,  217 
Nichols  v.  Boston,  709a 

v.  Brush,  etc.  Mfg.  Co.,  223 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241c 

v.  Laurens,  376 

v.  Louisville,   etc.  R.  Co.,  483 

v.  Marsland,  16,  705,  732 

v.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  508 

v.  Minneapolis,  376 

v.  St.  Paul,  289 

v.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  520,  508 

v.  Smith,  58,  111,  690 

v.  Thomas,  303 

v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  United  States,  249 

v.  Washington,    etc.    R.    Co., 
417a 
Nicholls  v.  Great  Southern  R.  Co.,  509 
Nicholson  v.  Atchison,   etc.  R.  Co., 
455 

v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  97,  464,  465,  705 

v.  Lancashire,  etc.  R.  Co.,  406, 
473 

v.  Mounsey,  246,  322 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.  \.<*™  to  sections.      CXXX111 


Nickerson  v.  Bridgeport  Hvdr.  Co., 
8,  118,  265 

v.  Harriman,  65 
Nield  v.  London,  etc.  R.  Co.,  729 
Niemann  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 

436 
Niendorff  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  760 
Nilan  v.  Richmond  Gas  Co.,  355 
Niles  v.  Martin,  25G,  258 
Nims  v.  Mt.  Hermon  School,  148 

v.  Troy.  287 
Nininger  v.  Norwood,  735 
Niskern  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  679 
Nitrophosphate  Co.   v.  London,  etc. 
Dock  Co.,  16,  31,  33,  61,  728 
Niver  v.  Rochester,  376 
Nix  v.  Texas,  etc.  Co.,  217,  233b 
Nixon  v.  Bogin,  579 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90,  476 

v.  Selby  Lead  Co.,  232 
Njus  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  131 
Noble  v.  Cunningham,  471 

v.  Desmond,  624 

v.  Richmond,  289,  337,  368 

v.  St.  Joseph,  etc.  R.  Co..  495 
Noblesville  Gas  Co.  v.  Loehr,  377 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gause,  147 
Noe  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  731,  750 
Nolan  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52 

v.  Brooklvn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  522, 
523 

v.  King,  361,  375 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc,  R.  Co.,  476 
Noll  v.  Phil.  &  Reading  R.  Co.,  207, 

Nolton  v."  Western  R.  Co.,  486,  491, 

492,  706 
Noonan  v.  Albany,  262,  274.  735 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  225, 458 

v.  Stillwater,  343 
Nordheimer  v.  Alexander,  18 
Nordyke.    etc.  M.  Co.  v.  Van  Sant, 

191,  194 
Norfolk,   etc.    R.    Co.  v.  Bohannan, 
675,  750 

v.  Briggs,  2076 

v.  Brown,  195,  241 

v.  Burge,  457,  477 

v.  Carper,  464,  480 

v.  De  Board,  481 

v.  Donnelly,  241 

v.  Dunnaway,  99 

v.  Ferguson,  57 

v.  Groseclose,  78,  488 

v.  Harmon,  483 

v.  Hoover,  192,  204,  233a 

v.  Jackson,  194,  195 

v.  Lipscomb,  748 

v.  McDonald,  209 

v.  McGavock,  434 

v.  Marshall,  496 

v.  Nuckols,   180,  188,  191,  235, 
238 


Norfolk,   etc.    R.    Co.   v.    Nunnally, 
1856,  194a 

v.  Ormsby,  49,  78 

v.  Phelps,  188 

v.  Prinnell,  508 

v.  Shott,  488 

v.  Stone,  478 

v.  Thomas,  188,  233 

v.  Ward,  222 

v.  Wilson,  476 

v.  Wysor,  493 
Norfolk  &'W.    R.  Co.    v.   Emmert, 
217 

v.  Jackson's  Adm'r,  195 

v.  Johnson,  421 
Normal  v.  Gresham,  377 
Normania,  The,  015 
Norris  v.  Androscoggin  R.  Co.,  421, 
438,  451a 

v.  Kohler,  158 

v.  Litchfield,  61,  93,  94,    104, 
379,  393 

v.  Saxton,  652 

v.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co.,  415 

v.  Warner,  62-\  630 
Norristown  v.  Fitzpatrick,  262 

v.  Mover,  354 
North  v.  Smith,  150,  645 
North  Baltimore  R.  Co.  v.  Arnreich, 

485c 
North  Birmingham  R.  Co.  v.  Calder- 

wood,  96,  110 
North  Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Brodie,  773 

v.  Cook,  50S 

v.  Cotton,  516 

v.  Eldridge,  114,  519 

v.  Gastka,  151 

v.  Williams,  499,  520 

Rolling  Mill  Co.   v.   Johnson, 
238,  471 
Northcott  v.  Smith,  641 
North  Hudson  R.  Co.  v.  Flannigan, 

481a 
North  Lebanon  v.  Arnold,  256 
North  Manheim  v.  Arnold,  355 
North  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Heileman,  463, 
476 

v.  Kirk,  85,  114,  706 

v.  Mahoney,  73,  77,  78 

v.  Rehman,  418,  659 

v.  Robinson,  472 
North  Side  R.  Co.  v.  Tippins,  485a 
North  Staffordshire  R.  Co.  v.  Dale, 

416 
North  Vernon  v.  Voegler,  272,  274 
Northern,  etc.  R.  Co.    v.   Price,  61, 
95,  99 

Transp.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  701 
Northeastern  R.  Co.  v.  Barnett,  144 

v.  Martin,  428 
North  Eastern  Co.  v.  Sineath,  432 
Northern  Central  R.  Co.  v.  State,  58, 
61.93,  108,  111 


CXXX1V 


References]         TABLE     OF    CASES.         [are  to  set  ions. 


Northern  Indiana  R.  Co.  v.   Martin, 

455 
Northern  Pac.  Coal  Co.  v.  Richmond, 

218 
Northern  R.  Co.  y.  Amato,  114,  1856 

v.  Austin,  478 

v.  Babcock,  132,  133,  215 

v.  Beaton,  239 

v.  Blake,  197 

v.  Cavanaugh,  233a 

v.  Charless,  203,  205,  239 

v.  Craft,  225 

v.  Egeland,  186,  207a 

v.  Ellison,  129 

v.  Everett,  1856,  213,  217 

v.  Hambly,  232,  235,  239,  241 

v.  Herbert,  193,   194,  204,  205, 
233a,  241a 

v.  Hogan,  241a 

v.  Lewis,  666,  675,  678,  679 

v.  Mares,  108,  191,  211,  216 

v.  Mase,  233a,  241c 

v.  Mortenson,  199 

v.  Nickels,  2076 

v.  O'Brien,  108,  238 

v.  Pauson,  493, 

v.  Peterson,  230,  235 

v.  Poirier,  204 

v.  Smith,  233a 

v.  Urlin,  60a 
Northwestern  Fuel  Co.  v.  Danielson, 
188,  203 

R.  Co.  v.  Hack,  492 
Norton  v.  Cooper,  569 

v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  417,  426,  470 

v.  Ittner,  87 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  209a 

v.  Mansfield,  299 

v.  St.  Louis,  343 

v.  Scholefield,  734 

v.  Sewall,  38,  117,  690 

v.  Volentine,  729 

v.  Volzke,  73a,  218 

v.  Wiswall,  708 
Norwalk  Gas  Co.    v.  Norwalk,  166, 

168,  175 
Norway  v.  Jensen,  238 
Norwich  v.  Breed,  703 

Gas  Co.  v.  Norwich  City  Gas 
Co.,  358 
Norwood  v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  26, 
475,  483 

v.  Somerville,  356,  376 
Nosier  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  477, 

482 
Novock   v.   Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 

207 
Nowell  v.  Wright,  313,  340 
Noxon  v.  Hill,  303 
Noyes  v.  Boscawen.  66 

v.  Colby,  627,  633 

v.  Gardner.  368 

v.  Shepherd,  87 


Noyes  v.  Smith,  180,  189,  194 

v.  Wood,  195 
Nuckolls  v.  Gaut,  656 
Nugent  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  413 

v.  Kauffman  Milling  Co.,  203 

v.  Mississippi  Levee  Com'rs,  328 

v.  Smith,  16 
Nulsen  v.  Priesmeyer.  632 
Nunn  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  510 
Nurse  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  492 
Nutt  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  189,  195 
Nutter  v.  Gallagher,  737 
Nutting  v.  Conn.   River  R.  Co.,  503, 

544 
Nuzum  v.    Pittsburgh,  etc.   R.  Co., 
468,  481 

O'Bannon  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R,  Co., 

423 
O'Barr  v.  Alexander,  559 
O'Brien  v.  Capwell,  708 

v.  Dredging  Co.,  232 

v.  Greenbaum,  708 

v.  Loomis,  760 

v.  McGlinchy,  74,  79,  114 

v.  Miller,  647 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Rideout,  2416 

v.  St.  Paul,  274,  287 

v.  Tatum,  108.  719 

v.  "Western  Steel  Co.,  719a 
O'Bryan  v.  Amsterdam,  375 
O'Callaghan  v.  Bode,  704 
O'Connell  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
180,  233 

v.  Jarvis,  626 

v.  Lewiston,  104 

v.  St.  Louis  Cable,  etc.  R.  Co., 
495 

v.  St.  PaulR.  Co.,  485c 

v.  Samuel,  150 
O'Connor  v.  Adams,  46,  1 14,  203 

v.  Andrews,  702,  709,  710 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73,  73a 

v.  Fond  du  Lac,  etc.   R.   Co., 
735 

v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  16,  73 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  92,  113, 
463 

v.  New  York,  363 

v.  North  Truckee  Co.,  94 

v.  Pittsburg,  283,  832,  334a 
O'Donnell    v.    Allegheny   Valley   R. 
Co.,  61.  184,  194,  239,  488,  523 

v.  Duluth,  etc.  R.  Co.,  223,  406 

v.  East  River  Gas  Co.,  197 

v.  Patton,  61 

v.  Providence,  etc.  R.  Co.,  469 
O'Donohoe  v.  Whitty,  566 
O'Driscoll  v.  Faxon,  215 
O'Dwyer  v.  O'Brien,  708,  710 
O'Flaheretv  v.  Union,    etc.    R.    Co., 
71,*  72,  73a 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.        CXXXV 


O'Hale  v.  Sacramento,  258 

O'Hara  v.  Brophy,  562 

O'Harra  v.  Portland,  254 

O'Kane  v.  Treat,  336 

O'Keefe  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94, 

102,  114,  480 
O'Laughlin  v.    Boston  <fe  Maine  R. 
Co.,  512 
v.  Dubuque,  351,  375 
O'Linda  v.  Lothrop,  703 
O'Loughlin  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 

207a 
O'Maley  v.  Dorn,  649 

v.  So.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  216, 
2416 
O'Malley  v.  N   Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  2076,  217 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73 
O'Mara  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
479 
v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,   137, 
458,  481,  763,  769,  775 
O'Meara  v.  New  York,  265,  295 
O'Mellia  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 

207a.  211,  775 
O'Neal  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  209a 
O'Neil  v.  Detroit,  353 

v.  Dry- Dock,  etc.  R.  Co.,  485a 

v.  Lynn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  518 

v.  N.  Y.,  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co., 

675,  678 
v.  O'Leary,  241& 
v.  New  Orleans.  289 
v.  N.  Y.  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co., 

30 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  459 
v.  So.  Carolina  R.  Co. ,  751 
v.  West  Branch,  369 
ONeile  v.  Neilson,  61 
O'Neill  v.  Keokuk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2076 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197 
v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  485c 
O'Reilly  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  England  R. 
Co.,  132,  133 
v.  Utah,  etc.  Stage  Co.,  654 
O'Rorke  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  208 
O'Rourke  v.  Hart,  175 
v.  Monroe,  356 
v.  Peck,  726 
v.  Sioux  Falls,  262 
O'Shaughnessy   v.    Suffolk   Brewing 

Co.,  73a 
O'Sullivan  v.  Victoria  R.  Co.,  180 
O'Toole  v.   Pittsburgh,   etc.    R.   Co., 

477 
Oakes  v.  Hill,  310 

v.  Spalding,  635 
Oakham  v.  Holbrook,  16,  353 
Oakland  Agric.  Soc.  v.  Bingham,  154 
R.  Co.  v.  Fielding,  115,  408,  763 
Oates  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  133 
Oatts  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  484 
Ober  v.  Crescent  City  R.  Co.,  520 


Oberdorfer  v.  Phila.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  475 
Oberf elder  v.  Doran,  719a 
Ocean  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Cheney,  238 

v.  Matthews,  206 
Oceanic  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Campa- 
nia Tr  Espanola,  24a,  725 

v.  Compania  Tr.  Espanola,  285 
Och  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  516 
Ocheltree  v.   Chicago,    etc.    R.  Co., 

426 
Ochsenbein  v.    Shaplev,  96,  101,  150 
Odell  v.  N.  Y.  CentralR.  Co.,  207 

v.  Schroeder,  291 

v.  Solomon,  712 
Odivrne  v.  Syford,  731 
Odlin  v.  Stetson,  563 
Ogburn  v.  Connor,  735 
Ogden  v.  Rum  mens.  194 
Ogg  v.  Lansing,  255,  266,  291 
Ogeir  v.  Albany  R.  Co.,  481a 
Ogilvie  v.  Edinburgh,  291 
Oglesby  v.  Smith,  654 
Ogley  v.  Miles,  218,  219 
Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Allender,  489 

v.  Brubaker.  421 

v.  Burrow,  95 

v.  Cole,  426,  448 

v.  Collarn,  53,  180,  192,  206 

v.  Cope,  493 

v.  Craycraft,  451a 

v.  Dunbar,  120a,  459 

v.  Dunn,  192,  222 

v.  Eaves,  482 

v.  Fitch,  445,  446 

v.  Gullett,  61 

v.  Hammersley,  60a,  71,  234 

v.  Heaton,  194a 

v.  Hecht,  61,  760 

v.  Hill,  475 

v.  Jones,  451a 

v.  Lackey,  16,  422 

v.  McCartney,  672 

v.  McDonald,  461,  468 

v.  Meisenheimer,  423 

v.  Muhling,  486 

v.  Nickless,  113 

v.  O'Donnell   431 

v.  Pearcv,  217,  233a 

v.  People.  421 

v.  Reed,  468.  485 

v.  Robb,  238 

v.  Schiebe,  521 

v.  Selby,  485,  492,  505 

v.  Shanefelt.  678,  680 

v.  Sim  ins.  506 

v.  Stein,  233a 

v.  Stransberry,  506 

v.  Stratton,  99,  520 

v.  Tindall,  241,  766,  769 

v.  Trowbridge,  355 

v.  Voigbt,  516,  519 

v.  Wachter,  735 

v.  Walker,  113,  463,  483 


CXXXV1 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wangelin,  54,  774 

So.  R.  Co.  v.  Morey.  175 

Valley  R.  Co.  v.  McKinley,  185 
v.  Watson,  513a 
Oil  City  Fuel  Co.  v.  Boundy,  93 

Gas  Co.  v.  Robinson,  65,  94,  696 

Creek  R.  Co.  v.  Keighron,  26, 
141,  161.  666 
Olathe  v.  Mizee,  375 
Old  Colony  R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  24a 
Oldenburg  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 

114,  477,  478 
Oldfield   v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  73a,  83, 

135,  137,  410.  775 
Oldham  v.  Sparks,  568 
Oklstein  v.  Firemen's  Bld'g  Ass'n., 

371 
Oleson  v.  Lake  Shore,   etc.  R.   Co., 
478 

v.  Tolford,  53 
Olfermann  v.  Union  Depot  R.  Co.,  516 
Olive  v.  Marble  Co.,  683 

v.  State,  333 

v.  Whitney  Marble  Co.,  148 
Oliver  v.  Kansas  City,  334 

v.  La  Valle,  55,  742 

v.  North  East  R.  Co..  408 

v.  No.  Pac.  Tr.  Co.,  758 

v.  Worcester,  258,  259 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  518, 
523 
Olmstead  v.  Brewer,  303 

v.  Dennis,  314 
Olney  v.  Riley,  367 
Olson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451,  475 

v.  Chippewa  Falls,  378 

v.    McMurray  Cedar    Lumber 
Co.,  216 

v.  St.    Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  209a, 
•513a.  735 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 

v.  Worcester,  338,  369 
dwell  v.  Milwaukee,  47 
Omaha  v.  Aver,  108,  376 

v.  Cunningham,  356 

v.  Jensen,  298,  356 

v.  Olmstead,  289 

v.  Randolph.  356 
Omaha  Fair  Ass'n  v.  Missouri  Pac. 

R.  Co.,  679 
Omaha,  etc.   R.  Co.  v.  Bradv,54,  417, 
426,  466 

v.  Brown,  731 

v.  Chollette,  49,  522 

v.  Clark,  426 

v.  Cook,  483 

v.  Crow,  492 

v.  Doolittle,  93 

v.  Krayenbuhl,  207a,  213,  238. 
460 

v.  Martin,  99,  520 

v.  Morgan,  225 

v.  O'Donnell,  482 


Omaha,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryburn,  417 

v.  Standen,  406 

v.  Talbot,  66,  485 

v.  Wright,  428 
Omaha  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Cameron,  485a 

v.  Lochneisen,  54 

v.  Martin,  54 
Ominger  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  477 
Omslaer  v.    Pittsburg,   etc.  Tr.  Co., 
485c 

v.  Traction  Co.,  475,476 
Onderdonk  v.  N.  Y.  &  Sea  Beach  R. 
Co.,  509 

v.  Smitb,  725 
Onondaga  Co.  Bank  v.  Bates,  597 
Opsahl  v.  Jucld,  104 
Orange,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Miles,  57 

v.  Ward,  114 
Orcutt  v.  Kittery  Bridge  Co.,  370,  397 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  490 

v.  Pacific  Coast  R.  Co.,  427 
Ordway  v.  Bacon,  618 

v.  Canisteo,  285 
Oregon  R.  Co.  v.  Smalley,  422 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Tracey,  207a,  216 
Orgall  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  137 
Orlando  v.  Pragg,  299 
Orleans  v.  Perry.  94,  376 
Orman  v.  Maddix,  233 
Ormond  v.  Holland,  184 
Ormsbee  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  88 

476.  481,  482 
Orne  v.  Roberts,  628 
Orr  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114, 

483 
Orsdol  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  729 
Ortmayer  v.  Johnson,  723 
Orttel  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197 
Orvif  v.  Elmira,  etc.  R.  Co.,  733 
Osage  City  v.  Larkins,  365 
Osborn  v.  Adams   635 

v.  Gillett,  124 

v.  Lenox,  628 
Osborne  v.  Detroit,  368,  375 

v.  Hamilton.  367,  368 

v.  Knox,  etc.  R.  Co.,  182 

v.  London,  etc.  R.  Co.,  209a,  214 

v.  McMasters,  145 

v.  Morgan,  243,  245 
Oshkosh  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

359 
Osincup  v.  Nichols,  628 
Osmond  v.  Widdicombe,  390 
Ostertag  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  479 
Osten  v.  Jerome,  735 
Oszkoscil  v.  Eagle  Pencil  Co.,  218 
Otis  v.  Janesville,  66 

v.  Thorn,  66 
Ott  v.  Buffalo,  377 
Ottawa  v.  Parks,  384 

v.  Walker,  336 

v.  Washabaugh,  289 

Gas  Co.  v.  Graham,  750 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.    CXXXV11 


Otteii  v.  Cohen,  36 
Ottendorff  v.  Willis,  645 
Ottersbach  v.  Philadelphia,  693 
Ouderkirk  v.  Central  Nat.  Bank,  588 
Ouillette  v.  Overman  Wheel  Co.,  222 
Ould  v.  Richmond,  254 
Outen  v.  North,  etc.  St.  R.  Co.,  520 
Ouverson  v.  Grafton,  66,  355,  376 
Overlay  v.   Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co., 

106,  108,  110 
Overholt  v.  Vieths,  704.  772 
Overman  Wheel  Co.  v.  Griffin,  111, 

212 
Overton  v.  Freeman,  169,  173,  699 
Oviatt  v.  Dakota  Central  R.  Co.,  513a 
Ovington  v.  Lowell,  etc.  R.  Co.,  408 
Owen  v.  Brockschmidt,  767,  770 

v.  Ft.  Dodge,  368,  373,  377 

v.  Gt.  Western  R.  Co.,  509 

v.  Hudson  Riv.  R.  Co.,  410 

v.  State,  249 

county  v.  Washington,  390 
Owens  v.  Gatewood,  621 

v.  Kansas  Citv,  etc.  R.  Co.,  508, 
758 

v.   Pennsylvania  R.   Co.,   464, 
478 

v.  People's  R.  Co.,  485c 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108 
Owensboro  Water  Co.  v.  Duncan,  22 
Owings  v.  Jones,  86,  108,   120,  709a, 

726 
Oxford  v.  Leathe,  120 

v.  Peter,  146 

Lake  Line  v.  Steadham,  426 
Oystherbank  v.  Gardner,  719 

Pacific  Cable  Co.  v.  Fleischner,  540 

R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  451a 

v.  Houts,  461 

Tel.  Co.  v.  Underwood,  554 
Pack  v.  New  York,  144, 165, 166, 168, 

173,  298 
Packard  v .  New  Bedford,  376 

v.  Voltz,  256 
Packet  Co.  v.  McCue,  65 
Paddock  v.    Atchison,   etc.   R.   Co., 
493,  761a 

v.  Cameron,  618 

v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  406 

v.  Somes,  735 
Paducah,    etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoehl,  61, 
73a,  108.  468,  477 

Lumber  Co.  v.  Paducah  Water 
Co.,  22,  265 
Paff  v.  Slack,  628 
Page  v.  Bucksport,  28,  346 

v.  Defries,  146 

v.  Hollingsworth,  627,  655 

v.  Mille  Lacs  Lumber  Co.,  737 

v.  Olcott,  603 

v.  No.  Carolina  R.  Co.,  433 

v.  Robinson,  119 


Page  v.  Weatherfield,  262,  334 
Paine  v.  Boston,  249 

v.  Delhi,  287 

v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  194,  194a 
Painter  v.  Pittsburgh,  165,  173,  699 
Painton  v.  Northern  Cent.  R.  Co.,  54 

v.  Pittsburgh,  298 
Pakalinsky  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 

62,  467,  472 
Palfrey  v.  Portland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  124 
Palmer  v.   Andover,   346,  348,   356, 
378,  393 

v.  Ashley,  559 

v.  Barker,  649 

v.  Crane,  623 

v.  Dearing,  87,  111,  114,  710 

v.  Delaware,   etc.  Canal  Co., 
45,  46,  54,  497,  516 

v.  Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197 

v.  Gallup,  619,  620 

v.  Holland,  582 

v.  Lincoln,  298 

v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  203, 
230,  233 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.Co.,  58,  676, 
680 

v.  Mulligan,  730 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  466,  477, 
4816 

v.  Penn.  Co.,  519 

v.  Portsmouth,  346,  370 

v.  St.  Albans,  266 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  427 

v.  Silverthorn,  656 

v.  Utah,  etc.  R.  Co.,  413 

v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  150 
Palys  v.  ErieR.  Co.,  475 
Pannell  v.  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  476 
Pantam  v.  Isham,  665 
Panton  v.  Holland,  701 
Pantzar  v.  Tillv.etc.  Mining  Co.,  197, 

204,  207a,  230,  233 
Pappa  v.  Rose,  310 
Parcells  v.  Auburn,  377 
Pardee  v.  Robertson,  619,  623 
Parish  v.  Eden,  368 
Park  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  192 

v.  O'Brien,  107,  114,  634,  639, 
654 

Hotel  Co.  v.  Lockhart,  195 
Parke  county  v.  Sappenfield,  393 
Parker  v.  Adams,  107,  654 

v.  Barnard,  704,  705 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  393 

v.  Boston,  etc.  Stmb.  Co.,  506, 
518 

v.  Fenn,  619 

v.  Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co.,  61,  87 

v.  Griswold,  733 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  238 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  424, 
427 

v.  Laredo,  287 


CXXXV111 


References]         TABLE     OF    CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


Parker  v.  Lowell,  287 

v.  Macon,  262,  289,  354 

v.  Mise,  748 

v.  N.  Y.   &  New  England  R. 
Co.,  203a,  241 

v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  480 

v.  Portland  Pub.  Co.,  97 

v.  Rensselaer,  etc.  R.  Co.,  435. 
444 

v.  Rolls,  574 

v.  Springfield,  376 

v.  Walrod,  303 

v.  Wilmington,    etc.    R.    Co., 
469,  472 
Parkhill  v    Brighton,  376 
Parkhurst  v.  Johnson,  203 
Parkinson  Sugar  Co.  v.  Riley,  190 
Parks  v.  Alta  Cal.  Tel.  Co.,  532,  755 

v.  Greenville,  291.  340 

v.  Newburyport,  735 
Parnaby  v.  Lancaster  Canal  Co.,  386 
Parody  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  215 
Parris  v.  Green  Island,  375 
Parrish  v.  Pensacola,  etc.  R.  Co.,  180 
Parrott  v.  Dearborn,  619,  621 

v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  747 

v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co. ,  747 

v.  Wells,  11,  16,  38,  47,  57,  689 
Parry  v.  Smith,  695 
Parshall  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.   Co., 

760 
Parsons  v.  Goshen,  299 

v.  Lindsay,  749a 

v.  Manchester,  369 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  772 

v.  N.  Y.    Central   R.    Co.,    91. 
114,  460,  478,  490,  525 

v.  San  Francisco,  254 

v.  Winchell,  244,  248 
Partenheimer  v.  Van  Order,  638 
Partlow  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  460 
Par  vis  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co., 

47,87 
Pasquini  v.  Lowry,  702 
Passamaneck  v.    Louisville,   etc.    R. 

Co.,  62 
Passenger  R.  Co.  v.  Young,  151 
Pastene  v.  Adams,  36,  704 
Pastoris  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  521 
Patch  v.  Covington,  265,  289 
Patchen  v.  Walton,  356 
Pater  son  v.  Colebrook,  53 

v.  Society,  etc.,  281 

v.  Wallace,  54.  87,  189,  194,  215 

Bank  v.  Hamilton,  622 
Patneand  v.  Claire.  736 
Patnode  v.  Harter.  207b 

v.  Warren    Cotton  Mills,  218, 
2416 
Patoka  v.  Hopkins,  274 
Patrick  v.  Pote,  86 
Patridge  v.  Scott,  701 
Patry  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  493 


Patten   v.  Chicago,    etc.    R.   Co.,  55, 
455.  506 

v.  Libbey,  739,  752 

v.  Rea,  147 

v.  Wiggin,  606,  607,  612 
Patterson  v.  Brooklyn,  254 

v.  East  Bridge  Co.,  396 

v.  Heminvvay,  719a 

v.  Philadelphia  R.  Co.,  114 

v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91, 
186,  206,  210,  211,  214,  215, 
221,  226,  230 

v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  518 
Pattison  v.  Syracuse  Nat.  Bank,  588 
Patton  v.  Central  Iowa  Ry.  Co.,  185, 
203 

v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
480 

v.  Montgomery  county,  257 

v.  West  End,  etc.  R.  Co.,  453 

v.  Western,   etc.    R.  Co.,    186, 
232,  233 
Pauley  v.  Steam  Gauge,  etc.  Co.,  13, 

702a 
Paulitsch  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  508, 

510 
Paulmier  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  65,  188 
Paulson  v.  Pelican,  373 
Pawling  v.  Hoskms,  195 
Paxson  v.  Sweet,  343 
Paxton  v.  Bover,  16 
Payne  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62,  66, 
73a,  94,  417,  473,  481a,  482 

v.  Humeston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  483 

v.  Irvin,  710 

v.  Reese,  114,  189,  195 

v.  Rogers.  120,  123,  708 

v.  Smith,  646 

v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  414 
Peabody  v.  Oregon  R.,  etc.  Co.,  493 
Peach  v.  Utica.  88,  374,  481. 
Peachey  v.  Rowland.  173 
Peacock  v   Dallas.  368 
Peake  v.  Buell.  718 
Peard  v.  Mt.  Vernon,  363 
Pearl  v.  Macaulay,  645 
Pearsall  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  541, 
542,  545,  547,  549,  552,  753a, 
755 
Pearson  v.  Cox,  169 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  419, 
451a 

v.  Lable,  298 
Peart  v.  Meeker,  328 
Pease  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233 

v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  493 
Peaslee  v.  Chatham,  114 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  192,  202 
Peavey  v.  Robbins.  310 
Peavy  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  493 
Peck  v.  Austin,  262 

v.  Batavia,  8  262,  281,  289,  328 

v.  Ellsworth,  258,  370 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         l"re  to  sections.       CXXX1X 


Peck  v.  Goodberlett,  735 

v.  Hurlburt,  623 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  675 

v.  N.  Y.  &  N.  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  67,  89 
Peckham  v.   Burlington,  345 

v.  Henderson,  365 

v.  Lebanon,  333 
Pederson  v.  Rusbford,  185 

v.  Seattle  R.  Co.,  519 
Peers  v.  Elliott,  672 
Peet  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425 
Peetz  v.  St.  Charles  R.  Co.,  375 
Peil  v.  Rheinhart,  114,  710 
Peirce  v.  Walters,  100 
Peisser  v.  Shanning,  723 
Pekin  v.  Brereton,  371 

v.  McMahon,  71,  78,285,  705 

v.  Newell,  279 
Pelky  v.  Palmer,  608 
Peltier  v.  Bradley  649 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  463 
Pelton  v.  Schmidt,  704,  705 
Pence  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R  Co.,  476 
Pendergast  v.  Union  R.  Co.,  194,  231, 

505,  523 
Pendlebury  v.  Greenhalgh,  174 
Pendleton  v.  Kinsley,  512 

St.  R.  Co.  v.  Shires,  457 

v.  Stallman,  457,  463 
Pennington  v.   Detroit,  etc.  R.   Co., 
207 

v.  Streight,  313 

v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  755 

v.  Yell,  55'.),  565,  570,  572 
Penniston  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  506 
Pennsylvania  Hall,  Re.  261 
Pennsylvania      v.     Wheeling,      etc. 

Bridge,  250,  283 
Pennsvlvania  Canal  Co.  v.  Bentley, 
53,  58,  108 

v.  Burd,  399 

v.  Graham,  9,  257,371,387,758 
Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Kelly,  217 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Backes,  185a,  468 

v.  Bray,  493 

v.  Brush,  217 

v.  Burgett,  185b 

v.  Congdon,  218 

v.  Con  Ian,  13,  53,  467 

v.  Connell,  493,  761a 

v.  Ellett,  120a 

v.  Gallaher,  182 

v.  Hensil,  467 

v.  Horton,  13 

v.  Keane,  477,  773 

v.  Krick,  463 

v.  Langendorf,  85 

v.  Lynch,  221 

v.  McCaffrey,  193,  213,  217 

v.  McCormack,  197,  217 

v.  Marion,  87,  410,  506 

t.  Martin,  521 


Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Meyers,  476,  480, 
482,  483 

v.  Morel,  478 

v.  Newmeyer,  513a 

v.  Rathgeb,  476 

v.  Roney,  85 

v.  Roy,  51,  495,  526,  769 

v.  Rudel,  477 

v.  Sears,  198 

v.  Stegemier,  91 

v.  Toomey,  513 

v.  Wbitcomb,  204,  207b 

v.  Whitlock,  30,  665 
Pennsylvania  Lead  Co.,  Re  701a 
Pennsylvania    R.   Co.  v.  Ackerman, 
468,  476 

v.  Aiken,  476,  485 

v.  Aspell.  61    520 

v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  737 

v.  Bantom.  486,  766,  769 

v.  Barnett,  53,  426, 

v.  Beale,  476,  477 

v.  Bock,  71 

v.  Books,  766 

v.  Butler,  771 

v.  Canal  Commissioners,  254 

v.  Coon,  47 

v.  Gallentine,  113 

v.  Goodenough,  67 

v.  Goodman,  485 

v.  Hammill,  464 

v.  Henderson,  60c,  472,  492,  505 

v.  Hensil,  13,  25.  27,  57 

v.  Hope,  26,  55,  666 

v.  Horst,  54,  479 

v.  Jones,  120a 

v.  Keller,  766 

v.  Kelly,  73a  115,  763 

v.  Kerr,  30,  666 

v.  Lacev,  55 

v.  Kilgore,  508,  520 
Pennsylvania,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Langdon, 
61,  523,  766 

v.  Leary,  90,  476 

v.  Lewis,  72 

v.  Lyons,  508,  520 

v.  McCloskey,  519 

v.  McKinney,  516, 

v.  McTighe,  87 

v.  Matthews,  466 

v.  Middleton,  223 

v.  Miller,  729 

v.  Mooney,  110 

v.  Ogier,  91,  137,  766,  775 

v.  Patterson,  899 

v.  Price.  128,  225,  486,  488 

v.  Riblet,  418.  422 

v.  Righter.  56,  102,  112,  476 

v.  Russ,  144 

v.  St.  Louis  etc.  R.  Co.,  120a 

v.  Smith,  7 

v.  Smith.  19 

v.  Stninahan,  675 


cxl 


References}        TABLE    OF    CASES.        We  to  sections. 


Pennsylvania,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Vandi- 
ver,  64,  151,  493 

v.  Wachter,  185,  235,  241 

v.  Watson  675 

v.  Weber,  108,  114,463 

v.  Werner,  89,  477 

v.  Wilson   758 

v.  Zebe,  521,  766 

v.  Zink,  207a,  217 
Pennsylvania  Tel.  Co.  v.  "Varnau,  60, 

89 
Penny  v.  Rochester,  R.  Co.,  73a,  485, 

485c 
Penruddock's  Case,  709a 
Pensacola  Gas  Co.  v.  Pebley,  692 
Penso  v.  McCormick,  73 
Penton  v.  Murdock,  633 
People  v.  Ames.  619 

v.  Auditor,  317 

v.  Bristol,  etc.  Tump.  Co.,  310 

v.  Brooklyn,  345 

v.  Butler,  602 

v.  Campbell,  319 

v.  Canal  Board,  398 

v.  Colby,  602 

v.  Colerick,  619 

v.  Commissioners,  etc,  337 

v.  Cunningham,  332,  362 

v.  Dennison,  249 

v.  Eastwood,  110 

v.  Elk  River  Mill,  etc.  Co.,  734 

v.  Express,  338 

v.  Faulkner,  303 

v.  Goshen  Turnp.  Co.,  387 

v.  Hillsdale  Turnp.    Co.,    348, 
386,  388 

v.  Jackson,  334a 

v.  Kerr,  332,  485a 

v.  Kingman,  333 

v.  Lambie,  333 

v.  Lamborn,  569 

v.  Little  Vallev,  338 

v.  Loechfelm,  333,  334 

v.  Medical  Soc,  323 

v.  Miles.  249 

v.  Morrell,  254 

v.  New  York,  572 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  470 

v.  Pease,  310 

v.  PI v mouth  Plank  Road  Co., 
386 

v.  Saratoga,  etc.  R.  Co.,  390 

v.  Seaman,  310 

v.  Stocking,  303,  310 

v.  Supervisors,  etc.,  337 

v.  Tallmadge,  249 

v.  Telephone  Co.,  536 

v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  415 

v.  Ulster  Co.,  340 

v.  Vanderbilt,  334a 

v.  Waterford,  etc.  Turnp.  Co., 
272 

v.  Watertown,  249 


People's  Bank  v.  Morgolofski,  719a 

Pass.  R.  Co.  v.  Green,  473 

Savings  Bank  v.  Cupps,  588 
Peoria  v.  Johnston,  336 

v.  Simpson,  345,  709a,  713 
Peoria  Bridge  Ass'n,  v.  Loomis,  389, 

743,  758 
Peoria,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Champ,  453 

v.  Herman,  87 

v.  Lane,  457,  502,  524 

v.  Miller,  461 

v.  Puckett.  207 

v.  Reynolds,  516 

v.  Rice,  89,  238 

v.  Siltman,  62 
Pepin  v   Dunham,  G18 
Pepper  v.  So.  Pacific  Co.,  426,  474,  767 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  553,  754 
Peppercorn    v.    Black    River    Falls, 

759.  760 
Percival  v.  Jones,  303 
Perdue  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241b 
Perigoy  v.  Sellick,  733 
Perez  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.,  514 

v.  Rayband,  709 
Perigo  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  217 
Perionowsky  v.  Freeman,  605 
Perkins  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  522 

v.  Eastern,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57,  107, 
418.  434,  435,  436 

v.  Eighmie,  683 

v.  Fayette,  346,  352,  355 

v.  Fond  du  Lac,  86,  258,  353, 
376 

v.  Lawrence,  286 

v.  Mossman,  629 

v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  151 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  491,  505 

v.  Oxford,  301 

v.  Perkins,  640 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  448 
Perley  v.  Chandler,  365 

v.  Foster,  620 
Perrin  v.  Hill,  577 
Perring  v .  Rebutter,  557 
Perry  v.  Buss,  310 

v.  Cedar  Falls,  377 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  480 

v.  Dubuque,  etc.   R.  Co.,  407, 
425 

v.  New   Orleans,  etc.   R.    Co., 
332 

v.  Ricketts,  194,  196 

v.  Rogers,  223 

v.  Smith,  672 

v.  Worcester,  105 
Perse  v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  432 
Pershing  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  407, 

495 
Peru  v.  Brown,  274,  287 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hasket,  448 
Peschel  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195, 
233 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


cxli 


Petaja  v.  Aurora  Iron  Co.,  195,233 
Peter  v.  Denison.  688a 

v.  Kendall,  333 
Peters  v.  Harrison  Wire  Co.,  194 

v.  Lindsborg,  291 

v.  Rylands,  502 
Petersbury  v.  Applegarth,  285 
Petersen  v.  Sherry  Lumber  Co. ,  216 

v.  Coal  Co..  232 

v.  New  York,  299 

v.  Western U.  Tel.  Co.,  531 

v.    Wisconsin    Cent.    R.    Co., 
451a 
Petrel,  The.  237 
Petrie  v.  Columbia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  102, 

468,  478,  769,  770,  775 
Pettengill  v.  Yonkers,    92,   286,  298, 

346,  356,  369 
Pettigrew  v.  Evansville,  274 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Steel  Co.,  144 
Pettingill  v.  Chelsea.  258,  287 

v.  Olean,  369 
Pettit  v.  May,  634 
Peverly  v.  Boston,  86,  523 
Peyton  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85,  460, 

467 
Pfau  v.  Reynolds,  359 
Pfeffer  v.  Cutter,  207 
Pfeiffer  v.  Brown.  736 
Phelon  v.  Stiles,  141,  146 
Phelps  v.  Cutter,  619 

v.  Dolan,  310 

v.  Mankato,  334 

v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  743 

v.  Nowlen,  700 

v.  Wait,  122.  244,  248,  645 
Philadelphia  v.  Gavagnin,  285 

v.  Weller,  358 
Philadelphia  Iron,  etc.  Co.  v.  Davis, 

197 
Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Anderson, 
39,  407,  459,  516,  521 

v.  Boyer,  25,  51,  57,  63,  66,  86, 
495 

v.  Brannen,  154 

v.  Constable,  666 

v.  Cooper,  122 

v.  Davis,  407,  735 

v.  Derby,  142, 146, 154, 155,  486, 
491,  700 

v.  Edelstein,  509 

v.  Ervin.  13 

v.  Fronk.  463 

v.  Hagan,  92 

v.  Hassan  1,  73 

v.  Hendrickson,  680 

v.  Henrice.  58 

v.  Hogeland,  66 

v.  Hummell,  97,  480,  481a,  484 

v.  Keenan,  195 

v.  Kellam,  460 

v.  Killips,  426 

v.  Larkin,  749 


Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Latshaw, 
676 

v.  Layer,  465 

v.  Lehman,  104 

v.  Long,  87,  71,  72,  78,  114,  461 

v.  McCormick,  509 

v.  Peebles,  476 

v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  Towboat 
Co.,  104,  395 

v.  Rice,  493 

v.  Schultz,  676.  680 

v.  Spearen,  53,  73,  99,  464,  483 

v.  State,  225 

v.  Stebbing,  8,  27,  57,  111 

v.  Stimpson.317 

v.  Stinger,  10,  426,  451,  474 

v.  Trainor,  194 

v.  Yeiser,  11,  672 

v.  Yerger.  58,  676 
Philadelphia   &  Reading  R.  Co.  v. 
Derby,  706 

v.  Smith,  709a 
Philadelphia  Traction  Cov.  Lightcap, 
4856 

v.  Orbann,  492,  748 
Phillips  v.  Bridge,  572 

v.  Brigham,  40 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  225 

v.  Commonwealth.  118,  325,  341 

v.  County  Court,  338 

v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 

v.  De  Waid,  85.  645 

v.  Dickerson,  28,  742 

v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
480 

v.  Edsall,  569,  572 

v.  Huntington,  334,  376 

v.  Library  Co. ,  706 

v.  Michaels,  215,  218 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  458, 
477 

v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
31,  66,  426 

v.  New  York  &  New  England 
R  Co.,  479 

v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  144,  489 

v.  Railway  Co.,  207a 

v.  Rennselaer,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Ritchie  county,  376 

v.  Southwestern   K.    Co.,    758, 
760 

v.  Veazie,  358 
Philpott  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  773 
Phinney  v.  Phinnev,  243 
Phippsv.  Millbury'Bank,  581 
Phoenix  Ins.   Co.  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R. 

Co.,  675 
Phcenixville  v.  Phoenix  Iron  Co.,  359, 

365 
Phyfe  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  745 
Pickard  v.  Smith,  14.  176,  314,  713 
Pickens  v.  Diecker.  634 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  493 


cxlii 


References] 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[are  to  se<  tions. 


Pickering  v.  Orange,  031 
Pickett  v.  Pearsons,  566 

v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  484, 
775 
Pidgeon  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  194 

v.  Williams,  573,  575 
Pieart  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  221 
Piedmont,   etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McKenzie, 

16 
Pielke  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  667 
Pierce  v.  Atlanta  Cotton  Mills,  195 

v.  Blake,  569 

v.  Central  Iowa  R.  Co.,  241c 

v.  Connors,  73a,  133,  645,  772 

v.  Dart,  371 

v.  New  Bedford,  262 

v.  Partridge,  619 

v.  Strickland,  619 

v.  Whitcomb,  705 
Piercy  v.  Averill,  313,  363 
Pierrepont  v.  Loveless,  164 
Pierson  v.  Gale,  303 

v.  Glean,  709« 
Pietzner  v.  Shinnick,  421 
Piggot  v.  Eastern  Counties  R.  Co., 

675,  676 
Pigott  v.  Engle,  649 
Pikev.  Brittan,  710 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  467 

v.  Emerson,  572 

v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  85 

v.  Megam,  249 

v.  Megoun,  310 
Pilkington  v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  192, 

2076 
Pillsbury  v.  Moore,  709a 
Pilot  Boy,  The,  495 
Pimm  v.  Roper,  612 
Pinckney  v.  Western  U.    Tel.   Co., 

529,  534,  542 
Pine  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  748 
Pine  Bluff  Light  Co.  v.  McCain,  695 

v.  Schneider,  693,  696 
Pingree  v.  Leyland,  209a 
Pinkham  v.  Topsfield,  363 
Pinney  v.  Hall,  704 
Piollet  v.  Simmers,  104,  355,  381 
Piper  v.  Cambria  Iron  Co.,  207 

v.  Chicago,   etc.  R.    Co.,  467, 
482,  485 

v.  Manny,  22 

v.  Menifee,  603 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  497 
Pippen  v.  Wilmington,  etc.   R.   Co., 

432 
Pippin  v.  Sheppard,  116 
Pitcher  v.  King,  620 

v.  Lennon,  702a 

v.  People's  R.  Co.,  410,  521 
Pitman  v.  Francis,  574 
Pitrowsky  v.  Reedy  Mf£.  Co.,  209a 
Pitt  v.  Yalden.  558,  559   572 
Pittinger  v.  Hamilton,  334,  353 


Pitts  v.  Gaince,  644 

v.  Lancaster  Mills,  730 
Pittston  v.  Harts,  356 
Pittsburgh  v.  Grier,  89,  262,  285,  704, 
725 

v.  Vining,  74 
Pittsburgh,    etc.    R.   Co.   v.   Adams, 
180,  186,  186a,  218 

v.  Allen,  437,  449 

v.  Andrews,  519 

v.  Bennett,  111,  475,  480,  482 

v.  Bingham  97,  419,  705 

v.  Bowyer,  434 

v.  Bumstead,  72 

v.  Burton,  478 

v.  Caldwell,  78,  84 

v.  Campbell,  58 

v.  Collins,  64,  87,  480 

v.  Commonwealth,  333 

v.  Cunnington,  434 

v.    Devinney,    224,    230,    233a, 
233b 

v.  Donahue,  513 

v.  Dunn,  408 

v.  Ensign,  513 

v.  Evans,  54 

v.  Gilleland,  407,  412 

v.  Henderson,  188,  230 

v.  Henlev,  195 

v.  Hinds^  512 

v.  Hixon,  678,  680 

v.  Ives,  410 

v.  Jones,  680 

v.  Karnes,  27,  427 

v.  Kirk,  146 

v.  Kitley,  479 

v.  Knutson,  467 

v.  Krichbaum,  114 

v.  Krouse,  490 

v.  Lewis,  233a,  2336 

v.  Lyons.  748 

v.  McClurg.  56.  519 

v.  Martin,  490,  519 

v.  Maurer,  463 

v.  Nelson,  85,  678 

v.  Pearson,  72 

v.  Pdlow,  512 

v.  Powers,  180,  238 

v.  Ranney,  233a,  2336 

v.  Redding.  481a 

v.  Ruby,  192 

v.  Russ,  486,  761a 

v.  Sentmeyer,  198,  207 

v.  Shields,  154 

v.  Smith,  64,  437,  450,  451a 

v.  Spencer,  66 

v.  Sponier,  479 

v.  Stuart,  418 

v.  Sullivan,  189 

v.  Taylor,  28,  426,  451,  379,  748 

v.  Thompson,  184,  496 

v.  Williams,  516 

v.  Wright,  114 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


cxliii 


Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Yundt,  417 

Pixley  v.  Clark,  728,  731,  732 

Plank  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  194,  218 

road  Co.  v.  Thomas,  385 
Plant  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co. ,  332 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Cook,  61,  725 
Planz  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64,  107 
Piatt  v.  Farney,  708 

v.  Forty-second  St.,  etc.  R.  Co., 
521 

v.  Johnson,  729,  730 

v.  Sherry,  616 
Platte,  etc.  Canal  Co.  v.  Dowell,  1 3 

Milling  Co.  v.  Dowell,  72,  108 
Plattsmouth  v.  Mitchell,  353,  376 
Platz  v.  Cohoes,  67,  104,  381 
Playford  v.  United  K.  Tel.  Co.,  532, 

543 
Pleasants  v.  Fant,  56 
Pleon  v.  Staff.  709 
Plopper  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  521 
Pluckwell  v.  Wilson,  651 
Plumleigh  v.  Dawson,  733 
Plumley  v.  Birge,  62,  73,  639 
Plummer  v.  Dill,  705 

v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  477 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  476 
Plunkett  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

434 
Plymouth  v.  Graver,  356 

v.  Painter,  313 
Poeppers  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  55, 

666,  678 
Poirier  v.  Carroll,  210.  215 
Poland  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 

v.  Earhart,  686 
Polaria,  The,  146 
Poler  v.  N.  Y.    Central  R.    Co.,  425, 

441,  450.  455 
Poling  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  160,  705 
Polk  v.  Plummer,  249 
Pollard  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  146 

v.  New  Haven,  R.  Co.,  523 
Pollett  v.  Long,  30,  729,  732 
Pollich  v.  Sellers,  209a 
Pollock  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  470 

v.  Louisville,  291 

v.  Stables,  179 
Polly  v.  McCall,  731 
Pomeroy  v.  Donaldson,  333 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  359 

v.  Westfield,  351 

v.  Granger,  700,  701 
Pomfrey  v.    Saratoga  Springs,  60b, 

333,  334,  363,  369,  373,  376 
Pomponio  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  Haven  R. 

Co.,  464,  481 
Ponca  v.  Crawford 
Pond  v.  Vanderveer,  618 
Pontiac  v.  Carter,  262 
Ponton  v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co., 

1*0.  241 
Pool  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  61,  473 


Poole  v.  Georgia  Railroad  &  Bank- 
ing Co.,  508 

v.  Jackson,  867,  368,  369 

v.  North  Carolina  R.  Co. ,  84 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co..  488 
Poor  v.  Sears,  66,  709a 
Pope  v.  Commissioners,  etc.,  336 

v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  457,  463 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  540a 
Popson  v.  Leathern,  743 
Port  Jervis  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  24a, 

384 
Port  Royal,    etc.   R.    Co.   v.   Davis, 

207b 
Porter  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  217 

v.  N.    Y.,    Lake   Erie,   etc.   R. 
Co.,  492,  505 

v.  Pierce,  619 

v.  Say  ward,  625 

v.  Waters-Allen  Co.,  191 
Porter  County  v.  Dombka,  369 
Portland  v.  Richardson,  365 
Posey  v.  Scofield,  60 
Poseyville  v.  Lewis,  376 
Post  v.  Boston,  338 

v.  Lincoln,  726 

v.  Mumn,  333 

v.  Olmsted,  645 

v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410 

v.  U.  S.  Exp.  Co.,  646 
Postal  Cable  Co.  v.  Lathrop,  754 

Tel.  Co.  v.  Zopfi,  31,  359 
Potter  v.  Bunnell,  359,  414 

v.  Castleton,  334.  351,356 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54,  102 

v.  Faulkner.  182,  183 

v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  475 

v.  Moran,  646,  654 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  222,  241 

v.  Seymour,  171 

v.  The  Majestic,  504 

v.  Warner,  102,  615,  741 
Pottner,  v.  Minneapolis,  867 
Pottstown  Gas  Co.  v.  Murphy,  692 
Poucher  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 

178,  505 
Poulin  v.  Broadway,  etc.  R.  Co.,  508 
Pouilin  v.  Canadian  Pac.  R.  Co.,  486 
Poulton  v.  Southwestern  R.  Co.,  145 
Pound  v.   Port  Huron,  etc.  R.  Co., 

423,  448 
Pounder  v.  North  Eastern  R.  Co.  512 
Powell  v.  Augusta,  etc.  Co.  742 

v.  Deveney,  31  35,  122 

v.  N.  Y.  Central   R.  Co.,   472, 
476,  477 

v.  Mo.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  460,  475, 
484 

v.  Salisbury,  662 

v.  Tuttle,  291,  597 

v.  Virginia  Const.  Co.,  169 
Power  v.  First  National  Bank,  582 

v.  Kent,  566 


cxliv 


References] 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[are  to  sections. 


Powers  v.  Boston  Gas  Co.,  693 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  513a 

v.  Council  Bluffs,  274 

v.  Craig,  (569 

v.  Davenport,  40 

v.  Harlow,  73,  688 

v.  Kindt,  638 

v.  N.  Y  ,   Lake   Erie,   etc.   R. 
Co.,  209a,  217 

v.  Quincey,  77 

v.  Woodstock,  393 
Pravie,  etc.  Co.  v.  Doig,  173,  699 
Prather  v.  Kean,  589 

v.  Lexington,  291 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94, 
108 
Pratt  v.  Amherst,  350 

v.  Chicago,  etc.    R.    Co.,   463, 
464a 

v.  Gardner,  303 

v.  Hill,  303 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  217 

v.  Lam  son,  730,  733 

v.  Prouty.  219 

v.  Weymouth,  291 

Iron  Co.  v.  Brauley,  71,  73a,  78 
Pray  v.  Jersey  City,  256.  258,  289 

v.  Omaha  R.  Co.,  523 
Prayther  v.  Dean,  588 
Prendihle  v.  Conn.  River  Mfg.  Co., 

214,  241b 
Prentice  v.  Geiger,  729,  734 

v.  Wellsville,  185,  195 
Prentiss  v.  Boston   356 

v.  Boston, etc.  R.  Co.,  107,  111, 
112. 

v.    Kent  Manufacturing    Co., 
186a.  219 
Presby  v.  Grand  Trunk  Ry.,  426 
Prescott  v.  Ball  Engine  Co.,  195 

v.  Knowles,  628 
Pressman  v.  Mooney,  645,  772 
Preston  v.  Prather,  588 
Prestwich  v.  Poley,  573 
Pretty  v.  Bickmore,  709a 
Prewitt  v.  Eddy,  482 

v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  474 
Price  v.  Bullen,  569 

v.  Ga  Nun,  691 

v.  Houston  Nav.  Co.,  180 

v.  New  Jersey  R.,  etc.  Co.,  57, 
418,  430 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  140 

v.  Sacramento,  256 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61,  99 
Prickett  v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  419, 

434,  453 
Prideaux  v.  Mineral  Point,   66,    108, 
356,  377 

v.  Morrice,  310 
Priest  v.  Nichols,  56,  57,  86 
Priestley  v.  Fowler,  184,  194 
Priester  v.  Augley,  155,  686 


Primrose  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  545, 

546,  552,  553.  754 
Prince  v.  Lynn,  291 

v.  N.  Y.   Central,  etc.   R.  Co., 
415.  417a 
Prince  George   County   v.   Burgess, 

108,  257,  376 
Princeton  v.  Gieske,  274 
Prindle  v.  Fletcher,  367 
Pringle  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93 
Pritchard  v.  La  Crosse,  etc.  R.  Co., 

430 
Probert  v.  Phipps,  218 
Probst  v.  Delamater,  189 
Proctor  v.  Andover,  387 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  129 

v.  Jennings,  26,  35 

v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  428 
Promer  v.   Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

185a,  203,  241c 
Prosser  v.  Montana  Central  R.  Co., 

606.  108.  194,  197 
Protector,  The,  172 
Prot.    Epis.  Church  v.  Anamosa,  299 
Prothers  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  519 
Providence  v.  Clapp,  258,  333,    350, 

352.  363 
Provost  v.  New   Chester  Water  Co., 

283 
Pruitt  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39, 

40 
Prvor  v.  Louisville,  etc  R.  Co.,  2076 
Pueblo  v.  Griff  en,  760 

v.  Smith,  379 
Puff  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.,  54 
Puffer  v.  Orange,  356 
Pullman  Car  Co.  v.  Bluhin,  31,  742 

v.  Gardner,  526 

v.  Gavin,  526 

v.  Harkins,  219a 

v.  Laack,  90,  188,  194,  204 

v.  Lawrence,  762 

v.  Lowe,  526 

v.  Martin,  526 

v.  Matthews,  526 

v.  Smith,  509,  526,  764 

v.  Taylor,  526 

v.  Trimble,  761 
Pumpelly  v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  274 
Purcell  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  26.  742,  761 
Purdy  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  478 

v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241a" 
Purinton  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  463, 

483 
Purl  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62,  88 
Purves  v.  Landell,  559 
Puterbaugh  v.  Reasor,  69 
Putnam  v.  Broadway,  etc.   R.   Co., 
512 

v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  140 

v.  Wigg,  629,  639 
Pye  v.  Faxon,  175,  701a 

v.  Mankato,  274 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


cxlv 


Pyle  v.  Richards,  729 

Pym  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  137, 

769 
Pyne  v.  Broadway,  etc.  R.  Co.,  485c 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 
Pzolla  v.  Michigan  Central  R.  Co.,  62 

Quackenbush  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. , 
513a,  742 
v.  Wisconsin,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62, 
422,  451a 
Quaid  v.  Cornwall,  197 
Quaife  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57,  58 
Quarman  v.  Burnett.  171,  172,  173 
Quebec  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Merchant,  241 
Queen,  The,  172 

v.  Dayton  Coal,  etc.  Co.,  13,62, 
73,  73a 
Quested  v.  Newburyport,  etc.  R.  Co., 

457    459 
Quick  v.  Minnesota  Iron  Co.,  216 
Quigley  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  493 
Quill  v.  Empire  State  Tel.  Co.,  120a, 

359 
Quilty  v.  Battie,  635 

v.  Batty.  115 
Quimby  v.  Boston, etc.  R.  Co.,  415,  505 
v.  Vanderbilt,  503 
v.  Vermont,  etc.  R.  Co.,  47,57, 
437 
Quin  v.  Complete  Elec.  Co..  162 

v.  Lowell  Electric  Light  Co., 

683 
v.  Moore,  135,  137,  766,  769 
Quincy  v.  Jones,  274,  701 
v.  Barber,  353 
Canal  v.  Newcomb,  371,  400 
Coal   Co.  v.  Hood,   137,  194a, 

205 
Mining  Co.  v.  Kitts,  203a,  235 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wellhoener,  27 
Quinlan  v.  Manistique,  338 

v.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  647 
v.  Utica.  60b,  369 
Quinn  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  523 

v.  Johnson  Forge  Co.,    186a, 

758,  767a 
v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  189 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  512 
v.  O'Keefe,  104 
v.  Perham,  710 
v.  Power,  146, 147 
v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  519, 
749 
Quirk  v.  Holt,  644,  654 

Raasch  v.  Dodge  county,  367 

Rabe  v.  Sommerbeck,  690 

Raben  v.  Central  Iowa  R.  Co.,  510 

Raby  v.  Cell,  56 

Race  v.  Union  Ferry  Co.,  502 

Radcliff  v.  Brooklyn.  283,  700 

Raden  v.  Geo.  R  Co..  480 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  —  j.] 


Radlev  v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  94, 

99 
Radway  v.  Briggs,  333,  725 
Rafferty  v.  Buckman,  766 
Ragon  v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  217,  406 
Ragsdale  v.   Memphis,   etc.  R.    Co., 
241 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co. ,  241c 
Rahman  v.   Minnesota,  etc.  R.  Co., 

207a 
Rahway  v.  Carter,  338 
Raiford  v.   Mississippi,  etc.   R.  Co., 

419,  463 
Rail  v.  Potts,  310 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Alabama,  249. 

v.  Barron,  413,  502,  758 

v.  Brown,  120a,  413 

v.  Charles,  195 

v.  Cunnington,  417a 

v.  Fort,  46,  186a 

v.  Gladmon,  73,  108 

v.  Hambleton,  120a 

v.  Harris,  503 

v.  Hartley,  358 

v.  Houston,  90 

v.  Jones.  1,  61,  86,  2076,  523 

v.  Keegan,  195 

v.  Lacy,  132 

v.  Leech,  185 

v.  Lockwood,  550,  551 

v.  Mfg.  Co.,  210 

v.  Miller.  180 

v.  Norton,  63,  99 

v.  Ogden,  87 

v.  Peterson,  195 

v.  Reeves,  40 

v.  Richardson,  666 

v.  Richmond,  358 

v.  Rush,  241a 

v.  Stout,  53,  57,  72,  73 

v.  Tennessee,  249 

v.  Walker,  62,  103 
Raine  v.  Alderson,  119 
Raines  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99 
Rainey  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 

27 
Rains  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  198, 
207 

v.  Simpson,  303 
Rainy  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  466 
Raisler  v.  Oliver,  319,  321 
Rajowski  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  672 
Ramm  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.   R.  Co., 

513a 
Ramsdell  v.  Morgan,  75 
Ramsden  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  151, 

154 
Ramsey    v.  Louisville,    etc.    R.    Co., 

*  477 

v.  Rushville  R.  Co.,  114,  351 
Rand  v.  Syms.  644 

Randall  v.  Baltimore, etc.  R.  Co.,  57, 
180,  224,  233a,  241,  241a 


cxlvi 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Randall  v.  Brigham,  303 

v.  Cheshire  Tump.  Co.,  387,  397 

v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  262,  356 

v.  Ikey,  559 

v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 
125 

v.  Northwestern  T.  Co.,  108 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  432 

v.  Silverthorn,  729 
Randleson  v.  Murray,  168 
Randolph  v.  O'Riordan,  66,  649 
Rankin  v.  Buckman,  256 

v.  Ingwersen,  708 

v.  Schaeffer,  574 
Ransier  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

410 
Ransom  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62, 
426,  470 

v.  Cothran,  567 

v.  Halcott,  620 

v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co.,  758 
Rapho  v.  Moore.  254,  257,369,  397 
Rappelyea  v.  Hulse,  644,  645 
Rapson  v.  Cubitts,  169,  173 
Raridan  v.  Central  Iowa  R.  Co.,  741 
Rascher  v.  East  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co., 

485c 
Rasmussen  v.  Chicago,  etc.    R.  Co., 

209a 
Ratte  v.  Dawson.  705 
Rau  v.  Minn.  Valley  R.  Co.,  713 
Raub  v.  Los  Angeles  R.  Co.,  508 
Rauch  v.  Lloyd,  54,  72,  73,  92,  479 
Rauenstein   v.   N.   Y.,   Lackawanna, 

etc.  R  Co.,  416 
Rawlston  v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  207 
Rawson  v.  Dole,  616,  625 

v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  210,  504 
Rawstron  v.  Taylor,  734 
Ray  v.  Birdseve,  572 

v.  Jeffries,  221 

v.  Manchester,  350,  355 

v.  Sellers,  709a 
Raymond  v.  Keseberg,  743 

v.  Lowell,  352,  353,  375 

v.  Sheboygan,  384 

v.  State,  249 
Raynor  v.  Mitchell,  147 
Raynsford  v.  Phelps,  313 
Read  v.  Barker,  731 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  104 

v.  Edwards,  418,  524,  627,  628 

v.  Great  Eastern  R.  Co.,  140 

v.  Morse,  672 

v.  Nichols,  30,  667. 

v.  Spaulding,  39,  40 
Readdy  v.  Shamokin,  764 
Readhead  v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  11,  494, 

497 
Reading  v.  Reiner,  384 

R.  Co.  v.  Ritchie,  56,  108,  463, 
477 


Readman  v.  Conway,  60c,  710 
Reagan  v.  Casey,  225 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  202 
Ream  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  107 
Reardon  v.  N.  Y.  Card  Co.,  222 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co,  483,  485 

v.  St.  Louis  county,  256 

v.  Thompson,  705 
Reary  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
Reber  v.  Bond,  513a 

v.  Herring.  615 

v.  Tower,  197 
Receivers  v.  Moore,  2076 
Rector  v.  Pierce,  377 
Redington  v.  Pacific  Cable  Co. ,  541 
Reddington  v.  Phila.  Tr.  Co.,  520 
Reddon  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  230 
Redfield  v.  Oakland  Consol.  R.  Co., 

133.  771 
Redigan  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  Co., 

705 
Redington  v.  N.  Y.,  Ontario  R.  Co., 

202 
Redmond  v.  Delta  Lumber  Co.,  223 

v.  Staton,  591 
Rednor  v.  Lehigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  506 
Redpath  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  553 
Red  River  Line  v.  Cheatham,  185 

Mills  v.  Wright,  729 
Redwood  Cemetery  v.  Bondy,  334 
Reece  v.  Rigby,  569 
Reed  v.  Allegheny,  173,  298 

v.  Belfast,  258,  337,  338 

v.    Chicago,   etc.   R.  Co.,  478, 
759 

v.  Cornwall,  334,  336,  388 

v.  Covington,  etc.  Bridge  Co., 
521 

v.  Darling,  602 

v.  Deerfield,  377,  379 

v.  Howell  county,  256 

v.  Madison,  73,  370 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  676 

v.  New  York,  343 

v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  139 

v.  Northfield,  110,  376 

v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  665 

v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  751 

v.  Southern  Express  Co., 626 

v.  State,  728,  743 

v.  Stockmeyer,  186a 
Reedie  v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  167, 

168,  173,  699 
Reese  v.  Biddle,  180 

v.  Western   U.  Tel.   Co.,   531, 
756 
Reeside  v.  Walker,  249 
Reeves  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61, 
92,  93,  99,  418 

v.    Dubuque,  etc.    R.   Co.,  62, 
476 

v.  Larkin,  359 

v.  State  Bank,  582 


References]  TABLE     OF    CASES.         \flre  to  sections.         Cxlvii 


Regan  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  England  R. 

Co.,  765 
Reget  v.  Bell,  93 
Regina  v.  Bamber,  348 

v.  Birmingham,    etc.   R.    Co., 

337,  392 
v.  Bucknall,  708 
v.  Gloucestershire,  390 
v.  Heathcote,  310 
v.  Hornsea,  348 
v.  Lincoln,  392 
v.  London,  etc.  R.  Co.,  392 
v.  McFarlane,  250 
v.  McLeod,  250 
v.  Paul,  348 
v.  Ramsdeu,  343 
v.  Stephens.  145 
v.  Watts,  343 
Regner  v.  Glens  Falls,   etc.  R.  Co., 

493 
Reho  v.  Hogan,  550 
Rehler  v.  Western  N.  Y.,  etc.  R.  Co., 

702 
Reibel  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 
Reichla  v.  Gruensfelder,  209a 
Reid  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  525 
v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  410,  466 
Reifsnyder  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

458 
Reilly  v.  Hannibal,  etc.   R.  Co.,  72, 
158,  461 
v.  Racine,  336 
v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  485c 
Reining  v.  Buffalo,  254,  373 
Reinke  v.  Bentley,  146,  761 
Reiper  v.  Nichols,  666 
Reis  v.  Stratton,  640 
Reiser  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  192 
Reisert  v.  Williams,  219 
Reiss  v.  N.  Y.  Steam  Co.,  16,  28,  57, 

60 
Relle  v.  Western  TJ.  Tel.  Co  ,  543 
Relyea  v.   Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 

238 
Rembe  v.  N.  Y.,  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co., 

91 
Rembert  v.  So.  Carolina  R.  Co.,  415 
Remer  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  480, 

483 
Renick  v.  Orser.  625 
Renneker  v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co., 

519 
Renner  v.  Canfield.  686 
Renwick  v.  Morris.  359,  371 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  375, 
468 
Requa  v.  Rochester.  262,  281,  390 
Respublica  v.  Spar  hawk,  261 
Rettig  v.  Fifth  Ave.  Tr.  Co. ,  186,  233 
Revill  v.  Pettit.  303 
Rex  v.  Burks   :-,90.  394 
v.  Carlisle,  362 


Rex  v.  Cross,  362 

v.  Cumberworth,  335 

v.  Deron,  392 

v.  Ecclesfield,  337,  394 

v.  Edmonton,  334 

v.  Flecknow,  343 

v.  Hendon,  337,  394 

v.  Jones,  332.  362 

v.  Kerrison,  408 

v.  Landulph,  348 

v.  Leake,  334 

v.  Long,  612 

v.  Machynlleth,  394 

v.  Montague,  348 

v.  Pedley,  120,  708 

v.  Russell,  362 

v.  Severn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  333,  403 

v.  Simpson, 

v.  Stoughton,  332 

v.  Butchell,  608 

v.  Ward,  3G2 

v.  Watts,  738 

v.  West  Riding  of  York,  393 

v.  Whitnev,  390 

v.  Yorkshire.  337 
Rexford  v.  State,  251,  398 
Rexter  v.  Starin,  85 
Reynolds  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  196, 
207,  219a 

v.  Clarke,  644 

v.  Graves,  605,  606 

v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  470 

v.  Hanrahan,  644 

v.  Hindman,  62 

v.  Hussev,  632 

v.  Keokuk,  111 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  73a,  112, 
114 

v.  Niagara  Falls,  759 

v.  Orvis.  303 

v.  Van  Beuren,  702 
Rheola,  The.  141 
Rheinhard  v.  New  York,  296 
Rhinelander  v.  Lockport,  278 
Rhines  v.  Evans,  565 

v.  Royalton,  743 
Rhing  v.  Broadway,  etc.  R.  Co.,  96 
Rhoades  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451, 

475 
Rhode  Island,  The,  744 
Rhodes  v.  Cleveland,  274 

v.  Otis,  333 

v.  Roberts  686 
Ricard  v.  North  Penn.  R.  Co.,  128 
Rice  v.  Des  Moines,  742 

v.  Evansville,  272,  274 

v.  Flint.  274 

v.  Montpelier,  350,  351,  356,  393 

v.  Wilkins.  621 

etc.   Malting  Co.   v.  Paulson, 
19.-) 
Rich  v.  K.-shena  Imp.  Co.,  732 

v.  Minneapolis,  359 


cxlviii 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Rich  v.  Pierpont,  606 

v.  Rockland,  368 
Richard  v.  San ford,  644 
Richards  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Ce.,  480 

v.  Connell,  705 

v.  Enfield,  122,  346,  356,  370, 
379 

v.  New  York,  296,  334 

v.  Schlemener,  668 
Richardson  v.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  Co., 
190,  207 

v.  Cooper,  184 

v.  Crandall,  299 

v.  Great  Eastern  R.  Co.,  459 

v.  Kier,  16,  283,  729 

v.  Kimball,  244 

v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  89,  519 

v.  Milburn,  655,  664 

v.    N.   Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  132, 
463,  476,  478 

v.  Rovalton  Turn.  Co.,  380 

v.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co.,  412 

v,   Wilmington,    etc.    R.    Co., 
480 
Richart  v.  Scott,  701 
Richfield  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 

89 
Richland's  Iron  Co.  v.  Elkins,  194 
Richmond   v.  Chicago,  etc.    R.   Co., 
466 

v.  Long,  255,  266,  291 

v.  Mulholland,  376 

v.  Sacramento,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94, 
419,  456 

v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  520 
Richmond  Gas  Co.  v.  Baker,  107 
Richmond  Granite  Co.  v.  Bailey.  233 
Richmond  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Allison,  745, 
758 

v.  Brown,  99,  207b 

v.  Bivins,  207 

v.  Buice,  428 

v.  Burnett,  194a 

v.  Burnsed,  492 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  772 

v.  De  Butts,  207 

v.  Didzoneit,  99 

v.  Dudley,  196,  2076,  217 

v.  Elliott,  204,  683 

v.  Farmer,  20,  89 

v.  Finlev,  2076 

v.  Free,  2076 

v.  Freeman,  464a,  767 

v.  Garthright,  410 

v.  George,  188 

v.  Hammond,  769 

v.  Hissong,  2076 

v.  Howard,  93 

v.  Jefferson,  512 

v.  Jones,  2416 

v.  Medley.  678,  680 

v.  Mitchell,  209a 

v.  Moore,  410 


Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Morris,  8. 

v.  Noell,  419 

v.  Norment,  211a,  235,  238,  758 

v.  Risdon,  216 

v.  Rush,  2076 

v.  Pickleseimer,  520 

v.  Powers,  525 

v.  Scott,  509,  519 

v.  Smith,  509,  521 

v.  Thomason,  2076 

v.  Vance,  748 

v.  Watts,  480 

v.  Wsems,  195 

v.  Williams,  233,  233a,  2336 

v.  Worley,  209a 

v.  Yeamans,  99,  463,  474 
Richter  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  128 
Richstain  v.  Washington   Mills  Co., 

203 
Richter  v.  Harper,  679 
Ricker  v.  Freeman,  31 
Ricketts  v.  Birmingham  St.  R.  Co., 
502,  520 

v.  Chesapeake, etc. R.  Co.,  120a, 
502,  749 

v.    East  India  Docks   R.  Co., 
418,  449 

v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  755,  756 
Rickhoff  v.  Heckman,  187 
Riddle  v.  Bedford  county,  313 

v.  Delaware  county,  272 

v.  Proprietors  of   Locks,  etc., 
256,  337,  400 

v.  Westfield,  367 
Ridenhour  v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  73, 

508 
Rider  v.  Kinsey,  702 

v.  White',  628,  632,  639 
Rideout  v.  Knox,  702 
Ridley  v.  Tiplady.  569 
Riedel  v.  Moran,  168 
Rietman  v.  Stolte,  216 
Riest  v.  Goshen,  107 
Rigby  v.  Hewitt,  28 
Rigdon  v.  Allegheny  Lumber  Co., 

217 
Rigler  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  463, 

474 
Rigony  v.  Schuylkill  county,  256,  289 
Riggs  v.  Thatcher,  619 
Rigney  v.  Tacoma  Water  Co.,  729 
Riley  v.  Baxendale,  184,  203 

v.  Farnum,  644 

v.  Galveston  R.  Co.,  241c 

v.  Lissner,  708 

v.  O'Brien,  231 

v.  St.  Lake  Tr.  Co.,  73a,  485a 

v.  Simpson,  708 
Rima  v.  Rossie  Iron  Works,  213 
Rindge  v.  Coleraine,  115 

v.  Sargent,  729 
Ring  v.  Cohoes,  26,  246,  367,  740 
Ringland  v.  Toronto,  363 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [>>v  to  sections. 


cxlix 


Rio  Grande  Western   H.  Co.  v.  Ru- 

benstein,  516,  760 
Riordan  v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  112 
Ripley  v.  Freeholders,  etc.,  256,  395 
Rippe  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  435 
Ritchey  v.  West,  604,  606,  607 
Ritchie  v.  Bowsfield,  172 

v.  Waller,  147 
Rittenhouse  v.  Independent  Tel.  Co., 

542,  754,  755 
Ritz  v.  Austin,  127,  767 
River  Wear  Co.  v.  Adamson,  16 
Rivers  v.  Augusta,  262 
Roach  v.  Ogdensburg,  271,  369 

v.  St.  Joseph,  etc.  R.  Co.,  464 

v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60a 
Roanoke  v.  Harrison,  375 

Nat.  Bank  v.  Hanibrick,  581 
Robb  v.  Connellsville,  375 
Robbins  v.  Chicago,    175,    176,  289, 
365,  703 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  475,  477 

v.  Jones,  343,  709 

v.  Mount,  723.  724 

v.  Springfield  R.  Co.,  90,  375, 
385c,  485c 
Robel  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54 
Roberson  v.  Kirby,  671 
Robert  v.  Alexander,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  463 
Roberton  v.  New  York,  97 
Roberts  v.  Boston,  323 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 

v.  Detroit,  289 

v.  Great  Western  R.  Co. ,  434 

v.  Johnson,  122,  508,  514 

v.  Quincy,  etc.  R.  Co..  436 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  752 

v.  Smith,  187 

v.  Sterling,  574 
Robertson   v.    Boston,   etc.    R.    Co., 
114,  225 

v.  Cornelson,  218 

v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  523 

v.  Miller.  730 

v.  N.  Y.  &ErieR.  Co.,  61 

v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  467 

v.  Wooley,  702 
Robeson  v.  French,  104 
Robinson  v.  Brennan,  622 

v.  Canadian  Pac.  R.  Co.,  140 

v.  Chamberlain,  341 

v.  Chamberlain,  118,  281,  313, 
325 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  455 

v.  Cone.  73.  73a,  78,  84 

v.  Evansville,  265 

v.  Fetterman,  657 

v.  Fitchburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57, 
107,  192 

v.  Fowler,  338 

v.  Gell,  591 

v.  Grand  Trunk  R.    Co.,  425, 
451a 


Robinson  v.  Greenville,  262 

v.  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  209a 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,   56, 

180 
v.  Marino,  628,  630 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  60,  66 
v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co.,  359,  365 
v.  Northampton  R.  Co.,  508 
v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73 
v.  People,  624 
v.  Pioche,  93 
v.  Rohr,  340 
v.  Shanks,  733,  750 
v.  Simpson,  758,  646 
v.  Ward,  753 
v.  Webb.  167,  173 
v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108 
v.  Western    Pac.    R.    Co.,    92, 

113,  353.  471 
v.  West  Virginia,  etc.  R.  Co., 

2076 
v.  Wilmington,  369,  377 
Roblee  v.  Indian  Lake,  356 
Roblin  v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  192, 

207,  222 
Robostelli  v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc. 

R.  Co..  460.  488 
Robson  v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  509 
Rochereau  v.  Jones,  602 
Rochester  v.  Campbell,  13,  13a,  343, 
384 
v.  Montgomerv,  24a.  301,  343, 

384 
White  Lead  Co.  v.  Rochester, 
14,  47,  274,  278 
Rockford  v.  Hildebrand,  53,  289,  353, 
367 
v.  Hollenbeck,  65 
Rockford,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Byarn,  476 
v.  Connell,  423,  436 
v.  Delanev.  73 
v.  Irish,  428 
v.  Lvnch,  440 
v.  Rafferty.  419 
v.  Rogers,  678 
Rockingham  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bosher,  115 
Rockwell  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  417 
Roden  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  470 
Roddy  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  115, 

217 
Roderick  v.  Whitson,  303 
Rodgers  v.  Central  Pacific  R.  Co.,  39, 
189 
v.  Lees,  73 
Rodman  v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  233, 

233a 
Rodney  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194, 

197 
Rodrian  v.  N.  Y. ,  New  Haven,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  476 
Roe  v.  Birkenhead  R.  Co.,  145 
v.  Kansas  City,  353 
v.  New  York,  353 


cl 


References]  TABLE    OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


Roeck  v.  Newark.  '2(52 
Roehrs  v.  Remhoff,  626 
Roesner  v.  Hermann,  ITS 
Rogahn  v.  Mcxnv  Mfg.  Co..  151 
Rogers  v.  Atlantic  City  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Florence  R.  Co.,  166,  167 

v.    Kennebec    Steamboat   Co., 
490,  505 

v.  Leyden,  188,  208,  215 

v.  Ludlow  Mfg.  Co.,  203a,  226, 
22S 

v.  Newburyport,  421 

v.  N.  Y.  &  Texas  Land  Co.,  243 

v.  Overton,  109,  113 

v.  People,  256 

v.  Phelps,  243 

v.  Rhymney  R.  Co.,  464,  471 

v.  Rogers,  631 

v.  Shirley,  368,  373 

v.  Smith,  115 

v.  Taylor,  701 

v.  The  St.  Charles,  61 

V.  Mulliner,  303 

w  Western  U.  Tel.    Co.,   531, 
538 

etc.  Works  v.  Hand,  234 
Rob  bach  v.  Par.  R.  Co.,  180 
Rohrbougli  v.  Barbour  County  Court, 

346 
Rolf  v.  Greenville.  363 
Rolipillon  v.  Abbott,  645 
Rolke  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  674 
Rollo  v.  Andes  Ins.  Co.,  249 
Rolseth  v.  Smith,  114 
Rome  v.  Dodd,  93,  289 
Rome,  etc.  Const.  Co    v.    Dempsey, 

207b 
Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnett,  484 

v.  Chasteen,   120a,  168 
Romeo  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  477 
Romick  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  471 
Romney  Marsh  v.  Trinity  House,  18, 

39.  738 
Romona  Stone  Co.  v.  Phillips,  194a, 

233a 
Rompillon  v.  Abbott,  35 
Roney  v.  Aldrich,  664,  702 

v.  Ward,  628 
Ronn  v.  Des  Moines,  369 
Rood  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co.,  11,  119, 

412,  672 
Roodhouse  v.  Christian,  334a,  367 
Roof  v.  Railroad  Co.,  57.  108 
Rooks  v.   Houston  St.  R.    Co.,  480, 

485a,  485c,  653 
Rooney  v.  Carson,  185 

v.  Randolph,  338 

v.   Sewell,    etc.    Cordage  Co., 
195,  203 
Root  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  503, 
544 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  Car  Co.,  526 

v.  Wagner,  618 


Rose  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  202 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  676 
v.  Des  Moines  Valley  R.   Co., 

140,  505 
v.  King,  702a 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  761a 
v.  Miles,  371 

v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  509 
v.  Stevens,  etc.  Tranp.  Co.,  60 
v.  U.  S.  Tel.  Co.,  543 
Roseback  v.  ^Etna  Mills,  2416 
Rosedale  v.  Golding,  334a 
Roseman  v.  Carolina  Cent.  R.  Co., 

493 
Rosenbaum  v.  Newbern,  262,  291 

v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co.,  197 
Rosenberg  v.  Des  Moines,  367 

v.  Durfree,  73,  91 
Rosenfield  v   Arrol,  723 

v.  Newman,  723 
Rosenhain  v.  Galligan,  361 
Rosenkranz  v.  Lindell  R.  Co.,  760 
Rosenthal  v.  Davenport,  591 
Rosevear  v.  Osceola  Mills,  369 
Rosevvell  v.  Prior,  120 
Rosiere  v.  Sawkins,  246 
Ross  v.  Boston  &  Worcester  R.  Co., 
680 
v.  Campbell,  618 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  191 
v.  Fedden,  723 
v.  lona,  346 
v.  Madison,  299 
v.  Pearson  Cordage  Co.,  223 
v.  Reed,  317 
v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99 
v.  Walker,  195 
Rossire  v.  Boston,  291 
Rost  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  673,  674, 

678 
Roth  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  485a 

v.  Northern  Pac.   Lumber  Co., 

219a 
v.  Union  Depot  Co.,  73,  481 
Rothe  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Rothenberger  v.  Northwestern  Mill- 
ing Co..  215 
Rothstein  v.  Penna.  R.  Co.,  520 
Rott  v.  Forty-second  St.  Ferry  Co., 

492a 
Roughan  v.  Boston,  etc.   Block  Co., 

195 
Roul  v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.,, 

186 
Roulston  v.  Clark,  61,  97,  705,  718 
Rounds  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  150, 
154 
v.  Mumford.  283 
Rourke  v.  White  Moss  Colliery  Co., 

162 
Rouse  v.  Harry.  241c 
v.  Hornsby,  241c 
v.  Somerville,  358 


References']  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


cli 


Eoux  v.  Blodgett  Co.,  204,  215 
Rowe  v.  Lent,  614 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  114 

v.  Portsmouth,  287,  367 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  735 
Rowell  v.  Lowell,  122,  346,  356,  378 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  62 

v.  Stamford  R.  Co.,  355 

v.  Williams,  358 
Rowen  v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  64,  467 
Rowland  v.  Baird,  702 

v.  Cannon,  65 

v.  Murphy,  701 
Rowning  v.  Goodchild,  419,  321 
Rowson  v.  Earle,  568 
Rozell  v.  Andrews,  334 
Rozelle  v.  Rose,  241 
Ruck  v.  Williams,  328 
Rucker  v  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. ,  523 

v.  Smoke  749 
Ruddiman  v.  Smith,  147 
Ruddock  v.  Lowe,  607 
Rudolphe  v.  New  Orleans,  266 
Rudy  v.  Rio  Grande  W.  R.  Co.,  493 
Ruffner  v.  Cincinnati,  R.  Co.,  58,  676 
Ruggles  v.  Bucknor,  317 

v.  Nevada,  57,  369 
Ruland  v.  South  Newmarket,  114 
Rummell  v.  Dilworth,  219,  219a 
Rumpel  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  479 
Rumsey  v  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  221 

v.  Nelson,  645 
Runnels  v.  Bullen,  701 
Runyan  v.  Patterson,  657 
Runyon  v.  Central  R.  Co.  61 
Rupard  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.   R.  Co., 

463 
Rusch  v.  Davenport,  393,  394 
Rush  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  186 
Rusher  v.  Dallas,  291 
Rushville  v.  Adams,  355 

v.  Poe,  107 
Russ  v.  Wabash   etc.  R.  Co.,  233 

v.  War  Eagle,  488 
Russell  v.  Beebe.  317 

v.  Carolina   Cent.  R.  Co.,  56, 
482 

v.  Columbia,  358,  368 

v.  Cone.  634 

v.  Hanley,  455 

v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  180, 
241 

v.  Men  of  Devon,  256 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  214 

v.  Monroe,  377 

v.  New  York,  295 

v.  Palmer,  559,  572,  753 

v.  Reagan,  668,  669 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2076 

v.  Roberts.  746,  751 

v.  Scott.  731 

v.  Stewart,  572 


Russell  v.  Tillotson,  209a 
v.  Tomlinson,  638 
v.  Western   U.    Tel.    Co.,    543, 
554,  756 
Rust  v.  Larue,  557 

v.  Low,  655,  658 
Ruter  v.  Floy,  64 
Rutherford  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

185 
Rutledge  v.    Missouri   Pac.    R.   Co., 

185,  202,  241 
Ryall  v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co. ,  482 

v.  Kennedy,  690 
Ryall  v.  Mechanics'  Mills,  241b 
Ryan  v.  Bagalev,  230 
v.  Bristol*.  107 
v.  Cumberland  Iron  Co.,  61 
v.  Cumberland  V.  R.  Co.,  180, 

226,  235,  2-69 
v.  Fowler,  189,  194,  197,  222 
v.  Gross,  676. 
v.  Los    Angeles    Storage   Co., 

219a,  223.  233 
v.  Louisville,  etc.   R.  Co.,  107, 

112 
v.  McCully.  180 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  506 
v.  Manufacturers',   etc.    Bank, 

587 
v.  N.  Y.   Cent.  R.  Co.,  17,  30, 

55,  195,  666,  668,  739 
v.  Porter  Mfg.  Co.,  217 
v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  660 
v.  Tar  box.  203 
v.  Wilson.  708 
Rychlicki  v.  St.  Louis,  274 
Ryder  v.  Womb  well,  56 
Ryerson  v.  Abington,  53 
Rylands  v.  Fletcher,  666,  701a 

Sabin  v.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co.,  413 
Sabine,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ewing,  217 

v.  Hanks,  457 

v.  Smith,  750 
Sack  v   Dolese,  195 
Sackett  Street,  Matter  of,  332 
Sacrider  v.  Brown,  597 
Sadler  v.  Henlock.  165 
Sadowski  v.  Michigan  Car  Co.,  197, 

204 
Safford  v.  Drew.  135,  137,  766 

v.  Green  Island,  363 
Sage  v.  Dickinson,  619 
Sagers  v.  Nuckolls.  190 
Saginaw  R.  Co.  v.  Bonn,  73 
Sahleaard  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co..  508,520 
Sahhen  v.  Bank  of  Lonoke.  581,  587a 
St.  Anthony's  Falls  v.  Eastman,  113 
St.  Clair  Nail  Co.  v.  Smith,  215 

St.  R.  Co.  v.  Eadie,  66 
St.  John  v.  New  York,  744 
St.  Johns,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ransom,  678 

v.  Shalley,  165 


clii 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.       [are  to  sections. 


St.  Johnsburv,  etc.    R.  Co.  v.  Hunt, 

140 
St.  Joseph  v.  McCabe,  310 

v.  Union  R.  Co.,  384 
St.  Joseph,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Chase,  673, 
679 

v.  Grover,  419 

v.  Hedges,  33,  500,  516,  519 
St.  Louis  v.  Conn.  Mutual  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  384 

v.  Gurno,  283 
St.  Louis  Brick  Co.  v.  Kenyon,  207, 

209a 
St.  Louis   Bridge  Co.   v.  Miller,  31, 

376,  397 
St.  Louis,  etc.  Packet  Co.  v.  Keokuk 

Bridge  Co.,  395 
St.  Louis,  etc  R.  Co.  v.  Amos,  482 

v.  Atchison,  520 

v.  Basham,  432 

v.  Bell,  73,  410 

v.  Biggs,  115,  752 

v.  Blovd,  207 

v.  Box,  473 

v.  Britz,  238,  241 

v.  Byas,  414 

v.  Cantrell,  523 

v.  Christian,  481a 

v.  Crosnoe,  99 

v.  Curl,  120a 

v.  Davis.  206,  209,  493,  772 

v.  Dingman,  484 

v.  Dobbins,  761 

v.  Doyle,  742 

v.  Dunn,  463 

v.  Eggmann,  194 

v.  Ferguson,  426 

v.  Finley,  510 

v.  Fire  Ass'n,  679 

v.  French,  207a 

v.  Gilham,  672 

v.  Goolsby,  633 

v.  Griffith,  490 

v.  Hagan.  432 

v.  Hardy,  493 

v.  Harper,  233 

v.  Harris.  412 

v.  Hauks,  418 

v.  Hecht,  679 

v.  Hendricks.  151 

v.  Herrin,  483 

t.  Higgins,  194a 

v.  Holman.  1856 

v.  Hopkins,  702 

v.  Huffman.  493 

v.  Irwin,  198 

v.  Jagerman,  184 

v.  Johnston.  771 

v.  Tones,  675 

v.  Kelton.  215 

v.  Knott,  169 

v.  Lemon,  209a,  233a 

v.  Lewis,  426,  461 


St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Linder,  43& 

v.  Lyman,  751 

v.  McClain,  1«8 

v.  McCormick,  132 

v.  Mackie,  493 

v.  Maddry,  94,  519,  765,  771 

v.  Marker,  216 

v.  Mathias,  13,  468 

v.  Mitchell,  497,  516 

v.  Monday,  483,  484 

v.  Morgart,,  61,  194a,  209a,  241 

v.  Murray,  89 

v.  Needham,  195,  233a,  410,  773 

v.  Odum.  463 

v.  Payne,  451 

v.  Person,  508 

v  Reagan,  489 

v.  Rice,  2076,513a,  523 

v.  Richardson,  678 

v.  Robbins,  194,  1 97 

v.  Rosenberry,  91,  520 

v.  Schumacher,  207 

v.  Shackelford,  233,  235 

v.  Sharp,  448 

v.  Smuck,  505 

v.  Snaveley,  676 

v.  Stapp,  436 

v.  Strotz,  676 

v.  Sweet.  51,  495,  771,  775 

v.  Tavlor,  433 

v.  Tippett,  478 

v.  Todd,  20,  419,  437,  451a 

v.  Torrev,  232 

v.  Triplett,  185a,  202 

v.  Valirius,  73 

v.  Vincent,  432 

v.  Walbrink,  409,  412 

v.  Washburn,  487 

v.  Weaver,  60c,   108,  189,  233, 
238 

v.  Welch,  239 

v.  Whittle,  525 

v.  Willis,  168 

v.  Yarborough.  751 

v.  Yocum,  133 

v.  Yon  ley,  164,  668 
St.  Louis  Press  Brick  Co.  v.  Kenyon, 

222 
St.  Nicholas  Bank  v.  State  Nat.  Bank, 

580« 
St.  Paul  v.  Kuby,  74,  375 

v.  Sietz,  166,  176 
St.  Paul.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Duluth,  274 
St.  Peter  v.  Denison,  325,  701a 
Sala  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  482 
Saldana  v.    Galveston,  etc.  R.   Co., 

482,  483 
Salem  v.  Goller,  64 

v.  Harvey,  769 
Salem  Bank  v.  Gloucester  Bank,  739 
Salem  Stone  Co.  v.  Griffin,  203 

v.  Hobbs,  217 

v.  O'Brien,  207 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


Saleui  Stone  Co.  v.  Tepps,  217 
Sales  v.  Western  Stage  Co.,  51,  495, 

514 
Salina  v.  Trosper,  761 
Salisbury   v.    Hirchenroder,  39,  343, 
350 

v.  Gourgas,  569 
Salladay  v.  Dodgeville,  741 
Salmon  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  680 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  472 
Salter  v.  Utica,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89,  114, 

475,  476,  747 
Saltonstall  v.  Stockton,  519 
Saltus  v.  Pruyn,  179 
Salzman  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  743 
Saramon  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
207 

v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co.,  241 
Sample  v.  Vicksburg,  274 
Samples  v.  Atlanta,  376 
Sampson  v.  Goochland,  334 

v.  Hoddinott,  729 
Samuel  v.  Commonwealth,  618 
Samuels  v.  Richmond,   etc.  R.  Co., 

509,  748 
Samuelson  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  Mining 

Co.,  144,  166 
Samyn  v.  McCloskey,  171 
San  Antonio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams, 
194,  492 

v.  Bennett,  108,  775 

v.  Bowles,  13,  241c 

v.  Lynch,  513a 

v.  McDonald   213 

v.  Mechler,  463,  485c 

v.  Petersen,  484 

v.  Reynolds,  241c 

v.  Wallace,  207b 
Sanborn  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  464 

v.  Madera,  etc.  R.  Co.,  204,  214 
Sanders  v.    Etiwan   Phosphate  Co., 
189 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  747 

v.  Reed,  119 

v.  Reister,  108.  343,  703 

v.  Teape,  626,  629 
Sanderson  v.  Frazier,  108,  519 
Sandford  v.  Clarke,  120 
Sandham  v.  Chicago,  etc   R.  Co.,  46 
Sandifer  v.  Lynn,  654 
Sandwicli  v.  Dolan,  95,  376 

v.  Nolan,  743 
Sanford  v.  Augusta,  258,  338 

v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  61,  64, 
151,  493 

v.  Standard  Oil  Co.    224 
Sangamon  Coal  Co.  v.  Wiggerhaus, 
206.  717 

etc.  Co    v.  Young.  633 
Sappenfield  v.  Main  St.  R.  Co.,  195 
Sarch  v.  Blackburn,  639 
Sargent  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  506 

v.  Stark,  708 


Sather  v.  Ness,  55 
Satterfield  v.  Rowan,  734 
Satterlee  v.  San  Francisco,  313 
Satterly  v.  Morgan,  241 
Sauerborn  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 

463 
Saulsbury  v.  Ithaca,  262,  289,   334, 

334a,  335,  369 
Saunders  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  516 

v.  Darling,  624 

v.  Gun  Plains,  392 

v.  Newman,  731 

v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  492,  505 
Saussy  v.  South  Florida  R.  Co.,  671 
Sautter  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  31, 

742,  769,  775 
Savacool  v.  Boughton,  303 
Savage  v.  Bangor,  351 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425 

v.  Corn  Exchange  Ins.  Co.,  92 
Savannah  v.  Cullins,  285 

v.  Spears,  287 

v.  Waldner,  354 

v.  Welson,  371 
Savannah,  etc.  Canal  Co.  v.  Bour- 
quin,  402,  731,  743 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Beasley,  485c 

v.  Bryan,  485c,  513 

v.  Buford,  735 

v.  Day,  1856,  199 

v.  Flannigan,  190,  467,  773 

v.  Folks,  103,  2076 

v.  McConnell.  432 

v.  McLeod,  760 

v.  Meadors,  480 

v.  Phillips,  58,  165 

v.  Rice,  419 

v.  Shearer,  767 

v.  Slater,  458 

v.  Smith,  73a 

v.  Stewart,  480 

v.  Watts,  520 
Savings  Bank  v.  Ward,  8,  117,  574 
Savoy  v.  Chapman,  573 
Sawyer  v.  Corse,  118,  289,  325 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  16,  47, 
494 

v.  McGillicuddy,  710 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8 

v.  Newburyport,  272 

v.  North  field,  358 

v.  Oakman,  104 

v.  Perry,  139 

v.  Rutland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  225 

v.  Sauer,  102,  749 

v.  Vermont,  etc.  R.  Co.,  422 
Saxton  v.  Bacon,  55,  662,  657,  664 

v.  Hawksworth,  193 

v.  St.  Joseph,  274 
Savior  v.  Montesano,  289,  368 
Sayward  v.  Carlson,  232,  239 
Scaggs  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
466 


d 


LV 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        \flre  to  sections. 


Scales  v.  Cliattalioochee  county,  256 
Scammon  v.  Chicago,  298 
Scanlon  v.  Boston,  358 

v.  Tonny,  509 
Scanlon  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  201, 

209a 
v.  Watertovvn,  376 
Scannal  v.  Cambridge,  346 
Scarff  v.  Metcalf ,  233 
Schaabs  v.  Woodburn,  654 
Schacherl  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  520 
Schaefer  v.  Osterbrink,  122,  160 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.   R.  Co.,  489, 

520 
Scbaefert   v.    Chicago,  etc.    R.   Co., 

426,  476 
Schaeffer  v.  Jackson,  346 
Schaefler  v.  Sandusky,  376 
Schafer  v.  New  York,  334 
Scliaible  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

207,  239 
Schall  v.  Cole,  197 
Schanda  v.  Sulsberger,  710 
Scharenbroich    v.    St.    Cloud    Fiber 

Co.,  185 
Schattner  v.  Kansas  City,  262,  274 
Schatz  v.  Pfiel,  333 
Schaub  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  773 
Schaum  v.  Equitable  Gas.  Co. ,  697 
Scheffer  v.  Railroad  Co.,  26,  30 

v.  Washington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65, 

742 
Scheffler  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

484 
Scheiber  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  523 
Schell  v.  Plumb,  775 

v.  Second  Nat.  Bank,  702 
Schenck  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  422 
Schepers  v.  Union  Depot  R.  Co.,  490, 

520 
Scherer  v.  Holly  Mfg.  Co.,  233a 
Schermerhorn  v.    Metropolitan  Gas 

Co.,  160,  695 
Scheunke  v.  Pine  River,  346,  356,  369 
Schexnaydre  v.  Texas,  etc.    R.  Co., 

484 
Schienfeldt  v.  Norris.  49 
Schierhold  v.  North  Beach,  73a,  74 
Schiffmacher  v.  Kircher,  365 
Schild  v.  Central  Park,  etc.  R.   Co., 

408 
Schilling  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Schillinger  v.  Verona,  60a 
Schimpf  v.  Sliter,  653 
Schindlebeck  v.  Moon,  708,  713 
Schindler  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

49,  78,  463,  464 
Schlacker   v.  Ashland   Iron   Mining 

Co.,  186,  215 
Schlaff  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  198 
Schlenckner  v.  Risley,  313 
Schlereth  v.   Missouri    Pac.    R.   Co., 

238.  476,48! 


Schlichter  v.  Phillipy,  274 
Schlichting  v.  Wintgen,  140 
Schlimgen   v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

463,  475 
Schlitz  v.  Pabst  Brewing  Co. ,  215 
Schmeer  v.  Syracuse  Gas  Co.,  693, 

696 
Schmid  v.  Humphrey,  104 
Schmidt  v.  Adams,  146 
v.  Bauer,  704 
v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  466, 

473,  475 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65 
v.  Cook,  61,  705,  710 
v.  Harkness,  649 
v.  Kansas  Distilling  Co.,  73 
v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73, 

761a 
v.  Phila.  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 
v.  Steinway,  etc.   R.  Co.,  485a 
Schmitz  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  461, 

761 
Schmolze  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 
Schuachne  v.  Barnett,  702 
Schneekloth  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

410,  451a 
Schneider  v.   Chicago,   etc.   R.   Co., 
241c 
v.  Second  Ave  R.  Co.,  89,  485c, 
516 
Schneir  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57 

v.  Citizens'  Tr.  Co.,  73a 
Schoenwald    v.    Metropol.    Savings 

Bank,  588 
Schofield  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90, 

476 
Schomer  v.  Rochester,  334a 
Schonhoff  v.  Jackson  R.  Co.,  375 
School  District  v.  Fuess,  298 
Schopman  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  488, 

502 
Schreiber  v.  Twenty-third  St.  R.  Co., 

508 
Schroeder  v.  Baraboo,  274 

v.  Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co.,  185a, 

213,  233 
v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  230 
Schroyer  v.  Lynch,  319,  321 
Schrubble  v.  Connell,  144 
Schubert  v.  Clark,  117 
Schulman   v.  Houston,   etc.  R.  Co., 

485a 
Schulte  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 

485a 
Schultz  v.  Bower,  701 
v.  Bvers,  701 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85,  92, 

99,  203,  207a  760 

v.  Milwaukee,  262 

v.  Second  Ave  R.  Co.,  508 

v.  Third  Ave  R.  Co.,  150,  154, 

513 

Shultze  v.  Missouri    Pac.  R.  Co.,  521 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         {are  to  sections. 


civ 


Schulz  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  463 
v.  Johnson,  217 
v.  Rohe,  194,  194a,  207 
Schum  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  478 
Schuinaker    v.  St.    Paul,  etc.  R.  Co., 

186 
Schuylkill  Nav.  Co.  v.  Farr,  750 

v.  McDonough,  732 
Sch wander  v.  Birge,  702a 
Schwanzer  v.  Brooklyn   R.  Co.,  742, 

762 
Schwartz  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  Tel.  Co., 534 
v.  Cornell,  209a 
v.  Cilinore,   47,  702 
Sch  weir  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  475, 

483 
Schwingschlegel  v.  Monroe  City,  742 
Scidmore  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

201 
Sciolina  v.  Erie    Preserving  Co.,  219 
Scoggs  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 

426 
Scott  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  135 

v.  Central  Park.  etc.  R.  Co.,  519 

v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  493 

v.  Derby  Coal  Co.,  209a 

v.  Des  Moines,  285 

v.  Dublin,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99 

v.  Grover,  657 

v.  Hunter,  28,  39,  55 

v.  London  Docks  Co.,  59,    60, 

158 
v.  Manchester,  286 
v.  Montgomery,  356,  743 
v.  Nat.  Bank  of  Chester  Valley, 

24,  588,  589 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  476 
v.  Shepherd,  37,  688 
v.  Simons,  708,  709 
v.  Sweeney,  233 
v.  United  States,  322 
v.  Waithman,  624 
v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co., 432 
v.  Wilson,  333 
v.  Yazoo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  427 
Scotti  v.  Behsmann,  645 
Scottowe  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  506 
Scoville  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61, 
99 
v.  Salt  Lake  City,  363 
Scranton  v.  Booth,  179 

v.  Catterson,  334,  367,  368 
v.  Hill,  352 
Scribner  v.  Kelley,  626,  628,  629 
Scudder  v.  Crossan,  614 
Scullin  v.  Dolan,  120,  343 
Sculley  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,   etc.  R. 

Co..  520 
Schuylkill  Nav.  Co.  v.  McDonough, 

387.  399 
Seaboard  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Woodson,  195, 
221,  760 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Joyner,  483 


Scabrook  v.  Hecker,  702 
Seaman  v.  Koehler,  66 

v.  New  York,  285,  726 

v.  Patten,  310 
Seare  v.  Prentice,  614 
Searcy  v.  Holmes  47 
Searing  v.  Saratoga,  287 
Searle  v.  Kanawha,  etc.  R.  Co.,  51, 
495,  769,  771 

v.  Lindsav,  180,  204 

v.  Parke,  148 
Searles  v.  Ladd,  628 

v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  16, 26,  56, 
57,  676 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99, 
419,  451a 
Sears  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Dennis,  89 

v.  Seattle  R.  Co.,  51,495,  500 
Seats  v.  Georgia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108 
Seaver  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  Co.,  184, 

189,  239 
Seckinger  v.  Philibert  Co.,  194 
Sebert  v.  Alpena,  338,  369 
Second  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cummings,  580 
Secord  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  209a 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61,  95, 
760 
Seddon  v.  Bickley,  497 
Sedgwick  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  Co., 

2076 
Seefield  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56, 

478 
Seeley  v.  Crane,  557 

v.  Littlefield,  351,  363 

v.   N.    Y.   Cent.   R.   Co.,   114, 
666 

v.  Peters,  419 
Seese  v.  Northern  Pac.   R.  Co.,  207b 
Seely  v.  Peters,  655,  656 
Seger  v.  Barkhamsted,  761 
Seibert  v.  Erie  R.  Co. ,  485 

v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  448 
Seifert  v.    Brooklyn,   255,   262,  271, 

275,  287 
Seiejel  v.  Eisen,  654 
Seiler  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  543 
Selden  v.  Delaware,  etc.   Canal  Co., 

359 
Selders  v.  Kansas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  424 
Seley  v.  So.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  197 
Selfridge  v.  Lithgow,  619 
Selinas  v.  Vermont  Agr.  Soc,  706 
Sell  v.  Reitz  Lumber  Co.,  719 
Sellick  v.  Langdon,  28 
Selma.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lacy,  131 

v.  Perkins,  256,  289 
Selz  v.  Collins,  587a 
Seneca  Falls  v.  Zalinski,  384 
Senestre  v.  New  York,  356 
Senhenn  v.  Evansville,  346,  362 
Senior  v.  Ward.  209a 
Senn  v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  133 


clvi 


References}        TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[are  to  sections. 


Sentman  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.   Co., 

735 
Sepert  v.  Alpena,  286 
Serwe  v.  No.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  761a 
Saska  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  676 
Sessengut  v.  Posey,  702 
Sessions  v.  Newport,  350 
Settle  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194a, 

197,  215 
Settoon  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co,,  484 
Severin  v.  Eddv,  365 
Severy  v.  Nickerson,  8,  97,  705 
Sevier  v.    Vicksburg,    etc.    R.    Co., 

510 
Sewall's  Falls  Bridge  v.  Fisk,  744 
Seward  v.  Milford,  92,  356 
Sewell  v.  Cohoes,  334,  334a,  335 

v.  Moore,  702a 

v.  Webster,  104 
Sexton  v.  Nervers,  622 

v.  Turner,  207 

v.  Zett,  359 
Seybolt  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  57,  58,  59,  225,  492,  516 
Seymour  v.  Cagger,  566 

v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  104,  523 

v.  Cummins,  272,  371 

v.  Greenwood,  145,  151 

v.  Maddox,  222 

v.  Salamanca,  334,  335 
Shaber  v.   St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62, 

417,  477,  485,  762 
Shackford  v.  Goodwin,  624 
Shackleford  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

464,  470 
Shackelton  v.  Manistee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

209a 
Shadd  v.    Georgia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  230, 

233,  233a 
Shadier  v.  Blair  county,  257 
Shadwell  v.  Hutchinson,  119 
Shaffer  v.  Haish,  185 

v.  Riseley,  625 
Shafter  v.  Evans,  53 
Shally  v.  Danbury,  etc.  R.  Co.,  373 
Shankenbury  v . Metropolitan  R.  Co., 

89 
Shannon  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Tama  City,  334a 
Shanny  v.  Androscoggin  Mills,  204, 

226 
Sharp  v.  Evergreen,  338,  381 

v.  Grey,  45,  51,  497 

v.  Hawker,  561 

v.  Kansas  City  Cable  R.  Co., 
516 

v.  Powell,  28 
Sharrer  v.  Pay  son,  93,  488 
Sharrod  v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  460 
Shartle  v.  Minneapolis,  289,  374,  742 
Shattuck  v.  Rand,  719a 
Shaw  v.  Boston  &  Worcester  R.  Co., 
60a,  463,  762 


Shaw  v.  Craft,  632 

v.  Crocker,  283 

v.  Etheridge,  735 

v.  Jewett,  477 

v.  Kidder,  573 

v.  Madrid,  345 

v.  New  York,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410 

v.  Philadelphia,  367 

v.  Reed,  148,  172 

v.  Sheldon,  185,  209,  215,  216 

v.  Sun  Prairie,  367,  369 

v.  Waterbury,  373 
Shawbut  v.  St.   Paul,   etc.    R.   Co., 

334a 
Shawhan  v.  Clarke,  18 
Shawneetown  v.  Mason,  367 
Shea  v.  Potrero,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92,  762 

v.  Reems,  142,  147,  160 

v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  485,  485c 

v.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  151 

v.  Wellington,  195,  241b 
Sheates  v.  Rome.  375 
Sheboygan  Lumber  Co.  v.  Delta  Tr. 

Co.,  672 
Sheedy  v.  Chicago  etc.  R.  Co.,  194a 
Sheehan  v.  Edgar,  758 

v.  Flynn,  735 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co., 

v.   Philadelphia,  etc. 
472,  475 
Sheehy  v.  Burger,  654 

v.  Graves,  622 

v.  Kansas  City,  274 
Sheel  v.  Appleton,  369 
Sheer  v.  Fisher,  713 
Sheerman  v.   Toronto,   etc. 

61 

Sheets  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2076, 
209,  241 

v.  Connolly  R.  Co.,  73a 

v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  493 
Sheff  v.  Huntington,  108,  114 
Sheffer  v.  Railroad  Co.,  94 
Sheffield  v.  Central  Union  Tel.  Co., 
359 

v.  Harris,  241  &   299 

v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Sheffler  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

124 
Shelby  v.  Clagett,  289,  368,  369 
Shelby  county  v.  Blair,  374 

v.  Duprez,  257 
Shelbvville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  v.  Lewark, 

744 
Shelbourne  v.  Yuba  county,  266 
Sheldon  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  428 

v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54 

v.  Hudson  R.  Co.,  58,  672,  675 

v.  Skinner,  635 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  359 
Shellabarger  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

434 
Shelley  v.  Austin,  73a,  367 


202 

R.   Co., 


R.  Co., 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


clvii 


Shenandoah  Val.   R.  Co.  v.  Lucado, 

2076 
Shepard  v.    Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62, 
437,  441.  451a,  452 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  748 
v.  Creamer,  701a 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  241d 
v.  Pulaski  county,  256 
Shepardson  v   Colerain,  351 
Shepherd  v.  Chelsea,  122,  346,  356 

v.  Hees,  663,  664 

v.  Lincoln.  313 

v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  506 
Shepp  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  675 
Sherbourne  v.  Yuba  county,  256 
Sherfey  v.  Bartley,  97,  629,  639 
Sheridan  v.  Bigelow,  28 

v.  Bean,  635 

v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  66,  73a 

v.  Charlick,  147 

v.  Foley,  60 

v.  Krupp,  709 

v.  Salem,  289 
Sherlev  v.  Billings,  513 
Sherlock  v.  Ailing,  51,  494,  495 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  731 
Sherly  v.  Billings,  154 
Sherman  v.  Anderson,  449 

v.  Charlestown,  323 

v.  Fall  River  Iron  Co.,   61,  95, 
696.  731.  741.  745,  758 

v.  Favour,  628 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61 

v.  Grenada.  299 

v.  Inman  Steamship  Co.,  39 

v.  Johnson,  124 

v.  Kortright,  57.  278 

v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  680 

v.  Minominee  Lumber  Co.,  188 

v.  Oneonta,  367 

v.  Western  Transp.  Co. ,  404 

v.  Williams.  258 
Sherrill  v.  Shuford,  619 

v.  Western  U.   Tel.  Co.,  540a, 
542,  243,  553,  756 
Sherrin  v.  St.  Joseph,  etc.  R.  Co.,  230 
Sherry  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R  Co., 

114,  476,  477.  482 
Sherwood  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  758 

v.  District  of  Columbia,  369 

v.  Hamilton,  346 
Shervel  v.  Fell.  625 
Shields  v.  Durham,  260,  373 

v.   N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  207. 
2076 

v.  Edinburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  159 
Shimmer  v.  Merry,  487 
Shinklev.  Covington.  285 
Shipley  v.  Bolivar,  369 

v.  Colclough,  634 

v.  Fiftv    asso.    17.  343,  710,  721 
Shippv  v.  Ausable  78,  271.  353,  368 
Shipsey  v.  Bowery  Nat.  Bank,  581 


Shively  v.  Hume,  729 
Shockley  v.  Shepherd,  649 
Shoemaker  v.  Kingsbury,  498 

v.  Lacey.  65 
Shook  v.  Cohoes,  362,  368,  376 
Short  v.   New  Orleans,  etc.   R.   Co., 
241c 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  359 
Shortel  v.  St.  Joseph,  186 
Showalter  v.  Fairbanks,  209a,  215 
Shrewsbury  v.  Smith,  16,  730 
Shufelt  v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Shumwav   v.    Walworth    Mfg.    Co., 

1856,  203,  226,  230,  231,  233 
Shute  v.  Princeton,  176 
Shutt  v.  Cumberland  Val.  R.  Co.,  92 
Sias  v.  Reed  City,  377 
Sibley  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  666 
Sickles  v.  Missouri, etc.  R.  Co.,  523 

v.  N.  J.  Ice  Co.,  Ill,  333 
Siddall  v.  Pacific  Mills,  219 
Sidekum  v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  758 
Sides  v.  Portsmouth,  358 
Siber  v.  Blanc,  708 
Siegel  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  478 
Siegrist  v.  Arot,  142 
Sieiav.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197 
Sigler  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  475 
Sikes  v.  Manchester,  369 
Silberstein  v.  Houston,   etc.  R.   Co., 

359 
Silliman  v.  Lewis,  93,  99 
Sills  v.  Fort  Worth,   etc.  R.  Co.,  772 
Silsby  Manufg  Co.  v.  State,  398 
Silver  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  419, 
423 

v.  Missouri  Pac.   R.  Co.,   120, 
395 

Mining  Co.  v.  McDonald,  89 
Silvers  v.  Nerdlinger,  356 
Simkins  v.  Columbia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  432 
Simmonds  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  England 

R.  Co.,  667 
Simmons  v.  Bradford,  570,  572 

v.  Brooklyn,  254 

v.  Camden,  283 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  209a 

v.  East  Tennessee  R.  Co.,  213 

v.  Eversou,  702 

v.  McConnell,  688a 

v.  N.  Bedford,  etc.  Steamboat 
Co.,  51,  494.  495,  497,  512,  515 

v.  Peters.  194a 

v.  Rose,  570 
Simms  v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  56. 

88,  410,  510 
Simon-Reigel  Cigar  Co.  v.  Gordon- 
Burn  ham  Co.,  723 
Simonin  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co..  510 
Simonds  v.  Henry.  607,  609 
Simons  v.  Baraboo,  375,  376 

v.  Casco,  355 


clviii 


Reference^  TABLE     OF    CASES.         \*re  to  sections. 


Simons  v.  Gt.  Western  R.  Co. ,  505 

v.  Seward,  701) 
Simonton  v.  Barrell,  573 

v.  Loring,  141,  723 
Simpson  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  207b 

v.  East  Tennessee  R.   Co.,  58, 
676 

v.  Hand,  63 

v.  Griggs,  630,  635 

v.  Keokuk,  89,  274 

v,  Mercer,  24a 

v.  N.  Y.  Rubber  Co. ,  241d 

v.  Waldby,  582 
Sims  v.  Am.  Steel-Barge  Co.,  195 

v.  Butler  county,  256 

v.  Macon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 
Simson  v.  London  General  Omnibus 

Co.,  514,632 
Sinai  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  735 
Sinclair  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  485 
Sindlinger  v.  Kansas  City,  370 
Siner  v.  Great  Western "R.   Co.,  89, 
509,  519,  521 

v.  Stearne,  582 
Singer  v.  Steele,  577 

Manuf'g  Co.  v.  Rahn,  160 
Singleton  v.  Eastern  Cos.  R.  Co.,  74, 

483 
Sinram  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  634 
Siordet  v.  Hall,  39 
Sioux  City  v.  Finlayson,  214,  215 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  99,  758 

v.  Stout,  705 
Sipple  v.  State,  249,  251,  401 
Sira  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  513 
Siren,  The,  249 

Sisco  v.  Lehigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  201 
Sisk  v.  Crump,  702 
Skelton  v.  Larkin,  702 

v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  481 
Skerritt  v.  Scallen,  192 
Skinner  v.  Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  45 
Skipp   v.  Eastern   Counties  R.    Co., 

193 
Skottowe    v.    Oregon,   etc.    R.    Co., 

775 
Sjorgren  v.  Hall,  203 
Slate  v.  Grover,  283 
Slater  v.  Baker,  612 

v.  Chapman,  209,  230 

v.  Jewett,  202,  231,  233a 

v.  Mersereau,  31,  122,  166,  169, 
174 

v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  16 
Slattery  v.  O'Counell,  72 

v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 
Slavin  v.  State,  750 
Slee  v.  Lawrence,  377 
Sleeper  v.  Sandown,  88,  375,  481 

v.  Worcester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114 
Slinger  v.  Henneman,  628 
Sloan  v.  Central  Iowa  R.    Co.,  241c, 
413 


Sloane  v.  Southern   Cal.    R.   Co.,  55, 

495,  758 
Sloman  v.  Heme,  619 
Slosson  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58, 

107,  675,  676,  679 
Sly  v.  Edgeley,  699 
Small  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58,666, 
676 

v.  Howard,  607 
Smalley  v.  Appleton,  31.  338,  346 
Smallwood  v.  Norton,  564,  570 

v.  Tipton,  369 
Smart  v.  Louisiana   Electric  Co.,  216 

v.  Morton,  701 
Smedes  v.  Elmendorf,  567 

v.  Utica  Bank,  579,  581 
Smedis  v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  468, 

477 
Smeed  v.  Foord,  40 
Smethurst  v.  Barton   Square  Cong. 

Church,  343,  370,  701a 
Smillie  v.  St.  Barnard  Dollar  Store, 

192 
Smith  v.  Agawam  Canal  Co.,  732 

v.  Alexandria,  274 

v.  Allen  county,  256 

v.  American  So.,  649 

v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  74 

v.  Backus  Lumber  Co.,  191,  215 

v.  Bailey,  158,  644 

v.  Baker,  209a,  211a 

v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114, 
478 

v.  BarreR.  Co.,  449 

v.  Belshaw,  144 

v.  Boston  Gas  Co.,  693 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  104 

v.  Brooklyn,  363 

v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  1856 

v.  Buttner,  709a 

v.  Caii-o,  375 

v.  Cause v,  628,  629 

v.  Chicago,    etc.    R.    Co.,    108, 
419,  479,  494,  495,  508,  675 

v.  Citizens'  R.  Co..  463 

v.  Clarkstown,  346,  353 

v.  Condry,  172,  744 

v.  Conway,  649 

v.  Countv  Court,  346 

v.  Cranford,  734 

v.  Crescent  City  R.  Co. ,  480 

v.  Dedham,  258,  338,  370 

v.  Des  Moines,  368,  369 

v.  Dobson,  122 

v.  Donohue,  628 

v.  Dumond,  607,  614 

v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  57,  108,  113 
421 

v.  First  National  Bank,  56 

v.  Fletcher,  717 

v.  Floyd  county,  256 

v.  Foran,  24a 

v.  French,  626 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


clix 


Smith  v.  Gardner,  649,  652,  654 
v.  Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co.,  521 
\.  Gillett,  56 
v.  Gould,  262 

v.  Great  Eastern  R.  Co.,  635 
v.  Griffith,  751 
v.  Hannibal,    etc.  R.   Co.,  58, 

680 
v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  225,  410,  495 
v.  Havemeyer,  725 
v.  Hays,  690,  691 
v.  Hestonville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71 
v.  Holland,  303 
v.  Holmes,  592 

v.  Humeston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241c 
v.  Irwin,  93,  218,  219 
v.  Jaques,  635 
v.  Judkins,  619 

v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  452 
v.  Keal,  142 
v.  Kenrick,  717 
v.  Kingston,  343 
v.  Leavenworth,  24,    289,  353, 

367,  369 
v.  London,  etc.  Docks  Co.,  704, 

705 
v.  London  &  So.  West  R.  Co., 


Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  151 

Lowell,  376 

Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  463,  475 

Matteson,  639 

Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 

Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  485c 

Milwaukee,  274,  291,  395 

Milwaukee  Builders,  etc. 
Exch.    13,  701a 

Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
4816 

Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  223 

Montgomery,  628 

New  York.  275,  287,  350,  367 

N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  49,  51, 
148,  195,  465,  505,  551 

N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co.,  45 

N.  Y.  Susquehanna,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  104,  516 

Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99,  101, 
484 

Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  666, 
676 

Northumberland,  334 

Occidental  S.  S.  Co.,  114, 
216 

O'Connor,  73,  78 

Old  Colony,  etc.  R.  Co.,  675 

Overby,  761 

Oxford  Iron  Co.,  204,  219a, 
233.  235 

Pelah,  632,  639 

Pella,   271,  279,  350,  367,  368 

Peninsular  Car  Works,  194a, 
203,  214 


Smith  v.  Philadelphia,  286,  744 

v.  Potter,  204 

v.  Race,  633,  635 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108, 
513a 

v.  Rio  Grande  R.  Co..  114 

v.  Rochester.  265,  299,  369,  729 

v.  St.  Joseph,  115,  376 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  195 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89, 
241c,  490,  495 

v.  Sellars,  185 

v.  Sibley  Mfg.  Co.,  209a 

v.  Simmons,  168 

v.  Sioux  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56 

v.  Smith,  122 

v.  South  Western  R.  Co.,  28, 
30,  666 

v.  Spitz.  148 

v.  Steele,  172 

v.  Team,  654 

v.  Thackerah,  701 

v.  Trawl,  303 

v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2075, 
233,  233a,  476,  477 

v.  Washington,  262,  283 

v.  Webster,  150 

v.  Wendell,  351 

v.  West  Derby,  328 

v.  Western  R.  of  Alabama,  16 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  531, 
538,  542,  544,  547,  553,  554, 
753a 

v.  Whittier,  11 

v.  Wildes,  110.  375 

v.  Wright,  340,  390 

v.  Wrightsville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
Smith,  etc.  Shoe  Co.  v.  Western  U. 

Tel.  Co.,  554 
Smithwick  v.  Hall,  etc.  Co.,  94,  95 
Smoot  v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  184, 189, 
206 

v.  Wetumpka,  108,  113,  289 
Smothers  v.  Hanks,  606,  607 
Smyth  v.  Bangor,  363 
Snap  v.  People,  640 
Snedicor  v.  Davis,  591 
Snell  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  359,  408 

v.  Smith,  135,  246 
Snelling  v.  Brooklyn   &   New  York 

Ferry  Co.  ,"508,  521 
Sneider  v.  Treichler,  194a 
Sneesby  v.  Lancashire,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  57 
Snider  v.  N.  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57 

v.  St.  Paul,  285 
Snodgrass  v.  Bradlv,  150 

v.  Carnegie  Steel  Co.,  683 
Snow  v.  Adams.  350 

v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  194a, 213, 
214.  217,  225 

v.  McCracken.  628 

v.  Parsons.  729.  734 

v.  Provincetown,  86,  379 


clx 


References]         TABLE     OF    CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


Snowden  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  524 
Snyder  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92, 
108,  113,  678,  679,  680 

v.  Viola  Mining  Co.,  235 

v.  Witner,  719 
Sobieski  v.  St.  Paul.  etc.  R.  Co.,  203 
Socola  v.  Chess  Carley  Co.,  690 
Soderman  v.  Kemp,  195 
Sohier  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  525 
Sohn   v.  Canibern,  370 
Solan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  505 
Solarz  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  195 
Solen  v.  Virginia  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 

461 
Solomon  v.  Kingston,  261 

v.    Manhattan  R.  Co.,  89,  91, 
520 
Somerville  v.  City  R.  Co.,  359 
Sommers  v.  Marshfield,  343,  373 
Sonier  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  460,  490 
Sonnenfeld  Co.  v.  People's  R.   Co., 

485c,  747 
Soper  v.  Henry  county,  257 
Sorelle  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  756 
Sorensen  v.   Northern  Pac.  R.  Co., 
135 

v.  Menasha,  etc.  Co.,  58 
Sorento  v.  Johnson,  368 
Soule  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  767 
South  v.  Maryland,  617 
South,  etc.  Ala.  R.  Co.  v.   Donovan, 
13,  791 

v.  Jones,  431 

v.  McLendon,  758 

v.  Thompson,  467 

v.  Williams,  431 
South  Bend  Iron  Works  v.  Larger, 
719 

v.  Paxon,  750 
South  Carolina  R.  Co.  v.  Nix,  132,  493 
South  Covington,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ware, 

89 
South  Fla.  R.  Co.  v.  Rhoads,  493 

v.  Weese,  217,  232 
South  Omaha  v.  Cunningham,  113 
South  Ottawa  v.  Foster,  256 
Southampton,    etc.    Bridge    Co.     v. 
Southampton  L.  Board,  254, 
327 
Southcote  v.  Stanley,  706 
Southeast,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stotlar,  476 
Southerland  v.  Jackson,  334 
Southern  Bell  Tel.  Co.  v.  Watts,  93 
Southern  Cotton-oil  Co.  v.  De  Vond, 

222 
Southern  Cotton  Press,   etc.  Co.  v. 

Bradlev,  49 
South.  Exp.  Co.  v.  Brown,  160,  749 

v.  Moon,  504 

v.  Newby,  504 

v.  Shea,  503 

v.  Texarkana  Water  Co.,  359 

v.  Thornton,  503 


Southern  R.  Co.  v.  Banknight,  144 

v.  Kendrick,  508 

v.  Moore,  211a 

v.  Parey.  508,  521 

v.  Rice,  748 

v.  Robbins,  53 

v.  Sullivan,  140 

v.  Walsh,  516 
Southern  Kan.  R.  Co.  v.  Croker,  215 

v.  Drake,  209a 
Southern  Marble  Co.  v.  Darnell,  750 
Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lafferty,  465 

v.  Kennedy,  151,  493 

v.  Johnson,  185,  207 

v.  Pool,  207 

v.  Ryan,  238 

v.  Seley,  197,  207 
Southside  Pass  R.  Co.  v.  Trich,  55 
Southwell  v.  Detroit,  289,  338 
South-West  Imp.  Co.  v.  Andrew,  185 

Va.  Co.  v.  Andrew,  113 
Southwestern   R.  Co.  v.  Hankerson, 
93,  114 

v.  Johnson,  480 

v.  Paulk,  89 

v.  Singleton,  520 

Tel  Co.  v.  Crank,  122 

v.  Robinson,  359 

v.  Woughter,  194a 
Southwick  v.  Estes,  146,  155 
Southworth  v.  Old    Colony,   etc.  R. 

Co.,  379,  451,  474 
Sowden  v.  Idaho,  etc.    Mining   Co., 

185a 
Soward  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  434 
Sowles  v.  Moore,  379 
Spade  v.  Lynn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  761 
Spaight  v.  McGovern,  640 
Spangler  v.  San  Francisco,  258,  274, 
287 

v.  Sellers,  568 
Sparhawk  v.  Salem,  356 
Sparling  v.  Dwenger,  336 
Spatz  v.  Lyons,  Qva 
Spaulding  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58, 
114,  150,  665,  676,  775 

v.  Flynt   Granite  Co,  196,  213 

v.  Jarvis,  480 

v.  Sherman,  369 
Spear  v.  Cummings,  310 

v.  Phila..  etc.  R.  Co.,  517 
Spearbracker   v.   Larrabee,  289,  334, 

369 
Spears  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54,  485 
Speed  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  166,  469 
Speer  v.  Greencastle  Road  Co.,  386 
Spelman  v.  Fisher    Iron    Co.,  219a, 
690 

v.  Portage,  274 
Spellman  v.  Bannigan,  708 

v.  Lincoln,  etc.  R.  Co.,  51,  495, 
516.  517 

v.   Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  749 


References]         TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


clxi 


Spence  v.  Schultz,  1?G 
Spencer  v.  Campbell,  683 

v.  Illinois    Cent.  R.    Co.,  463, 
476,  477 

v.  Milwaukee,    etc.  R.  Co.,  519 

v.  Montana  R.  Co. ,  678 

v.  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  209a,  233, 
2°9 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  197 

v.  Utica,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61 
Spicer  v.   Chesapeake,    etc.    R.   Co., 
470,  484 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  743 

v.  Elkhart  county,  256 

v.  Lynn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  761a 

v.  South   Boston   Iron  Co.,  194 
Spier  v.  Brooklyn,  263 

v.  New  Utrecht.  334 
Spillane  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  73a 
Spiller  v.  Woburn.  323 
Spinner  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 

418,  425,  455 
Splittorf  v.  State,  8,  251,  377,  705 
Spofford  v.  Harlow,   93,   99,   104,  651 
Spohn  v.   Missouri  Pac.    R.  Co.,  89, 

761 
Spokane,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Holt,  71,  705 

Truck,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hoefer,  47, 
748 
Spooner  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  519,  523 

v.  Delaware,   etc.  R.   Co.,  85, 
97.  99,  406,  481a,  483 

v.  Freetown.  373 
Spragins  v.  Houghton,  310 
Sprague  v.  Attee,  218 

v.  Baker,  574 

v.  Fremont  R.  Co.,  419 

v.  Rochester,  368 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  754 

v.  Worcester,  737 
Spray  v.  Am  merman,  628,  640 
Springett  v.  Balls,  775 
Springfield  v.  Burns,  353 

v.  Doyle,  369 

v.  Le  Claire,  287,  289,  298,  356, 
358 

v.  Rosenmeyer,  376 
Springfield   Consolidated   R.   Co.  v. 

Welsch,  60a 
Springfield    Fire  Ins.  Co.    v.  Keese- 

ville,  253,  265 
Springfield     Milling     Co.     v.     Lane 

county,  334 
Springfield  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  485c 

v.  Flynn,  512 

v.  Welsh,  78a 
Springier  v.  Bawdoinham,  367 
Sprong  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  110 
Sprow  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Spurrier  v.  Front  St.  R.  Co.,  108,  485a 
Squire  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  755 
Squires  v.  Chillicothe,  369 
Staal  v.  Grand  St.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  758 
[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  I  — k.] 


Staats  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  422 
Stacev  v.  Dane  Co.   Bank,  582,  585, 
598 

v.  Phelps,  378 

v.  Winona,  etc.  R.  Co.,  455 
Stack  v.  Bangs,  313,  325,  397 

v.  Cavanaugh,  121 

v.  Portsmouth,  353 
Stackhouse  v.  Lafayette,  262 

v.  Vendig,  375,  703 
Stackman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89, 

203,  207 
Stackpole  v.  Healy.  333,  659 
Stackus  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co. ,  476, 

477 
Stacy  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  676, 
678 

v.  Phelps,  356 

v.  Portland  Pub.  Co.,  748 
Staetter  v.  McArthur,  629 
Stafford  v.    Ingersoll,  627,  655,   657, 
661 

v.  Oskaloosa,  65,  367 

v.  Reubens,  73a 

v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  753a 
Stager  v    Ridge  Ave.  Pass.  R.  Co., 

508,  521 
Stamey  v.  Western  IT.  Tel.  Co.,  546, 

552 
Stamm  v.  Southern  R.  Co.,  458 
Stanchfield  v.  Newton.  274 
Standard  Mfg.  Co.'s  Appeal,  206 
Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Bowker,  95,  194 

v.  Swan,  665 

v.  Tierney,  690 
Stanford  v.  Roberts,  574 

v.  San  Francisco,  273 
Stanley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Davenport,  263,  355,  358 
Stannard  v.  Ullithorne.  559,  570,  574 
Stanton  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  27, 
426 

v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  104 

v.  Salem,  363 

v.  Springfield,  363 
Stapenhorst  v.  American  Mfg.  Co., 

723 
Staple  v.  Spring.  120 
Staples  v.  Schinid,  145 

v.  Staples,  556,  567 
Stapley  v.  Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co..  466 
Stark  v.  Lancaster,  28,  55 
Starling  v.  Bedford,  373 
Stasney  v.  Second  A  v.  R.  Co.,  183 
State,  Ex  parte,  249 

v.  Alburgh.  388 

v.  Allen,  313 

v.  Atkinson,  333,  334a 

v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  25, 
106,  108,  113,  124,  133,  249, 
475,  481,483,  489 

v.  Barksdale,  340 

v.  Beeman,  352 


clxii 


References']        TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


State  v.  Bell  Tel.  Co.  536 
v.  Berdetta,  333 
v.  Blanch,  619 
v.  Bolles,  56 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  51,  66, 

417,  466 
v.  Bovce.  709 
t.  Broyles,  336,  340 
v.  Burlington,  258 
v.  Burton,  323 
v.  Canterbury,  390 
v.  Carrick,  303 
v.  Chappell,  340 
v.  Collins,  653 
v.  Commissioners,  310 
v.  Compton,  390 
v.  Culver,  33(5 
v.  Cumberland,  262 
v.  Daniels,  310 
v.  Davis,  23,  492 
v.  Delesdenier,  249 
v.  Deliesseline,  310 
v.  Frazer,  333 
v.  Frvsburg,  348,  363 
v.  Gas  Co.,  358 
v.  Gennon.  258 
v.  Goff,  104 

v.  Gorham,  332,  343,  358,  390 
v.  Goss,  313 
v.    Grand  Trunk  R.   Co.,  139, 

490,  510 
v.  Halifax,  340 
v.  Hampton,  262 
v.  Harrington,  619 
v.  Hastings,  310 
v.  Herod,  622 
v.  Hill,  249 
v.  Hogg,  340 
v.  Horn,  334 
v.  Housekeeper,  614 
v.  Hudson  county,  256 
v.  Jones,  336 
v   Joyce,  334 
v.  Kinney,  151,  493 
v.  Lanier,  249 
v.  Laverack,  332 
v.  Leffingwell,  253,  256 
v.   Maine  Central  R.   Co.,   65, 

114.  475,  476,  524 
v.  Mainev,  336 
v.  Malster,  178,  222,  232 
v.  Manchester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  28, 

53,  65 
v.  Mann,  178 
v  Meyer,  602 
v.  Miller,  340 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  415 
v.  Mobile,  359 
v.  Moore.  97,  720 
v.  Morris  etc.  R.  Co.,  334a,  362 
v.  Murfreesboro,  332 
v.  Nebraska  Tel.  Co.,  536 
v.  Ownby,  619 


State  v.  Perry.  657 

v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57, 
93 

v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  131 

v.  Porter,  619 

v.  Powell,  95,  740 

v.  Proctor.  333 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  104 

v.  Raymond,  334 

v.  Kobb,  310 

v.  Ruland.  591 

v.  Rye,  374 

v.  St.  Louis  county,  256 

v.  St.  Paul.  etc.  R.  Co.,  359 

v.  Seawell,  390 

v.  Shinkle,  332 

v.  Sloane,  591 

v.  Society,  etc.,  343 

v.  Tupper,  672 

v.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co.,  362 

v.  Webber,  323 

v.  Welpton,  334 

v.  Western   Maryland  R.  Co., 
234,  239 

v.  Whittaker,  303 

v.  Wilkinson,  333 

v.  Williams,  332 

v.  Wilmington  Bridge  Co.,  35& 

v.  Tarrell    332 

v.  Lanesville,  etc.  Turnp.  Co., 
397 
Stanton  v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  735 
Steamboat  New  World  v.  King,  47, 

51 
Stearns  v.  Old  Colony,  etc  R.  Co., 
418  437,  440 

v.  Reidy,  233 

v.  Richmond,  285 
Stebbins  v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  741 

v.  Keene,  379 

v.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co.,  61,  95 
Stedman  v.  Rome,  368,  373 
Steeg  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  508 
Steel  v.  Kurtz,  766 

v    Lostfi"    133 

v!  Southeastern  R.  Co.,  395 
Steele  v.  Boston,  262,  285,  370 

v.  Burkhardt,  64,  99,  104,  654 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  92 

v.  Pacific  Coast  R.  Co.,  678 

v.  Smith,  629 

v.  Townsend.  550 
Steen  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  221 
Steere  v.  Field,  625 
Steffenson  v.   Chicago,  etc.    R.  Co., 

241c 
Stein  v.  Burden,  733 

v.  Council  Bluffs,  367 

v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co.,  60a 
Steinbrunner  v.   Pittsburgh,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  760,  775 
Steinhauser  v.  Spraul,  209a.   245 
Steinke  v.  Diamond  Match  Co. ,  188 


References}         TABLE     OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


clxiii 


Steinrnetz  v.  Kelly,  64 
Steinmeyer  v.  St.  Louis,  262 
Steiuweg  v.  Biel,  723 

v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  45,51,  195,  496, 
673 
Steivermann  v.  White,  359 
Steman  v.  Harrison,  543 
Stephani  v.  Brown,  365 

v.  Manitowoc,  368,  396 
Stephen  v.  Woodruff,  742 
Stephens  v.  Davenport,  etc.  R.  Co., 
445 
v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  186 
v.  Hudson  Knitting  Co.,  215 
v.  Macon,  108,  368 
v.  Martins,  92 
Stephens,  etc.  Transp.  Co.  v.  West- 
ern IT.  Tel.  Co.,  737 
v.  White,  562 
Stephenson  v.  Duncan,  215,  216 
v.  Rowland,  559,  564 
v.  Southern  Pac.    R.   Co.,   89, 
154 
Steppe  v.  Alter,  702 
Ster  v.  Tuety,  361 
Sterger  v.  Van  Sicklen,  705,  709a 
Sterling  v.  Schiffmacher,  359 
Stertz  v.  Stewart,  675,  750 
Stetler  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  188, 

196 
Stetson  v.  Faxon,  371 

v.  Kempton,  254,  299 
Stettin,  The,  172 
Steubenville  v.  King,  334 
Stevens  v.  Adams,  557 

v.  Armstrong,  65,  144,  160 
v.  Dudley,  313,  647 
v.  European,  etc.  R.  Co.,  497 
v.  Monges,  557 
v.  Nichols,  705,  718 
v.  Oswego,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62,  90 
v.  Rowe,  623 

v.  San  Francisco,  192, 207,  241a 
v.  Stevens,  ;559 
v.  Walker,  559,  567 
v.  Woodward,  147 
Stevenson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
v.  Jewett,  197,  205 
v.  Jov,  159,  703,  710 
v.  Montreal  Tel.  Co.,  544 
v.  New  Orleans,   etc.    R.   Co., 

419 
v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  520 
v.  Ravenscroft,  203 
v.  Wallace,  701 
Steves  v.  Oswego,   etc.  R.  Co.,  469, 

476,  481 
Steward  v.  Milford,  351 
Stewart  v.  Benninger,  655 

v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  146, 

150,  154,  513 
v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  412, 
416,  417a 


Stewart  v.  Clinton,  274 
v.  Davis,  104 
v.  International,  etc.   R.    Co., 

506 
v.  Nashville,  375 
v.  New  Orleans,  291 
v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  185,  223 
v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  434 
v.  Ripon,  742 
v.  State,  398 

v.   Terra  Haute,    etc.  R.  Co., 
135 
Stickney  v.  Maidstone,  346 
v.  Munroe,  142,  708 
v.  Salem,  258.  370 
Stier  v.  Oskaloosa,  377 
Stiles  v.  Cardiff  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  630 
v.  Geesey,  99,  102 
v.  Hooker,  731 

v.    West    Point,    etc.    R.   Co., 
492a 
Stilling  v.  Thorpe,  289 
Stillson  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  77 

78,  479 
Still  well  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  60a 
Stimmel  v.  Brown,  701 
Stimpson  v.  Sprague,  562 

v.  Wood,  773 
Stimson  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.   Co., 
500 
v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  421 
Stinson  v.  Fishel,  735 

v.  Gardiner,  351,370 
v.   N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  471, 
505 
Stirk  v.  Central  Railroad  Co.,  199 
Stirling  Bridge  Co.  v.  Pearl,  53 
Stock  v.  Boston,  22,  286 
v.  Harris,  319 
v.  Wood,  107 
Stockdale  v.  Lancashire,  etc.  R.  Co., 

488 
Stockport  Waterworks  v.  Potter,  734 
Stockton  v.  Frey,  494,  514,  516,  758, 

762 
Stockwell  v.  Fitchburg,  334,  337,  356 
Stoddard  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.    R.  Co., 
53.  87 
v.  Saratoga  Springs,  262,  274 
v.  Winchester,  291,  369 
Stodder  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  413 
Stoeckman  v.   Terre  Haute,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  110 
Stoehr  v.  St.  Paul,  274 
Stoher  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  197, 

407,  748 
Stokes  v.  Railroad  Co.,  502 

v.  Saltonstall,  89,  487,  516 
v.  Tifft,  397 
Stokes  v.  Trumper,  569 

v.  Attleborough,  351 

v.  Cheshire  R.  Co.,  173,  699 


clxiv 


References] 


TABLE     OF    CASES.         {are  to  sections. 


Stokes  v.  Dry  Dock,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a, 
107 
v.  Hills,  147 
v.    Hubbardstown,    346,    355, 

363,  379 
v.  Hunt,  113,  702 
v.  New  York,  254 
v.  Poughkeepsie,  363 
v.  Uniontown  Water  Co.,  265 
Stoneman  v.  Atlantic,  etc.   R.  Co., 

27,  427 
Stoner  v.  Penn.  Co.,  521 
v.  Shugart,  656 
v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  750 
Stonehewer  v.  Farrar,  734 
Storey  v.  Ashton,  147 
Stormfeltz  v.  Manor  Turnp.  Co.,  332 

v.  Turnp.  Co.,  3S5 
Storrs  v.  Utica,  14,  174,  175,  176,  298, 

356,  358 
Story  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 
Stott  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  426 

v.  Harrison,  574 
Stoughton  v.  Diniick,  322 

v.  Porter,  365 
Stout  v.  McAdams,  731 
Stoutimore  v.  Chicago,    etc.    R.  Co. , 

440 
Stover  v.  Bluehill,  28,  741,  742 
Stowe  v.  Bishop,  53 
Strader  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  225 
Strain  v.  Babb,  591 
Strand  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93 
Stratton  v.  Staples,  709 
Strause  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  543, 

739 
Strauss  v.  Francis,  573 

v.  Newburgh  R.  Co. ,  66,  474 
Strawbridge  v.  Philadelphia,  367 
Street  v.  Holyoke,  352,  363 

R.  Co.  v.  Eadie,  78 
Streett  v.  Laumier,  645,  654 
Streiff  v.  Milwaukee,  287 
Streissguth   v.    Nat.    German-Amer. 

Bank,  582 
Striker  v.  Plath.  702 
Stringer  v.  Frost,  644,  654 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  91 
Stringham  v.  Hilton,  195 

v.  Stewart,  194,  197,  719a 
Strohl  v.  Levan,  644 
Strohm  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  614.  743 
Strong  v.  Campbell,  313 

v.  Canton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  482 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  424 
v.  Iowa  Cent.  R.  Co.,  202,  207b, 

213 
v.    Pickering  Hardware    Co., 

703 
v.  Sacramento,  etc.  R.  Co.,  87, 
478 


Strother  v.  Lucas,  317 

Strouse  v.  Whittlesey,  654 

Struck  v.  Chicago,   etc.   R.  Co.,  463, 

477 
Strudgeon  v.  Sand  Beach,  73a,  95 
Strutzel   v.   St.    Paul  Ry.    Co.,    73a, 

485b 
Stryker  v.  Crane,  633 
Stuart  v.  Clark,  333 

v.  Havens,  358,  359,    361,  374, 

7()3 
v.  Hawley,  669 
v.  Machias,  114 
v.  Machiasport,  110 
v.  West  End.  St.  R.  Co.,  203 
v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  756 
Stubbs  v.  Atlantic  Oil  Mills,  217 

v.  Beene,  559 
Stuber  v.  Gannon,  639 
Stubley  v.  Northwestern    R.  Co.,  56, 

463,  466,  476 
Stucke  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  102, 

418 
Studeor  v.  Gouveneur,  355 
Studer  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  425 
Studley  v.  Oshkosh,  353 

v.  St.  Paul,  etc.   R.  Co.,  481b, 
482,  484 
Studwell  v.  Ritch,  419,  657,  664 
Stuettgen  v.  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co., 

466a 
Stumps  v.  Kelley,  628,  629 
Sturges  v.  Robbins,  668 
Sturtevant  v.  Plymouth  Co.,  385 
Stutz  v.  Armour.  232 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  743 
Suben  v.  Georgia,  etc.   R.  Co.,  492a 
Submarine  Tel.  Co.  v.    Dickson,  21 
Substitute,  etc.,  Matter  of,  249 
Suburban  Electric  Co.  v.  Nugent,  58 
Sudbury  v.  Stearns,  310 
Suga'rman  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  676, 

679 
Sullens  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  729 
Sullivan  v.  Boston,  208,  267 

v.  Boston  &  Albany  R.  Co.,  698 

v.  Dunham,  688a 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co..  185 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.   Co.,  214 

v.  Helena,  289,  358 

v.  Holyoke,  291 

v.  Indian  Mfg.  Co. ,  46,  203, 218, 

219 
v.  Jefferson  A  v.    R.  Co.,  495, 

500 
v.  Jones.  303 
v.  Louisville  Bridge  Co.,  87,93, 

209o 
v.  Lowell,  etc.  R.  Co.,  764 
v.  Mississippi,  etc.  R.  Co.,  180, 

235.  241a 
v.  Missouri   Pac.    R.    Co.,   99, 
129,  235,  238,  482 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.  [are  to  sections. 


clxv 


Sullivan  v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  192,  195,  232,  477 
v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 

4816 
v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  493 
v.  Oregon  R.* Co.,  749 
v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  471 
v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65, 

500,  516 
v.  Scripture,  18,  629,  634,  647 
v.  Syracuse,  606 
v.  Tioga  R.  Co.,  95,  225,478 
v.  Union  R.  Co.,  58 
v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  124 
v.  Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  458 
v.  Wamsutta  Mills,  195 
v.  Zeiner,  701 
Sullivan  County  v.  Arnett,  259,  752 

v.  Sisson,  355 
Sulzbacher  v.  Dickie,  174 
Sumnierfield  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co. ,  756, 

761 
Summers  v.  Daviess  county,  266 
Sumnierhavs  v.  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co., 

180,  191,  241 

Sunderlin  v.  Hollister,  719 

Susquehanna  Depot  v.  Simmons,  358 

Fertilizer  Co.    v.  Malone.  701a 

etc.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  People,  387 

Sussex  countv   v.  Strader,  256,  258, 

285,  289,  390.  393 
Suter  v.  Park,  etc.  Lumber  Co.,  197, 

209a,  214 
Sutherland  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co., 
505 
v.  Murray,  302 

v.  Standard  Life  Ins.  Co.,  523 
v.  Trov.  etc.  R.  Co.,  54,  61,  114, 
192.  2076,  233a 
Sutliff  v.  Johnson,  731 
Sutphen  v.  North  Hempstead,  370 
Sutton  v.  Board  of  Police,  256,  298 
v.  Bennett,  686 
v.  Clarke,  14,  278 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 

8,  56.  464,  465,  705 
v.  N.    Y.,    Lake  Erie,  etc.    R. 

Co.,  192 
v.  Omnibus  Co.,  645 
v.  Snohomish,  289,  356,  368,  369, 

373 
v.  Waite,  624 
v.  Wauwatosa,  104 
Butzin  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  483 
Suydam  v.  Grand  St.  R.  Co.,  485a, 
652 
v.  Moore,  244,  248,  422,  446 
v.  Vance,  559,  566 
Bwaboda  v.  Ward,  114 
Bwadley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  197, 

207a 
Swain    v.    Fourteenth    St.    R.    Co., 
485c 


Swainson  v.   North  Eastern  R.  Co., 

225 
Swannell  v.  Ellis,  566,  569 
Swanson  v.  La  Fayette,  185 

v.  Milton,  434 

v.  Mississippi,  etc.  Boom  Co., 
371 
Swartz  v.  Gilmore,  166 
Sweatland  v.  Illinois,  etc.  Tel.  Co., 

544,  545 
Sweeney  v.  Barrett,  704 

v.  Berlin,  etc.  R.  Co.,  178,  185, 
185a,  195.  209 

v.  Butte,  353,  375 

v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  216 

v.  Gulf.  etc.  R.  Co.,  2336 

v.  Merrill,  666,  668 

v.  Murphy,  162 

v.  N.  Y.  Steam  Co.,  99 
Sweeny  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  410, 

417a,  473,  705,  706 
Swearinger  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co., 

434 
Sweat  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  194a 
Swett  v.  Cutts,  729,  735 
Swezey  v.  Lott,  623 
Swift  v.  Applebone,  628 

v.  New  York,  255 

v.  Raleigh.  743 

v.  Staten   Island,   etc.    R.  Co., 
54,  73a   464,  472 
Swindell  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  471 
Swindler  v.  Hilliard.  550 
Swinfen  v.  Lord  Chelmsford,  557,  569 

v.  Swinfen,  569 
Swinyard  v.  Bowes.  587.  602 
Swords  v.  Edgar,  12",  285,  343,  708, 

709a.  725 
Svenson  v.  Atlantic  Mail  S.  S.  Co., 

158,  225 
Sykes  v.  Lawlor,  646 

v.  Packer,  184 

v.  Pawlet,  370 
Sykora  v.  Case  Mach.  Co..  140 
Sylvester  v.  Maay,  639 
Syme  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  483 
Symes  v.  Nipper,  559 
Symonds  v.  Clay  county,  256,  260 
Syracuse,    etc.    Plank-road    Co.    v. 

People,  386,  387 
Szathmary  v.  Adams,  708 

Taber  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  46, 
51,  111.  495,  520 
v.  Graff  miller,  333 
Tabor  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Tacoma  Lumber  Co.  v.  Tacoma,  680 
Taft  v.  N.  Y.,  etc  R.  Co.,  425 
Tagg  v.  McGeorge,  186,  219 
Taintor  v.  Worcester,  253,  265 
Talbot  v.  McGee,  569 
Tallahassee  v.  Fortune,  289.  379 
Talley  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  526 


clxvi 


References]         TABLE     OF    CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


Tally  v.  Ayres,  086 

Talmadge  v.  Rensselaer,  etc.  R.  Co., 

422,  437 
Talty  v.  Atlantic,  356 
Tankersly  v.  Anderson,  573 
Tanner  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64, 
480 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  675,  680 
Tarrant  v.  Webb,  180 
Tarry  v.  Ashton,  343,  712 
Tarwater  v.    Hannibal,  etc.   R.  Co., 

52,  419 
Tate  v.  Chambers,  303 

v.  Salmon,  249 

v.  St.  Paul,  287 
Taylor  v.  Alexander,  303 

v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  11,  738 

v.  Austin,  287 

v.  Baldwin,  207,  697 

t.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  731 

v.  Blacklow,  576 

v.   Carew  Mfg.    Co.,   62,    185, 
214,  719a 

v.    Chesapeake,    etc.    R.    Co., 
219 

v.  Constable,  375,  376 

v.  Cumberland,  262 

v.  Davis  county,  257 

v.   Delaware,  etc.   Canal   Co., 
464 

v.  Evansville,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  203a, 
233 

v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  51,  60a, 
495,  499,  748,  749 

v.  Hancock,  623 

v.  Lake  Snore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  14, 
343 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207a 

v.  Manchester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  486 

v.  Monroe,  53 

v.  Mc Vernon,  375 

v.  New  York,  708,  710,  725 

v.  Peckham,  258,  350 

v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  501,  506 

v.  Penn.  Val.  R.  Co.,  676,  678 

v.  Trask,  303 

v.  Wootan,  219 

v.  Yonkers,  26,  363,  376 
Taylor,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  1856 

v.  Warner,  417,  769 
Teall  v.  Barton,  608 

v.  Felton,  321 
Tearney  v.  Smith,  340 
Teator  v.  Seattle,  393 
Tebbutt  v.  Bristol,  etc.  R.  Co.,  704, 

706 
Teipel  v.  Hilsendegen,  107,  112,  114 
Tefft  v.  Wilcox,  600,  612 
Telegraph  Co.  v.  Griswold,  553,  555, 
550 

v.  Texas,  534 
Telfer  v.  Northern,  etc.   R.  Co.,  61, 
62,  65,  463,  469,  766 


Temperance  Hall  Asso.  v.  Giles,  60b, 

703 
Templeton  v.  Linn  county,  256 

v.  Voshloe.  274 
Ten  Eyck  v.   Delaware,  etc.  Canal, 

739 
Tennessee  Coal,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hamilton, 
734 

R.  Co.  v.  Horndon,  207a,  774 
Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Markins,  66 
Tenney  v.  Lenz,  628 
Tennis  v.   Interstate,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 
Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Augustus, 
57,  419,  421 

v.  Barr,  478 

v.  Buck.  Ill,  520,  521,  742 

v.  Clark,  476 

v.  Clem,  60c 

v.  Graham,   20,   88,    100,   102, 
480 

v.  Hud  nut,  278,  744 

v.  McKinley,  412 

v.  Mansberger,  207a,  233a 

v.  Schaeffer,  434 

v.  Smith,  417a,  437 

v.  Voelker,  54,  472,  477 
Terrell  v.  State,  619 
Terry  v.  Jewett,  477,  490,  525 

v.  New  York,    267,    286,   291, 
750 

v.   N.   Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  57,  61, 
418,  437,  440 
Tetherow  v.  St.  Josephs,  etc.  R.  Co., 

485,  771,  773 
Tewksbury  v.  Bucklin,  635,  664 
Texas,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Barrett,  194a 

v.  Alexander.  508 

v.  Bavliss,  751 

v.  Berry,  133 

v.  Best,  492a 

v.  Black,  150 

v.  Bowlin,  513 

v.  Breadow,  484 

v.  Brick,  218 

v.  Brown,  506 

v.  Buckelew,  516 

v.  Chapman,  426 

v.  Cody   475,  485c 

v.  Cornelius,  506 

v.  Cox,  132 

v.  Crowd er,  222 

v.  Cumpston,  202 

v.  Cunningham,  427 

v.  Davidson,  508 

v.  Douglas,  203,  219a,  761 

v.  Easton,  225 

v.  Edmond,  513 

v.  French,  216 

v.  Geiger,  129 

v.  Gentry,  111,  481b 

v.  Glenn,  436 

v.  Hamilton,  497,  516 

v.  Hare,  480 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


clxvii 


Texas,  etc.   Ry.  Co.  v.  Harrington, 
191,  241 

v.  Hohn,  201 

v.  James,  493 

v.  Johnson,  191,  192,  197,  513 

v.  Kirk,  237 

v.  Lester,  2076 

v.  Levi,  54 

v.  Levine,  676 

v.  Lowry,  463 

v.  McAtee,  194 

v.  McGilvary,  492a 

v.  McKee,  209a 

v.  McLane,  521 

v.  Mays,  506 

v.  Miller,  508,  510 

v.  Minnick,  209 

v.  Mitchell,  435 

v.  Moody,  151 

v.  Moore,  198,  207b 

v.  Morin,  760 

v.  Mother.  151,  493 

v.  Murphv,  108,  113 

v.  O'Donnell,  78 

v.  Overall,  519 

v.  Overheiser,  213 

v.  Pierce,  518 

v.  Pollard.  508 

v.  Reed,  207a,  233b 

v.  Roberts,  483 

v.  Robertson,  133 

v.  Rogers,  209a,  231 

v.  Ross.  678,  679 

v.  Scott.  424 

v.  Scoville.  154 

v.  Smith,  209a 

v.  Spradling.  468,  473 

v.  Suggs,  516 

v.  Tatman,  241c 

v.  Thompson,  194 

v.  Vallie.  406 

v.  Watkins,  89,  464,  484 

v.  Whitmore.  230 

v.  White,  22 '. 

v.  Williams,  513 

v.  Young,  92,  419,  439 
Texas  Tel.  Co.  v.  Seiders.  540 
Thain  v  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  203 
Tharsis  Sulphur  Co.  v.  Loftus,  310 
Thatcher  v.  Central  Traction  Co.,  31, 
485c 

v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  516 

v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  675,  676 
Thayer  v.  Arnold.  655,  664 

v.  Boston,  259,  299 

v.  St.  Louis,   etc.  R.  Co.,  191, 
495 
Theall  v.  Yonkers,  345,  394 
Thibodeaux  v.  Thibodeaux,  274 
Thieme  v.  Gillen,  359 
Thiessen  v.  Belle  Plaine,  367 
Third  Nat.  Bank  v.  Vicksburgh  Bank, 
582 


Thirteenth  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Boudron,  94, 

523 

Thoburn  v.  Campbell,  667 
Thorn  v.  Pittard,  230 
Thoman  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 

207 
Thomas  v.  Brooklyn,  332,  760 

v.  Chicago,  etc.    R.   Co.,   460, 

481a,  484 
v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  464 
v.  Findlav,  265 
v.  Henges,  709a,  725 
v.  Kenyon,  61,  93,  95,  721,  728, 

736 
v.  Lancaster  Mills,  40 
v.  Leland,  332 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  494 
v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.    Co.,    185, 

196 
v.  Morgan,  629,  632 
v.  Phila.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  516 
v.  Quartermaine,  214,  241b 
v.  Railroad,  120a 
v.  Rhymney  R.  Co.,  459,  503 
v.  Koyster.  645 
v.  Schee,  574 
v.  Weed.  625 
v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  60, 

87,  357.376 
v.  Winchester,  26,  38,  116,  690, 

691 
Iron    Co.    v.    Allentown   Min. 
Co.,  717 
Thompkins  v.  West,  759 
Thompson  v.  Allis  Co.,  207a,  219a 
v.  Bank  of  So.  Car..  581,  585 
v.  Beaver,  323 
v.  Belfast,  etc.  R.  Co..  509 
v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  207 
v.  Bridgewater.  62,  375 
v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476,  481a 

485c 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  241 
v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451 
v.  Crocker,  730 
v.  Dickinson.  567 
v.  Dodge,  653 
v.  Duncan,  113 
v.  Evans,  310 
v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  441 
v.  Jackson.  303 
v.  Johnston  Co.,  197,  218 
v.  Kyler,  655 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  31, 

125 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  119 
v.  Nat.  Express  Co.,  645,  654 
v.  North  Missouri  R.  Co.,  108 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.   R.  Co., 

460.  463,  467, 476.  477 
v.  Polk'  county,  274 
v.  Quincy,  368 
v.  Truesdale,  493 


clxviii 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        We  to  sections. 


Thompson  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co., 
531.  542.  553.  756 

v.  Yazoo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  488,  493 
Thomson  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  512 
Thorburn  v.  Smith,  150 
Thoresen  v.  La  Crosse  R.  Co.,  485a 
Thornburg  v.  American  Strawboard 

Co.,  136 
Thome  v.  California  Stage  Co.,  488 
Thornton  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co., 

476 
Thorogood  v.  Bryan,  66,  74,  75,  77,  86 
Thorp  v.  Brookfield,  114 

v.  Concord  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Minor,  144,  635 
Thorpe  v.  Brumfitt,  734 

v.   Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,   113, 
193,  214,  215 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  526 

v.  Rutland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  422 
Thome  v.  Lehigh  Val.  R.  Co.,  445 
Thrussell  v.  Handyside,  211a 
Thurber  v.  Harlem,  etc.  R.   Co.,  73, 
74.  48 lo 

v.  Martin,  729 
Thuringer  v.  N.  Y.  Cent,  etc.  R.  Co.. 

55,  95,  345 
Thurman  v.  Cherokee  R.  Co.,  241c 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64 
Thurston  v.  Hancock,  701 

v.  Percival,  557 
Thwaites  v.  Mackerson,  567 
Thyng  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  195 
Tibbv  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  492, 

505 
Tice  v.  Bay  City.  368.  369 
Tiernan  v.  Commercial  Bank,  585 
Tieraey  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  463 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  205 

v.  Syracuse,  etc.   R.   Co.,  146, 
225 

v.  frov.  295,  343 
Tiers  v.  New  York,  346 
Tiffin  v.  McCormack,  160,  164,  167, 

701a 
Tifft  v.  Tifft.  626 

v.  Buffalo.  332 
Tift  v.  Jones.  95,  397 

v.  N.  Y.,  Providence,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  451a 

v.  Towns,  386,  389 
Tighe  v.  Lowell.  370 
Tilford  v.  New  York,  299 
Tillett   v.    Lynchburg,    etc.    R.  Co., 
519 

v.    Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  519. 
Tilley  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  135, 
137,  769,  771,  775 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58,  86 
Tillock  v.  Webb,  104 
Tillotson  v   Smith.  729,  735 
Timlin  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,   120,  709 
Timm  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  192 


Timmons  v.  Central  Ohio  R.  Co.,  81 
Timpson  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.  506 
Timony  v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  485c 
Tindley  v.  Salem.  258 
Tinker  v.  N.  Y.,  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co., 
406 

v.  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co.,  426 

v.  Russell,  262,  336 
Tinkham  v.  Sawyer,  219 

v.  Stockbridge,  392 
Tinsman   v.   Belvidere,  etc.   R.   Co., 

250,  283 
Tipping  v.  St.  Helen  Smelting  Co., 

701a 
Tisdale  v.  Norton,  8 
Tissue  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  189 
Titcomb  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  392 
Titter  v.  Iowa  county,  257 
Titus  v.  Bradford,  185 

v.  Mechanics'  Nat.  Bank,  582 

v.  New  Scotland.  377 

v.  Northbridge,  346,  378 
Tobey  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  213 

v.  Hudson,  363 
Tobias  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  415, 

463.  475.  4810 
Tobin  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.    481a, 
483.  485c 

v.  Portland,  etc.   R.  Co.,  410, 
492a,  506 

v.  Western  U.   Tel.  Co.,  555, 
556a 
Toby  v.  Leonard,  618 
Todd  v.  Cochell,  47,  701a 

v.  Flight,  708,  709 

v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  362 

v.  Old  Colony,  etc.  R.  Co.,  491, 
519 

v.  Rome,  334 

v.  Rowley,  60b,  105 

v.  Troy.  346,  363,  376 
Tolbot  v.  West  Virginia,  748 
Toledo  v.  Cone,  289,  291 
Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Apperson,  499 

v.  Baddeley,  758 

v.  Bailev,  111 

v.  Barlow,  428,  430 

v.  Black.  178 

v.  Brooks,  489 

v.  Burgan,  443 

v.  Clark,  408 

v.  Cline,  468,  477 

v.  Cohen,  425 

v.  Cole,  421 

v.  Conrov,  184,  194a,  204,  499 

v.  Coen,  673 

v.  Crittenden,  67,  426 

v.  Cupp,  434,  4t>5 

v.  Daniels,  425 

v.  Darst,  436 

v.  Deacon,  13 

v.  Durkin.  238 

v.  Eder,  425 


References']  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


clxix 


Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Eddy,  221 

v.  Endres,  678 

v.  Fensteniaker,  445 

v.  Foster,  53,  427 

v.  Fowler,  425 

v.  Franklin,  434 

v.  Fredericks,  197 

v.  Furgusson,  470 

v.  Goddard,  61,  63,  69,  87,  463, 
476 

v.  Grush,  492a 

v.  Harmon.  155,  461,  463 

v.  Hauck,  471 

v.  Howell,  435,  436 

v.  Ingraham,  197,  428 

v.  Jackson,  436 

v.  Kingman,  676 

v.  Larmon,  58 

v.  McGinnis,  458 

v.  Maine,  458 

v.  Maxfield.  680 

v.  Miller,  66,  424 

t.  Moore,  60,  65,  234,  238 

v.  Muthersbaugh,  666 

v.  O'Connor.  58,  238,  467 

v.  Owen,  435 

v.  Parker,  95 

v.  Pence,  440 

v.  Pindar,  55,  674,  741 

v.  Riley,  93 

v.  Rumbold,  444 

v.  Siebems,  439 

v.  Sweeney,  368,  434 

v.  Thomas,  455 

v.  Trimble,  219 

v.  Tucker,  740 

v.  Wand,  678 
Toll  Bridge  Co.  v.  Langrell,  396 
Tolland  v.  Wilmington,  390,  393 
Tolman  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co.,  107, 

111,  112,  114,  476,  4816 
Tombs  v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  437, 

452 
Tomkins  v.  N.  Y.  Ferry  Co.,  511 
Tomle  v.  Hampton,  703,  709a 
Tomlinson  v.  Brown,  119 

v.  Derby,  8 
Tompkins  v.  Clay  St.  R.  Co.,  66, 122 

v.  Kanawha,  94 

v.  Sands,  303 
Toms  v.  Whitby.  346 
Tonawanda  R.  Co.  v.  Munger,  1,  20, 

433 
Toncray  v.  Dodge  Co.,  49 
Tone  v.  New  York,  295 
Toner  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,   232, 

233 
Tonnesen  v.  Ross,  191 
Toole  v.  Beckett,  710 
Toomey  v.  Albany,  262 

v.   Brighton,    etc.  R.  Co.,   56, 
58.  410.  502 

v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  145 


Toomey  v.  Donovan,  188,  2416 

v.  New  York,  295 

v.  Sanborn,  705 

v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co..  480 
Topeka  v.  Sherwood,  334a,  343 

v.  Tuttle,  289,  355 

R.  Co.  v.  Higgs,  495,  523 
Topping  v.  St.  Lawrence,  137,  766 
Torbush  v.  Norwich,  265 
Torians  v.  Richmond,    etc.    R.    Co., 

194a,  238 
Torongo  v.  Salliotte,  223 
Torrey  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 

v.  Scranton,  735 
Totten  v.  Cole,  640 

v.  Phipps,  87,  91,  377 
Tondv  v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  429 
Tourtellot  v.  Phelps,  729 

v.  Rosebrook,  8,  57.  668,  669 
Tousey  v.  Roberts,  710,  719a 
Toutloff  v.  Green  Bay,  343 
Towanda  Coal  Co.  v.  Heeman,  64 
Tower  v.    Providence,   etc.    R.    Co., 
418,  437 

v.  Rutland,  334 

v.  Utica,  etc.  R.  Co.,  526 
Towler  v.  Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  94 
Town  v.  Armstrong,  708 

v.  Lampshire,  634 

v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  188 
Towne  v.  Nashua,  etc.  R.  Co..  418 
Towner  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  207 
Townley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a, 
464,  484 

v.  Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.,  668 
Towns  v.  Cheshire  R.  Co.,  418 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  188 

v.  Vickburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  233 
Townsend  v.  Bell,  734 

v.  Briggs,  761 

v.  Langles,  219a 

v.  Libbey,  619 

v.  McDonald,  729 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  493,  749 

v.  Paola,  743 

v.   Susquehanna    Tump.    Co., 
272,  386 

v.  Wathin,  97,  720 
Tozer  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  743 
Traction  Co.  v .  Scott,  73 
Tracey  v.  Poughkeepsie,  363 
Tracy  v.  Cloyd,  322 

v.  Hornbuckle.  249 

v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  526 

v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57,  421, 
434,  435.  444 
Tradesmens'  Nat.  Bank  v.  Third  Nat. 

Bank.  582 
Transit,  The,  751 

Transportation  Co.  v.  Chicago,  249, 
262,  283 

v.  Bowner,  223 

v.  Ullman,  120a 


clxx 


Referent 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


\are  to  sections. 


Tranter  v.  Sacramento,  289 
Trapnell  v.  Red  Oak,  368 
Trask  v.  California,  etc.  R.  Co.,  216 
v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  2416 
v.  Shotwell,  719 
Traver  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  763 
Travers  v.  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.,  749a 
Travis  v.  Pierson,  751 
Treadwell  v.  New  York,  286,  291 

v.  Whittier,  487,  719a 
Treasurers,  etc.  v.  McDowell,  573 
Trect  v.  Bates,  735 
v.  Lord,  333 
Trego  v.  Honevbrook,  298 
Tremain  v.  Cohoes  Co.,  688a,  701a 
Tremblav  v.  Harndin,  223 
Trenton  Water-Power  Co. ,  Matter  of, 

359 
Trevor  v.  Wood,  543 
Trexler  v.  Greenwich,  356,  378 
Tribette  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  674,  675 
Trice  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  422 
Triese  v.  St.  Paul.  334 
Trigg  v.  McDonald,  619 

v.  St.  Louis,    etc.  R.  Co.,  761 
Trihay  v.  Brooklvn  Lead  Min.  Co., 

230 
Trinidad  Nat.  Bank  v.  Denver  Nat. 

Bank,  587a 
Trinity  Lumber  Co.  v.  Denham,  195 
Trinity,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lane,  413 

v.  Schofield,  750 
Tripp  v.  Lyman,  350,  363,  367,  374 
Tritz  v.  Kansas  City,  334 
Trompen  v.  Verhage,  628 
Tronghear  v.  Lower  Vein  Coal  Co., 

241 
Trousclair  v.  Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co., 

61 
Trout  v.   Virginia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  419, 

430 
Trow  v.  Vermont,  etc.   R.   Co.,  99, 

418,  430,  451a 
Trower  v.  Chadwick,  701 
Troy  v.  Cape  Fear,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114 
etc.   R.  Co.  v.  Boston,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  120a 
Troxel  v.  Vinton,  350,  378 
True  v.  Internat.  Tel.  Co.,  547 
Truex  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  523 
Trumbull  v.  Nicholson,  573 
Truntle  v.   North  Star  Woolen-Mill 

Co., 203,  214 
Truro,  The,  197 
Trustees,  etc.  v.  Tatman,  256 
Tubervil  v.  Stamp,  665,  669 
Tubbs  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  525 
Tucker  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 
v.  Bradley  619 
v.  Conrad,  334 
v.  Henniker,  87,  378 
v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co. ,  702 


Tucker  v.  Mowrey,  104 

v.  Newman,  119,  721 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  73a, 
122,  476,  4816 

v.  West,  104 
Tuel  v.  Weston,  141 
Tuell  v.  Paris,  368 
Turf  v.  Warnian,  61,  93,  94,  99,  100 
Tuffree  v.  State  Centre,  90,  379 
Tuller  v.  Talbot,  496,  514 
Tully  v.  N.  Y.  &  Texas  S.  S.  Co.,  216 

v.  Texas  S.  S.  Co.,  719 
Tunney  v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  239 
Tunnicliffe  v.  Bay  R.  Co.,  764 
Tupper  v.  Clark,  631,  657 
Turley  v.  Thomas,  649 
Turner  v.  Buchanan,  355 

v.  Craighead,  632 

v.  Cross,  241c 

v.  Haar,  39 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  120a 

v.  Hawkeye  Tel.  Co.,  544 

v.  Indianapolis.  265,  370 

v.  Newburgh,  92,  298,  367,  369, 
375 

v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  218 

v.  Phillips,  557 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57 

v.  Thomas,  703 

v.  Tuolumne  Water  Co. ,  402 

v.  Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  509 
Turnier  v.  Lathers,  57,  704 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Champney,  310 

v.  Jackson,  376 

Road  v.  Brosi,  385 
Tuteur  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  771 
Tutis  v.  Northbridge,  379 
Tuttle  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  59,  115 

v.  Farmington,  378,  741 

v.  Gilbert  Mfg.  Co.,  708,  709 

v.  Holyoke,  356 

v.  Lawrence,  379 

v.  Love,  243,  618 
Twigg  v.  Ryland,  630 
Twist  v.  Winona,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a 
Twogood  v.  New  York,  368,  376 
Twombley  v.  Leach,  612 
Twomey  v.  Swift,  195 
Twomley  v.   Central   Park,    etc.    R. 

Co.,  89,  518,  519 
Tyler  v.  Kelley,  483 

v.  Nelson.  654 

v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  468 

v.  New  York,  etc.  R.  Co.,  477 

v.  Ricamore,  666 

v.  Sites,  481,484 

v.  Sturdy,  333 

v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  739 

v.  Western   U.  Tel   Co.,    536, 

540.  553,  556,  755,  756 
v.  Wilkinson,  730 

v.  Williston,  393 
Tylor  v.  Alvord,  303 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


clxxi 


Tyndale  v.  Old  Colony,  R.  Co.,  222 
Tyrrell  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  407 
Tyson  v.  Keokuk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  455 

v.  South  &  N.  Ala.  R.  Co.,  232 
v.  State  Bank,  580,  582 

Uggla  v.  West  End  R.  Co.,  47,  54,516 
Ulbricht  v.  Eufala  Water  Co.,  729 
TJline  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  743 
Ulrich  v.  St.  Louis,  260 

v.  Dakota  Trust  Co.,  701 
Umback  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

195 
Underhill  v.  Manchester,  261 
Underwood  v.  Waldron,  99 
Undhejsm  v.  Hastings,  654 
Unger  v.    Forty  second  St.   R.  Co., 

647 
Union  v.  Durkes,  258 
Union  Bank  v.  Geary,  572 
Union  Brass   Mfg.  Co.,  v.  Lindsay, 

709a 
Union  Canal  Co.  v.  Pinegrove,  401 
Union  Ice  Co.  v.  Crowell,  726 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  90,  474, 
477 

v.  Arthur,  676,  679 

v.  Billiter,  225 

v.  Buck,  678 

v.  Callaghan.  55,  222,  233a,  485 

v.  Daniels.  194a,  206,  223 

v.  De  Busk.  675,  676 

v.  Doyle.  233,  233a,  233b 

v.  Dunden,  73.  775 

v.  Dyche,  729,  735 

v.  Erickson.  238 

v.  Estes,  207,  221 

v.  Fort,  207a,  218,  233 

v.  Gilland,  678 

v.  Hand,  495 

v.  Harris,  421 

v.  Ha r wood,  465 

v.  High,  421 

v.  James,  57,  194 

v.  Jarvi,  1856,  223 

v.  Jones,  743.  761 

v.  Keller,  675,  676 

v.  Kelley,  225 

v.  Knowlton,  435 

v.  McCollum,  679 

v.  McDonald,  13,  56,  72,  467, 
705,  717 

v.  Mertes,  99,  483 

v.  Monden,  217 

v.  Nichols,  486,  492 

v.  O'Brien,  108,  194,  197,  410 

v.  Patterson,  428 

v.  Rassmussen,  431,  467 

v.  Rollins,  102,  418 

v.  Springsteen,  206 

v.  Sue,  506 

v.  Williams.  676 

v.  Young,  180 


Union  R.  Co.  v.  Kallaher,  160,  459 

v.  Sehlacklet,  133 

v.  State,  472,  476 

v.  Stone,  341,  346 
Union  Packet  Co.  v.  Clough,  491,  518 
Union  S.  S.  Co.  v.  New  York,  61 
Union  Stockyards  Co.  v.  Larson,  194a 
Union  etc.  Co.  v.  Rourke,  705 
Union  Trust  Co.  v.  Cuppy,  731 
United   Electric   R.    Co.  v.    Shelton 
122 

So.  of  Shakers  v.  Underwood, 
150,  588,  589 
United  States  v.  Arredondo,  317 

v.  Clark,  251 

v.  Clarke,  249 

v.  Collier,  319 

v.  Eckford,  249 

v.  Hillegas,  249 

v.  Lee.  249 

v.  McLemore,  249 

t.  O'Keefe,  249 

v.  Peachy,  701 

v.  Thompson,  249 
United  States  Mortgage  Co.  v.  Hen- 
derson, 558 
United  States  Rolling  Stock  Co.  v. 

Wilder,  186a,  217 
United  States  TpI.  Co.  v.  Gildersleeve, 
545,  548 

v.  Wenger,  755 
United  Tel.  Co.  v.  Cleveland,  588 
Upham  v.  Detroit  City  R.  Co.,  523 
Urquhart  v.  Boutell,  646 

v.  Ogdensburg,  262,  271,  363 
Usher  v.  West  Jersey  R.  Co.,  133 
Uther  v.  Rich,  20 

Van  Alstyne  v.  Freeday,  340 

Van  Amburg  v.  Vicksburg,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  233,  233a 
Van  Antwerp  v.  Linton,  243 
Van  Atta  v.  McKinney,  557 
Van  Bergen  v.  Van  Bergen,  731 
Van  Den  Heuvel  v.  National  Furnace 

Co.,  195 
Van  Dusen  v.  Letellier,  194a,  233a 
Van  Duzer  v.  Elmira,  etc.  R.  Co., 

395,  407 
Van  Dyke  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.  Co., 

197 
Van  Epps  v.  Commissioners,  256 
Van  Fleet  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  665 
Van  Frachen  v.  Ft.  Howard,  373 
Van  Hoesen  v.  Coventry,  729 
Van  Horn  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co., 

419,  428,  451a 
Van  Horn  v.  Des  Moines,  265 
Van  Inwegen  v.   N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie, 

etc.  R.  Co.,  53 
Van  Leuven  v.   Lyke,   17,  626,  627, 

629,  657 
Van  Natta  v.  People's  R.  Co.,  73a 


clxxii 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.       [are  to  sections. 


Van  Nostrand   v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie, 
etc.  R.  Co. ,  675 
v.    Wallkill  Val.  R.  Co.,  678 
Van  Norden  v.  Robinson,  13,  683 
Van  Pelt  v.  Davenport,  262,  274,  278 
Van  Praag  v.  Gale,  703 
Van  Sandau  v.  Brown.  568 
Van  Schaick  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co. , 
480.  521 
v.  Sigel,  590,  592 
Van  Slyck  v.  Hogeboom,  625 
Van  Steenburgh  v.  Thornton,  194 

v.  Tobias,  123,  638 
Van  Vranken  v.  Clifton  Springs,  356 
Van  Wart  v.  Woolley.  581,  582,  602 
Van  Wickle   v.    Manhattan  R.   Co., 

241 
Van    Winkle    v.    American    Steam 
Boiler  Ins.  Co.,  122 
v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  500, 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  184 
Vaccari  v.  Maxwell,  313 
Vail  v.  Amenia,  256 

v.  Broadway  R,  Co.,  522,  523 
v.  Jackson,  573 
Vale  v.  Bliss,  703 

Valin  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  484 
Valleau  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  421 
Vallo  v.  U.  S.  Exp.  Co.,  89,  741 
Valparaiso  v.  Cartwright,  287 
Voltez  v.  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  238 
Vance  v.  Franklin,  376 
Vandalia  v.  Huss,  355 
Vandegrift  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co. , 
418,  419 
v.  Rediker,  57,  418,  428,  446 
Vandemark  v.  Porter,  335 
Vandenburg  v.  Truax   19,  37 
Vanderbeck  v.  Hendrey,  97,  705 
Vanderbilt    v.    Richmond    Turnpike 

Co.,  154 
Vanderheyden  v.  Young,  303,  310 
Vanderkar  v.  Rennselaer,  etc.  R.  Co., 

435 
Vanderpool  v.  Husson,  361 
Vanderslice  v.  Philadelphia,  368,  369 
Vanderwerken  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co., 

131 
Vanderworker   v.  Missouri  Pac,    R. 

Co.,  434.  435 
Vandewater  v.  N.  Y.,  New  England 
R.  Co..  463,  464,467,  468 
v.  Williamson,  598 
Vanduzer  v.  Lehigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  421 
Vandyke  v.  Cincinnati,  343 
Vanesse  v.  Catsburg  Coal  Co. ,  1856 
Vannest  v.  Fleming,  735 
Vantine  v.  The  Lake,  744 
Varick  v.  Smith,  333,  737 
Varney  v.  Manchester,  370 
Varnham  v.  Council  Bluffs,  759 
Varnum  v.  Martin,  566,  567 
Vass  v.  Waukesha,  363 


Vaughan,  The  Mary  J.,  747 
v.  Biggers,  3*17 
v.  Menlove,  665 
v.  Tatf  Vale  It.  Co.,  11,  16,  47, 
85,  672,  674,  680 
Vaught  v.  Johnson  county,  257 
Vaughtman  v.  Waterloo,  291 
Vaux  v.  Scheffer,  61 
Vawter  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  132 
Veazie  v.  Penobscot  R.  Co.,  359,  384, 

414 
Veeder  v.  Little  Falls,  48,  334a 
Veerhusen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

418,  434.  449 
Velte  v.  United  States.  251,  729 
Venables  v.  Smith,  147 
Vennal  v.  Garner,  92,  100 
Vermillion  county  v.  Chipps,  380 
Vermont  v.  Leicester,  334 
Verner  v.  Alabama  R.  Co. ,  484,  525 
Verrill  v.  Minot,  370,  749a 
Vertrees  v.  Newport  News,  etc.   R. 

Co.,  472,  489 
Vessel  Owners'  Towing  Co.  v.   Wil- 
son, 737 
Vick  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  184,  239 
Vickers  v.  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a 
Vicksburg  v.  Hennessev,  92,  107,  289, 

375 
Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hart,  467 
v.  Howe,  490 
v.  McLain,  98,  113,  286 
v.  McGowan,  97 
v.  O'Brien,  518 
v.  Patton,  419.  748 
v.  Putnam,  758 
Victor  Coal  Co.  v.  Muir,  207,  209a, 

217 
Victor  Min.  Co.  v.  Morning  Star  Min. 
Co.,  701 
v.  Penna.  R.  Co.,  520 
Victorian  R.  Com.  v.  Coultes,  761 
Victory  v.  Baker,  343,  705 
Vieths  v.  Skinner,  377 
Vigo  county  v.  Daily,  256,  257 
Vilas  v.  Bryants,  582 
v.  Downer,  557 
Vinal  v.  Dorchester,  350,  358 
Vincennes     Water-Supply     Co.     v. 

White,  166,  217 
Vincent  v.  Brooklyn,  254,  291 
v.  Groome,  569 
v.  Morgan's  R.  Co.,  476 
Vincett  v.  Cook,  60,  343 
Vinton  v.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  493 
v.  Schwab,  53 

Vinyard  v.  St.  Louis,   etc.  R. 
Co.,  450 
Virginia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Roach,  91 
v.  Sanger,  14.  51.406 
v.  White.  467.  471 
Virginia  Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Barksdale, 
480 


References']  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.       clxxitt 


Virginia  Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Boswell, 

480 
v.  Washington,  413 
Virtue  v.  Police  Commissioners,  326 
Voak  v.  Northern  Central  R.  Co.,  89, 

426,  427,  468 
Vogel  v.  McAuliffe,  761 

v.  New  York.  262,  298 
Vogg  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  476 
Volkman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  432 
Volkmar  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  60 
Volz  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  180, 

2336 
Von  Raden  v.   N    Y.,   New  Haven, 

etc.  R.  Co.,  13 
Von  Steuben  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  413 
Von  Wallhoffen  v.  Newcombe,  572 
Voorhees  v.  Martin,  303 
Vormus  v.  Coal  Co. ,  190 
Vosburgh  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

194 
Vosper  v.  New  York,  354 
Voss  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  526 
Vreeland  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207, 

483 
Vruland  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.   R.  Co., 

476 
Vroman  v.  Rogers,  726 
Vrooman  v.  Lawyer,  629 

Wabash  v.  Carver.  380 

Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  Jones.  481,  484 

v.  McDaniels,  189.  191.  202 

v.  Williamson,  417a,  424,  455 
Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.v.  Brown,  187,  436 

v.  Forshee,  435,  436 

v.  Hawk,  233 

v.  Hicks,  478,  485 

v.  Koenigsam.  494 

v.  Locke,  16,  57 

v.  Nice.  434,  451a 

v.  Rector.  749 

v.  Shacklet,  66,  122,  135,  520 

v.  Fretts,  436 

v.  Wallace,  102,  482 

Western  R  v.  Brow.  60a,  192 
Wabasha  v.  Southworth,  384 

R.  Co.  v.  Defiance,  334 
Wade  v.  Leroy,  758,  760 
Wadsworth  v.  Duke,  225 

v.  McDougall.  730 

v.  Marshall,  568,  688a 

v.  Tillotson.  729,  730 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co..  531,  756 
Waffle  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  735 
Wagner  v.  Bissell,  656 

v.  Jayne  Co.,  209a.  215 

v.  Long  Tel.  R.  Co.,  729 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  513a 

v.  Woolsey,  125 
Wait  v.  Bennington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  424, 
455,  466a 

v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  455 


Waite  v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  74,  77 
Waixel  v.  Harrison,  888 
Wakefield   v.   Connecticut,    etc.   R. 
Co.,  13,  27,  426,  468,  469 

v.  Moore,  616 

v.  Newport.  258,  299 
Wakeham  v.  St.  Clair,  351,  369,  375 
Wakelin    v.    Southeastern    R.    Co., 

109,  114 
Wakeman  v.  Gowdy.  566,  587 

v.  Hazleton,  557 

v.  Robinson,  16 
Walbert  v.  Trexler,  190 
Walcott  v.  Swampscott,  291 
Waldele  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  60a, 

477 
Waldo  v.  Beckwith,  47 

v.  Goodsell,  134,  138 

v.  Wallace,  302,  303 
Waldron  v.  Haverhill,  259,  285 

v.  Hopper,  644 
Walkenhauer  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

466a 
Walker  v.  Bank  of  State  of  N.  Y., 
580,  581 

v.  Boiling,  204 

v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  Co..  241, 
426 

v.  Butz,  731 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  689 

v.  Columbia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  432 

v.  Erie  K.  Co..  517,  758,760 

v.  Globe  Mfg.  Co.,  723 

v.  Goodman,  567 

v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  116 

v.  Hallock,  313 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  148 

v.  Herron,  633,  662 

v.  Hobbs,  709 

v.  Kansas  City,  393 

v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  216, 
775 

v.  Lockport,  353 

v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  466 

v.  Pt.  Pleasant.  334 

v.  Reidsville,  377 

v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  763 

v.  Stevens,  577 

v.  Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Wasco  county,  256 

v.  Westfield,  108 

v.  Wildman,  576 

v.  Winstanley,  705 
Walkup  v.  May,  654 
Wall  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  192 

v.  Des  Moines,  etc.  R.  Co.,  432 

v.  Highland,  373,  375 

v.  Livezav,  516 
Wallace  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  1856, 
199,  207a,  213 

v.  Pouglas,  628 

v.  Evans   334 

v.  Lent.  709 


cl 


XXIV 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Wallace  v.  Merrirnac  River  Nav.  Co., 
104,  154 

v.  Morss,  121 

v.  Muscatine,  287 

v.  N.  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co,,  73a 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  427, 
460,  4(57 

v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  219 

v.  Suburban  R.  Co.,  483,  485c 

v.  Western  N.  C.  R.  Co.,  513a, 
760 

v.  Wilmington,  etc.     R.    Co., 
506,  521 
Waller  v.  Dubuque,  291 

v.  Hebron,  338,  356 

v.  Lasher,  14 

v.  Southeastern  R.  Co.,  241 
Walley  v.  Holt,  121 
Walling  v.  Congarce  Constr.  Co.,  185 
Wallis  v.  Larnbat,  557 
Wallsworth  v.  McCullough,  303 
Wain  v.  Beaver,  563 
Walpole  v.  Carlisle,  559 
Walrath  v.  Redfield.  739 
Walser  v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co  ,  753a 
Walsh  v.  Buffalo,  363,  373 

v.  Consol.  Laundry  Co.,  185 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  410,  705 

v.  Mead,  343 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  485 

v.  New  York,  295,  33o 

v.  N.  Y.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  410 

v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108 

v.  St.    Paul,   etc.  R.  Co.,  185, 
205 

v.  Trustees  of  Brooklyn  Bridge, 
295,  330 
Walter  v.  Kensinger,  115 

v.  Post,  744 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  519,  523 
Waltham  v.  Kemper,  256,  258 
Walters  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65, 
72,  78,  84,  85 

v.  Collins  Park  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Phila.  Traction  Co.,  508 

v.  Sykes,  618 
Walther  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  436 
Walthers  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  425 
Walton  v.  Booth,  691 

v.   Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  634, 
639 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  Sleeping  Car 
Co.,  148 
Wanata,  The,  93 

Wanless  v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  466 
Wann  v.  Western   U.  Tel.  Co.,  552, 

553 
Wannamaker  v.  Burke,  209a 
Wanstall  v.  Pooley,  157 
Warburton  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co., 

178,  225,  334 
Ward,  The,  132 

v.  Andrews,  701 


Ward  v.  Brown,  635 

v.  Central  Park  R.  Co.,  523 

v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  H.  Co.,  207 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93,  461 

v.  Fagan,  710 

v.  Fagin,  708 

v.  Farwell,  334 

v.  Folly,  334 

v.  Hartford  countv,  256 

v.  Jefferson,  258,  367 

v.  Lee,  577 

v.  Louisville,  261 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  679 

v.  Newark,  etc.  Turnp.  Co. ,  386, 

388 
v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  493 
v.  North  Haven,  346,  394 
v.    Southern  Pac.    R.  Co.,  97, 

114,  484,  485 
v.  Young,  150,  160 
Warden  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  197 
Wardlaw  v.  California    R.  Co.,  56, 

521 
Ware  v.  Allen,  729 

v.  Gay,  516 
Wartield  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  477 
Wardwell  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

493 
Warn  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  202 
Warner  v.  Chamberlain,  632,  761 
v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  184,  230 
v.  Griswold,  577 
v.  Holyoke,  262,  356 
v.  McGarry,  384 
v.  N.  Y.  Central   R.   Co  ,  460, 

463,  475 
v.  Southern  Pac.  Co.,  749 
Warren  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  466, 
761 
v.  Chicago,  etc.   R.   Co.,  430, 

436 
v.  Clement,  338 
v.  Fitchburg,   etc.   R.  Co.,  65, 

91,  473,  477,  488,  490,  506 
v.  Kauffman,  709 
v.  Keokuk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  437 
v.  Wright,  353 

Bank   v.   Suffolk    Bank,    585, 
598 
Warsaw  v.  Dunlap,  358 
Washburn  v.  Tracy,  652,  654 

etc.   Mfg.    Oo.    v.   Worcester, 
258 
Washington  v.    Baltimore,    etc.   R. 
Co.,  419 
v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  223 
v.  Nashville,  343 
v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  503 
v.  Small,  369 
v.  Spokane  R.  Co.,  519 
Gas  Co.  v.  Dist.  of  Columbia, 
692 


References']  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.         clxXV 


Washington  Ice  Co.  v.  Lay,  333,  334 

Natural  Gas  Co.  v.  Wilkinson, 
332 
Washington,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  502 

v.  Harmon,  104,   108,  114,  508, 
743 

v.  McDade,  184,  188 
Wasnier  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85, 

94,  379,  408,  415,  459 
Wasuiuth  v.  Butler,  645 
Wasson  v.  Canfield,  303 

v.  Mitchell.  310 

v.  Pettit,  56,  703 
Water  Co.  v.  Duncan,  118,  175,  298 
Waterbury  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  61,  489 

v.  Westervelt.  618 
Waterford.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.   Kearney, 
416 

etc.  Turnp,  Co.  v.  People,  386, 
387 
Waterhouse  v.  Wait,  618 
Waterloo  Milling  Co.   v.    Kuenster, 

582 
Waterman  v.  Chicago,  etc.    R.  Co., 
55,  743 

V.Connecticut,  etc.  R.  Co., 412 
Watertown  v.  Cowen,  333 
Waters  v.  Bay  View,  274 

v.  Greenleaf  Lumber  Co.,  165, 
750 

v.  Moss.  656 

v.  Pioneer  Fuel  Co. ,  165 

Pierce  Oil  Co.  v.  King,  680 
Watier  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  451a 
Watkins  v.  County  Court,  354 

v.  Goodall.  710 

v.  Lynch,  336 

v.  Penna.  R.  Co.,  503 

v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Roberts,  39 
Watkinson  v.  Bennington,  619 
Watson  v.  Bauer,  57 

v.  Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 

v.  Kingston,  271,  274,  283 

v.  Lisbon  Bridge  Co.,  392.  752 

v.   Minneapolis    R.    Co.,  485a, 
485c 

v.  Mound  City  R.  Co.,  485c 

v.  Muirhead,  558,  559.  574 

v.  Northern  R.  Co,.  522. 

v.  Oxanna  Land  Co.,  506,  705 

v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  51,  495 

v.  Todd,  618 

Lodge  v.  Drake,  701 
Watt  v.  Nevada  Cent.    R.  Co.,  672, 

675,  745,  751 
Watts  v.  Boston  Towboat  Co.,  221 

v.  Hart,  184,  185,  203,  241 

v.  Porter,  575 

v.  Richmond,  etc.  R  Co.,  480 
Waud  v.  Polk  county,  369,  376 


Waxahachie  v.  Connor,  334 

Way  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207,  488 

v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56,  107 

v.  Powers,  144,  147 

v.  R.  R.  Co.,  112 

v.  Townsend,  303 
Wayne  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Berry,  389 
Weare  v.  Fitchburg,  89,  333,  353 
Weatherhed  v.  Bray,  374 
Weaver   v.   Baltimore,  etc.,  R.  Co., 
132,  138 

v.  Bullis,  73,  75 

v.  Devendorf ,  249,  303 

v.  Iselin,  218 

v.  Ward,  686 
Weavers  v.  Wood,  121 
Webb  v.  Browning,  557 

v.   Denver,    etc.   R.    Co.,    238, 
763,  767 

v.  Portland  Mfg.  Co.  730,  733 

v.    Portland,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  457, 
466 

v.  Rennie,  194 

v.  Rome.  etc.   R.  Co.,   30,   55, 
665,  666 
Webber  v.  Closson,  418 

v.  Hoag,  632 

v.  Piper,  194a,  195 
Weber  v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  479 

v.  Creston,  334a.  369 

v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Morris,  etc*  R.  Co. ,  765 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  417, 457, 
463.  466,  476 

Wagon  Co.  v.  Kehl,  215 
Webster  v.  Elmira,  etc.  R.  Co.,  516 

v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  488 

v.  Fleming,  729 

v.  Hillsdale  county,  256 

v.   Hudson  River  R.   Co.,    31, 
65,  66,  359 

v.  Quimby,  623 

v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39,  92, 
465,  519,  523 

v.  Symes.  30,  666,  668 
Weckerly  v.  Geyer,  310 
Weddell "v.  Hapner,  735 
Wedgwood  v.   Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

194a,  204 
Weed  v.  Ballston  Spa,  368,  369,  374, 
376 

v.  Greenwich,  259 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  477 

v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  14,  146,  150, 
155,  495,  513 

v.  Saratoga,  etc.  R.  Co.,  22 
Week  v.  Fremont  Mill  Co.,  216 
Weeklund  v.  So.  Oregon  Co.,  185, 195 
Weeks  v.  Lyndon,  379 

v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 
93.  477,  480 

v.  Shirley,  338,  749a 
Weems  v.  Mathieson,  187,  194 


cl 


XXVI 


References]        TABLE    OF    CASES.        \.*re  to  sections. 


Weet  v.  Brockport,  118,  281,  289 
Weger  v.  Pennsylvania  R.   Co.,   180 
Wegmann  v.  Jefferson  City,  274 
Wegner  v.  Calder,  612 
Welin  v.  Gage  county,  256 
Weick  v.  Lander,  31,  35,  359 
Weidekin  v.  Snelson,  735 
Weideman  v.  Tacoma  R.  Co.,  60 
Weightman  v.    Louisville,    etc.    R. 
Co.,  510 

v.  Washington,   118,  256,  272, 
278,  285 
Weil  v.  Dry  Dock,  etc    R.  Co.,  72, 

73a,  82 
Weiler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  55;  521 
Weimer  v.  Sloane,  558 
Weirs  v.  Jones  county,  367,  369,  376 
Weis  v.  Madison,  56,  274 
Weisenberg  v.  Appleton,  369,  743 

v.  Winneconne,  122,  394,  396 
Weiss  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  108, 

114 
Weisser  v.  Denison,  69 
Weissner  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  72 
Weitner  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 

399 
Welch  v.  Brainard,  207 

v.  Durand,  748 

v.  McAllister,  704 

v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  526 

v.  Sage,  20 

v.  Wesson,  64,  646 
Weld  v.  Chadbourne,  618 

v.   N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,   etc.  R. 
Co.,  115 
Welddes  v.  Edsell,  590 
Weldonv.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  147,  629, 

634 
Welfare  v.  Brighton  R.  Co.,  56,  159, 

194 
Wellcome  v.  Leeds,  358 
Weiler  v.  Burlington,  262 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92,  114, 
472,  4816 

v.  London,  etc.  R.  Co.,  509 

v.  McCormick,  343,  354,  703 
Welles  v.  Hutchinson,  592 
Welling  v.  Judge,  645,  654 
Wellington  v.  Downer  Oil  Co.,  117 

v.  Greyson,  358,  367 
Wellman  v.  Susquehanna  Depot,  346, 

356,  376,  378 
Wells  v.  Beal,  418 

v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  485c 

v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  198 

v.  Coe,  217 

v.  Denver,  etc.   Ry.   Co.,   Ill, 
773 

v.  Howell.  655 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  102, 
505 

v.  Sibley,  368,  703 

v.  World's  Med.  Asso.,  612 


Wells  v.  Gortorski,  209a 

etc.  Co.  v.  Miskowicz,  218 
Wellsborough,  etc.  Co.  v.  Griffin,  388 
Welsch  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  466 
Welsh  v.  Argyle,  376 

v.  Jackson,  99 

v.  Rutland,  265,  273 

v.  St.  Louis,  298 

v.  Wilson,  362 
Welter  v.  St.  Paul,  289 
Welty  v.   Indianapolis,  etc.   R.  Co., 

452 
Wend  v.  Bond,  559 
Wendall  v.  Baxter,  725,  726 

v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
73a 

v.  Pratt,  16 
Wendell  v.  Corbin,  525 

v.  Baxter,  333 

v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
90,  475,  476 

v.  Troy,  118,  263,  289,  358,  367. 
374 
Wentworth  v.  Jefferson,  104 
Wenzlick  v.  McCotter,  343 
Werk  v.  Illinois  Steel  Co.,  207 
Werle  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  523 
Werely  v.  Persons,  60a 
Wertheimer  v.  Howard,  303 
Wertz  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  553 
Wescott  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  England  R. 

Co.,  2076 
Wesley  Coal  Co.  v.  Healer,  89 
West  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  678,  679 

v.  Eau  Clair.  369,  375 

v.  Forrest,  758 

v.  Lynn,  350 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  709a 

v.  Martin,  93 

v.  St.  Paul  Nat.  Bank,  581 

v.  Ward,  39 

v.   Western  U.   Tel.   Co.,   543, 
756 
West   Branch   Bank   v.  Fulmer,  581, 

587a 
West  End,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mozely,  508 
Westchester,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McElwee, 
53.  54 

R.  Co.  v.  Miles.  493 
West  Chicago,  R.  Co.  v.  Craig,  490 

v.  Devyer,  207a 

v.  Martin,  516 
West  Jersey  R.  Co.  v.  Ewan,  114 

v.  Paulding,  60c 
West  Mahoney  v.  Watson.  346 
West  Orange  v.  Field,  274 
West  Point  Iron  Co.   v.  Reimert,  729 
West  River  Bridge  Co.  v.  Dix,  737 
Westaway   v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.    Co., 
464 

v.  Frost,  562 
Westbrook  v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71, 
73a,  78 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.     clxXVU 


Westcott  v.  Fargo,  555 
Westerberg  v.  Kinzua  R.  Co.,  71 
Westerrield  v.  Levis,  73,  78 
Western  Coal  Co.  v.  Ingraham,  1856, 

717 
"Western  College  v.  Cleveland,  261 
Western  Maryland  R.  Co.  v.  Herold, 
490,  500 
v.  Kehoe.  476,  484 
v.  Stockdale,  493 
Mining  Co.   v.  Ingraham.  233a 
Western,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Atlanta,  289 
v.  Bishop,  195,  241d 
v.  King,  457 
v.  Ledbetter,  761a 
v.  Moore,  769 
v.  Roberson,  61 
v.  Steadly,  431 
v.  Strong.  132,  178,  241d 
v.  Trimmier,  429 
v.  Young.  13,  73,  761 
Western  Railway  v.  Sistrunk,  13 
Western  Savings  Fund  v.  Philadel- 
phia, 285.  286 
Western  Stone  Co.  v.  Whalen,  192 
Western  Transp.  Co.  v.  Newhall,  550 
Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.   Adams,  553, 
757 
v.  Allen,  531 
v.  Arevine,  552 
v.  Aubrey,  755 
v.  Barnes,  540a 
v.  Beringer,  543,  756 
v.  Bierhaus,  531 
v.  Blanchard,  534,  538,  553, 554. 

555 
v.  Boots,  541 
v.  Bowen,  753a 
v.  Brightwell.  531 
v.  Broesche.  539,  540,  555 
v.  Brown,  7:!1).  753a 
v.  Bruner,  540a 
v.  Buchanan,  539 
v.  Call  Pub.  Co.,  534 
v.  Carew,    532,    534,  537,   548, 

553 
v.  Carter,  5WV/,  754,  756 
v.  Clarke.  .331,  540a 
v.  Clifton,  754 
v.  Cline,  756 
v.  Cobbs,  554 
v.  Coffin,  543.  754,  756 
v.  Cohen.   53T,  755 
v.  Collins.   755 
v.  Cook,  542 
v.  Cooled  ge,  554 
v.  Cooper,  510a,  542,  756 
v.  Crall,  5 12,  553,  753a 
v.  Crawford,  553,  755 
v.  Culberson,  554 
v.  Cunningham,  239,  543,  549, 

749,  754.  756 
v.  Davis,  531 

[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  I— 1.] 


Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  De  Jarles,  539 

v.  Dougherty,  554 

v.  Dozier,  540 

v.  Dubois,  543 

v.  Dunfield,  554 

v.  Edsall,   537,    540,    541,   543, 
552 

v.  Edwards,  531 

v.  Eskridge.  539,  542,  754 

v.  Evans,  543 

v.  Eyser,  85.  359 

v.  Fatman,  555,  754,  755 

v.  Fellner,  753a 

v.  Fenton,  553,  555,  755,  757 

v.  Ferguson,  538,  554 

v.  Fontaine,  534 

v.  Fore,  543 

v.  Georgia  Cotton  Co.,  540,546 

v.  Gidcumb.  756 

v.  Griffin.  531 

v.  Griswold,  542 

v.  Hall,  23,  755 

v.  Haman,  754 

v.  Hamilton,  531 

v.  Harding,  540,  756 

v.  Harper,  753a 

v.  Hearn,  553 

v.  Henderson,  540a,   546,   554, 

756 
v.  Hoffman,  71,  77,  78 
v.  Hope,  537 
v.  Houghton,  540a 
v.  Howell,  542 
v.  Hutcheson,  538 
v.  Hyer,  541,  754 
v.  James,  554,  755 
v.  Jobe,  540a,  554,  754 
v.  Johnson,  542 
v.  Jones,  531,  540,  543,  552,  554 
v.  Karr,  540a,  554 
v.  Kemp,  531,  541,  554 
v.  Kendzora,  753a 
v.  Kerr,  756 
v.  Kinnev,  757 
v.  Kinsley,  554,  756 
v.  Liddell,  543,  546 
v.  Linn,  555,  754,  756 
v.  Linney,  755 
v.  Lively,  754 
v.  Longwill,  543,  755 
v.  Lowrey,  531,  553,  754 
v.  Lydon,  756 
v.  Lyman,  544,  555 
v.  McCoy,  540a,  554 
v.  McDaniel,  556a 
v.  McGuire,  546 
v.  McKibben,  531,  543,  554,755 
v.  McLaurin,  538 
v.  McMullen,  203 
v.  Mansfield,  531 
v.  Martin.  754 
v.  May,  546.  554 
v.  Meek,  542,  547 


ClxXViil  References']         TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections. 


"Western 
v. 
v. 

V. 
V. 


U.Tel.  Co.  v.  Mellon,  531,543 

Meredith,  554 

Merrill,  f)40a 

Meyer,  540a 

Michelson,  531,  555 

Moore,  531,  540a,  545,  546 

Moss,  531 

Mullins,  148 

Munford,  544 

Murphey,  531 

Nations,  750 

Neel,  540,  549 

Neil,  534 

Neill,  555 

Newhouse,  756 

O'Keefe,  549 

Patrick,  531,  556a 

Pelzer,  540 

Pendleton,  531,  757 

Phillips,  554,  555 

Piner,  552,  554 

Power,  531 

Pruett,  540a,  552 

Quinn,  18 

Rains,  554 

Randies,  756 

Reeves  541 

Reynolds,  546.  754 

Richman,  542,  555 

Robinson,  755 

Rogers,  756 

Rosentreter,  540a,  555 

Rountree,  531 

Ryals,  531 

Scircle,  542.  757 

Sheffield,  754,  755 

Short,  542,  553,  754 

Shotter,  755 

Shumate,  544 

Simpson,  555,  756 

Smith,  542,  556a,  753a,  756 

Stevenson,  552 

Stone,  756 

Stratemeier,  554,  756 

Taylor,  540a 

Teague,  546 

Terrell,  554 

Thorn,  698 

Timmons,  54,  531 

Trotter,  546 

Trumbell,  554 

Valentine,  754,  755 

Watson.  753a 

Way,  555 

Wilhelm.  755 

Williford,  755 

Wilson,  540.  543,  754 

Wingate,  546 

Womack,  546,  756 

Wood,  543.  756 

Woods,  540a 

Yopst,  104.540a,  546,  554,555 

Young,  540a 


Weston  v.  Alden,  729 

v.  N.  Y.  Elevated  R.  Co.,  87,92 
506,  704,  7(i.-) 

v.  Tailors  of  Potter-row,  723 

v.  Troy,  363,  375 
Wetmore  v.  Atl.  Lead.  Co.,  333 

v.  Little  Miami  R.  Co.  ,154 

v.  Tracy,  o65 
Weyant  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  144 
Weyerhauser  v.  Dun,  582,  587a 
Weyl  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Weymire  v.  Wolfe,  65 
Weymouth  v.  Broadway,  etc.  R.  Co., 
522 

v.  New  Orleans,  341 
Whaalen  v.  Mad  River,  etc.  R.  Co., 

180,  235,  239,  241 
Whalen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  471 

v.  Citizens'  Gas  Co. ,  376 

v.  Gloucester,  709a 

v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.,  216,  406 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  477 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114 
Whaley  v.  Bartlett,  222,  230 

v.  Laing,  85 
Wharton  v.  Stevens,  735 
What  Cheer  Coal  Co.  v.  Johnson,  230 
Whatman  v.  Pearson,  155 
Wheatley  v.  Baugh,  729 

v.  Chrisman,  734 

v.  Mercer,  256 
Wheaton  v.  Hadley,  369 
Wheelan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  775 
Wheeler  v.  Brant,  626,  628,  629,  632, 
643 

v.  Berry,  186a 

v.  Cincinnati,  265 

v.  ErieR.  Co.,  425 

v.  Nesbitt,  303 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  673,  674, 
675,  676 

v.  Patterson,  310 

v.  Plymouth.  263,  358 

v.  Rowell,  657 

v.  St.  Joseph  Stock-Yards  Co. , 
705 

v.  San  Francisco,  etc.   R.  Co., 
503 

v.  Thomas,  618 

v.  Townshend,  751 

v.  Troy,  338 

v.  Wasson  Mfg.  Co.,  203 

v.  Westport,  87,  89,  258 

v.  Worcester,  735 
Wheeler   etc.  Co.  v.  Boyce,  749 
Wheelock  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
Wheelson  v.  Hardisty.  56 
Wheelwright  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co., 

473 
Whelan  v.  N.  Y..  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  758,  760 
Whelden  v.  Chappel,  104 
Wherry  v.  Duluth,  etc.  R.  Co.,  479 


References}         TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.         dxxix 


Whilton   v.  Eichmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 

470 
Whipple  v.  Fair  Haven,  3'i8 
Whirley  v.  Whitman,  73,  b6 
Whissler  v.  Walsh,  647 
Whitaker  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  518 

v.  West  Boylston,  376 
Whitbeck  v.  Dubuque,  etc.  R.  Co., 
419,  432 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co..  750 
Whitcomb  v.  Bane,  115 

v.  Gilman,  104 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  481a 
White  v.  Atlanta  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Augusta,  etc.  R.  Co.,  480 

v.  Bond  county,  256 

v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  516 

v.  Central  R  Co.,  480 

v.  Chapin,  735 

v.  Charleston,  256 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  672,  750 

v.  Chowan  county,  256 

y.  Concord  R.  Co.,  57, 108,  432, 
433 

v.  Crisp,  738 

v.  FitchburgR.  Co.,  463,  495 

v.  France,  705 

v.  Grand  Rapids,  etc.  R.  Co  , 
493 

v.  Hind  ley  Local  Board,  328 

v.  Hovt,  179 

v.  Kennon,  238 

v.  Lang,  104 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.   Co.,  202, 
2076,  223 

v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  743 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  678 

v.  Montgomery,  708,  709,  713, 
723 

v.  Nellis,  115 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  483 

v.  N.  Y.,  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
673   675 

v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  513 

v.  Phillips,  725,  726 

v.  Quincy,  3  2 

v.  Reagan,  574 

v.  Road  District,  256 

v.  South  Shore  R.  Co.,  733 

v.  The  Governor,  249 

v.  Vickeburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  472 

v.  Webb,  119 

v.  West  End  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Western  U.    Tel.    Co.,  553, 
555.  556 

v.   Whittemann    Lithographic 
Co.,  219a 

v.  Wilcox.  616 

v.  WinnisimmetCo.,  487 

v.  Yazoo  City,  262.  274,  737 
White  River  Log  Co.  v.  Nelson,  731 
White  Water  R.  Co.  v.  Butler,  509 
White,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Quick,  434 


Whitehead  v.  Greetham,  562,  575 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  513a 
Whitehouse   v.    Birmingham   Canal 
Co.,  402,  728 

v.  Fellows,  359 
Whitelaw  v.  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

219a 
Whitelegge  v.  De  Witt,  569 
Whiteley  v.  Pepper,  141,  176 
Whitesell  v.  Hill,  603 
Whitesides  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

433 
Whitfield  v.  Carrollton,  285,  367 

v.  Despenser,  319,  321 

v.  Meridian,  289,  368,  374 

v.  Paris,  291 
Whitford  v.    Panama    R.    Co.,   134, 
131,  139 

v.  Southbridge,  376 
Whitlock  v.  Comes,  520 
Whitmore  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  207 
Whitney   v.  Atlantic,   etc.    R.    Co., 
120a.  444, 445 

v.  Clifford.  58,  174 

v.  Essex,  334 

v.  Hitchcock,  763 

v.  Leominster,  606 

v.  Lynn,  368 

v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  410,  451 

v.  Merchants'  Ex.  Co.   569,  587a 

v.  Milwaukee,  350 

v.  Ticonderoga,  338 
Whiton  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R  Co.,  133 
Whittaker  v.  Coombs,  221 

v.  Delaware,  etc.   R.  Co.,    99, 
114,  192,  202,  203a 

v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  13 

v.  Helena,  66 

v.  West  Boylston,  376 
Whittemore  v.  Thomas,  635 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.   Co.,  540a, 
546 
Whitten  v.  Hartin,  686 
Whittier  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  437, 
451a 

v.  CochecoMfg.  Co.,  729 
Whyte  v.  Nashville,  343 
Wichita  v.  Coggshall.  374 
Wichita,  etc.  R.  Co  v.  Davis,  102,  476 

v.  Gibbs.  159 
Wicks  v.  De  Witts,  262,  274 
Wickware  v.  Bryan,  303 
Wick  wire  v.  Angola,  384 
Wiediner  v.  N.  Y.  Elev.  R.  Co.,  60 
Wiel  v.  Wright,  654 
Wiggett  v.  Fox,  225 
Wiggins  v.  Boddington.  371 

v.  Hathaway,  321 

v.  Tallmadge,  333 
Wigmore  v.  Jay,  65,  180,  227 
Wilber  v.  Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.,  207 
Willirand  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  480 
Wilbur  v    Hubbard,  636,  638 


clxxx 


References}        TABLE    OF    CASES.        We  to  sections. 


Wilcox  v.  Brown,  619 

v.  Chicago,  265 

v.  Hausch,  729 

v.  Pluuimer,  567,  753 

v.  Rome,   etc.  R.  Co.,  476,  482 

t.  N.Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
478 
Wild  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  203 

v.  Paterson,  265 
Wilde  v.  Lynn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  523 
Wilder  v.  Maine,  etc.  R.  Co.,  418,  419, 
422,  451a 

v.  St.  Paul,  334 

v.  Speer,  641 

v.  Stanley,  31 
Wilds  v.  Brunswick,  etc.  R.  Co.,  472 

v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  61,  64, 
65,  90,  96,  102,  111,463,  475 
Wiley  v.  Slater.  643 

v.  Strickland,  303 
Wilkes  v.  Dinsman,  317 

v.  Hungerford  Market  Co.,  371 
Wilkie  v.  Bolster,  516 
Wilkins  v.  McCue,  729 

v.  Rutland.  286,  338 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  1,  468 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  531 
Wilkinsburg    v.     Home    for    Aged 

Women,  343 
Wilkinson  v.  Detroit  Steel  Works,  176 

v.  Fairrie,  704 

v.  Parrott,  635 

v.  State,  104 
Will  v.  Mendon,  60a,  334a 

v.  Postal  Cable  Co.,  546,  554 
Willard  v.  Cambridge,  370,  371 

v.  Killingworth,  254 

v.  Newbury,  358,  389 

v.  Pinard,  114,  242 

v.  Sherborne,  338,  373 
Willetts  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  C.  R.  Co.,  750 
Willey  v.  Allegheny,  725 

v.  Belfast,  346 

v.  Ellsworth,  351,  356 

v.  Gatling,  256 

v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  735 

v.  Portsmouth,  351,  356 
Williams  v.  Barber,  729 

v.  Bower,  303 

v.  Bridges,  619 

v.  Cameron,  121 

v.  Central  R.  Co.,  207 

v.  Chicago,  etc.   R.    Co.,    470, 
476,  482 

v.  Churchill,  223 

v.  Clinton,  87,  377 

v.  Clough,  197 

v.  Cummington,  334 

v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  25,  199 

v.  East  India  Co. ,  690 

v.  Edmunds,  94 

v.  Fresno  Canal  Co.,  175 


Williams  v.  Gale,  729,  736 

v.  Gardiner,  74 

v.  Gibbs,  567 

v.  Gilman,  613 

v.  Grand  Rapids,  262,  289 

v.  Grealy,  654 

v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  57, 
417 

v.  Groucutt,  704 

v.  Hart,  592 

v.  Hays,  121,  413 

v.  Hingham  Turnp.  Co..  387 

v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  484 

v.  Ladew,  733 

v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co-,  525 

v.  McDonald,  589 

v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  61,  64, 
418,  430 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  192,  217 

v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  489 

v.  Moray,  639 

v.  Mostyn,  619 

v.  Norfolk,    etc.  R.  Co.,  207&, 
465 

v.  O'Keefe,  56,  646 

v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  151,  492, 
526 

v.  Reed,  572 

v.  Richards,  644,  646,  654 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  189, 
194a,  221 

v.  Sheldon,  122,  123 

v.  South,  etc.  R.  Co.,  129 

v.  Stillwell,  256 

v.  Tilt,  75 

v.  Tripp,  338 

v.  Vanderbilt,  503 
Williamson  v.  Barrett,  744 

v.  Lacy,  303 

v.  Louisville  Reform  School, 
331 

v.  Newport  News,  etc.  Co.,  209 

v.  Oleson.  735 

v.  Price,  172 

v.  Sheldon  Marble  Co.,  218 

v.  Wadsworth,  160 
Willingham  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co., 

538 
Willis  v.  Long  Isl.  R.  Co.,  516,  519, 
522,  523 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  131 

v.  Oregon  R.,  etc.  Co.,  180 

v.  Perrv,  107,  733 

v.  Walters,  657 
Willy  v.  Mulledv,  702a 
Wilmott  v.  Corrigan  R.  Co. ,  523 
Willoughby  v.  Chicago,   etc.  R.  Co., 

472 
Wilmington  v.  Vandegrift,  262 
Wilson  v.   Blackbird  Creek   M.  Co., 
283,  333 

v.  Atlanta,  272,  289 

v.  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.,  674 


References]  TABLE     OF     CASES.         [are  to  sections.        dxXxi 


Wilson  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  526 
v.  Brett,  49 
v.  Burr,  557 
v.  Charleston,  376 
v.  Coffin,  566 
v.  Cunningham,  46,  461 
v.  Dumreath  Red  Stone  Co., 

232 
v.  Granby,  749a 
v.  Hillhouse,  617 
v.  Jefferson  county,  257,  337 
v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  633 
v.  Louisville,   etc.  R.  Co.,  113, 

207 
v.  Marsh,  310 
v.  Merry,    180,    191,   224,  227, 

228,  231 
v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  207 
v.  New  Bedford,  286,  701a,  728 
v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 

408 
v.  New  York,  262,  274,  275 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.. 

178 
v.  N.  Y..  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 

Co..  466,  476 
v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  432 
v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  449 
v.    Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  89, 

516,  519,  675 
t.  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co.,  438 
v.  Owens,  142 
v.  Peverlv,  146 
v.  Phoenix  Powder  Co.,  689 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  113 
v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  468 
v.  Russ,  559 
v.  So.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  759 
v.  Spafford   355 
v.   Steel-Edge  Stamping  Co., 

207,  219 
v.  Strobach,  619 
v.  Susquehanna  Turnpike  Co., 

272,  279,  386 
v.  Syracuse,  376 
v.  Trafalgar,  etc.  Road,  376 
v.  Tread  well.  708 
v.  Tremont  Mills,  186 
v.  Troy,  286.  291,  367 
v.  Tucker,  574 
v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  436 
v.  Waddell,  736 
v.  Wheeling,  176,  289,  298 
v.  White.  169 
v.  Willi tn antic  Linen  Co.,  194, 

197,  205 
v.  Wilmington,    etc.    R.    Co., 

424,  432 
v.  Winona,  etc.  R.  Co.,  215 
v.  Wright.  628 
v.  York,  etc.  R.  Co..  20 
Wiltse  v.  State  Bridge  Co.,  148 
Wiltsie  v.  Tilden,  289,  363 


Wilton  v.  Middlesex  R.  Co.,  489,  491, 

492 
Winans  v.  Randolph,  686 
Winbigler  v.  Los  Angeles,  258,  289 
Winch  v.  Conservators  of  the  Thames, 

254,  327 
Winchell  v.  Abbott,  54,  476 
Windsor  v.    Hannibal,  etc.  R.    Co., 

453 
Wines  v.  Rio  Grande  R.  Co.,  432 
Winey  v.  Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  476 
Wingate  v.   Mechanics'  Bank,    581, 

582 
Wink  v.  Weiler,  190 
Winn  Case,  62 

v  Lowell,  88,  368,  481 
v.  Rutland,  281 
Winnegar  v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  513 
Winner  v.  Oakland,  67,  376 
Winnt  v.  International,  etc.  R.  Co., 

127 
Winpenny  v.  Philadelphia.  262,  285 
Winship  v.  Enfield,  61,  110,  346,  350, 

355,  374,  378 

Winslow  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co., 

v.  Mt.  Pleasant,  340 

v.  Pleasant  Prairie. 430 

Winsmore  v.  Greenbank,  709a 

Winstanlev  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 

466,  467 
Winston  v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co. 
Winter  v.  Central  Iowa  R.  Co. 

v.  Federal  St.  R.  Co.,  485c 
Winterbottom  v.  Wright,  8,  116 

v.  Derby,  8 
Winters  v.    Hannibal,  etc.    R.    Co., 
519 
v.  Jacobs,  658 
v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  78, 

4S5a 
v.  New  York,  286 
Wintuska  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

223 
Wischam  v.    Rickards,  183. 
Wisconsin  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Ross,  120a, 

413 
Wise  v.  Ackerman,  60o,  197 

v.  Covington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54 
v.  Freshly.  751 
v.  So.  Covington,  513 
v.  Withers,  303 
Wiseman  v.  Booker,  418 
Wiswall  v.  Brinson,  173,  699 

v.  Dovle,  72 
Witham  v.  Portland,  367 
Wither^ll  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
429 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  418 
Witherlv  v.  Regent's  Canal  Co.,  61, 
65,  99,  401 

North  Kent  R.  Co.,  16, 


525 


Co., 

429 
741 


Withers   v. 

407 

Witowski  v 


Brennan,  619 


clxxxii 


References}         TABLE    OF    CASES. 


[tire  to  sections. 


Witte  v.  Dieffenbach,  3G1 

v.  Hague,  244 

v.  Stifel,  718 
Wittenberg  v.  Tietz,  702 
Wittkowsky  v.  Wasson,  56 
Wiwirowski  v.   Lake  Shore,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  112 
Wixon  v.  Bear  River,  etc.  Co.,  734 

v.  Newport,  258,  267 
Woburn  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  384 
Wohlfahrt  v.  Beckert,  117,  690 
Wolf,  Matter  of,  561 

v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
201 

v.  Holton,  340 

v.  Kilpatrick,  144,  705,  708 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Water  Co.,  16 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  531 
Wolfe  v.  Dorr,  619 

v.  Erie  Tel.  Co.,  359 

v.  Mersereau,  153 
Wolff  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  645 
Wolfskebl  v.  Western  U.   Tel.   Co., 

543 
Wolsey  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

2076 
Wolski  v.  Knapp  Co.,  219 
Womack  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  124 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  556 
Wonder  v.   Baltimore,    etc.   R.   Co., 

195,  204 
Woo  Dan  v.  Seattle  R.  Co.,  520 
Wood  v.  Bodine,  621 

v.  Bridgeport,  375 

v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  522,  523 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58 

v.  Clapp,  606,  607 

v.  Edes,  729 

v.  Farnell,  303 

v.  Gilboa,  272 

v.  Heiges.  185,  195 

v.  Hopkins,  562 

v.  Lake  Sbore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  521 

v.  Larue,  640 

v.  Locke,  413 

v.  Luscomb,  651 

v.   Kansas  City,   etc.  R.  Co., 
436 

v.  Mears,  359 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  485 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  421 

v.  School  District,  168,  298 

v.  Watertovvn,  291,  367,  760 

v.  Waterville,  105,  340,  375 

v.  Wand,  733 

v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  531 

River  Bank  v.  First  Nat.  Bank, 
581,  585 
Woodard  v.  Boscobel,  343,  742 

v.  Michigan,  etc.   R.   Co.,   131, 
132 

v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
476 


Woodbridge  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.. 
472 

v.  Marks,  626 
Woodburv  v.  Owosso,  368,  380,  744, 

760 
Woodcock  v.  Calais,  299 
Woodell  v.  West  Virginia,  Imp.  Co., 

201 
Wooden  v.  Mt.  Pleasant  Lumber,  etc. 
Co.,  729 

v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  132, 133 
Woodhead  v.  Gartness  Mineral  Co., 

245 
Woodhull  v.  New  York,  291 
Woodman  v    Hubbard,  104 

v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  58,  359 

v.  Nottingham,  115,  393 

v.  Tufts,  709a.  731 
Woodring  v.  Forks  Township,  365 
WToodruff  v.  Bowen,  702,  705 

v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  120a 

v.  North  Bloomfield  Gravel  Co., 
283 

v  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  484 

Sleeping  Coach  Co.  v.  Diehl, 
526 
Woodrum  v.  Clay,  633 
Woods  v.  Boston,  375 

v.  Colfax  county,  256 

v.  Groton,  356,  393 

v.  Jones,  61 

v.  Kansas  Citv,  262,  287 

v.  Lindvall,  1*94,  230 

v.  Lloyd,  705 

v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  194 

v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60c 

v.  Naumkeag,  709 

v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  519 

v.  Trinity  Parish,  702 
Woodward  v.  Aborn,  39,  734 

v.  Griffith,  662 

v.  Hancock,  609 

v.  Purely,  663 

v.  Washburn,  115 

v.  West  Side  R.  Co.,  99 
Woodyard  v.  Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co., 

464 
Wooley  v.  Grand  St.  R.  Co.,  606,376, 

408,  410 
Woolf  v.  Chalker,  97,  628,  629,  632, 

639 
Woolf  oik  v.  Macon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  437 
Wooliscroft  v.  Norton,  443 
Woolley  v.  Baldwin,  313 
Woolery  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
Woolsey  v.  Cbicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  489 
Woolwine  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co., 

56,  705 
Wooster  v.  Broadway,  etc.  Co.,  110 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99 
Wooton  v.  Dawkins,  97,  720 
Woram  v.  Noble,  119,  709a 
Worcester  v.  Canal  Bridge  Co. ,  356 


References}  TABLE     OF     CASES. 


ire  to  sections.    C1XXX1U 


Worden  v.  Humeston,   etc.  R.    Co., 
206,  209a,  214 

v.  New  Bedford,  259,  291 

v.  Witt.  340 
Wordsworth  v.  Willan,  649,  651,  654 
Work  v.  Hoofnagle,  592 
Workman  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co., 
33,  750 

v.  New  York,  295 
Works  v.  Junction  R.  Co.,  395 
Worrnell  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  185 
Wormley  v.  Gregg,  629 
Wormwood  v.  Waltham,  373 
Worsley  v.  Scarborough,  69 
Worster  v.   Forty-second  St.  etc.  R. 

Co..  359,  407,  408,  417 
AVorth  v   Edmonds,  95 

v.  Gilling,  632 
Worthen  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  520 

v.  Love,  626 
Worthington  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co., 
523 

v.  Mencer,  88 

v.  Parker,  709 

v.  Wade,  702 
Wragge  v.  South  Carolina,  etc.  R. 

Co.,  27 
Wray  v.  Evans,  160,  169 
Wren  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  485 
Wright  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64 

v.  Briggs,  254 

v.  Brown,  61,  99 

v.  California  Cent.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  512,  665 

v.  Child,  622 

v.  Cincinnati,  etc.   R.  Co.,  477 

v.  Clark,  49 

v.  Compton,  244,  248,  688a 

v.  Defrees,  249 

v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73 

v.  Hazen,  303 

v.  Holbrook,  285 

v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93,  95, 
741 

v.  Illinois,  etc.  Tel.  Co.,  61 

v.  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  418 

v.  Kansas  City,  376 

v.  Maiden,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71,  74, 
467.  468 

v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  459,  502 

v.  N.  Y.    Central   R.  Co.,  192, 
194.  215,  231,241 

v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  183 

v.  Pearson,  628 

v.  Rawson,  190 

v.  St.  Cloud,  376 

v.  Shindler,  730 

v.  Wheeler,  591 

v.  Wilcox   244,  248 

v.  Williams,  734 

v.  Wilmington,  271,  287,  367 

v.  Woodcock.  283 

v.  Wright,  657 


Wrinn  v.  Jones,  652 

Wrought  Iron  Range  Co.  v.  Martin, 

194 
Wuotilla  v.  Duluth  Lumber  Co.,  214 
Wust  v.  Erie  Iron  Works,  215 
Wyandotte  v.  White,  85,  289 
Wyatt  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  53,  87,  520 

v.  Great   Western  R.  Co.,  89, 
92,  479 

v.  Harrison,  701 

v.  Williams,  124 
Wychoff  v.  Queens  Ferry  Co.,  487 
Wyld  v.  Pickfod,  49 
Wvlde  v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  520 
Wylie  v.  Birch,  619 
Wyllie  v.  Palmer,  117,  148 
Wyman  v.  Leavitt,  761 

v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  493 

v.  Penobscot,  etc.   R.  Co.,  444, 
445 

v.  Philadelphia,  363 

v.  State,  334 
Wymore  v.  Mahaska  county,  78 
Wynn  v.  Allard.  110,  114,  644 

v.  Central   Park,   etc.   R.  Co., 
473,  495,  497 

v.  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73a,  99 
Wynne  v.  Conklin,  219 

Yahn  v.  Ottumwa,  67 
Yale  v.  Hampden  Turnp.  Co.,  387 
Yancey  v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
Yankton   Fire  Ins.  Co.   v.  Fremont, 

etc.  R.  Co.,  666 
Yarmouth  v.  France,  211a,  214 
Yarnall  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  86, 

93 
Yarnell  v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  492a, 

508,  510,  516 
Yates  v.  Brown.  172 
v.  Judd,  287 
v.  Lansing,  303 
v.  McCullough   Iron  Co.,  216, 

233a 
v.  Squires,  148 
Yazoo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brumfield,  429 

v.  Davis,  412 
Yeager  v.  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  476 
v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  219a 
v.  Tippecanoe,  256 
Yeaman  v.  Noblesville  Foundry  Co., 

219a 
Yearance  v.  Salt  Lake  City,  353 
Yearsley  v.  Sunset  Telephone  Co., 

207 
Yeaton  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  185 
Yeaw  v.  Williams,  53,  346,  350 
Yeazel  v.  Alexander,  633 
Yelton  v.  Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  140 
Yeomans  v.  Contra  Costa,  Nav.  Co., 

180,  492 
Yerex  v.  Eineder,  735 
Yerian  v.  Linkletter,  748,  749 


Clxxxiv  He/trences]         TABLE    OF    CASES.        [are  to  sections. 


Yerkes  v.  Keokuk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  516 

Yoakum  v.  Mettasch,  99 

Yonge  v.  Kinney,  516 

Yonoski  v.  State,  104 

Yordy  v.  Marshall  county,  380 

York  v.  Canada  Atl.  S.  S.  Co.,  725 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  605 

v.  Davis,  658.  664 

v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  461 
Youll  v.  Sioux  City  etc.  R.  Co.,  221 
Young  v.   Burlington  Mattress  Co., 
195 

v.  Charleston,  258,  289 

v.  Gentis.  750 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  460 

v.  Harvey,  343,  703 

v.  Herbert,  303 

v.  Hosmer,  624 

v.    Kansas  City,   etc.   R.   Co., 
449 

v.  Macomb,  338,  374 

v.  Murray,  630 

v.  New  Haven,  355 

v.  N.    Y.,  Lake   Erie,   etc.    R. 
Co.,  476,  477 

v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  464,  475 

v.  Pennsylvania  Co..  503 

v.  Road  Commissioners,  256 

v.  South  Boston  Ice  Co.,  649 

v.  Spencer,  119 

v.  Waterville,    289,   333,  334a, 
543 

v.  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.,  756 

v.  Yarmouth,  351,  358 


Youngblood  v.  Sexton,  254 
Youngstown  v.  Moore,  274 
Ysleta  v.  Babbitt,  286 
Yule  v.  New  Orleans,  265 

Zagelmeyer   v.    Cincinnati,    etc.    R. 

Co.,  493 
Zanesville  v.  Fanan,  358 
Zeigler  v.  Danbury,  etc.  R.  Co.,  160, 

177,  225 
v.  Northeastern   R.    Co.,   463. 

475 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  90 
v.  South,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  422 
Zemlock  v.  United  States,  251 
Zemp  v.    Wilmington,    etc.    R.  Co., 

60a.  516 
Zenner  v.  Blessing,  625 
Zettler  v.  Atlanta,  56,  90.  375 
Ziegler  v.  Commonwealth,  592 
Ziemann  v.  Kieckhefer  Elevator  Mfg. 

Co.,  719a 
Zimmerman  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co., 

61,  88,  464,  481 
v.  Long  Isl.  R.  Co.,  497 
v.  Union  R.  Co.,  485a 
Zintek  v.  Stimson  Mill  Co..  217,  232, 

233 
Zoebisch  v.  Tar  bell,  97,  705 
Zuccarello  v.  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co., 

386,  414 
Zurn  v.  Tetlow,  218 
Zwack  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 

Co..  467 


THE 

LAW  OF  NEGLIGENCE. 


PART  I. 

GENERAL  PRINCIPLES. 


Chapter  I.  Negligence  in  General. 
II.  Proximate  Cause. 

III.  Degrees  of  Negligence. 

IV.  Questions  of  Fact  and  Law. 
V.  Evidence. 

VI.  Contributory  Negligence. 
VII.  Parties. 
VIII.  Deceased  Persons. 


CHAPTER    I. 

NEGLIGENCE  IN  GENERAL. 


;    1.  Negligence  variously  defined. 

2.  Difficulty  of  exact  definition. 

3.  Definition  of  actionable  negli- 

gence. 

4.  Negligence      and      concurring 

damage  distinguished. 

5.  Analysis  of  a  cause  of  action  on 

negligence. 

6.  Dr.  Wharton's    definition    re- 

viewed. 
7    Election  between  intended  and 
unintended  injury. 

8.  Duty,  an  essential  element. 

9.  The  duty  must  be  to  use  care. 

10.  The   duty   must    be   legal   not 

merely  moral. 

11.  No     unreasonable      duty     re- 

quired. 

12.  In  determining  duty,  regard  to 

be  had  to  era. 

13.  Violation  of  duty  imposed  by 

statute  or  ordinance. 
Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  I  —  1  [l] 


j5  13a.  Regulations  for  public  benefit 

only. 
A    personal    duty    cannot    be 

delegated. 
No  negligence  where  there  is  no 

breach  of  duty. 
Inevitable  accident. 
17.  Apparent  exceptions  to  rule  as 

to  inevitable  accident. 
What  is  not  inevitable  accident. 
Absence  of  intent  to  produce 

damage. 
Distinction  between  negligence 

and  fraud. 
Defendant's  anticipation  of  in- 
jury not  essential. 
Election  between  contract  and 

tort. 

23.  Damage,  an  essential  element. 

24.  Damage    must    be    special    to 
plaintiff. 

24a.  Right  to  recover  over. 


14. 


15. 


16. 


18. 
19. 

20. 

21. 

22. 


§2] 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


§  I.  Negligence  variously  defined.  —  Many  definitions 
of  negligence  have  been  attempted,  none  of  which  appears  to 
us  to  be  quite  satisfactory,  as  no  one  of  them  has  proved  to 
be  satisfactory  to  the  framer  of  any  other.1  The  truth  is  that 
a  strictly  correct  definition  is  always  difficult  to  give,  and 
absolutely  correct  definitions  of  legal  rights  are  often  utterly 
impossible.  The  number  of  words,  in  any  language,  runs  far 
short  of  the  number  of  distinct  conceptions  ;  and  the  attempt 
to  reduce  abstract  ideas  into  a  precise  form  of  words  must 
generally  fail.  In  attempting  to  add  a  definition  of  our  own 
to  the  number  which  have  already  been  submitted  by  judges 
and  scholars,  we  do  not  hope  to  cover  all  the  ground,  but  seek 
only  to  add  one  more  to  the  list  of  imperfect  definitions 
from  which,  eventually,  something  more  complete  may  be 
developed. 

§  2.  Difficulty  of  exact  definition  of  negligence. — Negli- 
gence, in  its  technical  legal  sense,  must  obviously  be  so 
defined  as  to  exclude  all  acts  and  omissions  which  do  not  vio- 
late any  legal  obligation,  as  well  as  many  which  do.     It  is 


1  "  Actionable  negligence  consists 
in  the  neglect  of  the  use  of  ordinary 
care  or  skill  towards  a  person  to 
whom  the  defendant  owes  the  duty 
of  observing  ordinary  care  and  skill, 
by  which  neglect  the  plaintiff,  with- 
out contributory  negligence  on  bis 
part,  has  suffered  injury  to  his  per- 
son or  property*'  (Brett,  M.  R., 
Heaven  v.  Pender,  L.  R.  11  Q.  B. 
Div.  503,  507).  "Negligence  is  the 
omitting  to  do  something  that  a 
reasonable  man  would  do,  or  the 
doing  something  that  a  reasonable 
man  would  not  do — not  intention- 
ally,'' (Per  Alderson,  B. ,  in  Blyth  v^ 
Birmingham  Water  Co.,  11  Exch. 
781).  "  Negligence  is  the  failure  to 
do  what  a  reasonable  and  prudent 
person  would  ordinarily  have  done 
under  the  circumstances  of  the 
situation  ;  or  doing  what  such  a 
person  under  the  existing  circum- 
stances    would     not     have    done" 


(Railroad  Co.  v.  Jones,  95  U.  S.  442 ; 
to  same  effect,  Galloway  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  87 Iowa,  458;  54N.W.447; 
Wilkins  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  101 
Mo.  93  ;  13  S.  W.  893).  "  Negligence 
is  the  failure  to  observe  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  interests  of  another 
person,  that  degree  of  care,  precau- 
tion and  vigilance  which  the  circum- 
stances justly  demand,  whereby 
such  person  suffers  injury."  (Cooley 
on  Torts,  630  ;  to  same  effect,  Brown 
v.  Congress  St.  etc.  R.  Co. ,  49  Mich. 
153  ;  Barrett  v.  Southern  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  91  Cal.  296;  27  Pac.  666).  "Neg- 
ligence, even  when  gross,  is  but  an 
omission  Of  duty  "  (Tonawanda  R. 
Co.  v.  Munger,  5  Den.  255,  267; 
Thomas  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  109 
Mo.  187;  18  S.  W.  980).  For  a  colla- 
tion and  discussion  of  decisions,  in 
which  negligence  has  been  defined, 
see  11  Amer.  St.  Rep.  548,  note;  12 
Id.  700,  note. 


3  GENERAL   PRINCIPLES.  [§  4 

extremely  difficult  to  make  such  a  definition  as  will  include 
all  cases  of  real  negligence,  while  excluding  all  such  breaches 
of  duty  as  the  failure  to  pay  a  debt  or  perform  any  other 
express  contract,  and  especially  the  failure  of  a  common 
carrier  of  goods  to  perform  his  common-law  duty ;  all  of 
which  are  outside  of  the  strict  law  of  negligence.  Dr.  Whar- 
ton's definition  is  open  to  the  objection  that  it  includes  all 
these  breaches  of  duty,  provided  that  they  are  inadvertent. 
But  it  is  often  the  case  that  they  are  purely  inadvertent ;  and 
still  they  do  not  fall  within  the  scope  of  a  proper  definition  of 
negligence ;  for,  if  they  did,  contributory  negligence  would  be 
a  bar  to  an  action  thereon.  It  will  not  suffice  to  say  that  this 
would  only  be  the  rule  where  the  inadvertency  was  alleged  by 
the  plaintiff  himself.  It  is  an  old  form  of  pleading  to  allege 
that  the  defendant  neglected  to  pay  his  note  ;  but  that  does 
not  enable  the  defendant  to  plead  contributory  negligence. 
Neither  would  it  do  so  in  an  action  against  a  common  carrier 
of  goods,  having  no  special  contract.  But,  if  the  complaint 
against  a  carrier  should  confine  itself  to  an  averment  that  the 
defendant  had  neglected  to  use  ordinary  care  in  the  carriage 
or  delivery  of  the  goods,  without  alleging  that  he  was  a  com- 
mon carrier,  or  anything  equivalent  thereto,  the  plaintiff  could 
not  recover  without  proof  of  actual  negligence. 

§  3.  Definition  of  actionable  negligence. — The  definition 
which  we  offer  is  this :  Negligence,  constituting  a  cause  of 
civil  action,  is  such  an  omission,  by  a  responsible  person,  to 
use  that  degree  of  care,  diligence  and  skill  which  it  was  his 
legal  duty  to  use  for  the  protection  of  another  person  from 
injury  as,  in  a  natural  and  continuous  sequence,  causes  unin- 
tended damage  to  the  latter. 

§  4.  Negligence  and  concurring  damage  distinguished. — 

It  will  be  advantageous  to  carry  the  analysis  a  little  further. 
The  foregoing  definition  attempts  to  define  the  negligence 
which  affords  the  ground  of  a  civil  action.  But  this  includes 
two  distinct  elements — negligence  and  damage  —  both  of 
which  must  concur,1  in  order  to  form  the  ground  of  an  action, 
just  as  fraud  and  damage  must  concur,  to  sustain  an  action  on 

1  See  §  23  post. 


§  6]  GENERAL   PRINCIPLES.  4 

fraud.  The  two  elements  are,  however,  distinct ;  and  the  result 
of  mingling  them  too  closely  has  been  to  introduce  that  confu- 
sion of  ideas,  under  which  the  same  courts  at  one  time  hold 
that  a  clear  violation  of  law  is  negligence  per  se,  and  at  another 
time  that  it  is  only  "  evidence,"  or  even  only  "some evidence  " 
of  negligence;  the  truth  being  that  every  breach  of  duty  to 
observe  the  degree  of  care  required  by  law  is  negligence,  and 
not  merely  evidence  of  it,  but  that,  damage  caused  to  the 
plaintiff  being  an  indispensable  element  in  his  cause  of  action, 
the  clearest  proof  of  negligence,  standing  by  itself,  is  only 
"some  evidence"  of  his  right  to  recover. 

§  5.    Analysis  of  a    cause    of   action    on    negligence. — 

A  cause  of  action  upon  negligence,  then,  should  be  thus 
analyzed.  Negligence  in  the  defendant  and  damage  to  the 
plaintiff  must  concur.     Negligence  consists  in  : 

1.  A  legal  duty  to  use  care  ; 

2.  A  breach  of  that  duty  ; 

3.  The  absence  of  distinct  intention  to  produce  the  precise 
damage,  if  any,  which  actually  follows. 

With  this  negligence,  in  order  to  sustain  a  civil  action,  there 
must  concur: 

1.  Damage  to  the  plaintiff; 

2.  A  natural  and  continuous  sequence,  uninterruptedly 
connecting  the  breach  of  duty  with  the  damage,  as  cause  and 
effect. 

§6.  Dr.  Wharton's  definition  reviewed. —  In  this  defi- 
nition, we  have  purposely  sought  to  include  every  element  of 
that  given  by  Dr.  Francis  Wharton,  in  his  learned  and  able 
treatise,1  which  our  view  of  the  law  would  justify.  We  gladly 
acknowledge  our  indebtedness  to  him,  and  were  anxious  to 
adopt  his  language,  without  change,  so  as  to  avoid  further  con- 
flict of  definitions.  But  we  are  unable  to  accept  his  definition, 
in  two  important  respects.  Dr.  Wharton  defines  negligence 
as   always   implying  inadvertence  in  the   act    complained  of 

1  Dr.    Wharton  proposes  the  fol-  agent,  in  the  discharge    of  a  legal 

lowing  :  "  Negligence,  in  its  civil  re-  duty,   as  produces,   in  an  ordinary 

lations,  is  such  an   inadvertent  im-  and  natural  sequence,  a  damage  to 

perfection,  by  a  responsible  human  another."     (Negligence,  §  3). 


5  GENERAL   PRINCIPLES.  [§  7 

This  is  not  necessary.  The  inadvertence,  which  marks  the 
distinction  between  negligence  and  willful  injuries,  relates  to 
the  damage,  rather  than  to  the  act  which  causes  the  damage. 
Thus,  a  railroad  engineer  may  willfully  shut  his  eyes  and  go  to 
sleep.  If,  while  thus  asleep,  he  runs  over  a  man,  the  test 
which  would  determine  whether  his  act  was  merely  gross 
negligence  or  was  a  willful  injury  would  be  to  ascertain 
whether,  when  he  closed  his  eyes,  he  saw  the  man  upon  the 
track  or  believed  that  he  would  be  there,  or  not.  If  he 
believed  that  he  would  inflict  the  injury,  or  if  he  intended  to 
do  it,  his  act  would  cease  to  be  mere  negligence,  but  not  other- 
wise. Doubtless,  it  would  be  a  fair  question  for  the  jury;  but 
it  could  not  be  ruled  upon  as  a  point  of  law.  So,  if  a  mis- 
chievous boy  should  strike  a  horse,  for  the  very  purpose  of 
making  it  run  away,  his  act  would  be  one  of  willful  injury,  as 
to  the  owner  of  the  horse,  but  only  of  negligent  injury,  as  to 
a  child  run  over  by  the  horse,  in  a  distant  street.  Again, 
Dr.  Wharton  see.ms  to  exclude  an  entire  omission  from  his 
definition.  It  may  be  true  that  in  most  cases  the  negligence 
complained  of  consists  in  the  imperfect  performance  of  a  duty; 
but  this  is  hardly  sufficient  reason  for  excluding  the  idea  of 
total  omission  from  the  definition  of  negligence. 

§  7.  Election  between  intended  and  unintended  injury. — 

In  applying  any  definition  of  negligence  to  the  facts 
of  a  special  case,  it  must  be  born  in  mind  that  the  injured 
party  has  the  right  to  treat  some  acts  as  negligent,  although, 
in  fact,  they  were  willful  and  malicious.  The  plaintiff  is  not 
to  be  turned  out  of  court,  simply  because  he  has  understated 
his  case.  Leaving  out  of  view  those  cases  in  which  the  com- 
mon law,  forbidding  private  actions  upon  felonies,  until  after 
ithey  had  been  criminally  prosecuted,  may  remain  in  force,  it 
•is  clear  that  the  plaintiff  may  elect  between  suing  on  a  charge 
of  willful  injury  or  on  a  mere  charge  of  negligence,  wherever 
the  facts  are  susceptible  of  a  double  construction.  It  does 
not  lie  with  the  defendant  to  insist  that  he  has  been 
criminal,  instead  of  merely  careless.  In  making  his  election, 
however,  the  plaintiff  must  remember  that  he  will  be  bound 
by  it.  If  the  complaint  sets  up  a  case  of  willful  injury,  it 
:annot  be  sustained  by  evidence  of  mere  negligence,  however 


§8] 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


gross,1  while,  on  the  other  hand,  if  it  charges  negligence  only, 
the  plaintiff  cannot  put  in  evidence  facts,  the  only  relevancy 
of  which  consists  in  proving  intentional  injury,  such  as  would 
sustain  an  entirely  different  action.2  Any  degree  of  negligence, 
however  gross,  may  be  proved  under  a  general  averment  of 
negligence;  but  nothing  more.3 

§8.  Duty,  an  essential  element  of  negligence. —  The  first 
element  of  our  definition  is  a  duty.  If  there  is  no  duty,  there 
can  be  no  negligence.1  If  the  defendant  owed  a  duty,  but  did 
not  owe  it  to  the  plaintiff,  the  action  will  not  lie.2     And  there 


'Highland  Ave.,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Winn,  93  Ala.  306  ;  9  So.  509  ;  Louis- 
ville, etc.  v.  Hurt,  101  Ala.  34  ;  13  So. 
130;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rayburn, 
153  111.  290;  38  N.  E.  558  ;  s.  P.,  Indi- 
ana, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Overton,  117  Ind. 
253  ;  20  N.  E.  147  [engineer  willfully 
ran  over  cow] ;  Lake  Erie,etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Matthews.  13  Ind.  App.  355  ;  41  N.  E. 
842  [conductor  assaulted  and  ejected 
passenger].  Under  a  complaint,  al- 
leging that  the  injury  was  caused  in 
a  •'  willful,  reckless,  careless  and  un- 
lawful manner,"  held,  that  plaintiff 
could  not  recover,  without  showing 
a  willful  injury.  (Indiana,  etc.  R. 
Co  v.  Burdge,  94  Ind.  46.)  We 
doubt  very  much,  however,  the  cor- 
rectness of  this  particular  applica- 
tion of  the  principle.  A  "willful 
manner'"  does  not  usually  imply  a 
willful  injury. 

"■  Where  plaintiff  charges  negli- 
gence, and  not  willful  injury,  he 
cannot  prove  the  latter.  (Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  98  Ind.  42). 

3  Keating  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  104 
Mich.  418  ;  62  N.  W.  575.  See  §  20 
post. 

1  Heaven  v.  Pender,  L.  R.  11  Q.  B. 
Div.  503,  507  ;  Cotton  v.  Wood,  8  C. 
B.  N.  S.  568  ;  Carpenter  v.  Cohoes, 
81  N.  Y.  21:  Sutton  v.  N.  Y.  Central, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  66  Id.  243;  Cusick  v. 
Adams,    115  Id.    55  ;  21   N.  E.  673; 


Larmore  v.  Crown  Point  Co.,  101 
N.  Y.  391 :  Splittorf  v.  State,  108  Id. 
205  ;  Donohue  v.  State,  112  Id.  142  ; 
Allen  v.  Willard,  57  Pa.  St.  374; 
Tourtellot  v.  Rosebrook,  11  Mete. 
460:  Severy  v.  Nickerson,  120  Mass. 
306  ;  Parker  v.  Portland  Pub.  Co.,  69 
Me.  173  ;  Lawton  v.  Little  Rock,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  55  Ark.  428;  18  S.  W.  543; 
Hargreaves  v.  Deacon,  25  Mich,  1. 

2  Savings  Bank  v.  Ward,  100  U.  S. 
195 ;  Losee  v.  Clute,  51  N.  Y.  494  ; 
Houseman  v.  Girard,  etc.  Asso.,  81 
Pa.  St.  256;  Marvin  Safe  Co.  v. 
Ward,  46  N.  J.  Law.  19  ;  Nickerson 
v.  Bridgeport  Hydr.  Co.,  46  Conn. 
24;  Winterbottom  v.  Wright,  10 
Mees.  &  W.  109  ;  Heaven  v.  Pender, 
L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  Div.  302,  reversed  on 
other  grounds  but  approved  as  to 
this,  11  Id.  503.  See  Hofnagle  v.  N. 
Y.  Central  R.  Co.  (55  N.  Y.  608), 
where  defendant  owed  a  duty  to  a 
workman's  employer,  but  not  to  the 
workman,  s.  P.,  Morris  v.  Brown, 
111  N.  Y.  318  ;  18  N.  E.  722  ;  Sawyer 
v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  38  Minn- 
103 ;  35  N.  W.  671  [defect  in  freight 
car-appliance  injuring  servant  of  a 
connecting  company  then  using  car 
in  its  own  business  on  its  own  line]. 
Mortgagees  advanced  money  to  a 
builder  upon  the  faith  of  certain  cer- 
tificates given  by  a  surveyor,  which 
contained    untrue    statements,    the 


7  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES.  [§  9 

can  be  no  duty  to  do  any  act  which  one  has  no  legal  right  to 
do.3  The  plaintiff  must  state  and  prove  facts  sufficient  to 
show  what  the  duty  is,4  and  that  the  defendant  owes  it  to  him." 5 
If  the  duty  is  owed  to  the  public  at  large,  no  action 
can  be  maintained  by  a  private  individual,  without  showing 
that  it  was  for  some  reason  specially  owing  to  him.6  Thus, 
where  the  defendant  wrongfully  stopped  up  a  public  way,  and 
persons  having  occasion  to  pass  thereby,  being  thus  prevented 
from  passing,  trespassed  upon  adjoining  land  of  the  plaintiff, 
in  order  to  find  a  convenient  path,  the  defendant  was  held  not 
liable  to  the  plaintiff.7 

§9.  The  duty  must  be  to  use  care. —  Not  without  some 
hesitation,  we  have  concluded  to  adhere  to  the  old  doctrine, 
that  the  duty  upon  which  alone  an  action  for  negligence  will 
lie  is  a  duty  to  use  care,  including,  in  that  word,  such  skill  and 
diligence  as  due  care  would  require  in  each  case.  This  is  un- 
doubtedly true  with  regard  to  all  actions  for  negligence  in 
matters  of  contract ;  and,  upon  the  whole,  it  seems  better  to 
exclude  from  the  definition  of  negligence  all  actions  upon 
duties  imposed  by  law,  requiring  more  than  the  exercise  of 
care,  skill  and  diligence.     Wherever  an  absolute  duty  to  do  a 

result  of  the  negligence  of  the  sur-  plaintiff  must   show  that  the  corpo- 

veyor,  but  there  was  no  fraud  on  his  ration  owed   a  duty  to  the  plaintiff, 

part,  and  no  contractual  relation  be-  as    one    of    the    general  public,    to 

tween    him    and    the    mortgagees,  repair  the  bridge.     (Peck  v.  Batavia, 

Held,  that  he  was  not  liable  to  them  32  Barb.    634  ;    Albany  v.  Cunliff,  2 

in    an  action   for   negligence.      (Le  N.   Y.   165.)    See  Cusick  v.  Adams, 

Lievre  v.  Gould,  4  Reports,  274;  1  115  Id.  55  [private  bridge]  and  cases 

Q  B.  [1893]  491).  supra. 

3  Carpenter  v.  Cohoes,  81  N.  Y.  6  Thompson,  Negl.  341,  754,  citing 
21  ;  Veeder  v.  Little  Falls,  100  Id.  Winterbottom  v.  Derby,  L.  R.  2  Ex. 
343  [a  city  not  responsible  for  not  316  ;  Houck  v.  Wachter,  34  Md. 
fencing  a  bridge  approach  belonging  265;  Baxter  v.  Winooski  Co.,  22 
to  the  state].     See  §  284,  post.  Vt.  114;  Lansing  v.  Smith,  8  Cow. 

4  Hayes  v.  Michigan  Central  R.  153  ;  Tisdale  v.  Norton,  8  Mete. 
Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  228;  Philadelphia,  388 ;  Adams  v.  Carlisle,  21  Pick, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stebbing,  62  Md.  504  ;  146  ;  Griffin  v.  Sanbornton,  44  N.  H. 
Daniel  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  246  ;  Tomlinson  v.  Derby,  43  Conn. 
5  H.  L.  45  ;  3  C.  P.  216,  591.  562;  Farrelly  v.  Cincinnati,  2  Disney, 

5  Hence  in  every  action  against  a  516.     See  §^  118,  332,  post. 
public  corporation  for  negligence  in  '  Blagrave  v.  Bristol  Water  Co.  1 
omitting    to    repair  a   bridge,    the  Hurlst.  &  N.  369. 


10] 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


3 


certain    thing   is   imposed,  the   question   ceases  to  be  one  of 
negligence.1 

§  10.  Duty  must  be  legal,  not  merely  moral. —  The  amount 
or  degree  of  care  which  it  is  the  duty  of  any  person  to  exer- 
cise, in  a  particular  case,  will  be  considered;  first,  under  the 
head  of  degrees  of  care,  and  next,  under  the  various  titles  into 
which  the  practical  application  of  these  general  principles  is 
divided.  But  it  may  be  well  to  state  here  the  universal  prin- 
ciple that,  as  the  duty,  the  breach  of  which  constitutes  negli- 
gence, must  be  a  legal  duty,  all  duties  of  imperfect  obligation, 
imposed  only  by  generosity,  kindness,  charity  or  even  abstract 
justice,  but  not  by  the  law  of  the  land,  are  necessarily  ex- 
cluded. Morally  speaking,  it  would  be  gross  negligence  for  a 
man  of  ordinary  strength  to  let  a  little  child  lie  helpless  when 
it  had  fallen  down,  and  he  could  easily  raise  it  and  show  it  the 
way  home ;  but  human  law  cannot  impose  such  a  duty,  because 
it  would  do  more  harm  than  good  to  attempt  to  enforce  such 
a  duty  by  an  action  for  damages.  Negligence,  therefore,  as 
the  term  is  used  in  law,  is  confined  to  a  neglect  of  that  kind 
and  degree  of  care  which  the  laiv  demands.  There  are  many 
cases  in  which  it  might  be  desirable  that  a  greater  degree  of 
care  should  be  used  than  the  law  requires;  but  it  is  only  the 
lack  of  such  care  or  diligence  as  the  law  demands,  in  the  par- 
ticular case,  which  constitutes  negligence.1 


1  See  Pennsylvania,  etc.  Canal  Co. 
v.  Graham,  63  Pa.  St.  290 ;  Hay  v. 
Cohoes  Co.,  2  N.  Y.  159;  McAndrews 
v.  Collerd,  42  N.  J. Law,  189;  Fletcher 
v.  Rylands,  L.  R.  3  H.  L.  330  ;  Couch 
v.  Steel,  3  El.  &  Bl.  402  [failure  to 
keep  a  proper  supply  of  medicines 
on  board  ship  as  required  by  statute]  ; 
Blamires  v.  Lancashire,  etc  R.  Co., 
L.  R.  8  Ex.  283  [non-compliance  with 
statutory  requirement  to  maintain 
means  of  communication  between 
passengers  and  guards];  Britton  v. 
Great  Western  Cotton  Co.,  L.  R.  7 
Ex.  130  [neglecting  statutory  duty  to 
fence  fly  wheel].  See  Hayes  v. 
Michigan  Central  R.  Co  ,  11 1  U.  S. 
228  and   cases  cited  under  §§  268, 


279,  post.  The  correctness  of  the  de- 
cision in  Couch  v.  Steel  was  doubted 
in  Atkinson  v.  Newcastle  Water  Co., 
L.  R.  2  Ex.  Div.  441. 

1  Dygert  v.  Bradley,  8  Wend.  469. 
Thus,  where  a  stone  was  thrown 
which  hit  plaintiff's  daughter  in  the 
eye,  but  it  did  not  appear  to  bave 
been  done  negligently,  the  defendant 
was  held  not  liable.  Yet  it  was 
obvious  that  there  must  have  been 
some  negligence.  (Harvey  v.  Dun- 
lop,  Hill  &  D.  Supp.  193.)  So,  where 
one  driving  a  wagon  on  the  highway 
with  all  due  care,  ran  over  a  child 
whom  he  did  not  see,  and  could  not 
reasonably  be  expected  to  see.  (Hart- 
field  v.  Roper,  21  Wend.  615.)    Cul- 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES. 


[§  II 


§  II.  No  unreasonable  duty  required. — The  law  makes  no 
unreasonable  demands.  It  does  not  require  from  any  man 
superhuman  wisdom  or  foresight.  Therefore  no  one  is  guilty 
of  negligence  by  reason  of  failing  to  take  precautions  which 
no  other  man  would  be  likely  to  take  under  the  same  circum- 
stances. If  one  uses  every  precaution  which  the  then  existing 
state  of  science  affords,1  and  which  the  most  prudent  man 
would  use  under  the  circumstances,  he  is  not  held  responsible 
for  omitting  other  precautions  which  are  conceivable,2  even 
though,  if  he  had  used  them,  the  injury  would  certainly  have 
been   avoided.3     If  he   uses  all  the  skill  and  diligence  which 


pable  negligence  is  the  omission  to 
do  that  which  a  reasonable,  prudent, 
and  honest  man  would  do  ;  or  doing 
that  which  such  a  man  would  not 
do  in  the  circumstances  of  a  particu- 
lar case  (Kay  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
65  Pa.  St.  269).  Negligence  is  "the 
absence  of  care  according  to  the  cir- 
cumstances'''' (Per  Paxson,  J.,  in  Phil- 
adelphia, etc.  R  Co.  v.  Stinger,  78 
Pa.  St.  225).  s.  P.,  Bunnell  v.  Ber- 
lin Iron  Bridge  Co.  66  Conn.  24  ;  3 
Atl.  533. 

1  See  Readhead  v.  Midland  R.  Co., 
L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  379 ;  McPadden  v.  N. 
Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  44  N.  Y.  478. 
Negligence  is  not  absolute  or  in- 
trinsic, but  always  relative  to  some 
circumstance  of  time,  place  or  per- 
son (Needham  v.  San  Francisco,  etc. 
R.  Co..  37  Cal.  410  ;  Smith  v.  Whit- 
tier,  95  Id.  279  ;  30  Pac.  529  ;  Elster 
v.  Springfield,  49  Ohio  St.  82;  30  N. 
E.  274). 

2  A  railroad  company  is  not  liable 
for  injuries  caused  by  sparks  from 
its  locomotives,  when  it  has  used 
all  the  means  known  to  science 
to  extinguish  them,  and  kept  a 
reasonable  watch  upon  the  track, 
even  though  it  might  have  prevented 
the  mischief  by  keeping  an  army  of 
men  to  watch  the  track  and  put  out 
the  sparks  (Rood  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie 
R.  Co.,  18  Barb.  80  ;  Vaughan  v.  Taff 


Vale  R.  Co.,  5  Hurlst.  &  N.  679;  re- 
versing s.  C.  3  Id.  743  ;  Philadelphia 
R.  Co.  v.  Yeiser,  8  Pa.  St.  366).  For 
other  cases  of  duty  to  prevent  spread 
of  fires  from  locomotives,  see^?  672, 
673, post.  The  mere  fact  that  a  better 
method  might  have  been  provided 
for  putting  a  machine  in  and  out  of 
gear  does  not  prove  negligence  in  not 
providing  it  (Jacobsen  v.  Cornelius, 
52  Hun,  377 ;  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  306). 
In  Lorimer  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co. 
(48  Minn.  391  ;  51  N.  W.  125),  an 
electric  railway  company  was  held 
not  liable  for  accidents  resulting 
from  its  non-use  of  a  device  the 
practical  utility  of  which  had  not 
then  been  demonstrated,  though  six 
months  after  the  accident  such  de- 
vice was  provided  on  all  its  cars.  Use 
of  improvement,  not  obligatory,  un- 
til its  actual  utility  or  superiority  is 
demonstrated  by  use  (Alabama,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Moody,  92  Ala.  279;  9  So. 
238).     See  §§  57,  58,  post. 

3  The  text,  thus  far,  is  cited  and 
approved  in  Parrott  v.  Wells,  15 
Wall.  524  [the  nitro-glycerine  case].* 
A  water-supplying  company  which 
had  constructed  its  works  upon  the 
best  known  system,  and  kept  them 
in  good  order  for  twenty-five  years, 
at  the  end  of  which  time  a  frost  of 
unprecedented  severity  caused  the 
pipes  to  burst,  held  not  liable  for  in- 


§12] 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


IO 


can  be  attained  by  reasonable  means,  he  is  not  responsible  for 
failure.4  Indeed,  as  will  be  hereafter  seen,  he  is  not  bound  to 
use  even  as  much  as  this.  But  the  mere  fact,  that  the  precau- 
tions necessary  to  avoid  injury  to  others  are  so  expensive  as  to 
consume  all  the  profits  of  the  business,  is  not  enough  to  show 
that  such  precautions  are  unreasonable.5  Where  a  statute 
imposes  a  duty  for  the  public  benefit,  it  is  to  be  presumed,  in 
the  absence  of  very  clear  language  to  the  contrary,  that  it  was 
only  intended  to  require  the  use  of  care  and  diligence,  and  not 
to  make  any  one,  and  especially  not  a  public  body,  absolutely 
responsible  for  the  performance  of  the  act  prescribed,  when 
no  practicable  degree  of  care  and  diligence  would  have  called 
for  such  performance.6 


§  12.  In  determining  duty,  regard  to  be  had  to  era. — In 

determining  what  is  the  duty,  the  failure  in  which  constitutes 


juries  caused  thereby.  (Blyth  v. 
Birmingham  Water  Co.  11  Exch. 
781.)  s.  P.  as  to  a  dam  (Cottrell  v. 
Marshall  Infirmary,  70  Hun,  495  ;  24 
N.  Y.  Supp.  381).  Instructions  that 
a  carrier  was  liable  for  the  fall  of  a 
passenger  ' '  if  the  fall  could  have 
been  averted  by  the  skill  or  care  of 
the  defendant,  "were  held  erroneous. 
(Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Trotter,  61 
Miss.  417.)  Instructions  that  a  horse- 
car  company  was  bound  ' '  as  far  as 
human  foresight  and  care  would 
enable  it,  to  carry  the  plaintiff  with 
safety,"  held,  erroneous  (Louisville 
R.  Co.  v.  Weams,  80  Ky.  420).  S.  P. 
East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Aiken, 
89  Tenn.  245  ;  14  S.  W.  1082  [protec- 
tion against  contact  with  machin- 
ery]. 

4  Taylor  v.  Atlantic  Ins.  Co.,  9 
Bosw.  369  ;  McKinnon  v.  Norcross, 
148  Mass.  533  ;  20  N.  E.  183  [furnish- 
ing supply  of  new  rope  to  foreman, 
for  derrick,  if  old  one  proved  insuffi- 
cient]. 

6  Where  plaintiff,  passing  along  a 
road,  was  injured  by  defendant's 
negligently  blasting  without  cover- 


ing the  mine,  the  defendant  cannot 
answer  that  the  profits  of  the  busi- 
ness do  not  warrant  the  expense  of 
such  precautions.  The  question  of 
necessity  is  for  the  jury.  (Beau- 
champ  v.  Saginaw  Mining  Co.,  50 
Mich.  163.) 

6  Hence,  a  public  body,  charged  by 
statute  with  a  duty,  absolute  in 
terms,  to  cleanse  its  sewers,  is  not  to 
be  held  liable  for  not  keeping  its 
sewers  cleansed  at  all  events  and 
under  all  circumstances  (Hammond 
v.  St.  Pancras,  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  316). 
The  defendant's  charter  required  it 
to  maintain  booms  "sufficiently 
strong  to  secure  all  the  lumber  con- 
tained therein."  Held,  not  to  re- 
quire the  performance  of  what  in 
the  nature  of  the  case  cannot  be  per- 
formed ;  that  if  the  defendant's 
boom  broke  from  inevitable  acci- 
dent, the  defendant  was  not  respon- 
sible. (Brown  v.  Susquehanna  Boom 
Co.,  109  Pa.  St  57;  1  Atl.  156.)  To 
same  effect  is  Murray  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co..  3  Abb.  Ct.  App.  339 
[railroad  fence  blown  down  in  night 
time].     See  §  282,  post. 


II 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES. 


[§i3 


negligence,  regard  is  to  be  had  to  the  growth  of  science,  and 
the  improvement  in  the  arts,  which  take  place  from  generation 
to  generation  ;:  and  many  acts  or  omissions  are  now  evidence 
of  gross  carelessness,  which  a  few  years  ago  would  not  have 
been  culpable  at  all,  as  many  acts  are  now  consistent  with 
great  care  and  skill,  which  in  a  few  years  will  be  considered 
the  height  of  imprudence.  Thus,  the  introduction  of  the 
steam  engine  has  made  it  necessary  that  more  care  should 
often  be  used  in  the  management  of  horses  than  was  formerly 
necessary;  the  invention  of  the  safety  lamp  made  it  a  careless 
act  to  enter  a  bituminous  coal  mine  with  an  open  candle;  and 
the  invention  of  improved  tools,  machinery,  and  modes  of 
working,  has  made  it  negligent  to  use  old-fashioned  and  more 
dangerous  ones.2 

§  13.  Violation  of  duty  imposed  by  statute  or  ordinance. — 

The  violation  of  any  statutory  or  valid  municipal  regulation, 
established  for  the  benefit  of  private  persons,  is  of  itself 
sufficient  to  prove  such  a  breach  of  duty  as  will  sustain  a 
private  action  for  negligence,  brought  by  a  person  belonging 
to  the  protected  class,  if  the  other  elements  of  actionable  neg- 
ligence concur.1     Thus,  the  violation  of  a  statute  or  ordinance 


1  See  Meier  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
64  Pa.  St.  225  and  cases  supra. 

■  Defendant's  servant  was  drill- 
ing a  hole  in  a  gas-main,  in  a 
thoroughfare,  using  for  the  purpose 
a  "  diamond  point"  chisel,  which 
caused  particles  of  iron  to  fly  off,  and 
injured  plaintiff's  eye.  Held,  that 
the  accident  would  have  been 
avoided  by  drilling  or  screening,  and 
defendant  was  liable  (Cleveland  v. 
Spier,  16  C.  B.  N.  S.  399  ;  §  673, 2>ost). 
The  fact  that  shafts  having  project- 
ing bolts  were  in  common  use  in 
mines  without  being  covered  will 
not  relieve  a  mining  company  from 
liability  for  injuries  caused  by  un- 
guarded bolts  (Homestake  Min.  Co. 
v.  Fullerton,  16  C.  C.  A.  545;  64  Fed. 

So  held,  as   to   statutes   (Union 


Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  152  U.  S. 
262  ;  14  S.  Ct.  619  ;  Queen  v.  Dayton 
Coal,  etc.  Co.,  95Tenn.  458;  3:  S.  W. 
460  [child  employed  in  mining,  con- 
trary to  statute,  can  recover  there- 
for]). So  held,  as  to  city  ordinances 
(Jetter  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  2  Abb.  Ct. 
App.  458  [running  train  at  greater 
speed  than  allowed  by  city  ordi- 
nance] ;  Massoth  v.  Delaware,  etc. 
Canal  Co.,  64  N.  Y.  524  [violation  of 
ordinance  as  to  rate  of  speed  at 
street  crossing] ;  McGrath  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  63  Id.  522;  Lane  v.  At- 
lantic Works,  111  Mass.  136  ;  Toledo, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Deacon,  63  111.  91  ; 
Devlin  v.  Gallagher,  6  Daly,  494 ; 
Langhoff  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
19  Wise.  515  ;  Mueller  v.  Milwaukee 
R.  Co  ,  86  Id.  340;  56  N.  W.  914) .  On 
this  point.  Brown  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R. 


§13] 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES. 


12 


regulating  the  speed  of  vehicles,  horses,  or  trains,2  or  requiring 
special  signals  or  warnings  to  be  given  upon  their  approach,3 
or  lights  to  be  shown,4  or  requiring  buildings  to  have  fire 
escapes,5  trap  doors,"  or  requiring  "  splices "  on  electric 
wires  to  be  perfectly  insulated,7  is  such  a  breach  of  duty  as 
may    be   made  the  foundation   of  an    action    by   any    person 


Co.  22  N.  Y.  191,  is  completely  over- 
ruled (Massoth  v.  Delaware,  etc. 
Canal  Co.,  supra).  Violation  of  city 
ordinance  does  not,  however,  neces- 
sarily make  injury  willful  (Illinois, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hetherington,  83  111. 
510).  There  are  cases  in  which  it 
was  decided  that  this  principle  ap- 
plied to  city  ordinances  (Heeney  v. 
Sprague,  11  R.  I.  456  ;  Phila.  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ervin,  89  Pa.  St.  71.)  But 
such  ruling  was  not  necessary  to  a 
decision,  and  the  overwhelming 
weight  of  authority  is  against  them. 
They  are  well  reviewed  in  Bott  v. 
Pratt,  33  Minn.  323 ;  23  N.  W.  237. 
A  mere  request  of  village  authorities 
to  a  railroad  company,  to  erect  gates 
at  street  crossings,  imposed  no  duty 
upon  the  latter  to  do  so)  Daniels 
v.  Staten  Island,  etc.  R.  Co.,  125  N. 
Y.  407  ;  26  N.  E.  466  ;  compare  Mer- 
rigan  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  154  Mass. 
189  ;  28  N.  E.  149). 

2Beisiegel  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
14  Abb.  N.  S.  29  ;  Pennsylvania  Co. 
v.  Conlan,  101  111.  93  ;  Baltimore  R. 
Co.  v.  McDonnell,  43  Md.  552  ; 
Liddy  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
40  Mo.  506  ;  Langhoff  v.  Milwaukee, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  19  Wise.  515;  Hoppe  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  01  Id.  357;  21 
N.  W.  227;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mathias,  50  Ind.  65  ;  Pennsylvania 
Co.  v.  Hensil.  70  Id.  569 ;  Cleve- 
land, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrington,  131 
Id.  426  ;  30  N.  E.  37;  Pennsylvania 
Co.  v.  Horton.  132  Ind.  189;  31 
N.  E.  45  ;  Bluedorn  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  R  Co.,  108  Mo.  430;  18  S.  W. 
1103;  Dahlstrom  v.    St.    Louis,  etc. 


R.  Co.,  108  Mo.  525;  18  S.  W.  919; 
South,  etc.  Ala.  R.  Co.  v.  Donovan, 
84  Ala.  141  ;  4  So.  142;  and  cases, 
supra. 

3  Such  as  sounding  bell  or  whistle 
(McGrath  v.  N.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  63  N. 
Y.  522  ;  Jetter  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  2 
Abb.  Ct.  App.  458;  Lane  v.  Atlantic 
Works,  111  Mass.  136;  Howenstein 
v.  Pacific R.  Co.,  5>  Mo  33  ;  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Boggs,  101  Ind.  522  ; 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Walborn, 
127  Ind.  142  ;  26  N.  E.  207;  Evans  v. 
Concord  R.  Co.  [N.  H.]  21  Atl.  105  ; 
Kenney  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  105 
Mo.  270  ;  16  S.  W.  837  ;  Western  Rail- 
way v.  Sistrunk,  85  Ala.  352;  5  So. 
79  ;  Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  17 
Colo.  98;  28  Pac.  79;  San  Antonio, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowles,  88  Tex.  634  ; 
32  S.  W.  880  ;  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Winters,  85  Tenn.  240;  1  S.  W. 
790  [a  peculiar  statute].) 

4  Whittaker  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  51 
N.  Y.  Superior,  287. 

6  Pauley  v.  Steam  Gauge,  etc.  Co., 
131  N.  Y.  90 ;  29  N.  E.  999 ;  30  Id. 
865  ;  McLaughlin  v.  Armfield,  58 
Hun,  370  ;  12  N.  Y  Supp.  164  ;  Gor- 
man v.  McArdle,  67  Hun,  484;  22 
N.  Y.  Supp.  479  ;  The  Frank  P.  Lee, 
34  Fed.  480  ;  affi'g  30  Id.  277.  But 
compare  Maker  v.  Slater  Mill  Co., 
15  R.  I.  112  ;  23  Atl.  63. 

6McRickard  v.  Flint,  114  N.  Y. 
222;  21  N.  E.  153;  Freeman  v.  Glens 
Falls  Mill  Co.,  61  Hun,  125  ;  15  N.  Y. 
Supp.  657. 

7  Clements  v.  Louisiana  Electric 
Light  Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  692  ;  11 
So.  51. 


13  GENERAL   PRINCIPLES.  [§   1 3 

belonging  to  the  class  intended  to  be  protected  by  such  a 
regulation,  provided  he  is  specially  injured  thereby.  The 
violation  of  such  a  statute  of  the  United  States  may  be  made 
the  basis  of  an  action  for  negligence  in  a  state  court.3  These 
principles  apply,  not  only  where  the  statute  or  ordinance 
declares  that  persons  violating  it  shall  be  liable  for  any  damage 
sustained  by  reason  of  its  breach,9  but  also  where  it  contains 
no  such  provisions,  and  simply  imposes  a  penalty  by  way  of 
fine  or  otherwise,  for  disobedience.10  Nor  is  the  plaintiff,  in 
such  a  case,  bound  to  prove  that  the  act  required  by  the  law 
Was-~e«e  which,  by  its  nature,  was  essential  to  the  exercise  of 
due  care  by  the  defendant.11  It  is  held  in  New  York,12  and 
Pennsylvania,13  that  the  violation  of  a  statute  or  ordinance  of 
this  kind  is  not  negligence  as  matter  of  law,  but  only  "  some 
evidence  of  negligence."  In  other  states,  such  as  Georgia, 
Indiana,  Missouri,  Wisconsin,  Minnesota  and  Colorado,  such 
violation  is  "  negligence  per  se."u  It  seems  to  us  that  the  true 
rule  is,  in  all  such  cases,  that  the  violation  of  such  a  statute  or 
ordinance  should  always  be  deemed  presumptive  evidence  of 
negligence,  which,  if  not  excused  by  other  evidence,  including 
all  the  surrounding  circumstances,  should  be  deemed  conclu- 
sive. But,  if  it  appears  upon  the  whole  evidence  that  the  cir- 
cumstances were  such  as  would  convince  a  prudent  man  that 
the  real  object  which  the  legislators  had  in  view  would  be  much 
better  served  by  the   breach  of  a  technical  rule  than  by  its 

8  Carroll  v.  Staten  Island  R.  Co.,  reaffirmed  (Moore  v.  Gadsden,  93 
58  N.  Y.  126  ;  Van  Norden  v.  Rob-  N.  Y,  12 ;  Rochester  v.  Campbell,  123 
inson,  45  Hun,  567  [steamboat  not  Id.  405;  Chrystal  v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co., 
inspected].  124  Id.  519). 

9  This  was  the  case  in  Carroll  v.  13  Connor  v.  Electric  Traction  Co., 
Staten  Island  R.  Co.,  supra.  173  Pa.  St.  602;  34  Atl.  238. 

10  Most  of  the  cases  already  cited  I4  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Young, 
belong  to  this  class,  especially  under  81  Ga.  397  ;  7  S.E.  912  ;  Central  Rail- 
note  1  of  this  section.  road,  etc.  Co.  v.  Curtis,  87  Ga.  416  ;  13 

11  Jetter  v.  N.Y.&  Harlem  R.  Co.,  S.  E.  757;  Indiana,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
2  Abb  Ct.  App.  458.  Barnhart,  115  Ind.  399  ;  16  N.  E.  121; 

12  Knupfle  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Bott  v.  Pratt,  33  Minn.  323;  23  N.  W. 
Co.,  84  N.  Y.  488  ;  applied  to  statutes.  237  ;  Smith  v.  Milwaukee  Builders' 
MrRickard  v.  Flint,  114  N.  Y.  222  ;  etc.  Exch  ,  91  Wise.  360;  64  N.  W. 
21  N  E.  153.  Seethe  first  case  criti-  1041  :  Keim  v.  Union  R.  Co.,  90  Mo. 
ciaed  and  disapproved  (Bott  v.  Pratt,  314;  2  S.  W.  427;  Platte,  etc.  Canal 
33    Minn.   323;   23   N.  W.   237)  but  Co.  v.  Dowell,  17  Colo.  376  ;30Pac.  68. 


§  14]  GENERAL   PRINCIPLES.  14 

strict  observance,  the  defendant  should  not  be  held  guilty  of 
negligence  in  such  a  breach.  And  such  negligence  may  not 
necessarily  warrant  recovery  of  "damages ;  for  it  must  be  a 
cause  of  the  injury.15  It  is  certainly  wrong  to  instruct  a  jury 
that  mere  proof  of  such  negligence  entitles  the  plaintiff  to 
recover.10  Therefore,  under  special  circumstances,  the  jury 
might  excuse  an  omission  to  give  signals,  required  by  a 
statute,  as  prudent  under  those  circumstances.17 

§  13a.  Regulations  for  public  benefit  only. —  The  breach  of 
regulations,  which  are  established  for  the  public  benefit  only, 
and  not  for  the  benefit  of  individuals,  does  not  furnish  a 
ground  of  private  action.  Thus,  under  a  statute  or  ordinance 
requiring  lot  owners  to  keep  sidewalks  in  repair  or  free  from 
ice,  persons  injured  by  failure  to  do  so  cannot  recover  from  the 
lot  owners.1  The  remedy  is  against  the  municipality  alone. 
It  follows  that  the  municipality,  after  paying  damages  in  such 
a  case,  cannot  recover  from  the  lot  owner.2 

§  14.  A  personal  duty  cannot  be  delegated. — One  who  is 

personally  bound  to  perform  a  duty  cannot  relieve  himself 
from  the  burden  of  such  obligation  by  any  contract  which  he 
may  make  for  its  performance  by  another  person.  Therefore, 
the  fact  that  he  may  have  used  the  utmost  care  in  select- 
ing an  agent  to  perform  this  duty,1  or  that  he  has  entered  into 
a  contract  with  any  person  by  which  the  latter  undertakes  to 
perform  the  duty,  is  no  excuse  to  the  person  upon  whom  the 
obligation  originally  rested,  in  case  of  failure  of  performance. 

15  Christner  v.  Cumberland,  etc.  Gray,  249  ;  Moore  v.  Gadsden,  93  N. 
Coal  Co.,  146  Pa.  St.  67;  23  Atl.  221 ;  Y.  12  ;  Taylor  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc,  R. 
Bott  t.  Pratt,  supra.  Co.,  45  Mich.  74;  Heeney  v.  Sprague, 

16  Van  Raden  v.  N.  Y. ,  New  Haven,  11  R.  I.  456.     See  §  343,  post. 

etc.    R.  Co.   56  Hun,    96  ;    8  N.   Y.  2  Rochester  v.  Campbell,  123  N.  Y. 

Supp.  914.  405;  Hartford  v.  Talcott,  48  Conn. 

11  Wakefield  v.  Connecticut,  etc.  R.  525. 

Co.,  37  Vt.  330;  recognized   in   Bott  'Rochester    White    Lead    Co.    v. 

v.   Pratt,    supra ;   and    see    Central  Rochester,  3  N.  Y.  463  [constructing 

Railroad,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brunswick,  etc.  street  sewer]  ;  Grote  v.  Chester,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  87  Ga.  386;  13  S.  E.  520  ;  and  R.  Co., 2  Exch.  251.     But  see  Sutton 

see  §  27,  post.  v.  Clarke,  6  Taunt.  29  ;  Hall  v.  Smith, 

1  Flynn  v.  Canton  Co.,  40  Md.  312;  2  Bing.  156. 
Kirby    v.    Boylston,    etc.    Asso.,  14 


i5 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


[§i5 


His  obligation  is  to  do  the  thing,  not  merely  to  employ 
another  to  do  it.2  Thus,  a  municipal  corporation,  bound  to 
repair  its  streets,  is  not  relieved  from  liability  for  non-repair 
by  the  fact  that  it  has  made  a  contract  for  such  repairs  with 
a  responsible  and  competent  person;3  and  a  railroad  company 
cannot  defend  itself  against  the  claims  of  passengers  for  in- 
juries, by  showing  that  it  has  employed  the  best  servants  that 
it  could  possibly  obtain,4  or  purchased  its  locomotives  and 
cars  at  the  best  factories.5 

§  15.  No  negligence  where  there  is  no  breach  of  duty. — 

As  a  matter  of  course,  there  can  be  no  negligence  where  there 
is  no  breach  of  duty.  It  must  appear,  therefore,  not  only  that 
the  defendant  owed  a  duty,  but  also  that  he  did  not  perform 


2 Hole  v.  Sittingbourne  R.  Co.,  6 
Hurlst.  &  N.  488  ;  Pickard  v.  Smith, 
10  C.  B.  N.  S.  480.  In  the  latter  case 
the  distinction  is  clearly  pointed  out 
between  the  responsibility  of  a  person 
who  causes  something  to  be  done 
which  is  wrongful,  or  fails  to  perform 
something  which  there  was  a  legal 
obligation  on  him  to  perform,  and 
the  liability  for  the  negligence  of 
those  who  are  employed  in  the  work. 
Williams,  J.,  said:  "  If  the  perform- 
ance of  the  duty  be  omitted,  the  fact 
of  his  having  intrusted  it  to  a  person 
who  also  neglected  it,  furnishes  no 
excuse,  either  in  good  sense  or  in 
good  law."  See  Mersey  Docks  v. 
Gibbs  (L.  R.  1  H.  L.  93),  where  many 
cases  on  this  point  are  reviewed; 
Blackstock  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co., 
20  N.  Y.  48  [carrier's  failure  to  de- 
liver freight,  caused  by  servants' 
strike] :  Weed  v.  Panama  R.  Co.  17 
N.  Y.  362  [detention  of  passenger 
train  by  company's  servants].  See 
§  176, pout.  One  contracting  to  do 
an  unlawful  thing,  such  as  making 
excavations  in  a  highway,  or  cutting 
into  a  party-wall  and  the  like,  cannot 
relieve    himself    from     liability    by 


having  the  contractor  stipulate  to 
guard  against  accidents.  (Dygert 
v.  Schenck,  23  Wend.  446  ;  Congreve 
v.  Smith,  18  N.  Y.  79;  Creed  v. 
Hartmann,  29  Id  591;  Hawver  v. 
Whalen,  49  Ohio  St.  69  ;  29  N.  E.  1049; 
Waller  v.  Lasher,  37  111.  App.  609. 

3Storrs  v.  Utica,  17  N.  Y.  104; 
Grote  v.  Chester,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  2  Exch. 
251  ;  Allen  v.  Hay  ward,  7  Q.  B.  960. 
It  is  no  excuse  for  a  city,  leaving  a 
street  unlighted  at  night,  that  the 
city  had  contracted  with  another  to 
light  the  street  (Hayes  v.  West  Bay 
City,  91  Mich.  418;  15  N.  W.  1067). 
For  other  cases  see  §  297,  post, 

4  Thus,  if  by  reason  of  work  done 
by  a  railroad  company  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  their  track,  a  stone  rolls 
on  the  track  and  obstructs  it,  that 
work  being  such  that  any  negligence 
in  its  performance  would  be  likely  to 
cause  such  an  obstruction,  they  are 
liable  to  a  passenger  for  an  accident 
caused  by  the  obstruction,  although 
they  employed  a  skilled  contractor 
to  perform  the  work  (Virginia,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Sanger,  15  Gratt.  230.) 

5  Hegeman  v.  Western  R.  Co.,  13 
N.  Y.  9. 


§  1 6]  GENERAL   PRINCIPLES.  l6 

it.     If,  therefore,  the  accident  complained  of  was  inevitable,  it 
is  not  a  case  of  negligence. 

§  16.  Inevitable  accident.  —  Inevitable  accident  is  a 
broader  term  than  "  the  act  of  God."  That  implies  the 
intervention  of  some  cause,  not  of  human  origin  and  not 
controllable  by  human  power.1  An  accident  is  inevitable, 
if  the  person  by  whom  it  occurs  neither  has,  nor  is  legally 
bound  to  have,  sufficient  power  to  avoid  it  or  prevent  its 
injuring  another.2  In  such  a  case,  the  essential  element  of 
a  legal  duty  is  wanting;  and  it  cannot,  therefore,  be  a  case 
of  negligence.  Therefore,  no  one  can  be  made  responsible 
for  damage  caused  to  another  by  an  act  which  is  strictly 
lawful  under  all  the  circumstances,  unless  he  has  been  neg- 
ligent in  the  manner  of  doing  the  act.3  Thus,  a  carrier,  who 
had  unwittingly  received  a  parcel  of  nitro-glycerine,  which 
exploded  on  the  way,  was  held  not  liable  for  damage  done 
thereby.4  So,  one  who,  in  self-defense,  justifiably  fires  a 
pistol  at  an  assailant,  and  in  so  doing  accidentally  shoots 
an  innocent  person,  is  not  liable   for  the  damage  thus  done.5 

1  Nugent  v.  Smith,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  was  applied  in  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Div.  428  ;  Forward  v.  Pittard,  1  T.  R.  Lackey  (78  111.  55),  notwithstanding 
27;  Merritt  v.  Earle,  29  N.  Y.  115  ;  a  statute  which  made  railroad  corn- 
Hays  v.  Kennedy,  41  Pa.  St.  378.  panies  chargeable  for  all  funeral  ex- 
See  Blythe  v.  Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.,  15  penses  in  case  of  persons  dying  or 
Colo.  333 ;  25  Pac.  702.  killed  by  accident  upon  their  cars. 

2  See  Carstairs  v.  Taylor,  L.  R.  6  4  Parrot  v.  Wells,  15  Wall.  524. 
Ex.  217;  Blyth  v.  Birmingham  Water  J  5  Morris  v.  Piatt.  32  Conn.  75  ;  s.  P. 
Co.  11  Exch.  781;  Losee  v.  Buchanan,  Paxton  v.  Boyer,  67  111.  132  ;  16  Am. 
51  N.  Y.  476  [boiler  explosion]  ;  Dob-  Rep.  615.  The  burden  is  on  def end- 
bins  v.  Brown,  119  Id.  188  ;  23  N.  E.  ant  to  prove  that  the  gun  was  not 
537  [stopping  of  hoisting  apparatus] ;  either  intentionally  or  negligently 
Reiss  v.  N.  Y.  Steam  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  aimed  at  the  person  shot  (Atchi- 
103  ;  28  N.  E.  24  [escape  of  steam  from  son  v.  Dullam,  16  111.  App.  42).  See 
heating  apparatus]  ;  Cosulich  v.  also,  Moebus  v.  Becker,  46  N.  J. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  122 N.Y.I  18;  25  N.  Law,  41  ;  Bradley  v.  Andrews,  51 
E.  259  [explosion  of  oil,  communi-  Vt.  530 ;  Hankins  v.  Watkins,  77 
eating  fire  to  plaintiff's  property].  Hun,  360  ;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  867  [hunt- 

3  Parrot  v.  Wells,  15  Wall.  524;  ing  accident].  Where  the  def endant, 
Losee  v.  Buchanan,  51  N.  Y.  476  ;  in  endeavoring  to  separate  his  dog 
Searles  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  101  Id.  from  another  with  which  it  was 
661  ;  Brown  v.  Collins,  53  N.  H.  442  ;  fighting,  accidentally  struck  the 
Vaughan  v.  Taff  Vale  R.  Co.,  5  Hurlst.  owner  of  the  latter  dog,  it  was  held, 
<&  N.  678.     The  doctrine  of  the  text  that  he  was  not  liable  for  his  acci- 


17 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


[§16 


Many  other  instances  might  be  cited.6  Much  less  can  any 
one  be  held  guilty  of  negligence,  when  the  injury  of  which 
he  is  the  alleged  cause  is  caused  solely  by  the  "  act  of  God,"7 


dental    blow  (Brown   v.    Kendall,  6 
Cush.  292). 

6  Dygert  v.  Bradley,  8  Wend.  473 
[canal  boats'  collision]  ;  Harvey  v. 
Dunlop,  Hill  &  D.  Supp.  1 93  [throw- 
ing stone]  ;  Calkins  v.  Barger,  41 
Barb.  424  [fire]  ;  Aldridge  v.  Great 
Western  R.  Co.,  3  Man.  &  G.  515; 
McGrew  v.  Stone,  53  Pa.  St.  436; 
Lawler  v.  Baring  Boom  Co.,  56  Me. 
443  ;  Boland  v.  Missouri  R.  Co.,  36 
Mo.  484  ;  Garris  v.  Portsmouth,  etc. 
R.  Co. ,  2  Ired.  Law,  324  ;  Harding  v. 
Fahey,  1  Greene,  377  ;  Wabash,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Locke,  112  Ind.  404 ;  14  N. 
E.  391';  O'Connor  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  83  Iowa,  105  ;  48  N.  W.  1002  ; 
Brown  v.  Collins,  53  N.  H.  442  [fright- 
ened horse].  In  the  last  case  the  ques- 
tion of  inevitable  accident  is  fully 
stated  and  discussed,  with  reference 
to  leading  cases,  by  Doe,  J.  See  £§ 
626,  647,  post. 

1  Nugent  v.  Smith,  L.  R.  1  C.  P. 
Div.  444  (per  James,  L.  J.) ;  Nichols 
v.  Marsland,  L.  R.  10  Ex.  255; 
affi'd.  2  Ex.  Div.  1 ;  Nitrophosphate 
Co.,  v.  London,  etc.  Dock  Co.  L.  R. 
9Ch.  Div.  303;  River  Wear  Co.  v. 
Adamson,  L.  R.  2  App.  Cas.  743 ; 
Blyth  v.  Birmingham  Water  Works 
Co.  11  Exch.  781.  A  storm  may  be 
of  such  unusual  violence  as  properly 
to  be  the  "  act  of  God  "  (Nichols  v. 
Marsland.  L.  R.  10  Ex.  255,  per 
Bramwell,  B).  A  railroad  embank- 
ment which  had  been  standing  five 
years  in  a  country  subject  to  floods, 
was  undermined  by  an  extraordinary 
flood,  and  sank  in  the  night-time,  by 
reason  of  which  an  express  train  left 
the  line  anda  passenger  was  injured, 
Held,  "  the  company  was  not  bound 
to  have  constructed  their  embank- 
ment so  as  to  meet  such  extra- 
Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  2 


ordinary  floods"  (Withers  v.  North 
Kent  R.  Co.,  3  Hurlst.  &  N.  969). 
The  same  rule  prevails  generally  in 
this  country  (International,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Halloran,  53  Tex.  46  ;  s.  c. 
37  Am.  Rep.  744  ;  Gillespie  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  6  Mo.  App.  554). 
The  following  were  cases  of  extra- 
ordinary floods  or  other  causes  at- 
tributed to  the  act  of  God,  and  not 
ordinarily  foreseen  and  preventable, 
and  for  which  there  was  no  liability: 
China  v.  Southwick,  12  Me.  238; 
Lapham  v.  Curtis,  5  Vt.  371  ;  Shrews- 
bury v.  Smith,  12  Cush.  177;  Oak- 
ham v.  Holbrook,  11  Id.  299  ;  Wendell 
v.  Pratt,  12  Allen,  464 ;  Bell  v.  Mc- 
Clintock,  9  Watts,  119;  Lehigh 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Lehigh  Coal,  etc.  Co., 
4  Rawle,  9  ;  Higgins  v.  Chesapeake, 
etc.  Canal  Co.,  3  Harr.  411 ;  Morris 
Canal  Co.  v.  Ryerson,  27  N.  J.  Law, 
457  ;  Richardson  v.  Kier,  34  Cal.  64  ; 
Everett  v.  Hydraulic  Flume  Co.,  23 
Id.  225;  Campbell  v.  Bear  River  Co., 
35  Id.  679  ;  Hoffman  v.  Tuolumne 
Water  Co.,  10  Id.  413;  Wolf  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  Water  Co.,  10  Id.  541; 
Piedmont,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McKenzie, 
75  Md.  458  ;  24  Atl.  157  ;  Central 
R.  etc.  Co.  v.  Kent,  87  Ga.  402  ;  13 
S.  E.  502  [water  spout  washing  out 
culvert]  ;  Black  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  30  Neb.  197;  46  N.  W.  428  [snow 
storm  preventing  moving  of  trains]  ; 
Smith  v.  Western  R.  of  Ala.,  91  Ala. 
455  ;  8  So.  754  [sudden  and  unpre- 
cedented overflow  of  river]  ;  Slater 
v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  29  S.  C. 
96  ;  6  S.  E.  936  [earthquake] ;  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  72  Tex. 
9">  ;  10  S.  W.  325  [sudden  freezing 
and  thawing].  See  other  cases 
cited  under  §£  665,  668,  686,  728,  732, 
post. 


§i7] 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


or    a    public    enemy,8    within    the    legal    meaning    of    those 
phrases. 

§  17.  Apparent  exceptions  to  rule  as  to  inevitable  acci- 
dent.—  In  the  nature  of  things,  there  can  be  no  exception  to 
this  rule.  But  there  has  been  such  conflict  in  its  application 
as  to  create  some  seeming  exceptions.  These  relate  chiefly  to 
the  keeping  of  dangerous  things.  Thus,  in  England,  it  was 
long  adjudged  that  every  man  was  bound,  at  his  own  peril,  to 
keep  his  own  fire  on  his  own  land,  and  that,  if  he  kindled  a 
fire,  whether  purposely  or  by  accident,  he  was  liable  for  its 
spread  upon  adjoining  land,  quite  irrespective  of  any  negli- 
gence on  his  part.1  This  doctrine  was  relaxed  by  statute.2 
At  a  very  recent  date,  it  was  also  adjudged  that  one  who  col- 
lects a  vast  mass  of  water  on  his  land,  which,  in  its  nature, 
must  be  destructive  if  it  escapes,  is  bound  absolutely  to  keep 
it  safely  there,  and  is  liable  for  its  escape,  even  though  he  may 
be  entirely  free  from  the  faintest  shade  of  negligence.3  And 
it  has  generally  been  held  that  one  who  keeps  wild  and  savage 
animals  must  keep  them  at  his  own  peril,  and  is  liable  for  all 
injuries  done  by  them  if  they  escape,  although  such  escape 
was  caused  by  inevitable  accident.4  But  all  these  decisions,  if 
correct,  simply  take  these  cases  out  of  the  realm  of  negligence 
and  put  them  in  the  same  class  with  the  liability  of  common 
carriers  of  goods.  No  question  of  care,  diligence  or  skill  is 
involved,  and  therefore  no  negligence.     The  mere  act  of  keep- 


8  Where  a  railroad  train  is,  with- 
out fault  on  the  part  of  the  company, 
precipitated  into  a  chasui,  spanned 
by  a  bridge  destroyed  by  an  armed 
force  of  the  enemy,  the  carrier  is  not 
liable  (Sawyer  v.  Hannibal,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  37  Mo.  240). 

1  Beaulieu  v.  Finglam,  2  H.  IV, 
fol.  18,  pi.  6;  cited,  22  N.  Y.  366. 
No  negligence  was  pleaded  in  that 
case. 

2  These  statutes  related  only  to 
purely  accidental  fires  (Filliter  v. 
Phippard,  11  Q.  B.  347). 

3  Fletcher  v.  Rylands,  L.  R.  3  H. 
L.  330.     This  rule  has  been  applied 


to  the  growing  of  a  poisonous  tree. 
If  its  branches  extended  over  a 
neighbor's  land,  the  owner  of  the  tree 
is  held  liable  for  all  injuries  done 
thereby  to  animals  eating  the  leaves 
(Crowhurst  v.  Amersham  Board,  L. 
R.  4  Ex.  Div.  5). 

4  May  v.  Burdett,  9  Q.  B.  101. 
This  rule  as  to  wild  and  savage  ani- 
mals, was  approved  in  Van  Leuven 
v.  Lyke  (1  N.  Y.  515),  but  that  was 
only  a  dictum,  and  may  well  stand 
upon  the  ground  that  they  are  a 
nuisance.  The  law  of  negligence 
does  not  apply  to  nuisances  (Heeg 
v.  Licht,  80  N.  Y.  579). 


19  GENERAL    PRINXIPLES.  [§  1 8 

ing  a  savage  and  dangerous  animal  may  indeed  be  well  deemed 
an  act  of  negligence.  The  old  English  rule  as  to  fire  is  uni- 
versally  considered  never  to  have  been  law  in  this  country;5 
and  the  modern  extension  of  this  rule  to  accumulations  of 
watei,  is  rejected  in  New  York.6  New  Hampshire,"  Vermont,8 
Ne_w  Tersey,9  California,10  though  accepted  in  Massachusetts11 
and  Minnesota,1-  where  the  principle  is  applied  to  other  cases. 

§  18.  What  is  not  inevitable  accident. —  But  in  order  to 
prove  that  an  accident  was  inevitable,  it  is  not  always  enough 
to  show  that,  under  the  circumstances  existing  at  the  time,  it 
could  not  have  been  then  avoided.  It  must  also  be  the  fact 
that  the  defendant  was  not  guilty  of  any  negligence  which 
brought  about  any  of  those  circumstances.1  For  if,  by  pre- 
vious negligence,  he  brought  himself  or  his  property  into  cir- 
cumstances of  such  difficulty  or  peril  as  to  make  it  impossible 
for  him  to  escape  from  them  without  injuring  his  neighbor,  he 
cannot  excuse  himself  by  showing  that  he  would  have  done 
more  injury,  if  he  had  not  attempted  to  escape.  His  original 
fault  deprives  him  of  the  right  to  plead  inevitable  accident.8 

5  Ryan  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  against  another  (Leame  v.  Bray,  3 
35  N.  Y.  210 ;  Losee  v.  Buchanan,  51  East,  593),  or  pulls  the  wrong  rein 
N.  Y.  476.     See  §§  665,  728,  post.  (Wakenian  v.  Robinson,  1  Bing.  213). 

6  See  Losee  v.  Buchanan,  supra.  See  Shawhan  v.  Clarke,  24  La.  Ann. 

I  Brown  v.  Collins,  53  N.  H.  442  ;  390  ;  Western  TJ.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Quinn, 
Garland  v.  Towne,  55  Id.  57.  56  111.  319  ;  Sullivan  v.  Scripture,  3 

8  See  Lapham  v.  Curtis,  5  Vt.  371.     Allen,  564;    Alexander  v.   Humber, 

9  Marshall  v.  Welwood,  38  N.  J.  86  Ky.  565  ;  6  S.  W.  453  ;  Haney  v. 
Law,  339.  Kansas  City,  94  Mo.  334 ;  7  S.  W. 

10  Everett  v.  Hydraulic  Flume  Co.,  417;  Nordheimer  v.  Alexander,  19 
23  Cal.  225.  Can.  S.  C.  R.  248  [fall  of  house-wall 

II  Shipley  v.  Fifty  Asso.,  101  Mass.  during  high  wind  after  a  fire];  and 
251  [snow  falling  from  roof]  ;  Gor-  cases  cited  under  g£  645-653,  post). 
ham  v.  Gross,  125  Mass.  23S  [wall  "Where  the  unintentional  shooting  of 
falling  on  adjoining  land].  one  hunter  by  another  might  have 

12Cahillv.  Eastman,  18  Minn.  324.  been  avoided,  if  he  had  previously 

1  The  Clarita,  23  Wall.  1  ;  Austin  looked  to  see  what  was  within  the 

v.  New  Jersey  Steamboat  Co.,  43  N.  range  of  his  gun  the  accident  was 

Y.  75  ;  Romney  v.  Trinity  House,  L.  not  inevitable  (Hankins  v.  Watkins, 

R.  5  Ex.  204;  7  LI.  247.     If  there  is  77  Hun.   360;  28  N.  Y.   Supp.  867). 

any  fault,  there  is  liability,  as  where  See  §  686.  post. 

one,  getting  on  the  wrong  side   of  ''  All  the  docti'ines  of  the  text  are 

the  road  in  a    dark    night,    drives  sustained  in  The  Clarita,  23  Wall.  1. 


§20] 


GENERAL    PRINCIPLES. 


20 


And  one  who,  by  inevitable  accident,  causes  an  injury,  must 
use  due  care  to  prevent  the  consequences  of  the  accident  from 
extending  further  than  is  inevitable.15 

§  19.  Absence  of  intent  to  produce  damage  necessary 
element. —  The  last  element  of  negligence,  and  that  which 
distinguishes  it  from  fraud  or  other  willful  injury,  is  the 
absence  of  any  distinct  intention  to  produce  the  precise  dam- 
age to  the  plaintiff,  which  actually  follows  as  a  result  of  the 
negligence.1  If  such  an  intention  is  alleged  in  a  complaint, 
the  action  is  based  upon  willful  injury,  and  can  only  be  sus- 
tained upon  that  ground.2  If  it  is  not  so  alleged,  evidence  of 
an  actual  intent  to  cause  the  damage  which  is  the  basis  of  the 
action  is  inadmissible.3  But  it  often  happens  that  evidence 
comes  out  at  the  trial,  in  a  perfectly  proper  way,  from  which  a 
jury  might  fairly  infer  actual  malice,  and  occasionally,  of  such 
a  nature  that  no  sensible  men  could  infer  anything  less.  In 
such  cases,  no  malice  being  pleaded,  the  plaintiff's  counsel 
ought  not  to  be  allowed  to  argue  to  the  jury  that  it  was  a 
case  of  real  malice ;  and  the  court  should  carefully  instruct  the 
jury  that  they  cannot  award  damages  upon  any  theory  more 
severe  than  that  the  defendant  had  been  so  grossly  negligent 
as  to  be  indifferent  whether  he  injured  the  defendant  or  not. 
All  this,  however,  is,  of  course,  subject  to  the  power  of  the 
court  to  amend  the  pleadings  and  to  allow  a  change  of  the 
original  issue. 

§  20.  Distinction  between  negligence  and  fraud. — There 
is,  necessarily,  a  marked  distinction  between  negligence  and 


See  Case  v.  Perew,  46  Hun,  57  [run- 
ning a  barge  into  canal  boat  when 
use  of  steam  tug  might  have  pre- 
vented collision]. 

3  The  Clara  Killam,  L.  R.  3  Adm. 
161.  The  fact  that  the  accident  was 
so  unusual  and  extraordinary  that  it 
could  not  reasonably  have  been  ex- 
pected to  happen  does  not  relieve  de- 
fendant from  the  effect  of  his  negli- 
gence (Doyle  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
77  Iowa.  607  :  42  N.  W.  555  [plaintiff 


struck  by  iron  coupling-pin  thrown 
by  the  wheel  of  a  passing  car]). 

1  Ante,  %  6;  Wharton,  Negl.  g  11; 
Gardner  v.  Heartt,  3  Denio,  232,  236  ; 
Blyth  v.  Birmingham  Water  Co.,  11 
Exch.  781. 

2  Indiana,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Burdge, 
94  Ind.  46. 

3  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Smyth, 
98  Ind.  42  ;  Vandenburgh  v.  Truax, 
4  Den.  464  ;  Han.kins  v.  Watkins,  77 
Hun,  360. 


21 


GENERAL    PRIN'CIPLES. 


[§2I 


fraud.  Sir  William  Jones,  in  his  celebrated  treatise  on  Bail- 
ments, somewhat  confounded  the  two,  speaking  of  gross  negli- 
gence as  equivalent  to  fraud.  But  this  is  a  misuse  of  terms. 
If  it  is  meant  that  the  effects  of  such  negligence  are  as  preju- 
dicial as  those  of  positive  fraud,  that  is  a  point  of  no  import- 
ance, since  the  most  trivial  negligence  may  be  attended  with 
the  same  results.  If  it  is  meant  that  the  motive  is  as  bad,  that 
is  an  assertion  which  cannot  be  sustained,  without  confining 
the  remedy  for  gross  negligence  to  a  very  limited  class  of 
cases;  since,  if  it  is  once  fully  understood  that  the  proof  re- 
quired to  support  an  allegation  of  gross  negligence  is  equal  to 
that  required  to  establish  fraud,  juries  will  hesitate  long  before 
affixing  such  a  stigma  upon  men  who  have  evidently  meant  no 
wrong,  although  exceedingly  careless.  Gross  negligence  may 
be  evidence  from  which  fraud  might  be  inferred ;  but  is  not 
the  same  thing.  In  this  view  all  of  the  latest  authorities 
concur.1 

§  21.  Defendant's  anticipation  of  injury  not  essential. — 

It  is  not  an  essential  element  of  negligence  that  the  defendant 
should  have  anticipated,  or  have  had  reason  to  anticipate,  that 
his   carelessness  would  injure  another  person.1     The  improb- 


1  Thus,  in  the  decisions  arising 
upon  negotiable  paper,  it  is  settled 
that  although  gross  negligence  may 
be  evidence  of  bad  faith,  it  is  not  the 
same  thing  (Goodman  v.  Harvey, 
4  Ad.  &  El.  870;  TJther  v.  Rich,  10 
Id.  784  ;  Carlon  v.  Ireland,  5  El.  &  B. 
765;  Chapman  v.  Rose,  56  N.  Y.  137  ; 
Welch  v.  Sage,  47  Id.  143;  Murray 
v.  Lardner,  2  Wall.  110  ;  Goodman 
v.  Simonds,  20  How.  U.  S.  452).  In 
cases  arising  upon  other  questions, 
the  same  rule  is  adhered  to  (Gard- 
ner v.  Heartt,  3  Denio,  232  ;  Lincoln 
v.  Buckmaster,  32  Vt.  652;  Wil- 
son v.  York,  etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Gill  &  J. 
58,  79 ;  see  Tonawanda  R.  Co.  v. 
Munger,  5  Denio,  255.)  In  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Todd  (36  111.  409),  the 
court  defined  gross  negligence  as 
"amounting     to     willful      injury." 


But  numerous  decisions  of  the  same 
court  establish  in  effect  the  opposite 
doctrine.  See  Gardner  v.  Heartt,  3 
Denio,  236,  and  cases  under  §^  1  and 
2,  ante.  It  is  held  in  Indiana  (Terre 
Haute,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Graham,  95 
Ind.  286),  that  gross  negligence  is 
not,  as  matter  of  law,  "  willfulness," 
and  even  if  the  defendant  was  guilty 
of  gross  negligence,  recklessness, 
or  wantonness,  he  could  plead  con- 
tributory negligence  on  the  part  of 
plaintiff.  The  negligence  of  a  pas- 
senger-carrier may  be  gross,  without 
being  willful  or  intentional  (Jackson- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Southworth,  32 
111.  App.  307  ;  affi'd  135  111.  250;  25  N. 
E.  1093).  s.  P.,  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Farmer,  97  Ala.  141;  12  So.  86.) 

1  The  defendant's  ship  in  drawing 
up  her  anchor,  injured  the  plaintiff's 


22l 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


22 


ability  of  injury  to  another  is  a  circumstance  that  might  be 
taken  into  account,  but  which  is  not  conclusive  of  the  ques- 
tion. If,  however,  no  reasonable  person  could  have  anticipated 
that  injury  to  another  miglit  ensue,  we  think  that  there  could 
be  no  negligence.  It  is  certainly  not  essential  that  the  negli- 
gent person  should  have  anticipated  injury  to  the  particular 
person  who  was  in  fact  injured,  or  the  particular  kind  of  injury 
produced. 

§  22.  Election  between  contract  and  tort. — The  owner  of 
property  may  recover  directly  from  the  wrong-doer  for  any 
tortious  injury  to  the  property,  without  noticing  any  contract 
which  the  wrong-doer  may  have  made  with  respect  to  such 
property,  of  which  the  wrongful  act  is  a  violation.1  This  is  so, 
whether  the  contract  was  made   with  the  owner  himself 2  or 


submarine  telegraph.  It  was  held 
that  the  defendant  was  liable,  if  he 
used  the  anchor  or  ship  without 
availing  himself  of  the  means  of 
knowledge  at  his  command,  even 
though  he  was  not  aware  of  the  posi- 
tion of  the  cable  ;  but  not  otherwise 
(Submarine  Tel.  Co.  v.  Dickson, 
15  C.  B.  N.  S.  759).  A.  moored 
barges  in  the  middle  of  a  stream  in 
such  position  that  if  any  of  them 
should  sink  it  would  probably  injure 
the  barges  of  others.  One  of  them 
sank  by  an  accident  which  did  not 
involve  negligence  in  A.  and  injured 
barges  of  B.  A.  was  held  liable  to 
B.  (McGrew  v.  Stone,  53  Pa.  St. 
436).  One  who  negligently  sets  and 
keeps  fire  on  his  own  land  is  liable 
for  injuries  done  by  its  direct  com- 
munication to  the  property  of 
another,  though  he  might  not  have 
anticipateJ  the  manner  in  which  it 
was  communicated  (Higgins  v. 
Dewey.  107  Mass.  494)  One  who  un- 
lawfully places  or  causes  an  obstruc- 
tion in  a  public  highway,  will  not  be 
heard  to  say  that  he  did  not  antici- 
pate an  injury  resulting  therefrom 
(Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Carvener, 


113  Ind.  51  ;  14  N.  E.  738).  See  cases 
cited  under  §  365,  post. 

1  "  For  tortious  acts,  independent 
of  the  contract,  a  man  may  be  sued 
in  tort,  though  one  of  the  conse- 
quences is  a  breach  of  his  contract" 
(Stock  v.  Boston,  149  Mass.  410  ;  21 
N.  E.  871  ;  Bickford  v.  Richards,  154 
Mass.  163;  27  N.  E.  1014;  Ashley  v. 
Root,  4  Allen,  504;  Dungan  v.  Read, 
167  Pa.  St.  393;  31  Atl.  639  [injuries 
to  horse  hired  by  defendant]  ).  In 
Fromm  v.  Ide  (68  Hun.  310  ;  23  N.  Y. 
Supp.  56),  defendant  contracted  with 
plaintiff  to  lower  and  extend  two 
ditches  in  the  highway  so  that  they 
would  drain  plaintiff's  land ,  but  he  did 
the  work  so  carelessly  that,  instead 
of  draining  the  land,  they  emptied 
the  water  upon  it.  Held,  that  plain- 
tiff's right  of  action  did  not  depend 
upon  the  contract,  but  upon  de- 
fendant's duty  not  to  injure  plain- 
tiff's property,  and  an  action  of  tort 
would  lie.  See  S.  C.  on  a  former  trial, 
60  Hun,  322  ;  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  802. 

2  Green  v.  Clarke,  12  N.  Y.  343 
[carrier  receiving  goods  from  for- 
warder liable  to  owner  for  loss.]  So 
a  master  can  recover  from  a  carrier 


23 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


[§23. 


with  any  other  person,  and  even  though  the  contract  is  under 
seal.3  The  contract,  if  made  with  any  other  person  than  the 
owner,  does  not  give  that  person  an  exclusive  right  to  sue  for 
damage  to  the  property  ; 4  and  if  made  with  the  owner,  it  does 
not  prevent  him,  or  any  person  who  afterwards  acquires  title  to 
the  property,5  from  enforcing  his  rights  without  relying  upon 
the  contract,  except,  of  course,  so  far  as  those  rights  are  waived 
by  the  contract. 

§  23.  Damage,  an  essential  element  of  negligence. —  As 

already  said  (,j  4),  neither  negligence  without  damage,  nor 
damage  without  negligence,  will  constitute  any  cause  of  action. 
The  concurrence  of  the  two  elements  is  essential.  Some  dam- 
age must  be  inferable  from  the   facts  pleaded  and  proved ;  or 


(Grant  v.  Newton,  1  E.  D.  Smith, 
95).  or  innkeeper  (see  Needles  v. 
Howard,  Id.  54  ;  Piper  v.  Manny,  21 
Wend.  282),  for  the  loss  of  his  prop- 
erty placed  in  the  defendant's  charge 
by  a  servant  traveling  with  it  as  its 
ostensible  owner.  Such  an  action 
may  be  brought  in  the  name  of  a 
firm  where  one  of  the  partners, 
traveling  alone,  deposits  baggage 
containing  partnership  property 
with  a  carrier  or  innkeeper,  who 
negligently  loses  it  (Needles  v. 
Howard,  supra.)  So  a  servant, 
whose  master  paid  for  tickets  for 
both,  may  recover  for  his  own  bag- 
gage lost  on  the  journey  (Marshall 
v.  York,  etc.  R.  Co.,  21  L.  J.  [C.  P.] 
34).  But  in  all  such  cases  the  action 
must  be  founded  upon  the  tort,  and 
cannot  be  sustained  at  all  upon  the 
contract  ;  because  carriers  of  per- 
sons and  innkeepers  always  deal 
with  their  customers  as  principals, 
and  the  most  important  part  of  the 
contract  being  always  made  by  the 
customers  as  principals,  they  cannot 


be  allowed  to  divide  it,  and  claim 
that  the  contract,  in  respect  to  their 
baggage,  was  made  for  the  benefit 
of  other  persons,  while  retaining 
themselves  the  rights  growing  out 
of  the  contract  in  respect  to  their 
persons  (see  Weed  v.  Saratoga,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  19  Wend.  534;  Needles  v. 
Howard,  supra), 

3  Leslie  v.  Wilson,  3  Brod.  &  B. 
171. 

4  Green  v.  Clarke,  12  N.  Y.  343  ; 
New  Jersey  Steam  Co.  v.  Merchants' 
Bank.  6  How.  U.  S.  344  ;  Cumber- 
land Valley  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  11  Pa. 
St.  141 ;  Paducah  Lumber  Co.  v. 
Paducah  Water  Co.,  89  Ky.  340;  13 
S.  W.  249  [breach  of  contract  be- 
tween a  city  and  a  water  company 
to  keep  the  former  supplied  with 
certain  quantity  of  water  is  ground 
for  action  by  private  person  for  loss 
by  fire  through  insufficient  supply 
of  water].  See,  also,  Owensboro 
Water  Co.  v.  Duncan  (Ky.)  32  S.  W. 
478. 

6  Dows  v.  Cobb,  12  Barb.  310. 


§24a] 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


24 


no  action  will  lie.1  But  nominal  damage  is  enough  to  sustain 
the  action.2 

§  24.  The  damage  must  be  special  to  plaintiff.—  It  is  not 

only  essential  to  the  maintenance  of  an  action  for  negligence 
that  some  damage  should  have  been  suffered,  but  that  dam- 
age must  have  been  suffered  by  the  plaintiff,  or  he  has  no 
cause  of  action.1  If,  by  reason  of  a  breach  of  duty  owed  to 
the  public,  he  has  suffered  no  special  damage,  that  is,  no  dam- 
age other  than  such  as  every  other  member  of  the  community 
has  suffered  in  equal  measure,  a  private  citizen  has  no  right  to 
sue.2 

§  24a.  Right  to  recover  over.  —  It  is  not  necessary  that 
the  plaintiff's  damage  should  have  resulted  immediately  from 
the  defendant's  negligence  ;  it  is  enough  if  the  plaintiff,  being 
legally  liable,  though  not  personally  in  fault,  for  a  third  per- 
son's injuries,  due  to  the  defendant's  negligence,  has  been 
compelled  to  answer  therefor  to  the  person  injured.  In  such 
a  case,  the  principal  delinquent  is  bound  to  indemnify  his 
codelinquent,    their    fault   being   unequal;1  and    this   whether 


1  McAllister  v.  Clement,  75  Cal. 
182  ;  16  Pac.  775  [notary's  failure  to 
take  proper  acknowledgment  of 
mortgage];  Hinckley  v.  Krug  (Colo.) 
34  Pac.  118  [negligence  of  attorney]  ; 
Dwyer  v.  Woulfe,  40  La.  Ann.  46  ;  3 
So.  360  [notary's  failure  to  seasonably 
register  a  mortgage];  s.  p.,  Clay  v. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  81  Ga.  285; 
6  S.  E.  813  [delay  in  delivering  tele- 
graph message]  ;  State  v.  Davis,  117 
Ind.  307 ;  20  N.  E.  159  ;  Merrill  v. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  78  Me.  97  ;  2 
Atl.  847.  Martin  v.  Columbia,  etc. 
E.  Co.  (32  S.  C.  592  ;  10  S.  E.  960) 
seems  to  us  to  have  been  a  case  for 
nominal  damages. 

2  Baker  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  118 
N.  Y.  533  ;  23  N.  E.  885.  In  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hall  (124  U.  S.  444  ; 
8  S.  Ct.  577),  defendant  telegraph 
company  delayed  delivery  of  a  mes- 
sage instructing  the  addressee  to  buy 


for  plaintiff  10,000  barrels  of  petro- 
leum, the  market  price  of  which, 
when  the  message  ought  to  have 
been  delivered,  was  $1.17  per  barrel, 
but  when  received  by  addressee  had 
advanced  to  $1.35  per  barrel.  The 
addressee  did  not  purchase.  Held, 
that  plaintiff  could  recover  only 
nominal  damages. 

1  No  one  has  a  right  of  action  upon 
negligence  who  is  not  injured  there- 
by (Harter  v.  Morris,  18  Ohio  St. 
492  ;  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Benton, 
69  111.  174  ;  Smith  v.  Leavenworth, 
15  Kans.  81  ;  Scott  v.  Nat.  Bank  of 
Chester  Valley,  72  Pa.  St.  471  ; 
Harlan  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65 
Mo.  22;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ocean 
Bank.  60  N.  Y.  278). 

8  See  §  332.  post. 

1  Oceanic  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Cam- 
pania Transatl.,  134  N.  Y.  461;  31 
N.  E.,  987;  S.  C,  on  second  trial,  144 


25 


GENERAL   PRINCIPLES. 


[§24a 


any  contractual  relation  existed  between  them  or  not.2  Thus 
a  servant  is  liable  to  his  master  for  damages,  which  the  latter 
has  been  required  to  pay  to  a  stranger  for  the  servant's  negli- 
gence, in  the  master's  work,  without  the  master's  fault.3  So  a 
municipal  corporation  is  entitled  to  recover,  from  one  who  has 
rendered  a  highway  unsafe,  damages  which  it  has  been  com- 
pelled to  pay  to  traveler  ;4  and  on  the  same  principle,  an  abut- 
ting owner  against  whom  a  recovery  has  been  had  for  injuries 
suffered  by  a  traveler  on  the  street,  from  the  fall  of  his  chim- 
ney, may  recover  the  amount  paid,  from  a  third  person  whose 
wrongful  act  caused  the  chimney  to  fall.5  So  a  carrier  is 
entitled  to  recover  from  one  whose  unnecessary  obstruction  of 
a  station-platform  caused  damage  to  a  passenger,  for  which 
the  carrier  was  compelled  to  pay.6 


N.  Y.,  461  [lessee  of  public  pier 
against  sub-lessee].  "  The  liability 
grows  out  of  the  affirmative  act  of 
the  defendant,  and  renders  him  li- 
able not  only  to  the  party  injured, 
but  also  mediately  liable  to  any  party 
who  has  been  damnified  by  his  ne- 
glect" (per  Ruger,  C.  J.,  Port  Jervis 
v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  96  N.  Y.  550 
[defendant  made  excavation  in 
street]  ;  Rochester  v.  Montgomery, 
73  N.  Y.  65;  Lowell  v.  Boston,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  23  Pick.  24  [highway  cases]). 
Plaintiff's  horse  took  fright  at  de- 
fendant's engine  and  ran  over  a  third 
person,  who  recovered  damages 
against  plaintiff.  Held,  the  latter 
could  recover  the  same  from  defend- 
ant on  showing  that  he  could  not 


have  prevented  the  accident  and  that 
defendant  could  (Nashua  Iron  Co. 
v.  Worcester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62  N.  H. 
159). 

2  Lowell  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  23 
Pick.  24,  and  cases  supra. 

3  Churchill  v.  Holt,  127  Mass.  165; 
s.  c,  on  new  trial,  131  Id.  67;  Simp- 
son v.  Mercer,  144  Mass.  413;  Smith 
v.  Foran,  43  Conn.  244 ;  Grand  Trunk 
R.  Co.  v.  Latham,  63  Me.  177,  and 
cases  cited  under  §  242,  post. 

4  Chicago  v.  Robbins,  2  Black,  418; 
4  Wall.  679,  and  other  cases  cited 
under  §  301,  post. 

5  Gray  v.  Boston  Gas-light  Co.,  114 
Mass.  149. 

6  Old  Colony  R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  148 
Mass.  363;  19  N.  E.  372. 


CHAPTER    II. 


PROXIMATE    CAUSE. 


§  25.  Breach  of  duty  must  cause  the 
damage. 

26.  Breach   of    duty  must  be  the 

proximate  cause. 

27.  Breach  of  statutory  duty. 

28.  Natural     and    continuous    se- 

quence, defined. 

29.  Foreseen  and  unforeseen  con- 

sequences of  negligence. 

30.  Extraordinary  consequences  of 

negligence . 

31.  Intervening    cause,    breaking 

connection. 

32.  Intervening     cause    must    be 

either  a  superseding  or  a  re- 
sponsible cause. 


S  33.  Superseding  cause  and  inevit- 
able accident,  distinguished. 

34.  Intervening  responsible  cause, 

not  superseding. 

35.  Intervening  cause  illustrated. 

36.  Intervening    cause    must     be 

culpable . 

37.  Intervening  cause  must  be  a 

free  agent. 

38.  Intervener  not  culpable,  if  ig- 

norant of  facts. 

39.  Superior  force  concurring  with 

defendant's  negligence. 

40.  Superior  force  concurring  with 

defendant's  delay. 


§  25.  The  breach  of  duty  must  cause  the  damage.  —  We 

now  come  to  the  most  important  and  difficult  part  of  the  gen- 
eral definition  of  a  right  of  action  upon  negligence  —  the  connec- 
tion between  the  negligent  act  or  omission  and  the  damage. 
No  action  can  be  maintained  upon  an  act  of  negligence,  unless 
the  breach  of  duty  has  been  the  cause  of  the  damage.  The  fact 
that  the  defendant  has  been  guilty  of  negligence,  followed  by 
an  accident,  does  not  make  him  liable  for  the  resulting  injury, 
unless  that  was  occasioned  by  the  negligence.  The  connection 
of  cause  and  effect  must  be  established.1  And  the  defendant's 
breach  of  duty,  not  merely  his  act,  must  be  the  cause  of  the 
plaintiff's  damage.2     The    defendant's  negligence   may  put  a 


1  Daniel  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  L. 
R.  3  C.  P.  216,  222 ;  Holbrook  v. 
Utica,  etc.  R.  Co.,  12  N.  Y.  236; 
Harlan  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65 
Mo.  22  ;  Crum  v.  Conover,  14  Ind. 
App.  264  ;  42  N.  E.  1029,  and  cases 
infra. 


2  One  suing  for  injuries  must  not 
only  prove  negligence,  but  that  the 
injury  resulted  from  the  negligence 
(Kelsey  v.  Jewett,  28  Hun,  51  ;  Wil- 
liams v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39 
Id.  430  ;  Murtaugh  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  49  Id.  456;  3  N.  Y.   Supp. 


[26] 


V 


PROXIMATE   CAUSE. 


[§26 


temptation  in  the  way  of  another  person  to  commit  a  wrong- 
ful act,  by  which  the  plaintiff  is  injured  ;  and  yet  the  defend- 
ant's negligence  may  be  in  no  sense  a  cause  of  the  injury.3 


§  26.  Breach  of  duty  must  be  the  proximate  cause. —  The 

breach  of  duty,  upon  which  an  action  is  brought,  must  be  not 
only  the  cause,  but  the  proximate  cause,  of  the  damage  to  the 
plaintiff.1  We  adhere  to  this  old  form  of  words,  because, 
while  it  may  not  have  originally  meant  what  is  now  intended, 
it  is  not  immovably  identified  with  any  other  meaning,  and  is 
the  form  which  has  been  so  long  in  use  that  its  rejection  would 
make  unintelligible  nearly  all  reported  cases  on  the  question 
involved.2  The  proximate  cause  of  an  event  must  be  under- 
stood to  be  that  which,  in  a  natural  and  continuous  sequence,3 
unbroken  by  any  new,  independent  cause,4  produces  that  event, 


483  ;  State  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
58  Md.  482 ;  Dickey  v.  Maine  Tele- 
graph Co.,  43  Me.  492  ;  Philadelphia, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Boyer,  97  Pa.  St.  91  ; 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Hensil,  70  Ind. 
569 ;  Lester  v.  Pittsford,  7  Vt.  158  ; 
Crandall  v.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.,  16 
Fed.  75  ;  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hembree,  85  Ala.  481  ;  5  So.  173). 
See  note  on  allegation  and  proof  of 
negligence,  20  Abb.  New  Cas.  236. 

3  See  §§  8-13,  ante. 

1  Kistner  v.  Indianapolis,  100  Ind. 
210  ;  Scheffer  v.  Railroad  Co.,  105  U. 
S.  249. 

■  The  use  of  the  old  words,  "  proxi- 
mate cause,"  is  approved  by  Earl,  J., 
in  Ehrgott  v.  New  York,  96  N.  Y.  264, 
281;  Norwood  v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co., 
Ill  N.  C.  236  ;  16  S.  E  4 ;  Florida,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  37  Fla.  406  ;  20 
So.  558  ;  Davis  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. 
[Wise. J,  67  N.  W.  167.  For  appli- 
cations of  the  rule,  see  §§  57-60, 
post. 

Wharton,  Negl.  §  3,  modified. 

4  Oil  Creek  R.  Co.  v  Keighron,  74 
Pa.  St.  320  ;  Insurance  Co.  v.  Tweed, 
7  Wall.  52.  As  to  what  will  be  such 
an  intervening  cause,  see  Wharton, 


Negl.,  §§  134-143;  Milwaukee,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Kellogg,  94  U.  S.  469; 
Lowery  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co  ,  99  N.  Y. 
158  ;  Cuff  v.  Newark,  etc.  R.  Co.,  35 
N.  J.  Law,  17  ;  and  §  31,  et  seq.,  post. 
In  his  work  on  Torts,  p.  69,  Judge 
Cooley  states  the  following  proposi- 
tions :  "  (1.)  In  the  case  of  any  dis- 
tinct legal  wrong,  which  in  itself 
constitutes  an  invasion  of  the  right 
of  another,  the  law  will  pre- 
sume that  some  damage  follows 
as  a  natural,  necessary  and  proxi- 
mate result.  Here  the  wrong  itself 
fixes  the  right  of  action  ;  we  need  not 
go  further  to  show  a  right  of  re- 
covery, though  the  extent  of  re- 
covery may  depend  upon  the 
evidence.  (2.)  When  the  act  or 
omission  complained  of  is  not  in 
itself  a  distinct  wrong,  and  can  only 
become  a  wrong  to  any  particular 
individual  through  injurious  conse- 
quences resulting  therefrom  ;  this 
consequence  must  not  only  be 
shown,  but  it  must  be  so  connected 
by  averment  and  evidence  with  the 
act  or  omission,  as  to  appear  to 
have  resulted  therefrom  according 
to   the    ordinary    course  of  events, 


§2/J 


PROXIMATE    CAUSE. 


28 


and  without  which  that  event  would  not  have  occurred.5 
Proximity  in  point  of  time  or  space,  however,  is  no  part  of  the 
definition.  That  is  of  no  importance,  except  as  it  may  afford 
evidence  for  or  against  proximity  of  causation,  that  is,  the 
proximate  cause  which  is  nearest  in  the  order  of  responsible 
causation.0 


§  27.  Breach  of  statutory  duty. — All  authorities  agree  that 
the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  upon  mere  proof  of  his  injury,  co- 
incident with  the  defendant's  breach  of  a  statute  or  ordinance 
of  the  kind  mentioned  in  §  13.  In  such  a  case,  the  action 
would  fail  for  want  of  connection  between  the  defendant's 
negligence  and  the  plaintiff's  damage.  The  plaintiff  must 
prove  that  the  breach  of  regulations  was  the  proximate  cause 
of  his  damage.  That  will  not  be  presumed.1  And  therefore 
non-compliance      with     a     statutory     requirement,     however 


and  as  a  proximate  result  of  a  suffi- 
cient cause.  (3.)  If  the  original  act 
was  wrongful,  and  would  naturally, 
according  to  the  ordinary  course  of 
events,  prove  injurious  to  some  other 
person  or  persons,  and  does  actually 
result  in  injury  through  the  inter- 
vention of  other  causes  which  are 
not  wrongful,  the  injury  shall  be  re- 
ferred to  the  wrongful  cause,  passing 
by  those  which  were  innocent.  But 
if  the  original  wrong  only  becomes 
injurious  in  consequence  of  the  inter- 
vention of  some  distinct  wrongful 
act  or  omission  by  another,  the  in- 
jury shall  be  imputed  to  the  last 
wrong  as  the  proximate  cause,  and 
not  to  that  which  was  more  remote." 
5  Thomas  v.  Winchester,  6  N.  Y. 
397;  and  see  §§  81,  32,  post.  An  ac- 
cident "  cannot  be  attributed  to  a 
cause,  unless  without  its  operation, 
the  accident  would  not  have  hap- 
pened "  (Ring  v.  Cohoes,  77  N  Y. 
83;  to  the  same  effect,  Ehrgott  v. 
New  York,  96  Id.  283  ;  Cone  v.  Dela- 
ware, etc.  R.  Co.,  81  Id.  206;  Searles 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  101  Id.  661; 
Taylor  v.  Yonkers,  105  Id.  203). 


6"  The  primary  cause  may  be  the 
proximate  cause  of  a  disaster,  though 
it  operate  through  successive  instru- 
ments. The  question  always  is,  was 
there  an  unbroken  connection  be- 
tween the  wrongful  act  and  the 
injury  —  a  continuous  operation  ? 
Did  the  facts  constitute  a  continuous 
succession  of  events  so  linked  to- 
gether as  to  make  a  natural  whole? 
Or  was  there  some  new  and  inde- 
pendent cause  intervening  between 
the  wrong  and  the  injury  ?  "  (Pur- 
cell  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  48  Minn.  134; 
50  N.  W.  1034). 

1  Hayes  v.  Michigan  Central  R. 
Co.,  Ill  U.  S.  228,  240;  Pennsyl- 
vania Co.  v.  Hensil,  70  Ind.  569 ; 
Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Steb- 
bing,  62  Md.  504  [train  running 
at  greater  rate  of  speed  than  that 
allowed  by  ordinance].  See  the  fol- 
lowing among  many  other  cases, 
to  the  same  effect:  Quincy,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Wellhoener,  72  111.  60; 
Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gillis,  68  Id. 
317;  Great  Western  R.  Co.  v.  Ged- 
dis,  33  Id.  305;  Stoneman  v.  At- 
lantic, etc.  R.  Co.,  58  Mo.  503 ;  Hoi- 


29 


PROXIMATE    CAUSE. 


[§28 


stringent,  affords  no  ground  of  action,  if  compliance  therewith 
would  not  have  prevented  the  injury.2 

§  28.  "Natural  and  continuous  sequence,"  defined. — 
Very  great  difficulty  has  been  found  in  determining  what  dam- 
ages should  be  considered  as  flowing,  in  a  "natural  and  con- 
tinuous sequence,"  from  an  act  of  negligence,  especially  when 
it  is  not  a  matter  of  contract  liability.  On  the  one  hand,  it 
has  been  maintained  that,  in  cases  of  tortious  negligence,  the 
defendant  should  be  held  responsible  for  all  damages  which  do 
in  fact  result  from  his  wrongful  acts,  whether  they  could  have 
been  anticipated  or  not. *  On  the  other  hand,  it  has  been 
maintained  that  he  should  not  be  held  responsible  for  any 
damages  except  such  as  he  could,  in  the  exercise  of  reason- 
able foresight,  have  foreseen  as  the  probable  consequences  of  his 
act.2     As  a  middle  ground,  it  has  been  asserted  that  he  should 


man  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62  Id. 
562  ;  Chicago,  etc.  E.  Co.  v.  Hotz,  47 
Kans.  627  ;  28  Pac.  693  ;  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Chrisman,  19  Colo.  30  ;  34 
Pa<  .  286  ;  Cumberland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  73  Md.  74 ;  20  Atl.  785  ;  Mor- 
rissey  v.  Providence,  etc.  R.  Co.,  15 
R.  I.  271  ;  3  Atl.  10  ;  Rainey  v.  N.  Y. 
Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  68  Hun,  495;  23 
N.  Y.  Supp.  80.  Under  the  South 
Carolina  statute  making  railroad 
companies  liable  for  a  neglect  to  give 
signals,  which  "contributed  to  the 
injury,"  it  is  only  necessary,  for  a  re- 
covery, to  show  that  the  neglect  con- 
tributed to,  not  that  it  proximately 
Caused,  the  injury  (Wragge  v.  South 
Carolina,  etc.  R.  Co.,47S.  C.  105;  25 
S.  E.  76). 

5  Flatles  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  35 
Iowa,  191  ;  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Phelps,  29  111.  447  ;  Gilman,  etc.  R. 
Co,  v.  Spencer,  76  Id.  192.  See,  also, 
E'lsnu  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  40  Iowa,  47  ; 
I  Ma  ware,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Salmon,  39 
N.  J.  Law,  299 ;  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.  v.  Hope,  80  Pa.  St.  373;  Stanton 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91  Ala.  382; 
8  Bo.  798.     Where  sounding  a  loco- 


motive whistle  is  as  likely  to  in- 
crease as  to  diminish  danger  to  one 
on  the  track,  failure  to  use  it  as  re- 
quired by  statute  will  noc  constitute 
negligence  (Galena,  etc.  R.  Co  v. 
Loomis,  13  111.  548  ;  Illinois  Central 
R.  Co.  v.  Phelps,  29  Id.  447  ;  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Karnes,  13  Ind. 
87  ;  Wakefield  v.  Connecticut,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  37  Vt.  330). 

1  Ehrgott  v.  New  York,  96  N.  Y. 
264;  Smith  v.  Southwestern  R.  Co., 
L.  R.  6  C.  P.  14  ;  affi'g  s.  c.  5  C.  P. 
98;  Henry  v.  So.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  50  Cal. 
183,  per  McKinstry,  J.;  Fairbanks  v. 
Kerr,  70  Pa.  St.  86  ;  McGrew  v.  Stone, 
53  Id.  436  ;  Morrison  v.  Davis,  20  Id. 
171 ;  Scott  v.  Hunter,  46  Id.  192  ;  Lake 
v.  Milliken,  62  Me.  240  ;  Atchison,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Stanford,  12  Kans.  354 ; 
Proctor  v.  Jennings,  6  Nev.  83  ;  Phil- 
lips v.  Dickerson,  85  111.  1 1 ;  Doggett 
v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 78  N.  C.  305; 
State  v.  Manchester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52 
N.  H.  528  ;  Stark  v.  Lancaster,  57  Id. 
88. 

2Rigby  v.  Hewitt,  5  Exch.  239; 
Hoey  v.  Felton.  11  C.  B.  N.  S.  143; 
Bovill,  C.  J.,  Sharp  v.  Powell,  L.    R. 


§28. 


TROXIMATE   CAUSE. 


SO 


be  made  responsible  for  such  damage  as  is  known  by  common 
experience  to  usually  follow  such  a  wrongful  act.3  The 
weight  of  authority  seems  to  be  decidedly  against  holding 
the  defendant  liable  for  all  the  actual  consequences  of  his 
wrongful  acts,  when  they  are  such  as  no  human  being,  even 
with  the  fullest  knowledge  of  the  circumstances,  would  have 
considered  likely  to  occur;4  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  best 
authorities  seem  to  be  quite  opposed  to  the  theory  that  he 
should  be  held  liable  only  for  such  consequences  as  he  ought 
himself  to   have   foreseen.5      So   much  difficulty,   indeed,  has 


7  C.  P.  253  ;  Sheridan  v.  Bigelow, 
93  Wise.  436 ;  67  N.  W.  732.  "  In  de- 
termining what  is  proximate  cause, 
the  true  rule  is  that  the  injury  must 
be  the  natural  and  probable  conse- 
quence of  the  negligence,  such  a 
consequence  as,  under  the  surround- 
ing circumstances  of  the  case,  might 
and  ought  to  have  been  foreseen  by 
the  wrong-doer,  as  likely  to  flow 
from  his  act"  (per  Paxson,  J.,  Pitts- 
burgh So.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  104  Pa. 
St.  306  ;  s.  P.  Hoag  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  83  Id.  293).  Or  such  as  "a 
person  of  ordinary  intelligence  might 
have  expected"  (McGowan  v.  Chi- 
cago etc.  R.  Co.,  91  Wise.  147  ;  64  N. 
W.  891  ;  Davis  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  ,93 Wise.  470;  07  N.  W.  16  ;  Motey 
v.  Pickle  Marble,  etc.  Co.,  74  Fed. 
155.) 

3  Gerhard  v.  Bates,  2  Ellis  &  B. 
490  ;  Selleck  v.  Langdon,  55  Hun,  19  ; 

8  N.  Y.  Supp.  573  ;  Whart.  Negl.  §§ 
16,  74-77. 

4 Kern  v.  DeCastro  Sugar  Co.,  125 
N.  Y.  50  ;  25  N.  E.  1071  [fall  of  eleva- 
tor] ;  Reiss  v.  N.  Y.  Steam  Co.,  128  N. 
Y.  103 ;  28  N.  E.  24  [steamer  explo- 
sion] ;  Cleveland  v.  N.  J.  Steamboat 
Co.,  125  N.  Y.  299;  26  N.  E.  327 
[steamboat  passenger  rush]  ;  Henry 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Mo.  288 
[passenger  being  ordered  out  of  car 
stepped  to  a  neighboring  track,  and 
while  waiting  there  was  injured  by 


another  train]  ;  s.  P.,  Lewis  v.  Flint, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  54  Mich.  55;  Briggs  v. 
Minneapolis  St.  R.  Co.,  52  Minn.  36  ; 
53  N.  W.  1019;  Bellefontaine,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  18  Ohio  St.  399; 
Connecticut  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  New 
Haven  R.  Co.,  25  Conn.  265  ;  Harri- 
son v.  Berkley,  1  Strobh.  525,  549 ; 
Bennett  v.  Lockwood,  20  Wend. 
223  ;  Greenland  v.  Chaplin,  5  Exch. 
243  ;  Jacksonville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Pen- 
insular Land  etc.  Co.,  27  Fla.  1  ;  9 
So.  661.  "The  general  rule  is,  that 
a  man  is  answerable  for  the  con- 
sequences of  a  fault  which  are  nat- 
ural and  probable  ;  but  if  this  fault 
happen  to  occur  with  something 
extraordinary  and  unforeseen,  he 
will  not  be  liable"  (McGrevv  v. 
Stone,  53  Pa.  St.  436). 

6  In  Ehrgott  v.  New  York  (96  N. 
Y.  264),  the  court  emphatically  re- 
fused to  hold  that  the  defendant 
was  only  liable  for  such  damages  as 
might  reasonably  be  supposed  to  be 
in  the  contemplation  of  both  parties 
as  the  probable  result  of  the  acci- 
dent ;  and  Earl,  J.,  commenting  upon 
the  various  forms  of  stating  the  rule 
which  are  given  in  the  text,  said  : 
"  These  various  modes  of  stating  the 
rule  are  all  apt  to  be  misleading,  and 
in  most  cases  are  absolutely  worth- 
less as  guides  to  the  jury.  *  * 
When  a  party  commits  a  tort,  result- 
ing in  a  personal  injury,  he  cannot 


3i 


PROXIMATE   CAUSE. 


[§29 


been  felt  in  attempting  to  lay  down  a  rule  to  cover  all  possible 
cases,  that  some  of  the  ablest  judges  have  declined  to  state 
any  fixed  rule,6  and  have  indicated  a  disposition  to  leave  all 
doubtful  cases  to  the  jury.7 

§  29.  Foreseen  and  unforeseen  consequences  of  negli- 
gence.—  The  practical  solution  of  this  question  appears  to  us 
to  be  that  a  person  guilty  of  negligence  should  be  held  respon- 
sible for  all  the  consequences  which  a  prudent  and  experienced 
man,  fully  acquainted  with  all  the  circumstances  which  in  fact 
existed  (whether  they  could  have  been  ascertained  by  reason- 


foresee  or  contemplate  the  conse- 
quences of  his  tortious  act.  *  *  * 
Here,  nothing  short  of  omnis- 
cience could  have  foreseen  for  a 
minute  what  the  result  and  effect 
of  driving  into  this  ditch  would  be. 
*  *  *  The  best  statement  of  this 
rule  is,  that  a  wrong-doer  is  respon- 
sible for  the  natural  and  proximate 
consequences  of  his  misconduct ;  and 
what  are  such  consequences  must 
generally  be  left  for  the  determina- 
tion of  the  jury"  In  that  case  the 
plaintiff  recovered  $25,000  for  injur- 
ies suffered  from  a  defect  in  a  high- 
way, resulting  months  afterwards  in 
a  permanent  spinal  disease  ;  and  this 
judgment,  though  set  aside  in  the 
lower  court,  was  reinstated  and  af- 
firmed in  the  Court  of  Appeals.  See 
cases  cited  under  note  1,  supra. 

6  Page  v.  Bucksport,  64  Me.  53, 
per  Peters,  J.  To  same  effect,  Stover 
v.  Bluehill,  51  Id.  441.  Where  logic 
and  common  sense  cannot  be  recon- 
ciled, logic  must  give  way  (Willey 
v.  Belfast,  61  Me.  575  ;  per  Barrows, 
J.).  In  Fleming  v.  Beck  (48  Pa.  St. 
309),  Agnew,  J.,  said  :  "In  strict 
logic  it  may  be  said  that  he  who  is 
the  cause  of  loss  should  be  answer- 
able for  all  the  losses  which  flow 
from  his  causation.  But  in  the 
practical  workings  of  society,  the 
law    finds,   in  this  as   in    a    great 


variety  of  other  matters,  that  the 
rule  of  logic  is  impracticable  and  un- 
just. The  general  conduct  and  the 
reflections  of  mankind  are  not 
founded  upon  a  nice  casuistry. 
Things  are  thought  and  acted  upon 
rather  in  a  general  way,  than  upcn 
long,  laborious,  extended  and  trained 
investigations.  Among  the  mass  of 
mankind,  conclusions  are  generally 
the  results  of  hasty  and  partial  re- 
flection. Their  undertakings,  there- 
fore, must  be  construed  in  view  of 
these  facts;  otherwise  they  would  of- 
ten be  run  into  a  chain  of  conse- 
quences wholly  foreign  to  their  in- 
tentions. In  the  ordinary  callings 
and  business  of  life,  failures  are  fre- 
quent. Few,  indeed,  always  come 
up  to  a  proper  standard  of  perform- 
ance—whether in  relation  to  time, 
quality,  degree  or  kind.  To  visit 
upon  them  all  the  consequences  of 
failure  would  set  society  upon  edge 
and  fill  the  courts  with  useless  and 
injurious  litigation.  It  is  impossible 
to  compensate  for  all  losses;  and  the 
law  therefore  aims  at  a  just  dis- 
crimination, which  will  impose  upon 
the  party  causing  them  the  propor- 
tion of  them  that  a  proper  view 
of  his  acts  and  the  attending  cir- 
cumstances would  dictate." 
1  See  cases  cited  under  §  55,  post. 


§  30]  PROXIMATE   CAUSE  32 

able  diligence  or  not)  would,  at  the  time  of  the  negligent  act, 
have  thought  reasonably  possible  to  follow,  if  they  had 
occurred  to  his  mind.1  This  definition  covers  all  the  fire 
cases  elsewhere  referred  to;  since  one  who  knew  all  the  facts 
(including  the  dry  kindling  matter  on  the  line  of  connection, 
the  exposure  of  property  to  injury,  the  force  of  the  wind  and 
the  other  circumstances  which  made  it  probable  that  the  fire 
would  spread,  as  it  actually  did)  could  have  foreseen  the  result 
as  not  improbable.  Yet,  in  several  of  those  cases,  it  is  prob- 
able that  no  one  person  did  know  all  these  facts;  and  certainly 
the  defendants  did  not.  So,  in  the  Lowery  case,2  any  one 
who  knew  that  travelers  were  in  danger  from  such  collisions 
would  have  deemed  the  ultimate  event  a  not  improbable  one. 
On  the  other  hand,  hardly  any  one  would  have  had  such  a 
result  in  his  mind,  at  the  time,  as  likely  to  occur.  The  test 
of  probability,  in  that  case,  was  evidently  this,  that  any  one, 
to  whom  the  idea  of  such  a  result  had  been  suggested,  would 
have  seen  that  it  might  naturally  occur. 

§  30.  Extraordinary  consequences  of  negligence. — In  one 

case  in  New  York,1  and  two  in  Pennsylvania,2  it  has  been  held 
that  negligence  entails  no  liability  for  extraordinary  conse- 
quences, although  caused  by  ordinary  means ;  and  while  these 
decisions  have  been  overruled  everywhere  else,  and  are  practi- 
cally overruled   in   New   York,3  where  they  originated,  their 

1  This  seems  to  us  to  be  the  neces-  49  N.  Y.  420  ;  Pollett  v.  Long,  56  Id. 
eary  result  of  the  latest  and  best  de-  200  ;  Lowery  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co. ,  99 
cisions  ;  although  nowhere  stated  in  Id.  158  ;  1  N.  E.  608  ;  Frace  v.  N.  Y. 
this  exact  language.  See  Lowery  v.  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  143  N.  Y.  182  ; 
Manhattan  R.  Co.  (99  N.  Y.  158  ;  1  38  N.  E.  102,  189  ;  Read  v.  Nichols,  118 
N.  E.  608),  where  defendant  was  held  N.  Y.  224  ;  23  N.  E.  468  ;  O'Neil  v.  N. 
liable  for  a  burning  coal  dropped  on  Y.  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co.,  115  N.  Y.  579 ; 
a  horse,  which,  running  against  a  22  N.  E.  217  ;  Gibney  v.  State,  137  N. 
traveler,  caused  him  to  injure  plain-  Y.  1  [child  fell  through  a  state  bridge, 
tiff,  in  his  own  effort  to  escape.  into  a  canal ;  its  father  plunged  after 

2  99  N.  Y.  158  ;  1  N.  E.  608.  it    and  both  -were    drowned  :    state 
'Ryan  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  35    liable].     The  decision  in   Ehrgott  v. 

N.  Y.  210.  New  York  (96  N.  Y.    264),  is  really 

2  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  62  more  directly  opposed  to  the  princi- 
Pa.  St.  353.  pie  of  the  Ryan  case  than  most  of 

3  See  the  manner  in  which  the  the  decisions  in  which  that  has  been 
Ryan  case  is  limited  and  explained  expressly  overruled. 

away,  in  Webb  v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co., 


33  PROXIMATE    CAUSE.  [§  30 

continued  affirmance  in  Pennsylvania4  entitles  them  to  con- 
sideration. The  point  decided  in  those  cases  was  that  a 
defendant,  who  had  negligently  kindled  a  fire,  should  not  be 
held  responsible  for  its  spread  over  an  unusually  long  distance, 
in  consequence  of  an  unusually  high  wind  prevailing  at  the 
time.  The  defect  in  this  reasoning  is  that,  although  the  wind 
was  extraordinary,  and  the  actual  consequences  extraordinary, 
yet  the  extension  of  the  fire  itself  was  only  the  reasonable  and 
natural  consequence  of  the  extraordinary  wind,  which  existed 
at  the  time  of  the  negligent  act.  The  true  doctrine  is  that  the 
defendant  is  liable  for  even  extraordinary  damage,  if  it  is  the 
result  of  his  negligence,  operating  in  a  natural  and  continuous 
sequence.  If  the  circumstances,  in  the  presence  of  which  he 
was  negligent,  were  extraordinary,  and  so  were  likely  to  make 
the  result  of  his  negligence  extraordinary,  that  is  an  additional 
reason  why  he  should  have  been  especially  careful  not  to  be 
negligent  at  such  a  time.  Accordingly,  one  who  negligently 
allows  fire  to  escape  on  his  neighbor's  land,  when  a  gale  of 
unusual  force  is  blowing,  is  all  the  more  to  blame  for  being 
negligent  at  so  peculiarly  dangerous  a  time,  and  should  be  held 
responsible  for  all  the  damage  done  by  reason  of  the  gale  car- 
rying the  fire  to  a  distance  which  it  would  not  have  reached 
under  an  ordinary  wind.  This  latter  view,  in  substance,  is 
taken  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States,5  and  by  the 

4Hoag  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  vator,  and  whether  it  was  the  result 

85  Pa.  St.  29'J>      Compare,  however,  of  the  continued  effect  of  the  sparks 

Elder  v.  Lykens  Val.  Coal  Co.,  157  from  the  steamboat,  without  the  aid 

Id.  490  ;  27  Atl.  545.  of  other  causes  not  reasonably  to  be 

5  In  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kel-  expected."    The  court  then  went  on 

logg  (94  U.  S.  469),  the  U.  S.  Supreme  to  say:     "  The  question    always   is, 

Court  denied  the  authority  of  Ryan  was  there  an  unbroken  connection 

v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.  (35  N.  Y.  210)  between  the  wrongful  act  and  the 

and  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr  (62  injury,  a  continuous  operation  ?  Did 

Pa.  St.  853),  and  affirmed  the  ruling  the  facts  constitute  a  continuous  suc- 

<>f  the  Circuit  Court  (Miller  ami  Dil-  cession  of  events,  so  linked  together 

Ion,  JJ.)  which   instructed  the  jury  as  to  make  a  natural  whole,  or  was 

"  to  find  whether  the  burning  of  the  there   some    new    and    independent 

mill  and  lumber  was  the  result  natu-  cause     intervening      between      the 

rally  and  reasonably  to  be  expected  wrong  and  the  injury?    It  is  admit- 

from   the    burning  of  the  elevator;  ted  that  the  rule  is  difficult  of  appli- 

whether  it  was  a  result  which,  under  cation.       But   it    is   generally  held, 

the  circumstances,  would  naturally  that,  in  order  to  warrant  a  finding 

follow  from  the  burning  of  the  ele-  that  negligence  or  an  act  not 
[Law  of  N eg.  Vot.   T  —  '■'] 


§31 


PROXIMATE   CAUSE. 


34 


courts  of  Ohio,6  Massachusetts,7  Connecticut,8  New  Jersey,9 
Indiana,10  Illinois,11  Michigan,12  Wisconsin,13  California,14  and 
practically  all  other  states,15  as  well  as  by  the  best  English 
decisions.16 

§  31.    Intervening    cause,    breaking    connection.  —  The 

second  alternative  involves  many  important  questions.  In  the 
first  place,  the  causal  connection  must  be  actually  broken,  the 
sequence  interrupted,  in  order  to  relieve  the  defendant  from 
responsibility.  The  mere  fact  that  another  person  concurs  or 
co-operates  in  producing  the  injury  or  contributes  thereto,  in 


amounting  to  wanton  wrong,  is  the 
proximate  cause  of  an  injury,  it 
must  appear  that  the  injury  was  the 
natural  and  probable  consequence 
of  the  negligence  or  wrongful  act, 
and  that  it  ought  to  have  been  fore- 
seen in  the  light  of  the  attending 
circumstances.  *  *  *  We  do 
not  say  that  even  the  natural  and 
probable  consequences  of  a. wrongful 
act  or  omission  are  in  all  cases  to  be 
chargeable  to  tbe  misfeasance  or  non- 
feasance. They  are  not,  when  there 
is  a  sufficient  and  independent  cause 
operating  between  the  wrong  and 
the  injury.  *  *  *  In  the  na- 
ture of  things  there  is  in  every 
transaction  a  succession  of  events, 
more  or  less  dependent  upon  those 
preceding,  and  it  is  the  province  of 
a  jury  to  look  at  this  succession  of 
events  or  facts,  and  ascertain  whether 
they  are  naturally  and  probably  con- 
nected with  each  other  by  a  contin- 
uous sequence,  or  are  dissevered  by 
new  and  independent  agencies,  and 
tbis  must  be  determined  in  view  of 
the  circumstances  existing  at  the 
time."  The  effect  of  the  decision  in 
that  case  was  to  sustain  a  recovery 
under  extraordinary  circumstances, 
on  the  ground  that  nevertheless  the 
damage  done  was  in  fact  the  natural 
and  probable  sequence  of  the  wrong- 
ful act.     But  in  Scheffer  v.  Railroad 


Co.  (105  TJ.  S.  249),  while  thoroughly 
approving  the  former  decision,  the 
court  held  that  where  a  railroad  col- 
lision, caused  by  the  negligence  of 
the  defendant,  produced  such  severe 
bodily  injuries  to  the  deceased  as 
eventually  to  produce  insanity ,  under 
the  influence  of  which  he  committed 
suicide,  the  negligence  of  the  defend- 
ant was  too  remote  in  the  chain  of 
causes  to  be  considered  a  proximate 
cause  of  the  death. 

6  Adams  v.  Young,  44  Ohio  St.   1. 

7  Higgins  v.  Dewey,  107  Mass.  494. 
8 Martin  v.  New  England  R.  Co., 

62  Conn.  331 ;  25  Atl.  239. 

9  Kulm  v.  Jewett,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  647. 

10  Billman  v.  Indianapolis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  76  Ind.  164  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Krinning,  87  Id.  351  ;  but  com- 
pare Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Whitlock, 
99  Id.  16. 

11  Fent  v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  59  111. 
349. 

"Hoyt  v.  Jeffers,  30  Mich.  181; 
Webster  v.  Symes  [Mich.],  66  N.  W. 
580. 

13  Atkinson  v.  Goodrich  Tr.  Co.,  GO 
Wise.  141. 

14  Henry  v.  Southern  Pacific  R.  Co., 
50Cal.  183. 

15  See  the  cases  collected  under 
§  666,  post. 

,B  Smith  v.  Southwestern  R.  Co., 
L.  R.  6  C.  P.  14 ;  aff'g  s.  C.  5  Id.  98. 


35 


PROXIMATE   CAUSE. 


[§3i 


any  degree,  whether  large  or  small,  is  of  no  importance.1 
If  the  injuries  caused  by  the  concurrent  acts  of  two  persons 
are  plainly  separable,  so  that  the  damage  caused  by  each 
can  be  distinguished,  each  would  be  liable  only  for  the 
damage  which  he  caused  ; 2  but  if  this  is  not  the  case, 
all  the  persons  who  contribute  to  the  injury  by  their 
negligence  are  liable,  jointly  or  severally,  for  the  whole 
damage.3  It  is  immaterial  how  many  others  have  been  in 
fault,    if    the   defendant's  act   was    an    efficient    cause    of    the 


1  Benzing  v.  Steinway,  101  N.  Y. 
547 ;  5  N.  E.  449  ;  Webster  v.  Hud- 
son River  R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  260  ;  Bar- 
rett  v.  Third  Avenue  R.  Co.,  45  Id. 
628  ;  Galvin  v.  New  York,  112  Id. 
223  ;  19  N.  E.  675  ;  Phillips  v.  N.  Y. 
Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  127  N.  Y.  657  ; 
27  N.  E.  978  ;  Eaton  v.  Boston,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  11  Allen,  500  ;  Drommie  v. 
Hogan,  153  Mass.  29  ;  26  N.  E.  237  ; 
Martin  v.  North  Star  Works,  31 
Minn.  407 ;  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Salmon,  39  N.  J.  Law,  299  ;  At- 
kinson v.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.,  60 
Wise.  141  ;  Hunt  v.  Missouri  R.  Co., 
14  Mo.  App.  160  ;  St.  Louis  Bridge 
Co.  v.  Miller,  138  111.  465  ;  28  N.  E. 
1091  ;  Colorado  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Rees, 
21  Colo.  435  ;  42  Pac.  42.  See  other 
cases  under  §  35,  post.  The  law  is 
said  to  be  different  in  Iowa  (DeCanip 
v.  Sioux  City,  74  Iowa.  392  :  37  N.W. 
971  ;  Knapp  v.  Sioux  C.  R.  Co.,  65 
Iowa,  91  ;  21  N.  E.  198).  But  this  is 
owing  entirely  to  a  misapprehension 
of  the  loose  language  of  Shaw,  C.  J., 
in  one  of  his  hair-splitting  opinions 
(Marble  v.  Worcester,  4  Gray,  395), 
which  related  only  to  the  construc- 
tion of  a  peculiar  statute,  and  is  not 
followed  except  as  to  that. 

■  See  Nitro-Phosphatc  Co.  v.  Lon- 
don, etc.  Docks  Co.,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  Div. 
503,  where  this  principle  was  applied 
to  injury  caused  in  part  by  negli- 
gence  and  in  part  by  "act  of  God." 
Lynch  v.  Nurdin,  1  Q.  B.  29  ; 
Chapman  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  19 


N.  Y.  341  ;  Colegrove  v.  New  Haven 
R.  Co.,  20  Id.  492  ;  Barrett  v.  Third 
Av.  R.  Co.,  45  Id.  628  ;  Johnson  v. 
N.  W.  Tel.  Co.,  51  N.  W.  225  ;  48 
Minn.  433  ;  Johnson  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  31  Minn.  57  ;  Flaherty  v. 
Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39  Id.  328  ; 
40  N.  W.  160  ;  Powell  v.  Deveney, 
3  Cush.  300  ;  Lane  v.  Atlantic  Works, 
111  Mass.  140  ;  Lake  v.  Milliken,  62 
Me.  240;  Ricker  v.  Freeman,  50  N.  H. 
420  ;  Wilder  v.  Stanley,  65  Vt.  145  ; 
26  Atl.  189;  Weick  v.  Lander,  75 
111.  93.  It  may  be  impossible  to 
apportion  the  damages  caused  by 
the  concurring  negligence  of  two 
wrong-doers  who  cause  a  single  in- 
jury to  a  third  person  ;  neverthe- 
less, either  is  responsible  for  the 
combined  result  (Slater  v.  Mer- 
sereau,  64  N.  Y.  138  ;  affi'g  5  Daly, 
445).  In  that  case,  a  contractor  for 
the  erection  of  a  building  sublet  a 
portion  of  the  work  to  an  independ- 
ent contractor.  Each  of  them  was 
negligent  in  performing  his  respect- 
ive portion  of  the  work.  It  was 
held  that,  as  the  negligence  of  the 
contractor,  united  with  that  of  the 
sub-contractor,  caused  the  injury,  he 
was  liable  for  the  whole  of  the  re- 
sulting damages.  Compare  Burrows 
v.  March  Gas  Co.,  L.  R.  5  Exch.  67; 
affi'd  L.  R.  7  Exch.  96.  See  Thatcher 
v.  Central  Traction  Co.,  166  Pa.  St. 
66;  30  Atl.  1048  ;  Edwards  v.  Carr, 
13  Gray.  284  :  and  other  cases  cited 
under  §  122,  post. 


§  32]  PROXIMATE   CAUSE.  36 

injury.4  Therefore,  in  an  action  against  one  who,  by  negli- 
gence, inflicted  an  injury  which  would  naturally  cause  death, 
it  is  no  defence  to  show  that  the  injured  person  was  so  unskill- 
fully  treated  as  to  hasten  his  death,1"'  or  that,  by  proper  treat- 
ment, his  life  would  have  been  saved.  Nor,  in  such  an  action, 
is  the  defence  that  the  decedent  died  from  an  independent 
disease  made  out,  unless  it  is  clearly  shown  that  he  must  have 
died  from  it,  when  he  did,  even  if  he  had  not  suffered  from  the 
defendant's  negligent  act.6  Of  course,  where  two  causes  con- 
tribute in  producing  the  injury,  for  both  of  which  defendant 
is  responsible,  no  question  of  proximate  cause  arises.7 

§  32.  Must  be  either  a  superseding  or  a  responsible 
cause. — The  connection  between  the  defendant's  negligence 
and  the  plaintiff's  injury  may  be  broken  by  an  intervening 
cause.  In  order  to  excuse  the  defendant,  however,  this  inter- 
vening cause  must  be  either  a  superseding  or  a  responsible 
cause.  It  is  a  superseding  cause,  whether  intelligent  or  not,  if 
it  so  entirely  supersedes  the  operation  of  the  defendant's  negli- 
gence that  it  alone,  without  his  negligence  contributing 
thereto  in  the  slightest  degree,  produces  the  injury.  It  is  a 
responsible  one,  if  it  is  the  culpable  act  of  a  human  being,  who 
is  legally  responsible  for  such  act.  The  defendant's  neg- 
ligence is  not  deemed  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury, 
when  the  connection  is  thus    actually  broken  by  a  responsi- 

4  McMahon  v.  Davidson,  12  Minn,  pleton  (75  Wise.  18  ;  43  N.  W.  826)  it 

357  :    Postal    Tel.    Co.    v.    Zopfi,   93  was  held  that  if  plaintiff  had  a  con- 

Tenn.  369  ;  24  S.  W.  633  ;  Boone  Co.  stitutional   tendency  to  disease,  and 

v.  Mutchler,  137  Ind.   140  ;  36  N.  E.  the  injury  was  the  proximate  cause 

534 ;  Cline  v.  Crescent  City  R.  Co.,  of  aggravating  that  tendency,  plain- 

43  La.  Ann.  327  ;  9  So.  122.  tiff  might  recover.     To   same  effect, 

Xagel  v.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.,  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  117 

75  Mo.  653.    Compare Sauter  v.  N.  Y.  Ind.  4!5  ;  20  N.  E.  284. 

Central  R.  Co  ,  60  N.  Y.  50  ;  Lyons  v.  7  As  where  the  unusual  speed  of 

Erie  R.  Co.,  57  Id.  489  ;  Klutts  v.  St.  the  car  and  the  state  of  the  pave- 

Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  75  Mo.  642  ;  Pull-  ment    were    the    two    contributing 

man  Car  Co.  v.  Bluhm,  1C9  111.  20  ;  causes,  and  defendant  wasresponsi- 

Allender  v.  Chicago,  etc.    R.  Co.,  37  ble  for  both.     (Kraut  v.  Frankford, 

Iowa,  264.  etc.    R.  Co  ,  160  Pa.  St.  327  ;  28  Atl. 

6  Beauchamp  v.   Saginaw  Mining  783.)     S.  P.  Burrell  v.  TJncapher,  117 

Co.,  50  Mich.  163.     Compare  Thomp-  Pa.    St.   353;  11    Atl.  619  [object  in 

son  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91  Ala.  road  frightening  horse,  and  unrailed 

496  :    8  So.  406.     In  Smalley  v.  Ap-  embankment]. 


37  PROXIMATE   CAUSE.  [§  34 

ble  intervening  cause.  But  the  connection  is  not  actually 
broken,  if  the  intervening  event  is  one  which  might,  in  the 
natural  and  ordinary  course  of  things,  be  anticipated  as  not 
entirely  improbable,  and  the  defendant's  negligence  is  an 
essential  link  in  the  chain  of  causation.  Of  course,  the  very 
definition  of  a  superseding  cause  implies  that  the  defendant's 
negligence  cannot  be  the  cause  of  the  injury. 

§  33.  Superseding-  cause  and  inevitable  accident,  distin- 
guished.— The  first  alternative  needs  little  comment.  It  is 
simply  the  case  of  inevitable  accident,  which  has  already  been 
considered,  with  only  this  difference,  that  such  accident  occurs 
after  the  defendant  has  been  negligent,  and  when,  perhaps, 
but  for  the  intervention  of  that  accident,  he  might  have  been 
liable.  But  it  must  be  carefully  noted  that  inevitable  accident, 
in  order  to  furnish  a  complete  defence  in  such  a  case,  must  be 
the  sole  cause  of  the  injury,  and  therefore  that  it  is  no  defence, 
if,  but  for  the  defendant's  negligence,  the  plaintiff  would  not 
have  been  exposed  to  injury  from  such  accident;1  while,  if  it 
contributed  to  any  part  of  the  resulting  damage,  it  is  only  a 
defence,  in  case  that  part  of  the  damage  can  be  accurately  dis- 
tinguished from  the  rest.2 

§34.  Intervening  responsible  cause,  not  superseding. — 

The  second  alternative,  of  a  responsible  but  not  superseding 
cause,  needs  further  statement.  If  the  negligent  acts  of  two 
or  more  persons,  all  being  culpable  and  responsible  in  law  for 
their  acts,  do  not  concur  in  point  of  time,  and  the  negli- 
gence of  one  only  exposes  the  injured  person  to  risk  of  injury 
in  case  the  other  should  also  be  negligent,  the  liability  of  the 
person  first  in  fault  will  depend  upon  the  question  whether  the 
negligent  act  of  the  other  was  one  which  a  man  of  ordinary 
experience  and  sagacity,  acquainted  with  all  the  circumstances, 
could  reasonably  anticipate  or  not.  If  such  a  person  could 
have  anticipated  that  the  intervening  act  of  negligence  might, 
in  a  natural  and  ordinary  sequence,  follow  the  original  act  of 

1  Condict  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  etc.  Docks  Co.,  L.  R.  9  Ch.  Div.  503  ; 

54  N.  Y.  500  ;  St.  Joseph,  etc.  R.  Co.  Workman  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co., 

t.  Hedge.  44  Neb.  448 ;  62  N.  W.  887.  32  L.  J.  Q.  B.  279. 

1  Nitro- Phosphate  Co.  v.  London, 


§35] 


PROXIMATE    CAUSE. 


38 


negligence,  the  person  first  in  fault  is  not  released  from  liability 
by  reason  of  the  intervening  negligence  of  another.1  If  it 
could  not  have  been  thus  anticipated,  then  the  intervening 
negligent  person  alone  is  responsible.2 

§  35.  Intervening  cause  illustrated. — Thus,  one  who  leaves 
a  horse  loose  and  unattended,  in  a  city  street,  is  responsible  for 
injuries  done  by  the  horse  in  running  away,  although  that 
might  not  have  happened  but  for  the  wrongful  act  of  a  stranger 
in  frightening  it,1  and  though,  after  the  horse  began  to  run, 
its  owner  did  his  best  to  stop  it.2  So  also  the  owner  of  any 
machine,  or  other  thing  capable  in  its  nature  of  doing  injury, 
is  liable  for  injury  which  ensues  to  a  person,  not  himself 
careless,  in  consequence  of  the  owner's  negligently  leaving  it 
exposed  and  unguarded,  in  a  public  place,  and  its  being  there 
set   in  motion   by  a  negligent  person.3     So  where  a  gas  com- 


1  Clark  v.  Chambers,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B. 
Div.  327  (practically  overruling  Man- 
gan  v.  Atterton,  L.  R.  1  Ex.  239) ; 
Lynch  v.  Nurdin,  1  Q.  B.  29  ;  Abbott 
v*  Macfie,  2  Hurlst.  &  C.  744  ;  Collins 
v.  Middle  Level  Com.,  L.  R.  4  C.  P. 
279. 

2  See  Hofnagle  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  55  N.  Y.  608.  Wbere  the  de- 
fendant negligently  sold  gunpowder 
to  a  child,  but  the  child  gave  all  the 
powder  to  its  parents,  who  after- 
ward allowed  the  child  to  take  some 
of  it,  by  the  explosion  of  which  he 
was  injured,  the  defendant  was  held 
not  liable,  and  quite  correctly,  be- 
cause all  effect  of  his  negligence  had 
been  cured  by  the  intervening  pru- 
dence of  the  child's  parents  in  taking 
charge  of  the  gunpowder,  and  their 
subsequent  negligence  in  allowing 
the  child  to  have  it  again  could  not 
restore  the  connection  between  the 
defendant's  original  imprudence  and 
the  final  injury  (Carter  v.  Towne,  103 
Mass.  507).  The  purchase  by  a  father, 
for  his  son  eleven  years  of  age,  of 
a  toy-gun,  cannot  be  held  to  have 
been   made   in  reasonable   anticipa- 


tion of  an  injury  caused  by  the  use 
of  the  gun  by  another  boy  to  whom 
the  son  lent  it  (Harris  v.  Cameron, 
81  Wise.  239  ;  51  N.  W.  487 ;  S.  P. 
Chaddock  v.  Plummer,  88  Mich.  225  ; 
50  N.  W.  135). 

1  Lynch  v.  Nurdin,  1  Q.  B.  29  ; 
Illidge  v.  Goodwin,  5  Can-  &  P.  192  ; 
Rompillon  v.  Abbott,  1  N.  Y.  Supp. 
662  ;  49  Hun,  607,  mem.  One  who 
left  his  cart  in  the  street  unattended, 
with  which,  while  so  standing,  an- 
other cart  came  in  collision,  in  con- 
sequence of  which  plaintiff  was  in- 
jured, is  liable  (Powell  v.  Deveney,  3 
Cush.  300).  s.  p.,  Proctor  v.  Jennings, 
6  Nev.  83  ;  Phillips  v.  De  Wald,  79 
Ga.  732  ;  7  8.  E.  161;  Belkv.  People, 
125  111.  584  ;  17  N.  E.  744.  See  §  645, 
post).  For  cases  of  injuries  caused  by 
defects  in  highways,  the  negligence 
of  third  persons  contributing,  see 
§§  346,  347,  jiost. 

8  McCahill  v.  Kipp,  2  E.  D.  Smith, 
413. 

3  Lane  v.  Atlantic  Works,  111 
Mass.  140  ;  Weick  v.  Lander,  75  111. 
93 ;  s.  p.  Clark  v.  Chambers,  L.  R.  3 
Q.  B.  Div.  327  ;    Mars  v.  Delaware 


39 


PROXIMATE   CAUSE. 


[§36 


pany  furnishes  leaky  pipes,  and  thus  by  its  negligence  fills  the 
plaintiff's  room  with  gas,  it  is  responsible  for  an  explosion 
caused  by  a  gasfitter  taking  a  lighted  candle  without  due  cau- 
tion, for  the  purpose  of  finding  where  the  leak  was.4  The  rule 
that  the  defendant  is  liable  for  any  negligence  of  other  persons 
which  he  might  have  anticipated  as  the  result  of  his  own,  has 
been  carried  to  such  an  extent  as  to  hold  that  where  the 
defendant  descended  in  a  balloon  upon  private  grounds,  and 
the  spectacle  attracted  upon  the  grounds  a  crowd  of  people,  by 
whom  the  premises  were  injured,  he  was  liable  to  the  owner 
for  the  damage;5  but  this  decision  is  condemned,  upon  satis- 
factory grounds.6 


§  36.  Intervening  cause  must  be  culpable. — The  chain 
of  responsible  connection  is  not  broken  so  long  as  the  defend- 
ant is  in  any  proper  sense  the   cause  of  the    plaintiff's  injury, 


etc.  C.  Co.,  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  107;  54 
Hun,  625,  mem.  [locomotive]  ;  Mexi- 
can Nat.  R.  Co.  v.  Mussette,  86  Tex. 
708  ;  26  S.  W.  1075  [locomotive].  So 
held  as  to  a  gun  left  loaded  and 
primed  (Dixon  v.  Bell,  5  Maule  &  S. 
198).  In  Henry  v.  Dennis  (93  Ind. 
452),  defendant  left  an  open  barrel  of 
fish  brine  in  the  street ;  a  stranger 
emptied  the  barrel  into  the  street ; 
plaintiff's  cow  drank  the  brine  and 
was  killed  thereby  ;  defendant  held 
liable.  See  note  to  this  case  47  Am. 
Rep.  381.  Where  an  open  cellar- way 
in  a  public  building  was  insecurely 
covered  by  a  bench,  easily  movable, 
and  which  in  fact  was  removed  by  a 
third  person,  shortly  before  the  plain- 
tiff fell  through  the  orjening,  the  own- 
er's negligence  held  to  be  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  the  injury  (Howe  v. 
Ohmart,  7  Ind.  App.  32  ;  33  N.  E.  466). 
See  Handyside  v.  Powers,  145  Mass. 
123;  13N.Y.462  ;  Mclntire  v.  Roberts, 
149  Mass.  450  ;  22  N.  E.  13. 

4  Burrows  v.  March  Gas  Co.,  L.  R. 
5  Ex.  67,  affi'd,  7  Id.  96.  In  Bartlett 
v.  Boston  Gas  Co.  (117  Mass.  533), 
where   the    gas  company   was  held 


not  liable  for  an  explosion,  the  cir- 
cumstances were  alike  in  every 
respect,  except  as  to  contributory 
negligence.  In  Koelsch  v.  Philadel- 
phia Co.  (152  Pa.  St.  355  :  25  Atl.  522), 
a  third  person,  not  defendant's  agent, 
struck  the  match  which  caused  the 
explosion;  defendant  held  liable,  as 
being  responsible  for  the  escape  of 
the  gas  from  defective  main.  See 
§  695,  post. 

5  Guille  v.  Swan,  19  Johns,  381. 

6  Wharton,  Negl.  §  95.  In  Fair- 
banks v.  Kerr  (70  Pa.  St.  87),  it  was 
held  that  where  a  street  preacher  at- 
tracted a  crowd  around  him,  and 
some  of  them  mounted  a  pile  of 
stones,  and  by  their  weight  broke 
them,  it  was  a  question  of  fact  for 
the  jury,  and  not  one  of  law,  whether 
the  speaker  should  have  anticipated 
this  result.  In  the  latter  case  it  is  to 
be  observed  that  it  was  the  very  ob- 
ject of  the  street  preacher  to  collect 
a  crowd,  whereas,  in  the  former  case, 
a  crowd  was  probably  the  last  thing 
which  the  descending  balloonist  de- 
sired. 


§  37]  PROXIMATE   CAUSE.  40 

unless  the  person  whose  act  intervenes  is  culpable.  If  such 
person's  act  is  innocent  it  is  no  defence.1  And,  generally 
speaking,  the  intervener  must  be  one  who  can  be  held  respon- 
sible in  an  action  at  law  for  the  damage.  But  the  act  of  the 
State  or  of  the  United  States  might  intervene  to  break  the 
connection  of  responsibility,  and  yet  no  action  be  allowed. 
The  intervention  of  a  private  person,  however,  can  never  re- 
lieve the  defendant  from  liability  for  an  injury  of  which  he 
was  the  cause,  unless  such  person  could  be  made  responsible 
in  an  action.  If,  therefore,  the  intervener  is  so  young,  or  a 
person  of  such  weak  mind,  that  greater  care  than  he  shows 
could  not  reasonably  be  expected  from  him,  such  intervention 
is  no  defence.2  This  doctrine  is  fully  illustrated  in  the  chap- 
ter on  Contributory  Negligence. 

§37.  Intervening  cause  must  be  a  free  agent.— Neither  is 

the  intervening  cause  sufficient,  if  the  intervener  was  not  a  free 
agent,  since  he  could  not  be  culpable  in  his  act  or  responsible 
for  it. 1  Thus,  where  the  defendant  chased  a  boy  with  an  axe, 
and  the  boy,  escaping  into  the  plaintiff 's  store,  injured  property 
in  his  terror,  the  defendant  was  held   liable  for   the  damage. 2 


1  Thus,  where  a  traveler  upon  a 
sidewalk  in  a  city  street  steps  upon 
a  loose  board  forming  part  of  the 
walk,  so  that  the  end  of  the  board 
tips  up  and  strikes  another  traveler, 
the  latter  has  his  remedy  against  the 
city,  whose  duty  it  was  to  maintain 
the  sidewalk  (Emporia  v.  Schmid- 
ling,  33  Kans.  485).  To  same  effect, 
Chacey  v.  Fargo,  5  N.  Dak.  173;  64  N. 
W.  932.  Plaintiff  went  into  defend- 
ant's lumber  yard  to  purchase  lum- 
ber. A  team  caught  a  projecting 
end  of  one  of  the  timbers  ;  it  fell  on 
plaintiff.  Held,  that  the  negligence 
of  defendant  in  piling  the  lumber 
was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  in- 
jury (Pastene  v.  Adams,  49  Cal.  87). 

2  Thus,  where  defendant  sold  pis- 
tol-cartridges to  children,  knowing 
that  they  were  dangerous  and  that 
the  purchasers  were  unfit  to  use 
them,   and   the  purchasers  allowed 


another  boy,  six  years  old,  to  fire  one 
of  the  cartridges,  thereby  killing  one 
of  the  boys  who  bought  it,  defend- 
ant was  held  liable  (Binford  v.  John- 
ston, 82  Ind.  426  ;  s.  P.,  Otten  v. 
Cohen,  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  430).  But  see 
§  34,  ante. 

1  Wharton,  Negl.  §§  89,  138.  The 
familiar  "squib  case"  is  an  apt  illus- 
tration of  the  doctrine.  In  that  case, 
A.,  in  violation  of  a  statute,  threw  a 
lighted  squib  into  a  market  house, 
and  it  fell  near  B.  The  latter,  to 
prevent  injury  to  himself,  seized  it 
and  threw  it  near  C,  who  in  turn 
threw  it  toward  D.,who  was  injured 
thereby.  A.  was  held  liable  to  D. 
for  the  injury  of  which  his  act  was 
the  proximate  cause  (Scott  v.  Shep- 
herd, 2  W.  Blackst.  892;  s.  c.,3  Wils. 
403). 

2  Vandenburgh  v.  Truax,  4  Denio, 
464. 


41  PROXIMATE   CAUSE.  [§  38 

So  where,  by  the  defendant's  negligence,  a  horse  was  fright- 
ened and  ran  away,  bringing  its  driver  into  collision  with  the 
plaintiff,  the  defendant  was  held  liable.3  The  same  principle 
applies  to  all  cases  in  which  the  intervener  acts  so  completely 
under  the  influence  of  sudden  alarm  as  not  to  be  responsible 
for  his  acts,  especially  if  this  alarm  is  caused  by  the  defend- 
ant's fault;  although  we  do  not  think  that  an  indispensable 
condition.  This  point  will  be  illustrated  in  the  chapter  on 
Contributory  Negligence. 

§38.  Intervener  not  culpable  if  ignorant  of  the  facts. — 

Neither  is  the  alleged  intervener  culpable,  if  he  was  ignorant  of 
the  facts  which  would,  if  known,  have  imposed  a  duty  of 
special  care  upon  him.  And,  therefore,  the  intervention  of  a 
person,  thus  ignorant,  is  no  defence,  even  though  his  act  was 
the  sole  immediate  cause  of  the  injury.  Thus,  where  the  de- 
fendant negligently  sells  to  a  third  person,  in  a  concealed  form, 
for  the  plaintiff's  use,  poison  or  other  articles  likely  to  cause 
personal  injury,  and  such  person  innocently  and  unsuspectingly 
gives  them  to  the  plaintiff,  who  is  injured  thereby,  he  can  re- 
cover damages  from  the  defendant. J     And    if  the  person  who 

3  Lowery  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  99  (Heaven  v.  Pender,  infra).  Thomas 
N.Y.  158  ;  1  N.  E.  608.  A.  was  injured  v.  Winchester  (6  N.  Y.  397)  goes  still 
by  B.'s  horse,  which  was  frightened  further  ;  its  authority  has  been  ques- 
by  the  overturn  of  the  sleigh  to  tioned  (see  Bigelow  on  Torts,  609  ; 
which  it  was  attached,  on  a  heap  of  Wharton,  Negl.  £  91 ;  Heaven  v.  Pen- 
snow  and  ice,  wrongfully  left  in  a  der,  L.  E.  11  Q.  B.  Div.  503) ;  but  we 
highway  by  C.  Held,  that  C.'s  act  think  it  correct.  It  is  reaffirmed  in 
was  the  proximate  cause  of  A.'s  in-  Devlin  v.  Smith,  89  N.  Y.  470.  In 
jury  (Lee  v.  Union  R.  Co.,  12  R.  I.  1  Law  Quarterly  Review,  516,  the  edi- 
383).  So  where,  in  consequence  of  tor,  approving  the  decision  in  Elliott 
defendant's  changing  the  course  of  a  v.  Hall,  15  Q.  B.  D.  315,  to  the  effect 
creek,  beavers  dammed  it  up,  caus-  that  the  seller  of  coals,  who  sends 
ing  the  water  to  overflow  adjoining  them  in  a  truck,  with  a  loose  trap- 
land,  he  was  held  liable  for  resulting  door  in  it,  is  liable  to  the  buyer's 
injury  (Cheeves  v.  Danielly,  80  Ga.  servants  if  they  go  through  the  trap- 
114;  4  S.  E.  902).  See  similar  cases  door  in  the  course  of  unloading  the 
cited  under  §§  355,  426,  626,  post.  coals,  adds:    "  Perhaps  it  is  not  too 

1  George   v.    Skivington,  L     R.    5  much  even  to  hope  that  the  Court  of 

Exch.    1  ;     Norton    v.    Sewall,     106  Appeal  will    some  day  follow    the 

Mass.  143  ;  Elkins  v.  McKean.  79  Pa.  leading  Now  York  case  of  Thomas  v. 

St.  493  :  Langridge  v.  Levy,  2  Mees.  Winchester,   6    N.    Y.    397,    which, 

&  W.   51!)  ;  affirmed,  4  Id.  337  ;  said  though  regarded  with  a  kind  of  sus- 

by  Brett,  M.  R.,  to  be  badly  reported,  picious  fear  by  English  commenta- 


§39] 


PROXIMATE    CAUSE. 


42 


shipped  the  nitro-glycerine,  in  the  well-known  case  arising  out 
of  its  explosion  while  in  transit,2  could  have  been  found,  it  is 
evident  that  the  fact  of  the  explosion  having  been  directly 
caused  by  the  rough  handling  of  the  carrier  would  have  been 
no  defence  to  him,  since  the  carrier  had  been  deceived  by  him 
as  to  the  nature  of  the  goods. 

§  39.  Superior  force  concurring  with  defendant's  negli- 
gence. —  It  is  universally  agreed  that,  if  the  damage  is  caused 
by  the  concurring  force  of  the  defendant's  negligence  and  some 
other  cause  for  which  he  is  not  responsible,  including  the  "  act 
of  God "  or  superior  human  force  directly  intervening,  the 
defendant  is  nevertheless  responsible,  if  his  negligence  is  one 
of  the  proximate  causes  of  the  damage,  within  the  definition 
already  given.1  It  is  also  agreed  that,  if  the  negligence  of  the 
defendant  concurs  with  the  other  cause  of  the  injury,  in  point 
of  time  and  place,2  or  otherwise  so  directly  contributes  to  the 
plaintiff's  damage  that  it  is  reasonably  certain  that  the  other 
cause  alone  would  not  have  sufficed  to  produce  it,3  the  defend- 


tors,  is,  in  our   opinion,   very  good 
law." 

-'Parrot  v.  Wells,  15  Wall.  524. 

1  Holladay  v.  Kennard,  12  Wall. 
254 ;  Bostwick  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  45  N.  Y.  712  ;  Michaels  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  30  Id.  564;  Read  v. 
Spaulding,  Id.  630  ;  George  v.  Fisk, 
32  N.  H.  32  ;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Sulphur  Spring,  96  Pa.  St.  65; 
Watkins  v.  Roberts,  28  Ind.  167  ; 
Pruitt  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62 
Mo.  527  ;  Clark  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  39 
Id.  184.  The  filling  of  a  steamer's 
boilers  over  night,  to  be  ready  for 
starting  next  morning,  resulting  in 
the  freezing  of  the  water  and  burst- 
ing of  the  pipe  during  the  night,  is 
negligence,  though  shown  to  be  cus- 
tomary to  fill  the  boilers  of  outgoing 
vessels  over  night  (Siordet  v.  Hall, 
4  Bing.  607).  It  is  negligent  for  a 
ferryman  to  start  a  little  boat  across 
a  river  when  a  dangerous  wind  is 
blowing  (Cook  v.  Gourdin,  2  Nott  & 


M.  19)  ;  or  for  a  wagoner  to  start 
across  a  stream  with  an  insufficient 
team  (Loouris  v.  Pearson,  Harp.  470) ; 
and  they  will  not  be  excused  for  a 
loss  occurring  by  reason  of  the  wind 
or  sudden  rising  of  the  stream.  In 
Jackson  v.  Wisconsin  Tel.  Co.  (88 
Wise.  243  ;  60  N.  W.  430),  a  telephone 
company  negligently  left  a  wire  con- 
necting plaintiff's  building  with 
another  greatly  higher  building  sur- 
mounted by  a  high  pole.  Plaintiff's 
building  was  burned  by  reason  of 
lightning  striking  the  pole  on  the 
other  building,  and  being  conducted 
along  the  wire  to  his.  Held,  that  the 
leaving  of  the  wire  between  the  two 
buildings  was  the  proximate  cause  of 
the  fire  and  the  company  was  liable. 

2  Scott  v.  Hunter,  46  Pa.  St.  192. 
See  Cooley  on  Torts,  72. 

3  See  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sul- 
phur Spring,  96  Pa.  St.  65.  The 
defendants'  vessel,  owing  to  their 
negligence,  struck,  and  was  driven 


43 


PROXIMATE   CAUSE. 


[§39 


ant  is  liable,  notwithstanding  he  may  not  have  anticipated  or 
been  bound  to  anticipate  the  interference  of  the  superior  force 
which,  concurring  with  his  own  negligence,  produced  the  dam- 
age.4    But    if  the  superior  force  would  have  produced  the  same 


by  the  wind  and  tide  upon  a  sea-wall, 
damaging  the  same.  In  that  state 
of  the  weather  and  tide,  it  was  im- 
possible to  prevent  this  result,  after 
the  ship  had  once  struck.  Held, 
that  defendants  were  liable  for  the 
damage  caused  to  the  wall  (Rotnney 
v.  Trinity  House,  L.  R.  5  Ex.  204 ; 
affi'd,  7  Id.  247).  In  Sherman  v. 
Inman  Steamship  Co.  (26  Hun,  107), 
it  was  held  that,  if  the  jury  were 
satisfied  that  the  captain  was  negli- 
gent in  endeavoring  to  continue  a 
voyage  in  the  disabled  condition  of 
the  steamer,  the  plaintiff  was  enti- 
tled to  recover  for  loss  of  cargo 
shipped  by  him. 

4  Woodward  v.  Aborn,  35  Me.  271 
[wrongfully  placing  deleterious  sub- 
stance near  plaintiff's  well,  into 
which  an  extraordinary  freshet  car- 
ried it,  spoiling  the  water].  In 
Frith  v.  Bowling  Iron  Co.  (L.  R.  3 
C.  P.  Div.  254),  defendant,  being 
bound  to  maintain  a  division  fence, 
constructed  it  with  old  wire  rope  ; 
this  decayed  by  rust,  and  some  of 
the  fragments  fell  on  plaintiff 's  land 
and  were  swallowed  by  his  cow, 
causing  her  death.  Defendant  held 
liable.  Compare  Henry  v.  Dennis, 
93  Ind.  452  {supra,  §  35,  n.  3).  In 
Lawrence  v.  Jenkins  (L.  R.  8  Q.  B. 
274),  defendant  negligently  suffered 
fence  to  be  broken  down  ;  plaintiff's 
cow  escaped  and  was  killed  ;  defend- 
ant held  liable,  s.  P.,  West  v.  Ward, 
77  Iowa,  323  ;  42  N.  W.  309  [defend- 
ant left  plaintiff's  fence  open  ;  mare 
escaped,  and  was  injured  in  a  wire 
fence].  An  action  lies  by  a  passenger 
against  a  carrier,  if  the  injury  oc- 
curred in  part  from  an  unforeseen 
cause,    and  in  part  by  negligence 


(Brehm  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co., 
34  Barb.  256).  The  defendant  had 
wrongfully  placed  a  dam  across  a 
stream  on  plaintiff's  land,  and  al- 
lowed it  to  remain  there ;  being 
swept  away  by  a  freshet,  the  rush 
of  water  injured  plaintiff's  prop- 
erty :  defendant  held  liable  (Dick- 
inson v.  Boyle,  17  Pick.  78).  In 
an  action  for  obstructing  a  water- 
course, where  the  overflow  was  in- 
creased by  the  effects  of  melting 
snows  and  falling  rains,  neither  the 
court  nor  jury  are  required  to  dis- 
criminate between  the  damages  so 
caused  and  those  resulting  from  the 
action  of  the  living  stream  (Bird  v. 
Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  30  Mo.  App. 
365).  The  fact  that  a  railroad  cul- 
vert would  not  have  given  way  but 
for  the  breaking  of  a  dam  on  ad- 
joining property,  over  which  de- 
fendant had  no  control,  will  not  pre- 
vent recovery  by  a  passenger,  if  the 
negligent  manner  of  the  culvert's 
construction  contributed  to  the  in- 
jury (Bonner  v.  Wingate,  78  Tex. 
333  ;  14  S.  W.  790  ;  Ilfrey  v.  Sabine, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Tex.  63;  13  S.  W.  165). 
To  same  effect,  Turner  v.  Haar,  114 
Mo.  335  ;  21  S.  W.  737  ;  Webster  v. 
Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  115  N.  Y.  112  ;  21 
N.  E.  725  [leaving  cars  unsecured 
on  side  track  whence  they  were 
blown  by  high  winds.]  See  §  465, 
post.  In  Rodgers  v  Central  Pa- 
cific R.  Co.  (67  Cal.  607;  8  Pac. 
377),  defendant's  bridge  fell  by 
reason  of  its  defects,  combined  with 
an  enormous  fall  of  water  from 
' '  a  cloud-burst  ;  "  defendant  held 
liable,  s.  p.,  Philadelphia,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Anderson,  94  Pa.  St.  356 ; 
Davis  v.  Vermont  Cent.  R.  Co.,  55 


40] 


PROXIMATE    CAUSE. 


44 


damage,  whether  the  defendant  had  been  negligent  or  not,  his 
negligence  is  not  deemed  the  cause  of  the  injury.5 


§  40.   Superior      force      concurring 
delay.  —  In     the     application     of    this 
difference    of    opinion    has    arisen 
sequence   of    negligence,   exposing 
to      injury.        In       Pennsylvania,1 


with      defendant's 

principle,    a    serious 

as    to    what    is    a    natural 

the    property    of    another 

Massachusetts,2      Ohio,3 


Vt.  84.  In  Ellet  v.  St.  Louis,  etc. 
R.  Co.  (76  Mo.  518),  a  storm  of  un- 
usual severity  carried  away  a  rail- 
way embankment.  The  defendant 
ran  a  train  without  first  causing  the 
road-bed  and  track  to  be  carefully 
examined,  and  a  train  was  wrecked 
in  consequence.  The  company  was 
held  liable.  Where  the  servants  of 
a  railroad  company,  aware  that  a 
bridge  on  the  line  had  been  carried 
away  by  a  flood,  neglected  to  take 
steps  to  warn  and  stop  an  approach- 
ing train,  the  company  was  held 
liable  (Lambkin  v.  Southeastern  R. 
Co.,  L.  R.  5.  App.  Cas.  352).  The  de- 
fendant hung  a  sign  over  a  street,  in 
violation  of  an  ordinance ;  it  was 
blown  down  by  the  wind  in  an  ex- 
traordinary storm,  and  in  its  fall  a 
bolt,  which  was  part  of  its  fasten- 
ings, struck  and  broke  plaintiff's 
window  ;  defendant  held  liable 
(Salisbury  v.  Hirchenroder,  106 
Mass.  458).  For  cases  of  street  ob- 
structions occasioned,  in  part,  by 
natural  causes  —  winds,  ice  and 
snow  —  see  g  363,  post. 

5  Thus  where  a  building  is  carried 
away  by  a  flood,  which  a  culvert 
under  defendant's  railway  embank- 
ment was  not  sufficiently  large  to 
pass,  a  charge,  in  effect,  that  de- 
fendant's negligence  concurring 
with  the  act  of  God,  although  that 
negligence  did  not  produce  the  in- 
jury, and  its  absence  would  not  have 
prevented  it,  was  sufficient  to  render 
the    defendant     liable,     was     held 


erroneous.  (Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sulphur  Springs,  etc.  96  Pa.  St.  65). 
"To  create  liability,  it  must  have 
required  the  combined  effect  of  the 
act  of  God  and  the  concurrent  negli- 
gence to  produce  the  injury"  (lb.; 
compare  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Anderson,  94  Pa.  St.  351).  Where  a 
lurch  of  the  vessel  caused  a  passen- 
ger to  trip  on  socket  fixed  in  floor 
of  saloon,  alleged  to  have  been  in- 
sufficiently lighted,  held  the  cause  of 
the  fall  was  the  action  of  the  sea,  and 
the  carrier  was  not  liable  (Bruswitz 
v.  Netherlands  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  64 
Hun,  262  ;  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  75).  The 
working  loose  of  long  lumber  on  two 
freight  cars,  properly  packed  and  in- 
spected, so  that  the  ends  of  the  lum- 
ber struck  a  passing  car,  held  to  be 
an  accident  which  could  not  have 
been  anticipated  (Knox  v.  N.  Y., 
Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  69  Hun,  93  ; 
23  N.  Y.  Supp.  198). 

1  In  Morrison  v.  Davis  (20  Pa.  St. 
171),  a  canal  boat  started  with  a  lame 
horse  ;  a  consequent  delay  occurred, 
pending  which  the  goods  were  lost 
by  an  extraordinary  flood.  But  for 
the  lameness  of  the  horse  the  boat 
would  have  passed  the  place  where 
the  flood  occurred.  Carrier  not 
liable. 

2  Denny  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co..  13 
Gray,  481  ;  Hoadley  v.  Northern  Tr. 
Co.,  115  Mass  304. 

8  One  who,  having  engaged  to 
tow  a  barge  over  Lake  Michigan, 
delayed  commencing  the  voyage,  so 


45 


PROXIMATE   CAUSE. 


[§40 


Iowa,4  Nebraska,5  and  Arkansas,6  as  well  as  in  the  United 
States  Supreme  Court,7  it  is  held  that  where  a  carrier,  by 
negligent  delay,  exposes  goods  to  injury  by  the  "act  of  God," 
or  other  cause  for  which  he  is  not  responsible,  and  which  he 
could  not  naturally  foresee,  he  is  not  liable  for  injuries  arising 
from  such  a  cause,  although  they  would  not  have  affected  the 
goods  if  he  had  not  negligently  delayed  their  transportation. 
This  decision  is  put  upon  the  ground  that  he  could  not 
reasonably  have  anticipated  such  a  result  of  his  delay,  and 
that,  for  aught  that  he  could  possibly  foresee,  promptness 
might  have  exposed  the  goods  to  the  risk  quite  as  much  as 
delay.8  In  New  York,9  New  Hampshire,10  Missouri,11  and 
Tennessee,12  the  very  opposite  doctrine  is  firmly  settled.  In 
all  courts,  the  act  of  a  master  of  a  vessel,  in  deviating  from 


that  after  it  was  commenced  a  storm 
was  encountered  in  which  the  barge 
was  lost,  was  not  liable  for  the  loss, 
although  the  delay  was  unreasonable 
and  unnecessary,  and  although  the 
barge  but  for  the  delay  would  prob- 
ably have  been  safe  (Daniels  v. 
Ballantine,  23  Ohio  St.  532). 

4  Where  plaintiff  deposited  wood 
at  one  end  of  a  bridge,  which  he  in- 
tended to  take  over  the  bridge  into 
the  city,  but  was  delayed  by  the 
neglect  of  the  city  to  repair  it,  and 
t'ue  wood  was  subsequently  carried 
away  by  a  flood,  it  was  held  that  he 
could  not  recover  (Dubuque  Wood, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Dubuque,  30  Iowa,  176). 

5  Where  a  train,  being  behind 
time,  was  upset  by  a  gale  of  wind, 
v  Inch  it  would  have  escaped  had  it 
been  on  time,  held,  that  the  carrier 
was  not  liable  (McClary  v.  Sioux, 
etc.  R.  Co.  3  Neb.  44). 

"  Martin  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
55  Ark.  510  ;  19  S.  W.  314. 

7  Railroad  Co.  v.  Reeves,  10  Wall. 
176  ;  Thomas  v.  Lancaster  Mills,  34 
U.  S.  App.  404;  71  Fed.  481. 

8  Colt,  J. ,  Hoadley  v.  Northern 
Transp.  Co.,  115  Mass.  304. 

?  In  New  York,  it  is   well  settled 


that  if  the  defendant's  delay  was  un- 
reasonable, and  such  delay  exposed 
the  goods  to  loss,  e.  g. ,  by  fire,  the 
loss  is  to  be  attributed  directly  to  the 
defendant's  fault  (Condict  v.  Grand 
Trunk  R.  Co.,  54  N.  Y.  500,  and  cases 
cited).  Compare  Read  v.  Spaulding, 
30  N.  Y.  600  :  Bostwick  v.  Baltimore, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  45  Id  712  ;  and  Michaels 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  30  Id. 
564,  where  forwarder  was  held  liable 
for  delay  in  forwarding  goods,  by 
which  they  became  damaged  by  ex- 
traordinary rise  of  water  in  river. 
So  held  also  in  Graw  v.  Baltimore, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  18  W.  Va.  361.  In 
Smeed  v.  Foord  (1  El.  &  El.  602),  the 
delay  was  in  the  delivery  of  a 
threshing  machine,  with  knowledge 
on  the  part  of  the  company  that 
it  was  needed  to  thresh  wheat  in 
the  field.  The  grain  was  injured 
by  the  delay.  The  carrier  was  held 
liable. 

'"  Deming  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co., 
48  N.  H.  455. 

11  Pruitt  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co., 
62  Mo.  527,  and  cases  cited. 

12  Deming    v.   Merchants'   Cotton 
Press  Co.,   90  Tenn.  306:  17  S.  W 


§40] 


PROXIMATE   CAUSE. 


46 


the  usual  course  of  his  voyage,  would  be  held  the  proximate 
cause  of  damage  caused  by  a  tempest,  in  itself  the  act  of  God.13 


13  Davis  v.  Garrett,  6  Bing.  716. 
Same  rule  as  to  carriers  by  land 
(Powers  v.  Davenport,  7  Blackf .  497  ; 
Lawrence  v.  McGregor,  Wright,  193  ; 
Phillips  v.  Brigham,  26  Ga.  617). 
If  a  carrier  agrees  to  transport  goods 
by  canal,  and  he  takes  them  out  to 


sea  (Hand  v.  Baynes,  4  Whart.  204). 
or  agrees  to  send  them  by  one  line 
of  boats  and  sends  them  by  another 
(Johnson  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  33 
N.  Y.  610),  and  they  are  lost  by  act 
of  God,  he  is  liable. 


CHAPTER  III. 

DEGREES  OF  NEGLIGENCE. 

§41.  The  theory  of  two    degrees  of  §46.  "  Utmost  care,"  when  required 


negligence. 

42.  Its  impracticability  in  modern 

affairs. 

43.  Unsatisfactory  tests  of  "  ordi- 

nary care." 

44.  Necessity    of    an     exceptional 

degree  of  care. 

45.  The  requirement  just  and  rea- 

sonable. 


47.  Three  degrees  of  care  defined. 

48.  Correlative    degrees    of    negli- 

gence. 

49.  "Gross,"      "ordinary"      and 

"  slight  "  negligence  defined. 

50.  Standard  of  "great  care"  stated. 

51.  Application  of  the  rule  to  pas- 

senger carriers. 


§  41.  The  theory  of  two  degrees  of  negligence. — We  de- 
sire to  express  the  obligation  under  which  we,  in  commsn  with 
the  courts  and  the  bar,  have  been  placed  by  the  eminent 
ability  and  learning  with  which  Dr.  Wharton  has  expounded 
the  Roman  law  concerning  degrees  of  negligence,  and  by  which 
he  has  cleared  up  the  confusion  which  had  so  long  existed 
upon  this  subject.  He  has  conclusively  shown  that  the  real 
Roman  law  did  recognize  degrees  of  negligence,  or  rather 
degrees  of  care  and  skill  to  be  required,  and  that  it  did  not 
recognize  the  division  and  definition  of  these  degrees  which 
were  invented  by  the  scholastic  jurists  of  the  Middle  Ages. 

We  should  be  glad  to  accept  and  follow  Dr.  Wharton's 
theory  to  the  fullest  extent,  if  we  could  feel  justified  in  doing 
so.  We  shall  accept  the  definitions  which  he  has  drawn  from 
the  Roman  law;  but  we  are  compelled  to  differ  from  him  upon 
one  important  point ;  although,  in  doing  so,  we  vary  nearly  as 
much  from  the  theory  of  our  first  three  editions  as  we  should  by 
accepting  his  views  without  qualification.  In  those  editions, 
which  were  all  issued  before  Dr.  Wharton's  work  appeared, 
we  referred  to  the  difficulties  and  confusion  which  surrounded 
the  whole  question  of  degrees  of  negligence,  and,  while  insist- 
ing that  some  difference  in  the  degree  of  care,  diligence  and 
skill  to  be  required  from  persons  in  very  different   positions 

f47j 


§  4~]  DEGREES   OE   NEGLIGENCE.  48 

must  be  recognized,  we  admitted  that  the  definitions  usually 
given  of  these  degrees  were  unsatisfactory. 

The  analysis  of  Dr.  Wharton  shows  clearly  wherein  these 
definitions  were  unsatisfactory  and  also  why  they  were  so. 
They  were  not  derived  from  the  real  Roman  law,  framed,  as 
that  was,  by  jurists  dealing  with  practical  affairs;  they  were 
invented  by  mere  students,  having  no  experience  of  practical 
life.  So  far,  the  reasoning  of  Dr.  Wharton  is  conclusive.  He 
goes  further,  however,  and  insists  that  only  two  degrees  of 
care  or  negligence  should  be  recognized  in  our  law,  as  only  two 
were  acknowledged  by  the  Roman  jurists. 

These  are  (1)  the  care  to  be  required  by  one  who  is  not,  and 
does  not  profess  to  be,  a  good  man  of  business  or  an  expert  in 
the  affairs  under  consideration,  and  (2)  the  care  to  be  required 
of  one  who  is,  or  professes  to  be,  such  an  expert.  The  care 
required  from  the  first  class  might  be  called  slight;  and  the 
care  required  from  the  second  class  might  be  called  ordinary. 
Great  care,  he  holds,  should  not  be  demanded  in  any  case,  if  it 
is  to  be  understood  as  implying  anything  more  than  what  is 
here  called  ordinary  care,  the  care  of  an  expert,  measured  by 
what  is  usual  among  good  men  of  business  in  the  same  line. 

§  42.  Its  impracticability  in  modern  affairs. — It  is  quite  true 
that  the  middle-age  definitions  of  the  degrees  of  care,  and  still 
more  the  application  of  those  definitions  to  particular  cases 
and  the  reasons  assigned  for  it,  were  the  product  of  mere 
abstract  speculation,  without  the  aid  of  practical  experience. 
The  result  of  all  attempts  to  apply  these  speculations  to 
practice  has  been  to  drop  out  of  sight  nearly  all  the  examples 
of  great  care  and  slight  negligence  which  were  given  in  the  old 
books.  But  a  new  class  of  cases  has  arisen  within  the  last 
century,  in  which,  as  the  result  of  that  very  experience  which  Dr. 
Wharton  justly  considers  the  true  foundation  of  all  theories  in 
law,  the  courts  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  have 
felt  so  strongly  the  necessity  of  a  special,  unusual  degree  of 
care,  that  they  have  actually  invented  a  fourth  degree,  and, 
not  content  with  that  great  care  and  responsibility  for  slight 
negligence  which  the  medieval  jurists  defined,  they  have  held 
defendants  to  the  duty  of  using  the  utmost  care,  and  to 
responsibility  for  the  slightest  negligence. 


49 


DEGREES   OF   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  43 


Dr.  Wharton  attempts  to  prove  that,  in  all  these  cases,  only 
ordinary  care  has  really  been  exacted,  that  is,  the  care  usually 
shown  in  such  cases  by  a  good  man  of  business,  accustomed  to 
that  line  of  business.     But  in  this,  we  think,  he  fails. 

£  43.  Unsatisfactory  tests  of  "ordinary  care."— Every 
possible  definition  of  ordinary  care  fails,  when  it  is  attempted 
to  include  within  it  the  actual  decisions  of  the  best  courts  as 
to  the  duty  of  carriers  of  persons.  Dr.  Wharton  admits  that 
the  general  language  of  the  leading  judicial  opinions  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  theory  that  ordinary  care  only  is  required  in 
such  cases.1  But  he  urges  that  this  language  is  only  theoretical, 
and  that  the  courts,  when  stating  as  a  principle  that  the  utmost 
care  and  skill,  the  highest  degree  of  prudence  and  the  greatest 
foresight,  are  demanded  from  carriers,  only  mean  that  they 
must  use  that  degree  of  care  and  skill  "  which  a  good  specialist, 
skilled  in  his  particular  department,  is  accustomed  to  apply,"2 
or  "  which  good  business  men  of  the  class  are  accustomed, 
under  similar  circumstances,  to  apply."  3  If,  by  these  expres- 
sions, it  is  meant  that  the  standard  of  care  and  skill  main- 
tained by  the  best  specialist  who  can  be  found  by  the 
passenger,  after  a  diligent  search  for  the  best  man,  is  to  be 
enforced  against  all  carriers,  that  would  establish  a  rule  even 
more  stringent  than  that  which  we  assert.  But  if,  as  doubtless 
is  the  case,  it  is  meant  that  no  greater  care  and  skill  are  re- 
quired than  such  as  is  generally  shown  by  average  good  busi- 
ness men  of  the  same  class,  and  especially  such  as  they  usually 
bestow  upon  their  own  protection,  under  similar  circumstances, 
these  phrases  are  misleading.  They  are  not  mere  students  or 
"  schoolmen  "  who  have  invented  a  different  rule  ;  they  are 
judges,  the  majority  of  whom  have  been  more  or  less  engaged 
in  railway  business,  and  many  of  whom  were  for  years  actively 
engaged  in  the  defence  of  railway  companies  against  claims  for 
personal  injuries.  Yet  they  are  unanimous,  or  very  nearly  so, 
in  requiring  the  managers  of  railways,  steamboats,  etc.,  to  use 
a  degree  of  care,  diligence  and  skill  for  the  protection  of  pas- 
sengers, which  they  know  perfectly  well  that  such  carriers 
never  would  use,  if  it  were  not  for  these  decisions,  and  which 

•Wharton,  Negligence,  §  636.  3Id.  §  629. 

5  Id.  §  636. 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  4] 


§  44]  DEGREES   OF   NEGLIGENCE.  50 

the  men  who  conduct  the  practical  details  of  such  business 
rarely  use  for  their  own  protection.4  The  courts  are  not  in- 
fluenced by  prejudice,  in  thus  holding  common  carriers  to  an 
ideal,  though  not  really  impracticable,  standard  of  perfection. 
They  do  it  because,  from  long  experience  and  observation  of 
affairs,  they  know  that,  if  they  lowered  their  standard  to  th< 
average  degree  of  care  used  by  those  who  are  reputed  to  be 
good  and  careful  railway  managers  and  servants,  human  life 
would  be  needlessly  put  in  peril  every  day. 

§44.  Necessity  of  an  exceptional  degree  of  care.— Let  us 
suppose  that  the  plaintiff  has  left  a  watch  to  be  repaired.  If 
the  defendant  has  used  as  much  skill  and  care  in  the  work  as 
is  usual  among  watchmakers  reputed  to  be  good  and  reason- 
ably skillful  workmen,  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover  damages  for 
a  defect  in  the  work,  even  though  he  proves  that  such  a  defect 
was  never  known  in  the  work  of  two  or  three  of  the  most 
famous  watchmakers  in  the  world.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
let  us  suppose  the  plaintiff  to  have  been  injured  by  a  railway 
accident,  caused  by  a  flaw  in  a  wheel.  If  the  plaintiff  proved 
that  three  of  the  best  railway  companies  had  a  thoroughly 
tested,  convenient  and  practicable  process  in  use,  by  which 
they  could  and  would  have  discovered  this  flaw,  and  that  this 
fact  was  known  to  the  defendant,  the  plaintiff  can  recover,  in 
spite  of  proof  that  three  hundred  other  companies  did  not  use 
such  a  test.1  The  only  question  in  such  a  case  is  whether  even 
as  much  proof  as  this  would  be  necessary.  This  is  but  one  of 
many  instances  in  which  the  courts  have  sternly  enforced  the 
rule  that  common  carriers  of  passengers,  and  especially  those 
who  use  steam  or  electric  power,  must  use,  not  that  de- 
gree of  care  which  is  usual  among  prudent  and  competent  car- 
riers, but  that  degree  of  care  which  the  court  can  see 
ought  to  be  used  by  them  all,  and  is  in  use  by  a  few 
unusually  prudent  carriers.  And  it  is  worthy  of  note,  as 
indicating  the  force  of  the  considerations  which  have  led 
practical  men  to  recognize  the  necessity  of  this  exceptional 
degree   of    care,   that   it   has  been   established  and    enforced, 

4  For  the  rule  of  the  degree  of  care        '  See  cases  under  next  section, 
required  of  carriers  of  passengers, 
see  §§  51,  495,  post. 


5  I  DEGREES   OF   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  45 

with  the  severest  strictness,  by  judges  who  had  been  coun- 
sel for  railway  companies  when  at  the  bar,  many  of  them 
owning  railway  stock  while  on  the  bench,  and  that  while 
many  legislatures  have  been  wholly  controlled  by  railway  cor- 
porations, none  of  them  ever  ventured  to  relax  the  stringency 
of  this  rule. 

§  45.  The  requirement  just  and  reasonable.— While    no 

definition  of  ordinary  care  calls  for  more  care  than  prudent  ex- 
perts generally  use  for  their  own  protection,  it  is  settled  law 
in  most  American  States,  if  not  in  all,  that  a  carrier  of  passen- 
gers by  steam,  is  responsible  for  any  defect  in  engines,  cars  or 
other  means  of  transportation  which  could  have  been  detected 
by  any  known  test,  either  while  in  use  J  or  in  the  process  of 
manufacture.2  As  a  matter  of  fact,  not  one  practical  railway 
official  in  a  thousand  would  ever  apply  these  tests  for  his  own 
protection  if  he  had  not  formed  the  habit  of  doing  so  for  the 
sake  of  passengers;  and  we  are  confident  that  not  one  in  ten, 
if  one  in  a  hundred,  would  do  it  even  now,  if  they  were  the 
only  passengers  in  the  train.  We  feel  confident,  moreover, 
that  neither  the  railway  companies  nor  the  car  manufacturers 
ever  applied  to  any  one  car,  which  they  did  not  specially  sus- 
pect of  defects,  all  the  tests  which  the  courts  unanimously  hold 
them  bound  to  apply  to  every  car.  So  the  courts  hold  that 
common  carriers  are  bound  to  adopt  all  inventions  which  have 
been  demonstrated  to  increase  the  safety  of  passengers,  and 
which  are  in  actual  use  by  some  carriers.3  But  a  great  major- 
ity of  railways  in  America  are  still  without  many  of  these  im- 
provements; and  very  few  of  them  would  ever  be  adopted  by 
railway    officials,     merely    for    their    own    protection ;    while 

1  Ingalls  v.  Bills,  9  Mete.  1  ;  Stein-  R.  Co.,  16  Q.  B.  984  ;  and  other  cases 

weg  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  43  N.  Y.  123  ;  Car-  cited  under  §§  410,  497,  post. 

roll  v.  Staten  Island  R.  Co.,  58  Id.  2  Hegeman  v.  Western  R.  Co.,  13 

126;    Caldwell  v.  N.   J.    Steamboat  N.  Y.9;  Sharp  v.  Grey,  9  Bing.  457  ; 

Co..  47  Id.  282  ;  Alden  v.  N.  Y.  Cen-  2  Moore  &  S.  620;   Burns  v.   Cork, 

tral  R.  Co.,  26  Id.  102  ;  reaffirmed,  etc.  R.  Co.,  13  Irish  C.  L.  543. 

Palmer  v.  Delaware  &  H.  Canal  Co.,  3  Caldwell  v.  N.  J.  Steamboat  Co., 

120  N.  Y.  170 ;  Meier  v.  Pennsylvania  47  N.  Y.  282  ;  Smith  v.  N.  Y.  &  Har- 

R.  Co.,   64  Pa.   St.  225  :   Carpue   v.  lem    R.  Co.,  19  Id.  127  ;   Knight  v. 

Brighton,  etc.   R.  Co.,  5  Q.    B.  749:  Portland    R.    Co.,  56  Me.    234;   see 

Skinner  v.  Brighton,  etc.   R.  Co.,  5  Meier  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  64  Pa. 

Exch.  787  ;  Collett  v.  Northwestern  St.  225,  and  §§51,  410,  495,  497,  post 


§  46J  DEGREES   OF   NEGLIGENCE.  52 

many  would  never  be  adopted  at  all,  if  it  were  not  for 
fear  of  heavy  damages  in  negligence  suits.  Wherever  no 
such  risk  is  incurred,  and  therefore  no  interference  of 
the  courts  is  dreaded,  some  of  the  most  famous  carry- 
ing companies  in  the  world  have  shown  a  callous  disre- 
gard for  the  comfort  and  safety  of  passengers,  which  indicates 
clearly  enough  what  would  be  the  fate  of  passengers  if  the 
courts  had  accepted  as  a  standard  the  ordinary  care  of  good 
business  men  in  that  line.  The  shocking  immoralities  and 
filthy  discomforts  of  Atlantic  passenger  ships,  prior  to  1850,  if 
not  later,  which  continued  and  increased  until  legislatures  in- 
terposed ;  the  practice,  at  one  time  common,  of  adding  petro- 
leum cars  to  passenger  trains;  the  continued  use  of  stoves  in 
American  cars,  notwithstanding  repeated  and  frightful  losses 
of  life  from  this  cause;  and  the  persistent  refusal  of  English 
railway  managers  to  afford  any  means  of  communication  be- 
tween passengers  and  guards,  are  but  a  few  among  a  multitude 
of  examples  which  might  be  cited. 

§46.  "Utmost  care,"  when  required. — The  modern  de- 
mand for  the  exercise  of  what  is  often  called  "  the  utmost 
care"  is  largely  due  to  the  essentially  modern  regard  for 
human  life  and  the  development  of  applied  science.  It  is  only 
within  a  very  recent  period  that  life  has  been  considered  more 
sacred  than  property ;  and,  side  by  side  with  the  growth  of 
this  feeling,  there  has  been  a  wonderful  extension  of  human 
powers  by  means  of  new  inventions.  In  ancient  times,  it 
would  have  seemed  preposterous  to  claim  a  greater  degree  of 
care  for  the  preservation  of  the  life  of  a  slave  than  for  the 
statue  of  an  emperor;  and  it  would  have  seemed  the  height  of 
tyranny  to  hold  any  man  of  business  to  a  degree  of  care  which 
no  one  in  that  business  had  ever  displayed,  and  to  require  him 
to  do  that  which  every  one  in  the  business  believed  to  be  im- 
possible. But,  in  our  own  time,  legislatures  have  absolutely 
forbidden  gas  companies  to  cast  their  refuse  into  rivers ; 
although  these  companies  unanimously  declared,  with  entire 
sincerity,  that  they  could  not  conduct  their  business  at  all  in 
any  other  way.  So  legislatures  have  compelled  manufacturers 
to  consume  their  own  smoke  ;  although  none  of  them  knew 
how  to  do  it.     And  the  result,  in  these  and  other  cases,  has 


53 


DEGREES   OF  NEGLIGENCE. 


[§46 


fully  vindicated  the  wisdom  of  this  stern  legislation.  When 
factories  were  compelled  to  consume  their  smoke,  their  owners 
paid  inventors  to  devise  a  method  of  doing  so.  When  gas 
companies  were  threatened  with  ruin,  if  they  could  not 
dispose  of  their  refuse,  they  paid  the  cost  of  experiments, 
which  resulted  in  the  invention  of  aniline  colors  and  in- 
creased the  wealth  of  the  gas  companies  themselves,  while 
putting  an  end  to  an  intolerable  nuisance,  which  they  had 
always  declared  to  be  unavoidable.  In  the  light  of  such 
experiences,  the  courts  are  justified  in  holding  those  who 
take  charge  of  the  lives  of  human  beings  to  any  degree  of 
care  which  is  not  incompatible  with  the  transaction  of  busi- 
ness, especially  when  its  practicability  has  been  demonstrated 
by  its  adoption  in  that  business  by  the  most  careful  class  of 
persons.1 


1  Taber  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71 
N.  Y.  489  ;  Wilson  v.  Cunningham, 
3  Cal.  241  ;  McGrevv  v.  Stone,  53  Pa. 
St.  436;  Fleet  v.  Hollenkemp,  13  B. 
Monr.  219.  "  Not  ordinary,  but  ex- 
traordinary, diligence  is  required  as 
to  passengers,  and  the  company  is 
responsible  for  the  utmost  care  and 
watchfulness,  and  answerable  for 
the  smallest  negligence  "  (Sandham 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  38  Iowa,  88). 
s.  P.,  Bemis  v.  Connecticut,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  42  Vt.  375;  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  v.  Ballard,  2  Mete.  (Ky.)  177; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Fort,  17  Wall.  553, 
per  Davis,  J.  A  railroad  company 
is  bound  to  use  "  the  utmost  care  and 
diligence  which  human  prudence 
and  foresight  will  suggest  "  to  secure 
the  safety  of  its  passengers  (Palmer 
v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co.,  120 
N.  Y.  170  ;  24  N.  E.  302).  See§§  51, 
49"),  post.  A  much  greater  degree 
of  care  is  required  in  driving  along 
;i  thoroughfare  that  is  crowded  and 
obstructed  with  teams  and  foot  pas- 
sengera  than  along  one  that  is  free 
from  such  obstructions  (Garmon  v. 
Bangor,  38  Me .  443  ;  Cayzer  v.  Tay- 
lor, 10  Gray,  274  ;  Denver  Tramway 


Co.  v.  Reid,  4  Col.  App.  53  ;  35  Pac. 
269;  McAdoo  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  105  N.  C.  140  ;  11  S.  E.  316,  and 
cases  cited  under  §§  461-464,  pos£). 
It  may  be  "ordinary  caution"  in  a 
master  to  apprise  an  adult  servant 
of  a  danger  to  be  guarded  against  in 
the  use  of  machinery,  while  in  the 
case  of  one  not  yet  beyond  the  years 
of  thoughtless  childhood  it  would  be 
gross  and  most  culpable,  if  not  crim- 
inal, carelessness  for  a  master  to  con- 
tent himself  with  pointing  out 
dangers  not  likely  to  be  appreciated, 
or,  if  appreciated,  not  likely  to  be 
kept  in  mind  with  sufficient  distinct- 
ness and  caution,  and  against  which 
effectual  precaution  ought  to  be 
provided  (Bartonshill  Coal  Co.  v. 
McGuire,  3  Macq.  H.  L.  300  ;  O'Con- 
nor v.  Adams,  120  Mass.  427;  Sullivan 
v.  India  Mfg.  Co.,  113  Id.  396 ;  Coombs 
v.  New  Bedford,  etc.  Co.,  102  Id.  572  ; 
Hillv.  Gust,  55  I  ml.  45;  East  Sagi- 
naw R.  Co.  v.  Bohn,  27  Mich.  503. 
See  §  219,  post).  A  heavy  electric 
car  requires  greater  caution  in  its 
management  than  an  ordinary 
vehicle  (Cincinnati  R.  Co.  v.  Whit- 
comb,  14  C.  C.  A.  183  ;  66  Fed.  915). 


§47] 


DEGREES   OF   NEGLIGENCE. 


54 


§47.  Three  degrees  of  care  defined. — Our  conclusion  is 
therefore,  that  three  degrees  of  care  are  and  should  be  recog- 
nized and  enforced  by  the  law  of  modern  times,  to  wit: 

(1.)  Slight  care,  which  is  the  care  usually  bestowed  upon 
the  matter  in  hand  by  persons  having  no  special  knowledge  of 
or  experience  in  such  matters,  but  having  the  average  prudence 
of  that  general  class  of  society  to  which  the  person  whose 
conduct  is  in  question  belongs. 

(2.)  Ordinary  care,  which  is  the  care  usually  bestowed  upon 
the  matter  in  hand  by  persons  accustomed  to  deal  with  such 
matters  and  having  the  average  prudence  of  the  general  class 
of  society  to  which  the  person  whose  conduct  is  in  question 
belongs.  If  the  matter  is  one  of  business,  ordinary  care  also 
implies  the  possession  and  use  of  such  knowledge  and  expe- 
rience, with  respect  to  similar  matters,  as  is  usually  possessed 
by  men  of  good  business  habits  in  that  line.1 

(3.)  Great  care,  which  is  the  care  usually  bestowed  upon  the 
matter  in  hand  by  the  most  competent,  conscientious,  prudent 
and  careful  class  of  persons  engaged  in  the  business  to  which 
such  matters  belong,  no  matter  how  few  such  persons  may  be, 
if  they  are  numerous  enough  to  have  a  recognized  existence  as 
a  class. 

In  every  case  it  must  be  understood,  as  an  essential  part 
of  the  definition,  that  the  test  applied  is  the  kind  of  care 
usually  exercised  by  persons  of  the  class  referred  to,  under 
circumstances  similar  to  those  of  the  case  under  consider- 
ation,2 where  their  own   interests   are  to   be  protected   from  a 


1  See  Bertha  Zinc  Co.  v.  Martin, 
93  Va.  791  ;  22  S.  E.  869 ;  Olwell 
v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  92  Wise. 
330  ;  66  N.  W.  362;  Houston,  etc. 
R  Co.  v.  Brin,  77  Tex.  174  ;  13  S.  W. 
886. 

2  This  branch  of  the  definition  ap- 
plies to  all  the  degrees  of  care  (John- 
son v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y. 
65  ;  affirming  S.  C.,6  Duer,  633  ;  Field, 
J.,  Parrot  v.  Wells,  15  Wall.  524; 
Willes  J.,  Vaughan  v.  Taff  Vale  R. 
Co. ,  5  Hurlst.  &  N.  679  ;  Kay  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.,  65  Pa.  St.  209  ;  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.  v.  Coon,  111  Id.  430  ; 


Grant  v.  Ludlow,  8  Ohio  St.  1  ;  Cleve- 
land, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Terry,  Id.  570, 
581  ;  Fallon  v.  Boston,  3  Allen,  38; 
Fletcher  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  1  Id. 
9, 15  ;  Holly  v.  Boston  Gas  Co. ,  8  Gray, 
123, 131  ;  Parvis  v.  Philadelphia,  etc. 
R.  Co., 8  Del.  436  ;  17  Atl.702  [railroad 
crossing]  ;  Spokane  Truck,  etc.  Co. 
v.  Hoefer,  2  Wash.  St.  45  ;  25  Pac. 
1072  [hoisting  safe]).  Determining 
what  was  reasonable  care,  tbe  appar- 
ent danger  of  causing  death  or  seri- 
ous bodily  injury  maybe  considered, 
and  the  jury  may  decide  that  rea- 
sonable care  required  a  high  degree 


55 


DEGREES   OF   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§48 


similar  injury,3  and  when  they  honestly  intend  to  be  careful.4 
What  they  do,  or  omit  to  do,  when  in  a  careless  or  reckless 
mood,  is  never  any  standard  by  which  to  judge. 

§48.  Correlative  degrees  of    negligence.— The  degrees  of 
negligence  are,   of  course,   correlative  to  the  degrees  of  care. 


of  care  (Uggla  v.  West  End  R. 
Co.,  160  Mass.  351;  35  N.  E.  1126). 
"  Negligence  is  want  of  care  under 
the  circumstances.  No  fixed  rule  of 
duty,  applicable  to  all'cases,  can  be 
established.  A  course  of  conduct, 
justly  regarded  as  resulting  from  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  care  under  some 
circumstances,  would  exhibit  the 
grossest  negligence  under  other  cir- 
cumstances; the  opportunity  for  de- 
liberation and  action,  the  degree  of 
danger,  and  many  other  considera- 
tions of  like  nature,  affect  the  stand- 
ard of  care  which  may  be  reasonably 
required  in  a  particular  case  "  (Ster- 
rett,  J.,  in  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
Coon,  supra).  ''Gross  negligence  is 
a  relative  term.  It  is,  doubtless,  to 
be  understood  as  meaning  a  greater 
want  of  care  than  is  implied  by  the 
term  '  ordinary  negligence,'  but  after 
all  it  means  the  absence  of  the  care 
that  was  requisite  under  the  circum- 
stances "  (Davis,  J..  Milwaukee,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Arms,  91  U.  S.  494).  See 
Steamboat  New  World  v.  King,  16 
How.  (U.  S.)  469  ;  Cronkv.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  3  So.  Dak  93 ;  52  N.  W. 
420;  Austin,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Beatty,  73 
Tex.  592  ;  11  S.  W.  858  ;  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  62  111.  App.  264. 

3  Rochester  White  Lead  Co.  v. 
Rochester,  3  N.  Y.  463  ;  Duff  v.  Budd, 
3Brod.  &  B.  177;  Schwartz  v.  Gil- 
more.  45  111.  455  ;  Searcy  v.  Holmes, 
45  Ala. 225  ;  Sawyer  v.  Hannibal, etc. 
R  Co.,  37  Mo.  240.  This  is  a  vital 
dement  of  the  definition,  very  often 
overlooked.  Thus,  in  determining 
whether  a  railroad  engineer  lias  been 
negligent  in  running  over  a  horse, 


the  test  of  his  care  is  not  the  care 
generally  taken  by  an  engineer  to 
avoid  injuring  other  people's  horses, 
but  the  care  which  a  prudent  engi- 
neer would  take  if  he  saw  his  own 
horse  upon  the  track  (Alabama,  etc. 
R.Co.  v.  McAlpine,  75  Ala.  113  ;  East 
Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bayliss,  Id. 
466,  and  cases  cited).  In  Quimby  v. 
Vermont,  etc.  R.  Co.  (23  Vt.  387),  it 
was  held  that  this  rule  was  too  favor- 
able to  the  defendant,  presumably 
because  the  engineer  might,  as  a 
matter  of  expediency,  choose  to  en- 
danger the  life  of  the  beast  rather 
than  check  the  train.  Where  a  reser- 
voir burst,  and  the  water  did  dam- 
age to  an  adjoining  garden,  it  was 
held  that  the  owners  of  the  reservoir 
were  bound  to  take  the  same  degree 
of  care  which  they  would  have  been 
likely  to  take  had  the  garden  been 
their  own  (Todd  v.  Cochell,  17  Cal. 
98),  and  no  greater  care  (Campbell 
v.  Bear  River  Mining  Co.,  35  Id.  679  ; 
s.  p.,  Waldo  v.  Beckwith,  1  N.  Mex. 
97).  The  degree  of  care  over  logs  of 
others  in  its  possession  required  of  a 
boom  company  is  that  which  an  or- 
dinarily prudent  man  in  charge  of  his 
own  property  would  exercise  (Ches- 
ley  v.  Mississippi,  etc.  Boom  Co.,  39 
Minn.  83  ;  38  N.  W.  769).  Gross  neg- 
ligence is  the  failure  to  take  such 
care  as  a  person  of  common  sense 
and  reasonable  skill  in  like  business, 
but  of  careless  habits,  would  observe 
in  avoiding  injury  to  his  own  person 
or  life,  under  circumstances  of  equal 
or  similar  danger  (Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  McCoy,  81  Ky.  403). 
4  Wharton,  Negligence,  §  46. 


§  49]  DEGREES   OF   NEGLIGENCE.  56 

Strictly  speaking,  it  is  not  correct  to  divide  negligence  into 
degrees  at  all,  because  there  can  be  no  negligence,  within  the 
legal  meaning  of  the  term,  except  where  the  degree  of  care 
required  by  law  in  the  particular  case  has  not  been  given  ; l  and, 
indeed,  it  is  a  solecism  to  speak  of  "ordinary  negligence," 
since,  if  the  negligence  were  ordinary  (that  is,  in  accordance 
with  the  usual  course  of  practice  among  all  men  of  average 
prudence),  it  would  cease  to  be  negligence  at  all.  But  the  at- 
tempt to  confine  legal  terms  within  such  precise  limits  as  this 
leads  to  more  subtle  and  useless  refinements  than  any  which 
have  been  suggested  as  resulting  from  the  use  of  the  objec- 
tionable phrases.  These  terms  are  in  familiar  use  and  are  per- 
fectly well  understood  ;  and  any  attempt  to  dispense  with 
them  will  cause  far  more  confusion  than  it  clears  away.  We 
adhere,  therefore,  to  a  classification  of  negligence,  correspond- 
ing with  the  classification  of  care. 

§49.  '*  Gross,"  "ordinary  "  and  "  slight"  negligence,  de- 
fined.—  Gross  negligence  is  the  want  of  slight  care  ; l  ordinary 
negligence  is  the  want  of  ordinary  care  ; 2  and  slight  negligence 
is  the  want  of  great  care. 

'Grill  v.  Gen.  Iron  Screw  Co.,  L.  (Schindler  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 

R.  1  C.  P.  000.  87  Mich.  400  ;   49   N.  W.   670).     To 

1  Gross  negligence  is  the  want  of  same  effect  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R. 
slight  diligence  (See  First  Nat.  Bank  Co.  v.  Bodemer,  139  111.  596  ;  29  N.  E. 
v.  Graham,  85  Pa.  St.  91  ;  Wright  v.  692.  The  term  "criminal  negli- 
Clark,  50  Vt.  130  ;  Smith  v.  N.  Y.  gence,"  as  used  in  a  statute  making 
Central  R.  Co.,  24  N.Y.  222).  "Want  railroad  companies  liable  for  all  in- 
of  ordinary  care"  and  "gross  negli-  juries  to  passengers,  except  such  as 
gence"  are  not  equivalent  terms  arise  from  the  "criminal negligence'' 
(Galbraith  v.  West  End  R.  Co.,  165  of  the  passenger,  held  to  mean  "gross 
Mass.  572  ;  43  N.  E.  501  ;  Chicago,  etc.  negligence,"  or  such  negligence  as 
R.  Co.  v.  Avery,  8  111.  A  pp.  1 33).  They  would  amount  to  a  flagrant  and  reek- 
were  erroneously  confounded  in  Gib-  less  disregard  of  the  passenger's  own 
blin  v.  McMullen  (L.  R.  2  P.  C.  317).  safety,  and  a  willful  indifference  to 
Gross  negligence  is  that  entire  want  the  injury  liable  to  follow  (Omaha, 
of  care  which  would  raise  a  presump-  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Chollette,  33  Neb.  143; 
tion  of   a  conscious  indifference   to  49  N.  W.  1114). 

consequences  (Southern  Cotton  Press.  2  See  definitions  of  ordinary  care, 

etc.  Co.  v.  Bradley,  52  Tex.  587  ;  fol-  ante,  %  47  ;  Jager  v.  Adams,  123  Mass. 

lowed,  Mo.  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Shuford,  26  ;    Schienfeldt  v.  Norris,   115  Id. 

72  Id.  165).     It  implies  a  thoughtless  17;    Moore  v.  Cass,   10   Kans.   288; 

disregard  of  consequences,  without  Murphy    v.    Chicago,    etc.    R.    Co., 

the  exertion  of  effort  to  avoid  them  38    Iowa,    539  ;    Carpenter   v.  East- 


57  DEGREES   OF   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  5 1 

§  50.  Standard  of  "  great  care." — In  the  foregoing  defi- 
nitions, our  principal  doubt  is  whether  we  have  raised  the 
standard  of  great  care  sufficiently  high.  Certainly,  the  objec- 
tion which  has  been  so  forcibly  urged  against  the  culpa  Icvis- 
siuia  of  the  mediaeval  jurists  has  no  application  to  the 
definitions  of  great  care  and  slight  negligence  here  given.  It  is 
indeed  absurd  to  require  from  any  person  perfection  in  care,  dili- 
gence or  skill.  No  human  being  is  capable  of  maintaining  so 
high  a  standard.  It  would  be  grossly  unjust  and  impracticable 
to  require  from  any  ordinary  person  even  that  extraordinary 
degree  of  care  which  single  individuals  of  eminent  prudence 
and  ability  have  succeeded  in  maintaining.  But  when  the  ut- 
most degree  of  care  required  is  that  which  has  been  demon- 
strated to  be  practicable  by  its  observance  on  the  part  of  a 
recognized  class  of  persons  engaged  in  similar  affairs,  there  is 
no  injustice  or  impracticability  in  requiring  that  standard  to 
be  observed  by  all  persons  who  undertake  that  business,  espe- 
cially when  such  a  requirement  is  only  made  in  a  few  specific 
branches. 

§  51.  Application  of  rule   to   passenger  carriers. —  It  is 

the  settled  rule  of  common  law  throughout  the  United  States, 
and  probably  also  in  Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  that  common 
carriers  of  persons,  and  especially  railway  companies,  are  liable 
for  any  damage  suffered  by  their  passengers,  which  is  proxi- 
mately caused  by  the  failure  of  such  carriers  to  use  the  highest 
degree  of  prudence,  and,  in  some  cases,  the  utmost  human 
skill  and    foresight.1     This  precise  language  is  constantly  used 


ern    Transp.    Line,    67    Barb.     570;  Eighth    Ave.  R.  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  378; 

Norfolk,    etc.    R.    Co.    v.    Ormsby,  Caldwell  v .  N.  J .  Steamboat  Co. ,  47 

27   Gratt.    455  ;    Tone-ray   v.    Dodge  Id.  282 ;  Taber  v.  Delaware,  etc.    R. 

County,    33    Neb.    802;    51    N.    W.  Co.,  71   Id.  489).     "A  railroad   com- 

835  :  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fisher,  pany   that  neglects  to  provide  safe 

49  Kans.    460  ;  -]0   Pae.  462  ;   Need-  and  road  worthy  vehicles  for  passen- 

liani     v.     Louisville,     etc.     R.    Co.,  gers,  when  the  omission  to  do  so  is 

85    Ky.    423  ;    3    S.    W.    797.    and,  fraught   with    imminent   danger  to 

generally,   Cashill    v.  Wright,  6  El.  human  life,  and  injury  occurs there- 

&    Bl.    891  ;     Wyld    v.    Pickford,   8  by.  is  not  only  culpably   negligent, 

Mees.  &  W.  443  ;  Wilson  v.  Brett,  11  but,  I  think,  practices  a  fraud  upon, 

Id.  113.  and  exhibits  bad  faith   in  respect  to 

1  So    in  New  York   (Maverick  v.  those  it  undertakes  to  carry  "  (per 


§50 


DECREES   OF   NECLICENCE. 


53 


in  charging  juries,  and  it  is  sustained  by  such  controlling  au- 
thority as  to  make  it  useless  to  discuss  its  propriety  at  any 
length.  But  while  these  words  cannot  be  excepted  to,  the 
current  of  decisions  shows  that  a  carrier  is  entitled  to  have 
them  explained  to  the  jury.  The  courts  do  not  hold  that  car- 
riers are  bound  to  use  the  highest  degree  of  prudence  or  skill 


Wright,  J.,  Smith  v.  N.    Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.    222).     It  does  not, 
however,   insure   the    safety    of   its 
vehicles    (Carroll   v.    Staten    Island 
R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y.  12G).      A  carrier  of 
passengers,     when     approaching    a 
dangerous  place,   is  "hound  to  use 
the  highest  degree  of  care  and  prud- 
ence,   the    utmost    skill    and    fore- 
sight "      (Coddington  v.    Brooklyn, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  66).     And  so  in 
substance  held  in  England  (Sharp  v. 
Grey,  9  Bing.  457) ;  in  Ireland  (Burns 
v.  Cork,  etc.  R.  Co.,  13  Irish  C.  L. 
543) ;  in  Maine  (Edwards  v.  Lord,  49 
Me.  279) ;  in  Massachusetts  (Ingalls  v. 
Bills,  9  Mete.  1  ;  Simmons  v.  N.  Bed- 
ford,   etc.    Steamboat  Co.,  97  Mass. 
361 ;  Moreland  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
141  Mass.  31  ;  6  N.  E.   Rep.  225);  in 
New   Hampshire    (Taylor  v.  Grand 
Trunk  R.  Co.,  48   N.  H.  304  ;    com- 
pare State  v.   Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58 
Id.  408) ;  in  Connecticut  (Derwort  v. 
Loomer,  21  Conn.  245) ;   in   Pennsyl- 
vania (Philadelphia,   etc.   R.  Co.    v. 
Boyer,97Pa.  St.  91);  in  Virginia  (Far- 
ish  v.  Reigle,  11  Gratt.  697  ;  Virginia, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sanger,  15  Id.  230;  Bal- 
timore etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wightman,  29 
Id.  431)  ;  in  West  Virginia  (Searle  v. 
Kanawha,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32  W.  Va.  370  ; 
9  S.  E.  248)  ;  in  Georgia  (Crawford  v. 
Georgia  R.  Co.,  62  Ga.  566;  Chatta 
nooga,  etc  R.  Co.  v.  Huggins,  89  Id. 
494 :    15   S     E.    848)  ;    in   Tennessee 
(Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Messino,  1 
Sneed,  220s!  ;  in  Indiana  (Sherlock  v. 
Allin--.  44  Ind    184}:  in  Illinois  (Fink 
v.  Potter,  17  111.   406;  Chicago,    etc. 
R.    Co.    v.   George,  19  111.  510)  ;    in 


Iowa  (Sales  v.    Western  Stage  Co.,  4 
Iowa,  547)  ;  in  Missouri  (Lemmon  v. 
Chansler,  68  Mo.  340) ;    in  Arkansas 
(St.    Louis,  etc.  R.    Co.  v.   Sweet,  57 
Ark.  287  ;  21  S.  W.  587)  ;  in  Nebraska 
(Spellman  v.  Lincoln,  etc.  R.  Co. ,36 
Neb.  S90 ;  55  N.  W.  270) ;  in  Minnesota 
(Johnson  v.   Winona,   etc.  R.  Co.,  11 
Minn.  296  ;  Watson  v.  St.  Paul   City 
R.  Co.,  42 Id.  46  ;  43*  N.  W.  904  ;  Hall 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  46  Minn.  439  ; 
49  N.   W.  239) ;  in    California   (Fair- 
child  v.  California  Stage  Co..  13  Cal. 
599) ;  in  Washington  (Sears  v.  Seattle 
R.  Co.,  6  Wash.  St.  227  ;  33  Pac.  389) ; 
and  in  all   Federal   Courts  (Pennsyl- 
vania  Co.    v.   Roy,   102  U.    S.   451); 
Curtis,  J.,  saying,  in  New  World   v. 
King  (16  How.  [U.  S  ],  469)  :  "When 
carriers  undertake  to   carry   passen- 
gers by  the  powerful    but  dangerous 
agency  of  steam,  public   policy  and 
safety  require  that   they  be  held   to 
the  greatest  possible   care  and  dili- 
gence."    In   Texas,  a  railroad   com- 
pany is  required  to  use  such  means 
and   foresight,  in   providing  for  the 
safety  of  passengei's,  "as  persons  of 
the    greatest     care     and     prudence 
usually    exercise     in  similar  cases" 
(Houston,   etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Gorbett,  49 
Tex.  573;   see   Gulf,  etc.   R.    Co.     v. 
Hodges,  76  Id.  90  ;  13  S.  W.  64).    But 
in  Kentucky,  an  instruction  that  de- 
fendant was  bound,  'as  far  as  human 
foresight  and  care    would  enable  it, 
to  carry  plaintiff  with    safety,"   was 
held  erroneous,  as  insisting  on  an  im- 
practicable degree  of  care  (Louisville 
R.  Co.  v.  Weams,  80  Ky.  420).     For 
cases  in  other  states,  see  §§  495,  498. 


59  DEGREES   OF   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  5 1 

which  could  be  conceived  of  as  possible  to  man.  They  are 
only  held  to  the  highest  degree  which  has  been  demonstrated 
by  experience  to  be  practicable.  Thus  railway  companies  are 
responsible  for  their  failure  to  use  improvements  and  new 
inventions,  the  value  of  which  has  been  demonstrated  by- 
actual  experience,2  but  not  for  omitting  to  try  mere  experi- 
ments or  to  adopt  untried  and  unproved  inventions.3  These 
qualifications  bring  even  this  strong  language,  in  our  opinion, 
within  the  limits  of  our  standard  definition  of  "great  care," 
but  to  no  lower  degree. 

2  Caldwell  v.  N.  J.  Steamboat   Co.,        3  Stein weg  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  43  N.  Y. 
47  N.  Y.  282,  and  cases  cited  under  §     123 
496,  post. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


QUESTIONS  OF  FACT  AND  LAW. 


§  52.  Negligence,  a  question  of  min- 
gled law  and  fact. 

53.  Province  of  court  and  jury. 

54.  Questions  proper  for  the  jury. 


S  55.  Proximate  cause,  when  ques- 
tion for  the  jury. 
56.  When  question   should  not  be 
left  to  the  jury. 


§  52.  Negligence,  a  question  of  mingled  law  and  fact. — 

The  definition  of  negligence,  already  given,  shows  upon  its  face 
that  negligence  is  a  question  of  mingled  law  and  fact.1  It  in- 
cludes, indeed,  two  questions :  ( I  )  whether  a  particular  act  has 
been  performed  or  omitted,  and  (2)  whether  the  performance 
or  omission  of  this  act  was  a  breach  of  a  legal  duty.  The  first 
of  these  is  a  pure  question  of  fact;  the  second  a  pure  question 
of  law.2  But  damage  to  the  plaintiff,  as  well  as  negligence  in 
the  defendant,  must  be  proved,  in  order  to  establish  a  cause  of 
action;  and  thus  the  further  questions  arise,  whether  the 
plaintiff  has  suffered  damage,  and  whether  the  defendant's 
negligence  was  the  proximate  cause  of  that  damage.  The  first 
of  these  questions  is  mainly,  though  not  exclusively,  a  ques- 
tion of  fact ;  the  second  is  about  equally  one  of  fact  and  of  law. 


1  This  is  illustrated  by  many  cases, 
cited  under  §£  54  and  56.  Whether 
a  given  state  of  facts  constitutes 
negligence,  is  generally  a  question 
of  law ;  but  whether  a  particular 
negligence  contributed  to  the  catas- 
trophe, is  a  question  of  fact  (Cata- 
wissa  R.  Co.  v.  Armstrong,  53  Pa. 
St.  282). 

2  Tarwater  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co. 
42  Mo.  19:1).  "  Negligence  may  be  de- 
fined to  be  a  failure  to  perform  some 
act  required  by  law,  or  doing  the  act 
in  an  improper  manner.  The  law 
determines  the  duty;  tbe  evidence 
shows   whether  the  duty  was  per- 


formed. What  duty  rested  upon  de- 
fendant was  question  of  law.  Was 
that  duty  properly  performed  is  a 
question  of  fact "  (Nolan  v.  New 
Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53  Conn.  461). 
To  same  effect,  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  McLallen,  84  111.  109  ;  Gibson  v. 
Leonard,  37  111.  App.  344  ;  Marshall 
v.  Schricker,  63  Mo.  308  ;  McGowan 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R  Co.,  61  Id.  528  ; 
Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  42 
Ala,  072.  But  this  broad  language 
seems  to  be  limited  by  other  decisions 
of  the  same  courts.  (See  next  sec- 
tion.) 


[60] 


6 1  QUESTIONS    OF    FACT   AND    LAW.  [_§  53 

§  53-  Province  of  court  and  jury.  —  Considering,  first,  the 
issue  of  negligence  alone,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  few  cases 
readily  resolve  themselves  into  the  simple  elements  stated  in 
the  last  section,  so  that  the  distinction  between  the  province 
of  the  court  and  that  of  the  jury  can  be  sharply  drawn.  There 
are  no  abstract  rules,  defining  so  clearly  the  duties  of  men, 
under  all  circumstances,  that  the  court  can  state  them  with- 
out passing  upon  any  question  of  fact.  The  extent  of  the  de- 
fendant's duty  is  to  be  determined  by  a  consideration  of  all 
the  surrounding  circumstances.  The  law  imposes  duties  upon 
men,  according  to  the  circumstances  in  which  they  are  called 
to  act.  And  though  the  law  defines  the  duty,  the  question, 
whether  the  circumstances  exist  which  impose  that  duty  upon 
a  particular  person,  is  one  of  fact.1  In  very  many  cases,  the 
law  gives  no  better  definition  of  negligence  than  the  want  of 
such  care  as  men  of  ordinary  prudence  or  good  men  of  business 
would  use  under  similar  circumstances.  Of  course,  this  raises 
a  question  of  fact  as  to  what  men  of  this  character  usually  do 
under  the  same  circumstances.  This  is  a  point  upon  which  a 
jury  have  a  right  to  pass,  even  though  no  evidence  of  the 
usage  were  given  ;  for  they  may  properly  determine  the  ques- 
tion by  referring   to  their   own    experience   and    observation.2 

1  See  an  excellent  opinion,  cover-  under  the  circumstances,"  has  been 

ing   all   this   ground,  in  McCully  v.  held  reversible  error  (Louisville,  etc. 

Clarke,  40  Pa.  St.  399.  R.   Co.   v.  Gower,  1  Pickle  [Tenn.], 

•The      terms     "ordinary     care,"  465;     3    S.    W.    824.      See  Missouri 

"reasonable    prudence,"   and    such  Pacific R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  75 Tex.  267  ; 

like  terms  have  a  relative   signifi-  12  S.  W.  1117;  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co. 

cance,  and  cannot  be  arbitrarily  de-  v.  Smith,  77  Tex.  179  ;  13  S.  W.  972). 

fined  ;  and,  when  the  facts  are  such  The  usual  practice  of  others  in  the 

that    reasonable     men    differ   as  to  same  business  or  employment  under 

whether  there  was  negligence  on  the  like  circumstances  may  be  shown  to 

part  of  the  plaintiff,  the  determina-  indicate  whether   ordinary  care  was 

tion   of  the  matter  is  for  the  jury  ;  used  in  a  special  instance   (Maynard 

hence  it  is  not  error  to  instruct  them  v.  Buck,  100  Mass.  40  ;   Cass  v.  Bos- 

to  fix  the   standard  for   reasonable,  ton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  14  Allen  448 ;   Cook 

prudent,  and  cautious  men  accord-  v.  Champlain  Transp.  Co. ,  1    Denio, 

ing  to  their  judgment   and   experi-  91;  Kolsti  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 

ence     (Grand   Trunk  R.  Co.  v.  Ives,  32  Minn.  133  ;  19  N.  W.  655  ;  compare 

12  S.  Ct.    679  ;   144  U.  S.  408).      But  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  v.    Richardson 

explaining  to  a  jury  the  "  care  of  a  91  U.  S.  454  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 

man  of  ordinary  prudence"  as  "just  Clark,  108  111.113).     A  party's   sya- 

Buch  care   as  one  of  you,  similarly  tern  or    course  of  business   may  be 

employed,    would    have    exercised  proved  to  show  whether  he   had  ex- 


53] 


QUESTIONS   OF   FACT   AND    LAW. 


62 


Indeed,  they  must  do  so  ;  since  expert  evidence  on  such  points 
is  usually  not  admissible.3     Consequently  a  case  of  this  kind 


ercised  due  care  on  a  particular  oc- 
casion (Holly  v.  Boston  Gas  Co.,  8 
Gray,  123  ;  Fuller  v.  Naugatuck  R. 
Co.,  21  Conn.  557).  "  There  is  no  ab- 
solute rule  as  to  what  constitutes 
negligence  ;  that  conduct  which 
might  be  so  termed  in  one  case,  be- 
ing in  another  properly  considered 
ordinary  care  ;  nor,  in  cases  where 
it  is  concurrent,  will  the  same  rule 
apply  to  adults  and  to  children.  It 
is,  therefore,  always  a  question  of 
fact  for  the  jury,  under  the  instruc- 
tion of  the  court,  as  to  the  relative  de- 
gree of  care,  or  the  want  of  it,  grow- 
ing out  of  the  circumstances  and 
conduct  of  the  parties  "  (Philadel- 
phia, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spearen,  47  Pa. 
St.  300).  See,  to  same  effect,  Curtiss 
v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  20  Barb. 
282  ;  McGrath  v.  Hudson  River  R. 
Co.,  32  Id.  144  ;  Galena,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Yarwood,  17  111.  509,  519  ;  Galena, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Dill,  22  111.  264,  271  ; 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Conlan,  101,  111. 
93 ;  Westchester,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Elwee,  67  Pa.  St.  311,  315  ;  McCully 
v.  Clarke,  40  Id.  399;  Pennsylvania 
Canal  Co.  v.  Bentley,  66  Id.  30  ; 
State  v.  Manchester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52 
N.  H.  529 ;  Vinton  v.  Schwab,  32 
Vt.  G12  ;  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Van 
Steinburg.  17  Mich.  99  ;  Wyatt  v. 
Citizens'  R.  Co.,  55  Mo.  485;  Stod- 
dard v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  65  Id. 
514  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fisher, 
49  Kans.  460  :  CO  Pac.  462. 

3  Where  the  facts  from  which 
negligence  is  sought  to  be  inferred 
are  within  the  experience  of  all  men 
of  common  education,  the  jury 
must  determine  the  question  of 
negligence  without  the  aid  of  ex- 
perts (Shafter  v.  Evans,  53  Cal.  32  ; 
Southern  Kansas  R.  Co.  v.  Robbins, 
43  Kans.  145  :  23  Pac.  113).  A  wit- 
ness   cannot  state  his  opinion  that 


a  highway  was  or  was  not  defective 
or  dangerous,  where  the  accident 
happened  (Lester  v.  Pittsford,  7  Vt. 
158 ;  Hutchinson  v.  Methuen,  1 
Allen,  33;  Lincoln  v.  Barre,  5Cush. 
590  ;  Ryerson  v.  Abington,  102  Mass. 
531  ;  Yeaw  v.  Williams,  15  R.  I.  20 ; 
Montgomery  v.  Scott,  34  Wise.  338  ; 
Griffin  v.  Willow,  43  Id.  509  ;  Barnes 
v.  Newton,  46  Iowa,  567  ;  Rockford 
v.  Hildebrand.  61  111.  155).  He  can- 
not give  his  opinion  as  to  the  com- 
parative danger  of  the  place  where 
the  accident  occurred  and  another 
place  on  the  road  (Ivory  v.  Deer 
Park,  116  N.  Y.  476  ;  22  N.  E.  1080) ; 
nor  state  what  cause  or  occasion  he 
saw  for  the  accident  (Patterson  v. 
Colebrook,  29  N.  H.  94)  ;  nor 
whether,  in  his  opinion,  the  acci- 
dent would  not  have  happened  if, 
etc.  (Crane  v.  Northfield,  33  Vt.  124 )  ; 
nor  whether  the  defendant's  leaving 
his  horse  unhitched,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, was  the  act  of  a  pru- 
dent man  (Stowe  v .  Bishop,  58  Vt. 
493  ;  3  Atl.  490)  ;  nor  whether  a  rail- 
road crossing  was  dangerous  (King 
v.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.,  98  Mo. 
235 ;  11  S.  W.  5(j}).  An  opinion 
that  a  stage  was  not  overloaded  is 
inadmissible  (Oleson  v.  Tolford,  37 
Wise.  327).  A  witness  cannot  be 
asked  what  he  thought  about  the 
danger  of  doing  a  certain  thing 
(Sterling  Bridge  Co.  v.  Pearl,  80  111. 
251)  ;  nor  how  the  bridge  in  ques- 
tion compared,  in  respect  to  the  con- 
dition of  repair,  with  other  bridges 
(Bliss  v.  Wilbraham,  8  Allen,  564). 
In  Connecticut  (Taylor  v.  Monroe.  43 
Conn.  36  ;  Dunham's  Appeal,  27  Id. 
192),  and  in  Pennsylvania  (Beatty  v. 
Gilmore,  16  Pa.  St.  463),  opinions  of 
witnesses  may  be  given  as  to 
whether  an  obstruction  in  a  highway 
was  dangerous.     See,   also,  Chicago 


63 


QUESTIONS   OF   FACT   AND   LAW. 


[§53 


must  be  left  to  the  jury,  even  if  there  is  no  conflict  of  evi- 
dence,4 unless,  indeed,  there  is  evidence  enough  to  decide  this 
point  as  well  as  all  other  questions  in  the  cause. 


v.  McGiven,  78  111.  347  ;  Alexander 
v.  Mount  Sterling,  71  Id.  366; 
Hughes  v.  Muscatine,  44  Iowa,  672  ; 
Laughlin  v.  Street  R.  Co.,  63  Mich. 
220;  28  N.  W.  873.  Witnesses,  though 
employees  of  defendant,  where  they 
were  not  responsible  for  the  system 
of  spark  arresters  adopted  by  the  de- 
fendant, and  were  testifying  upon  a 
subject  well  known  among  those 
familiar  with  railroad  engines,  and 
the  system  of  spark  arresters  in 
existence  or  adopted  by  different 
railroads,  are  competent  to  testify 
that  the  particular  system  adopted 
by  defendant  was  in  general  use, 
and  that  it,  in  fact,  arrested  sparks 
as  well  as  any  kind  known  (Frace  v. 
N.  E.  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  143  N. 
Y.  182;  38  N.  E.  102).  A  person 
experienced  in  the  running  and 
management  of  railway  trains  is 
competent  to  testify  as  to  whether, 
under  an  assumed  state  of  facts, 
which  the  evidence  tended  to  prove, 
all  judicious  and  proper  precautions 
were  taken  by  the  defendant's  ser- 
vants to  prevent  injuries  (Cincin- 
nati, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  22  Ohio 
St.  227).  The  engineer  of  the  locomo- 
tive, if  an  expert,  may  testify  that  it 
was  impossible  to  stop  the  train, 
after  he  discovered  animals  on  the 
track  (Bellefontaine,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bailey,  11  Ohio  St.  333;.  So  it  is 
competent  to  show  by  experts  the  dis- 
tance in  which  the  train  could  have 
been  stopped.  (Meagher  v.  Coop- 
erstown,  etc.  R.  Co..  75  Hun,  455  ;  27 
N.  Y.  Supp.  504).  Evidence  that  an 
engine  was  often  repaired  and  would 
'i"t  sustain  a  full  head  of  steam  and 
afterwards  exploded,  makes  the 
question  of  neglisrenee  one  for  jurv 
(Kirkpatrick   v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc. 


R.  Co.,  79  N.  Y.  240).  Where  the 
alleged  incompetency  of  the  engi- 
neer is  in  question,  what  training  is 
necessary  to  make  one  a  competent 
engineer  is  a  question  for  the  jury 
(Joch  v.  Dankwardt,  85  111.  331).  But 
where  the  injury  does  not  involve 
questions  of  science  and  skill, 
opinions  of  witnesses  are  inadmissi- 
ble, e.  g.,  whether  a  brakeman 
could  displace  the  rod  of  a  car-brake, 
if  the  pin  had  remained  in  it, 
or  whether  a  pin  could  be  lost  out  on 
the  road  (Bailey  v.  Rome,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  55  Hun,  509;  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  780). 
For  other  illustrations,  see  cases 
supra,  and  Frey  v.  Lowden  70  Cal. 
550;  11  Pac.  838  [capacity  of  a 
ditch  to  carry  off  water]  ;  Van 
Inwegen  v.  N.  Y. ,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  76  Hun,  53  ;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  169 
[that  blowing  a  locomotive  whistle 
was  malicious] ;  East  Tennessee, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  76  Ga.  532 
[that  the  damage  to  goods  resulting 
from  the  ' '  blowing  "  of  bilge-water 
in  hold  of  vessel  was  occasioned  by 
negligence]. 

4  Railroad  Co.  v.  Stout,  17  Wall. 
057,  664,  per  Hunt,  J. ;  Bernhard  v. 
Rensselaer,  etc.  R.  Co..  1  Abb.  Ct. 
App.  131  ;  Ernst  v.  Hudson  Riv.  R. 
Co.,  35  N.  Y.  9;  Westchester,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  McElwee,  67  Pa.  St.  311  ; 
Gay  nor  v.  Old  Colony,  etc.  R  Co., 
100  Mass.  208,  It  has  been  said  that 
whether  there  was  negligence  or 
want  of  care,  in  whatever  degree, 
in  either  of  the  parties,  will  not, 
though  the  circumstances  be  ad- 
mitted, be  decided  by  the  court  as 
matter  of  law,  but  will  be  left  to 
the  jury  (Beers  v.  Housatonic  R. 
Co.  19  Conn.  566).  See,  to  same 
effect,  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Bar. 


§  54]  QUESTIONS   OF   FACT   AND    LAW.  64 

§  54-  Questions   proper  for  the  jury. —  The    question    of 

negligence  must  be  submitted  to  the  jury  as  one  of  fact,  not 
only  where  there  is  room  for  difference  of  opinion  between 
reasonable  men  as  to  the  existence  of  the  facts  from 
which  it  is  proposed  to  infer  negligence,1  but  also  where  there 

is  room  for  such  a  difference  as  to  the  inferences  which  might 

nett,  59  Pa.  St.  259  ;  Johnson  v.  being  doubtful,  the  case  was  beld  to 
Brunei-,  61  Id.  58  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  have  been  properly  left  to  the  jury, 
Co.  v.  Foster,  43  111.  415  ;  Ohio,  etc.  in  the  following,  among  man}-  other, 
R.  Co.  v.  Callarn,  73  Ind.  261 ;  Cen-  cases  :  Gonzales  v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem 
tral  Branch,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hotham,  R.  Co., 38  N.  Y.  440;  Feler  v.  N.  Y. 
22  Kans.  41  ;  Meyer  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  Central  R.  Co.,  49  Id.  47  ;  Connolly  v. 
40  Mo.  151.  But  this  must  be  limited  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.  114  Id.  104; 
as  stated  in  §  56.  21  N.  E.  101  ;  McGovern  v.  Central 
1  In  various  cases  it  is  said  the  Vermont  R.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.  280 ;  25 
question  is  for  the  jury  if  there  is  N.  E.  373  ;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Moore, 
sovie  evidence  (Bernhard  v.  Rens-  24  N.  J.  Law,  824  ;  Rauch  v  Lloyd, 
selaer,  etc.  R.  Co.,  1  Abb.  Ct.  App.  31  Pa.  St.  358  ;  West  Chester,  etc.  R. 
131  ;  Cumberland,  etc.  Iron  Co.  v.  Co.  v.  McElwee,  67  Id.  311 ;  Pitts- 
Scally,  27  Md.  589  ;  Johnson  v.  Mis-  burgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Evans,  53  Id. 
souri  Pacific  R.  Co.,  18  Neb.  6»0;  26  250  ;  Fritz  v.  Jenner,  166  Id.  292  ;  31 
N.  W.  347);  or  any  evidence  tend-  Atl.  80;  Fiske  v.  Forsyth,  etc.  Bleach- 
ing to  show  actionable  negligence  ing  Co.,  57  Conn.  118  ;  17  Atl.  356; 
(Sheldon  v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  59  Delaney  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
Mich.  172  ;  26  N.  W.  507  ;  Louisville,  33  Wise.  67  ;  Elmore  v.  Hill,  51  Id. 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Red,  154  111.  95;  39  365  ;  Donaldson  v.  Milwaukee,  etc. 
N.  E.  1086) ;  or  any  evidence,  though  R.  Co.,  21  Minn.  293;  Callahan  v. 
slight  (Paintonv.  Northern  Cent.  R.  Warne,  40  Mo.  131  ;  Fletcher  v.  At- 
Co.,  83  N.  Y.  7  ;  Moore  v.  Metropoli-  lantic,  etc.  R.  Co.  64  Id.  484  ;  Green- 
tan  R.  Co.  2  Mackay  [D  C.J.437) ;  or  leaf  v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.,  29  Iowa, 
when  the  case  upon  the  facts  is  not  14  ;  Gagg  v.  Vetter,  41  Ind.  228; 
free  from  doubt  (Mynning  v.  Detroit,  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Feehan,  47 
etc.  R.  Co.  59  Mich.  257 ;  26  N.  W.  111.  App.  66  ;  affi'd  36  N.  E.  1036 ; 
514 ;  Robel  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  35  Hayes  v.  Williams,  17  Colo.  465  ;  30 
Minn.  84  ;  27  N.  W.  305  ;  but  see  §  57,  Pac.  352  ;  Wise  v.  Covington,  etc.  R. 
post):  or  if  the  facts  are  in  substantial  Co.,91Ky.  537;  16S.  W.  351;  Western 
dispute  (Newark,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Timmons,  93  Ga. 
Block,  55  N.  J.  Law,  605  ;  27  Atl.  345  ;  20  S.  E.  649  ;  Augusta,  etc.  R. 
1067).  It  is  said  that  the  question  Co.  v.  Killian,  79  Ga.  234;  4  S.  E. 
should  not  be  withdrawn  from  the  165  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Woods, 
jury  unless  the  facts  clearly  warrant  105  Ala.  561 ;  17  So  41 :  Missouri  Pac. 
it  (Boon  v.  Allegheny,  etc.  P.  R.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Baier,  37  Neb.  235;  55  N. 
Co.,  101  Pa.  St.  334)  ;  or  if  there  is  W.  913;  Chicago,  B.  etc.  R  Co.  v. 
more  than  a  scintilla  of  evidence  Oleson,  40  Neb.  889;  59  N.  W.  354  ; 
(Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Horst.  110  International,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Eck- 
Pa.  St.  226  ;  1  Atl.  217).     The  facts  ford,  71  Tex.  274;  8  S.  W.  679. 


QUESTIONS   OF   FACT   AND   LAW. 


[§54 


fairly  be  drawn  from  conceded  facts.2     Where  this  is  the  case, 
the   issue   must  go  to  the  jury,  no  matter  what  may  be  the 


2  If  the  inferences  to  be  fairly 
drawn  from  the  circumstances  are 
not  certain,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  de- 
cide (Hart  v.  Hudson  R.  Bridge  Co., 
80  N.Y.  622  ;  Bernhard  v.  Rensselaer, 
etc.  R.  Co..  1  Abb.  Ct.  App.  131; 
affirming  s.  C. ,  32  Barb.  165  ;  Johnson 
v.  Bruner,  61  Pa.  St.  58 ;  Howett  v. 
Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  166  Pa.  St. 
607;  31  Atl.  336).  See  Abbett  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  30  Minn.  482. 
Omaha  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Loehneisen,  40 
Neb.  37  ;  58  N.  W.  535  ;  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Wymore,  40  Neb.  645  ;  58 
N.  W.  1120.  A  question  as  to  the 
existence  of  negligence  should  not 
be  withdrawn  from  the  jury  unless 
the  conclusion  follows,  as  matter  of 
law,  that  no  recovery  can  be  had 
upon  any  view  which  can  be  properly 
taken  of  the  facts  which  the  evi- 
dence tends  to  establish  (Gardner 
v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  150  U.  S. 
349 ;  14  S.  Ct.  140;  Terre  Haute,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Voelker,  31  111.  App.  314; 
affi'd,  129  111.  540;  22  N.  E.  20).  Un- 
less an  inference  of  negligence  or  its 
absence  is  necessarily  deducible  f  rom 
undisputed  facts  and  circumstances 
(Dahl  v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co. ,  62  Wise. 
653  ;  Lasky  v.  Canadian  Pacific  R. 
Co.,  83  Me.  461  ;  22  Atl.  367  ;  Bannon 
v.  Lutz,  158  Pa.  St.  166  ;  27  Atl.  890) ; 
or  if  the  evidence  is  not  so  plain  that 
reasonable  men  might  not  reach  dif- 
ferent conclusions  on  the  subject 
(Erickson  v.  Twenty  third  St.  R.  Co., 
71  Hun,  108  ;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  603),  the 
case  should  be  submitted  to  the  jury. 
See,  to  same  effect,  Bennett  v.  Syn- 
dicate Ins.  Co.,  39  Minn.  254;  39  N. 
W.  488.  Although  there  is  no  dis- 
pute about  the  facts,  yet,  if  they  are 
numerous  in  details  (Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hotham,  22  Kan.  41  ;  compare 
Johnson  v.  Husband,  Id.  277),  or  if 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  5] 


the  facts  are  complicated,  and  the 
general  knowledge  and  experience 
of  mankind  do  not  at  once  condemn 
the  conduct  as  careless  (Gaynor  v. 
Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  100  Mass.  208; 
Connolly  v.  Waltham,  156  Id.  368; 
31  N.  E.  302  ;  Mangam  v.  Brooklyn, 
38  N.Y.  455  ;  Hay  croft  v.  Lake  Shore, 
etc.  R.  Co.  64  Id.  636  ;  West 
Chester,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McElwee,  67 
Pa.  St.  311  ;  Paterson  v.  Wallace,  1 
Macq.  H.  L.  Cas.  748),  or  the  reverse, 
the  question  whether  they  establish 
negligence  must  be  submitted  to  the 
jury.  Where  there  are  special  cir- 
cumstances which  call  for  the  deter- 
mination of  the  applicability  to  the 
case  at  bar,  of  general  principles 
governing  similar  cases,  as  testified 
to  by  uncontradicted  experts,  the 
question  is  properly  submitted  to 
the  jury  (Cornish  Farm  Build- 
ings Ins.  Co.,  74  N.  Y.  295). 
Thus  whether  in  operating  an  elec- 
tric railroad,  it  was  negligent  not  to 
maintain  a  guard  wire  over  the  trol- 
ley wire  so  as  to  prevent  a  fallen  tel- 
ephone wire  from  resting  thereon 
and  charging  it  with  electricity,  to 
the  injury  of  one  on  the  street,  is  for 
the  jury  (Block  v.  Milwaukee  St. 
R.  Co.,  89  Wise.  371  ;  61  N.  W.  1101) ; 
and  so  is  the  question  whether  the 
system  and  manner  of  inspecting 
cars  were  all  that  might  be  required 
of  a  carrier  (Palmer  v.  Delaware, 
etc.  Canal  Co.  120  N.  Y.  170 ;  24  N. 
E.  302) ;  and  whether  a  train-dis- 
patcher should  have  sent  orders 
directly  to  the  conductor  and  en- 
gineer of  a  train,  thus  lessen- 
ing the  possibilities  of  the  tele- 
graph operator's  misinterpretation 
of  tli.;  dispatcher's  order  (Sutherland 
v.  Trov,  etc.  R.  Co.,  46  Hun,  372); 
and  whether  it   was  negligence  to 


§541 


QUESTIONS   OF   FACT   AND    LAW. 


66 


opinion  of  the  court  as  to  the  value  of  the  evidence  3  or  the 
credibility  of  the  witnesses.4  So,  if  the  issue  narrows  itself 
to  a  distinction  between  what  is  reasonably  safe  and  what  is 
not  so,  the  question  is  emphatically  one  for  the  jury.5  It  is 
for  the  court  to  say  whether  there  is  any  evidence  in  the  case 
from  which  negligence  might  reasonably  be  inferred  ;  and  then 
it  is  for  the  jury  to  say  whether,  from  the  facts  thus  proved, 
negligence  ought  to  be  inferred.6 


run  a  train  without  a  light  or  flag- 
man on  the  track  (Winchell  v.  Ab- 
bot, 77  Wise.  371  ;  46  N.  W.  6G5)  ;  or 
at  the  rate  of  25  miles  an  hour  over 
a  city  street- crossing  (De  Loge  v. 
N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92  Hun, 
149  ;  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  697). 

3  Where  there  is  conflicting  evi- 
dence on  a  question  of  fact,  whatever 
his  own  opinion  as  to  the  value  of 
that  evidence,  the  judge  must  leave 
the  consideration  of  it  to  the  jury. 
(Dublin,  etc.  R.  Co  v.  Slattery,  L.  R. 
3  App.  Cas.,  1155  ;  Carver  v.  Detroit, 
etc.  Plank-Road  Co.  61  Mich.  584  ;  28 
N.  W.  721).  Whether  there  is  rea- 
sonable evidence  of  negligence  to  be 
left  to  the  jury  is  a  question  for  the 
judge;  it  is  for  the  jury  to  say 
whether  and  how  far  the  evidence 
is  to  be  believed  (Metropolitan  R. 
Co.  v.  Jackson,  L.  R.  3  App.  Cas. 
193  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Baker, 
106  Ala.  624;  17  So.  452). 

4  Where  there  is  testimony  on  be- 
half of  plaintiff  which,  alone,  if 
believed,  would  warrant  a  jury  in  in- 
ferring negligence,  the  case  should 
be  submitted  to  the  jury,  no  matter 
how  strong  or  persuasive  be  the 
countervailing  proof  (Citizens,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Foxley,  107  Pa.  St.  537 
[car  running  over  child]).  See, 
among  many  other  cases,  to  the  same 
effect,  Swift  v.  Staten  Island,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.  645,  mem. ;  25  N.  E. 
378;  Barker  v.  Paulson,  116  N.  Y. 
660,  mem.:  22  N.  E.  959 :  Puff  v. 
Lehigh  Valley  R.   Co..  71   Hun.  177  ; 


24  N.  Y.  Supp.,  1068;  Leopold  v. 
Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co.,  74  Hun, 
137  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  1123  ;  Moore  v. 
N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  75  Hun, 
381  ;  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  449  ;  Hanlon  v. 
Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.,  104  Mo.  381  ; 
16  S.  W.  233  ;  Omaha,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brady,  39  Neb.  27 ;  57  N.  W.  767 ; 
Potter  v.  Chicago,  etc,  R.  Co.,  46 
Iowa,  399  ;  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Levi, 
59  Tex.  674  ;  Leak  v.  Rio  Grande, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  9  Utah,  246  ;  33  Pac.  1045. 

5  Leishman  v.  Brighton,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  23  Law  Times,  712;  Uggla  v. 
West  End  St.  R.  Co.,  160  Mass.  351  ; 
35  N.  E.  1126  ;  Dacey  v.  Old  Colony 
R.  Co.,  153  Mass.  112  ;  26  N.  E.  437  ; 
Heucke  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
69  AVisc.  401  ;  34  N.  W.  243. 

6  Metropolitan  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson, 
3  App.  Cas.  193,  and  cases,  supra.  It 
is  for  the  court  to  say  what  act  or 
omission  is  evidence  of  negligence, 
but  generally  it  is  for  the  jury  to  say 
whether  the  evidence  establishes 
negligence  (Omaha  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Martin,  48  Neb.  65  ;  66  N.  W.  1007). 
Hence,  where  the  accident  was  caused 
by  the  breaking  of  a  draw-bar,  a 
charge  that  "the  mere  fact  that  a 
drawbar  of  a  car  breaks  when  struck 
by  another  car  in  motion,  is  not  suf- 
ficient to  establish  negligence,"  in- 
vades the  province  of  the  jury 
(Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wangelin,  152 
111.  138;  38  N.  E.  760).  Whether  a 
certain  act  or  omission  is  competent 
evidence  of  negligence  is  for  the 
court,    but    whether    such   evidence 


67 


QUESTIONS   OF   FACT  AND   LAW. 


T§  55 


§  55.  Proximate  cause,  when  for  the  jury. — Where  the  right 
to  recover  depends  upon  the  question  whether  the  defendant's 
negligence  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  defendant's  injury, 
that  is  to  be  submitted  to  the  jury,  under   proper  instructions,1 


convicts  a  party  of  negligence  is  for 
the  jury  (Spears  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  43  Neb.  720;  62  N.  W.  68, 
s.  P.,  Cope  v.. Hampton  Co.  42  S.  C. 
17;  19  S.  E.  1018). 

1  ■'  It  is  the  province  of  a  jury  to 
look  at  the  succession  of  events  or 
facts,  and  ascertain  whether  they  are 
naturally  and  probably  connected 
with  each  other  by  a  continuous 
sequence,  or  are  dissevered  by  new 
and  independent  agencies,  and  this 
must  be  determined  in  view  of  the 
circumstances  existing  at  the  time'" 
(per  Strong,  J.,  in  Milwaukee,  etc 
R.  Co.  v.  Kellogg,  94  U.  S.  469).  To 
the  same  effect  are  Insurance  Co.  v. 
Tweed,  7  Wall.  44  ;  Insurance  Co.  v. 
Seaver,  19  Id.  531  ;  Ehrgott  v.  New 
York,  96  N.  Y.  264 ;  Cosulich  v. 
Standard  Oil  Co.  122  Id.  118  ;  Webb 
v.  Rome.  etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Id.  420; 
Fairbanks  v.  Kerr,  70  Pa.  St.  86; 
Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.  v.  McKeen,  90 
Id.  122  ;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
Lacey,  88  Id.  458  ;  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.  v.  Hope,  80  Id.  373  ;  Scott  v. 
Hunter,  46  Id.  192 ;  Willey  v.  Bel- 
fast. 61  Me.  569  ;  Lake  v.  Milliken,  62 
Id.  240  ;  Handyside  v.  Powers,  145 
Mass.  123  ;  13  N.  E.  462  ;  Saxton  v. 
Bacon,  31  Vt.  540  ;  Littleton  v.  Rich- 
ardson, 32  N.  H.  59  ;  Stark  v.  Lan- 
caster, 57  Id.  88  ;  Gilman  v.  Noyes, 
Id.  627  ;  Clemens  v.  Hannibal,  etc. 
H.  Co.,  53  Mo.  366  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Pindar,  53  111.  -147  ;  Kellogg  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  26  Wise.  223  ; 
Jacker  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52  Id. 
160;  Sather  v.  Ness,  42  Minn.  379; 
44  N.  W.  128  ;  Denver,  etc  R.  Co. 
v.  Roi.bins,  2  Colo.  App  313  :  30  Pac. 
20i  :  Jeffs  v.  Rio  Grande,  etc  R.  Co., 
9  Utah,  374  ;  35  Pac.  505  ;  Knahtla  v. 


Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  21  Oreg.  136  ;  27 
Pac.  91.  For  different  illustrations  of 
the  general  rule,  see  McCann  v.  New- 
ark, etc.,  R.  Co.,  58 N.  J.  Law,  642;  34 
Atl.  1052;  Oliver  v.  La  Valle,  36  Wise. 
592 ;  Waterman  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  82  Id.  613  ;  52  N.  W.  247; 
Pceppers  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67 
Mo.  715  ;  Southside  Pass.  R.  Co.  v. 
Trich,  117  Pa.  St.  390  ;  11  Atl.  627; 
Weiler  v.  Manhattan  R,  Co.,  53  Hun, 
372  ;  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  320  ;  Thuringer  v. 
N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  82  Hun, 
33  ;  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  419  [water  drip- 
ping from  defendant's  tank  formed 
ice  on  sidewalk]  ;  Haverly  v.  State 
Line,  etc.  R.  Co.,  135 Pa.  St.  50;  19  Atl. 
1013  [whether  spread  of  apparently 
extinguished  fire  was  caused  by  wind 
thereafter  rising]  ;  Ewing  v.  North 
Versailles.  146  Pa.  St,  309  ;  23  Atl. 
338  [whether  town's  failure  to  build 
a  fence  on  highway  caused  railroad 
collision  with  animals]  ;  Bluedorn  v. 
Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.,  121  Mo.  258  ; 
25  S.  W.  943  [whether  excessive 
speed  of  train  caused  the  accident]  ; 
Boothby  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  66 
N.  H.  342  ;  34  Atl.  157  [whether  sta- 
tion being  closed  was  proximate 
cause  of  illness  of  passenger  wait- 
ing on  platform  for  delayed  train, 
in  inclement  weather]  ;  Patten  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Wise.  524 
[similar]  ;  Sloane  v.  Southern  Cal.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  Cal.  668;  44 Pac. 320 [whether 
the  humiliation  consequent  on  plain- 
tiff's wrongful  expulsion  from  de- 
fendant's car  was  the  proximate 
cause  of  her  subsequent  nervous 
paroxysms]  ;  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v. 
Callaghan,  6  C.  C.  A.  205  ;  56  Fed.  988 
[whether  conductor's  ordering  train 
ahead,    or    engineer's    disregarding 


§  56]  QUESTIONS   OF    FACT   AND    LAW.  68 

unless  it  is  entirely  free  from  doubt.2  It  has  been  already- 
pointed  out  that  the  difficulties  surrounding  this  question  are 
often  so  great  that  the  courts  are  unable  to  arrive  at  a  conclu- 
sion which  can  be  safely  stated,  as  matter  of  law,  to  govern 
future  cases,  even  upon  undisputed  facts.3  They,  therefore, 
prefer  to  leave  the  decision  of  such  cases  to  a  jury,  which,  if 
it  decides  erroneously  in  the  particular  case,  will  at  least  not 
prejudice  the  rights  of  any  future  litigant;  whereas  one  erro- 
neous decision  of  the  court,  as  in  the  famous  Ryan  fire  case,4 
may  throw  a  whole  department  of  law  into  confusion,  and  in- 
juriously affect  hundreds  of  persons  before  it  can  be  corrected. 

§56.  When  questions   should   not  be  left  to  jury. — The 

courts  have  sometimes  used  such  broad  language  as  to  the 
necessity  of  leaving  the  question  of  negligence  to  the  jury  that 
it  might  be  inferred  that  every  case  must  be  so  left ; l  but  this 
is  not  true.  When  the  facts  are  clearly  settled,  and  the  course 
which  common  prudence  dictated  can  be  so  clearly  discerned 
that  only  one  inference  can  be  drawn,  it  would  be  the  duty  of 
the  court  to  set  aside  a  verdict  contrary  to  such  inference;2 
and  whenever  that  is  the  case,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
take  the  case  away  from  the  jury  and  direct  a  verdict  of  a  non- 
suit, as  the  case  may  require.3  The  question  is  then  one  of 
law,  for  the  court  to  decide.4     And   it  is  now  well  settled  in  all 

danger  signal  caused  the  accident]  ;  N.   Y.   417,  427.     The  amount   and 

s.  P.,  Hall  v.  Ogden  City  R.  Co.,  13  character  and  the  weight  and  effect 

Utah  243;  44  Pac.  1046.  of  evidence  in  rebuttal  of  the  infer- 

2 Henry  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  ence  arising  from  the  facts  shown 

7G  Mo.    288  ;  Kerrigan    v.    Hart,  40  are  questions  of  law,  when  the  evi- 

Hun,  389.  dence    is    undisputed    (Menomonie 

3  See  §  28,  ante.  River,  etc.  Co.  v.  Milwaukee  &  N.  R. 

4  Ryan  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  35  Co.,  91  Wise.  447  ;  65  N.  W.  176). 

N.  Y.  210.  4  Where  the  facts  are   undisputed 

•See  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Coggin,  73  and  such  that  only  one  conclusion 

Ga.  689;  Cleveland  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  can  be  drawn  from  them,  the  ques- 

Id.  793  ;  Cumberland,  etc.  Iron  Co.  v.  tion  of   negligence  is  one  of    law 

Scally,  27  Md.  589.  (Dickens  v.  N  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  1 

8  Kitchen  v.  Carter,  47  Neb.  776;  66  Abb.  Ct.  App.  504  ;  Keller  v.  N.  Y. 

N.  W.  855.  Central  R.  Co. ,  2  Id.  480 ;  Indianapolis, 

3  Elliott  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  150  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Watson,  114  Ind.  20 ;  15 

U.  S.  245  ;  14  S.  Ct.  85  ;  Union  Pacific  N.  E.  824  ;  Woolwine  v.  Chesapeake, 

R.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  152  U.  S.  262  ;  etc.  R.  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  329  ;  15  S.  E. 

14  S.  Ct.  619  ;  Cagger  v.  Lansing,  64  81 ;  Knight  v.  Albemarle,  etc.  R.  Co., 


69 


QUESTIONS   OF   FACT   AND   LAW. 


[§56 


the  English  and  the  chief  American  courts  that  a  mere  scintilla 
of  evidence  is  not  enough  to  go  to  the  jury.5  There  must  be 
evidence  upon  which  reasonable  men  could  reasonably  and 
properly  find  the  fact  of  negligence;  or,  in  default  of  this,  a 
nonsuit  should  be  ordered.6  The  case  should  not  be  left  to 
the  jury,  but  the  complaint  should  be  dismissed,  if  there  is  no 
evidence  of  negligence,7  or  if    the  evidence    only  suggests  a 

HON.  C.  58;  14  S.  E.  650;  Russell  t.    road  Co.,  38  Ohio  St.  3S9),  and  Illi- 

Carolina  Cent.  R.  Co.,  118  N.C.  1098;    nois  (Guerdon  v.  Corbett,  87111.  272  ; 

24  S.  E.  512;  Cope  v.  Hampton,  42S.C.    Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sykes,  96  Id. 

17;  19  S.  E.  1018;  Jacoboski  v.  Grand    162,  176),  and  Nebraska    (Smith  v. 

Rapids,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  106  Mich.  440;  64    Sioux    City,    etc.  R.    Co.,    15  Neb. 

N.  W.  461;  Bradley  v.  Ft.  Wayne,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  94  Mich.  35  ;  53  N.  W.  915  ; 

Seefeld  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.    Co.,  70 

Wise.  216  ;  35  N.  W.  278  ;  Aurandt  v. 

Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90  Iowa,  617  ;  57 

N.  W.  442  ;  Wardlaw  v.  California  R. 

Co.,  [Cal.]  ;  42  Pac.  1075).     See,  also, 

Beisiegal  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  40 

N.  Y.  9  ;  Stubley  v.  Northwestern  R. 

Co.,  L.   R.    1   Exch.  13;  Crafter    v. 

Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  L.    R.  1    C.  P. 

300  ;  Glassey  v.  Hestonville,  etc.  R. 

Co.,   57  Pa.  St.  172  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc. 

R.  Co.,  v.  McClurg,  56  Id.  294  ;  Carter 

v.  Towne,  103  Mass.  507  ;  Chaffee  v. 

Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  17   R.   I.  658  ;   24 

Atl.  141. 

5  Improvement  Co.  v.  Munson,  14 
Wall.  442,  448  ;  Hathaway  v.  East 
Tenn.  etc.  R.  Co.,  29  Fed.  489  ;  Jewell 
\  Parr,  13  C.  B.  909,  916  ;  Avery 
v.  Bowden,  0  El.  &  B.  953  ;  Mellors  v. 
Shaw,  1  Best  &  S.  437  ;  Wheelson  v. 
Hardisty,  8  El.  &  B.  232 ;  Baulec 
v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  356,  366. 
Cases  in  which  a  scintilla  of  evi- 
dence was  allowed  to  go  to  the  jury 
are  found  in  Arkansas  (Little  Rock, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Perry,  37  Ark.  164), 
South  Caroline  fSfnte  v.  Boles,  is 
S.  C.  504;  see  Carrier  v.  Dorrance, 
19  Id.  30;  Siiiuns  v.  South  Carolina 
E,  ( '.,.,  26  Id.  490  ;  2  S.  E.  486),  Ioica 
(Muldowney  v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co., 
32  Iowa,  176  ;  Way  v.  Illinois,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  35  Id.  585),  Ohio  (Dick   v.  Rail- 


583 ;  19  N.  W.  638  ;  Johnson  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,""  18  Neb. 
690  ;  26  N.  W.  347  ;  Leigh  v.  Omaha 
St.  R.  Co.,  36  Neb.  132  ;  54  N.  W.  134). 
Where  the  doctrine  of  "scintilla  of 
evidence  "  prevails,  the  court  cannot 
take  the  case  from  the  jury  when 
there  is  any  evidence  tending  to 
prove  the  issue  (Robinson  v.  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.,  2  Lea,  rjs  ;  Smith  v. 
Gillett,  50  111.290).     See  §  54,  ante. 

6  Ryder  v.  Wombwell,  L.  R.  4 
Ex.  32,  39  ;  Improvement  Co.  v.  Mun- 
son, 14  Wall.  442.  See  Babcock  v. 
Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  140  N.  Y.  308  ;  35 
N.  E.  596.  "Negligence  is  ordina- 
rily a  question  for  the  jury,  but  only 
when  the  facts  would  authorize  the 
jury  to  infer  it"  (per  Andrews,  J., 
Sutton  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  66 
N.  Y.  243  [accident  which  could 
not  have  been  anticipated]);  s.  P., 
Pleasants  v.  Fant,  22  Wall.  116,  120. 

7  De  Vau  v.  Penn.  etc.  Canal  Co., 
130  N.  Y.  632  ;  28  N.  E.  532  ;  Reading, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  v.  Ritchie,  102  Pa.  St. 
425  ;  Manzoni  v.  Douglas,  L.  R.  6  Q. 
B.  Div.  145  [horse  bolting  without 
assignable  cause ;  driver  not  lacking 
in  skill]  ;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  v. 
Righter,  42  X.J.  Law,  180;  N.  J. 
Express  Co.  v.  Nichols,  33  Id.  434 ; 
Barton  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52 
Mo.  253  ;  Hoth  v.  Peters,  55  Wise. 
405  ;  Hoyt  v.  Hudson,  41  Id.  105. 


§56] 


QUESTIONS    OF    FACT    AND    LAW. 


70 


possibility  of  negligence,8  or  is  as  consistent  with  the  absence 
of  all  negligence  as  with  its  existence.9  The  court  has  no 
right  to  allow  a  jury  to  act  upon  "  mere  surmise  or  conjecture."  10 
On  the  other  hand,  if  negligence  and  the  necessary  damage 
proximately  flowing  from  it  are  so  clearly  proved,  both  in  fact 
and  inference,  that  there  is  no  room  for  an  honest  difference 
of  opinion  between  reasonable  men,  the  court  should  direct  a 
verdict  for  the  plaintiff.11  There  are  some  cases  in  which  the 
courts  seem  to  have  held  that  such  a  direction  should  never  be 


8Baulec  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  59  N. 
Y.  b56;  McCaffrey  v.  Twenty-third 
St.  R.  Co.,  47  Hun,  404  ;  Raby  v.  Cell, 
85  Pa.  St.  80  ;  Wittkowsky  v.  Was- 
son,  71  N.  C.  451  ;  Mercier  v.  Mercier, 
43  Ga.  323;  Zettler  v.  Atlanta,  66  Id. 
195;  Crookshank  v.  Kellogg,  8  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  256;  Weis  v.  Madison.  75 
Ind.  241.  The  court  must  be  able 
"  to  perceive  what  more  the  de- 
fendant could  have  done  or  was 
bound  to  do,"  than  he  actually  did, 
before  allowing  a  jury  to  pass  upon 
the  question  (Kelly  v.  Sea  Beach 
R.  Co.,  109  N.  Y.  44  ;  15  N.  E.  879). 

9  If  the  evidence  would  justify  an 
inference  consistent  with  the  absence 
of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  de- 
fendant, just  as  well  as  it  would  an 
inference  of  negligence,  the  plaintiff 
cannot  recover  (Smith  v.  First 
National  Bank,  99  Mass.  605  ;  Cotton 
v.  Wood,  8  C.  B.  N.  S.  568 ;  Toomey 
v.  Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  3  Id.  146; 
Baulec  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  59  N.  Y. 
356  ;  Hayes  v.  Forty-second  St.  R. 
Co.,  97  Id.  259;  Priest  v.  Nichols,  116 
Mass.  401  ;  Beaulieu  v.  Portland  Co., 
48  Me.  291  ;  Jackson  v.  Hyde,  28  Up- 
per Canada,  294  ;  Deverill  v.  Grand 
Trunk  R.  Co.,  25  Id.  517  ;  Welfare  v. 
Brighton  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  693). 
This  language  has  been  used  so  often 
that  Moody  v.  Osgood  (54  N.  Y.  488) 
cannot  be  considered  a  valid  author 
ity  against  it.  When  the  fact  is  that 
the  damages  claimed  in  an  action 
were  occasioned  by  one  of  two  causes, 


for  one  of  which  defendant  is  re- 
sponsible, and  for  the  other  not,  the 
plaintiff  must  fail,  if  it  is  just  as 
probable  that  they  were  caused 
by  the  one  as  by  the  other  (Searles 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  661). 
Seejiost,  §  57,  n.  4. 

10  Martin  v.  Pettit,  117  N.  Y.  118, 
124  ;  22  N.  E.  566  (snb  nom.  Wasson 
v.  Pettit) ;  Morris  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  148  N.  Y.  182,  185  ;  42  N.  E.  579. 
While  negligence  of  a  railway  com- 
pany, in  operating  a  train  at  a  cross- 
ing may  be  made  out  from  the  proof 
of  all  the  surrounding  circum- 
stances, including  the  absence  of 
signals  and  the  rate  of  speed;  yet, 
unless  there  is  something  in  that 
proof,  taken  as  a  whole,  which,  if 
believed  by  the  jury,  would  estab- 
lish a  failure  on  its  part  to  perform 
a  legal  duty,  or  to  use  reasonable 
care  and  prudence  in  what  it  did,  the 
case  should  not  be  submitted  to  them 
(Heaney  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  112 
N.  Y.  122;  19  N.  E.  422). 

"Hogan  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  149 
N.  Y.  23;  43  N.  E.  403;  Moore  v.  West- 
ervelt,  1  Bosw.,  357.  Even  if  there 
be  controversy  in  the  evidence  as 
to  some  facts,  yet  if  those  that  are 
uncontroverted  clearly  and  indis- 
putably establish  negligence,  it  is 
a  question  of  law  for  the  court 
(Abbett  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  30 
Minn.  482  ;  s.  P. ,  Cook  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.,  1  Abb.  Ct.  App.  432; 
Williams  v.  OKeefe,24  How.  Pr.  16). 


jl  QUESTIONS   OF   FACT   AND    LAW.  [§  $6 

given,  but  that  the  farthest  extent  to  which  the  court  can  go, 
in  favor  of  a  plaintiff,  is  to  leave  the  question  to  the  jury. 
But  this  is  not  sustained  by  the  best  authorities,  and  is  entirely 
inconsistent  with  principle.  All  courts  pass  upon  the  contrib- 
utory negligence  of  the  plaintiff,  as  matter  of  law,  when  clearly 
proved;  and,  if  courts  are  qualified  to  do  this,  they  are  equally 
competent  to  decide  the  same  issue  against  the  defendant. 


CHAPTER  V. 


EVIDENCE. 


§  57.  Plaintiff's  burden  of  proof. 

58.  What  will  shift  burden  to  de- 

fendant. 

59.  Presumptions  of  negligence. 


§  60.  Illustrations     of    presumptive 
negligence. 
60  a.  Admission  and   declarations. 
60  b.  Other  similar  accidents. 
60  c.  Subsequent  repairs. 


§57.  Plaintiff's  burden  of  proof.— In  an  action  founded 
upon  negligence,  the  burden  of  proof  of  course  rests  upon  the 
plaintiff.1  He  must  make  out  his  case  by  a  clear  preponder- 
ance of  evidence;2  but  he  is  not  bound  to  do  so  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt.3    The  burden  of  proof  as  to  defendant's  neg- 


:Parrott  v.  Wells,  15  Wall.  524; 
Bridges  v.  North  London  R.  Co., 
L.  R.  6  Q.  B.  377  ;  7  H.  L.  232  ;  The 
Marpesia.L.  R.  4  P.  C.  212  ;  The  Ben- 
more,  L.  R.  4  Adm.  132  ;  Caldwell  v. 
N.  J.  Steamboat  Co.,  47  N.  Y.  282 ; 
affi'g  56  Barb.  425  ;  Curran  v.  War- 
ren Chem.  etc.  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  153; 
Moody  v.  Osgood,  54  Id.  488 ;  Hale  v. 
Smith,  78  Id.  480;  Allan  v.  State 
Steamship  Co.,  132  Id.  91  ;  30  N.  E. 
482  [ship's  physician  furnished  from 
the  ship's  stores  calomel  when  qui- 
nine was  called  for] ;  Illinois,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Cragin,  71  111.  177  ;  Brown  v. 
Congress  St.  R.  Co.,  49  Mich.  153; 
Button  v.  Frink,  51  Conn.  342  ;  Dono- 
van v.  Hartford  St.  R.  Co.,  65  Id.  201  : 
32  Atl.  350.  As  to  admissibility  of 
opinion-evidence,  and  the  practice  of 
others  in  the  same  employment,  see 
£  5;},  ante.  As  to  burden  and  suffi- 
ciency  of  proof  in  actions  by  servants 
for  master's  negligence,  see  §§  222, 
223.  post;  in  actions  against  munici- 
pal corporations  in  respect  to  public 


works,  highways,  etc.,  see  §§  290, 
367,  382,  post;  in  actions  against  rail- 
roads for  negligent  construction  and 
maintenance  of  track  and  acces- 
sories, see  §  411,  post;  in  actions 
against  railroads  for  collisions  with 
animals,  see  §  432.  post ;  and  for  col- 
lisions with  persons  see  §  485,po.s£; 
in  actions  by  passengers  against  car- 
rier, see  §§  516-518  ;  as  to  origin  of 
fire,  see  §§  675,  676  ;  in  management 
of  gas  works,  see  §  697,  post. 

2  Searles  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co. ,  101 
N.  Y.  661  ;  5  N.  E.  66  ;  McCaig  v. 
Erie  R.  Co.,  8  Hun,  599.  Plaintiff's 
testimony  that  the  frog  in  which  he 
was  injured  was  then  unblocked  is 
sufficient  to  carry  the  question  to  the 
jury,  though  a  number  of  witnesses 
testify  that,  just  after  the  accident, 
the  frog  was  found  to  be  properly 
blocked  (Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
James,  163  U.  S.  485  ;  16  S.  Ct.  1109). 

3  In  actions  upon  negligence,  issues 
of  fact  are  to  be  determined  by  the 
jury  upon  the  preponderance  of  evi- 


[72] 


73 


EVIDENCE. 


[§57 


ligence  remains  upon  plaintiff  throughout  the  trial.4  The 
extent  to  which  it  continues  upon  him,  even  where  the  issue 
is  as  to  his  own  contributory  negligence,  will  be  considered  in 
the  chapter  of  Contributory  Negligence.5  It  is  certainly  the 
duty  of  the  plaintiff  to  prove  affirmatively  that  the  defendant 
has  been  negligent.  It  is  not  enough  for  him  to  prove  that  he 
has  suffered  damage  by  reason  of  some  event  which  happened 
upon  the  defendant's  premises,6  or  even  by  reason  of  some  act 
or  omission  of  the  defendant.7     He  must  also  prove  that  the  de- 


dence;  and  it  is  not  necessary  that 
defendant's  negligence  should  be 
proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt 
(Seybolt  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  93  N.  Y.  562;  Hart  v.  Hudson 
River  Bridge  Co.,  80  Id.  622;  Brad- 
well  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  139  Pa. 
St.  404  ;  20  Atl.  1046  ;  Quaife  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  48  Wise.  513  ;  Hart- 
wig  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Id. 
358 ;  Fitts  v.  Cream  City  R.  Co. ,  59 
Id.  323;  Kelly  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R. 
Co  ,  70  Mo.  604:  Louisville,  etc.  R.Co. 
v.  Jones,  83  Ala.  376;  3  So.  902,  and 
cases  cited  under  §  54,  ante). 

4  The  burden  of  sustaining  the  af- 
firmative of  the  issue  remains  on  the 
plaintiff  throughout  the  trial;  and 
the  jury  must  be  satisfied  from  the 
whole  case  that  the  allegation  is 
established  (Heinemann  v.  Heard, 
62  N.  Y.  448  ;  Dowell  v.  Guthrie,  99 
Mo.  653  ;  12  S.  W.  900). 

5  See  gg  106-109,  i>ost. 

6  Dobbins  v.  Brown,  119  N.  Y. 
18S  ;  23  N.  E.  537  ;  Curran  v.  War- 
ren  Chemical  Co.,  36  N.  Y.  153; 
Nason  v.  West,  78  Me.  253  ;  3  Atl. 
912.  The  mere  fact  of  an  explosion 
in  an  oil  refinery  does  not  raise  a 
presumption  of  negligence  (Cos- 
ulioh  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  122  N.  Y. 
118  ;  25  N.  E.  259).  s.  P.,  Henry  v. 
Brackenridge  Lumber  Co.,  48  La. 
Ann.  950;  20  So.  221  [injury  from 
defendant's  machinery]  ;  Davidson 
v.  Davidson,  46  Minn.  117;  48  N.  W. 


560  [negligence  cannot  be  pre- 
sumed merely  from  fall  of  elevator- 
weights]  ;  Turnier  v.  Lathers,  59 
Hun,  623,  mem.;  13  N.  Y.  Supp. 
500  [elevator  rope  breaking] . 

1  Reiss  v.  New  York  Steam  Co., 
128  N.  Y.  103 ;  28  N.  E.  24  [steam 
pipes  furnished  by  defendant  ex- 
ploded]. A  defect  in  a  highway 
at  a  particular  time  and  place, 
is  not  to  be  inferred  merely  from 
the  fact  that  an  injury  was  sus- 
tained at  that  time  and  place  ;  but 
that  fact  may  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration, in  connection  with  the 
other  facts  of  the  case  (Church  v. 
Cherryfield,  33  Me.  460  ;  Sherman  v. 
Kortright,  52  Barb.  267).  The  con- 
dition of  the  road  in  the  immediate 
vicinity  of  the  place  where  the  acci- 
dent occurred  may  be  shown  (Cox 
v.  Westchester  Turnpike  Co.,  33 
Barb.  414),  but  not  in  the  "  locality" 
generally  (Ruggles  v.  Nevada,  63 
Iowa,  185  ;  see  Grand  Rapids  v.  Wy 
man,  46  Mich.  516).  In  an  action 
against  a  railway  company,  for  in 
juries  to  cattle  on  its  track  (unless 
some  statute  declares  proof  of  in- 
jury prima  facie  evidence  of  negli- 
gence), proof  that  the  cattle  were 
injured  by  the  defendant's  engines 
is  not  enough  (Sneesby  v.  Lanca- 
shire, etc.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  263 ; 
1  Q.  B.  Div.  42;  Bradley  v.  Buffalo, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  34  N.  Y.  427  ;  Tracy  v. 
Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  38  Id.  433  ;  Perkins 


§57] 


EVIDENCE. 


74 


fendant  in  such  act  or  omission  violated  a  legal  duty  incumbent 
upon  him.8  He  must,  therefore,  prove  that  the  defendant  has 
violated  some  contract9  or  rule  of  law,10  thus  infringing  upon  the 
plaintiff's  known  rights;11  or  else  he  must  prove  facts  and 
circumstances,  from  which  it  can  be  ascertained  with  reason- 
able certainty  what  particular  precaution  the  defendant  ought 
to  have  taken  but  did  not  take.13     If  a  defect  was  not  obvious, 


v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  29  Me.  307  ;  May- 
nai'd  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  115  Mass. 
458;  Baxter  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
102  Id.  383  ;  White  v.  Concord  R. 
Co.,  30  N.  H.  207;  Smith  v.  Eastern 
R.  Co  .  35  Id.  357  ;  Hook  v.  Wor- 
cester, etc.  R.  Co.,  58  Id.  251  ;  Bulk- 
ley  v.  N.  Y.  &New  Haven  R.  Co.,  27 
Conn.  479  ;  Lindsay  v.  Connecticut, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  27  Vt.  643  ;  Quimby  v. 
Vermont  Central  R.  Co.  23  Id.  387  ; 
Vandegrift  v.  Rediker,  22  N.  J. 
Law,  185 ;  Price  v.  New  Jersey, 
R.  etc.  Co.,  31  Id.  229;  32  Id.  19; 
Galpin  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.,  19 
Wise.  637  ;  McCandless  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  45  Id.  365  ;  Turner  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Mo.  261  ; 
Orange,  etc.  R.  Co.,  v.  Miles,  76  Va. 
773;  Campbell  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  4  Hughes'  C.  C.  170;  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  v.  Patchin,  16  111.  198  ; 
Great  Western  R.  Co.,  v.  Morthland, 
30  Id.  451  :  Indianapolis,  etc.  R  Co., 
v.  Means,  14  Ind.  30 ;  Schneir  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  40  Iowa,  337  ; 
Grand  Rapids  R.  Co.,  v.  Judson,  35 
Mich  507 ;  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  v. 
Hudson,  50  Miss.  572 ;  Bethje  v. 
Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  26 Tex.  604). 
See  §  419,  post.  The  rule  is  other- 
wise in  South  Carolina  (Murray  v. 
So.  Carolina  R.  Co.,  10  Rich.  Law, 
227  ;  Roof  v.  Railroad  Co.,  4  S.  C.  61  ; 
see  §  432,  post). 

8  Dubois  v.  Kingston,  102  N.  Y. 
219  ;  6  N.  E.  273  ;  McGrath  v.  Hud- 
son River  R.  Co.,  32  Barb.  144; 
Terry  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  22  Id. 
574  ;  Robinson  v.  Fitchburg,  etc.  R. 


Co  ,  7  Gray,  92  ;  Tourtellot  v.  Rose- 
brook,  11  Mete.  460;  Lester  v.  Pitts- 
ford,  7  Vt.  158  ;  Allen  v.  Willard, 
57  Pa.  St.  374  ;  M'Cully  v.  Clarke, 
40  Id.  399  ;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
v.  Bahrs,  28  Md.  647;  Freeh  v. 
Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39  Id.  574  ; 
State  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60 
Id.  555  ;  Herring  v.  Wilmington, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  10  Ired.  Law,  402 
Bachelder  v.  Heagan,  18  Me.  32 
Beaulieu  v.  Portland  Co.,  48  Id.  291 
Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  v.  Thomas,  42 
Ala.  672  ;  Fuller  v.  Citizens'  Bank, 
15  Fed.  875  ;  Crandall  v.  Goodrich 
Transp.  Co.,  16  Id.  75  ;  Crew  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  20  Id.  87  ;  Button 
v.  Frink,  51  Conn.  342  ;  Illinois  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.,  v.  Cragin.  71  111.  177; 
Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  v.  Augus- 
tus, 21  Id.  186  ;  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Locke,  112  Ind.  404;  14  N.  E. 
391  ;  Michigan  Central  R.  Co.,  v. 
Coleman,  28  Mich.  440  ;  Norfolk, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  v.  Ferguson,  79  Va.  241  ; 
and  cases  cited  under  §§  8-13,  25- 
27,  ante. 

9  McCaldin  v.  Parke,  142  N.  Y. 
564  ;  37  N.  E.  662  [plaintiff's  vessel, 
while  under  charter  by  defendant, 
struck  a  rock  on  approaching  de- 
fendant's wharf  ;  plaintiff  held 
bound  to  show  contract  to  furnish 
sufficient  depth  of  water]  ;  Arent  v. 
Squire,  1  Daly,  347.  Compare  Wat- 
son v.  Bauer,  4  Abb.  N.  S.  273. 

10  See  cases  cited  under  §  13,  ante. 

11  See  §  27,  ante. 

12  Daniel  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co., 
L.  R.   3  C.   P.  216,  591  ;  5  H.  L.  45 


75 


EVIDENCE. 


[§57 


there  must  be  some  evidence  from  which  it  can  be  inferred 
how  it  might  and  ought  to  have  been  discovered.13  He  must 
also  prove  facts  from  which  it  can  fairly  be  inferred  that  the  de- 
fendant's negligence  was  the  canse,u  and  the  proximate  cause,13 
of  the  injury.  Mere  surmise  or  conjecture,  on  any  of  these 
points,  will  not  do.16 


In  that  case,  Willes,  J.,  said:  "  It  is 
necessary  for  the  plaintiff  to  estab- 
lish *  *  *  reasonable  probability 
that  the  accident  resulted  from  the 
want  of  some  precaution  which  the 
defendant  might  and  ought  to  have 
resorted  to;  and  I  go  further  and  say 
that  the  plaintiff  should  also  show 
with  reasonable  certainty  what  par- 
ticular precaution  should  have  been 
taken."  This  language  was  cited 
with  approval  in  Hayes  v.  Michigan 
Central  R.  Co.  (Ill  U.  S.  228),  and 
in  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Steb- 
bing  (62  Md.  504).  s.  P., Williams  v. 
Great  Western  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  9  Exch. 
157  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Stout,  17  Wall. 
657  ;  Randall  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  109  U.  S.  478;  Lovegrove  v. 
Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  16  C.  B.  X.  S. 
669.  The  judgment  given  by  Willes, 
J.,  was  reversed,  but  this  doctrine 
was  distinctly  affirmed,  s.  P.,  Kelly 
v.  Sea  Beach  R.  Co..  100  X.  Y.  44  ; 
15  N.  E.  879.  Plaintiff  cannot  show 
that  other  fastenings  could  have 
been  used,  without  proof  that  they 
were  in  common  use  (McCarthy 
v.  Boston  Duck  Co.,  165  Mass. 
165;  42  X.  E.  5G8) .  Where  the 
complaint  specifies  the  negligence 
complained  of,  and  the  court  finds 
that  the  defects  claimed  could  not 
have  caused  the  accident,  it  is  not 
incumbent  on  defendant  to  show  that 
no  other  defect  could  have  produced 
tlie  injury  (Lennon  v.  Rawitzer, 
57  Conn.  583;  19  Atl.  334).  Where 
mismanagament  of  the  engine  which 
bet  the  fire  was  the  only  negligence 
alleged,  defendant  was  not  obliged 


to  prove  that  the  engine  was  in  good 
condition  (Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co# 
v.  Ayers,  56  Kans.  176  ;  42  Pac.  722). 

13  De  Graff  v.  N.Y.  Central  R.  Co.. 
76  X.  Y.  125. 

14  Cochran  v.  Dinsmore,  49  N.  Y. 
249;  Dobbins  v.  Brown,  119  Id.  188; 
23  N.  E.  537  ;  Geoghegan  v.  Atias 
Steamship  Co.,  146  X.  Y.  369;  40 
N.  E.  507.  Plaintiff  is  not  bound  to 
show  the  precise  cause;  it  is  enough 
if  he  shows  the  injury  to  be  attribu- 
table to  one  or  other  of  several  causes 
(e.  g.,  sparks  from  one  or  other  of 
defendant's  locomotives),  for  each  of 
which  defendant  is  responsible  (Be- 
vier  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co.,  13 
Hun.  254, 257) .  But  where  goods  were 
injured  by  two  different  causes  for 
only  one  of  which  defendant  is  re- 
sponsible, the  burden  of  proof  is  on 
plaintiff  to  show  that  the  damage 
was  occasioned  by  the  latter  cause 
(Priest  v.  Nichols,  116  Mass.  401  ; 
Snider  v.  Xew  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 
48  La.  Ann.  1;  18  So.  695:  s.  p., 
Searles  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  101  X. 
Y.  661). 

15Holbrook  v.  Utica,  etc.  R.  Co., 
12  X.  Y.,  236  :  Kelsey  v.  Jewett.  28 
Hun,  51;  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Boyer,  97  Pa.  St.  91  ;  Fox  v.  Borkey, 
126  Id.  164:  17  Atl.  604;  Pennsylvania 
Co.  v.  Hensil,  70  Ind.  5G9;  Crandall 
v.  Goodrich  Transp.  Co.,  16  Fed.  75. 
See  §  54,  ante. 

16  Dobbins  v.  Brown,  119  NY.  188  ; 
23  X.  E.  537  [unsafe  machinery]. 
Recovery  for  explosion  of  a  boiler 
cannot  be  had,  though  an  inexperi- 
enced man  had  been  placed  in  charge, 


§58] 


EVIDENCE. 


76 


§  58.  What  will  shift  burden  to  defendant.  —  The  plaintiff 
is  not  bound  to  prove  more  than  enough  to  raise  a  fair  pre- 
sumption l  of  negligence   on  the  part  of  the  defendant  and   of 


it  being  shown  that  the  explosion 
was  not  due  to  his  negligence,  and 
the  cause  being  left  to  mere  conjec- 
ture (Brunner  v.  Blaisdell,  25  Pa. 
St.  170  ;  32  Atl.  607).  In  an  action  for 
injuries  caused  by  defendant's  fright- 
ening plaintiff's  horse  and  causing  it 
to  run  away,  the  defendant  is  enti- 
tled to  have  the  jury  charged,  liter- 
ally or  in  substance,  that  no  recovery 
could  be  had  without  proof  to  their 
satisfaction  that  the  frightening  of 
the  horse  was  the  cause  of  the  acci- 
dent (Mitchell  v.  Turner,  149  N.Y. 
39  ;  43  N.  E.  403). 

1  But  to  be  sufficient  to  sustain  a 
verdict,  this  presumption  must  be 
the  conclusion  from  facts  proved 
or  admitted,  and  not  a  presumption 
from  a  presumption  (Philadelphia, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Henrice,  92  Pa .  St. 
431  :  Gillespie  v.  McGowan.  100  Id. 
144  ;  Northern  Central  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  54  Md.  113 :  Sorenson  v. 
Menasha,  etc.  Co.,  56  Wise.  338).  In 
actions  for  damages  caused  by  fire 
communicated  from  defendant's 
locomotive,  the  burden  has  been 
held  in  some  courts  to  be  on  plaintiff 
to  prove  more  than  this  origin  of  the 
fire    (Gandy  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 

30  Iowa,  420;  Albert  v.  Northern, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  98  Pa.  St.  316;  Philadel- 
phia, etc.  R  Co.  v.  Yerger.  73  Id. 
121;  Henderson  v.  Philadelphia,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  141  LI.  461  :  22  Atl.  851  ;  In- 
dianapolis, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Paramore, 

31  Ind.  143;  Ruffner  v.  Cincinnati, 
etc.  R.  Co..  34  Ohio  St.  96).  But  in 
other  states,  this  evidence  casts  the 
burden  on  the  defendant  to  disprove 
negligence  :  New  York  —  Case  v . 
Northern  Central  R.  Co.,  59  Barb. 
644 ;  Sheldon  v.  Hudson  River  R. 
Co.,  14  N.  Y.  218  ;  Field  v.  N.Y.  Cen- 


tral R.  Co.,  32  Id.  339  ;  Missouri  — 
Coale  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60  Mo. 
227  ;  Palmer  v.  Missouri  Pacific  R. 
Co.,  76  Id.  217  ;  Bedford  v.  Hannibal, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  46  Id.  456;  compare 
Smith  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  37 
Id.  287  ;  Tennessee  —  Simpson  v.  East 
Tennessee  R.  Co.,  5  Lea,  456  ;  Wis- 
consin—  Spaulding  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  30  Wise.  110 ;  33  Id.  582.  By 
statute  in  Maryland,  Illinois,  Iowa, 
Arkansas  and  Utah,  the  burden  is 
placed  on  railroad  companies  to  dis- 
prove negligence  in  cases  of  fire- 
communicated  by  s])arks  from  en- 
gines (see  Anuapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Gantt,  39  Md.  115  ;  Baltimore,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Shipley,  39  Id.  251  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc  R.  Co.  v.  Clampit,  63 
111.  95  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Campbell,  86  Id.  443  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Larmon,  67  Id.  68  ;  Slosson  v. 
Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  51  Iowa, 
294;  Small  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R  Co., 
50  Id.  338  ;  Engle  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co  ,  77  Id.  661  ;  37  N.  W.  6  ;  Tilley  v. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Ark.  535  ;  6 
S.  W.  8;  Anderson  v.  Wasatch,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  2  Utah,  518).  See  §  671, 
post.  The  fact  that  the  roof  fell 
while  defendant  was  raising  it  was 
sufficient  evidence  of  defendant's 
negligence  in  executing  the  work  to 
go  to  the  jury  (Barnowski  v.  Hel- 
son,  89  Mich.  523;  50  N.  W.  989). 
As  to  when  an  inference  that  dece- 
dent came  to  his  death  through  hav- 
ing touched  uninsulated  wire  was 
justified,  see  Suburban  Electric  Co.  v. 
Nugent,  53  N.  J.  Law,  658;  34  Atl. 
1069.  What  evidence  will  sustain  a 
verdict  on  a  charge  of  negligent  lay- 
ing of  rails,  see  Woodman  v.  Metro- 
politan R.  Co. ,  149  Mass.  335;  21  N.  E. 
482.     As  to  burden  of  proof  in  statu- 


77 


EVIDENCE. 


[§58 


resulting  injury  to  himself.  Having  done  this,  he  is  entitled 
to  recover,  unless  the  defendant  produces  evidence  sufficient 
to  rebut  this  presumption.2  It  has  sometimes  been  held  not 
sufficient  for  the  plaintiff  to  establish  a  probability  of  the  de- 
fendant's fault ; 3  but  this  is  going  too  far.  If  the  facts  proved 
make  it  probable  that  the  defendant  violated  his  duty,  it  is  for 
the  jury  to  decide  whether  he  did  so  or  not.  To  hold  other- 
wise would  be  to  deny  the  value  of  circumstantial  evidence. 
As  already  stated,  the  plaintiff  is  not  bound  to  prove  his  case 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt ; 4  and,  although  the  facts  shown 
must  be  more  consistent  with  the  negligence  of  the  defend- 
ant than  with  the  absence  of  it,  they  need  not  be  incon- 
sistent with  any  other  hypothesis.5  It  is  well  settled  that 
evidence  of  negligence  need  not  be  direct  and  positive.6  Cir- 
cumstantial evidence  is  sufficient.7     In  the  nature  of  the  case, 


tory  actions  against  railroad  com- 
panies for  injuries  from  operation  of 
locomotives,  cars  and  machinery, 
see  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Small  80  Ga. 
519  ;  5  S.  E.  794  ;  Savannah,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Phillips,  90  Ga.  829 ;  17  S.  E. 
82;  Hamlin  v.  Yazoo,  etc.  R.  Co., 
72  Miss.  39 ;  16  So.  877;  Mobile,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Holborn,  84  Ala.  133  ;  4  So. 
146  ;  and  against  railroad  companies 
for  injuries  to  animals  from  neglect 
to  fence  track,  etc.,  see  §  421,  x>ost, 
and  for  injuries  to  persons  from 
neglect  of  statutory  precautions,  see 
§  467,  post. 

2  Pennsylvania  Canal  Co.  v.  Bent- 
ley,  66  Pa.  St.  30  ;  Sullivan  v.  Union 
R.  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  238  ;  40  N. 
Y.  Supp.  84.  See  also,  Mullen  v.  St. 
John,  57  N.  Y.  567  ;  Atchison,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Bales,  16  Kans    252  ;  Ken- 


lyn,  29  Id.  234.     See,  too,  Beaulieu  v. 
Portland  Co.,  48  Me.  291. 

4  Seybolt  v.  N.  Y  ,  Lake  Erie,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  95  N.  Y.  582  ;  Quaife  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co. ,  48  Wise.  513 ; 
Johnson  v.  Agricultural  Ins.  Co.,  25 
Hun,  251  ;  Hays  v.  Gallagher,  72  Pa. 
St.  136  [plaintiff,  found  hurt  under 
bridge,  said  he  had  fallen  from 
bridge,  but  manner  of  his  fall  wa-i 
not  shown;  case  for  jury].  See  § 
57,  ante. 

5  Toomey  v.  Brighton  R.  Co.,  3  C. 
B.  N.  S.  146,  150.  "  The  plaintiff  is 
not  bound  to  prove  his  case  so 
clearly  as  to  exclude  the  possibility 
of  any  other  theory  "  (Whitney  v. 
Clifford,  57  Wise.  156). 

6  Direct  and  positive  evidence  is 
not  required.  Any  circumstance 
from  which  negligence  may  be  rea- 


dallv.  Boston,  118  Mass.  234  ;  McKee    sonably  inferred   maybe   sufficient 


v.  Bidwell,  74  Pa.  St.  218  ;  Toledo,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  O'Connor,  77  111.  391  :  Cor- 
rell  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.Co..  38  Iowa, 
120;  Grey  v.  Mobile  Trade  Co.,  55 
Ala.  387  ;  Ficken  v.  Jones,  28  Cal.  618 
[plaintiff  lawfully  in  street  injured 
by  defendant's  cattle  driven  there]. 
3  Sheldon  v.  Hudson  River  R. 
Co.,  29  Barb.  226;  Lehman  v.  Brook - 


( Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brassfield, 
51  Kans.  167;  32  Pac.  814  ;  Cincin- 
nati, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McMullen,  117 
Ind.  439;  20  N.  E.  287). 

7  Circumstantial  evidence  alone 
may  authorize  the  finding  of  negli- 
gence (Jacksonville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v 
Peninsular,  etc.  M'f'g  Co.,  27  Fla.  1, 
157;  9  So.  661). 


§  59]  EVIDENCE.  78 

the  plaintiff  must  labor  under  difficulties  in  proving  the  fact  of 
negligence  ;  and  as  that  fact  itself  is  always  a  relative  one,  it  is 
susceptible  of  proof  by  evidence  of  circumstances  bearing  more 
or  less  directly  upon  the  fact  of  negligence,  a  kind  of  evidence 
which  might  not  be  satisfactory  in  other  classes  of  cases,  open 
to  clearer  proof.  This  is  on  the  general  principle  of  the  law  of 
evidence,  which  holds  that  to  be  sufficient  or  satisfactory  evi- 
dence, which  satisfies  an  unprejudiced  mind.8  Proof  that 
similar  accidents  do  not  happen  from  similar  things,  when 
properly  managed,  is  competent  to  raise  a  presumption  of  neg- 
ligence, where  an  accident  has  happened.9 

§59.  Presumptions  of  negligence.— In  many  cases,  the 
maxim  "res  ipsa  loquitur"  applies.  The  affair  speaks  for 
itself.1  The  accident,  the  injury,  and  the  circumstances  under 
which  they  occurred,  are  in  some  cases  sufficient  to  raise  a  pre- 
sumption of  negligence,  and  thus  cast  upon  the  defendant  the 
burden  of  establishing  his  freedom  from  fault.  Proof  of  an 
injury,  occurring  as  the  proximate  result  of  an  act  of  the  de- 
fendant, which  would  not  usually,  if  done  with  due  care,  have 
injured  any  one,  is  enough  to  make  out  a  presumption  of  neg- 
ligence. When  a  thing  which  causes  injury  is  shown  to  be 
under  the  management  of  the  defendant,  and  the  accident  is 
such  as  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things  does  not  happen,  if 
those  who  have  the  management  use  proper  care,  it  affords 
reasonable  evidence,  in  the  absence  of  explanation  by  the  de- 
fendant, that  the  accident  arose  from  a  want  of  care.2     So,  also  : 

8Gandy  v.  Chicago,  etc.    R.  Co.,  ;1  Mason  v.  Tower  Hill  Co.,  83  Hun, 

30  Iowa,  421;   Garrett    v.   Chicago,  479;  32  KSY.  Supp.  36  [splice  in  rope]. 

etc.  R.  Co.,  3  5  Id.  123;  Hart  v.  Hud-  '  Cummings    v.  National  Furnace 

son   R.  Bridge  Co.,   80  N.   Y.    622;  Co.,  GO  Wise.  603;  Briggs  v.  Oliver, 

Jones  v.  N.  Y.  Central,   etc.  R.  Co.,  4    Ilurlst.  &    C.  403;  Mullen  v.  St. 

28  Hun,  364;  Lyons  v.Rosenthal,  11  John,    57    N.    Y.    567;    Kearney  v. 

Id    46;  Nichols  v.  Smith,     15  Mass.  Brighton,  etc.  R.   Co.,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B. 

332  ;  Quaife  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  761  ;  affi'g  S.  C.,  5  Id.  411  ;  Byrne  v. 

48  Wise.  51:?;  Wood  v.Chicago,  etc.  Boadle,    2   Hurlst.    &    C,   722. 

R.  Co.,  51  1.1.  196;  Illinois  Central  v.  2 Scott    v.     London  Docks    Co.,    3 

Cragin,  71  111.  177  ;  McKissock  v.  St.  Hurlst.  &  C,  596  ;  Seybolt  v.  N.  Y., 

Louis,    etc.    R.    Co..    73    Mo.    456  ;  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  95  N.  Y.  562  ; 

Bueschingv.  St. Louis  Gas  Light  Co.,  Butler  v.    Cushing,    46    Hun,    521; 

73  Id.  219  ;  Kelly  v.  Hannibal,    etc.  Tuttle  v.  Chicago,   etc.    R.    Co.,   48 

R.  Co  .  70  Id.  604  ;  Lackawanna,  etc.  Iowa.  236  [where  satisfactory  expla- 

R.  Co.  v.  Doak,  52  Pa.  St.  379.  nation  was  given]. 


79  EVIDENCE.  [§  60 

"  Where  it  is  shown  that  the  accident  is  such  that  its  real 
cause  may  be  the  negligence  of  the  defendant,  and  that,  whether 
it  is  so  or  not,  is  within  the  knowledge  of  the  defendant,  the 
plaintiff  may  give  the  required  evidence  of  negligence,  with- 
out himself  explaining  the  real  cause  of  the  accident,  by  prov- 
ing the  circumstances,  and  thus  raising  a  presumption  that,  if 
the  defendant  does  not  choose  to  give  the  explanation,  the  real 
cause  was  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant."3 

§  60.  Illustrations  of  presumptive  negligence. — Not  only 
is  it  evidence  of  negligence  to  show  that  the  defendant  or  his 
chattel  was  trespassing  on  the  plaintiff's  premises,  and  that  the 
injury  occurred  in  consequence  of  that  trespass,  but  it  is  also 
sufficient  to  show  that  something  belonging  to  the  defendant, 
which  ought  not  to  have  been  on  the  highway  at  the  time,  in- 
jured the  plaintiff  while  he  was  on  the  highway.  Thus,  the 
falling  of  cinders,1  or  of  a  bolt 2  from  an  overhead  railroad,  or 
the  fall  of  overhead  telegraph  wires  upon  the  road  below;3 
the  fall  of  a  barrel  from  a  window,4  or  of  bricks  from  a  bridge, 
or  other  building5  is  sufficient  evidence  of  negligence,  without 
proving  actual  want  of  care  as  the  cause  of  such  fall.  For, 
on  such  a  state  of  facts,  the  presumption  is  that  the  defendant 
has  violated  the  duty  which  the  law  imposes    upon  him,   of 

3  Per  Channell,  B.,  Bridges  v.  North  41   Pac.   499;  Larson  v.  Central  R. 

London R.  Co.,  L.  R.  6  Q.  B.,  377,391.  Co.,  56  111.  App.  263. 

'Lowery  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  99  4  Byrne  v.  Boadle,  2  Hurlst  &  C. 

N.  Y.  158;  1  N.  E.  608.     But   not  so,  722  ;  Scott  v.  London  Docks  Co.,  3  Id. 

where  only  one  cinder,  smaller  than  596  [bag  coffee]  ;  Dehring  v.  Com- 

a  pinhead,  fell  in  plaintiff's  eye,  and  stock,   78  Mich.  153  ;  43  N.  W.  1049 

there  was  no  evidence    that  more  [bales  hay]. 

than  this  one  coal  ever  fell  (Wied-  5"Itis  not  a  matter  of  common 

mer  v.  N.  Y.  Elev.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  Y.  occurrence  for  bricks  to  come  loose 

462;  21   N.    E.    1041  ;  rev'g  41  Hun,  and    to     fall    from     the    fabric    to 

^84).  which   they    belong "    (Kearney    v. 

'Volkmar   v.    Manhattan  R.  Co.,  London  and    Brighton  R.  Co.,  L.  R. 

134  N.  Y.  418  ;  31  N.  E.  870  :  Hogan  5  Q.  B.  411;  6  Id.   759).     Where  one 

v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  149  N.  Y.  23  ;  engaged  in  a  building  is  injured  by  a 

43  N.  E.  403 ;  Maher  v.  Manhattan  R.  falling  brick,  in  the  absence  of  ex- 

Oo.,  53  Hun,  506  ;  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  309.  planation  by  the  contractor  doing  the 

3  Thomas  v.  Western   Union    Tel.  brick  work,  it  will  be  presumed  that 

Co.,  100  Mass.  156;  Penn.  Tel.  Co.  v.  it  occurred  from  want  of  reasonable 

Varnau  (Pa.),  15    Atl.    624  ;  Denver  care  on  his  part  (Sheridan  v.  Foley, 

Electric  Co  v.  Simpson,  21  Colo.  371  ;  58  N.  J.  Law,  230;  33  Atl.  484). 


§6oa] 


EVIDENCE. 


80 


using  due  care  to  keep  his  property  off  the  highway.6  On 
proof,  however,  that  the  defendant  has  used  due  care  for  that 
purpose,  the  burden  of  proof  is  again  upon  the  plaintiff,  to 
show  other  negligence,7  such,  for  example,  as  that  the  defend- 
ant did  not  use  a  proper  degree  of  care  to  control  his  property, 
after  it  had  got  upon  the  highway.  So  the  fall  of  a  building,* 
a  scaffold,9  an  elevator,  10  or  other  hoisting  machinery,11  the 
sudden  giving  way  of  the  door  of  a  railway  carriage,12  the  fall 
of  a  gangway  plank  between  a  ship  and  wharf,13  or  the  explosion 
of  a  boiler,14  is  presumptive  evidence  of  negligence. 


§  60a.  Admissions  and  declarations.  —  An  admission  by 
either  party  personally,  out  of  court,  that  he  was  in  fault,  is 
entitled  to  great  weight,  but  is  not  necessarily  conclusive 
against    him.1      But    admissions    by    a    husband     against     his 


6  Mullen  v.  St.  John,  57  N.  Y. 
567  ;  McKune  v.  Santa  Clara  Valley 
Mill,  etc.  Co.,  110  Cal.  480  ;  42  Pac. 
980. 

7Searles  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  101 
N.  Y.  661;  5  N.  E.  66  ;  McCaig  v. 
Erie  R.  Co.,  8  Hun,  599. 

8  Mullen  v.  St.  John,  57  N.  Y.  567  ; 
Vincett  v.  Cook,  4  Hun,  318.  Other- 
wise, where  an  effort  is  being  made 
to  tear  down  a  building,  and  it 
merely  falls  before  it  is  expected  to 
fall    (Weideman  v.  Tacoma  R.  Co., 

7  Wash.  St.  517  ;  35  Pac.  414). 

9  See  Flynn  v.  Gallagher,  52  N. 
Y.  Superior,  524. 

10  Moran  v.  Racine  Wagon  Co. ,  74 
Hun,  454  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  852  ;  Law- 
son  v.  Merrall,  69  Hun,  278  ;  23  N.  Y. 
Supp.  560;  Gerlach  v.  Edelmeyer, 
47  N.  Y.  Superior,  292.  In  Murphy 
v.  Hays  (68  Hud,  450  ;  23  N.  Y. 
Supp.  70)  held  otherwise,  as  against 
a  servant,  where  elevator  started  up 
suddenly. 

11  Lyons  v.  Rosenthal,  11  Hun,  46. 

12  Gee  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  L.  R. 

8  Q.  B.  161. 

13  Eagle  Packet  Co.  v.  Defries,  94 
111.  598. 


14  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Phillips, 
55  111.  194  ;  Bahr  v.  Lombard,  53  N. 
J.  Law,  233  ;  23  Atl.  167  [explosion 
oil  pipe]  ;  Grimsley  v.  Hankins,  46 
Fed.  400.  Evidence  sufficient  to  re- 
pel presumption  ;  see  Reiss  v.  N.  Y. 
Steam  Co.,  128  N.  Y.  103  ;  28  N.  E. 
24  ;  Losee  v.  Buchanan,  51  N.  Y.  476  ; 
McMahon  v.  Davidson,  12  Minn.  357 ; 
Robinson  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  20 
Blatch.  338  ;  Rose  v.  Stevens,  etc. 
Transp.  Co.,  Id.  411;  Posey  v.  Scofield, 
10  Fed.  140.  Explosion  is  not  even 
presumptive  evidence  of  negligence 
in  favor  of  the  operator  himself 
(Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  77  111. 
217).  Compare  Caldwell  v.  N.  J. 
Steamboat  Co.,  56  Barb.  425;  affi'd  47 
N.  Y.  282. 

1  Zemp  v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co., 
9  Rich.  Law,  84.  Compare  Cooper  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  44  Iowa,  134, 
Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hammersley  28 
Ind.  371,  Firkins  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  61  Minn.  31  ;  63  N.  W.,  172, 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
81  Md.  371  ;  32  Atl.  201  :  as  to 
injured  person's  declarations  made 
at  any  time,  being  admissible,  as 
against  interest.     The  fact  that  the 


8i 


EVIDENCE. 


[§6oa 


wife,2  by  a  wife  against  her  husband,3  or  by  a  servant  against  his 
master,4  are  not  competent  evidence.  Declarations  of  any 
person  engaged  in  the  transaction,  including  the  plaintiff,  are 
admissible  against  the  defendant,  when  part  of  the  res  gestce  ;  5 
but   to    be   so,    they   must    have  been    substantially    simulta- 

person  killed  had  warned  others  son  made  at  the  time  of  the  injury 
against  committing  the  act  which 
caused  his  death,  is  admissible  to 
prove  contributory  negligence  (Le- 
high Valley  Coal  Co.  v.  Jones,  86 
Pa.  St.  432);  and  so  are  warnings 
given  to  the  deceased  (Central  R. 
Co.  v.  Sears,  59  Ga.  436). 

2  Keller  v.  Sioux,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  27 
Minn.,  178;  6  N.  W.  486. 

3Stillwell  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  34  N.  Y.,  29.  Compare  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  66 
lnd.,  43  ;  Fitzgerald  v.  Weston,  52 
Wise.  354. 

4  Luby  v.  Hudson  Riv.  R.  Co. ,  17 
N.  Y.  131  ;  Hamilton  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral, etc.  R.  Co.,  51  Id.,  100; 
Butler  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  143 
Id.  417 ;  38  N.  E.,  454.  Declarations 
of  defendant's  servant,  at  the  time 
of  the  accident,  that  plaintiff  was 
not  to  blame  (Lane  v.  Bryant,  9 
Gray,  245),  or  made  afterwards  as  to 
cause  of  the  accident  (Alabama, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hawk,  72  Ala.  112; 
Aldridge  v.  Midland  Furnace  Co., 
78  Mo.  559  ;  McGuerty  v.  Hale,  161 
Mass.  51;  36  N.  E.  682),  are  inad- 
missible. But  what  was  said  by  de- 
fendant's foreman  when  the  accident 
was  reported  to  him  has  been  held 
competent  as  res  gestae.  (Wabash 
Western  R.  v.  Brow,  13  C.  C. 
A.  222;  65  Fed.  941).  Declarations 
and  admissions  of  a  public  officer 
are  inadmissible  to  bind  a  municipal 
corporation  of  which  he  is  the  agent, 
unless  they  are  part  of  the  res  gestce 
(Cortland  Co.  v.  Herkimer  Co.,  44 
N.  Y.  22;  Clapper  v.  Waterford,  131 
Id.  382). 
6  Declarations  of  the  injured  per- 
[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  1  —  61 


or  immediately  afterwards,  are  ad- 
missible as  part  of  the  res  gestce 
(Stein  v.  Grand  Ave.  R.  Co. ,  10  Phil. 
440  ;  Friedman  v.  Railroad  Co.,  7  Id. 
202;  Lund  v.  Tyngsborough,  9  Cush. 
36 ;  Brownell  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.  47  Mo.  239;  Entwistle  v. 
Feighner,  60  Id.  214;  Bass  v.  Chicago, 
etc,  R.  Co.,  42  Wise.  654).  Plain- 
tiff's contemporaneous  declarations 
as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  his 
injury,  are  admissible  (Werely  v. 
Persons,  28  N.  Y.  344  ;  Gardner  v. 
Bennett,  38  N.  Y.  Super.  197; 
Will  v.  Mendon,  108  Mich.  251  ;  66 
N.  W.  58).  But  it  is  error  to  per- 
mit the  nurse  and  physician  to 
testify  that  plaintiff  told  them, 
some  time  after  the  accident,  that 
a  piece  of  nail  had  come  out  of 
his  knee,  and  to  permit  the  physician 
to  point  out  the  scar  of  the  hole  out 
of  which  the  plaintiff  had  told  him 
the  nail  had  come,  as  such  matters 
are  mere  hearsay  (Boston,  etc.  R. 
Co  v.  O'Reilly,  158  U.  S.  334;  15  S.  Ct. 
830).  See  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Walker,  93  Ga.  462;  21  S.  E.  48. 
On  an  issue,  however,  as  to  whether 
plaintiff's  injuries  were  temporary 
or  permanent,  physicians  may  tes- 
tify as  to  plaintiff's  utterances  and 
exclamations  when  undergoing  phy- 
sical examination  during  two  years, 
and  the  fact  that  plaintiff  is  a 
competent  witness  does  not  alter 
the  rule  (Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v. 
Urlin,  158  U.  S.  271  ;  15  S.  Ct.  840). 
To  same  effect,  East  Tennessee,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  94  Ga.  580  ;  20  S. 
E.  127;  Jackson  Co.  v.  Nichols,  139 
lnd.  611;  38  N.  E.  526. 


Cob] 


EVIDENCE. 


82 


neous   with    the   transaction."       Dying    declarations   are   not 
admissible  in  civil  actions,  in  favor  of  the  declarant.7 

§  6ob.  Other  similar  accidents.  —  The  fact  that  premises 
or  appliances  have  been  used  for  many  years  by  many  persons, 
without  injury,  or  that  no  evidence  was  produced  that  any 
other  person  than  the  plaintiff  had  been  injured,  being  a 
strong  circumstance  in  disproof  of  negligence  in  the  use  of 
such  premises  or  appliances, '  evidence  is  admissible  of  previ- 
ous accidents  from  precisely  the  same  cause,  at  the  same  place  a 


6  Declarations  made  afterwards 
(even  within  half  an  hour)  and  con- 
stituting merely  a  narrative  of  a  past 
transaction,  are  not  part  of  the  res 
gestae,  and  not  admissible  as  such 
(Waldele  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
95  N.  Y.  275  ;  Martin  v.  New  Haven, 
etc,  E.  Co.,  103  Id.  626  ;  Cleveland, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mara,  26  Ohio  St.  185  ; 
Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Sutton,  42 
111.  438  :  Galena,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fay, 
16  Id.  558  ;  Fitzgerald  v.  Weston, 
52  Wise.  354  ;  Schillinger  v.  Ver- 
ona, 88  Id.  317 ;  60  N.  W.  272 ; 
Shaw  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8  Gray, 
45  ;  Taylor  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co., 
48  N.  H.  304  ;  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ashcroft,  48  Ala.  16  ;  Roach  v.  West- 
ern, etc.  R.  Co.,  93  Ga.  785  ;  21  S.  E. 
67  [declaration  made  twenty  min- 
utes after  accident,  at  a  <  is  nine 
from  the  scene]  ;  Cleveland,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Sloan,  11  Ind.  App.  401  ;  39 
N.  E.  174  [ten  minutes].  Declara- 
tions by  the  engineer  and  fireman 
of  a  train,  made  within  ten  min- 
utes after  a  collision,  and  while 
the  injured  persons  were  being 
taken  from  the  wreck,  are  admissi- 
ble (East  St.  Louis  R.  Co.  v. 
Allen,  54  111.  App.  27);  and  so  are 
statements  made  by  the  general 
manager  of  the  road  when  he  had 
come  to  the  wreck,  immediately 
after  the  accident,  as  to  its  cause 
(Krogg  v.  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.,  77 
Ga.  202).  See,  also,  Springfield  Con- 


solidated R.  Co.    v.  Welsch,  155  111. 
511;  40  N.  E.  1034. 

7  Waldele  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  95  N.  Y.  275,  287;  Spatz  v. 
Lyons,  55  Barb.  476;  Marshall  v.  Chi- 
cago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  48  111.  475. 

1  Lafflin  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co., 
106  N.  Y.  136  :  12  N.  E.  599  :  Dougar 
v.  Champlain  Transportation  Co.,  56 
N.  Y.  1  ;  Loftus  v.  Union  Ferry  Co., 
4  Id.  455  ;  Burke  v.  Witherbee,  98 
Id.  562  ;  McCaldin  v.  Parke,  142  Id. 
564  ;  37  N.  E.  622.  Where  an  act  of 
a  brakeman  in  mounting  a  car  was 
not,  per  se.  negligent,  it  is  competent 
to  show  that,  under  the  same  cir- 
cumstances, experienced  brakemen 
perform  the  same  act  as  he  did 
(Prosser  v.  Montana  Central  R.  Co., 
17  Mont.  372;  43  Pac.  81). 

2  Wooley  v.  Grand  Street,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  83  N.  Y.  121  [plaintiff's  sleigh 
upset  by  striking  a  street-railroad 
switch]  :  Quinlan  v.  Utica,  11  Hun, 
217;  affi'd,  74  N.  Y.  603  ;  Morse  v. 
Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  C,  30  Minn  465; 
16  N.  W.358  [defective  switch]  :  Hig- 
ley  v.  Gilmer,  3  Mont.  90;  Todd  v. 
Rowley,  8  Allen,  51  ;  Donnelly  v. 
Fitch,  136  Mass.  558;  Hogan  v.  North- 
field,  56  Vt.  721.  In  an  action  for  an 
injury  to  plaintiff's  trees  caused  by 
escaping  gas,  evidence  as  to  the  con- 
dition of  other  trees  in  that  vicinity 
after  the  construction  of  defendant's 
gas  line  is  competent  (Evans  v.  Key- 
stone  Gas  Co.,  148  N.  Y.  112  :  42  N. 


83 


EVIDENCE. 


[~§6ob 


or  from  a  precisely  similar  cause,  at  another  place.3  But 
in  the  latter  instance,  the  evidence  must  show  not  only  that 
both  places  were  under  defendant's  control,  but  also  that  all 
conditions  were,  in  every  material  respect,  precisely  the 
same.4  It  has  been  held  in  one  case,  that  this  evidence  is 
only  competent  for  the  purpose  of  proving  constructive  notice, 
and  therefore  that  evidence  of  subsequent  accidents  is  inadmis- 
sible.5 But  this  decision  stands  alone;  and  it  is  quite  incon- 
sistent with  the  reasoning  in  other  cases  of  superior  authority, 
which  treat  this  evidence  as  material,  if  not  even  necessary,  to 
prove  a  thing  dangerous,  which  is  usually  not  so.6 


E.  513).  To  same  effect,  see  Dis- 
trict of  Columbia  v.  Armes,  107  U. 
S.  519  [sidewalk]  ;  McCarragher  v. 
Rogers,  120  N.  Y.  526  ;  24  N.  E.  812 
[machine]  ;  Pomfrey  v.  Saratoga 
Springs,  104  N.  Y.  459  ;  11  N.  E.  43 
[sidewalk]  ;  Colorado  Mortg.  Co.  v. 
Rees,  21  Colo.  435  ;  42  Pac.  42  [eleva- 
tor] :  Hanrahan  v.  Manhattan  R. 
Co.,  53  Hun,  420  ;  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  395 
[railroad  platform]  ;  Larkin  v. 
CTNeill,  48  Hun,  591  [stairway]  ; 
Aurora  v.  Brown,  12  Bradw.  122 
[sidewalk] ;  Calkins  v.  Hartford,  33 
Conn.  57  [same] ;  Kent  v.  Lincoln, 
32  Vt.  591;  Wooley  v.  Grand  St.  R. 
Co.,  83  N.  Y.  121  ;  Collins  v.  Dor- 
chester, 6  Cush.  396.  So  held,  where 
horses  were  frightened  by  an  ob- 
struction (Crocker  v.  McGregor,  76 
Me.  282;  Gordon  v.  Boston,  etc.  R. 
Co..  58  N.  H.  396:  House  v.  Met- 
calf,  27  Conn.  631  ;  compare  Cleve- 
land, etc.  R.  Co.,  v.  Wynant,  114  Ind. 
525  :  17  N.  E.  118).  The  fact  that  no 
accident  ever  before  happened  in  the 
mine  where  plaintiff  was  injured  is 
inadmissible  to  show  the  mine  was  a 
sat"  place  to  work  in  (Burgess  v. 
Davis  Sulphur  Ore  Co.,  165  Mass.  71; 
42  X.  B.  501).  Nor  is  the  fact  that 
a  large  number  of  persons  had  passed 
over  a  footway  without  accident, 
competent  evidence  that  the  foot- 
way was  not  a  nuisance  (Temper- 


ance Hall  Asso.  v.  Giles,  33  N.  J.  Law, 
260).  s.  P.,  Bauer  v.  Indianapolis,  99 
Ind.  56. 

3  Brady  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  15 
Daly,  272 ;  limited  to  this,  127  N.  Y.  46. 

4  Brady  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  127 
N.  Y.  46  ;  rev'g  s.  C  ,  15  Daly,  272  ; 
6  N.  Y.  Supp.  533.  On  the  question 
whether  a  certain  act  or  omission 
which  caused  the  injury,  was  negli- 
gence, it  may  be  shown  that,  under 
substantially  the  sa  me  circumstances, 
the  same  act  or  omission  had  pro- 
duced similar  injuries  on  former 
occasions  (Morse  v.  Minneapolis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  30  Minn.  465  ;  16  N.  W. 
358;  Hunt  v.  Lowell  Gas  Co.,  8  Allen, 
169  ;  Emerson  v.  Lowell  Gas  Co., 
3  Id.  410  ;  Hodgkins  v.  Chappell,  128 
Mass.  197 ;  Griffin  v.  Auburn,  58  N. 
H.  121  ;  Wise  v.  Ackerman,  76  Md. 
375  ;  25  Atl.  424).  Vicious  habits  of  a 
horse  may  be  shown  by  proving  cases 
of  like  misbehavior  both  before  and 
after  the  act  in  question  (Magie 
v.  Cutts,  12:}  Mass.  535  :  Chamber- 
lain  v.  Enfield,  43  N.  H.  356  ;  cf. 
Whitney  v.  Leominster,  136 Mass.  25). 

'  Johnson  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  52 
Hun,  111  ;  4N.  Y.  Supp.  848. 

6  See  particularly  cases  cited  in 
Quinlan  v.  Utica,  11  Hun,  217; 
affi'd,  74  N.  Y.  603;  also,  Sullivan 
v.  Syracuse,  77  Hun,  440;  29  N.  Y. 
Supp.  105. 


§6oc] 


EVIDENCE. 


34 


^6oc.  Subsequent  repairs. — The  defendant's  voluntary  con- 
duct, subsequent  to  an  accident,  in  respect  to  a  structure  or 
appliance  in  connection  with  which  an  accident  happened,  such 
as  making  alterations  or  repairs,  or  taking  other  precautionary 
measures  to  prevent  the  occurrence  of  similar  accidents,  may 
be  proved,  as  tending  to  show  the  defendant's  control  of  the 
property,1  and  his  responsibility  for  its  repair;2  if  that  is 
disputed.  But  such  evidence  is  inadmissible  by  itself,  to  show 
that  the  former  condition  was  unsafe,  and  that  defendant  was 
negligent  in  so  maintaining  it;3  for  such  subsequent   improve- 


•Morrell  v.  Peck,  88  N.  Y.  398; 
Bateman  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  E.  Co., 
47  Hun,  429  ;  Lafayette  v.  Weaver, 
92  Ind.  477. 

9  Read  man  v.  Conway,  126  Mass. 
374;  Woods  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co., 
51  Mo.  App.  500. 

3  Hammargren  v.  St.  Paul,  69  N. 
W.  470.  The  best  statement  of  this 
rule,  and  the  reasons  for  it,  is  in 
Morse  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  30 
Minn.  405  ;  16  N.  W.  358.  The  rule 
has  been  repeatedly  enforced  in 
New  York,  although  never  with  a 
statement  of  reasons  approaching  to 
the  clearness  of  Judge  Mitchell's 
opinion  in  the  Minnesota  case.  See 
Dougan  v.  Cham  plain  Transp.  Co., 
56  N.  Y.  1  [boarding  up  unprotected 
gang-space  in  steamboat]  ;  Baird  v. 
Daly,  68  N.  Y.  547  [reducing  rate  of 
speed  after  accident]  ;  Dale  v.  Dela- 
ware, etc.  R.  Co.,  73  Id.  468;  Cor- 
coran v.  Peekskill,  108  Id.  151.  The 
same  rule  is  now  the  law  of  New 
Hampshire  (Aldrich  v.  Concord, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  N.  H.  ;  29  Atl.  408 ; 
overruling  Martin  v.  Towle,  59  N.  H. 
31).  It  has  also  been  adopted  in  most 
other  states.  See  Menard  v.  Boston, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  150  Mass.  386;  23  N.  E. 
214  [railroad  gates]  ;  Nalley  v.  Hart- 
ford Carpet  Co.,  51  Conn.  524  ;  Couch 
v.  Watson  Coal  Co.,  46  Iowa,  17; 
Hudson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  59  Id. 
581  ;  Cramer  v.  Burlington,  45  Id.  627; 


Hodges  v.  Percival,  132  111.  53  ;  23  N. 
E.  423  [defendant  supplied  elevator 
with  an  air-cushion,  to  prevent  in- 
jury from  similar  falls];  Terre  Haute, 
etc,  R.  Co.  v.  Clem,  1,3  Ind.  15  ;  23  N. 
E.  965  ;  Anderson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co. ,  87  Wise.  195 ;  58  N. W.  79  [reduc- 
ing rate  of  speed]  ;  Heucke  v.  Mil- 
waukee R.  Co.,  69  Wise.  401  ;  34  N. 
W.  243  ;  Kuhns  v.  Wisconsin,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  76 Iowa,  67;  40 N.W.  92;  Day 
v.  Akeley  Lumber  Co.,  54  Minn.  522; 
56  N.  W.  243  [repairing  saw-dust 
burner,  after  fire  caused  by  emission 
of  sparks]  ;  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Gowan,  73  Tex.  355  ;  US.  W.  336 
[subsequently  enlarging  culvert]  ; 
Holt  v.  Spokane,  etc.  R.  Co., 
Idaho,  ;  35  Pac.  39  [filling  up  a  well, 
after  child  had  fallen  in  it]  ;  Denver, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Morton,  3  Colo.  App. 
155  ;  32  Pac.  315  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Weaver,  35  Kans.  412  ;  11  Pac. 
408  [increasing  capacity  of  water- 
way] ;  but  compare  Atchison,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  McKee,  37  Kans.  592  ;  15 
Pac.  484  [subsequent  repair  of  ma- 
chine]. It  is  also  the  law  in  England 
(Hart  v.  Lancashire,  etc.  R.  Co.,  21 
Law  Times,  N.  S.,  261).  The  rule  is 
otherwise  in  Pennsylvania  (Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.  v.  Henderson,  51  Pa.  St. 
315  ;  McKee  v.  Bidwell,  74  Id.  218 
[defendant,  after  accident,  placed  a 
light  at  the  opening  of  cellar]  ) .  It  is 
not  an  infringement  of  this  rule  to 


85 


EVIDENCE. 


|_£6oc 


merits  might  be  taken  from  excessive  precaution;  and  the 
effect  of  admitting  such  testimony  would  obviously  be  to  dis- 
courage improvement  and  punish  careful  and  considerate  per- 
sons. Evidence  of  such  repairs  having  been  made  under  the 
order,  or  even  the  request,  of  a  public  authority,  is  admissible, 
as  a  practical  concession  that  they  ought  to  have  been  made 
before.4 


admit  proof  that,  after  the  breaking 
of  an  appliance,  a  substitute  theref  or 
which  was  on  hand  at  the  time  of 
the  accident  and  could  have  then 
been  used,  was  in  fact  thereafter 
used  for  successfully  working  the 
appliance  (Miller  v.  Ocean  Steam- 
ship Co.,  118  N.  Y.  199  ;  2d  N.  E.  462  ; 
Merrigan  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  154 
Mass.  189  ;  28  N.  E.  149  [railroad 
gates] ;  See  Daniels  v.  Staten  Is.  etc. 


R.    Co.,    125  N.  Y.  407;     26   N.  E. 
466). 

4  This  is  extremely  well  put  by 
Mitchell.  J.  in  Morse  v.  Minneapolis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  30  Minn.  465 ;  16  N.  W. 
358.  But  the  mere  fact  of  such  an 
ordinance  having  been  passed  and 
notice  thereof  given  to  the  defendant 
is  incompetent  (West  Jersey  R.  Co. 
v.  Paulding,  58  N.  J.  Law,  178;  33 
Atl.  381). 


CHAPTER  VI. 
CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


§  61.  General  rule.  §  83. 

62.  Contributory  negligence  under 

statutory  claims.  84. 

63.  Reason  of  rule. 

64.  When  no  defense.  85. 

65.  Fault  must  be  that  of  injured 

party  or  his  agent.  86. 

66.  Doctrine  of  "identification.*7 
66a.  Stranger's   contributory  fault 

no  excuse  for  plaintiff's.  87. 

67.  Husband  and  wife.  88. 

68.  Knowledge  of  principal,  when       89. 

imputed  to  agent. 

69.  Knowledge    of     agent,    when       90. 

imputed  to  principal.  91. 

70.  Contributory  negligence  of  chil- 

dren. 92. 

71.  Negligence      of     parents,      in 

parent's  action.  93. 

72.  Parent    must    be   actually   in 

fault.  94. 

73.  Degree  of  care  required  from 

child.  95. 

73a.  Age  of  discretion. 

74.  Imputation  of   parent's  negli-       96. 

gence  ;  New  York  rule. 

75.  New  York  rule  criticised.  97. 

76.  Imputed    negligence ;    Illinois       98. 

rule.  99. 

77.  Identification  of  child  and  cus- 

todian. 100. 

78.  True   rule;   no  imputation    of     101. 

parental  negligence.  102. 

79.  No  imputed  negligence,  if  child      103. 

careful. 

80.  Imputed     negligence ;    limita-      104. 

tions  of  rule.  105. 

81.  Imputed    negligence ;    parent 

must  be  acting  as  such.  106. 

82.  Imputed    negligence :    parent 

must  be  negligent  in  fact.  107. 

T86J 


Imputed    negligence ;    age    of 

child. 
Imputed  negligence;  lunatics, 

etc. 
Plaintiff  not  prejudiced  unless 

actually  in  fault. 
Plaintiff    not     prejudiced    by 

want  of  more  than  ordinary 

care. 
Ordinary  care  defined. 
Care  required  of  infirm,  etc. 
Effect  of    mistaken  judgment 

under  sudden  alarm. 
Duty  of  looking  and  listening. 
Effect  of  defendant's  advice  or 

invitation. 
Plaintiff  not  bound  to  antici- 
pate negligence. 
Plaintiff's  fault  must  contribute 

to  injury. 
Plaintiff's    fault    must    proxi- 
mately contribute  to  injury. 
Negligence  increasing  damages 

only,  no  bar. 
Plaintiff's    fault  need  not    be 

cause  of  injury. 
Effect  of  technical  trespass. 
Technical  trespass,  no  bar. 
Defendant's  later    negligence; 

rule  in  Davies  v.  Mann. 
Illustrations  of  rule. 
Plaintiff  last  in  fault. 
Comparative  negligence. 
Rule  in    Georgia,  Florida  and 

Tennessee. 
Plaintiff's  violation  of  statute. 
Plaintiff's  fault  in  representa- 
tive capacity. 
Burden   of    proof  :    conflict  of 

decisions. 
Burden  of  proof  on   plaintiff. 


87 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§6i 


§108.  Burden  of  proof  on  defendant.  §111.  What  proof  of  care  sufficient. 

109.  Burden  ought  to  be  on  defend-  112.  Inference  from  circumstances. 

ant.  113.  Pleading:  absence  of  fault. 

110.  Presumption     against     negli-  114.  Questions  of  fact  and  law. 

gence  :  how  over-balanced. 

§6l.  General  rule. —  One  who,  through  the  mere  negli- 
gence of  another,1  suffers  an  injury  which  would  not  have 
happened,3  but    for    his    own    or   his    agent's3   wrongful    act4 


1  This  rule  applies  only  to  cases  of 
mere  negligence  (Sanford  v.  Eighth 
Ave.  R.  Co..  23  N.  Y.  343,  and  other 
cases  cited  under  §  64,  post). 

■  Wilds  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  24 
N.  Y.  -13  )  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Jones,  95 
U.  S.  439  :  Woods  v.  Jones,  34  La. 
Ann.  10S0  ;  Murphy  v.  Deane,  101 
Mass.  455;  Hickey  v.  Boston,  etc.  R. 
Co. ,  14  Allen,  429 ;  Thomas  v.  Ken- 
yon,  1  Daly,  132  ;  Tuff  v.  Warman,  5 

C.  B.  N.  S.  573  ;  affirming  s.  c,  2  Id. 
740 ;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  24  N. 
J.  Law,  824 ;  Runyon  v.  Central  R. 
Co.,  25  Id.  556;  Moore  v.  Central  R. 
Co..  24  Id.  268  ;  Teller  v.  Northern, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  30  Id.  188  ;  Pennsylvania, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Langdon,  92  Pa.  St.  21; 
Northern  Central  R.  Co.  v.  State,  31 
Md.  357  ;  Paducah,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hoehl,  12  Bush,  41  ;  Covington  v. 
Bryant,  7  Id.  248  ;  Kentucky,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Thomas,  79  Ky.  160;  Hous- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Clemmons,  55 
Tex.  88 ;  Colorado,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Holmes.  5  Colo.  197.  It  is  not  neces- 
sary that  the  plaintiff's  negligence 
should  have  amounted  to  more  than 
a  careless  exposure  of  his  person  or 
property  to  the  risk  of  injury.  See 
Hughes  v.  Muscatine,  44  Iowa,  672  ; 
Trousclair  v.  Pacific  Coast  S.  S.  Co., 
80  Cal.  521;  22Pac,  258.  This  will 
appear  from  the  great  majority  of 
cases  hereafter  cited. 

3  See  §§  65-86,  post . 
*  Terry  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  22 
Barb.   574  ;  Roulston   v.  Clark,  3  E. 

D.  Smith,  366.  Therefore,  where  the 
plaintiff  rode  upon  defendants'  loco- 


motive, with  notice  that  it  was  con- 
trary to  defendants'  orders  to  the 
engineer,  he  cannot  recover  for  in- 
juries received  through  the  defend- 
ants' negligence,  while  on  the  loco- 
motive (Robertson  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R. 
Co.,  22  Barb.  91).  This  rule  was  ap- 
plied in  Waterbury  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
etc.  R.  Co.  (21  Blatchf.  314),  and 
Austin  v.  Great  Western,  etc.  R.  Co. 
(L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  442) .  Compare  Carter 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  98  Ind.  552. 
So  a  conductor  of  a  train,  having 
control  of  its  speed,  who  suffers  it  to 
run  at  a  rate  of  speed  above  that 
allowed  by  the  rules  of  the  company, 
or  is  careless  in  "the  make  up"  of 
the  train,  and  runs  backward,  is 
guilty  of  such  contributory  negli- 
gence as  will  prevent  his  recovering 
for  a  resulting  injury  (St.  Louis,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Morgart,  45  Ark.  318; 
Sutherland  v.  Troy,  etc.  R  Co.,  125 
N.  Y.  737  ;  26  N.  E.  609  [killing  of 
locomotive  engineer  by  collision 
would  not  have  occurred  but  for  his 
running  train  contrary  to  company's 
rules]).  So  a  passenger  who  jumps 
from  a  moving  train,  against  the  re- 
monstrance of  the  train-men  (Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.  v.  Aspell,  23  Pa. 
St.  147  ;  Jewell  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  54  Wise.  610  ;  Burrows  v.  Erie 
R.  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  556);  or  rides  in  a 
baggage  car,  contrary  to  the  rules 
of  the  company  (Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.  v.  Langdon,  92  Pa.  St.  21  ;  Ken- 
tucky Central  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  79 
Ky.  160  ;  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Clemmons,   55  Tex.   88),  even  with 


§6lJ                          CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  88 

or  want  of  ordinary  care5  proximately  contributing  thereto,6 

the  consent  of  the  conductor  (Penn-  way,  without  light];  Runyonv.  Cen- 
sylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Langdon,  supra),  tral  R.  Co., 25 N.  J.  Law,  556  ;  Graham 
or  upon  a  freight  train  (Houston,  etc.  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  139  Pa.  St.  149  ; 
R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  49  Tex.  31  ;  Eaton  21  Atl.  151  ;  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gul- 
v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  lett,  15  Ind.  487  ;  Evansville,  etc.  R. 
382  ;  Sherman  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lowdermilk,  Id.  120  ;  McGrath 
Co.,  72  Mo.  62),  or  on  hand-cars,  in  v.  Bloomer,  73  Wise.  29;  40  N.  W. 
violation  of  the  company's  rules  585 ;  Cummins  v.  Syracuse,  100  N. 
(Hoar  v.  Maine  Central  R.  Co.,  70  Y.  637,  rev'g  29  Hun,  144  [walking 
Me.  65  ;  McQueen  v.  Central  Branch  needlessly  in  darkness,  in  dangerous 
R.  Co.,  30Kans.  689  ;  Pool  v.  Chicago,  place];  Countryman  v.  East  Tennes- 
etc.  R.  Co.,  53  Wise.  657),  is  willfully  see,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89  Ga.  835;  16  S.  E. 
negligent.  As  to  riding  on  the  roof  84  [railway  servant  did  not  carry 
of  a  freight-car,  see  Indianapolis,  etc.  lamp,  in  crossing  yard  at  night] ;  Ft. 
R.  Co.  v.  Horst  (93  U.  S.  291).  If  a  Worth,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mackney,  83 
passenger  is  received  on  a  freight  Tex.  410 ;  18  S.  W.  949  [fireman  on 
train,  though  against  the  rule  of  the  one  of  two  colliding  trains  failed  to 
company,  and  pays  his  fare,  the  rela-  keep  a  lookout];  O'Donnell  v.  Patton, 
tion  of  carrier  and  passenger  is  117  Mo.  13  ;  22  S.  W.  903  [plaintiff 
established,  and  he  may  recover  undermined  a  pile  of  shavings  which 
(Edgerton  v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R.  Co.,  he  was  hauling  away].  See  cases 
39  N.  Y.  227  ;  Creed  v.  Pennsylvania,  cited  under  §  87  et  seq.  post. 
etc.  R.  Co.,  86  Pa.  St.  139  ;  Ryan  v.  6  To  make  it  a  defense,  the  plain- 
Cumberland  Iron  Co.,  23  Id.  384;  tiff's  fault  must  be  a  proximate  cause 
O'Donnell  v.  Allegheny  Valley  R.  of  his  injury  (Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  v. 
Co.,  59  Id.  239;  Dunn  v.  Grand  Ives,  144 U.  S.  408  ;  12  S.  Ct.  679  ;  Plant 
Trunk  R.  Co.,  58  Maine,  187  ;  Murch  Inv.  Co.  v.  Cook,  20  C.  C.  A.  625;  74 
v.  Concord  R.  Co.,  29  N.  H.  9  ;  Gill-  Fed.  503).  "Contribute"  is  the  word 
shannon  v.  Stoney  Brook  R.  Co.,  10  used  in  most  of  the  decisions.  See 
Cush.  228  ;  Lawrenceburg,  etc.  R.  Wilds  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co. ,  24  N. 
Co.  v.  Montgomery,  7  Ind.  476  ;  Y.  430;  Johnson  v.  Hudson  River  R. 
Arnold  v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.,  83  111.  Co.,  20  Id.  65,  73;  Button  v.  Hudson 
273  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hazzard,  River  R.  Co.,  18  Id.  248;  Munger  v. 
26  Id.  375  ;  Lucas  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  Tonawanda  R.  Co., 4 Id.  349;  NewHa- 
R.  Co.,  33  Wise.  41;  Sheerman  v.  ven  Steamboat  Co.  v.  Vanderbilt,  16 
Toronto,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  34  Upper  Can-  Conn.  420  ;  Knowles  v.  Crampton,  55 
ada,  Q.  B.,  451  ;  Graham  v.  Toronto,  Id.  336  ;  11  Atl.  593;  Winship  v.  En- 
etc.  R.  Co.,  23  Id.  C.  P.  541).  For  field,  42  N.  H.  197;  Norris  v.  Litch- 
further  illustrations  of  passengers'  field,  35  Id.  271;  Briggs  v.  Guilford, 
contributory  negligence,  see  §  519  8  Vt.  264  ;  Drake  v.  Mount,  33  N.  J. 
post.  Law,  441;  Drake  v.  Philadelphia,  etc. 
5  Wilds  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  24  R.  Co.,  51  Pa.  St.  240;  Connor  v. 
N.  Y.  430  [looking  and  listening,  at  Electric  Tr.  Co..  173  Id.  602;  34  Atl. 
railway  crossing]:  Johnson  v.  Hud-  238;  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Terry, 
son  River  R.  Co.,  20  Id.  65;  Button  8  Ohio  St.  570;  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  18  Id.  248;  Gullett,  15  Ind.  487  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R. 
Gl^ason  v.  Boehm,  58  N.  J.  Law.  475;  Co.  v.  Goddard,  25  Id.  185  ;  Ohio,  etc. 
34  Atl  883  [descending  strange  stair-  R.  Co.  v.   Hecht,  115  Id.   443  ;  17  N. 


89 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


[§6i 


cannot       recover       at       common       law7      any       compensa- 


E.    297 ;  Dougherty    v.    Missouri   R. 
Co.,  97  Mo.  647  ;  11  S.  W.   251  ;  Cal- 
lahan v.  Warne,   40  Mo.  131  ;  Michi- 
gan,   etc.    R.     Co.     v.     Leahey,    10 
Mich.      193  ;     Griggs     v.     Flecken- 
stein,   14  Minn.  1  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Chambers,  15  C.  C.  A.  327 ;  68 
Fed.  148 ;  Witherley  v.  Regent's  Ca- 
nal Co.,  12  C.  B.  N.  S.  2  ;   Dovvell  v. 
Gen.  Steam  Nav.  Co.,  5  El.  &  B.  195; 
Ellis  v.  Southwestern  R.Co.  ,2  Hurlst. 
&  N.  424.     Sometimes  the  language 
used  is,  that  the  plaintiff  cannot  re- 
cover if  his  own  negligence  concurred 
(Hance   v.  Cayuga,  etc.  R.  Co.,  26 
N.  Y.  428  ;  Button  v.  Hudson  River 
R.  Co.,    18  Id.   248;  Cook  v.  Cham- 
plain,  etc.  R.  Co.,  1  Denio,  91  ;   Heil 
v.  Glanding,  42  Pa.  St.  493  ;  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.  v.  Aspell,  23  Id.   147  ; 
Woods  v.  Jones,  34  La.  Ann.  1086), 
or  co-operated  in  producing  the  in- 
jury (Terry  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
22   Barb.  574 ;    Timmons  v.  Central 
Ohio  R.  Co.,  6  Ohio  St.   105  ;  Ker- 
whacker  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  3 
Id.  172).  "It  is  not  the  contributing 
act,  but  contributory  negligence,  that 
defeats      recovery  "     (Guichard    v. 
New,   84  Hun,  54  ;  31  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1080).    See  Schmidt  v.  Cook,  30  Abb. 
N.  C.  285.     In  other  cases,  it  is  said 
simply    that  the  plaintiff    must   be 
without  fault  (Spencer  v.  Utica,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  5  Barb.  337  ;  Brown  v.  Max- 
well, 6  Hill,  592),  or  that,  as  between 
the  parties,  the  injury  must  be  caused 
solely  by  the  defendant's  fault  (Grip- 
pen  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  40  N.Y. 
34;  Bigelow   v.  Reed,  51    Me.    325), 
or  that  he  cannot  recover  if  the  in- 
jury  is  the  result  of   the   want  of 
ordinary  care  on  the  part  of  both 
parties     (Reeves  v.     Delaware,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  454  ;  Williams  v. 
Michigan  Central   R.    Co.,    2   Mich. 
259 ;  Duggins   v.    Watson,   15    Ark. 
118),  or  that  the  plaintiff  cannot  re- 


cover, if  by  the  use  of  ordinary  care 
he  might  have  avoided  the  injury 
(Beers  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  19 
Conn.  566  ;  Beatty  v.  Gilmore,  16 
Pa.  St.  463 ;  Runyon  v.  Central  R. 
Co.,  25  N.  J.  Law,  556  ;  Hassa  v. 
Junger,  15  Wise.  662  ;  Central  R.  Co. 
v.  Lanier,  83  Ga.  587  ;  10  S.  W.  27! ). 
In  Scotland  the  same  principle  has 
been  expressed  in  various  forms 
(M'Naughton  v.  Caledonian  R.  Co.,  21 
Dunlop,  160  ;  Davidson  v.  Monkland 
R.  Co.,  17  Dunlop,  1038;  O'Neile  v. 
Neilson,  20  Dunlop,  427) .  These  va- 
riations of  language  are  of  no  prac- 
tical importance,  as  it  will  be  found 
that  the  meaning  of  the  court  was 
substantially  the  same  in  each  case, 
and  the  decisions  all  stand  on  one 
principle,  which  is,  however,  best 
expressed  in  the  word  "  contribut- 
ing," though  it  has  been  criticised 
as  "much  too  loose,"  and  as  "  a  very 
unsafe  word"  (Crompton,  J., Tuff  v. 
Warman,  5  C.  B.  N.  S.  573,  584). 
Undoubtedly  it  is  a  word  which 
should  not  be  used  in  charging 
a  jury,  without  explanation.  As 
qualified  in  the  text,  we  believe  it  to 
be  entirely  proper  and  intelligible. 
7  In  admiralty,  the  loss  is  equitably 
apportioned,  according  to  the  degree 
of  negligence  on  each  side  (The 
Clara,  102  U.  S.  203  ;  The  Max  Mor- 
ris v.  Curry,  137  Id.  1;  11  S.  Ct.  29; 
alfi'g  28  Fed.  881  ;  The  Morning 
Light,  2  Wall.  550  ;  The  Baltimore,  8 
Id.  377  ;  The  Continental,  14  Id.  345; 
dishing  v.  The  Fraser.  21  How.  U. 
S.  184  ;  Rogers  v.  The  St.  Charles,  19 
Id.  108  ;  The  Catharine  v.  Dickinson, 
17  Id.  170  ;  Vaux  v.  Sheffer,  8  Moore, 
P.  C.  75).  But  in  a  court  of  com- 
mon-law, the  same  rule  is  applied  to 
cases  of  maritime  collisions  as  to  any 
other  (Arctic  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin,  69 
N.  Y.  470  ;  Dowell  v.  General  Steam 
Nav.  Co.,  5  El.  &  Bl.  195  ;  Gen.  Steam 


§  62  I 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


GO 


tion8  for  such  injury,  unless  its  more  proximate  cause  is  the 
omission  of  the  other  party,  after  having  notice  of  the  danger9 
to  use  due  care  to  prevent  injury.10  This  rule  applies  to  all 
cases  of  mere  negligence,  no  matter  how  gross  it  may  be.11 

§  62.  Contributory  negligence  under  statutory  claims  — 

The  rule  forbidding  a  recovery  for  negligence  where  a  plaintiff 
has  contributed  to  the  injury  by  his  own  fault,  is  generally  held 


Nav.  Co.  v.  Mann,  14  C.  B.  127 ; 
Wright  v.  Brown,  4  Ired.  N.  C.  Law, 
95  ;  Union  S.  S.  Co.  v.  New  York, 
etc.  S.  S.  Co.,  24  How.  U.  S.  307  ; 
The  Farmer  v.  McCraw,  26  Ala.  189  ; 
Broadwell  v.  Swigert,  7B.  Mon.  39). 
The  common-law  rule  has  been 
altered  by  statute  in  some  states,  as 
in  Kentucky,  Tennessee  and  Geor- 
gia, where  the  admiralty  rule  is 
adopted  in  some  cases.  See  Miller  v. 
Smythe,  95  Ga.  288 ;  22  S.  E.  532 ; 
Western,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Roberson,  9C. 
C.  A.  640 ;  61  Fed.  592  ;  Knoxville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  AcufT,  92  Tenn. 
36  ;  20  S.  W.  318  ;  Byrne  v.  Kansas 
City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  9  C.  C.  A.  666;  61 
Fed.  605. 

8  In  the  absence  of  special  statutes 
(such  as  those  of  Kentucky,  Tennes- 
see and  Georgia) ,  it  is  a  complete  bar 
to  any  claim,  as  all  the  cases  show, 
unless  it  only  served  to  increase  the 
damage,  and  not  to  produce  the  in- 
jury (Stebbins  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co., 
54  Vt.  464;  Hunt  v.  Lowell  Gas 
Co.,  1  Allen,  343;  Sherman  v.  Fall 
River  Iron  Co.,  2  Id.  524 ;  Hibbard  v. 
Thompson,  109  Mass.  286  ;  Chase  v. 
N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  24  Barb.  273  ; 
Gould  v.  McKenna,  86  Pa.  St.  297  ; 
Wright  v.  Illinois,  etc.  Tel.  Co.,  20 
Iowa,  195  ;  Matthews  v.  Warner,  29 
Gratt.  570  ;  Secord  v.  St.  Paul,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  5  McCrary,  515 ;  Fay  v. 
Parker,  53  N.  H.  342  ;  Lawrence  v. 
Housatonic  R.  Co.,  29  Conn.  390; 
Borschart  v.  Tuttle,  59  Id.  1  ;  21  Atl. 
929  ;  and  cases  cited  under  §  62,pos£)- 


A  party  was  not  bound  to  take  legal 
measures  to  restrain  the  continuance 
of  reckless  blasting  on  adjoining 
property  before  he  sustained  as  much 
damage  as  he  did  (Berg  v.  Parsons, 
84  Hun,  60  ;  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  1091). 
The  English  rule  is,  that  the  defend- 
ant is  liable,  if  at  all,  for  the  whole 
damage  (Greenland  v.  Chaplin,  5 
Exch.  243),  except  where  the  effect 
of  the  plaintiff's  negligence  is  plainly 
separable  from  that  of  the  defend- 
ant (Nitro-Phosphate,  etc.  Co.  v. 
London,  etc.  Docks,  L.  E.  9  Ch.  Div. 
503). 

9  See  §  99,  post ;  Barker  v.  Savage, 
45  N.  Y.  191  ;  Brown  v.  Lynn,  31 
Pa.  St.  510  ;  Northern,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Price,  29  Md.  420  ;  Lock  v.  First  Div. 
etc.  R.  Co.,  15  Minn.  350;  Nelson  v. 
Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  68  Mo.  593; 
Scoville  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  81 
Id.  434 ;  Zimmerman  v.  Hannibal, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  71  Id.  476  ;  Price  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  72  Id.  414  ;  Parker 
v.  Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co.,  83  Ga.  539; 
10  S.  E.  233  ;  Factors',  etc.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Werlein,  42  La.  Ann.  1046  ;  8  So.  435. 

,0Davies  v.  Mann,  10  Mees.  &  W. 
546.  In  that  case,  the  plaintiff  hav- 
ing fettered  the  forelegs  of  his 
donkey,  turned  him  out  on  the  high- 
way to  graze.  The  defendant,  driv- 
ing recklessly,  ran  over  the  donkey. 
The  plaintiff  having  obtained  a  ver- 
dict, a  rule  for  a  new  trial  was  re- 
fused. See  §  99,  post,  for  a  larger 
discussion  of  this  doctrine. 

11  See  £  64,  post. 


9' 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§62 


applicable  to  causes  of  action  given  by  statute.1  Under  a 
statute  giving  a  right  of  action  for  all  damages  sustained  or 
injury  suffered  "  by  reason  "  or  "inconsequence"  of  neglect 
to  do  some  act,  the  ordinary  rule  as  to  contributory  negligence 
is  not  excluded  from  the  operation  of  the  statute.  In  such 
case,  the  practical  construction  given  to  the  statute  is  that  the 
injury  is  not  suffered  by  reason  or  in  consequence  of  the  de- 
fendant's neglect,  but  rather  in  consequence  of  the  plaintiff's 
want  of  ordinary  care  to  avoid  exposure  to  the  injur}-.  Thus, 
where  a  statute  requires  railroad  companies  to  ring  bells  when 
approaching  a  highway  crossing,  or  keep  a  flagman  stationed 
there,  or  use  other  means  to  warn  travelers,  and  making  them 
liable  to  another  person  who  suffers  injury  by  reason  of  their 
omission  to  use  such  means,  contributory  negligence  is  a  good 
defense.2     But  where  a  statute  gives  an  absolute  right  of  action 


1  In  Caswell  v.  Worth  (5  El,  &  B. 
849).  it  was  claimed  that  one  who 
suffered  injury  from  an  omission 
to  fence  machinery,  as  required  by 
statute,  could  not  be  prejudiced  by 
his  contributory  negligence.  But 
the  court  held  otherwise,  s.  p.,  Rey- 
nolds v.  Hindman,  32  Iowa,  146 ; 
Curry  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  43 
Wise.  665,  and  cases  infra.  See, 
however,  remarks  of  Pigott,  B.,  in 
Britton  v.  Gt.  West.  Cotton  Co.,  L. 
R.7  Exch.  130,  139. 

2  Where  the  statute  does  not  other- 
wise provide,  the  rule  requiring  the 
plaintiff  to  show  that  at  the  time  of 
the  injury  he  was  in  the  exercise  of 
due  care  governs.  (Thompson  v. 
Bridgewater,  7  Pick.  187  ;  Munn  v. 
Reed,  4  Allen,  431  ;  Plumley  v.  Birge, 
124  Mass.  57  ;  Taylor  v.  Carew  Manfg. 
Co.,  143  Id.  470  ;  10  N.  E.  308  ;  Passa- 
maneck  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  98 
Ky.  195;  32  S.  \V.  620).  s.  p.,  Pakalin- 
sky  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  82  N.  Y. 
424;  McGrath  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  62  Id.  522  ;  Stevens  v.  Oswego, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  18  Id.  422;  Field  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  14  Fed.  332; 
Telfer   v.  Northern,   etc.  R.  Co. ,  30 


N.  J.  Law,  188  ;  Reeves  v.  Dubuque, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  92  Iowa,  :)2  ;  60  N.  W. 
243  ;  Purl  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  72 
Mo.  168  ;  Hohnan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  62  Id.  562;  Payne  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  129  Id.  405  ;  31  S.  W.  885  : 
Pzolla  v.  Michigan  Central  R.  Co., 
54  Mich.  273  ;  Memphis  v.  Copeland, 
61  Ala.  376  ;  Peoria,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Siltman,  88  111.  529  ;  Ransom  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62  Wise.  178; 
22  N.  W.  147.  The  failure  of  a  rail- 
way company  to  maintain  sign- 
boards at  crossings,  as  required  by 
statute,  is  not  negligence  as  to  persons 
who  in  fact  know  of  the  existence 
and  location  of  the  crossing  (Haas  v. 
Grand  Rapids,  etc.  R.  Co.,  47  Mich. 
401;  Shaber  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.. 
28  Minn.  103  ;  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Howard,  124  Ind.  280  ;  24  N.  E. 
892 ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  v.  Stoui- 
mel,  126  Ind.  35  ;  25  N.  E.  863  ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crisman,  19 
Colo.  30 ;  34  Pac.  286 ;  Laney  v. 
Chesterfield  County,  29  S.  C.  140  ;  7 
S.  E.  56  [action  under  Gen.  St.  ^ 
1087,  against  county  for  injuries  from 
defective  highway]).  Mr.  Beach  has 
collected  a  great  number  of  cases  in 


*  62] 


O  >NTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


for  injuries  suffered,  where  certain  precautions  are  not  taken, 
without  qualifying  the  liability,  so  as  to  confine  it  to  injuries 
suffered  "by  reason"  or  ''inconsequence"  of  such  neglect, 
this  rule  does  not  apply,  and  contributory  negligence  is  no 
defense.  Thus,  where  a  statute  requires  railroad  companies  to 
fence  their  roads,  and  declares  that,  if  they  omit  to  do  so,  they 
shall  be  liable  to  the  owners  of  all  cattle  which  may  be  injured 
by  trains  running  on  such  unfenced  roads,  contributory  negli- 
gence is  (generally  speaking)  no  defense.3 


support  of  the  general  proposition 
that  a  plaintiff,  guilty  of  contribu- 
tory negligence,  cannot  recover  on 
the  ground  that  the  defendant's 
negligence  is  a  violation  of  some 
statutory  obligation  (Contrib.  Neg. 
2d  ed.  §  49). 

3  Shepard  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co., 
35  N.  Y.  641  ;  Corwin  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie 
R.  Co.,  13  Id.  42  ;  Jeffersonville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Ross,  37  Ind.  545  ;  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitesell,  68  Id.  297; 
Lloyd  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  128  Mo. 
595  ;  29  S.  W.  153.  In  Flint,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Lull  (28  Mich.  510),Cooley,  J., 
said :  "  If  contributory  negligence 
could  constitute  a  defense,  the  pur- 
pose of  the  statute  might  be  in  a 
great  measure,  if  not  wholly,  de- 
feated ;  for  the  mere  neglect  of  the 
railway  company  to  observe  the  di- 
rections of  the  statute  would  render 
it  unsafe  for  the  owner  of  beasts  to 
suffer  them  to  be  at  large,  or  even  on 
his  grounds,  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
road,  so  that  if  he  did  what,  but  for 
the  neglect  of  the  company,  it 
would  be  entirely  safe  and  proper  for 
him  to  do,  the  very  neglect  of  the 
company  would  constitute  its  pro- 
tection, since  the  neglect  alone 
rendered  the  conduct  of  the  plaintiff 
negligent.''  So  held  under  Tennessee 
Code  (§1167)  declaring  company's  lia- 
bility for  all  damages  resulting  from 
failure  to  keep  a  lookout  on  locomo- 
tives (Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Now- 
lin,    1    Lea,  523 ;    Railroad    Co.    v. 


Walker,  11  Heisk,383  ;  Nashville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  6  Id.  347  ;  Chesa- 
peake, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Foster,  88  Tenn. 
671  ;  13  S.  W.  694).  So,  under  a  simi- 
lar statute  in  Georgia  (Macon,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  27  Ga.  113  ;  Winn 
Case,  26  Id.  250  ;  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Ayres,  53  Id.  12).  So,  in  New 
York,  in  an  action  for  death  by 
"wrongful  act,"  under  Co.  Civ.  Pro. 
§  1902  (Kain  v.  Larkin,  56  Hun  79  ; 
9  N.  Y.  Supp.  89  [decedent  shot  by 
defendant]).  So,  in  Kentucky,  under 
a  statute  (Gen.  Stat.  ch.  57,  §  3)  pro- 
viding for  the  recovery  of  punitive 
damages  in  certain  cases  where  death 
results  from  defendant's  "  willful 
negligence  "  (Jones  v.  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,82Ky.  610).  See  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  Co.  v.  Dick,  91  Ky.  434  ;  15  S.  W. 
665  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Coniff 
(Ky.)  27  S.  W.  865  ;  Chesapeake,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  YTost  (Ky.),  29  S.  W7.  326. 
So,  under  Illinois  statute  giving  a 
right  of  action  for  injuries  occasioned 
by  willful  neglect  to  fence  coal  mine 
shafts  (Catlett  v.  Young,  143  111.  74 ; 
32  N.  E.  447).  So,  under  Wisconsin 
statute  requiring  railroads  to  fence 
their  right  of  way  (Quackenbush  v. 
Wisconsin,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71  Wise.  472; 
37  N.  W.  834).  So,  under  Tennes- 
see statute,  forbidding  employ- 
ment of  boys  in  mines  (Queen 
v.  Dayton  Coal  Co.,  95  Tenn.  458; 
32  S.  W.  460).  In  Rowell  v.  Rail- 
road Co.  (57  N.  H.  132).  under  a  statute 
giving  railway  companies  an  insur- 


93  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  63 

§  63.  Reason  of  rule. —  The  reason  of  the  rule  which  denies 
relief  to  an  injured  party  who  has  contributed  to  the  injury 
by  his  own  fault  has  been  variously  stated.  Perhaps  the 
majority  of  opinions  are  in  favor  of  basing  it  upon  the  other  rule, 
confining  liability  to  the  party  who  is  the  proximate  cause  of  an 
injury;1  and  it  is  said  that,  where  the  plaintiff's  negligence  has 
contributed  to  his  injury,  his  act  is  the  proximate  cause  thereof 
and  not  the  act  of  the  defendant.  But  there  are  innumerable 
cases  in  which  contributory  negligence  has  been  held  to  bar 
a  recovery,  where  such  negligence  was  certainly  no  more  a 
proximate  cause  of  the  injury  than  the  negligence  of  the  de- 
fendant, if  even  as  much  so.  It  has,  therefore,  been  asserted 
that  the  reason  of  the  rule  is  that  the  defendant  is  not  liable 
for  an  injury  of  which  his  negligence  was  not  the  sole  cause.2 
But  this  is  plainly  not  true,  since  the  concurring  negligence  of 
a  stranger  is  no  defense;3  and,  even  allowing  for  that  error  in 
the  definition,  it  still  remains  incorrect,  unless  the  rule  lying 
at  the  foundation  of  the  famous  case  of  Davies  v.  Mann,4  now 
recognized  by  every  court,  both  in  England  and  America,  with 
one  or  two  exceptions,  is  to  be  ignored.  The  fact  that  courts  of 
admiralty  have  always  ordered  compensation  in  cases  of  con- 
tributory negligence,  apportioning  the  damages  as  they  deemed 
to  be  j  ust  under  the  circumstances,  and  that  this  course  has  been 
universally  acquiesced  in  and  has  given  general  satisfaction, 
affords  strong  proof  that  the  stern  rule  of  common  law  is  not 
founded  upon  any  immutable  principle,  but  is  simply  the  re- 
sult of  judicial  unwillingness  to  trust  juries  to  apportion 
damages  between  parties  in  fault :  a  task  for  which  very  few 
juries  are  competent.  We  think  that  the  Supreme  Court  of 
California  has  stated  the  exact  truth  in  holding  that  the  reason 

able  interest  in  the  property  along  cending   shaft;    Coal    Miners'  Act, 

the  line  of  their  road,  the  plaintiff's  1872]. 

contributory  negligence  was  held  no  !  Wharton,  Negligence,  §  300. 

defense  to  an  action  for  the  negli-  ■  Grippen  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 

gent  communication  of  fire.     Under  40  N.  Y.  34.     See  Philadelphia,    etc. 

a    similar    statute     in    Missouri,  no  Co.  v.    Boyer,    97  Pa.    St.  91  ;  New 

negligence  short    of  fraud   will  bar  Jersey    Express  Co.    v.   Nichols,    33 

plaintiff's  right  to  recover  (Matthews  N.  J.  Law,   434  ;  Toledo,  etc.   Co.  v. 

v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  121  Mo.  298;  Goddard,25Ind.  185  -,  Mississippi,  etc. 

24  S.  W.  591).  See  Baddeley  v.  Gran-  R.  Co.  v.  Mason,  51  Miss.  234. 

ville,  19  Q.  B.  Div.  423    [absence  of  8  See  §  66,  post. 

banksman,    while     miner    was    as-  4 10  Mees.  &  W.,  546.  See  §99,  post 


§64] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


94 


of  the  rule  is  simply  the  impossibility  in  most  cases  of 
equitably  apportioning  the  damages  between  the  parties  in  a 
common-law  action,5  and  that,  where  this  impossibility  does 
not  exist,  the  rule  itself  does  not  apply.6 

§  64.  When  no  defense.  —  The  rule  excluding  a  re- 
covery in  cases  of  contributory  negligence  is  of  course 
only  applicable  to  actions  founded  upon  negligence.  It 
is  universally  conceded  that  the  greatest  contributory  fault, 
including  a  willful  trespass,  is  no  defense  in  an  action 
for  willful  injuries.1  Thus  a  trespasser  upon  a  railroad 
train,   or  street  car,  who  is  pushed  off,2  or  forced,3  or  fright- 


6  Needham  v.  San  Francisco,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  37  Cal.  409.  See,  also,  to 
similar  effect,  Simpson  v.  Hand,  6 
Whart  311  ;  Heil  v.  Glandin  42  Pa. 
St.  493,  499  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Norton, 
24  Id.  469  ;  Kerwhacker  v.  Cleveland, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  3  Ohio  St.  172. 

6  Needham  v.  San  Francisco,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  37 Cal.  409. 

'  Sanford  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co., 
23  N.  Y.  343;  Kain  v.  Larkin,  56 
Hun,  79  ;  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  89  [willful 
shooting]  ;  Welch  v.  Wesson,  6  Gray, 
505  ;  Steele  v.  Burkhardt,  104  Mass. 
59  ;  Banks  v.  Highland  St.  R.  Co., 
136  Id.  485 ;  Steinmetz  v.  Kelly,  72 
Ind.  442  ;  Salem  v.  Goller,  76  Id.  291  ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bills,  118 
Ind.  221  ;  20  N.  E.  775  [ejection  from 
train]  ;  Birge  v.  Gardner,  19  Conn. 
507  ;  Williams  v.  Michigan,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  2  Mich.  259  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Smith,  46  Id.  504  ;  Cincinnati, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Waterson,  4  Ohio  St. 
424  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
26  Id  124  ;  Tanner  v.  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co..  60  Ala.  621  ;  Gothard  v.  Ala- 
bama, etc  R.  Co.,  67  Id.  114;  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.  v.  Newman,  94  Ga.  560  ; 
21  S.  E.  219  :  Bunting  v  Central,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  16  Nev.  277  ;  Holstine  v.  Ore- 
gon, etc.  R.  Co. ,  8  Oreg.  163 ;  Hector 
Min.  Co.  v.  Robertson,  22  Colo.  491  ; 
45   Pac.   406  ;    Alaska    Min.  Co.    v. 


Whelan,  64  Fed.  462  ;   12  C.  C.  A. 
225. 

2  Barre  v.  Reading  R.  Co.,  155  Pa. 
St.  170;  26  Atl.  99;  Thurman  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  [Ky.] ;  34  S. 
W.  893  [trespasser  ejected  from  train]. 
Though  a  carrier  has  the  right  to 
eject  from  his  vehicle  a  person  un- 
lawfully there,  he  is  bound,  in  doing 
so,  to  use  no  unnecessary  violence, 
and  not  to  subject  the  trespasser  to 
the  hazard  of  serious  personal  injury 
(Sanford  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  23 
N.  Y.  343  ;  Hoffman  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  87  N.  Y.  25  ;  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.  v.  Vandiver,  42  Pa.  St.  365; 
Holmes  v.  Wakefield,  12  Allen,  580; 
Meyer  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  40  Mo. 
151 ;  Kline  v.  Central  Pacific R.  Co., 
37  Cal.  400;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Dunkin,  92  Ind.  601 ;  Carter  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.,  98  Id.  552). 

3  Biddle  v.  Hestonville,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  112  Pa.  St.  551  ;  4  Atl.  485  ;  s.  c. 
again,  16  Id.  488.  While  a  mere  or- 
der to  quit  the  train,  given  while  it 
is  in  motion,  may  not  always  be 
equivalent  to  force,  as  to  an  adult 
(see  Benton  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
55  Iowa,  496  ;  8  N.  W.  330),  it  is,  in 
the  case  of  a  mere  child  (Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  West,  125  111.  320  ;  17 
N.  E.  788),  and  in  the  case  of  any 
young  person  (e.  g.,  16  years),  the 


95 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§64 


ened,4  into  jumping  off,  while  the  train  is  in  motion,  is  not 
debarred  from  recovery  by  his  own  fault,  either  in  originally 
entering  the  car,  or  in  quitting  it,  while  in  motion.  Con- 
tributory negligence  is  as  good  a  defense  to  a  claim  founded 
upon  gross  negligence,  as  to  any  other;5  except  where  such 
negligence  is  so  wanton  and  reckless,  as  to  imply  a  willingness 
to  injure,  or  entire  indifference  to  c<£n£2^ences.6  Yet  this, 
after  all,  is  only  another  form  of  stating  the  well-known  rule  in 
Davies  v.  Mann,  that  is,  that  even  a  trespasser  can  recover  for 
any  want  of  ordinary  care  in  avoiding  injury  to  him,  after  his 
presence  is  known  to  the  defendant." 


question  is  for  the  jury  (Benton  v. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  supra;  Kline 
v.  Central  Pac.  R.  Co.,  37  Cal.  400). 

4  Clarke  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc. 
R.  Co.  40  Hun,  60">.  In  Planz  v, 
Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.  (157  Mass.  377 ; 
32  N.  E.  356),  where  plaintiff  was 
stealing  a  ride  on  a  freight  train. 
was  ordered  off  while  it  was  sta- 
tionary, refused  to  obey,  and  was 
then  driven  off  while  it  was  in  mo- 
tion, his  contributery  negligence  was 
held  to  be  fatal  to  his  recovery. 
This  decision  was  clearly  wrong.  In 
Marion  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  (59 
Iowa,  428  ;  13  N.  W.  415),  it  was  held 
that,  while  the  company  would  lie 
liable  for  such  an  act  on  the  part  of 
a  conductor,  it  was  not  liable  for  the 
act  of  a  brakeman  (and  see  Towanda 
Coal  Co.  v.  Heeman,  86  Pa.  St.  418). 
But  this  decision  was  also  wrong,  in 
relieving  from  liability  for  the  brake- 
man's  act.  See  the  conclusive  rea- 
soning in  Hoffman  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
K.  I  ....  s:  N.  Y.  25;  s.  p.,  Bayley  v. 
Manchester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  8  C. 
P.  148. 

'  Wilds  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co., 
24  N.  Y.  430  ;  rev'g  33  Barb.  503  ; 
Grippen  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  40 
N.  Y.  34,51  ;  Neal  v.  Gillett,  23  Conn. 
437  ;  Rowen  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co. , 
59  Id.  364  ;  21  Atl.  1073  ;  New  Jersey 
Express  Co.    v.    Nichols,    33    N.  J. 


Law,  434  ;  Catawissa  R.  Co.  v.  Arm- 
strong, 49  Pa.  St.  186  ;  Cunningham 
v.  Lyness,  22  Wise.  236  ;  Maumus  v. 
Champion,  40  Cal.  121  ;  Carroll  v. 
Minnesota,  etc.  R.  Co.,  13  Minn.  30; 
Griggs  v.  Fleckenstein,  14  Id.  81; 
Ruter  v.  Foy,  46  Iowa,  132  ;  Carring- 
ton  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  88 
Ala.  472  ;  6  So.  910  ;  Florida  So.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hirst,  30  Fla.  1  ;  1 1  So.  506  ;  Inter- 
national, etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Kuehn,ll 
Tex.  Civ.  App.21;  31  S.  W.  322. 

6  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bode- 
mer,  139  111.  596  ;  29  N.  E.  692  ;  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Watson,  90  Ala. 
68 ;  8  So.  249.  In  Gray  v.  McDonald 
(104  Mo.  303  ;  16  S.  W.  398),  it  was 
held  that  the  fault  of  one  killed  in  a 
personal  encounter,  in  not  avoiding 
the  conflict,  was  no  defense  to  an 
action  for  his  wrongful  death,  the 
doctrine  of  negligence  having  no 
application  to  the  case,  a  man's  right 
to  personal  security  being  absolute. 

1  See  §  99,  post.  In  some  cases  it 
is  said  that  a  trespasser  can  only  re- 
cover for  willful  injuries  (Wright 
v.  Boston,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  129  Mass. 
440  ;  Moore  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
99  Pa.  St.  301  ;  Mulherrin  v.  Dela- 
ware, etc.  R.  Co.,  81  Id.  366;  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Collins,  87  Id. 
405  :  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v.  God- 
frey, 71  111.  501  ;  Bresnahan  v.  Michi- 
gan Central,  49  Mich.  410  ;  Chicago, 


§65] 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


96 


§  65.  Fault  must  be  that  of  injured  party  or  his  agent- 
It  is  only  the  contributory  fault  of  the  injured  party,  or  of 
some  one  whose  fault  is  imputable  to  him,  that  can  excuse 
the  defendant.  The  fault  of  a  mere  stranger,  however  much 
it  may  contribute  to  the  injury,  is  no  defense  for  one  whose 
negligence  was  its  proximate  cause.1  For  convenience,  we 
speak  of  the  injured  party  as  the  plaintiff;  but  it  is,  of  course, 
to  be  understood  that,  in  an  action  for  injuries  causing  death, 
contributory  fault  of  the  deceased  person  is  a  bar  to  the 
action,  to  precisely  the  same  extent  as  if  he  were  the  plaintiff 
of  record,-  while   the   contributory  fault    of   the   actual   plain- 


etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hedges,  105  Ind.  398 ; 
7  N.  E.  801 ;  Mason  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  27  Kans.  83).  But  this  is 
erroneous,  and  overruled  every- 
where. Nor  was  it  necessary  to  the 
decision  of  any  case. 

1  Arctic  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin,  69 
N.  Y.  470  ;  Webster  v.  Hudson  River 
R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  161  ;  Barrett  v. 
Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  45  Id.  628  ;  Paul- 
mier  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J.  Law, 
151  ;  Sullivan  v.  Philadelphia,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  234  ;  Eaton  v.  Bos- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Allen,  505  ;  War- 
ren v.  Fitchburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8  Id. 
227  ;  Ingalls  v.  Bills,  9  Mete.  1  ;  Cay- 
zer  v.  Taylor,  10  Gray,  274: 
Churchill  v.  Holt,  127  Mass.  165; 
Harrison  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  3 
Hurlst.  &  C.  231;  Gee  v.  Metropolitan 
R.  Co.,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  161, 174  ;  Clark  v. 
Chambers,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B.  Div.  327. 
See  §  32,  ante,  and  §  §  94,  122,  x>ost. 
For  a  full  discussion  of  this  principle, 
see  Cooley  on  Torts,  132.  A  gas 
pipe  laid  in  a  street  leaked,  and  the 
leaks  were  not  stopped  by  the  gas 
company  when  complaint  was  made 
to  it.  It  was  held  that  this  negli- 
gence of  the  company  was  the  proxi- 
mate, not  the  remote  cause  of  an  ex- 
plosion, and  the  fact  that  the  city 
contractor,  in  building  a  sewer,  had 
disturhed  and  broken  the  pipe,  had 
no  effect  to  shift  the  cause  (Oil  City 


Gas  Co.  v.  Robinson,  99  Pa.  St.  1). 
A  gas  company  supplied  plaintiff 
with  a  defective  service  pipe  to  con- 
vey gas  from  its  main  to  his  meter  ; 
and  the  gas,  leaking,  exploded 
through  the  negligence  of  a  gas-fitter 
employed  by  plaintiff.  The  cause  of 
action  was  held  to  be  the  negligence 
of  the  company ;  from  the  conse- 
quences of  which,  the  intermediate 
negligence  of  a  person  not  in  plain- 
tiff's service  could  not  relieve  it 
(Burrows  v.  Marsh  Gas  Co.,  L.  R.  5 
Exch.  67).  A  person  tripped  by 
another's  stepping  on  the  end  of  a 
plank  laid  lengthwise  in  a  walk, 
which,  being  unsupported,  gives 
way  and  throws  up  the  opposite  end, 
is  not  guilty  of  contributory  negli- 
gence (Rockford  v.  Hollenbeck,  34 
111.  App.  40). 

'2  In  an  action  for  injuries  causing 
death,  the  sole  test  on  the  question 
of  contributory  negligence  is  whether 
the  decedent  himself  was  so  far  free 
from  fault,  as  to  have  entitled  him  to 
maintain  an  action  had  he  lived 
(Dennick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  103  U.  S. 
11  ;  Scheffer  v.  Washington,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  1C5  Id.  249;  Packet  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Cue,  17  Wall.  508  ;  Witherley  v.  Re- 
gents' Canal  Co..  12  C.  B.  N.  S.  2  ; 
Batchelor  v.  Fortescue,  L.  R.  11  Q. 
B.  Div.  474 ;  Wigmore  v.  Jay,  5 
Exch.  354  ;  Mansfield  Coal,  etc.  Co.  v. 


- 


rrwiT 


CO 

en 


a  o 


duhttORY 

Qt)QD    >• 

&  c-5  1 


NEGLIGENCE. 


[§66 


p 


as 


p. 
a 


M 


I 


S 

P 
8 

I 

8' 

■3 

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a 


12  ;  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
6  Heisk.  174;  Hill  v.  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  9  Id.  823  ;  Hubgh  v.  New 
Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.,  6  La.  Ann.  495  ; 
Knight  v.  Pontchartrain  R.  Co.,  23 
Id.  402  ;  Lofton  v.  Vogles,  17  Ind. 
105 ;  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stout,  53  Id.  143  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Moore,  77  111.  217;  Schmidt  v. 
Chicago, etc.  R.  Co..  83  Id.  405  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Triplett,  38  Id. 
482  ;  Ewen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
38  Wise.  613;  Walters  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  41  Iowa,  71  ;  Shoemaker 
v.  Lacey,  38  Id.  '277  .  Weymire  v. 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  — 7  J 


defense,  except  conceivably 
;h  has  never  yet  occurred.3 
t  by  a  parent  or  master,  for 
injury  to  a  child  or  servant, 
"iff  of  record  or  of  the  person 
he  negligence  of  the  plaintiff, 
:r.4  The  plaintiff  is  responsi- 
is  agent  in  the  affair,5  on  the 
ie  conditions  as  he  would  be, 

on."— As  already  stated,  the 
/  the  joint  negligence  of  the 
universally  admitted  to  be  no 
e  of  Thorogood  v.  Bryan,2  an 

iolie,  52  Id.  533;  Elliott  v.  St. 
,ouis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Mo.  272 ;  Kan- 
is,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Salmon,   11  Kans. 

3  In  such  an  action,  the  contribu- 
ary  negligence  of  the  plaintiff  of 
ecord  or  of  any  other  person  inter- 
red in  the  recovery  is  not  an  avail- 
able defense  (Button  v.  Hudson  R. 
I.  Co.,  18  N.  Y.  248  ;  Wilds  v.  Hud- 
ion  R.  R.  Co.,  24  Id.  430  ;  Cleveland 
tc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crawford,  24  Ohio  St. 
J31). 

4  See  §§  70-86,  post.  As  to  hus- 
band and  wife,  see  §  67,  post. 

5  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stom- 
mel,  126  Ind.  35 ;  25  N.  E.  863 ; 
Miner  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co., 
153  Mass.,  398;  26  N.  E.  994;  La 
Riviere  v.  Pemberton,  46  Minn.  5  ; 
48  N.  W.  406.  See  Eaton  v.  Boston, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Allen,  500  ;  Stevens  v. 
Armstrong,  6  N.  Y.  435.  Owner  of 
team,  riding  in  it,  allowed  a  com- 
panion to  take  the  reins.  Held, 
liable  for  latter's  contributory  fault 
(Stafford  v.  Oskaloosa,  57  Iowa,  749  ; 
11  X.  W.  608). 

1  See  cases  cited  under  §  65,  ante, 
and  .:  122,  jwst. 
38C.  B.  115. 


§65] 


i  «  >\  fRIBUTORY    NEC. I 


n6 


§  65.  Fault  must  be  that  o 
It  is  only  the  contributory  fa 
some  one  whose  fault  is  impt 
the  defendant.     The  fault  of  a 

it  may  contribute  to  the  injur} 
negligence  was  its  proximate  I 
speak  of  the  injured  party  as  tl 
to  be  understood  that,  in  an  ac 
contributory  fault  of  the  dec 
action,  to  precisely  the  same  e^ 
oi  record,'-  while   the   contribir 


-Oi/f-  or    C^fM  ^ 


etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hedges,  105  Ind.  398; 
7  N.  E.  801  ;  Mason  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  27  Kans.  83).  But  this  is 
erroneous,  and  overruled  every- 
where. Nor  was  it  necessary  to  the 
decision  of  any  case. 

1  Arctic  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin,  69 
N.  Y.  470  ;  Webster  v.  Hudson  River 
R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  161  ;  Barrett  v. 
Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  45  Id.  628  ;  Paul- 
mier  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J.  Law, 
151  ;  Sullivan  v.  Philadelphia,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  234  ;  Eaton  v.  Bos- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Allen,  505  ;  War- 
ren v.  Fitchburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8  Id. 
227 ;  Ingalls  v.  Bills,  9  Mete.  1  ;  Cay- 
zer  v.  Taylor,  10  Gray,  274: 
Churchill  v.  Holt,  127  Mass.  165  ; 
Harrison  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  3 
Hurlst.  &  C.  231;  Gee  v.  Metropolitan 
R.  Co.,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  161, 174  ;  Clark  v. 
Chambers,   L.  R.  3  Q.   B.  Div.  327. 

32,  ante,  and  §  §  94,  122,  po.s,. 
For  a  full  discussion  of  this  principle, 
see  Cooler  on  Torts,  132.  A  gas 
pipe  laid  in  a  street  leaked,  and  the 
leaks  were  not  stopped  hy  the  gas 
company  when  complaint  was  made 
to  it.  It  was  held  that  tins  negli- 
gence  of  the  company  wastheproxi- 
mate,  aol  the  remote  cause  of  an  ex- 

m.  and  the  fact  that  the  city 
contractor,  in  building  a  sewer,  had 
disturbed  and  broken  the  pipe,  had 
no  effect  to  shift  the  cause   (Oil  City 


£  — — .  «~ 

111.  App.  40). 

-  In  an  action  for  injuries  causing 
death,  the  sole  test  on  the  question 
of  contributory  negligence  is  whether 
the  decedent  himself  was  so  far  free 
from  fault,  as  to  have  entitled  him  to 
maintain  an  action  had  he  lived 
(Dennick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  103  TJ.  S. 
11  ;  Scheffer  v.  Washington,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  1C5  Id.  243;  Packet  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Cue,  17  Wall.  508;  Witherley  v.  Re- 
gents' Canal  Co..  12  C.  B.  N.  S.  2  ; 
Batchelor  v.  Fortescue,  L.  R.  11  Q. 
B.  Div.  474 ;  Wigmore  v.  Jay,  5 
Exch.  354  ;  Mansfield  Coal,  etc.  Co.  v. 


97 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


[§66 


tiff  in  such  an  action  would  be  no  defense,  except  conceivably 
in  some  extraordinary  case  which  has  never  yet  occurred.3 
And,  where  the  action  is  brought  by  a  parent  or  master,  for 
the  loss  of  service  caused  by  an  injury  to  a  child  or  servant, 
the  negligence  of  either  the  plaintiff  of  record  or  of  the  person 
actually  injured  is  to  be  deemed  the  negligence  of  the  plaintiff, 
within  the  meaning  of  this  chapter.4  The  plaintiff  is  responsi- 
ble for  the  contributory  fault  of  his  agent  in  the  affair,5  on  the 
same  principles  and  under  the  same  conditions  as  he  would  be, 
if  he  were  sued  upon  such  fault. 

§  66.  Doctrine  of  "  identification." — As  already  stated,  the 
fact  that  the  injury  was  caused  by  the  joint  negligence  of  the 
defendant  and  a  mere  stranger  is  universally  admitted  to  be  no 
defense.1     But,  in  the  famous  case  of  Thorogood  v.  Bryan,2  an 


McEnery,  91  Pa.  St.  183 ;  Gay  v. 
Winter,  34  Cal.  133  ;  Cleveland,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Crawford,  24  Ohio  St.  631  ; 
Carey  v.  Berkshire  R.  Co.,  1  Cush. 
473  :  Bancroft  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
97  Mass.  275  ;  State  v.  Manchester, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  H.  528 ;  Bradbury 
v.  Furlong,  13  R.  I.  15  ;  Nickerson  v. 
Harriman,  38  Me.  277 ;  State  v. 
Maine  Central  R.  Co.,  60  Id.  490  ; 
Telfer  v.  Northern,  etc.  R.  Co.,  30 
N.  J.  Law,  188  ;  Cumberland,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Fazenbaker,  37  Md.  156  ;  Row- 
land v.  Cannon,  35  Ga.  105 ;  Berry 
v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  72  Id.  137; 
Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ayers,  53  Id. 
12  ;  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
6  Heisk.  174;  Hill  v.  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  9  Id.  823;  Hubgh  v.  New 
Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.,  6  La.  Ann.  495  ; 
Knight  v.  Pontchartrain  R.  Co.,  23 
Id.  462  ;  Lofton  v.  Vogles,  17  Ind. 
105 ;  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stout,  53  Id.  143  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Moore,  77  111.  217  ;  Schmidt  v. 
Chicago, etc.  R.  Co.,  83  Id.  405  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Triplett,  38  Id. 
482  ;  Ewen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
38  Wise.  613;  Walters  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  41  Iowa,  71  :  Shoemaker 
v.  Lacey,  38  Id.  '-277  ;  Weymire  v. 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  —  7J 


Wolfe,  52  Id.  533;  Elliott  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Mo.  272  ;  Kan- 
sas, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Salmon,  11  Kans. 
83). 

3  In  such  an  action,  the  contribu- 
tory negligence  of  the  plaintiff  of 
record  or  of  any  other  person  inter- 
ested in  the  recovery  is  not  an  avail- 
able defense  (Button  v.  Hudson  R. 
R.  Co.,  18  N.  Y.  248  ;  Wilds  v.  Hud- 
son R.  R.  Co.,  24  Id.  430  ;  Cleveland 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crawford,  24  Ohio  St. 
631). 

4  See  §§  70-86,  post.  As  to  hus- 
band and  wife,  see  §  67,  post. 

5  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stom- 
mel,  126  Ind.  35;  25  N.  E.  863; 
Miner  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co., 
153  Mass.,  398;  26  N.  E.  994;  La 
Riviere  v.  Pemberton,  46  Minn.  5  ; 
48  N.  W.  406.  See  Eaton  v.  Boston, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Allen,  500  ;  Stevens  v. 
Armstrong,  6  N.  Y.  435.  Owner  of 
team,  riding  in  it,  allowed  a  com- 
panion to  take  the  reins.  Held, 
liable  for  latter's  contributory  fault 
(Stafford  v.  Oskaloosa,  57  Iowa,  749  ; 
11  N.  W.  668). 

1  See  cases  cited  under  §  65,  ante, 
ami  §  122,  post. 
38C.  B.  115. 


§66J 


C<  >NTKIUUTC)RY    NEGLIGENCE. 


9S 


English  court  invented  a  new  application  of  the  old  Roman 
doctrine  of  identification,  and  held  that  a  passenger  in  a  pub- 
lic vehicle,  though  having  no  control  over  the  driver,  must  be 
held  to  be  so  identified  with  the  vehicle,  as  to  be  chargeable 
with  any  negligence  on  the  part  of  its  managers  which  con- 
tributed to  an  injury  inflicted  upon  such  passenger  by  the 
negligence  of  a  stranger.  In  former  editions,  we  devoted 
much  space  to  the  refutation  of  this  doctrine  of  "identifica- 
tion." But  it  is  needless  to  do  so  any  longer,  since  the  entire 
doctrine  has,  since  our  first  edition,  been  exploded  in  every 
court,  beginning  with  New  York  and  ending  with  Penn- 
sylvania.3    It  was  finally  overruled   in    England  a   few   years 


3  Little  v.  Hackett,  116  U.  S.  366  ; 
6  Sup.  Ct.  391  ;  whore  the  question 
was  fully  and  ably  discussed.  Ap- 
plied to  case  of  wagon  driven  by 
plaintiff's  brother  (Lapsley  v.  Union 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  50  Fed.  172  ;  affi'd.  51  Id. 
174  ;  2  C.  C.  A.  149  ;  4  U.  S.  App.  542). 
So  in  New  York  (Webster  v.  Hud- 
son River  R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  260;  Bar- 
rett  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  45  Id.  623  ; 
Sheridan  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  36  Id. 
39 ;  Phillips  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  127  Id.  657;  27  N.  E.  978).  So 
held,  as  to  persons  accepting  an  invi- 
tation to  ride  with  the  driver  in 
fault  (Robinson  v.  N.  Y.  Central, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  66  N.  Y.  11;  Dyer  v. 
Erie  R.  Co.,  71  Id.  228  ;  Masterson  v. 
N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84  Id.  247  ; 
Strauss  v.  Newburgh  R.  Co.,  6  N. 
Y.  App.  Div.  2C4  ;  39  N.  Y.  Supp. 
998).  Negligence  of  a  street-car  driver 
is  not  imputable  to  the  conductor 
(Seaman  v.  Koehler.  123  N.  Y.  646  ; 
25  N.  E.  353).  So  in  Alabama  (Otis  v. 
Thorn,  23  Ala.  469  ;  Georgia  Pacific 
R.  Co.  v.  Hughes.  87  Id.  610  ;  6  So. 
413  ;  Elyton  Land  Co.  v.  Mingea,  89 
Ala.  521;  7  So.  660);  California 
(Hillman  v.  Newington.  57  Cal.  56  ; 
Tompkins  v.  Clay  St.  P..  Co.,  66  Id. 
163;  4  Pac.  1165);  Georgia  (East 
Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Markens,  *3 
Ga.  60 ;  13  S.   E.  855  [public   hack]  ; 


Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Powell,  89 
Ga.  601  ;  16  S.  E.  118  ;  [private  con- 
veyance] ;  Illinois  (Wabash,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Shacklet,  105  111.  364 ;  Carmi 
v.  Ervin,  59  111.  App.  555  ;  compare 
Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  76  Id. 
278);  Indiana  (Albion  v.  Hetick, 
90  Ind.  545  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Spencer,  98  Id.  186 ;  Brannan  v. 
Kokomo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  115  Id.  115;  17 
N.  E.  202  [intoxicated  driver  run- 
ning a  toll-gate]  ;  Knightstown  v. 
Musgrove,  116  Ind.  121  ;  18  N.  E.  452  ; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Creek,  130 
Ind.  139  ;  29  N.  E.  481  ;  Lake  Shore, 
etc.  R.  Co.v.  Boyts,  16  Ind.  App.  640; 
43  N.  E.  667,  and  other  cases) ;  Iowa 
(Nesbit  v.  Garner,  75  Iowa,  314;  39 
N.  W.  516 ;  Larkin  v.  Burlington, 
etc.  R.  Co. ,  85  Iowa,  492  ;  52  N.  W. 
480 ;  overruling  Artz  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  34 Iowa,  153;  Payne  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co..  39  Id.  523):  Kansas 
(Leavenworth  v.  Hatch,  57  Kans.  57; 
45  Pac.  65  [plaintiff  driven  by  ser- 
vant of  owner  of  carriage  on  lat- 
ter's  invitation]) ;  Kentucky  (Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Case,  9  Bush,  728  ; 
Danville,  etc.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Stewart, 
2  Mete.  [Ky.]  119  ;  Cabill  v.  Cincin- 
nati, etc.  R.  Co.,  92  Ky.  345  ;  18  S. 
W.  2  [ride  on  invitation] ) :  Maine 
(State  v.  Boston,  etc.  P.  Co.,  80  Me. 
430;  15  Atl.  36);  Maryland    (Phila- 


99  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  66 

ago.4  The  only  remnant  of  this  doctrine  which  remains  in  sight 
anywhere  is  the  theory  that  one  who  rides  in  a  private  convey- 
ance thereby  makes  the  driver  his  agent,  and  is  thus  responsible 
for  the  driver's  negligence,  even  though  he  has  absolutely  no 
power  or  right  to  control  the  driver.  This  extraordinary 
theory,  which  did  not  even  occur  to  the  hair-splitting  judges 
in  Thorogood  v.  Bryan,  was  invented  in  Wisconsin,  and  sus- 
tained by  a  process  of  elaborate  reasoning;5  and  this  Wisconsin 
decision,  in  evident  ignorance  of  all  decisions  to  the  contrary, 
was  recently  followed,  with  some  similar  reasoning,  in  Montana fi ; 
and  in  Nebraska,7  without  any  reasoning  whatever;  which 
last  is  certainly  the  best  method  of  reaching  a  conclusion, 
directly   opposed   to   common  sense  and   to  the   decisions   of 

delphia,  etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Hogeland,  66  requested    a  ride    in   another's   car- 

Md.  149;    7  Atl.  105);  Massachusetts  riage]) ;  Ohio   (Covington    Transfer 

(Poor  v.  Sears,  154  Mass.  539  ;  28  N.  Co.    v.    Kelly,  36   Ohio   St.  86  ;   St. 

E   1046  ;  Randolph  v.  O'Riordon,  155  Clair  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Eadie,  43  Id.  (Jl  ; 

Mass.  331  ;  29  N.   E.  583  [hired  car-  1  N.   E.   519  [negligence  of  a  father 

riage]);  Michigan  (Cuddy  v.  Horn,  driving  his  daughter  not   to  he  im- 

46  Mich.  596  ;  10   N.  W.  32  ;  Malm-  puted  to    her]) ;    Texas  (Galveston, 

sten    v.    Marquette,   etc.   R.   Co.,  49  etc.   R   Co.  v.  Kutac,  72  Tex.  643  ;  11 

Mich.  94  ;  13  N.  W.  373) :  Minnesota  S.  W.  127  ;  Markham  v.  Houston,  etc. 

(McMahon   v.    Davidson    12    Minn.  Navigation    Co.  73  Tex.  247 ;  11    S. 

307;  Griggs  v.   Fleckenstein,   14  Id.  W.  131  ;  Johnson  v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co., 

81  ;  Follman  v.   Mankato,  35  Minn.  2  Tex.  Civ.  App.  139  ;  21  S.   W.  274)  ; 

52'2 ;    29  N.     W.    317;   Flaherty    v.  Virginia  (New  York,    etc.  R.  Co.  v. 

Minneapolis,  etc.  R  Co.,  39  Minn.  328 ;  Cooper,     85    Va    939  ;  9  S.  E.  321). 

40 NAY.  100);  Mississippi  (Alabama,  Pennsylvania    held   out,  until  1891, 

etc.    R.    Co.    v.  Davis,  69   Miss.  444  ;  when  its  highest  court,  in  Bunting  v. 

13  So.  693  ) ;  Missouri  (Becke  v.  Mis-  Hogsett  (139  Pa  St.  363  ;  21  Atl.  31), 

Bouri  Pac.  R.    Co.,   102   Mo.  544;  13  unanimously  overruled  its  own  deci- 

S.    W.   1 053  [stage  coach]  ;  Dickson  sion  inLockhart  v.  Liehtenthaler,  46 

v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  104  Mo.  491  ;  Pa.  St.  151,  and  Pliila.   etc  R.  Co.  v. 

16  S.  W.  381  [stagecoach])  ;  Kuttner  Boyer,  97  Id.  91,  in  which  Thoro  ood 

v.  Lindell  R.   Co.,  29  Mo.  App.  502  ;  v.  Bryan  had  been  followed. 

[street-car]) ;  New  Hampshire  I  Noyes  '  Mills  v.  Armstrong,  L.  R.  13  App. 

V.  Boscawen,    « '» 4   X    H.  361  ;  10  Atl.  Cas.    1;   affirming  s.   C.   sub.  rtom  ; 

690  [riding  on   invitation   of   owner  The  Bernina,  L.  R.  12  Prob.  Div.  58 

in  carriage  driven  by  his  servant]) ;  B  Prideaux    v.    Mineral    Point.  43 

New  Jersey  (Bennett  v.  Now  Jersey,  Wise.  513  ;  followed.   Otis  v.  Janes- 

fcfcc.  Trans.    Co.,  36  N.  J.   Law.  225  ;  ville,  47  Wise.  42?  ;  2  N.  W.  783. 

N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stein-  6  Whittaker  v.   Helena,  14  Mont, 

hrenn..,-.  17  Id.  161  [hired  carriage]);  121  :   35  Pac.  904. 

North  Dakota  (Ouverson  v.  Grafton,  7  Omaha,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Talbot,  48 

5  N.  D.  281;  65  N.  W.  676  [  plaintiff  Neb.  627:  07  N.  W.  569. 


§  66a]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  IOO 

twenty  other  courts.  The  notion  that  one  is  the  "agent"  of 
another,  who  has  not  the  smallest  right  to  control  or  even  ad- 
vise him,  is  difficult  to  support  by  any  sensible  argument. 
This  theory  is  universally  rejected,8  except  in  the  three  states 
mentioned,  and  it  must  soon  be  abandoned  even  there. 

§  66a.  Stranger's  contributory  fault  no  excuse  for 
plaintiff's. —  In  the  natural  reaction  against  the  false  doctrine  of 
"  identification,"  attempts  have  been  made  to  excuse  a  plaintiff 
from  using  care  to  avoid  injury,  by  showing  that  he  relied  upon 
a  stranger  to  do  so  for  him.  But  such  excuses  have  always 
failed.  No  one  can  be  allowed  to  shut  his  eyes  to  danger,  in 
blind  reliance  upon  the  unaided  care  of  another,  without 
assuming  the  consequences  of  the  omission  of  such  care.1  And 
one  who  needlessly  entrusts  himself  to  the  control  of  one  whom 
he  knows  to  be  incompetent,  contributes  thereby,  in  some 
degree,  to  injuries  which  result  from  such  incompetency.2 
Whether  such  negligence  proximately  contributes  to  the  injury, 
depends  upon  all  the  circumstances.  These  principles  have 
thus  far  been  applied  only  to  cases  of  injuries  to  passengers  in 
vehicles,  managed  by  negligent  persons ;  but  they  have  a 
broader  application. 

8  Even   in  Pennsylvania,  the  Wis-  protest  against  her  husband  driving 

cousin  theory  was  always,  repudiated  across  the  track  does  not  constitute 

(Carlisle  v.  Brisbane,  113  Pa.  St.  544;  negligence  as  matter  of  law.     It  is  a 

6  Atl.  372;  Mann  v.  Weiand,  81   Pa.  question  for  the  jury  (Hoag  v.  N.  Y. 

St.  248).  Central,  etc.   R.   Co  ,   111   N.  Y.  199; 

1  A  person  riding  in  a  wagon  with  18  N.  E.  648).     And  a  passenger  in  a 

another,  who  is  conscious  of  danger  public    hack   is   under    no   duty  to 

and  risk  assumed  by  the  driver,  and  supervise   the   driver   at   a   railroad 

makes  no  objection  or  effort  to  avoid  crossing,  nor  to  look  or  listen  for  ap- 

it,  is  chargeable  with  the  neglect  of  proaching  trains,  unless  she  has  some 

such  driver   (Donnelly  v.  Brooklyn  reason   to  distrust  the   diligence  of 

R.  Co.,  109  N.  X.  16  ;  15  N.  E.  733;  the  driver    (East   Tennessee,  etc.  R. 

Brickell  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Co.  v.  Markens,  88  Ga.   60;  13  S.  E. 

120  X.  Y. ,  290  ;  24  N.  E.  449  ;  Griffith  855). 

v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  44  Fed.  9  This  qualification  is  expressly 
574:  Brannen  v.Kokomo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  stated  in  most,  if  not  all,  the  cases 
115  Tnd.  115  ;  17  N.  E.  202  ;  Miller  v.  cited  under  §  66,  ante.  But  going  in 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  128  Ind.  97  ;  27  a  boat,  in  charge  of  a  blind  man,  but 
N.  E.  339).  But  the  degree  of  care  to  able-bodied  and  familiar  with  the 
be  exercised  varies  with  the  circum-  management  of  boats,  is  not  of  it- 
stances  and  emergencies,  and  a  wife's  self  contributory  negligence  (Har- 
failure  to  seize  the  reins,  jump  out  or  ris  v.  Uebelhoer,  75  N.  Y.  169). 


101  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  6j 

§  67.  Husband  and  wife.— The  application  of  this  rule  to 
the  case  of  husband  and  wife  is  not  free  from  difficulty,  own- 
ing to  the  great  changes  which  have  been  made  in  the  com- 
mon law  as  to  their  relations.  Under  the  rule  of  the  common 
law,  which  denied  to  the  wife  any  right  to  bring  an  action, 
separately  from  her  husband,  for  damages  suffered  by  her 
through  the  negligence  of  a  stranger,  it  was  doubtless  proper 
to  hold  that  the  contributory  negligence  of  the  husband 
barred  the  wife's  right  to  recovery,  as  effectually  as  it  did  the 
husband's.1  Even  after  some  change  had  been  made  in  the 
common  law  in  relations  of  husband  and  wife,  yet  the  form  of 
action  remaining  the  same,  it  was  held  that  the  negligence 
of  a  husband,  while  the  wife  was  under  his  immediate  care, 
was  imputable  to  the  wife,  so  as  to  bar  her  recovery,  as  much 
as  it  would  have  barred  his.2  But  in  New  York,  Indiana  and 
Missouri  and  other  states,  where  the  change  has  been  radical, 
and  married  women  have  a  right  to  recover  in  such  cases 
damages  for  their  own  separate  use,  the  contributory  fault  of 
:a  husband,  while  in  company  with  his  wife,  is  not  chargeable  to 
her,  in  such  an  action.3  At  common  law,  a  wife's  contribu- 
tory negligence  is  available  against  her  husband's  action  for 
loss  of  her  services.4  But  it  is  not  so,  in  a  state  where  she  has 
been  relieved  of  all  common-law  disabilities,  and  he,  of  all  re- 
sponsibility for  her  torts.3 

1  Nanticoke  v.  Warne,  106  Pa.  St.  St.  Louis,  3  Id.  231 ;  Louisville,  etc.  R. 

373 ;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.    Good-  Co.  v.  Creek,  130  Ind.  139  ;  29  N.  E. 

enough,  55  N.  J.  Law,  577  ;  28  Atl.  3  ;  481  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker, 

Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crittenden,  42  134 Ind.  380  ;  33  N.  E.  280  ;  Galveston, 

111.  App.  469.  etc.  R.   Co.  v.  Kutac,  76  Tex.  473  ; 

5  Carlisle  v.  Sheldon,  38  Vt.  440  ;  13  S.  W.  327). 

Yahn    v.  Ottumwa,  60    Iowa,    429 ;  4  Winner  v.  Oakland,   158  Pa.  St. 

Peck  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  405;  27  Atl.  1111.     Under  the  Civil 

('-.,  50  Conn.  379  ;  Huntoonv.  Trum-  Code  of  California  (§§  162,  164,  169, 

bull,  2  McCraryC.  C.  314.  172),  damages  for  personal  injuries 

3  The  contributory  negligence  of  the  to  the  wife  being  community  prop- 
husband  will  not  bar  the  wife  from  erty  and  recovei-able  only  in  a  joint 
recovering  for  her  personal  injuries  action  by  husband  and  wife,  it  is 
she  being  free  from  negligence,  held  that  tbe  husband's  contributory 
though  sitting  by  his  side  in  a  wagon  negligence  is  a  bar  to  such  an  action 
driven  by  him  (Platz  v.  Cohoes.  24  (McFadden  v.  Santa  Ana,  etc.  R.  Co., 
Hun,  101  ;  affi'd  89  N.  Y.  219  ;  Hoag  87  Cal.  464  ;  25  Pac.  681). 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co..  111  N.  5  Honey  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  59 
Y.  109:  18  N.  E.  648;  Hedges  v.  Fed.  423. 
Kansas  City,  18  Mo.  App.  62  ;  Flori  v. 


§69]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  I 

§  68.  Knowledge  of  principal,  when  imputed  to  agent, 

Notice  to  a  principal  of  a  danger  to  his  property  does  not 
prejudice  his  right  to  recover  for  an  injury  occasioned  by  such 
danger,  while  his  agent,  who  was  not  aware  of  its  existence, 
had  exclusive  charge  of  his  property,  unless  the  circumstances 
were  such  that  the  principal  could  and  should,  in  the  exercise 
of  ordinary  care,  have  communicated  his  knowledge  to  the 
agent,  in  time  to  avoid  the  injury.  For  example,  if  the  princi- 
pal knows  of  an  obstacle  in  the  road,  created  by  the  negligence 
of  another,  and  nothing  appears  to  make  it  his  duty  to  warn 
his  agent  of  the  special  danger  caused  by  such  obstacle,  and 
the  agent,  not  knowing  the  fact,  drives  his  principal's  wagon 
against  such  obstacle,  the  principal  may,  nevertheless,  recover 
from  the  party  in  fault.1 

§  69.  Knowledge  of  agent,  when  imputed  to  principal. — 

On  the  same  principle,  notice  to  an  agent  of  the  existence  of 
a  danger  is  not  necessarily  imputable  to  his  principal.  In 
order  to  charge  the  principal  with  contributory  negligence,  in 
not  personally  watching  for  and  avoiding  danger  known  to  his 
agent,  but  not  known  to  him,  it  must  appear  that  the  agent  is 
so  far  in  fault,  for  not  communicating  his  knowledge,  that  the 
principal  would  have  a  right  of  action  against  him  for  breach 
of  duty.1  But  where  the  master's  property,  while  in  charge  of 
his  servant,  is  exposed  to  a  danger  of  which  the  servant  has 
notice,  the  servant's  knowledge  of  the  danger  of  negligence 
contributing  to  the  injury  will  be  imputed  to  the  master. 
Thus,  in  a  case  where  the  plaintiff's  servant,  having  plaintiff's 
team  in  charge,  stopped  in  the  highway,  and,  leaving  the 
horses  unhitched  and  unattended,  engaged  in  a  boisterous 
altercation  with  the  defendant,  which  so  frightened  the  horses 
that  they  ran  away  and  were  injured,  it  was  held  that  the 
negligence  of  the  servant  in  thus  exposing  the  horses,  unat- 
tended on  the  highway,  was  a  good  defense  to  an  action  by 
the  master;  the  test  being  that  the  servant  was  guilty  of  such 
negligence  as  would  have  precluded  him,  if  he  had  been  the 

1  Garmon  v.  Bangor,  38  Me.  443;  '  See  Weisser  v.  Denison,  10  N.  Y. 
Miller  v.  Rochester  Pav.  Co..  66  68;  Fuller  v.  Bennett,  2  Hare,  402; 
Hun,  634  ;  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  651.  Worsley  v.  Scarborough,  3  Atk.  392. 


103  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  yi 

owner  of  the  horses,  from  maintaining  a  similar  action  against 
the  defendant.2 

§70.  Contributory  negligence  of  children. —  The  applica- 
tion of  the  rules  concerning  contributory  negligence  to  cases  of 
injuries  suffered  by  small  children  has  been  found  a  matter  of 
considerable  difficulty.  The  obvious  hardship  of  requiring 
from  a  little  child  a  degree  of  care  and  a  soundness  of  judg- 
ment in  anticipating  and  avoiding  danger,  which  are  not 
found  in  the  majority  of  grown-up  persons,  and  the  apparent 
hardship,  on  the  other  hand,  of  compelling  strangers,  whose 
negligence  has  not  contributed  any  more  to  the  injury  of  chil- 
dren than  the  negligence  of  their  own  parents  or  guardians,  to 
compensate  for  the  whole  loss,  have  so  embarrassed  the  courts 
as  to  lead  to  many  inconsistent  and  irreconcilable  decisions. 
Some  judges  solved  the  difficulty  by  holding  that  even  babies 
are  bound  in  law  to  use  as  much  care  and  discretion  in  avoid- 
ing injury,  as  could  be  expected  from  adults.  Other  judges, 
shocked  at  this  harsh  rule,  adopted  the  equally  short  method 
of  declaring  that  the  rule  of  contributory  negligence  did  not 
apply  at  all  to  small  children.  Still  others  adopted  a  midway 
course,  holding  that  small  children  were  not  bound  to  use  any 
greater  care  than  was  usually  possessed  by  children  of  the 
same  age,  but  that  the  negligence  of  their  parents  or  guar- 
dians, in  suffering  them  to  be  exposed  to  injury,  was  to  be 
imputed  to  them.  Under  this  conflict  of  opinion,  we  must  at- 
tempt to  state  what  seems  to  us  to  be  the  true  rule,  noting  the 
deflections  on  one  side  or  the  other  from  that  rule,  which  are 
supported  by  authority  in  the  different  states.1 

§  71.  Negligence  of  parents  in  parent's  action. —  It  may 
be  as  well,  in  the  first  place,  to  eliminate  from  the  discussion 
a  class  of  cases,  which  have  been  improperly  mingled  with  the 
others,  thus  creating  confusion.  When  a  parent  or  master 
sues,  for  his  own  benefit,  to  recover  damages  for  the  technical 

8  Puterbaugh  v.  Reasor,  9  Ohio  St.        '  See  the   cases  collected  and  re- 
484.     To    the  same  effect,    Toledo,     viewed  (Beach,  Contr.   Neg.  2d  ed. 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Goddard,  25  Ind.  185  ;    §£  116-142;. 
Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  25 
Mich.  274. 


§70 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


IO4 


loss  of  service  caused  to  him  by  the  injury  of  a  child  or  ser- 
vant, the  contributory  negligence  of  the  actual  plaintiff,1  or 
his  agent,2  is  of  course  a  good  defense.  And  in  such  an  action 
any  contributory  negligence  of  the  child  or  servant,  which 
would  suffice  to  bar  an  action  brought  in  his  name,  will  also 
preclude  a  recovery  by  the  parent  or  master.3  It  is  obvious 
that  decisions  in  such  cases  afford  no  support  to  the  doctrine 
that  the  negligence  of  the  parent  is  to  be  imputed  to  the  child. 
Yet  they  are  continually  cited  for  that  purpose,  both  in 
opinions  and  digests.  The  distinction  between  the  two  classes 
of  cases  is,  however,  well  illustrated  in  two  Ohio  decisions. 
A  child  brought  an  action  upon  his  own  injuries,  and  the  court 
held  that  his  father's  contributory  negligence  was  no  defense.4 
The  father  brought  another  action  upon  the  same  injury,  to 


1  Of  the  many  authorities  in  sup- 
port of  this  rule,  we  may  cite  the 
following:  Leslie  v.  Lewiston,  62  Me. 
468  ;  Daley  v.  Norwich,  etc.  R.  Co., 
26  Conn.  591 ;  Wright  v.  Maiden,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  4  Allen,  283  ;  Glassey  v.  Hes- 
tonville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57  Pa.  St.  172  ; 
Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  75 
Id.  257  ;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Bock, 
93  Id.  427  ;  Smith  v.  Hestonville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  92  Id.  450  [plaintiff  permitted 
young  son  to  serve  drivers  of  horse- 
cars  with  water]  ;  Westerberg  v.  Kin- 
zua  R.  Co.,  142  Id.  471 ;  21  Atl.  878  ; 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fryer,  30 
Md.  47  ;  Pratt  Coal  Co.  v.  Brawley, 
83  Ala.  371  ;  3  So.  555  [sending  child 
across  railroad]  ;  Bamberger  v.  Citi- 
zens' R.  Co.,  75  Tenn.  18  ;  31  S.  W.  163 ; 
Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hammersly,  28 
Ind.  371  [permitting  a  boy  to  serve 
laborers  on  a  construction  train  with 
water] ;  Jeffersonville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bowen,  40  Id.  545  ;  49  Id.  154 ;  Evans- 
ville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wolf,  59  Id.  89  ; 
Chicago  v.  Hesing,  83  111.  204 ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Becker,  84  Id. 
483;  Hund  v.  Geier,  72  Id.  393  ;  Chi- 
cago v.  Major,  18  Id.  349  ;  Pekin  v. 
McMahon,  154  Id.  141;  39  N.  E.  484  ; 
Isabel  v.   Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60 


Mo.  475;  Koons  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  65  Id.  592;  O'Flaherty  v.  Union, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  45  Id.  70;  Lynch  v.  Met- 
ropolitan R.  Co.,  112  Id.,  420  ;  20  S. 
W.  642;  Spokane,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Holt,     Idaho,     ;  40  Pac.  56. 

2  Pratt  Coal  Co.  v.  Brawley,  83 
Ala.  371  ;  3  So.  555  [fault  of  grand- 
mother in  charge] ;  Albert  v.  Albany 
R.  Co.,  5  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  544  ;  39  N. 
Y.  Supp.  430  [mother  sent  young 
child  across  street,  knowing  it  to  be 
dangerous]. 

3  Moore  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  99 
Pa.  St.  301 ;  Honegsberger  v.  Second 
Ave.  R.  Co.,  2  Abb.  Ct.  App.  378  ; 
Burke  v.  Broadway,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49 
Barb.  529  [both  these  cases  have 
been  overruled  on  other  points,  but 
not  on  this],  s.  p.,  Kennard  v.  Bur- 
ton, 25  Me.  39;  Fitzgerald  v.  St. 
Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  29  Minn.  336  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Harney,  28  Ind. 
28 ;  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gravitt, 
93  Ga.  369  ;  20  S.  E.  550  ;  Westbrook 
v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66  Miss.  560; 
6  So.  321  ;  Bamberger  v.  Citizens'  R. 
Co.,  75  Tenn.  18  ;  31  S.  W.  163. 

4  Belief  on  taine,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sny- 
der, Jr.,  18  Ohio  St.  399. 


105  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  72 

recover  for  loss  of  service;  and  the  same  court  held  his  con- 
tributory negligence  to  be  a  complete  defense.5 

§  J2.  Parent  must  be  actually  in  fault. — Even  in  an  action 
by  the  parent  or  master,  however,  it  is  to  be  remembered 
that  he  must  be  actually  in  fault,  in  order  to  bar  his  recovery 
on  the  ground  of  his  contributory  fault.  This  branch  of  the 
rule  has  sometimes  been  overlooked ;  but  it  has  been  well 
pointed  out  and  enforced  in  later  cases,  especially  in  Pennsyl- 
vania. Where  a  parent  or  guardian  has  done  all  which  can 
reasonably  be  expected  of  one  in  his  circumstances,  he  is  not 
debarred  from  recovery  by  the  mere  fact  that  he  has  not  thrown 
as  many  restraints  around  his  child  for  its  protection  as  would 
be  reasonably  expected  from  parents  having  more  means  at 
their  command.  Thus,  a  poor  woman,  earning  her  daily  bread, 
is  not  necessarily  in  fault,  because  she  does  not  restrain  her 
child  from  wandering  in  the  street.  In  these  and  all  similar 
cases,  all  the  circumstances  are  to  be  taken  into  account ;  and 
the  question  to  be  determined  is  whether  the  plaintiff  took  as 
much  care  of  his  child  as  reasonably  prudent  persons  of  the 
same  class  and  with  the  same  means  ordinarily  do.1  If  the 
guardian  of  a  child  has  taken  ordinary  care  of  him,  and,  not- 
withstanding the  use  of  such  care,  the  child  escapes  into  a 
dangerous  place,  there  is  no  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
guardian.2  Furthermore,  the  parent's  fault  is  of  no  import- 
ance, if  the  child  acted  with  as  much  prudence  as  would   be 

5  Belief  ontaine,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sny-  ant's  negligence  being  conceded,  a 

der,  Sr.,  24  Ohio  St.  670  ;  both  cases  judgment  for  the  son  was  proper, 

approved  in  Pratt  Iron  Co.  v.  Braw-  '  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Long, 

ley,  supra.     Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  75  Pa.  St.  257  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co. 

v.   Hoffman   (80  Tex.   420  ;  15  S.  W.  v.  Pearson,  72  Id.  169  ;  Kay  v.  Penn- 

1048)  was  a  joint  action  by  a  father  sylvania  R.  Co.,  65  Id.  277  ;  Pennsyl- 

a nd  his  minor  son  for  failure  to  de-  vania  R.   Co.  v.   Lewis,    79   Id.    33; 

liver  a  telegram  sent  by  the  mother  O'Flaherty  v.  Union,  etc.  R.  Co.,  45 

to  a   physician   to   attend    the   son,  Mo.  70  ;  Isabel   v.    Hannibal,  etc.  R. 

whose  arm  had  that  day  been  broken.  Co. .60   Id.  475  ;    Frick  v.   St.   Louis, 

The  telegram  was  not  delivered  for  etc.    R.  Co.,  75   Id.  541;    Walters  v. 

nine  days,  and  in  the  meantime  the  Chicago,   etc.  R.    Co.,    41    Iowa,  71  ; 

parents  made  no  further  effort  to  Hoppe    v.  Chicago,    etc.  R.  Co.,  61 

procure  a  physician  until  it  was  too  Wise.  :!57. 

late  to  save  the    arm.      Held,   the  '2  Weil   v.    Dry  Dock,    etc.  R.  Co., 

father's      contributory      negligence  119  N.  Y.  147;   23  N.  E.  487  ;  Huer- 

barred    his    recovery,   but,   defend-  zeler  v,   Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  139  N. 


§73] 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


1 06 


required  from  an  adult.8     For  then  it  is  not  a  proximate  cause 
of  any  injury. 

§  73.  Degree  of  care  required  from  child. —  It  is  now  set- 
tled by  an  overwhelming  weight  of  authority  that  a  child  is 
held,  so  far  as  he  is  personally  concerned,  only  to  the  exer- 
cise of  such  degree  of  care  and  discretion  as  is  reasonably  to 
be  expected  from  children  of  his  age.1     No  injustice  is  done  to 


Y.  490;  34  N.  E.  1101;  Mangam  v. 
Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  38  N.  Y.  455  ;  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Stout,  17  Wall,  657  ;  Karr 
v.  Parks,  40  Cal.  188  ;  Mulligan  v. 
Curtis,  100  Mass.  512  ;  Creed  v.  Ken- 
dall, 156  Id.  291  ;  31  N.  E.  6 ;  Slattery 
v.  O'Connell,  153  Mass.  94  ;  26  N.  E. 
430  ;  Rauch  v.  Lloyd,  31  Pa.  St.  358  ; 
Bronson  v.  Southbury,  37  Conn.  199  ; 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  30 
Md.  47  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bumstead,  48  111.  221  ;  Elgin,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Raymond,  148  Id.  241 ;  35  N. 
E.  729  ;  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v. 
Slater,  129  111.  91;  21  N.  E.  575; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Shanks, 
132  Ind.  395  :  31  N.  E.  1111  ;  Weiss- 
nerv.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  47  Minn. 
468  ;  50  N.  W.  606 ;  McGuire  v. 
Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  46  La.  Ann. 
1543;  16  So.  457.  The  question  of 
the  parent-plaintiff's  contributory 
negligence  is  for  the  jury  (Bliss  v. 
South  Hadley,  145  Mass.  91  ;  13  N. 
E.  352  ;  Reilly  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  94  Mo.  600  ;  7  S.  W.  407  ;  Platte, 
etc.  Milling  Co.  v.  Do  well,  17  Colo. 
376  ;  30  Pac.  68,  and  cases,  supra. 
3  Wiswell  v.  Doyle,  160  Mass.  42  ;  35 
N.  E.  107.  To  similar  effect,  Union 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Macdonald,  152  U.  S. 
262  ;  14  S.  Ct.  619. 

1  Railroad  Co.  v.  Gladmon,  15 
Wall.  401  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Stout,  17 
Id.  657  ;  Lynch  v.  Nurdin,  1  Q.  B. 
29.  In  Railroad  Company  v.  Glad- 
mon (15  Wall.  401),  Hunt,  J.,  said: 
"  Of  an  infant  of  tender  years  less 
discretion   is  required   [than   of  an 


adult]  ;  and  the  degree  depends  upon 
his  age  and  knowledge.     Of  a  child 
of  three  years  of  age  less  caution 
would  be  required  than  one  of  seven, 
and  of  a  child  of  seven  less  than  one 
of  twelve  or  fifteen.     The  caution 
required  is  according  to  the  maturity 
and  capacity  of  the  child  ;  and  this 
is  to  be  determined  in  each  case  by 
the  circumstances  of  that  case."     In 
Rauch  v.    Lloyd    (31    Pa.   St.    358), 
Woodward,  J.,  said  :  "  Children  are 
to  be  held  responsible  only   for  the 
discretion  of  children."     In  Thurber 
v.  Harlem,  etc.  R.  Co.  (60  N.  Y.  326), 
it  was  held  that  the  degree  of  care 
required  of  a  child   (in  this  case   a 
boy  of  nine)  was  to  be  graduated  by 
the  age  and  capacity  of  the  indi- 
vidual ;  and  if  the  jury  were  of  the 
opinion  that  the  boy  had  shown  the 
possession  and    exercised   prudence 
and  discretion  in  as  great  a  degree 
as    could    be    expected,    they  were 
justified    in    finding    a   verdict   for 
plaintiff.     Acts     that    in    an    adult 
would    be   contributory   negligence, 
such  as  would  justify  a  non-suit,  in 
an  infant  would  be  properly  a  ques- 
tion to  be  left  to  the  jury  (Barry 
v.   N.  Y.  Central,  R.  Co.,  92  N.  Y. 
289;    McGovern    v.  N.    Y.    Central 
R.  Co.,  67  N.  Y.  417  ;  Jones  v.  Utica, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  36  Hun,  115).     A  verdict 
for  a  boy  of  seven  who  was  injured 
in  trying  to  get  on  a  moving  train, 
there   being    no   negligence   on    the 
part  of   train  hands,    cannot  stand 
(Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stumps,    69 


107 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


[§73 


the  defendant  by  this  limitation  of  the  defense  of  contributory 
negligence,  since  the  rule  itself  is  not  established  primarily  for 


111.  409).  See  McMahon  v.  Northern 
R.  Co.,  39  Md.  438;  Cram  v.  Metro- 
politan R.  Co.,  112  Mass.  38;  Ecliff 
v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64  Mich.  196  ; 
31  N.  W.  180.  It  has  been  said  that 
the  presumption  that  a  child  of  four- 
teen  has   capacity  to   avoid  danger 


Gregory,  58  Id.  226  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Murray,  71  Id.  601  ;  Rockford, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Delaney,  82  Id.  198  ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Becker,  76  Id. 
25  ;  84  Id.  483  ;  Illinois  Central  R.  Co. 
v.  Slater,  129  Id.  91  ;  21  N.  E.  57.1)  ; 
Indiana  (St.    Louis,   etc.   R.   Co.    v. 


can  only  be    overthrown    by  clear    Valirius,  56  Ind.  511;  Atlas  Engine 


proof  of  the  absence  of  such  discretion 
(Nagle  v.  Allegheny  Valley  R.  Co..  88 
Pa.  St.  35).  But  see  Hayes  v.  Bush 
Man'g  Co.,  41  Hun,  407  ;  and  Cincin- 
nati R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  54  Ohio  St. 
181  ;  43  N.  E.  688.  And  in  Haycraft  v. 


Works  v.  Randall,  100  Id.  293); 
Iowa  (McMillan  v.  Burlington,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  46  Iowa,  231) ;  Kansas  (Kansas 
Pacific  R  Co.  v.  Whipple,  39  Kans. 
531  ;  18  Pac.  730) ;  Maryland  (Balti- 
more, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  30  Md.  47  ; 


Lake  Shore  R.  Co.  (64  N.  Y.  636),  the    Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonnell, 


question  whether  a  girl,  nearly 
seventeen,  whose  injury  was  clearly 
due  to  her  own  carelessness,  was 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence, 
was  left  to  the  jury  under  an  in- 
struction that  she  was  not  to  be  held 
to  so  high  a  degree  of  care  as  an 
older  jjerson  would  be.  It  is  not,  as 
matter  of  law,  negligence  to  allow 
a  child  of  four  and  one-half  years  to 
play  on  the  sidewalk  with  her 
brother,  six  years  of  age,  in  a  thickly 


43  Id.  534) ;  Massachusetts  (Munn  v. 
Reed,  4  Allen,  431  ;  Lynch  v.  Smith, 
104  Mass.  52  ;  Plumley  v.  Birge,  124 
Id.  57  ;  O'Connor  v.  Boston,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  135  Id.  352  ;  Elkins  v.  Boston,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  115  Id.  190) ;  Michigan  (East 
Saginaw  R.  Co.  v.  Bohn,  27  Mich.  503  ; 
Wright  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co,  77  Id. 
123  ;  43  N.  E.  765) ;  Missouri  (Boland 
v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.,  36  Mo.  484  ; 
O'Flaherty  v.  Union  R.  Co.,  45  Mo. 
70  ;  Hicks  v.  Pacific,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64 


populated  portion  of  a  city,  on  an     Id.  430  ;  Lynch  v.  Metropolitan,  etc. 


August  afternoon,  but  the  question 
is  for  the  jury  (Birkett  v.  Knicker- 
bocker Ice  Co.,  110  N.  Y.  504  ;  18  N. 
E.  108;  affi'g  41  Hun,  404).  The 
rule  stated  in  the  text  has  been 
recognized  by  the  courts  of  the  fol- 
lowing states:  Alabama  (Govern- 
ment R.  Co.  v.  Hanlon,  53  Ala.  70  : 
Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crenshaw,  65 
Id.  566);  California  (Rosenberg  v. 
Durf  ree,  87  Cal.  545 ;  26  Pac.  793) ; 
Connecticut  (Birge    v.   Gardiner,   19 


R.  Co.,  112  Id.  420;  20  S.  W.  642; 
Ridenhour  v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co., 
103  Mo.  270  ;  14  S.  W.  760) ;  New  Jer- 
sey (Traction  Co.  v.  Scott,  58  N.  J. 
Law,  682;  34  Atl.  1094)  ;  New  York 
(Thurber  v.  Harlem,  etc.  R.  Co., 
60  N.  Y.  326:  McGovern  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  67  Id.  417;  Ihl 
v.  Forty -second  St.  R.  Co.,  47  Id. 
317  ;  Mangam  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co., 
38  Id.  455 ;  Byrne  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  83  Id.  620  ;  Dowling  v.  N.  Y. 


Conn.  507;  Bronson    v.    Southbury,     Central  R.  Co.,  90  Id.  670;  Barry  v. 


37  Id.  199) ;  Georgia  (Western,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Young,  81  Ga.  397  ;  7  S.  E. 
912  :  S.  c,  83  Ga.  512  ;  10  S.  E.  197  ; 
Central,  etc.  B'k'gCo.v.  Rylee,87Ga. 
491  :  13  S.  E.  584);  Illinois  (Kerr  v. 
Forgue,  54  111.  482  ;  Chicago,  etc.  v. 


N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  92  Id.  289; 
Weaver  v.  Bullis,  14  N.  Y.  Supp. 
338  ;  affi'd,  128  N.  Y.  634  [overruling 
Honogsberger  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co., 
2  Abb.  Ct.  App.  378  ;  1  Keyes,  57-1 1 ; 
McCarragher  v.  Rogers,  120  N.    Y. 


§73] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


1 08 


his  benefit,  and  he  can  never  be  made  liable,  if  he  has  not 
been  himself  in  fault.2  Thus  where  one  is  driving  a  horse 
with  ordinary  care,  at  a  rate  of  speed  suited  to  the  locality,  he 
is  of  course  not  liable  for  an  injury  by  the  horse  to  a  child 
who  suddenly  throws  himself  in  the  way,  and  is  run  over  be- 
fore the  driver  can  prevent  it.8  So,  if  a  child,  proceeding  in 
reckless  haste,  however  natural  to  his  age,  should  rush  against 
a  railroad  car  while  in  motion,  the  driver  of  the  car  or  engineer 
of  the  train  not  seeing  him,  it  is  obvious  that  his  own  act  is 
the  sole  cause  of  his  injury;  and  even  though  he  may  be 
entirely  free  from  blame,  the  most  that  can  be  said  in  his  favor 
is  that  the  case  is  one  of  inevitable  accident ;  and  the  owner  of 
the  car  is  no  more  responsible  for  his  injury  than  would  have 
been  the  owner  of  a  wall  against  which  the  child  had  thought- 
lessly struck  himself.4     It  was  held  in  some  English  cases,  that 


526;  24  N.  E.  812  [boy  of  13]); 
North  Carolina  (Maul}'  v.  Wil- 
mington, etc.  R.  Co.,  74  N.  C.  655); 
Ohio  (Cleveland,  etc.  Co.  v.  Cor- 
rigan,  46  Ohio  St.  283  ;  20  N.  E.  466  ; 
Lake  Erie,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Mackey,  53 
Ohio  St.  37U;  41  N.  E.  980;  Pennsyl- 
vania (Rauch  v.  Lloyd,  31  Pa.  St. 
358;  Smith  v.  O'Connor,  48  Id.  218  ; 
North  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Mahoney,  57 
Id.  187;  Grayv.  Scott,  06  Id.  345; 
Philadelphia,  etc  R.  Co.  v.  Hassard, 
75  Id.  367  ;  see  Philadelphia,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Spearen,  47  Id.  300);  South 
Carolina  (Bridger  v.  Asheville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  27  S.  C.  450;  3  S.  E.  800); 
Tennessee  (Queen  v.  Dayton,  etc. 
Iron  Co.  95  Tenn.  458  ;  32  S.  W.  460) ; 
Texas  (Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Moore,  59  Tex.  64  ;  Houston,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Simpson,  60  Id.  103);  Vermont 
(Robinson  v.  Cone,  22  Vt.  715); 
Washington  (Roth  v.  Union  Depot 
Co.,  13  Wash.  St.  525  ;  43  Pac.  641); 
Wisconsin  (Schmidt  v.  Milwaukee, 
etc.  R.  Co.  23  Wise.  186  ;  Meibus  v. 
Dodge,  38  Id.  300  ;  Reed  v.  Madison, 
83  Id.  171  ;  53   N.  W.    547). 

2  Felton  v.  Aubrey,  20  C.  C.  A.  436  ; 
74  Fed.  350). 


3  This  was  substantially  the  case 
in  Hartfield  v.  Roper  (21  Wend. 
615),  and  the  court,  therefore,  held 
the  defendant  free  from  negligence. 
The  opinion  of  the  court  upon  all 
other  points  has  been  generally  dis- 
proved (see  Rauch  v.  Lloyd,  31  Pa. 
St.  358  ;  Robinson  v.  Cone.  22  Vt. 
213),  and  has  been  completely  over- 
ruled, so  far  as  it  undertakes  to 
require  from  a  little  child  the  same 
degree  of  care  as  from  a  grown  per- 
son. See  Moebus  v.  Herrmann,  108 
N.  Y.  349  ;  15  N.  E.  415  ;  and  Beach, 
Contrib.    Negl.    2d  ed.  §119,  vt  teq, 

4  Burke  v.  Broadway  R.  Co  ,  49 
Barb.  529.  The  dicta  of  the  court, 
in  that  case,  upon  the  general  ques- 
tion of  the  care  required  from  a 
child,  have  been  overruled,  and  are 
of  no  authority  ;  but  upon  this  par- 
ticular point,  assuming  that  the  facts 
were  as  above  stated,  the  decision 
was  correct,  s.  p. ,  Felton  v.  Aubrey, 
20  C.  C.  A.  436;  74  Fed.  350  ;  Baker  v. 
Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  68  Mich.  90  :  35  N. 
W.  836.  In  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
McLaughlin  (47  111.  265),  it  was  held 
not  to  be  the  duty  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany to  guard   its  cars  so  as  to  pre- 


io9 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


[§73 


if  a  child's  own  act  directly  brings  the  injury  upon  him,  while 
the  negligence  of  the  defendant  is  only  such  as  exposes  the 
child  to  the  possibility  of  injury,  the  latter  cannot  recover 
damages.5  But  these  decisions  have  been  condemned  in  Eng- 
land,6 and  are  directly  opposed  to  the  current  of  American 
cases.7  The  law  has  been  settled  to  the  contrary,  in  America, 
by  the  famous  series  of  turn-table  cases,  in  which  railroad  com- 
panies were  held  liable  by  the  Federal  Supreme  Court,  as  well 
as  by  several  state  courts  of  last  resort,  for  injuries  suffered  by 
little  children,  in  consequence  of  their  own  acts  in  meddling 
with  railroad  turn-tables,  which  were  left  open  to  public  access, 
unfastened  and  unguarded,  although,  of  course,  perfectly 
harmless,  if  let  alone.8     When  such  turn-tables  are  kept  in  a 


vent   children   from    climbing  over 
them. 

5  Hughes  v.  Macfie,  2  Hurlst.  &  C. 
744 ;  Mangan  v.  Atterton,  L.  R.  1 
Ex.  239  ;  4  Hurlst.  &  C.  388. 

6  Clark  v  Chambers,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B. 
Div.  327,  339. 

1  Birge  v.  Gardiner,  19  Conn.  507. 
In  that  case,  the  defendant  negli- 
gently hung  a  gate,  and  the  plain- 
tiff, who  was  six  or  seven  years  old, 
shook  the  gate,  which  fell  upon  him. 
The  jury  having  found,  in  respect  to 
the  age,  condition,  and  circumstances 
of  the  plaintiff,  that  he  was  guilty  of 
no  negligence,  it  was  held  that  even 
if  the  plaintiff  was  a  trespasser,  he 
could  recover.  In  Kunz  v.  Troy  (104 
N.  Y.  314,  revg  36  Hun,  615),  it 
was  held  that  a  boy  less  than  six 
years  old  could  recover  for  injuries 
caused  by  his  pulling  down  upon 
himself  a  liar-counter,  which  had 
been  negligently  suffered  by  the  city 
to  wlistruct  a  sidewalk.  So  in  Mc- 
Guinesa  v.  Butler  (159  Mass.  233; 
84  N.  E.  259),  it  was  held  that 
a  child  who,  in  play  with  other 
boys,  interfered  with  marble  slabs 
resting  on  private  property,  and  par- 
ticipated in  throwi  ig  the  stones  over 
on  himself,  could  not  recover  for 
hi--  in  juries,  though  defendant  may 


have  been  negligent  in  leaving  the 
slabs  where  he  did,  and  though  the 
child's  conduct  was  such  as  might 
reasonably  have  been  expected  of 
him. 

s  Railroad  Co.  v.  Stout,  17  Wall. 
657;  affi'g  2  Dill.  294.  These 
turn-table  cases  were  unfavorably 
noticed  by  Miller,  J.,  in  McAlpin  v. 
Powell  (70  N.  Y.  12G),  where  a  boy  of 
ten  years  was  not  allowed  to  recover 
for  injuries  received  from  a  defect- 
ive fire-escape.  But  they  have  been 
followed  in  California  (Meeks  v. 
Southern,  etc  R.  Co.,  58  Cal.  5 13; 
Barrett  v.  Southern  Pacific  R.  Co.,  91 
Id.  296  ;  27  Pac.  666  ;  Callahan  v  Eel 
River,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92  Cal,  89  ;  28  Pac. 
104)  ;  Georgia  (Ferguson  v.  Colum- 
bus, etc.  R  Co.,  77  Ga.  102) :  Kansas 
(Union  Pacific  li  Co.  v.  Dunden,  37 
Kans.  1  ;  14  Pac.  501  ;  Kansas,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Fitzsimmons,  22  Kans.  686); 
Kentucky  (Bransom  v.  Labrot,  81 
Ky.  638  [lumber  piled  loosely  in  de- 
fendant's yard  ]  i;  Louisiana  .Wot 
erfield  v.  Levi.,  43  La.  Ann.  63  ;  9  So. 
52  [boy  got  on  a  street-roller  left  un- 
cared  for  in  street]  :  but  compare 
O'Connor  v.  Illinois  Central  R.  Co , 
44  La.  Ann.  339;  10  So  678  [cars 
stored  in  an  enclosed  lot]);  Massa- 
cli'isrlts  i Gay  v.   Essex,  etc.   R.   Co., 


§73*] 


t'ONTRIIiUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


I  lO 


place  not  readily  accessible  and  where  children  could  not  be 
reasonably  expected  to  enter,"  or  if  they  were  properly  fas- 
tened or  guarded,10  the  companies  are  not  thus  liable.  In  that 
case  there  would  be  no  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  com- 
panies. 

§  73a.  Age  of  discretion. —  Everywhere,  it  would  seem,  a 
person  of  over  fourteen  years  of  age  is  presumed  to  be  capa- 
ble of  using  some  reasonable  degree  of  care  for  his  own  pro- 
tection ; !  and  in  New  York,  this  line  has  been  once  drawn  at 
twelve  years.2  This,  however,  is  a  mere  presumption,  at  all 
events,  up  to   eighteen   years,  if   not  to   twenty-one  ;  and   the 


159  Mass.  238 ;  34  N.  E.  186  [cars  left 
standing  in  street  with  unfastened 
brakes,  likely  to  attract  children]  ; 
but  compare  Daniels  v.  N.  Y.  &  New 
England  R.  Co.,  154  Mass.  349  ;  28  N. 
E.  283) ;  Michigan  (Powers  v.  Har- 
low, 53  Micl).  507,  a  dynamite  case) ; 
Minnesota  (O'Malley  v.  St.  Paul,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  43  Minn  289  ;  45  N.  W.  440  : 
Keffev.  Milwaukee,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  21 
Minn.  207)  ;  Missouri  (Koons  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  65  Mo.  5  »2  ;  Nagel 
v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  75  Id.  653)  ; 
Nebraska  (Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bailey,  11  Neb  332);  Pennsylvania 
(Hydraulic  Works  v.  Orr,  83  Pa.  St. 
332  :  Cauley  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  95  Id.  398 ;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Schwindling,  101  Id.  258);  South 
Carolina  (Bridger  v.  Asheville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  25  S.  C.  24)  ;  Tennessee 
(Whirley  v.  Whitman,  1  Head.  610  ; 
Bates  v.  Nasbville,  etc.  R.  Co.  90 
Tenn.  36 ;  15  S.  W.  1069)  ;  Texas 
(Houston,  etc.  R.  Co  v.  Simpson,  60 
Tex.  103  ;  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Styron, 
66  Tex.  423  ;  1  S.  W.  161  ;  Gulf,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  McWhirter,  77  Tex.  356  ;  14 
S.  W.  26  :  Ft.  Worth,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Measles,  81  Tex  474  ;  17  S.  W.  124)  ; 
Washingt on  (Hwaco,  etc.  Xav.  Co.  v. 
Hedrick,  1  Wash.  St.  446;  25  Pac. 
335). 


9  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bell,  81 
111,  76  ;  Schmidt  v.  Kansas  Distilling 
Co.,  90  Mo.  284;  1  S.  W.  865. 

10  Bates  v.  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
90  Tenn.  36  ;  15  S.  W.  1069 ;  Haesley 
v.  Winona,  etc.  R.  Co.,  46  Minn.  233  ; 
48  N.  W.  1023  ;  Kolsti  v.  Minneapolis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Minn.  133.  For  pecu- 
liar cases,  in  which  defendant  was 
held  liable  to  children,  see  Penso  v. 
McCormick,  125  Ind.  1 16  ;  25  N.  E.  156 
[hot  asbes  on  lot]  ;  Gunderson  v. 
Northwestern  Elevator  Co.,  47  Minn. 
161  ;  49  N.  W.  694  [machinery 
started]  ;  and  for  cases  in  which  chil- 
dren could  not  recover,  see  Rodgers 
v.  Lees,  140  Pa.  St.  475  ;  21  Atl.  399 
[machinery  in  motion  from  unknown 
cause]  ;  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ed- 
wards, 90  Tex.  65  ;  36  S.  W.  430 
[child  of  eight,  disobeying  orders  to 
quit]  :  Robinson  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  7  Utah,  493  ;  27  Pac.  689  [un- 
guarded handcar]. 

1  See  Pratt  Iron  Co.  v.  Brawley,  83 
Ala.  371  ;    3  So.  555. 

'-'  Tucker  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  124  N.  Y.  308;  26  N.  E.  916. 
This  case,  so  far  as  it  held  a  boy  of 
twelve  bound  to  as  much  care  as  an 
adult,  is  clearly  overruled  by  the 
superior  authority  of  Swift  v.  Staten 
I.  R.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.  645  ;  25  N.  E.  378- 


I II 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


[§73* 


question  is  for  the  jury.3  The  division  line,  between  responsi- 
ble and  irresponsible  age,  is  not  for  the  jury,  but  must  be 
decided  by  the  court.4  In  analogy  to  the  rule  which  holds  a 
child,  under  seven  years  of  age,  incapable  of  crime,  some 
courts  have  also  considered  them  incapable  of  negligence;5 
but  it  is  generally  held  that  this  is  not  to  be  conclusively  pre- 
sumed.6 Juries  may  be  depended  upon  not  to  overrule  this 
presumption,  except  in  perfectly  clear  cases.     Some  degree  of 


3  At  eighteen  years  a  full  degree  of 
care  is  required  (Shelley  v.  Austin, 
74  Tex.  608  ;  12  S.  W.  753)  ;  but  not 
at  sixteen  (Kucera  v.  Merrill  Lumber 
Co.,  91  Wise.  637;  65  N.  W.  374) ;  or 
at  fifteen  (Swift  v.  Staten  Island  R. 
Co..  123  N.  Y.  645;  25  N.  E.  378; 
Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Gastineau, 
83  Ky.  119). 

4  In  the  case  of  a  boy  between 
fourteen  and  fifteen  years  of  age, 
Paxson,  J.,  in  Nagle  v.  Alle- 
gheny, etc.  R.  Co.  (88  Pa.  St. 
35),  said  :  "At  what  age  must 
an  infant's  responsibility  for  negli- 
gence be  presumed  to  commence? 
This  question  cannot  be  answered 
by  referring  it  to  a  jury.  That 
would  furnish  us  with  no  rule 
whatever.  It  would  give  us  a  mere 
shifting  standard  affected  by  the 
sympathies  or  prejudices  of  the  jury 
in  each  particular  case.  One  jury 
would  fix  the  period  of  responsibility 
at  fourteen,  another  at  twenty  or 
twenty-one.  This  is  not  a  question 
of  fact  for  the  jury,  but  of  law  for 
the  court."  s.  P.,  Deitrich  v.  Balti- 
more, etc.  R.  Co.,  58  Md.  347.  But 
compare  many  cases  elsewhere  cited, 
apparently  to  the  contrary. 

5  It  lias  been  said  that  a  child  of 
four  years  (Hamilton  v.  Morgan's 
Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  824  ;  8  So.  586; 
Barnes  v.  Shreveport  R.  Co.,  47  La. 
Ann.  1218  ;  17  So.  782  ;  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Schuster,  113  Pa.  St.  412  ; 
Fink  v.  Missouri  Furnace  Co.,  10  Mo. 
App.  61),  or  less  than  six  (Schnur  v. 


Citizens'  Tr.  Co.,  153  Pa.  St  29;  25 
Atl.  650;  Dicken  v.  Liverpool  Salt 
Co.,  41  W.  Va.  511;  23  S.  E.  582  [child 
under  three]  ;  Bay  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Harris,  67  Ala.  6) ,  is  incapable  of 
negligence.  In  Alabama,  the  rule  is 
said  to  be,  that  negligence  cannot  be 
imputed  to  a  child  under  seven ; 
while  a  child  between  seven  and 
fourteen  is  presumed  to  be  incapable 
of  it  (Pratt  Iron  Co.  v.  Brawley,  83 
Ala.  371;  3  So.  555). 

6  Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Wilcox,  138  111. 
370  ;  24  N.  E.  419  [question  always 
for  jury  ;  error  in  charging  that 
child  of  six  was  not  responsible]  ; 
Pekin  v.  McMahon,  154  111.  141  ;  39 
N.  E.  484  [child  over  seven  may  be 
responsible]  ;  Hayes  v.  Norcross,  162 
Mass.  546;  39  N.  E.  282  [boy  of  five 
and  one-half];  Ervvin  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  96  Mo.  290 ;  9  S.  W.  577 
[boy  of  eleven].  From  the  nature  of 
the  case,  it  is  impossible  to  prescribe 
a  fixed  period  when  a  child  becomes 
s/ii  juris,  some  reaching  the  point 
earlier  than  others,  according  to 
natural  capacity,  physical  condi- 
tions, training,  habits  of  life  and 
surroundings.  Unless  the  court  can 
safely  decide  the  fact  in  the  case  of 
a  child  of  very  tender  years  (e.  g. 
seven)  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury 
(Stone  v.'Dry  Dock,  etc.  R.  Co.,  115 
N.  Y.  104  ;  21  N.  E.  712  ;  rev'g  46  Hun, 
184).  A  child  under  two  years  is 
clearly  not  responsible  (Bottoms  v. 
Seaboard  R.  Co.,  114N.  C.  699;  19  S. 
E.  730). 


§73a] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


II: 


care  may  justly  be  required,  even  from  children  of  six  or  seven 
years.  But  such  a  child  is  everywhere  presumed  to  be  in- 
capable of  contributory  negligence.7  In  nearly  all  the  cases, 
the  question  of  the  power  and  duty  of  any  child,  between 
three  and  twelve  years  of  age,  to  exercise  care  for  its  own  pro- 
tection, is  held  to  be  for  the  jury.8  But  in  Massachusetts,  the 
question  has  been  taken  away  from  the  jury,  in  the  case  of  a 
child  of  eight  years9  and  even  five  years  and  a  half.10     And  in 


1  Stone  v.  Dry  Dock,  etc.  R.  Co., 
stipm :  Johnson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  56  Wise.  274 ;  Westbrook  v.  Mo- 
bile, etc.  R.  Co.,  66  Miss.  560  ;  6  So. 
321  [at  rive  years,  presumed  not 
responsible]. 

s  Spillane  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
Ill  Mo.  555  ;  20  S.  W.  293  ;  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sears,  11  Ind.  App.  654  ; 
38  N.  E.  837  [eight  years]  ;  Avey  v. 
Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  81  Tex.  243 
[ten  years]  ;  Bridger  v.  Asheville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  25  S.  C.  24  ;  3  S.  E.  860  [eleven 
years]  ;  Fehnrich  v.  Michigan  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  87  Mich.  606  ;  49  N.  W.  890 
[boy  of  fourteen,  question  of  con- 
tributory negligence  for  the  jury]  : 
McCann  v.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  117  N. 
Y.  505  ;  23  N.  E.  164  [boy  of  thirteen]. 
The  court  properly  left  it  to  the  jury 
to  say  whether  a  bright,  intelligent 
child,  aged  seven  years  and  ac- 
customed to  being  out  in  the  street, 
was  or  was  not  sui  juris  (Kitchell  v. 
Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  6  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
99  ;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  741) ;  s.  P.,  Penny 
v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  595  ;  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  172  ;  Ben- 
nett v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  1  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  205  ;  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  447  [eight 
years]  ;  Guichard  v.  New,  9  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  485 ;  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  456 
[Ik  iv  of  eight  years,  warned  of  dan- 
ger]: Payne  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
129  Mo.  405  ;  31  S.  W.  885  [colored  boy 
of  eleven  years,  crossing  track]  : 
Savannah,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  93 
Ga.  742  ;  21  S.  E.  157  [hoy  of  nine 
years].    "  Whether  the  injury  might 


have  been  avoided  by  the  exercise  of 
that  care  and  discretion  which  was 
reasonably  to  be  looked  for  in  a  boy 
of  his  years  "  (Pensylvama  R.  Co.  v. 
Kelly,  31  Pa.  St.  372)  is  for  the  jury 
to  determine  (Johnson  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Wise.  529  ;  56  Id.  274  ; 
Ewen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  38  Id. 
614  ;  Townley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  53  Id.  626  ;  Vickers  v.  Atlanta, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  64  Ga.  306  ;  Wynn  v. 
City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91  Id.  344  :  17  S.  E. 
649  ;  Nagle  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co., 
75  Mo.  653  ;  Paducah,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hoehl,  12  Bush,  41;  Reynolds  v.  N. 
Y.  Central,  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y.  248; 
Ihl  v.  Forty-second  St.  R.  Co., 
47  Id.  317;  Connolly  v.  Knicker- 
bocker Ice  Co.,  114  Id.  104  ;  21  N.  E. 
101 ;  Mulligan  v,  Curtis,  100 Mass.  512  ; 
Bliss  v.  South  Hadley.  145  Id.  91  ;  13 
N.  E.  352  ;  Dealey  v.  Muller,  149  Mass. 
432  ;  21  X.  E.  763,  and  cases  supra. 
See  §  114,  post).  The  jury  found 
specially  that  plaintiff,  seven  years 
old,  was  ordinarily  bright,  knew  the 
danger  of  crossing  before  an  ap- 
proaching train,  did  not  see  it,  but 
would  have  seen  it  if  he  had  looked 
in  the  proper  direction.  General 
verdict  for  plaintiff  sustained 
(Baker  v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  68  Mich. 
90  ;  35  N.  W.  836). 

9  Messenger  v.  Dennie,  137  Mass. 
197  [boy  dropping  from  rear  of 
sleigh]. 

10  A  boy  five  and  one-half  years  of 
age,  with  his  mother's  permission, 
started  to  go  across  a  street,  darted 


H3 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§73* 


New  York,  a  child,  over  seven,  has  been  held  responsible  as 
matter  of  law  for  willful  disobedience  of  proper  orders.11  The 
true  rule  would  seem  to  be  that  the  court  should  take  the 
question  away  from  the  jury,  where  the  clear  weight  of  evi- 
dence shows  that  the  child  had  a  capacity  for  self-protection, 
which  it  culpably  omitted  to  use,  in  face  of  a  danger  which  it 
knew  and  sufficiently  appreciated;12  but  not  otherwise.13 
Subject  to  these  qualifications,  a  child  is  responsible  for  that 
degree  of  care,  and  that  only,  which  could  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected from  him,  considering  his  age,  capacity  and  experi- 
ence.14    Where  the  fiction  of  imputed  parental  negligence  still 


quickly  from  the  curb,  and  was 
struck  by  defendant's  horse  ;  when 
he  started  he  could  have  been  but  a 
few  feet  from  him.  The  accident 
occurred  in  broad  daylight.  Held, 
that  plaintiff  failed  to  exercise  the 
care  which  ordinarily  careful  boys 
of  his  age  would  exercise,  and  could 
not  recover  (Hayes  v.  Norcross,  162 
Mass.  546  ;  39  N.  E.  282  . 

!1  A  boy  of  seven,  who  willfully 
runs  in  front  of  a  train,  in  spite  of 
warnings  and  efforts  to  restrain  him, 
cannot  recover  damages  (Wendell  v. 
N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  91  N.  Y.  420). 
That  case,  however,  was  tried  upon 
the  assumption  that  the  boy  was  old 
enough  to  justify  his  parents  in  al- 
lowing him  to  go  out  freely.  In 
Twist  v.  Winona,  etc.  R.  Co.  (39 
Minn.  164 ;  39  N.  W.  402),  a  boy  over 
ten  who,  in  disobedience  of  parental 
warning,  interfered  with  a  turn- 
table, was  held  responsible. 

"  AVendell  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  91  N.  Y.  420  ;  Reynolds  v.  N.  Y. 
Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58  Id.  248; 
Hooper  v.  Johnstown,  etc.  R.  Co., 
59  Hun,  121;  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  151 
[girl  of  eleven  on  familiar  path]; 
Sheets  v.  Connolly  St.  R.  Co.,  54  N.  J. 
Law,  518;  24  Atl.  483  [intelligent 
girl  of  ten].  A  boy  of  thirteen, 
knowing  the  danger  which  he  as- 
sumed, is  responsible  i  Merryman  v. 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  8] 


Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85  Iowa,  634  ; 
52  N.  W.  545)  ;  Wallace  v.  New 
Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  165  Mass.  236  ;  42 
N.  E.  1125  [girl  of  thirteen  going  be- 
tween sections  of  train]. 

13  Brown  v.  Sherer,  155  Mass.  83  ; 
29  N.  E.  50  [girl  of  six  skipping  in 
front  of  horse] ;  O'Shaughnessy  v. 
Suffolk  Brewing  Co.,  145  Mass.  569  ; 
14  N.  E.  779  [girl  of  eight  struck  by 
wagon,  while  sitting  on  curb,  with 
feet  in  gutter]  ;  Hepfel  v.  St.  Paul, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Minn.  263 ;  51  N.  W. 
1049  [boy  of  twelve  stealing  ride]  ; 
Guichard  v.  New,  84  Hun,  54  ;  31  N. 
Y.  S.  1080  [boy  of  eight,  peering  into 
elevator]  ;  McGuire  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  37  Fed.  54  [boy  of  ten  struck 
by  train]  ;  see  Lynch  v.  Metropolitan 
R.  Co.,  112  Mo.  420;  20  S.  W.  642 
[boy  of  ten  run  over  by  car].  It  is 
not  enough  that  a  boy  should  know 
that  his  act  was  wrong,  if  he  does 
not  know  that  it  is  dangerous 
(Bridger  v.  Asheville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  25 
S.  C.  24).  s.  p.,  McCahill  v.  Detroit 
R.  Co.,  96  Mich.  156  ;  55  N.  W.  668 
[disobedience  of  father  :  but  no  proof 
of  comprehension  of  danger]. 

14  The  law  demands  the  exercise  of 
care  and  prudence  equal  to  plaintiff's 
actual  capacity,  age,  knowledge  and 
experience;  no  less  (Van  Natta  v. 
People's  R.  Co.,  133  Mo.  13  ;  34  S.  YV. 
505;    Queen  v.  Dayton  Coal  Co.,  95 


§  73a]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  II4 

lingers  (as  in  Massachusetts)  a  child,  allowed  by  its  parents  to 
go  alone,  in  public  places,  is  charged  with  such  capacity  as 
such  a  child  ought  to  have,  before  being  allowed  to  do  so.15 
In  other  courts,  no  such  rule  prevails.16  In  actions  brought  by 
parents,  etc.,  for  their  damage  through  injuries  to  their  chil- 
dren, the  question  whether  they  were  negligent  in  permitting 
children  to  encounter  danger  by  going  out  alone,  involves 
much  the  same  consideration  of  age,  intelligence  and  capacity; 
and  the  requirement  of  parental  watchfulness  and  restraint 
varies,  in  inverse  proportion,  according  to  the  age  of  the 
child.     Reference  must  be  made  to  the  reported  cases.17 


Tenn.  458  ;  32  S.  W.  460  ;  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Webb,  99  Ky.  332  ;  35 
S.  W.  1117) :  and  no  more  (Cons. 
Traction  Co  v.  Scott,  58  N.  J.  Law, 
682;  34  Atl.  1094;  Strudgeon  v. 
Sand  Beach,  107  Mich.  496  ;  65  N.  W. 
616  [boy  of  ten]  ;  Norton  v.  Volzke, 
158  111.  402  ;  41  N.  E.  1085).  So  held, 
as  to  boys  of  seven  years  (Spring- 
field R.  Co.  v.  Welsh,  155  111.  511 ; 
40  N.  E.  1034  ;  Kentucky  Hotel  Co. 
v.  Camp  [Ky.]  30  S.  W.  1010  ;  Pierce 
v.  Connors,  20  Colo.  178  ;  37  Pac. 
721 ;  Stone  v.  Dry  Dock,  etc.  R.  Co. , 
115  N.  Y.  104 ;  21  N.  E.  712) ;  and 
even  sixteen  (Kucera  v.  Merrill  Lum- 
ber Co.,  91  Wise.  637  ;  65  N.  W.  374.) 
15  Hayes  v.  Norcross,  162  Mass. 
546  ;  39  N.  E.  282.  The  truth  is  that 
the  defendant  in  that  case  was  not 
in  fault ;  and  that  was  the  proper 
ground  of  decision. 

"Cincinnati  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  54 
Ohio  St.  181 ;  43  N.  E.  688  [boy  of  four- 
teen J:  compare  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Eininger,  114  111.  79;  29  N.  E. 
196,  in  which  boy's  age  did  not 
appear. 

17  It  has  been  held  not  negligence, 
as  matter  of  laic,  for  the  parents  of 
a  child  six  or  seven  years  old.  to 
allow  him  to  go  into  the  streets  un- 
attended. The  question  of  negli- 
gence in  such  case  must  be  left  to  the 
jury  (Oldfield  v.  Harlem R.  Co.,  14  N. 


Y.  310).     The  same  ruling  was  made 
in  the  case  of  children  of  seven  (Riley 
v.  Salt  Lake  Tr.  Co.,  10  Utah  428  ;  37 
Pac.  681),  eight  (Drew  v.  Sixth  Ave. 
R.  Co.,  26  N.  Y.  49) ;  nine  (Sheridan  v. 
Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co.  36  Id.  39),  and 
ten  years  of  age  (Karr  v.  Parks,  40 
Cal.  188).    Nor,  in  the  case  of  a  child 
eleven  years  old,    is    it  necessarily 
negligent   to  allow    him  to  go  out 
alone,   even  after  dark    (Lovett  v. 
Salem,   etc.    R.   Co.,  9    Allen,  557). 
But  it  has  been  held  negligence,  as 
matter  of   law,  to  allow  a  child  of 
about  two  years  (Hartfield  v.  Roper, 
21  Wend.  615),  two  years  and  four 
months  (Callahan  v.  Bean,  9  Allen, 
401),    seventeen   months    (Kreig   v. 
Wells,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  74),  four  years 
(Glassey  v.  Hestonville,  etc.   R.  Co., 
57  Pa.  St.  172  ;  see  Lehman  v.  Brook- 
lyn. 29  Barb  234\  five  (Clinton  v.  Bos- 
ton Beer  Co.,  164  Mass.  514  ;  41  N.  E. 
1070).  or  even  six  years  of  age  (Chi- 
cago v.  Starr,  42  111.  174),  to  go  thus 
unattended,  in  the  absence  of  some 
explanation.      See,  however,  to  the 
contrary,    as    to  a   child   about  two 
years  old,  Boland  v.  Missouri  R.  Co., 
36  Mo.  484  ;  as  to  one  less  than  four 
years    old,     Robinson  v.    Cone,    22 
Vt.  213,  and  as  to   a  child  of  four, 
Chicago  v.  Major.  18  111.  349  ;  McVee 
v.  Watertown,    92  Hun,  306.    And, 
in  Karr  v.  Parks  (40  Cal.  188),  it  was 


I  i 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


[£74 


|  74.  Imputation  of  parent's  negligence :  New  York 
rule.—  The  Supreme  Court  of  New  York,  in  the  leading  case 
of  Hartfield  v.  Roper,1  invented  a  rule  that  where  a  child,  so 
young  as  not  to  be  held  responsible  for  the  exercise  of  such 
care  as  is  required  from  persons  of  full  age,  fails  to  exercise 
that  care,  the  negligence  of  his  parents  or  other  lawful  custo- 
dians is  to  be  imputed  to  the  child,  in  the  same  manner  as  if 
they  were  acting  under  his  direction,  instead  of  his  acting  under 
theirs.  Some  of  the  decisions  put  this  doctrine  on  the  ground 
that  the  parent  must  in  law  be  deemed  the  agent  of  the  child  ;2 
while  in  other  decisions  the  courts  refused  to  consider  the  ques- 
tion as  one  of  agency,  and  put  their  rule  upon  the  ground  that 
the  child   is  identified  with  its  guardian:3  a  legal  fiction  which 


held  not  necessarily  negligent  to  let 
a  child  of  five  years  go  alone  upon 
an  unfrequented   street.     See,  also, 
Schierhold    v.  North  Beach,  etc.  R. 
Co.  (40  Cal.  447).  Very  slight  explana- 
tions were  held  sufficient  to  send  the 
case  to  a  jury  where  a  boy  four 
and  two-thirds  years  old,    was   al- 
lowed    to     go    alone    in    the     vic- 
inity   of     railroad      tracks      (Led- 
errnan     v.     Pennsylvania    R.     Co., 
165   Pa.    St.    118;   30  Atl.    725);    or 
where  a  child  escapes  from  control 
(Weil  v.  Dry  Dock  R.  Co.,  119  N.  Y. 
147  :  23  N.    E.   487  [two  years  old]  ; 
Marsland  v.   Murray,  148   Mass.  91  ; 
18  N.    E.    680  [less  than  five]  ;   Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Logue.  158  111.  621  ; 
1J    X.    E.    53    [twenty-one  months]. 
See  Chrystal  v.   Troy,    etc.    R.   Co., 
105  N.  Y.  164  ;    11  N.  E.   380  [seven- 
teen  months]  ;     Bamberger  v.  Citi- 
zens" R.  Co.,  95  Tenn.  18  ;    31  S.  \Y. 
163.)     Where  a  child  of  three  years 
was  sent  out  under  the  charge  of  his 
lister,  aged   nine  and   a  half,    held, 
that  the   question    must   be   left   to 
jury  ilhl  v.  Forty-second  St.  R.  Co., 
47  X.  Y.  317).     S.  P.,  Evers  v.  Phila- 
delphia Traction  Co.,  176  Pa.  St.  376  ; 
B5     Ml.    140    [child    four    and    one- 
halt    years    in    charge  of    another, 
eight  years] ;  Harkins  v.  Pittsburgh, 


etc.  Tr.  Co.,  173  Pa.  St.  146  ;  33  Atl. 
1041  [custodian  a  boy  of  four- 
teen]. So  as  to  children,  both  un- 
der six  years  (Strutzel  v.  St.  Paul 
Ry.  Co.,  47  Minn.  543  ;  50  N.  W. 
690).  Permission  by  the  parent  of 
a  child  three  years  old  to  play  in  the 
street,  accompanied  by  another  child 
seven  years  older,  is  not  such  neg- 
ligence as  to  prevent  a  recovery 
(Stafford  v.  Reubens,  115  111.  196). 
When  a  child  eighteen  months  old, 
strays  on  the  track  and  is  injured, 
while  prima  facie,  negligence  is  im- 
putable to  the  parent,  still  the  ques- 
tion is  for  the  jury  (Gibbons  v.  Wil- 
liams, 135  Mass.  333;  McGeary  v. 
Eastern  R.  Co.,  Id.  363;  compare 
O'Connor  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Id. 
352.) 

1  21  Wend.  615  ;  S.  C,  34  Am.  Rep 
273. 

2  See  the  cases  collected  and  re- 
viewed on  all  points  covered  by  this 
section,  in  Beach,  Contr.  Negl.  2d 
ed.,  §§  119-130. 

3  This  seems  to  have  been  partly 
the  ground  of  the  decision  in  Waite 
v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  El.,  Bl.  &  E. 
719  ;  affi'd,  Id.  728.  In  that  case 
the  negligence  charged  was  only  a 
failure  to  warn  P.  ;  and  the  child 
could  not  have  understood  any  warn- 


§74j 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


Il6 


led  to  the  famous  and  now  exploded  decision  of  Thorogood 
v.  Bryan,1  which  we  have  already  noticed.  For  one  or  the 
other  reason,  or  no  reason,  this  rule  of  imputed  negligence 
seems  to  be  at  present  established  in  New  York,5  Maine,6 
Massachusetts,7  Delaware,8  Maryland,9  Indiana,10  Minnesota,11 
Kansas,12  and  California;13  although  there  is  an  increasing 
disposition  in  all  these  states  to  moderate  the  stringency 
of  the  rule.  It  is  probably  adopted  in  England  ;14  although 
the  recent  overruling  of  Thorogood  v.  Bryan15  and   Mangan 


ing.  The  decision  was  put  upon  the 
ground  that  defendant's  implied  con- 
tract was  only  to  carry  the  child, 
subject  to  proper  care  on  the  part  of 
the  custodian. 

4  8  C.  B.  115  :  see  §  66,  ante. 

5  The  rule  is  assumed  to  be  law,  in 
Thurber  v.  Harlem,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60 
N .  Y.  333  ;  McGarry  v.  Loomis,  63  Id. 
104  ;  Ihl  v.  Forty-second  St.  R.  Co., 
47  Id.  323 ;  Cosgrove  v.  Ogden,  49 
Id.  255  ;  Mangam  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co., 
38  Id.  455  ;  affi'g  36  Barb.  230  ;  Hon- 
egsberger  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  2 
Abb.  Ct.  App.  378.  The  rule  is  of 
course  followed  blindly,  in  all  the 
lower  courts;  Williams  v.  Gardiner, 
58  Hun.  508;  12  N.  Y.  Supp.  612; 
Ames  v.  Broadway,  etc.  B.  Co.,  56 
N.  Y.  Superior,  3  ;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  803. 

6  Leslie  v.  Lewiston,  62  Me.  468  ; 
Brown  v.  European,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58 
Id.  384 ;  compare  O'Brien  v.  Mc- 
Glinchy,  68  Id.  552. 

1  Lynch  v.  Smith,  104  Mass.  52  ; 
Gibbons  v.  Williams,  135  Id.  333  ; 
Mulligan  v.  Curtis,  100  Id.  512; 
Casey  v.  Smith,  152  Id.  294 ;  25  N. 
E.  734  :  Wright  v.  Maiden,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  4  Allen,  283  ;  Callahan  v.  Bean, 
9  Id.  401  ;  Holly  v.  Boston  Gas  Co.,  8 
Gray,  123.  In  Coombs  v.  New  Bed- 
ford Card  Co.  (102  Mass.  572),  how- 
ever, it  was  held  that  a  boy  of  four- 
teen, who  is  negligently  and 
improperly  sent  by  his  parents  to 
work  at    dangerous    machinery,    is 


injured,  through  the  negligence  of 
the  proprietor,  has  a  remedy  against 
the  proprietor,  notwithstanding  the 
parent's  negligence. 

8  Kyne  v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co., 
8  Del.  185  ;  14  Atl.  922. 

0  McMahon  v.  Northern,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  39  Md.  439  ;  Baltimore,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  McDonnell,  43  Id.  534 ;  but 
limited  in  the  latter  case. 

10  Jeffersonville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bowen,  40  Ind.  545  ;  Hathaway  v. 
Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  46  Id.  25  ;Evans- 
ville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wolf,  59  Id.  89; 
Pittsburgh  v.  Vining,  27  Id.  513 ; 
Lafayette,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Huffman,  28 
Id.  287. 

11  Fitzgerald  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  29  Minn.  336  ;  St.  Paul  v.  Kuby, 
8  Id.  166. 

12  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
28  Kans.  541  ;  Smith  v.  Atchison,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  25  Id.  738. 

u  Meeks  v.  Southern  Pacific  R. 
Co.,  52  Cal.  602  ;  56  Id.  513  ;  Schier- 
hold  v.  North,  etc.  R.  Co.,  40  Id.  447 ; 
McQuilken  v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64 
Id.  463  ;  2  Pac.  46  ;  assumed  in  Daly 
v.  Hinz,  113  Cal.  366;  45  Pac.  693; 
Higgins  v.  Deeney,  78  Cal.  578;  21 
Pac.  428. 

14  Singleton  v.  Eastern  Cos.  R.  Co., 
7  C.  B.  [N.  S.]  287  ;  Mangan  v.  Atter- 
ton.  L.  R.  1  Ex.  239.  This  is  said  to 
be  the  law  of  Scotland  (Campbell  on 
Negl..  £  81). 

15  See  £  66,  ante, 


117  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  [§75 

v.    Atterton,16   logically    requires    a   re-consideration    of    this 
point. 

§  75.  New  York  rule  criticised. —  The  rule  of  imputed 
negligence,  founded  upon  a  dictum  in  Hartfield  v.  Roper,1 
has  undoubtedly  been  affirmed  in  many  cases  in  New  York 
courts  of  original  jurisdiction;  and  it  has  been  often  men- 
tioned by  the  Court  of  Appeals  as  if  it  were  settled  law.2  But 
it  is  a  remarkable  fact  that  the  question  has  never  been 
squarely  presented  to  any  court  of  last  resort  in  New  York, 
for  decision ;  and  apparently  the  question  has  never  been 
argued  there.  In  only  one  case  was  a  decision  made  upon 
even  a  part  of  that  issue;  and  in  that3  the  injured  child  was 
twelve  years  old,  and  was  old  enough  to  know  better  than  to 
jump  off  a  moving  train  in  motion,  but  was  fairly  dragged  off 
by  her  father.  The  court  assumed,  without  the  slightest  dis- 
cussion, that  the  parent's  negligence  was  chargeable  to  the 
child.  But  there,  the  father,  by  almost  forcibly  carrying  off 
his  daughter,  was  the  direct  cause  of  her  injury;  and  if  she 
consented  to  his  act,  as  she  undoubtedly  did,  she  was  old 
enough  to  be  responsible.  The  result  of  our  examination  of 
the  cases  is  to  satisfy  us  that  the  last  of  the  long  series  of  so- 
called  decisions  on  this  point  is  like  the  first,  a  mere  dictum, 
uttered  without  hearing  argument  and  without  consideration. 
The  main  question  is  entirely  open  to  review  in  the  Court  of 
Appeals.4  And,  as  that  court  did  not  hesitate  to  overrule  a 
decision  of  the  Supreme  Court,3  on  a  point  of  commercial  and 
statutory  law,  which  had  been  acted  upon  for  thirty  years 
without  question,  we  can  see  no  good  reason  why  it  should 
not  break  through  the  precedents  on  this  important  question, 
and  allow  it  to  be  argued  as  new,  in  accordance  with  the  wise 

,,;  In  Clark  v.  Chambers,  L.  R.  3  was,    therefore,  a   perfectly  proper 

Q.  B.  Div.  327.  defense.     As  to  the  authority  of  this 

1  21  Wend.  615.  case,  see  Weaver  v.  Bull  is,  14  N.  Y. 

2  See  last  section.  Supp.   338  ;  affi'd,   without  opinion, 
;  Morrison  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  128  N.  Y.  634. 

302.  ■'  Williams  v.  Tilt,   36  N.  Y.  319  ; 

4  Honegsberger  v.  Second  Ave.   R.  overriding  Ramsdell  v.  Morgan,  16 

Co.  (2  Abb.  Ct.  App.  378  ;  1  Keyes,  Wend.  574,  and  Keutgen  v.  Parks,  2 

574),  was  an  action  by  the  father  in  Sandf.  60. 
his  own  right ;  and   his  negligence 


£  ;SJ  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  I  I  8 

policy  of  the  English  Court  of  Appeal,  in  overruling  Thoro- 
good  v.  Bryan,  after  it  had  stood  for  thirty-eight  years. 

§  76.  Imputed  negligence  ;  Illinois  rule. —  {Omitted:  see 
§78]. 

§77.  Identification  of  child  and  custodian. —  In  former 
editions,  we  discussed  at  length  the  application  of  the  doctrine 
of  "identification"  to  the  case  of  a  child;  a  doctrine  which 
was  thus  applied  in  England,1  in  Massachusetts2  and  Mis- 
souri,3 but  wholly  rejected  in  Ohio,4  Pennsylvania,5  and  Texas.6 
But  as  this  idea  is  now  exploded,  and  would,  upon  principle, 
require  that  a  wife,  when  submitting  to  the  guidance  and  con- 
duct of  her  husband,  should  be  chargeable  with  his  negligence, 
which  is  certainly  not  the  law  in  America,  we  do  not  see  how 
this  rule  is  to  escape  the  fate  of  Thorogood  v.  Bryan. 

§  78.  True  rule  :   no  imputation  of  parental  negligence. — 

Without  further  discussion  of  the  supposed  "  New  York  "  rule, 
we  content  ourselves  with  saying  that  the  Vermont  rule,  as  it 
may  be  called,  from  having  been  first  clearly  adjudged  in  Ver- 
mont, commends  itself  to  our  judgment,  and  is  abundantly 
justified  by  the  reasoning  of  the  courts  which  have  adopted  it. 
This  rule,  which  has  now  been  adopted  in  at  least  twenty 
states,1  is,  that  the  contributory  negligence  of  a   parent,  guar- 

1  Waite  v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  El.  which  were  as  prudent  as  could  he 
B.  &  El.  719.  expected  at  his  age.     s.  P.,  Collins  v. 

2  Holly  v.  Boston  Gas  Co.,  8  Gray,  South  Boston  R.  Co.,  142  Mass.  301. 
132.  It  is  now  held,  in  Massachu-  4  Bellefontaine  R.  Co.  v.  Snyder, 
setts,  that  the  question  whether  a  18  Ohio  St.  399.  See  all.  the  cases 
parent  exercised  reasonable  care  collected  in  Thompson,  1189-11.  1. 
over  a  child,  run  over  in  the  street,  D  North  Penn.  R.  v.  Mahoney,  57 
is  for  the  jury   (Powers  v.  Quincy,  Pa.  St.  187. 

etc.  R.  Co..  163  Mass.  5  ;  39  N.  E.  345).  G  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Hoff- 

See  Clinton  v.  Boston  Beer  Co.,  164  man,  80  Tex.  420  ;  15  S.  W.  1048. 

Mass.  514;  41  N.  E.  1070.  •Robinson    v.  Cone,  22   Vt.    213. 

3  Stillson  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  A  boy  three  years  and  nine  months 
67  Mo.  671.  In  East  Saginaw  R.  Co.  old,  while  coasting  in  the  highway, 
v.  Bohn  (27  Mich.  503),  it  was  held  lying  upon  his  breast  upon  a  sled, 
that  a  little  child,  sent  out  in  charge  was  run  over  by  a  sleigh.  It  was 
of  an  older  one,  is  not  deprived  of  held  that  he  was  not  precluded  from 
remedy  by  acts  of  the  older  child,  redress:    the    court    (Redfield,    J.) 


ii9 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


[§78 


dian,  or  other  person  having  control  of  a  child  is  not  to  be 
imputed  to  the  child  itself  and  is  no  defense  to  the  child's 
action;  inasmuch  as  such  guardian  is  not  the  agent  of  the 
child,  and  the  doctrine  of  identification  is  a  pure  fiction. 
Such  an  overwhelming  weight  of  authority,  as  well  as  of  argu- 
ment, entitles  us  to  treat  the  so-called  "New  York  rule" 
as  obsolete. 


saying:  "We  are  satisfied  that 
although  a  child  or  idiot  or  lunatic 
may  to  some  extent  have  escaped 
into  the  highway  through  the  fault 
or  negligence  of  his  keeper,  and  so 
be  i  nproperly  there,  yet  if  he  is  hurt 
by  the  negligence  of  the  defendant, 
he  is  not  precluded  from  his  redress. 
If  one  knew  that  such  a  person  is  in 
the  highway,  or  on  a  railway,  he  is 
bound  to  a  proportionate  degree  of 
watchfulness,  and  what  would  be 
ordinary  neglect  in  regard  to  one 
whom  the  defendant  supposed  a  per- 
son of  full  age  and  capacity,  would 
be  gross  neglect  as  to  a  child  or  one 
known  to  be  incapable  of  escaping 
danger."'  This  rule  is  law  in  Ala- 
bama (Government  St.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hanlon,  53  Ala.  70  :  S.  P. ,  Pratt  Iron 
Co.  v.  Brawley,  83  Ala.  371  :  3  So. 
55">);  Connecticut  (Daley  v  Norwich, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  26  Conn.  591;  Bronson 
v.  Southbury,  37  Id.  199;  Birge  v. 
Gardiner.  19  Id.  507);  Georgia  (Fer- 
guson v.  Columbus,  etc.  R.  Co.,  77 
Ga.  102);  Illinois  (Chicago  R.  Co.  v. 
Wilcox,  138  111.370;  27  N.  E.  899, 
reviewing  all  the  Illinois  cases  ;  S. 
C.,  24  N.  E.  319,  is  probably  a  minor- 
ity opinion,  concurring  on  this  point. 
The  doctrine  was  reaffirmed  in 
Daube  v.  Tennison,  154  111.  210  ;  39 
N.  E.  989  ;  Iowa  (Wymore  v.  Ma- 
haska County,  78  Iowa,  396;  43  N. 
W.  264  ;  Walters  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  41  Iowa,  71);  Louisiana  (West- 
erfield  v.  Levis,  43  La.  Ann.  63  ;  9 
80.  52);  Michigan  (Shippy  v.  An 
Sable,    65  Mich    494  ;  48  N.    W.  584. 


per  Champlin,  C.  J.;  Schindler  v. 
Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  87  Mich.  400 ; 
49  N.  W.  670);  Mississippi  (West- 
brook  v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66  Miss. 
560;  6  So.  321);  Missouri  (Frick  v. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  75  Mo.  542, 
595  ;  Boland  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co. , 
36  Id.  484  ;  see  Stillson  v.  Hannibal 
etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Id.  671  ;  Winters  v. 
Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99  Id.  509  ; 
12  S.  W.  652);  Nebraska  (Huff  v 
Ames,  16  Neb.  139;  19  N.  W.  623); 
New  Hampshire  (Bisaillon  v.  Blood, 
64  X.  H.  565  ;  15  Atl.  147  [a  very 
pungent  criticism  of  the  supposed 
New  York  rule]) ;  New  Jersey  (New- 
man v.  Phillipsburgh  R.  Co.  52  N. 
J.  Law,  446;  19  Atl.  1102);  Ohio 
(Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Manson, 
30  Ohio  St.  451  ;  Belief ontaine.  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Snyder,  18  Id.  399  ;  Street 
R.  Co.  v.  Eadie,  43  Id.  91);  Pennsyl- 
vania (Smith  v.  O'Connor,  48  Pa. 
St.  218  ;  North  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Ma- 
honey,  57  Id.  187  ;  Kay  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.,  65  Id.  269;  Philadel- 
phia, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  75  Id.  257  ; 
Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Caldwell, 
74  Id.  421);  Texas  (Galveston,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Moore,  59  Tex.  64  ;  Houston, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Simpson,  60  Id .  103  ; 
Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Donnell,  58 
Id.  27  ;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Hoffman,  80  Id.  420  ;  15  S.  W.  1048) ; 
Utah  (Hyde  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co., 
7  Utah,  356 ;  26  Pac.  979) ;  Virginia 
Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Groseclose,  88 
Va.  267  :  13  S.  E  454  ;  Norfolk,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Ormsby,  27  Gratt.  455). 


§  8l]  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  1 20 

§  79.  No  imputed  negligence,  if  child  careful.— The  so- 
called  New  York  rule,  wherever  it  is  followed,  is  to  be  applied 
only  to  cases  in  which  a  child  has  itself  failed  to  use  that  de- 
gree of  care  which  would  be  required  from  an  adult.  If  it  has 
in  fact  been  as  free  from  negligence  as  an  adult  would  be  ex- 
pected to  be,  no  amount  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  its 
parents  or  guardians  can  affect  its  right  to  recover,  except,  of 
course,  as  their  acts,  in  breaking  the  sequence  of  events,  might 
affect  the  same  right  in  any  other  person.  The  whole  theory 
of  imputed  negligence  rests  upon  the  assumption  that  the 
child  has  acted  in  a  manner  which  would  be  negligent,  if  it 
had  been  of  full  age.1 

§  80.  Imputed  negligence ;  limitations  of  rule.  —  \Omittcd 
as  now  unnecessary^. 

§  81.  Imputed   negligence ;    parent   must    be   acting  as 

such.— Under  the  "New  York  rule,"  the  negligence  of  a 
parent  or  guardian,  when  not  acting  in  that  capacity,  is  not 
chargeable  to  his  child,  even  though  it  tends  to  expose  the 
child  to  injury  from  other  persons.  Thus,  if  a  gas  company, 
being  called  upon  to  repair  a  leak,  sends  an  agent,  who  care- 
lessly strikes  a  light  in  a  cellar  full  of  gas,  thus  causing  an 
explosion  which  injures  a  child,  the  fact  that  the  leak  was 
caused  by  the  negligence  of  the  child's  father  would  be  no 
excuse   for  the   gas   company.1      On   the   other    hand,    if    gas 

'In  our  first  edition  (1869),  we  R.  Co.,  104  Id.  669;  10  N.  E.  855  ; 
said:  "This  limitation  is  not  ex-  O'Brien  v.  McGlinchy,  68  Me.  552). 
pressly  sactioned  by  the  decisions,  See  Ihl  v.  Forty-second  St.  R.  Co., 
but  is  so  obviously  consistent  with  47  N.  Y.  323  ;  McMahon  v.  New  York, 
good  sense,  and  with  the  facts  upon  33  Id.  642  ;  South,  etc.  Ala.  R.  Co.  v. 
which  the  decisions  were  based,  that  Donovan,  84  Ala.  141 ;  4  So.  142. 
its  propriety  cannot  be  doubted.  '  Lannen  v.  Albany  Gas  Co.,  46 
Thus,  it  would  be  impossible  to  say  Barb.  264  ;  afn'd,  44  N.  Y.  459.  To 
that  a  child,  even  though  barely  hold  otherwise  "would  be  'visit- 
able to  walk,  may  be  run  over  with  ing  the  sins  of  the  fathers  upon  the 
impunity,  while  on  the  sidewalk,  children '  to  an  extent  not  conteni- 
conducting  itself  in  the  same  man-  plated  in  the  Decalogue,  or  in  the 
ner  as  grown  persons."  This  doc-  more  imperfect  digests  of  human 
trine  has  now  received  the  fullest  law  "(Id.).  The  text  is  quoted  and 
judicial  sanction  (Lynch  v.  Smith,  approved  in  Hennessey  v.  Brooklyn 
104  Mass.  52;  McGarry  v.  Loomis,  R.  Co.,  6  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  206  ;  39 
63  N.  Y.  104  ;  Cummings  v.  Brooklyn  N.  Y.  Supp.  805. 


121  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  83 

should  leak  in  a  house  to  such  an  extent  as  to  make  it  con- 
tributory negligence  on  the  part  of  a  father  himself  to  remain 
in  the  house,  his  negligence  in  keeping  his  children  in  the 
house  under  such  circumstances  must  be  imputed  to  them.2 

§  82.  Imputed  negligence ;  parent  must  be  negligent  in 
fact.  —  Furthermore,  under  the  New  York  rule,  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  the  guardian  must  have  been  guilty  of  actual 
negligence  in  the  care  of  the  child,  in  order  to  prejudice  the 
child's  right  of  action  for  negligence  on  the  part  of  a  stranger. 
The  mere  fact  that  a  child  is  found  in  an  exposed  and  dan- 
gerous position  is  not  conclusive  proof  of  negligence  on  the 
part  of  its  guardian.1  If  the  guardian  of  the  child  has  taken 
reasonable  care  of  it,  and,  notwithstanding  the  use  of  such 
care,  the  child  escapes  into  a  dangerous  place,  there  is  no 
negligence  on  the  part  of  the  guardian  to  be  imputed  to  the 
child.2 

£83.  Imputed  negligence  ;  age  of  child. — Under  the  New 
York  rule,  great  difficulty  arises  in  defining  the  age  at  which  a 
child  becomes  subject  to  the  rule  of  imputed  negligence,  and  still 
more  in  defining  the  age  at  which  it  will  be  deemed  negligent 
on  the  part  of  its  parents  or  guardians  to  suffer  it  to  go  abroad 
unattended  or  attended  only  by  a  very  young  person.     On  the 

8  Holly  v.  Boston  Gas  Co.,  8  Gray,  escaped  through  the  window  into  the 

132.     The  particular  application  of  street,  where  he  was  almost  imme- 

the  principle  in  this  case  seems  to  us  diately  run  over  by  a  horse  railroad 

very  questionable,  inasmuch  as  the  car  carelessly  driven.     Held,  that  he 

facts  did  not  make  it  clearly  neces-  could  recover  against  the  railroad 

sary  or  wise  for  the  plaintiff  or  her  company  if  the  jury  should  deem 

father  to  leave  the  house.     Indeed,  that  sufficient  care  had  been  taken 

it  might  have    been    out    of    their  of  him,  and  a  non-suit  was  set  aside, 

power  to  do  so.  To  similar  effect.  Weil  v.  Dry  Dock, 

1  Mangam  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  38  etc.  R    Co.,  119  N.  Y.  147;  23  N.  E. 

N.  Y.  455  ;   Coghlan   v.    Third   Ave.  487.      Permitting  a  child  six   years 

R.  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  124  ;  30  N.  old   to  go  out  by  himself  in  a  quiet 

Y.  Supp.    113;  see  notes  to  £  114,  street  (Cosgrove  v.  Ogden.  49  N.  Y. 

post.  255),  or  permitting  a  child  five  years 

Mangam    v.     Brooklyn    R.    Co.,  old  to  remain  alone  in  a  room  with 

supra.      In   that   case,  a    child    li-ss  an  open  door  (Fallon  v.  Central  Park, 

than  four  years  old  was  left  alone  in  etc   R.  Co.,  (54  N.  Y.  13),  is  not  con- 

the  room  for  a  very  few  minutes,  the  elusive  of    contributory   negligence 

front   door   being    locked  ;    and    he  on  the  part  of  the  parent. 


§  S4J 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


I  22 


one  hand,  it  has  been  apparently  held  that  a  jury  may  find 
it  to  be  culpable  negligence  on  the  part  of  parents  to  allow 
boys  of  ten  years  old  to  go  out  alone;1  though  not  so  as  to 
boys  of  eleven  years;2  but  in  such  cases,  and  even  in  the  case 
of  a  child  six  years  old,  it  has  been  held  that  it  is  not  conclusive 
evidence  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  parent  to  show  that 
the  child  was  allowed  upon  the  streets  unattended.3  Beyond 
these  limits  it  is  difficult  to  say  what  the  rule  is,  or  whether 
any  will  be  enforced  with  such  rigidity  as  to  take  the  question 
away  from  the  jury.    We  can  only  refer  to  the  cases  as  reported.4 

§  84.  Imputed  negligence  ;  lunatics,  etc. — All  that  is  here 
said  with  regard  to  children  is  equally  applicable  to  lunatics  of 
any  kind,1  with  this  difference  as  to  the  obligations  of  others 
towards  them,  that  the  sight  of  a  child  in  peril  ought  to  be 
sufficient  to  induce  every  mature  person  to  take  greater  care 
than  he  otherwise  would;2  whereas  a  lunatic  does  not  neces- 
sarily manifest  his  infirmity  by  his  appearance,  and  one  who  is 
not  aware  of  that  fact  is  not  to  be  blamed  for  dealing  with 
him  as  a  person  of  ordinary  intellect.3 


1  See  Karr  v.  Parks,  40  Cal.  188 ; 
Lovett  v.  Salem,  etc.  R.  Co.,  9  Allen, 
557. 

2  McMahon  v.  New  York,  33  N.  Y. 
642,  647.  In  that  case,  the  defendant 
was  repairing  an  old  well  in  front  of 
the  plaintiff's  house,  and,  in  conse- 
quence of  negligence  in  covering  it, 
the  plaintiff's  son,  a  boy  of  eleven 
years  old,  fell  into  it  and  was  killed. 
In  an  action  by  plaintiff,  as  adminis- 
trator of  his  son,  it  was  held  that 
negligence  of  the  parents  of  the  child 
did  not  necessarily  form  a  defense  to 
the  action,  and  Wright,  J.,  remarked: 
"  The  deceased  was  not  an  infant, 
incapable  of  taking  proper  care  of 
himself  in  the  street.  ■  ■  ■  Had  he 
survived  the  injury,  and  been  with- 
out fault  himself,  he  could  have  re- 
covered, notwithstanding'  his  father 
or  mother  were  guilty  of  negligence; 
and  so  may  his  administrator,  such 
injury  causing  his  death." 


301dfleld  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  14  N. 
Y.  310  ;  affi'g  S.  c.,  3  E.  D.  Smith, 
103. 

4  See  notes  to  §  73a,  ante. 

1  Willetts  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  14 
Barb  585 ;  see  Hartfield  v.  Roper.  21 
Wend.  015,  619. 

-  East  Saginaw  R.  Co.  v.  Bohn,  27 
Mich.  503  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Caldwell,  74  Pa.  St.  421  ;  Brennan  v. 
Fairhaven  R.  Co.,  45  Conn.  284; 
Walters  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  41 
Iowa,  71,  76.  See  this  distinction 
commented  upon  by  Redfield,  J.,  in 
Robinson  v.  Cone  (22  Vt.  213.  225}  ; 
S.  C.  in  full,  Thompson,  Negl.  1129. 

3  A  lunatic  was  traveling  on  a  rail- 
road, in  charge  of  his  father,  and  the 
father  left  him  in  one  car  and  took  a 
seat  in  another.  The  lunatic  not 
paying  his  fare  after  repeated  re- 
quests, the  conductor,  in  ignorance 
of  his  condition,  put  him  off  the 
train  ;  he  wandered  about  the  track. 


123 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§85 


§  85.  Plaintiff  not  prejudiced,  unless  actually  in  fault. — 
The  plaintiff's  right  to  recover  is  not  affected  by  his  having 
contributed  to  his  injury,  unless  he  was  in  fault  in  so  doing.1 
It  is  possible  for  the  plaintiff  not  only  to  contribute  to  his  own 
injury,  but  even  to  be  himself  its  immediate  cause,  and  yet  to 
recover  compensation  therefor.2  Thus  he  has  a  right  to 
assume  some  risk  of  personal  injury,  when  necessary  to  escape 
a  greater  risk.3  So  one  who,  seeing  his  property  imperiled, 
hastens  to  protect  it,  and  in  doing  so  imperils  his  own  person, 
is  not  necessarily  deprived  of  remedy  thereby.  It  is  his  right 
and  duty  to  protect  his  property,  so  long  as  he  can  do  so 
without  recklessly  exposing  himself  to  injury.4  One  who  im- 
perils his  own  life,  for  the  sake  of  rescuing  another  from 
imminent  danger,  is  not  chargeable,  as  matter  of  law,  with  con- 
tributory negligence ;  and,  if  the  life  of  the  rescued  person  was 


and  was  run  over  by  another  train 
and  killed.  Held,  that  there  was 
negligence  on  the  part  of  the  father, 
which  was  attributable  in  law  to  the 
lunatic,  and  none  on  the  part  of  the 
conductor  (Willetts  v.  Buffalo,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  14  Barb.  585).  Where  a  deaf 
mute  slave,  who  was  walking  on  a 
railroad,  with  his  back  to  an  ap- 
proaching train,  was  killed  by  the 
train,  it  not  appearing  that  the  engi- 
neer knew  of  the  slave's  infirmity, 
and  it  being  shown  that  the  usual 
warning  was  given  by  the  steam 
whistle,  it  was  held,  that  the  rail- 
road company  was  not  liable  (Poole 
v.  North  Carolina R.  Co.,  8  Jones  [N. 
C.|  Law,  340). 

1  He  must  be  shown  to  have  ne- 
glected some  duty  (Missouri  Pacific 
R.  Co.  v.  White,*  80  Tex.  202;  15  S. 
W.  808). 

s  Gee  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  L.  R. 
8Q.  B.  161,  174:  Whaley  v.  Laing. 
-I  Ilurlst.  &  N,  470).  See  this  doc- 
trine applied  in  Baldwin  v.  Green- 
woods, etc.  Co.,  40  Conn.  238  :  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Nelson,  51  Ind. 
150  :  Hammond  v.  Mukwa.  40  Wise. 
Iiultz  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 


44  Wise.  638  ;  Walter  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  39  Iowa,  33:  Wyandotte  v. 
White,  13  Kans.  191  ;  Baltimore  v. 
Holmes,  39  Md.  241  :  Geiselman 
v.  Scott,  25  Ohio  St.  86;  Gillespie 
v.  Newburg,  54  N.  Y.  468  ;  Jennings 
v.  Wayne,  63  Me.  468.  The  text  was 
expressly  approved  in  Western  Union 
Tel.  Co.  v.  Eyser.  2  Colo.  141. 

3  Such  as  jumping  on  or  off  a  plat- 
form (Buchanan  v.  West  Jersey  R. 
Co.,  52  N.  J.  Law.  265  ;  19  Atl.   254. 

4  Rexter  v.  Starin,  73  N.  Y.  601  ; 
Wasmer  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 
80  Id.  212.  In  the  first  case,  the 
plaintiff's  boat  was  fastened  to  a 
pier,  and  he  was  on  another  boat 
adjoining,  when  he  saw  a  barge 
approaching  his  boat,  and,  appre- 
hending a  collision,  he  ran  on  his 
own  boat,  the  barge  struck  it,  and  a 
piece  of  timber  torn  off  by  the  col- 
lision injured  him.  Held,  that  it 
was  plaint  ill's  right  and  duty  to 
look  to  the  safety  of  his  boat  :  and 
it  was  for  the  jury  to  say  whether 
the  act  was  reasonable  under  all  the 
circumstances.  To  same  effect,  see 
North  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirk,  90  Pa. 
St.  15. 


§  85] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


I24 


endangered  by  the  defendant's  negligence,  the  rescuer  may  re- 
cover for  the  injuries  which  he  suffered  from  the  defendant  in 
consequence  of  his  intervention.5  There  need  be  no  fear  that 
this  principle  will  make  any  one  liable  for  the  cost  of  volun- 
teered benevolence,  without  being  himself  in  fault.  No  one  is 
liable  at  all,  unless  he  is  in  fault.  Thus  a  railroad  company 
could  not  be  made  liable  for  injuries  suffered  by  one  who,  with 
the  most  praiseworthy  motives,  rushed  in  front  of  a  train  to 
rescue  another  who  was  unlawfully  on  the  track,  and  of  whose 
presence  the  engineer  in  charge  had  no  notice,  actual  or  con- 
structive, the  train  being  prudently  managed.  In  such  a  case 
neither  party  would  be  in  fault,  and,  therefore,  neither  could 
recover  damages."  This  privilege  of  rescue  under  obvious 
danger  is  not  to  be  extended  to  cases  in  which  mere  property 
is  imperiled;  nor  even,  it  has  been  held,  to  the  rescue  of  sensi- 
tive animals,  such  as  horses;7  although  we  should  incline  to 


5  Where  one  threw  himself  in  front 
of  a  train  for  the  purpose  of  saving 
the  life  of  a  child,  it  was  held  that 
he  was  not  necessarily  negligent  in 
so  doing  (Eckert  v.  Long  Island  R. 
Co.,43N.  Y.  502).  "The  law  has 
so  high  a  regard  for  human  life  that 
it  will  not  impute  negligence  to  an 
effort  to  preserve  it,  unless  made  un- 
der such  circumstances  as  to  consti- 
tute rashness  in  the  judgment  of 
prudent  persons  "  (per  Grover,  J.,  Id.). 
S.  P.,  Spooner  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  115  N.  YT.  22  ;  21  N.  E.  696  [chil- 
dren on  track]  ;  Gibney  v.  State,  137 
N.  Y.  1  ;  33  N.  E.  142  [father  trying 
to  save  his  child  from  drowning]  ; 
Condiff  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 
45  Kans.  256  ;  25  Pac.  562  ;  Peyton 
v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  41  La.  Ann. 
861  ;  6  So.  690  ;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
Langendorf ,  48  Ohio  St.  316  ;  28  N. 
E.  172;  Clark  v.  Shoe,  etc.  Co.,  16 
Mo.  App.  463.  In  Evansville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hiatt  (17  Ind.  102)  and  At- 
lanta, etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Leach  (91  Ga. 
419  ;  17  S.  E.  619),  no  negligence  was 
proved  against  the  railroad  com- 
pany.    Dicta  on  other  points  in  these 


cases  should  be  disregarded.  The 
principle  of  the  Eckert  case  has  been 
approved,  even  in  Massachusetts 
(Linnehanv.  Sampson,  126  Mass,  506). 

6  "  It  is  only  when  a  railroad  com- 
pany, by  its  own  negligence,  created 
the  danger,  or,  through  its  negli- 
gence, is  about  to  strike  a  person  in 
danger,  that  a  third  person  can  vol- 
untarily expose  himself  to  peril  in 
an  effort  to  rescue  such  person  and 
recover  for  an  injui-y  he  may  sus- 
tain in  that  attempt  .  .  .  The  negli- 
gence of  the  company  as  to  the 
person  in  danger  is  imputed  to  the 
company,  with  respect  to  him  who 
attempts  the  rescue ;  and  if  not 
guilty  of  negligence  as  to  such  per- 
son, then  it  is  only  liable  for  negli- 
gence occurring  with  regard  to  the 
rescuer,  after  his  efforts  to  rescue  the 
person  in  danger  commenced" 
(Henry,  J.,  in  Donahoe  v  Wabash, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  83  Mo.  560).  This  was 
the  true  ground  for  the  decision  in 
Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Leach,  supra. 

"'  Morris  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co. , 
148  N.  Y.  182 ;  42  N.  E.  579  [ex- 
posure made  to    save    cattle    from 


125 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§86 


the  opinion  that  taking  a  moderate  degree  of  personal  risk  in 
such  a  case  ought  not  to  be  considered  a  fault.  So  a  railroad 
engineer  who,  at  a  time  of  threatened  collision,  remains  at  his 
post  and  faces  a  danger  which  he  could  personally  escape,  in 
the  hope  of  saving  others  upon  the  train,  is  not  chargeable 
with  contributory  negligence ;  for  he  is  at  least  doing  right,  if 
not  performing  a  positive  duty,  even  though  he  runs  into  cer- 
tain death.8  And  upon  this  principle  it  is,  that  no  proper  use 
of  his  own  land,  though  exposing  him  to  greater  risk  from 
the  negligence  of  others  than  would  be  the  case  if  a  different 
use  were  made  of  it,  will  deprive  any  one  of  a  remedy  for 
such  negligence.9 

§  86.  Plaintiff  not  prejudiced  by  want  of  more  than 
ordinary  care.  —  The  contributory  negligence  of  the  plaintiff, 
when  relied  upon  to  defeat  his  recovery,  must  consist  of  at 
least  ordinary  negligence,  that  is,  want  of  ordinary  care.1  His 
failure    to   take   unusual   care   is    no   defense   to   the  action;3 


train] ;  Deville  v.  Southern,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  50  Cal.  383  ;  Pike  v.  Grand  Trunk 
R  Co.,  39  Fed.  255  [structure  on  lire]. 

8Cotterill  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
47  Wise.  634  ;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
Koney,  89  Ind.  453. 

9  In  Kalbfleisch  v.  Long  Island  R. 
Co.  (102  N.  Y.  520  ;  7  N.  E.  557),  it 
\vas  held  not  to  be  negligence  for 
the  proprietor  of  a  varnish  factory, 
which  was  adjacent  to  a  railway,  to 
set  some  varnish  out  of  doors  in  the 
process  of  manufacture,  where  it  was 
set  on  fire  by  sparks  from  a  passing 
locomotive,  which  had  a  defective 
spark  arrester.  The  mere  location 
and  use  of  a  railroad  do  not  operate 
as  a  prohibition  upon  branches  of  in- 
dustry which  may  be  endangered  In- 
ks vicinity.  To  same  effect,  Cook 
v.  Champlain,  etc.  Co. ,  1  Denio, 
91  ;  Vaughan  v.  Taff  Yale  R.  Co.,  3 
Hurlst.&N.  743  ;  see  Ferov.  Buffalo, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  22  N.  Y.  209. 

1  The  words  "ordinary  care"  are 
used  in  almost  every  case  upon  this 
subject,  as,  for  example,  in  Munger 


v.  Tonawanda  R.  Co.  (4  N.  Y.  349) ; 
Gannon  v.  Bangor  (38  Me.  443); 
Owings  v.  Jones  (9  Md.  108)  ;  Davies 
v.  Mann  (10  Mees.  &  W.  546); 
Bridge  v.  Grand  Junct.  R.  Co.  (3  Id. 
244) ;  Butterfield  v.  Forrester  (11 
East,  60),  and  innumerable  later 
cases.  See,  among  other  cases, 
Priest  v.  Nichols.  116  Mass.  401  ; 
Peverly  v.  Boston,  136  Id.  366  ;  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Jones,  95  U-  S.  439  ;  com- 
pare, however,  N.  J.  Express  Co.  v. 
Nichols,  33  N.  J.  Law,  434 ;  Cronin 
v.  Delavan,  50  Wise.  375 ;  Phila- 
delphia, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Boyer,  97  Pa. 
St.  91.  "The  plaintiff,  in  order  to 
show  that  he  was  in  the  exercise  of 
due  care,  must  prove  that  he  acted 
as  men  of  ordinary  prudence  exer- 
cising this  faculty,  and  possessed  of 
sufficient  sense  and  capacity  to  act 
intelligently,  would  have  acted  under 
similar  circumstances"  (per  Devens, 
J.,  Patrick  v.  Pote,  117  Mass.  297). 

-  So  it  has  been  repeatedly  ad- 
judged, in  cases  involving  the  risk 
of  life  and  limb  (Ernst  v.  Hudson 


§86j 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


120 


while,  on  the  other  hand,  his  use  of  slight  care  will  not  enable 
him  to  recover,  if  with  ordinary  care  he  could  have  avoided 
the  injury.  Therefore,  one  who  is  engaged  in  the  performance 
of  any  work  in  which  he  has  only  undertaken  to  use  slight  care 
for  the  benefit  of  his  employer,  is  none  the  less  bound  to  use 
ordinary  care  for  his  own  preservation  from  injuries  to  which 
that  work  makes  him  liable  ;  while,  even  if  he  had  entered  into 
an  express  contract  to  take  extreme  and  unusual  care  in  the 
performance  of  the  work,  he  would  not  be  bound  to  use  more 
than  ordinary  care,  so  far  as  his  own  preservation  from  injury 
was  concerned.  Substantially  the  same  standard  of  ordinary 
care  is  applied  to  the  conduct  of  a  woman  as  to  that  of  a  man 
in  questions    of    contributory    negligence.3      No    one    can    be 


River  R.  Co.,  35  N.  Y.  9,  26  ;  Beisie- 
gel  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  34  Id. 
622,  628,  632  ;  Fero  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R. 
Co.  22  Id.  209  ;  Beers  v.  Housatonic 
R.  Co.,  19  Conn.  566  ;  Bloor  v.  Dela- 
field,  69  Wise.  273  ;  34  N.  W.  115  ; 
Bequette  v.  People's  Tr.  Co. ,  2  Oreg. 
200),  as  well  as  in  cases  involving 
injury  to  property  only  (Nevvbold  v. 
Mead.  57  Pa.  St.  487;  Bridge  v. 
Grand  June.  R.  Co.,  3  M.  &  W.  244  ; 
Thorogood  v.  Bryan,  8  C.  B.  115  ; 
Clayards  v.  Dethick,  12  Q.  B.  439 ; 
Butterneld  v.  Forrester,  11  East,  60 ; 
Whirley  v.  Whiteman,  1  Head,  610). 
Therefore,  a  vessel  at  anchor,  with 
the  usual  watch  on  deck,  which  suf- 
fered injury  from  another  drifting 
against  her,  was  held  not  to  be  in 
fault,  although,  if  she  had  been  bet- 
ter lighted  and  watched,  she  proba- 
bly could  have  lifted  anchor  in  time 
to  avoid  injury  (The  Clarita,  23  Wall. 
1).  For  other  illustrations  of  this 
rule,  see  Lyons  v.  Erie  R.  Co. ,  57  N. 
Y.  489  ;  Mark  v.  Hudson  River  Bridge 
Co.,  103  Id.  28;  Evans  v.  Utica,  69 
Id.  166;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Donahue,  75  111.  106  ;  Centralia  v. 
Scott,  59  Id.  129  :  Elgin  v.  Renwick, 
86  Id.  498  ;  Luvenguth  v.  Blooming- 
ton.  71  Id.  238  ;  Bills  v.  Ottumwa,  35 
Iowa,   107 ;   Larrabee   v.   Sewall.    C6 


Me.  376  ;  Barstow  v.  Berlin,  34  WTisc. 
357  ;  Krueger  v.  Bronson,  45  Id.  198  ; 
Perkins  v.  Fond  du  Lac,  34  Id.  435. 
' '  Slight  negligence  is  the  want  of 
extraordinary  care  and  prudence, 
and  the  law  does  not  require  of  a 
person,  injured  by  the  carelessness 
of  others,  the  exercise  of  that  high 
degree  of  caution  as  a  condition 
precedent  to  right  to  recover  "  (Cre- 
mer  v.  Portland,  36  Wise.  92).  We 
have  found  but  one  case  in  which  a 
contrary  opinion  was  even  intimated 
(Hurst  v.  Burnside,  12  Oreg.  520), 
and  this  is  a  mere  obiter  dictum. 

3  Hassenyer  v.  Mich.  Central  R. 
Co..  48  Mich.  205;  Yarnall  v.  St. 
Louis  etc.  R  Co.,  75  Mo.  575  ;  Snow 
v.  Provincetown,  120  Mass.  580  ;  Fox 
v.  Glastonbury,  29  Conn.  204.  Per- 
mitting a  woman  to  drive  a  horse 
upon  a  highway  is  not  conclusive  of 
the  plaintiff's  want  of  care  (Cobb  v. 
Standish,  14  Me.  198 ;  Bigelow 
v.  Rutland,  4  Cush.  247 ;  Babson 
v.  Rockport,  101  Mass.  93 ;  Blood  v. 
Tyngsborough,  103  Id.  509).  A  wo- 
man ma}-  be  presumed  to  be  some- 
what lacking  in  knowledge,  skill, 
dexterity,  steadiness  of  nerve  and 
coolness  of  judgment  in  driving,  so 
that  a  person  meeting  her  under  cir- 
cumstances   threatening   a  collision 


12' 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§37 


required  to  make  efforts  beyond  his  powers,4  nor  such  as  must 
needs  be  futile. 

§  87.  Ordinary  care  defined. —  Ordinary  care  does  not  re- 
quire one  absolutely  to  refrain  from  exposing  himself  to  peril.1 
But  it  implies  the  use  of  such  watchfulness  and  precautions 
to  avoid  coming  into  danger,2  and  such  effort  to  escape  from 3 
or  mitigate  it,  when  actually  in  danger,  as  a  person  of  ordinary 
prudence  would  use  for  his  own  protection,  under  the  same 
circumstances,  in  view   of  the  danger  to  be  avoided.4     If   the 


should  govern  his  conduct  with 
some  regard  to  her  probable  defi- 
ciencies (Daniels  v.  Clegg,  28  Mich. 
33  ;  compare  Bloomington  v.  Perdue, 
99  111.329). 

4  Tilley  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49 
Ark.  535  ;  6  S.  W.  8. 

'  It  is  not  necessarily  negligence, 
as  matter  of  law,  for  one  to  expose 
his  person  or  property  to  j^eril  (Dub- 
lin, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Slattery,  L.  R.  3 
App.  Cas.  1 155  ;  Jeffrey  v.  Keokuk, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  56  Iowa,  546).  If  the 
danger  is  not  so  great  or  imminent, 
that  a  man  of  ordinary  prudence 
would  refuse  to  encounter  it,  incur- 
ring it  is  not  contributory  negli- 
gence (Stoddard  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  65  Mo.  514  ;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Ogden,  3  Colo.  499).  It  is  not  negli- 
gence per  se  for  one  who  knows  that 
there  is  ice  on  the  pavement  to  at- 
tempt to  pass  over  it,  even  at  night 
(Evans  v.  Utica,  69  N.  Y.  166;  s.  P., 
Dewire  v.  Bailey,  181  Mass.  169 ; 
Weston  v.  N.  Y.  Elevated  R.  Co.,  73 
N.  Y.  595).  "  The  fact  that  a  person 
voluntarily  takes  some  risk  is  not 
conclusive  evidence,  under  all  cir- 
cumstances, that  he  is  not  using  due 
care  "  (Lawless  v.  Connecticut  River 
Iv'.  Co.,  136  M;.ss.  1  ;  s.  P.,  Thomas 
v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  100  Mass. 
156;  Mahoney  v.  Metropolitan  R. 
Co.,  104  Id.  73). 

2  One  who  unnecessarily  exposes 
himself  or  property  to  a  known  dan- 


ger, assumes  all  the  risks  reasonably 
to  be  apprehended  from  such  a  course 
of  conduct  (Mehan  v.  S3  racuse,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  73  N.  YT.  585  ;  Goldstein  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  46  Wise.  404 ; 
Simpson  v.  Keokuk,  34  Iowa,  568  ; 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Depew,  40 
Ohio  St.  121  ;  Corlett  v.  Leaven- 
worth, 27  Kans.  672  ;  Mansfield,  etc. 
Coal  Co.  v.  McEnery,  91  Pa.  St.  185  ; 
Erie  v.  Magill,  101  Id.  616  ;  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Collins,  87  Id. 
405  ;  Sullivan  v.  Louisville  Bridge 
Co.,  9  Bush,  81. 

3  Parker  v.  Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co. ,  83 
Ga.  539  ;  10  S.  E.  233. 

4  Filer  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co. ,  49  N. 
Y.  47  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Goddard, 
25  Ind.  185.  This  is  sufficient  (Totten 
v.  Phipps,  52  N.  Y.  354,  357 ;  Ganiard 
v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  50  Hun,  22i 
26;  Clements  v.  La.  Electric  Co.,  44 
La.  Ann.  692;  11  So.  51).  For  in- 
stances of  application  of  the  rules  as 
to  ox-dinary  care,  laid  down  in  the 
text,  see  Eppendorf  v.  Brooklyn  R. 
Co.,  69  N.  Y.  195  ;  Dougan  v.  Cham- 
plain,  etc.  Co.,  56  Id.  1 ;  Macauley  v. 
New  York,  67  Id.  602  ;  Maguire  v.  Mid- 
dlesex R.  Co.,  115  Mass.  239  ;  Elkins 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Id.  190;  French 
v.  Taunton  Br.  R.  Co.,  116  Id.  537  ; 
Barton  v.  Springfield,  110  Id.  131  ; 
Marble  v.  Ross,  124  Id.  44 ;  Kennard 
v.  Burton,  25  Me.  39  ;  Noyes  v.  Shep- 
herd, 30  Id.  173;  Daley  v.  Norwich, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  26  Conn,  591  ;  Williams 


§87] 


lONTkir.UTORY  nk(;lh;i«;nce. 


128 


danger  is  remote  or  slight,  the  care  required  to  avoid  it  may 
be  such  as  would,  under  other  circumstances,  be  called  slight. 
If  the  clanger  is  near  or  extraordinary,  the  care  and  vigilance 
required  to  avoid  it  may  be  such  as,  under  a  slighter  peril,  might 
be  deemed  extraordinary.  Care  must  be  proportioned  to  the 
circumstances.5  In  either  case,  the  plaintiff  is  bound  to  take 
that  degree  of  care  which  persons  of  ordinary6  care  and  pru- 
dence are  generally  accustomed  to  use  under  similar  circum- 
stances, but  no  more.7  It  is  not  enough  that  he  should  use 
"his  own  best  judgment."  That  is  not  the  proper  test.8 
Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  is  it  always  necessary  "to  exercise  the 
best  judgment  or  to  use  the  wisest  precaution."9  It  is  not 
enough  that  the  plaintiff  should  act  prudently,  in  view  of  the 


v.  Clinton,  28  Id.  266  ;  Fox  v.  Glas- 
tonbury, 29  Id.  204  ;  Philadelphia, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Long,  75  Pa.  St.  257; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  70  111. 
211;  Augusta,  etc  R.  Co.  v.  Renz,  55 
Ga.  126  ;  Central  R.  etc.  Co.  v.  Perry, 
58  Id.  461 ;  Crommelin  v.  Coxe,  30 
Ala.  318  ;  Gothard  v.  Alabama,  etc. 
R.  C.  67  Id.  114;  Richmond,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Morris,  31  Gratt,  200  ;  Indian- 
apolis, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stout,  53  Ind. 
143  ;  Wyatt  v.  Citizens*  R.  Co.,  55  Mo. 
485 ;  Norton  v.  Ittner,  50  Id.  351  ; 
Jeffrey  v.  Keokuk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56 
Iowa,  546  ;  Leavenworth,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Rice,  10  Kans.  426 ;  Strong  v. 
Sacramento,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61  Cal.  326. 

5  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Howard, 
124  Ind.  280  ;  24  N.  E.  892.  Due 
care  must  be  exercised  in  advance  of 
the  injury,  not  merely  "  at  the  time  " 
(Peoria,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Herman,  39  111. 
App.  287.  See  Palmer  v.  Dearing,  93 
N.  Y.  7). 

6  It  will  not  do  to  substitute  the 
words  "average  prudence,"  in  a 
charge  to  a  jury  (Marsh  v.  Benton, 
75  Iowa,  469 ;  39  N.  W.  713).  But 
the  words  "ordinary  prudence" 
(Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker,  134 
Ind.  380 ;  33  N.  E.  280  ;  34  Id.  218), 
or  "a  reasonably  prudent  man" 
(Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  McTighe,  46 


Pa.  St.  316 ;  Havvley  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  71  Iowa,  717 ;  29  N.  W.  787; 
Parvis  v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8 
Del.  436  ;  17  Atl.  702)  are  sufficient. 

7  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Terry,  8 
Ohio  St.  570,  581.  Thus,  one  who 
passes  along  an  obstructed  highway, 
"  is  bound  to  observe  ordinary  care," 
that  is,  such  care  as  a  reasonably  pru- 
dent man,  under  the  circumstances, 
would  exercise  to  preserve  himself 
from  injury  (Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
McTighe,  46  Pa.  St.  316  ;  Farrer  v. 
Greene,  32  Me.  574  ;  Wheeler  v. 
Westport,  30  Wise.  392).  See  §  375, 
post.  No  greater  care  is  required 
(see  jpos£,  §  519  ;  Totten  v.  Phipps,  52 
N.  Y.  354). 

8  Berg  v.  Milwaukee,  83  Wise.  599  ; 
53  N.  W.  890  ;  Liermann  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  82  Wise.  286  ;  52  N.  W.  91. 

9  Lent  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
120  N.  Y.  467  ;  24  N.  E.  653.  While 
it  is  true  that  "  mere  error  of  judg- 
ment is  not  negligence,"  the  danger 
of  charging  this  to  a  jury  is  well 
illustrated  by  comparing  the  opposite 
fates  of  two  cases  in  which  this  was 
done  :  Hoyt  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc. 
R.  Co.  (118  N.  Y.  399  :  23  N.  E.  565), 
reversed  ;  and  McClain  v.  Brooklyn 
R.  Co.  (116  N.  Y.  459  ;  22  N.  E.  1062), 
affirmed. 


129  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  [§  Sj 

knowledge  which  he  actually  had.10  He  is  responsible  for  his 
ignorance  of  that  which  he  ought  to  have  known.11  As  there 
are  different  classes  in  society,  with  widely  different  degrees  of 
intelligence,  the  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  exercise  more  care 
than  is  usual,  under  similar  circumstances,  among  careful  and 
prudent  persons  of  the  class  to  which  he  belongs,12  if  that  class 
is  numerous  enough  to  have  a  well-recognized  existence,  and 
is  one  which  reasonably  informed  men  are  aware  must  be 
exposed  to  similar  dangers.13  Undoubtedly,  these  definitions 
are  all  vague  and  unsatisfactory.14  It  is  not  possible  to  frame 
a  definition  of  "prudence"  or  "  ordinary  care,"  which  will  be 
perfectly  clear  and  accurate.  Prudent  men  often  act  impru- 
dently ;  and  their  conduct  then  furnishes  no  standard.15  In 
special  cases,  it  may  be,  in  a  large  sense,  prudent  to  take  great 
personal  risks,  for  the  sake  of  a  great  good.  A  surgeon,  called 
to  attend  a  dangerous  case,  might  wisely  leap  off  a  train  in 
motion,  rather  than  be  carried  by  the  station.  One  who  knew 
that  a  mob  was  in  waiting  for  him  at  the  first  station  might 
"prudently  "  leap  off  before  reaching  it.  But  common  carriers 
are  not  required  to  participate  in  such  risks.  The  best  test 
which  can  be  given  is  the  general  example  of  men  reputed  to 
be  prudent,  when  using  such  prudence  as  they  have,  with  refer- 
ence to  the  protection  of  themselves  or  others  from  the  effects 
of  the  defendant's  acts. 

10  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall,  91  15  "Whether    plaintiff    was    neg- 

Ala.  112  ;  8  So.  371.  ligent  depended  upon  the  particular 

nBrad\vellv.  Pittsburgh,  etc.   R.  facts     admitted      or     satisfactorily 

Co.,  153  Pa.  St.  105  ;  25  Atl.  623.  proved  in  the  case.     If  the  facts  thus 

,2Mackay  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  established   constituted    negligence, 

35  N.  Y.  75,  80 ;  Paterson  v.  Wallace,  then    whether   they    exhibited  such 

1  Macq.  II.  L.  748.     To  the  contrary,  conduct    as    an   ordinarily   prudent 

however,  is  Tucker  v.  Henniker,  41  man   might  reasonably  be  expected 

N.  H.  317.  to  indulge  in  or  not,  it  was  none  the 

13  This  qualification  is  our  own,  but  less  negligence.  The  most  prudent 
we  think  clearly  just.  A  New  York  men  are  not  always  exempt  from 
railroad  company  ought  not  to  be  carelessness;  and,  when  actually 
obliged  to  anticipate  any  negligence  negligent,  the  law  attaches  the  same 
peculiar  to  Chinese,  while  in  Cali-  consequence  to  their  negligent  con- 
fornia  it  might  reasonably  be  re-  duct  as  to  similar  conduct  in  others  " 
quired  of  railroad  officers  that  they  (per  Mitchell,  J.,  Pennsylvania  Co. 
should  do  so.  v.    Marion,    104  Ind.    239 ;   3  N.   E. 

14  See  McGrath  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  874). 
Co.,  59  N.  Y.  468. 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  —  9] 


§88] 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


I3C 


§  88.  Care  required  of  infirm. —  The  plaintiff's  own  condi- 
tion may  be  such  as  to  seriously  modify  his  duty  with  regarc 
to  self-preservation.  If  he  is  in  the  prime  of  life,  active,  alert, 
vigorous,  far-sighted  and  clear-headed,  he  may  without  impru- 
dence, take  what  might  theoretically  be  considered  a  certaii 
amount  of  risk,  since  he  would  be  almost  absolutely  certain 
to  place  himself  in  no  actual  danger  thereby.  On  the  other 
hand,  if  he  is  old  or  infirm,  lame,  sick  or  weak,  or  even  if  he 
has  dim  sight,  or  is  for  any  reason  apt  to  lose  his  presence  of 
mind  under  the  appearance  or  sight  of  danger,  he  would  not 
be  justified  in  taking  a  risk  which  would  be  nothing  to  a  vigor- 
ous and  far-sighted  man.1  Thus  it  would  often  be  gross  neg- 
ligence for  a  decrepit  or  lame  person  to  cross  a  street  railway, 
within  the  same  distance  of  an  approaching  car  at  which  a 
person  of  ordinary  health  and  strength  would  have  a  right  t( 
cross  without  hesitation.  In  other  words,  every  person  must 
use  that  degree  of  care  which  prudent  persons  of  his  class, 
taking  all  circumstances  into  account,  including  health,  strengtl 
and  habits  of  body  and  of  mind,  would  use,2  when  acting 
prudently.  Negligence  is  not  imputed  to  persons  bereft  of 
their  senses,  as  the  deaf  or  the  blind,  on  account  of  their  fail- 
ure to  use  senses  which  they  have  not.  But  if  such  a  person, 
knowing  his  incapacity,  needlessly  places  himself  in  a  positior 
in  which  danger  is  probable,  without  means  on  his  part  t( 
avert  it,  that   is  negligence.3     The  incapacity  of  such  a  persor 


1  Deceased  was  killed  in  the  fore- 
noon of  the  day  on  a  railway  which 
ran  through  his  farm.  He  was  sixty 
years  of  age,  decrepit,  hard  of  hear- 
ing, and  of  defective  sight,  and  was 
seen  just  before  the  accident  walking 
at  a  moderate  gait  along  the  railroad 
and  on  the  trestle,  where  he  was 
killed  by  a  coming  train.  Held  that, 
under  the  facts  and  circumstances, 
hf  was  guilty  of  such  contributory 
negligence  as  to  preclude  a  recovery 
(Maloy  v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84 
Mo.  270). 

2  So  held,  as  to  persons  partially 
blind  (Peach  v.  Utica.  10  Hun.  477; 
compare  Davenport  v.  Ruckman,  37 
N.  Y.  568),  or  having  poor  and  weak 


eyesight  (Winn  v.  Lowell,  1  Allei 
177  ;  see  Sleeper  v.  Sandown,  52  N. 
H.  244),  or  extremely  aged  (Centra 
lia  v.  Krouse,  64  111.  19).  As  to  the 
care  required  of  such  persons  wher 
traveling  on  a  highway,  see  £  375 
X>oat ;  or  when  crossing  a  railroa 
track,  see  §  481,  post. 

3  Deafness  does  not  f umish  an  e? 
cuse  for  the  negligence  of  one  who, 
when  about  to  cross  a  track  saw 
smoke  of  locomotive,  but  without 
stopping  to  find  out  which  way  it 
was  coming,  drove  on  and  was  -in- 
jured (Purl  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co  ,  72  Mo.  168).  Compare  Zimmer- 
man v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71  Id. 
476.     In  crossing   a   railroad   track, 


i3i 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


[§89 


to  use  care  in  one  direction  imposes  on  him  the  duty  of  exer- 
cising, for  his  own  protection,  a  degree  of  care  in  other  direc- 
tions that  will,  as  far  as  possible,  compensate  for  his  impaired 
senses  or  other  disability.4 

§  89.   Effect  of  mistaken  judgment  under  sudden  alarm. — 

In  judging  of  the  care  exercised  by  the  plaintiff,  reasonable 
allowance  is  always  made  for  the  circumstances  of  the  casj; 
and  if  the  plaintiff  is  suddenly  put  into  peril,  without  having 
sufficient  time  to  consider  all  the  circumstances,  he  is  excusable 
for  omitting  some  precautions  or  making  an  unwise  choice, 
under  this  disturbing  influence,  although,  if  his  mind  had  been 
clear,   he  ought  to  have  done  otherwise.1     This  is   especially 


it  is  negligence  for  a  deaf  person 
not  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout  for  ap- 
proaching trains  (Illinois  Central  R. 
Co.  v.  Buckner,  28  111.  299  ;  Orms- 
bee  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  14  R.  I. 
102  ;  Birmingham,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bowers,  110  Ala.  328;  20  So.  345;  Gal- 
veston, etc  R.  Co.  v.  Ryon,  80  Tex. 
59;  15  S.  W.  588).  Deafness  calls 
for  increased  vigilance  with  the 
eyes  (Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Terry, 
8  Ohio  St.  570  ;  International,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Garcia,  75  Tex.  583  ;  13  S. 
W.  223).  To  same  effect,  Fenneman 
v.  Holden,  75  Md.  1  ;  22  Atl.  1049. 
4  Hayes  v.  Michigan,  etc.  R.  Co., 
Ill  U.  S.  228  ;  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Feller,  84  Pa.  St.  226  ;  Winn  v.  Low- 
ell, 1  Allen,  177  ;  Cleveland,  etc,  R. 
Co.  v.  Terry,  8  Ohio  St.  570  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  46  Midi. 
53!;  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mil- 
ler, 35  Id.  279;  Morris,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Baslan,  33  N.  J.  Law,  147  ;  New 
Jersey  Trans.  Co.  v.  West,  32  Id.  91  ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Triplett,  38 
111.  182  ;  Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Graham,  46  Ind.  239;  Cogswell  v. 
Oregon,  etc.  R  .  Co.,  6  Oreg.  417; 
Laicher  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co., 
28  La.  Ann.  320;  Purl  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  72  Mo  168  ;  Simtns  v. 
South  Carolina  R.  Co.,  26  S.  C.    490  ; 


3  S.  E.  301  ;  Worthington  v.  Mencer, 
96  Ala.  310  ;  11  So.  72  [dull  intellect]. 
It  is  gross  negligence  in  a  blind  per- 
son to  attempt  to  cross  a  network  of 
railroad  tracks  unattended,  when  ho 
knows  that  trains  are  passing  to  and 
fro  (Florida  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Williams,  37  Fla.  4(6  ;  20  So.  558). 

1  Bucher  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
98  N.  Y.  128  ;  Salter  v.  Utica,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  88  Id.  42,  49  ;  Pennsylvania  R. 
Co.  v.  Werner,  S9  Pa.  St.  59  [plain- 
tiff, in  endeavoring  to  escape  injury 
from  a  train,  was  struck  by  a  loco- 
motive going  in  the  opposite  direc- 
tion] ;  Mack  v.  St  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co., 
30  Minn.  493  [plaintiff,  hearing  a  cry 
of  danger,  ran  in  front  of  the  loco- 
motive and  was  injured].  The  plain- 
tiff knew  of  a  defect  in  a  sidewalk, 
but  being  frightened  by  the  attempt 
of  a  strange  man  to  seize  her,  ran 
along  the  sidewalk  without  thought 
of  the  defect,  and  was  injured. 
Held,  she  was  not  prevented  from 
recovering  barton  v.  Springfield, 
110  Mass.  131)  ;  and  in  a  similar  case 
(Weare  v.  Fitchburg,  Id.  334),  where 
the  woman,  alarmed  by  hearing  that 
her  children  were  in  clanger,  ran  to 
her  home  without  thought  of  the 
sidewalk,  a  recovery  was  had.  Mere 
mental  abstraction  will  not  excuse  a 


§39] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


13; 


true,  if  his  peril  is  caused  by  the  defendant's  fault.2  If  one  is 
placed,  by  the  negligence  of  another,  in  such  a  position  that  lit 
is  compelled  to  choose  instantly,  in  the  face  of  grave  am 
apparent  peril,  between  two  hazards,  and  he  makes  such  a 
choice  as  a  person  of  ordinary  prudence  placed  in  such  a  posi- 
tion  might  make,  the  fact  that,  if  he  had  chosen  the  other 
hazard,  he  would  have  escaped  injury,  is   of  no   importance.3 


failure  to  observe  a  defect  of  which 
the  traveler  lias  knowledge  (Gilrnan 
v.  Deerfield,  15  Gray,  577  ;  Kewanee 
v.  Depew,  80  111.  119 ;  compare 
George  v.  Haverhill,  110  Mass.  500  ; 
Wheeler  v.  Westport,  30  Wise.  392). 
'-'  One  ' '  who  places  another  in  peril 
cannot  complain  if  he  does  not  exer- 
cise the  best  judgment  in  extricating 
himself  from  such  peril "  (Voak  v. 
Northern  Central  R.  Co.,  75  N.  Y. 
320.  323 ;  Coulter  v.  American  Exp. 
Co.,  56  Id.  585  ;  Wheelock  v.  Boston, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  105  Mass.  203;  Pennsyl- 
vania, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Werner,  89  Pa. 
St.  59;  Gibbons  v.  Wilkesbarre  R. 
Co.,  155  Id.  279  ;  26  Atl.  417  ;  Vallo 
v.  U.  S.  Exp.  Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  404 ;  23 
Atl.  594  [trying  to  avoid  missile]  ; 
Blackwell  v.  Lynchburg,  etc.  R.  Co., 
Ill  N.  C.  151  ;  16  S.  E.  12  [plaintiff 
killed  while  seeking  refuge  from 
blast  without  notice]  ;  Richmond, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Farmer,  97  Ala.  141; 
12  So.  86  ;  Clarke  v.  Pennsylvania 
Co.,  132  Ind.  199;  31  N.  E.  808; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  46 
Mich.  532;  9  N.  W.  841;  Wesley 
Coal  Co.  v.  Healer,  84  111.  126  ;  Dun- 
ham Towing  Co.  v.  Dandelin,  143  111. 
409  :  32  N.  E.  258  ;  Smith  v.  St.  Paul, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  30  Minn.  169  ;  Wilson  v. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co..  26  LI.  278; 
Gumz  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52 
Wise.  672  ;  Stackman  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  80  Id.  433;  50  N.  W. 
404 ;  Lincoln  Transit  Co.  v.  Nich- 
ols, 37  Neb.  332 ;  55  N.  W.  872  ; 
Silver  Mining  Co.  v.  McDonald,  14 
Colo.    191  ;    23   Pac.    346 ;    Karr    v. 


Parks,  40  Cal.  188  ;  Stephenson  v. 
Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  102  Id.  143  ;  34 
Pac.  618  ;  36  Id.  407  ;  Ladd  v.  Fos- 
ter, 31  Fed.  827  ;  Collins  v.  Davidson, 
19  Id.  83  ;  Stevenson  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  18  Id.  493  ;  5  McCrary,  634. 
But  compare  Muldowney  v.  Illinois, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  36  Iowa,  462,  and  Peck 
v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  50  Conn.,  379 
[jumping  from  wagon,  in  fear  of 
collision  with  train]  ).  A  plaintiff  is 
not  necessarily  to  be  regarded  as 
having  contributed  to  his  own  in- 
jury by  acting  in  a  manner  prima 
facie  dangerous  and  imprudent,  if 
there  is  evidence  of  acts  or  omis- 
sions of  the  defendant,  by  which 
he  might  have  been  put  off 
his  guard  (Dublin,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Slattery,  L.  R.  3  App.  Cas.  1155. 
See  Knapp  v.  Sioux  City  R.  Co.,  65 
Iowa,  91 ;  21  N.  W.  198).  In  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Parkinson  (56  Kans. 
652 ;  44  Pac.  615),  a  boy  fifteen  years 
old,  when  delivering  railroad  mail 
to  the  baggage  master  on  a  car,  being 
rudely  cursed  by  the  baggage  man, 
became  confused,  and  stepped  in 
front  of  an  approaching  engine  on 
another  track  close  by,  and  was  in- 
jured. Held,  proper  to  refuse  to 
direct  a  verdict  for  defendant. 

3  Stokes  v.  Saltonstall,  13  Peters, 
101  ;  Eldridgev.  Long  Island  R.  Co., 
1  Sandf.  S9  ;  Ingalls  v.  Bills,  9  Mete. 
1  ;  Frink  v.  Potter.  17  111.  406; 
Southwestern  R.  Co.  v.  Paulk,  24  Ga. 
356  ;  McKinney  v.  Neil,  1  McLean, 
540  ;  Pennsylvania  Tel.  Co.  v.  Var- 
nau  (Pa.),  15  Atl.    624;  Gibbons  v. 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


[§89 


Even  if,  in  bewilderment,  he  runs  directly  into  the  very  dan- 
ger which  he  fears,  he  is  not  in  fault.4  The  confusion  of  mind, 
caused  by  such  negligence,  is  part  of  the  injury  inflicted  by 
the  negligent  person ;  and  he  must  bear  its  consequences. 
When  the  question  is  one  of  mere  inconvenience,  and  not 
actual  danger,  some  moderate  risk  may  be  taken,  if  there  is  no 
obvious  danger.5  But  the  plaintiff  will  be  chargeable  with 
contributory  negligence,  if  he  runs  the  risk  of  an  obvious  and 
serious  danger,  merely  to  avoid  inconvenience.6  No  such 
allowance  is  made  in  favor  of  one  whose  own  fault  has 
brought  him  into  the  peril  which  disturbs  his  judgment.7 


Wilkesbarre,  etc.  R.  Co.,  155  Pa.  St. 
279  ;  26  Atl.  417.  This  principle  ap- 
plies to  the  case  of  plaintiffs  who 
are  injured  by  jumping  from  car,  at- 
tempting to  get  off  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, although  no  harm 
happened  to  the  car  (Buel  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  31  N.  Y.  314  ;  Twom- 
ley  v.  Central  Park,  etc.  R.  Co.,  69 
Id.  158  ;  Smith  v.  Wrightsville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  83  Ga.  671;  10  S.  E.  361  ; 
Woolery  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
107  Ind.  599 ;  8  N.  E.  226  ;  Peoria, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice,  144  111.  227  ;  33 
N.  E.  951  ;  South  Covington,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ware,  84  Ky.  267  ;  1  S.  W. 
493;  Kleiber  v.  People's  R.  Co.,  107 
Mo.  240  ;  17  S.  W.  946  ;  Spohn  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  101  Mo.  417  ;  14 
s.  W.  880  [train  robbery] ;  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Murray,  55  Ark.  248  ;  18 
S.  W.  50  ;  s.  P.,  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Shi  veil  [Ky.],  18  S.  W.  944.  Com- 
pare Sears  v.  Dennis,  105  Mass.  310  ; 
Wilson  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  26 
Minn.  278  ;  Pittsburgh  R.  Co.,  v. 
Grii-i ,  22 Pa.  St.  54  ;  Indianapolis,  etc. 
I!.  Co.  v.  Stout,  53  Ind.  143  ;  Jeffer- 
son ville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Swift,  26  Id. 
469,  476).  A  passenger  who  leaps 
from  a  train  while  moving  at  a  rate 
of  speed  which  makes  death  or  great 
bodily  in  jury  inevitable,  is  guilty  of 
nr^ligence  to  a  degree  of  rashness; 
unless  the  circumstances  are  such  as 


to  induce  in  his  mind  the  belief  that 
to  remain  will  result  in  greater  bodily 
harm  (Card  v.  Ellsworth,  65  Me.  547). 

4  McMillan  Marble  Co.  v.  Black,  89 
Tenn.  118;  14  S.  W.  479  [boy  ran 
under  falling  rock]  ;  Texas,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Watkins,  7  Tex.  Civ.  App.  1  ; 
26  S.  W.  760  [woman  jumped  in 
front  of  train]  ;  Killien  v.  Hyde,  63 
Fed.  172  [fireman  of  tug,  in  collision, 
jumped  overboard]. 

5  Gee  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  L.  R. 
8  Q.  B.  161  ;  Fordham  v.  Brighton, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  4  C.  P.  619  ;  Clay- 
ards  v.  Dethick,  12  Q.  B.  439  ;  Wyatt 
v.  Great  Western  R.  Co.,  6  Best&  S. 
709  ;  Siner  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co., 
L.  R.  3  Exch.  150  ;  Johnson  v.  West 
Chester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  70  Pa.  St.  357. 

6  Solomon  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co., 
103  N.  Y.  437,  443 ;  9  N.  E.  430 ; 
Adams  v.  Lancashh'e,  etc.  R.  Co., 
L.  R.  4  C.  P.  739  ;  a  very  doubtful 
case.  To  the  same  effect,  Richard- 
son v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,L.  R.  3  C. 
P.  374,  note  ;  Lax  v.  Darlington,  5 
Exch.  Div.  28.  See,  also,  Gavett  v. 
Manchester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  16 Gray,  501  ; 
Damont  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  9.  La.  Ann.  441  ;  Illinois  Cen- 
tral v.  Able,  59  111.  131  ;  Jefferson- 
ville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hendricks,  26 
Ind.  228;  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  La 
Gierse,  51  Tex.  189. 

1  An   error   of    judgment    in   one 


§9o] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


134 


§90.  Duty  of  looking  and  listening. —  One  of  the  most 
familiar  applications  of  the  rule  requiring  ordinary  care  to 
avoid  injury,  is  the  requirement  that  the  plaintiff  should  have 
used  watchfulness  to  discover  the  approach  of  dangers  which 
might  reasonably  be  apprehended,  or,  as  it  is  usually  ex- 
pressed, that  "  he  must  look  and  listen."  Innumerable  illus- 
trations of  this  rule  will  be  found  in  railroad  cases.1     But  the 


suddenly  placed  in  peril  by  his 
own  fault  does  not  relieve  him 
from  the  consequences  of  the  negli- 
gence which  caused  such  position 
(Schneider  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co., 
133  N.  Y.  583 ;  30  N.  E.  752  ;  Rich- 
field v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  110 
Mich.  496  ;  68  N.  W.  218 ;  Baltzer 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  83  Wise.  459  ; 
53  N.  W.  885;  Shankenbery  v. 
Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  46  Fed.  177  ; 
Reary  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  40 
La.  Ann.  32  ;  3  So.  390  ;  Austin  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Beatty,  73  Tex.  592  ;  11  S. 
W.  858.  See  a  hard  and  doubtful 
case,  International,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hester.  73  Tex.  40  ;  US.  W.  1041. 

1  §§  472-478,  posf.  Thus,  no  re- 
covery can  usually  be  had  for  in- 
juries suffered  by  one  who  without 
looking  carefully  both  ways  along 
the  track  of  a  railroad,  walked  or 
drove  across  or  along  it,  and  was 
run  over  by  a  train  (Schofield  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114  U.  S.  615  ; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Houston,  95  Id.  697  ; 
Allerton  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co.,  146 
Mass.  241  ;  15  N.  E.  621  ;  Wilds  v. 
Hudson  River  R  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  430; 
Steves  v.  Oswego,  etc.  R.  Co.,  18  Id. 
422  ;  Wendell  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc. 
R.  Co., 91  Id.  420  ;  Nash  v.  Same,  125 
Id.  715  ;  26  N.  E.  266  ;  Ellis  v.  Lake 
Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  138  Pa.  St.  506  ;  21 
Atl.  140;  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Leary,  56 
N.  J.  Law,  705  ;  29  Atl.  678 ;  Hearne 
v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  50  Cal.  482  ; 
Zeigler  v.  Railroad  Co.,  5  S.  C.  221  ; 
Metropolitan  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  90 
Ga.  500  ;  16  S.  E.  49  ;  Chicago,  etc. 


R.  Co.  v.  Harwood,  80  111.  88  ;  Lake 
Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hart,  87  Id.  529 ; 
New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell, 
53  Miss.  808;  Grostick  v.  Detroit, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  90  Mich.  594;  51  N.  W. 
667  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stom- 
mel,  126  Ind.  35  ;  25  N.  E.  863  ;  Lesan 
v.  Maine  Central  R.  Co.,  77  Me.  85  ; 
Maryland  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Neubeur, 
62  Md.  391;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Crawford,  89  Ala.  240  ;  8  So.  243 ; 
Galveston,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Brocken, 
59  Tex.  71 ;  Delaney  v.  Milwaukee, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  33  Wise.  67  ;  Nixon  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84  Iowa,  331 ; 
51  N.  W.  157  ;  Carney  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  46  Minn.,  220  ;  48  N.  W. 
912  ;  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Adams, 
33  Kans.  427  ;  Durbin  v.  Oregon  R. 
Co.,  17  0reg.  5;  17  Pac.  5.  See  £§ 
472,  476,  post.  These  are  but  ex- 
amples, from  hundreds  of  cases. 
More  are  given  under  Chap.  XXI. 
A  large  collection  is  given  in  Patter- 
son on  R.  R.  Accident  Law,  168,  and 
Beach,  Contr.  Negl.  (2d  ed.)  §  181. 
Exceptions  to  the  rule  are  stated  in 
Dolan  v.  Delaware  Canal  Co.,  71  N. 
Y.  285  ;  McGovern  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  67  Id.  417  ;  Jewett  v.  Klein, 
27  N.  J.  Eq.  55 ) ;  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Lee,  s7  111.  -454.  See  g§  477, 
478,  post.  And  the  rule  does  not  ap- 
ply with  the  same  strictness  to  city 
street  railroads,  having  no  exclusive 
right  of  way  (Robbins  v.  Springfield 
R.  Co.,  165  Mass.  30;  42  N.  E.  334; 
Consol.  Traction  Co.  v.  Scott,  58  N.  J. 
Law,  682;  34  Atl.  1094). 


135 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


[§9i 


rule  denying  a  right  of  action  for  negligence,  in  cases  in  which 
the  plaintiff,  by  simply  looking,  would  have  avoided  the 
injury,  is  one  of  wide  application.  Thus,  one  who,  in  conse- 
quence of  not  looking,  steps  over  the  edge  of  a  sidewalk,2  or  a 
hoist-way,3  or  otherwise  fails  to  use  proper  watchfulness,4  can- 
not recover  for  such  injuries.  But  contributory  negligence  is 
not  imputable  to  any  one  for  failing  to  look  out  for  a  danger 
which  he  has  no  reasonable  cause  to  apprehend.5 

§91.  Effect   of  defendant's   advice   or    invitation.  —  The 

plaintiff  may  often  be  deemed  to  have  used  ordinary  care, 
when  acting  under  the  express  invitation  or  advice  of  the  de- 
fendant, even  though,  but  for  that  circumstance,  his  conduct 
would  be  deemed  clear  evidence  of  negligence.1     Thus,  where 


2  One  who,  while  walking  on  a 
sidewalk,  five  feet  wide,in  the  enjoy- 
ment of  sufficient  light  and  eyesight, 
stepped  off  into  a  ditch  and  was 
injured,  cannot  recover  (McLaury  v. 
McGregor,  54  Iowa,  717  ;  s.  P.,  Hut- 
ton  v.  Windsor,  34  Upp.  Canada  [Q. 
B.],  487  ;  see  Zettler  v.  Atlanta,  66 
Ga.  195). 

3  Brenstein  v.  Mattson,  10  Daly, 
336. 

4  Plaintiff,  while  riding  in  one 
buggy  and  looking  and  talking  to 
persons  in  another,  drove  into  a 
child's  swing  suspended  between  the 
sidewalk  and  the  traveled  part  of 
the  street.  Held,  contributory  neg- 
ligence (Tuffree  v.  State  Centre, 
57  Iowa,  538).  One  who,  without 
necessity,  joins  a  crowd  leaving  a 
ferryboat,  which  is  so  dense  as  to 
prevent  his  seeing  where  he  treads, 
and  whose  foot  is  caught  between 
the  boat  and  the  dock,  is  guilty  of 
contributory  negligence  (Dwyer  v. 
N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  47  N.  J. 
Law,  9 ;  s.  c.  on  second  trial,  7  Atl. 
417;  s.  c,  without  opinion,  48  N.  J. 
Law,  373)  ;  but  not  so  if  he  was 
unexpectedly  surrounded  by  the 
crowd  (Id.).  A  boy  was  riding  on 
the  runners  of  a  sleigh.     He  sud- 


denly dropped  from  the  sleigh  with- 
out looking  behind  him,  and  a 
horse,  which  was  following  behind, 
struck  him.  Held,  contributory 
negligence  (Messenger  v.  Dennie, 
137  Mass.  197).  As  to  duty  to  look 
before  and  behind  while  driving,  see 
§  654,  post. 

5Langan  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
72  Mo.  392  ;  Moulton  v.  Aldrich,  28 
Kans.  300  [not  bound  to  prepare  for 
runaway  horse]  ;  plaintiff's  failure 
to  look  for  a  defect  due  to  defend- 
ant's negligence,  and  unsuspected  by 
him,  is  not  contributory  negligence 
per  se,  but  is  for  the  jury  (Gillespie 
v.  Newburgh,  54  N.  Y.  468).  S.  P., 
Bradford  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.,  160 
Mass.  392  ;  35  N.  E.  1131  [mailbags 
thrown  from  trains]  ;  Pullman  Pal- 
ace Car  Co.  v.  Laack,  143  111.  242  ; 
32  N.  E.  285. 

1  Lewis  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Co.,  145 
N.  Y.  508  ;  40  N.  E.  248  ;  Filer  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co., 49  N.  Y.  47;  Mclntyre 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  37  Id.  287; 
Foy  v.  London,  Brighton,  etc.  R. 
Co!,  18  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  225;  Cincinnati, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Carper,  112  Ind.  26; 
13  N.  E.  122  [following  train  con- 
ductor's directions  as  to  alighting 
from  train]  ;  Irish  v.  Northern  Pac. 


§90 


(•oNTkii;rn>kY   nix;lk;ence. 


136 


gates  at  a  railroad  crossing  are,  as  a  rule,  closed  when  trains 
are  near,  the  fact  that  they  are  open  dispenses  with  the  usual 
obligation  to  look  and  listen.2  Much  more  is  this  the  case, 
where  the  man  in  charge  signals  the  train  to  proceed.3  But, 
in  order  to  justify  the  plaintiff's  conduct  under  circumstances 
otherwise  questionable,  it  must  appear  that  the  invitation  or 
advice  actually  proceeded  from  the  defendant  or  some  agent 
for  whose  act  he  was,  at  least  apparently,  responsible  ; 4  and 
even  then  such  advice  will  not  be  a  sufficient  excuse,  if  the 
defendant  was  clearly  not  as  well  aware  of  the  actual  danger 
as  the  plaintiff  was,  or  if,  the  advice  being  given  only  by  an 
agent  of  the  defendant  under  a  mere  general  or  implied  author- 
ity, the  circumstances  were  such  that  the  plaintiff  could  not 
reasonably  have  believed  that  the  defendant  intended  to  au- 
thorize   the    agent's    act.5      Neither   can  the   plaintiff   excuse 


R.  Co.,  4  Wash.  St.  48 ;  29  Pac.  845. 
See,  also,  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wood,  113  Ind.  544  :  14  N.  E.  572. 
These  cases  limited  in  Solomon  v. 
Manhattan  R.  Co.,  103  N.  Y.  437  ;  9 
N.  E.  430. 

'Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Schnei- 
der, 45  Ohio  St.  678  ;  17  N.  E.  321 ; 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Stegemier,  118 
Ind.  305 ;  20  N.  E.  843 ;  Lindeman  v. 
N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  42  Hun, 
306  ;  s.  C.,  on  appeal,  after  new  trial, 
11  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  837  ;  Callagan  v. 
Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52  Hun,  276; 
5  N.  Y.  Supp.  285;  Kane  v.  New 
Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  9  N.  Y.  Supp. 
879  ;  56  Hun,  648,  mem.  See  notes 
to  §  473,  post. 

3  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Prescott, 
59  Fed.  237;  8  C.  C.  A.  109  ;  Warren 
v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  8  Allen,  227. 
Defendant's  leading  a  horse  over  the 
track  implies  that  it  is  safe  (Rembe 
v.  N.  Y.,  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co.,  102 
N.  Y.  721 ;  more  fully,  7  N.  E.  797). 

4  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Daniel,  12  Lea,  386,  where  a  bridge 
watchman  was  injured  while  work- 
ing to  clear  a  tunnel  of  fallen  rock, 
under  orders  of  a  servant  of  the  rail- 


road company  whose  duty  it  was  to 
look  after  killed  stock.  The  plaintiff 
is  not  negligent,  in  obeying  the  di- 
rections of  one  who  is  apparently 
(although  not  actually)  authorized 
by  a  corporation  defendant  to  give 
such  directions (Mowrey  v.  Central  R. 
Co.,  66  Barb.  43  ;  affi'd,  51  N.  Y.  666). 
6  An  act,  outside  of  any  implied 
authority  of  the  agent,  is  no  ex- 
cuse for  the  plaintiff;  e.  g.,  where 
an  invitation  is  given  to  ride  on 
freight  trains  (Files  v.  Boston,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  149  Mass.  204  ;  21  N.  E.  311 ; 
Virginia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Roach,  83 
Va.  375  ;  5  S.  E.  175  ;  Stringer  v.  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.,  96  Mo.  299  ;  9  S. 
W.  905  ;  Keating  v.  Michigan  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  97  Mich.  154;  56  N.  W.  346 
[directing  child  to  jump  on  moving 
train]  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rosenberry,  45  Ark.  256  [getting  off 
train  moving  12  miles  an  hour]).  In 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sykes  (96  111. 
162),  plaintiffs  intestate  tried  to  pass 
under  a  freight  train  obstructing  the 
sidewalk,  at  invitation  of  conductor, 
and  was  injured  so  that  he  died. 
Held,  the  question  of  negligence 
should  have  been  left  to  the  jury. 


137 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


[§  92 


himself,  on  this  ground,  for  taking  an  unmistakably  improper 
risk.'1  The  defendant's  advice  or  direction  is  an  excuse  only 
when  the  plaintiff  might  honestly  think  the  question  of  negli- 
gence doubtful."  If  the  defendant,  by  his  own  act,  has  thrown 
the  plaintiff  off  his  guard,  and  given  him  good  reason  to 
believe  that  vigilance  was  not  needed,  the  lack  of  such  vigi- 
lance on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff  is  no  bar  to  his  claim,8 
especially  if  the  defendant  has  done  so  by  means  of  positive 
misrepresentations,  upon  which  the  plaintiff  relied.9  Promises 
or  assurances,  unfulfilled,  have  the  same  effect,  although  not 
intentionally  false.10  All  these  rules  are  especially  applicable 
in  favor  of  children.11 

§  92.  Plaintiff  not  bound  to  anticipate    negligence. — As 

there  is  a  natural  presumption  that  every  one  will  act  with  due 
care,1  it  cannot  be  imputed  to  the  plaintiff  as  negligence  that 


6  Cassidy  v.  Maine  Central  R.  Co., 
76  Me.  488. 

''  In  Dist.  of  Columbia  v.  Mc- 
Elligott  (117  U.  S.  621),  a  laborer 
under  a  road  supervisor,  at  work 
on  a  gravel  bank,  discovered  the 
bank  to  be  in  a  dangerous  condition, 
and  reported  the  fact  to  the  super- 
visor, who  said  he  would  have  a 
man  watch  it.  The  laborer  con- 
tinued to  work  for  half  a  day,  when 
the  bank  fell  and  injured  him. 
Held,  reversing  a  judgment  below 
for  the  laborer,  that  it  was  his  duty, 
having  knowledge  of  the  dangerous 
condition  of  the  bank,  to  exercise 
care  in  protecting  himself  from 
harm,  and  to  disregard  any  assur- 
ances of  his  superior,  s.  P.,  Baker 
v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  68  Ga.  699; 
Hunter  v.  Cooperstown,  etc.  R.  Co., 
126  N.  Y.  18;  26  N.  E.  958.  This 
limitation  is  recognized  in  other 
<a-<s  already  cited. 

8  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Ogier,  35 
Pa.  St.  60  ;  Ernst  v.  Hudson  River 
R.  Co..  35  N.  Y.  9.  28;  Paterson  v. 
Wallace,  1  Macq  II.  L.  748;  see 
MorrisdHy   v.  Wiggins  Ferry  Co..  47 


Mo.  521.  The  text  was  cited  and 
approved  in  Totten  v.  Phipps,  52  N. 
Y.  354. 

9  Hutchinson  v.  Guion,  5  C.  B.  N. 
S.  149. 

10  Hawley  v.  Northern  Central  R. 
Co.,  82  N.  Y.  370  [assurance  of 
repairs]  ;  Bradley  v.  N.  Y".  Central 
R.  Co.,  62  N.  Y.  99  [promise  to  warn 
of  danger].  To  similar  effect : 
Holmes  v.  Clarke,  6  Hurlst.  &  N. 
349  ;  Hough  v.  Texas,  etc.  R  Co., 
100  U.  S.  213 ;  Laning  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  521  ;  Ford  v. 
Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  110  Mass.  261  ;  Pat- 
terson v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  76 
Pa.  St.  389  ;  Belair  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  43  Iowa,  663  ;  Le  Clare  v.  St. 
Paul,  etc.  R.  Co..  20  Minn.  9  ;  Con- 
roy  v.  Iron  Works,  02  Mo.  247  ;  Kan- 
sas City,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Flynn,  78  Id. 
195  ;  East  Tenn.,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Duf- 
field,  12  Lea,  63.  A  traveler  may 
rely  on  published  regulations  (Par- 
sons v.  N.  Yr.  Central,  R.  Co.,  113 
N.  Yr.  355;  21  N   E.  145). 

11  Rosenberg  v.  Durfee,  87  Cal. 
545  :  26  Pac.  793. 

'Daniel  v    Metropolitan  R.Co.,L. 


§  9-1 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


138 


he  did  not  anticipate  culpable  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
defendant,2  or  of  a  stranger/1  He  has  a  right  to  assume  that 
even-  one  else  will  obey  the  law  (including  not  only  the  com- 
mon law,  but  also  any  statutes'  or  city  ordinances5},  and  to 
act    upon   that    belief.6     But   if  the    plaintiff    sees,    or  by   or- 


R.  5  H.  L.  45  ;  The  Mangerton,  1 
Swabey,  120  ;  Vennal  v.  Garner,  1 
Cr.  &  M.  21,  and  cases  infra.  Com- 
pare Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Young,  60 
Tex.  201. 

-N.  Yr.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Atlantic  Kef g Co.,  129  N.  Y.  597  ;  29 
N.  E.  829  ;  Turner  v.  New  burgh,  109 
N.  Y.  301;  16  N.  E.  344  [highway] ; 
Pettengill  v.  Yonkers,  116  N.  Y., 
558  ;  22  N.  E.  1095  [same]  ;  Boyce  v. 
Manhattan  R.  Co.,  118  N.  Y.  314;  23 
N.  E.  304  [railroad  platform] ;  Shutt 
v.  Cumberland  Val.  R.  Co.  149  Pa. 
St.  266  ;  24  Atl.  305  [same]  ;  O'Con- 
nor v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  94  Mo. 
150  ;  7  S.  W.  106  [railroad-crossing]; 
Central  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Attaway,  90 
Ga.  656  ;  16  S.  E.  956  [implements]  : 
Newson  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  29 
N.  Y.  383,  391  ;  Ernst  v.  Hudson 
River  R.  Co.,  35  Id.  9,  35  ;  Carroll  v. 
New  Haven  R.  Co. ,  1  Duer,  571  ;  Fox 
v.  Sackett,  10  Allen,  535 ;  Reeves  v. 
Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  454  ; 
Stephens  v.  Martins  (Pa.),  17  Atl.  242 
[blast  without  notice]  ;  Bullock  v. 
Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  105  N.  C. 
180  ;  10  S.  E.  988.  Evidence  that  the 
plaintiff  requested  the  defendant  to 
perform  the  act  which  caused  the 
injury,  does  not  tend  to  prove  con- 
tributory negligence,  if  the  injury 
was  not  a  natural  result  of  such  act 
carefully  performed  (Fisk  v.  Wait, 
104  Mass.  71).  To  same  effect,  Gee 
v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B. 
161,  171  [passenger  may  rely  on  car 
door  being  fastened].  See,  also,  Cleve- 
land, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Terry,  8  Ohio  St. 
570  ;  Reeves  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 
30  Pa.  St.  454  ;  Brown  v.  Lynn,  31 
Id.  510 ;  Kellogg  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 


Co.,  26  Wise.  223  ;  Seward  v.  Milford, 
21  Id.  491  ;  Langan  v.  St.  Louis,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  72  Mo.  392  ;  Damour  v.  Lyons, 
44  Iowa,  276  ;  Moulton  v.  Aldrich,  28 
Kans.  306  ;  Robinson  v.  Western  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  48  Cal.  409  ;  Shea  v.  Potrero, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  44  Id.  414. 

3  Murphy  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  118  N.  Y.  527  ;  23  N.  E.  812 
[fellow servants];  Franke  v.  St.  Louis, 
110  Mo.  516  ;  19  S.  W.  938  [falling 
wall].  A  brakeman  tried  to  un- 
couple cars ;  finding  them  moving 
too  fast,  he  signaled  the  engineer  to 
slow  up,  and  not  waiting  to  see  if  his 
signal  was  obeyed,  made  a  second 
attempt  and  was  killed.  Held,  not 
contributory  negligence,  as  he  had  a 
right  to  believe  that  his  signal  would 
be  immediately  obeyed  (Beems  v. 
Chicago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  58  Iowa,  150). 

4Klanowski  v.  Grand  Trunk  R. 
Co.,  57  Mich.  525  ;  24  N.  W.  801. 

5 A  traveler  has  a  right  to  presume 
that  a  railway  company  will  con- 
form to  a  city  ordinance,  regulating 
the  rate  of  speed  of  its  trains  within 
the  city  limits  (Hart  v.  Devereux,  41 
Ohio  St.  565).  Lulled  into  a  sense  of 
security  by  a  knowledge  of  such  an 
ordinance,  and  assuming  that  the 
company  will  comply  with  it,  it  is 
not  negligence  for  him,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  apparent  danger,  not  to  use 
the  precaution  in  crossing  the  track 
which  he  otherwise  should  (Meek 
v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  38  Ohio  St. 
632  ;  see  Baker  v.  Pendergast,  32  Id. 
494;  Correll  v.  Railroad  Co.,  38 Iowa, 
120). 

6  Continental,  etc.  Co.  v.  Stead, 
95  U.  S.  161  ;  Jetter  v.  Harlem  R. 
Co.,  2  Abb.  Ct.  App.  458;  Filer  v.  N. 


139 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


r§92 


dinary  care  could  see,  that  the  defendant  has  in  fact  negligently 
exposed  him  to  the  risk  or  injury,  or  will  probably  do  so,  he 
can  no  longer  rely  upon  this  presumption,  and  must  use  all  the 
additional  precautions,  on  his  own  part,  which  a  person  of 
ordinary  prudence  would  use,  in  view  of  the  circumstances  as 
they  are,  and  not  as  they  ought  to  be.7  Nevertheless,  even 
where  the  plaintiff  sees  that  the  defendant  has  been  negligent, 
he  is  not  bound  to  anticipate  all  the  perils  to  which  he  may 
possibly  be  exposed  by  such  negligence,  or  to  refrain  absolutely 
from  pursuing  his  usual  course  on  account  of  risks  to  which  he 
is  probably  exposed  by  the  defendant's  fault.  Some  risks  are 
taken  by  the  most  prudent  men ;  and  the  plaintiff  is  not  de- 
barred from  recovery  for  his  injury,  if  he  has  adopted  the 
course  which  most  prudent  men  would  think  it  prudent  to 
take  under  similar  circumstances.8 


Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  351  ; 
Weston  v.  N.  Y.  Elevated  R.  Co  ,  73 
Id.  595;  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Shultz,  64  111.  172  ;  Steele  v.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.,  43  Iowa,  109  ;  Robinson 
v.  Western  Pacific  R.  Co.,  48  Cal.  409; 
McWilliams  v.  Detroit,  etc.  Co.,  31 
Mich.  274 ;  Snyder  v.  Pittsburgh, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  11  W.  Va.  14  ;  Schultz 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  44  Wise. 
638  ;  Minor  v.  Sharon,  112  Mass.  477  ; 
Philadelphia  R.  Co.  v,  Hagan,  47 
Pa.  St.  244. 

1 1n  Dudley  v.  Camden,  etc.  Ferry 
Co.  (45  N.  J.  Law,  308),  and  Hobo- 
ken  Land,  etc.  Co.  v.  Lally  (48  Id. 
604,  Ct.  of  Errors),  it  was  held  that 
one  who  has  charge  of  horses  on  a 
ferryboat  cannot  recover,  if  lie  omits 
to  guard  them,  even  if  they  are  not 
properly  guarded  by  the  ferry- 
master,  Woodruff,  J.,  in  Grippen 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.  (40  N.  Y.  34), 
said :  "  Each  has  a  right,  in  gov- 
erning his  own  conduct  to  assume 
that  all  others  will  perform  their 
duties  also,  and  act  accordingly,  un- 
less and  until  he  sees,  or,  by  the 
exercise  of  ordinary  care,  might  see, 
that  it  is  dangerous  to  do  so.     But  it 


will  not  permit  a  party,  in  reliance 
on  such  an  assumption,  to  neglect 
his  own  means  of  self-preservation." 
If  the  peril  of  doing  a  certain  thing 
is  known  to  plaintiff,  and  means  are 
provided  for  its  being  done  in  safety, 
as  where  a  city  has  provided  suitable 
steps  for  pedestrians  to  reach  a  side- 
walk, raised  above  the  level  of  the 
roadway,  it  is  negligence  for  the 
plaintiff  not  to  use  such  means 
(Vicksburg  v.  Hennessey,  54  Miss. 
391).  One  who  was  injured  while 
driving  over  a  railway  crossing,  will 
not  be  exonerated  from  the  presump- 
tion of  contributory  negligence,  be- 
cause of  failure  to  give  the  statutory 
signals,  or  because  the  train  was  run 
at  a  rate  of  speed  forbidden,  if  it 
appears  that  by  the  exercise  of 
proper  diligence  he  might  have 
avoided  the  injury  (Cincinnati,  etc., 
R.  Co.  v.  Butler,  103  Ind.  31  ;  2  N. 
E.  138).  Especially,  if  he  drove  reck- 
lessly on  the  track,  without  looking 
or  listening  (Weller  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  120  Mo.  635  ;  23  S.  W.  1061 ; 
25  Id.  532). 

8  This  section  was  quoted  and  fol- 
lowed    by  the  court   in  Johnson  v. 


§931 


rON'TKIl'.UTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


140 


§  03.  Plaintiff's  fault  must  contribute  to  injury. —  The 
plaintiff's  negligence  or  other  fault  does  not  affect  his  right  to 
recover  for  an  injur}-  caused  by  the  defendant's  negligence,  if 
it  did  not  in  any  degree  contribute  to  bring  upon  him  the  injury 
of  which  he  complains;  '  and  some  courts  have  held  that  it  is 


Belden,  2  Lans.  433.  See  Reeves  v. 
Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  454. 
The  defendant  is  not  necessarily  ex- 
cused, merely  because  the  plaintiff 
knew  that  some  danger  existed 
through  the  defendant'?;  neglect, 
and  voluntarily  incurred  such  dan- 
ger. The  amount  of  danger  and  the 
circumstances  which  led  the  plain- 
tiff to  incur  it,  are  for  the  considera- 
tion of  a  jury  (Clayards  v.  Dethick, 
12  Q.  B.  439).  Therefore,  where  the 
plaintiff,  in  full  view  of  obstructions 
left  in  the  road,  led  his  horse  over 
them,  and  the  horse  fell  and  was 
killed,  it  was  a  question  for  the  jury, 
whether  the  plaintiff  was  negligent 
or  not  (Id).  Where  a  traveler 
crossed  a  bridge  which  he  knew  to 
be  somewhat  unsafe,  but  which  the 
county  officers  had  not  closed  nor 
warned  people  not  to  pass,  it  was 
held  that  he  was  not  in  fault 
(Humphreys  v.  Armstrong  Co.,  56 
Pa.  St.  204) .  So  in  Pennsylvania  a 
traveler,  whose  path  is  wrongfully 
impeded  by  a  railroad  train  standing 
across  it,  may  recover  for  injuries 
suffered  in  attempting  to  cross  before 
the  train  (Rauch  v.  Lloyd,  31  Pa. 
St.  358).  But  the  contrary  was  held 
in  two  very  arbitrary  and  unjust 
cases  (Gahagan  v.  Boston,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  1  Allen,  187-  Wyatt  v.  Great 
Western  R.  Co.,  6  Best  and  S.  709). 
In  Dewire  v.  Bailey  (131  Mass.  169), 
the  plaintiff  entered  defendant's 
public  hall  ;  on  coming  out,  he 
slipped  on  an  accumulation  of  snow 
and  ice  in  front  of  the  door.  He 
was  held  not  precluded  from  re- 
covery by  the  fact  that  he  noticed 
the  snow  and   ice  in  going  in.     A 


teacher  was  injured  by  stepping  in 
a  hole  in  the  school-house  floor, 
which  she  had  seen  three  weeks 
previous  ;  part  of  time  it  had  been 
covered  with  paste-board.  When 
she  fell  she  was  looking  at  the  pupils 
and  their  books.  Held,  not  con- 
tributory negligence  (Bassett  v.  Fish, 
75  N.  Y.  303). 

1  Inland  Coasting  Co.  v.  Tolson, 
139  U.  S.  551  ;  11  S.  Ct.  653;  South- 
ern Bell  Tel.  Co.  v.  Watts,  13  C.  C. 
A.  579;  66  Fed.  460;  Webster  v. 
Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.  115  N.  Y.  112  ;  21 
N.  E.  725  ;  affi'g40  Hun,  161  ;  Savage 
v.  Corn  Exchange  Ins.  Co.,  36  N.  Y. 
655  ;  Haley  v.  Earle,  30  N.  Y.  208  [no 
helmsman] ;  Morrison  v.  General 
Steam  Nav.  Co.,  8  Exch.  733  ;  Baker 
v.  Portland,  58  Me.  199  ;  Norris  v. 
Litchfield,  35  N.  H.  271  ;  Alger  v. 
Lowell,  3  Allen,  402  ;  Churchill  v. 
Rosebeck,  15  Conn.  359  ;  Cummings 
v.  Nat.  Furnace  Co.,  60  Wise.  603; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hurt,  101 
Ala.  34;  13  So  130  ;  Gadsden  R.  Co. 
v.  Causler,  97  Ala.  237  ;  12  So.  4^9  ; 
Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Parker, 
131  111.  557  ;  23  N.  E.  237  [excessive 
speed].  The  absence  of  signals  re- 
quired by  law  is  immaterial,  if  the 
defendant  saw  the  plaintiff's  vessel 
without  them  (Silliman  v.  Lewis,  49 
N.  Y.  379).  The  plaintiff  had  been 
injured  by  noxious  vapors  created 
by  the  defendant  —  held,  the  fact 
that  the  plaintiff  himself  created 
other  bad  odors  upon  his  own  land, 
was  immaterial  (Brown  v.  Illius,  27 
Conn.  84).  If  the  traveler  could  not 
have  seen  or  heard  the  train,  had  he 
tried  to  do  so  it  is  not  material  that 
he  did  not  look  and  listen  (Dyer  v. 


I4i 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§93 


of  no  importance  unless  it  substantially  or  essentially  contributed 
to  the  injury.2  But  other  courts,  fearing  that  this  would  leave 
too  much  discretion  to  juries,  hold  that  the  plaintiff's  want  of 
ordinary  care  is  a  bar  to  the  action  if  it  contributed  in  any 
degree,  however  slight,  to  bring  about  the  particular  accident 
which  caused  the  injury.3  The  defendant  is  not  excused  from 
liability  by  any  negligence  of  the  plaintiff,  not  amounting  to  a 
want  of  ordinary  care  in  avoiding  the  injurious  consequences 
of  the  defendant's  negligence.4  His  negligence  must  not  only 
concur  in  the  transaction,  but  must  co-operate,  either  in  causing 


Erie  R.  Co.,  71  N.  Y.  228  ;  Davis  v.  N. 
Y.  Central  R.  Co. ,  47  Id.  400;  Connelly 
v.  New  York  Central  R.  Co.,  88  Id. 
346  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  87 
111.  454  ;  Laverenz  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co. ,  56  Iowa,  689  ;  State  v.  Philadel- 
phia, etc.  R.  Co.,  47  Md.  76).  To  the 
same  effect,  The  Wanata,  95  U.  S. 
600  ;  Blanchard  v.  New  Jei-sey,  etc. 
Co.,  59  N.  Y.  292  ;  Flatles  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  35  Iowa,  191  ;  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox,  11  Bush,  495  ;  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.  v.  Van  Horn,  38  N.  J. 
Law,  133  ;  Rome  v.  Dodd,  58  Ga.  238  ; 
Centerville  v.  Woods,  57  Ind.  192; 
Omaha  R.  Co.  v.  Doolittle,  7  Neb. 
481  ;  Gould  v.  McKenna,  86  Penn.  St. 
297  ;  McAunich  v.  Mississippi,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  20 Iowa,  338  ;  Pringle  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  64  Id.  013.  Where  a  per- 
son gets  on  a  moving  train,  his  neg- 
ligence in  so  doing  does  not  con- 
trihute  to  his  death,  caused  by  his 
being  pushed  therefrom  by  an  em- 
ploye of  the  company  (Sharrer  v. 
Paxson,  171  Pa.  St.  26  ;  33  Atl.  120). 
"Substantially"  (Daley  v.  Nor- 
wich, etc.  R.  Co.,  26  Conn.  591  ;  New 
Haven  Steamboat,  etc  Co.  v.  Van- 
derbilt,  10  LI.  420;  West  v.  Martin, 
31  Mo.  375).  '•Essentially"  (Mont- 
gomery <!;is  Co.  v.  Montgomery  R. 
Co.,  S6  Ala.  372  ;  5  So.  735).  In  Sulli- 
v:in  v.  Louisville  Bridge  Co.  (9  Bush, 
81),  it  was  said  that  to  constitute  a 
defense,  plaintiff's  negligence  must 


have  been  an  efficient  cause  of  the 
injury.  So  also  in  Spofford  v.  Har- 
low, 3  Allen.  176  ;  Bigelow  v.  Reed, 
51  Me.  325.  It  has  been  held  unjust 
to  the  plaintiff  to  charge  that  he  can- 
not recover,  if  his  negligence  "con- 
tributed in  any  appreciable  degree  " 
(Erie  Tel.  Co.  v.  Grimes,  82  Tex.  89 ; 
17  S.  W.  831). 

3  This  was  expressly  held  in  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.Co.v.  Shanks,  94  Ind.  598, 
It  has  been  held  that  a  court  is  bound 
upon  request  to  charge  the  jury  that 
the  injury  must  be  "solely"  caused 
by  the  defendant's  fault  (Grippen  v. 
N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  40  N.  Y.  34  ; 
Bigelow  v.  Reed,  51  Me.  325).  But 
this  is  obviously  erroneous.  See  ^  65, 
ante.  It  has  been  held  not  sufficient 
to  charge  that  it  must  be  essentially 
so  caused  (Grippen  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  supra-,  Oil  City  Fuel  Co.  v. 
Boundy,  122  Pa.  St.  449 ;  15  Atl.  865, 
and  it  has  been  held  error  to  charge 
that  it  must  materially  contribute 
(Artz  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  38  Iowa, 
293 ;  Mattimore  v.  Erie,  144  Pa.  St. 
14;  22  Atl.  817;  MonongahHa  v. 
Fischer,  111  Pa.  St.  !)  ;  2  All.  87). 

4  Brown  v,  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
31  Barb.  385;  affi'd,  32  N.  Y.  597; 
Davies  v.  Mann,  10  Mees.  &  W.  546; 
Bridge  v.  Grand  June.  R.  Co.,  3  Id. 
244  ;  Do<i»ett  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  78  N.  C.  305.     See  §  61,  ante. 


§93] 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


I42 


the  injury,  or  in  exposing  himself  or  his  property  to  it.5  If 
the  injury  would  have  occurred,  notwithstanding  the  exercise 
of  all  due  care  by  the  plaintiff,  his  omission  to  take  such  care 
is  immaterial.6  Thus,  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff  was  intoxi- 
cated at  the  time  of  the  injury,  while  no  excuse  for  his  negli- 
gence.7 and  indeed  competent  and  material  evidence  of 
contributory  negligence,8  is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  defeat  his 
action,9  unless  it  is  proved  or  is  reasonably  to  be  inferred  from 


5  Carroll  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co. ,  1  Duer,  571  ;  Colegrove  v.  New 
Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  492. 

6Carrico  v.  West  Va.  etc.  R.  Co., 
39  W.  Va.  86  ;  19  S.  E.  571  ;  Smith 
v.  Irwin,  51  N.  J.  Law,  507  ;  18  Atl. 
852  ;  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  How- 
ard, 79  Ga.  44  ;  3  S.  E.  426  ;  Beers  v. 
Housatonic  R.  Co.,  19  Conn.  560  ; 
Thomas  v.  Kenyon,  1  Daly,  132  ; 
McDonald  v.  Montgomery  R.  Co.,  110 
Ala.  161;  20  So.  317;  Wright  v.  Illi- 
nois, etc.  R.  Co.,  20  Iowa,  195.  See 
Colegrove  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  6  Duer,  382  ;  affi'd,  20  N.Yr.  492  ; 
Tuff  v.  Warman,5  C.  B.  [N.  S.]573  ; 
affi'g  s.  c.,  2  Id.  740;  Northern 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  State,  31  Md.  357  ; 
Brown  v.  Sullivan,  71  Tex.  470  ;  10 
S.  W.  288.  The  only  case  opposed  is 
Reeves  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.  (30 
Pa.  St.  454),  and  that  is  a  mere 
dictum. 

7  The  plaintiff's  intoxication  at  the 
time  of  the  injury  will  not  relieve 
him  from  the  legal  consequences  of 
his  contributoiy  negligence  (Kean 
v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61  Md. 
154  ;  Milliman  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  66  N.  Y.  642  ;  Herring  v. 
Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  10  Ired. 
Law,  402  ;  Jones  v.  North  Carolina 
R.  Co.,  67  N.  C.  125  ;  Toledo,  etc  R. 
Co.  v.  Riley,  47  111.  514  ;  Illinois,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Cragin,  71  Id.  177  ;  Yar- 
nall  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  75  Mo. 
575  ;  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Synip- 
kins,  54  Tex.  615;  Weeks  v.  New 
Orleans,    etc.   R.   Co.,    32  La.  Ann. 


615  ;  Fitzgerald  v.  Weston,  52  Wise. 
354). 

8  Strand  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67 
Mich.  380  ;  34  N.  W  .  712 ;  Lynch  v. 
New  York,  47  Hun,  524  ;  Brand  v. 
Schenectady,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8  Barb.  368. 

9  The  mere  fact  of  intoxication  will 
not  establish  want  of  ordinary  care. 
The  jury  must  determine  whether 
the  intoxication  contributed  to  the 
injury  ;  and  if  it  did  not,  it  is  of  no 
importance  (Ditchett  v.  Spuyten, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  5  Hun,  164  ;  aftTd,  67  N. 
Y.,  425  [injury  by  defects  in  road]  ; 
Alger  v.  Lowell,  3  Allen,  402; 
Robinson  v.  Pioche,  5  Cal.  461  ; 
Aurora  v.  Hillman,  90  111.  61  ;  Ward 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85  Wis.  601 ; 
55  N.  W.  771  ;  Central  R.  Co.  v. 
Phinazee,  93  Ga.  488  ;  21  S.  E.  66). 
Plaintiff  while  partially  intoxicated 
was  injured  in  consequence  of  de- 
fects in  the  sidewalk.  Held,  it  was 
for  the  jury  and  not  for  the  court  to 
say  whether  the  intoxication  con- 
tributed in  any  way  to  the  injury 
sustained.  Because  one  is  intoxi- 
cated, it  cannot  be  presumed  that  he 
is  negligent.  '  'A  drunken  man  is  as 
much  entitled  to  a  safe  street  as  a 
sober  one,  and  much  more  in  need  of 
it  "  (Healy  v.  New  York,  3  Hun,  708, 
quoting  from  Robinson  v.  Pioche,  5 
Cal.  461 ;  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Reason,  61  Tex.  613  ;  Baltimore,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Boteler,  38  Md.  568).  To 
similar  effect,  American  Waterworks 
Co.  v.  Dougherty,  37  Neb.  373  ;  55 
N.   W.  1051  ;  Dickson  v.   Hollister, 


H3 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


[§94 


the  circumstances  that  it  prevented  him  from  taking  ordinary- 
care  to  avoid  the  injury.10  So  the  fact  that  the  plaintiff  was 
acting  in  violation  of  a  municipal  ordinance,  or  even  of  a 
statute,  is  not  material,  if  such  violation  did  not  contribute  to 
the  injury.11 

§  94.  Plaintiff's  fault  must  proximately  contribute  to 
injury. —  The  plaintiff's  fault  does  not  affect  his  right  of  action, 
unless  it  proximately  contributed  to  his  injury.1  It  must  be  a 
proximate  cause,  in  the  same  sense  in  which  the  defendant's 
123  Pa.  St.  421  ;  16  Atl.  484.     So  as    W.  Va.  579  ;  Tompkins  v.  Kanawha, 


to  any  other  form  of  debauchery 
McVoy  v.  Knoxville,  85  Tenn.  19  ; 
1  S.  W.  498.  Evidence  that  one 
killed  at  a  railroad  crossing  was 
given  to  the  habit  of  intoxication  is 
not  admissible  on  the  issue  of  con- 
tributory negligence  (Lane  v.  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.,  132  Mo.  4  ;  33  S.  W. 
645).  Under  a  statute  in  Georgia, 
one  who,  being  voluntarily  drunk, 
places  himself  on  a  railway  track,  is 
not  entitled  to  recover,  whether  the 
defendant  was  negligent  or  not 
(Southwestern  R.  Co.  v.  Hankerson, 
61  Ga.  114).     See  g  110,  post. 

10  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cragin,  71 
111.  177  ;  Cramer  v.  Burlington,  42 
Iowa,  315.  And  see  Reget  v.  Bell,  77 
111.  593  ;  Johnson  v.  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  104  Ala.  241  ;  16  So.  75  ; 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  81 
Md.  371;  32  Atl.  201. 

11  See  §  mi,  post. 

1  Radley  v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.. 
L.  R.  1  App.  Cas.  754 ;  Sheffer  v. 
Railroad  Co. ,  105  U.  S.  249  ;  Austin  v. 
N.  J.  St.  Co.,  43  N.  Y.  75,  82  ;  Isbell 
v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  27  Conn. 
393;  Smith  wick  v.  Hall,  etc.  Co., 
59  LI.  261;  21  Atl.  924;  Cleveland, 
etc.  R.  Co  v.  Elliott,  4  Ohio  St,  474; 
Richmond  v.  Sacramento,  etc.  R.  Co., 
18  Cal.  351  ;  Flynn  v.  S;m  Francisco, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  40  Id.  14  ;  Fernandez  v. 
Sacramento,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  52  Id.  45  ; 
Indianapolis  v.  Caldwell,  9  Ind.  397 ; 
Towler  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,   18 


21  Id .  224  ;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Reaney,  42  Md.  117 ;  Kennedy  v. 
Cecil  Co.,  69  Id.  65  ;  14  Atl.  524  ;  Gun- 
ter  v.  Wicker,  85  N.  C.  310  ;  Doggett 
v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  78  Id.  305  ; 
Thirteenth  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Boudron,  92 
Pa.  St.  475  ;  Drake  v.  Kiley,  93  Id. 
492  ;  Oil  City  Gas  Co.  v.  Robinson, 
99  Id.  1  ;  Dudley  v.  Camden,  etc. 
Ferry  Co.,  45  N.  J.  Law,  368  ;  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wolfe,  80  Ky.  82  ; 
Louisville  Gas  Co.  v.  Gutenkunz,  82 
Id.  432  ;  Barbee  v.  Reese,  60  Miss. 
906  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Maddry, 
57  Ark.  306  ;  21  S.  W.  472  ;  Meyer  v. 
People's  R.  Co.,  43  Mo.  523  ;  Dickson 
v.  Omaha,  etc.  R.  Co.,  124  Mo.  140 ; 
27  S.  W.  476  ;  Williams  v.  Edmunds, 
75  Mich.  92  ;  42  N.  W.  534;  O'Con- 
nor v.  North  Truckee  Co.,  17  Nev. 
245  ;  30  Pac.  882;  Ford  v.  Umatilla 
County,  15  Oreg.  313  ;  16  Pac.  33  [in- 
toxication  of  plaintiff]  ;  Davis  v. 
Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8  Oreg.  172 
[same].  See  Thompson,  Negl.  1151. 
The  fact  that  plaintiff  left  his  horse 
untied  in  the  street  will  not  de- 
feat a  recovery  for  defendant's 
negligence,  if  plaintiff's  negligence 
was  not  in  any  proper  sense  the 
immediate  or  proximate  cause  of  the 
accident  (Wasmer  v.  Delaware,  etc. 
R  Co  .  80  N.  Y.  212;  Griggs  v. 
Fleckenstein,  14  Minn.  81).  The  fail- 
ure of  one  about  to  ci-oss  a  railroad 
track,  to  stop,  look  and  listen,  is  im- 
material, if  it  was  not  the  proximate 


§  94]  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  144 

negligence  must  have  been  a  proximate  cause  in  order  to  give 
any  right  of  action.2  It  is,  of  course,  not  correct  to  say  that 
negligence  which  does  not  occur  at  the  time  of  the  injury 
necessarily  does  not  proximately  contribute  thereto.3  Great 
difficulties  arise  in  charging  juries  upon  this  point.  No  jury 
could  ever  understand  what  "  proximate  "  means.  In  most 
reported  cases,  it  has  been  held  permissible  to  say  that  the 
plaintiff's  negligence  is  no  defense,  unless  it  directly  contributes 
to  the  injury;4  but  such  an  instruction  is  not  tolerated  in  New 
York,5  and  perhaps  not  in  Georgia/' 

cause  of  the  injury,  as  where  the  killing  of  animals,  the  court  in- 
casualty  was  wholly  due  to  the  de-  structed  the  jury  that  "  proximate 
fective  condition  of  the  crossing,  for  negligence  is  negligence  at  the  time 
which  the  railway  company  was  re-  of  the  happening  of  the  injury  com- 
sponsible  (Baugham  v.  Shenango,  plained  of ,"  that  "  remote  negligence 
etc.  R.  Co.,  92  Pa.  St.  335).  An  is  that  which  does  not  occur  at  the 
instruction  to  the  jury  asked  by  a  time  of  such  injury."  Held,  error 
turnpike  company,  to  the  effect  that  (Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Goss,  17 
even  if  it  were  negligent  in  repairing  Wise.  441).  See  §  26,  ante. 
its  road,  yet  if  the  plaintiff  were  driv-  4  Norris  v.  Litchfield,  35  N.  H.  271  ; 
ing  a  fractious  horse,  or  was  unable  Lehigh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Greiner,  113 
to  control  his  horse  because  of  a  Pa.  St.  600,  605  ;  Farmer  v.  McCraw, 
weakness  of  his  arm,  he  was  not  en-  26  Ala.  189  ;  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co. 
titled  to  recover,  was  properly  re-  v.  Terry,  8  Ohio  St.  570  ;  Orleans  v. 
fused  (Baltimore,  etc.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Perry,  24  Neb.  831  ;  40  N.  W.  417 ; 
Cassell,  66  Md.  419;  7  Atl.  805).  McNaughton  v.  Caledonian  R.  Co., 
Plaintiff's  intoxication  is  there-  21  Dunlop,  160.  See  Haley  v. 
fore,  no  defense,  if  it  only  re-  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  21  Iowa,  16 ; 
motely  contributed  to  his  injury  O'Keefe  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32 
(Davis  v.Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8  Oreg.  Id.  467  ;  Carlin  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
172).     See  §  93,   ante.     It  has  been    Co.,  37  Id.  316. 

held,  however,  error  to  charge  5  Button  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  18 
that  negligence  remotely  con-  N.  Y.  248.  Nevertheless,  where  the 
tributing  to  the  injury  is  not  only  negligence  with  which  the  plain- 
material  (Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  tiff  is  charged  is  such  as  operated  di- 
Plunkitt,  25  Kans.  188).  Such  phrases,  redly,  if  at  all,  to  produce  the  injury, 
however  scientifically  correct,  are,  a  new  trial  will  not  be  granted  on 
when  used  to  a  jury,  without  ex-  account  of  the  judge's  charging  the 
planation.  often  misleading.  jury    that   they   must    find   for  the 

•  See  definition.  §  26,  ante.  A  plaintiff  upon  this  issue,  unless  his 
charge  which  implies  that  contribu-  negligence  operated  directly  to  pro- 
tory  neglisrence.  to  defeat  recovery,  duce  the  injury  (Johnson  v.  Hudson 
must  be  the  sole  proximate  cause  of  River  R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  65:  Tuff  v. 
the  injury,  is  erroneous  (Payne  v.  Warman,  5  C.  B.  [N.  S]  573;  2 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co..  129  Mo.  405  ;  13    Id.  740). 

S   W.  885.  6  Prather  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 

3  In   an  action  for  the    negligent    80  Ga.  427  :  9  S.  E.  530  ;  Montgomery 


H5 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


[§95 


§  95.  Negligence  increasing  damages  only,  no  bar.  —  By 
the  "  injury,"  contribution  to  which  by  the  plaintiff's  fault  is 
said  to  be  a  bar  to  his  action,  must  be  understood  the  par- 
ticular event  which  causes  damage  to  the  plaintiff,  not  the 
damage  itself.  If  the  plaintiff  in  no  degree  contributed  by 
his  want  of  ordinary  care  to  expose  himself  to  the  act  by 
which  he  was  injured,  it  is  no  bar  to  his  action  that,  by  any 
fault  of  his  own,  he  aggravated  the  consequences  of  that 
injury.1  That  fact,  if  established,  only  goes  to  mitigate  the 
damages  recoverable  by  him.2  He  cannot  recover  compensa- 
tion for  any  damage  which  he  might  have  avoided  by  the 
use  of  ordinary  care  and  diligence,  after  becoming  aware 
of  the  injury  of  which  he  complains;3  but  he  can  recover 
for  any  other  damage;4  and  the  utmost  result  of  such  negli- 
gence on  his  part  would  be  to  reduce  his  recovery  to  a 
nominal  sum.  Where  the  plaintiff  has  suffered  two  distinct 
injuries,   with   respect    to    only   one    of    which    he    is    charge- 


v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94 Ga. 
332  ;  21  S.  E.  571. 

1  Bradford  v.  Downs,  126  Pa.  St. 
622  ;  IT  Atl.  884  ;  Gould  v.  McKenna, 
86  Pa.  St.  297 ;  Matthews  v.  Warner, 
29  Gratt.  570;  Secord  v.  St.  Paul, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  5  McCrary,  515  ;  Smith- 
tick  v.  Hall,  etc.  Co.,  59  Conn.  261  ; 
21  Atl.  924;  Thomas  v.  Kenyon,  1 
Daly,  132  ;  DuBois  v.  Decker,  52  Hun, 
610  ;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  768  [disobeying 
surgeon's  directions]  ;  Standard  Oil 
Co.  v.  Bowker,  141  Ind.  12  ;  40  N.  E. 
128  [same],  Strudgeon  v.  Sand  Beach, 
107  Mich.  496 ;  65  Is.  W.  616  [same]. 
'  mshen  v.  England,  119  Ind.  368  ; 
21  X.  E.  977.     See  §  741,  pout. 

Hamilton  v.  McPherson.  28  N.  V. 
72  ;  Milton  v.  Hudson  River  Steam- 
boat Co.,  37  Id.  210;  Chase  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  24  Barb.  273  ;  Slier- 
man  v.  Fall  River  Iron  Co.,  2  Allen, 
524  ;  Hunt  v.  Lowell  Gas  Co.,  1  Id. 
343;  Wright  v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co., 
20  I<»ua,  195;  Tift  v.  Jones,  52  Ga. 
538 ;  Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Eskew, 
86  Id.  641  ;  12  S.  E.  1061  [expelled 
passenger  walking,  when  lie  could 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  — 10] 


have  ridden]  ;  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Burrow,  32  111.  App.  161  [same]; 
Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hembree, 
84  Ala.  182  ;  4  So.  392  [value  of  dead 
animal  deducted]  ;  Sandwich  v.  Do- 
lan,  34  111.  App.  199  [not  employing 
competent  physician].  Whether  the 
refusal  of  plaintiff  to  have  a  limb 
amputated,  as  advised  by  his  physi- 
cian, contributed  to  his  death  so  as 
to  bar  a  recovery  is  for  the  jury 
(Sullivan  v.  Tioga  R.  Co.,  112  N.  Y. 
643;  20  N.  E.  569). 

4  Where  the  damage  caused  by 
the  negligence  of  defendant  was  in- 
creased by  the  negligence  of  plaintiff, 
the  latter  can  recover  up  to  the  time 
when  bis  contributory  negligence 
began  to  affect  the  result  (Stebbins 
v.  Vermont  Central  R.  Co.,  ."4  Yt 
464  ;  quoting  §  32  of  our  earlier  edi- 
tion). See  Miller  v.  Mariner's 
Church,  7  Me.  51  ;  State  v.  Powell, 
44  Mo.  436  ;  Douglass  v.  Stevens,  18 
Id.  362  ;  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Finni- 
gan,  21  111.  646  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Parker,  49  Id.  385  ;  Worth  v.  Ed- 
monds, 52  Barb.  40. 


§  96] 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


I46 


able  with  contributory  fault,  he  can  nevertheless  recover  for 
the  other.5 

§  96.  Plaintiffs  fault  need  not  be  cause  of  injury.— It  is 

not  essential  to  this  defense  that  the  plaintiff's  fault  should  have 
been,  in  any  degree,  the  cause  of  the  event  by  which  he  was 
injured.1  It  is  enough  to  defeat  him,  if  the  injury  might  have 
been  avoided  by  his  exercise  of  ordinary  care.2  The  question 
to  be  determined  in  every  case  is,  not  whether  the  plaintiff's 
negligence  caused,  but  whether  it  contributed  to  the  injury  of 
which  he  complains.3  This  it  may  do  by  exposing  him  to  the 
risk  of  injury,  quite  as  effectually  as  if  he  committed  the  very 
act  which  injured  him.4  Neither  is  it  necessary  that  the 
plaintiff's  negligence  should  have  contributed  to  the  injury  in 
any  greater  degree  than  the  negligence  of  the  defendant.5 


5  In  Northern  Central  R.  Co.  v. 
Price  (29  Md.  420),  the  decedent, 
while  negligent,  was  run  over  by  a 
train.  The  trainmen  laid  his  appar- 
ently lifeless  body  in  a  warehouse  at 
night.  In  the  morning,  it  was  found 
that  decedent  had  survived,  and  he 
afterwards  died  from  loss  of  blood. 
The  company  was  held  liable,  not- 
withstanding plaintiff  contributed  to 
causing  the  collision.  Whether  one 
injured  by  falling  on  ice,  negligently 
allowed  to  accumulate  on  the  side- 
walk, was  negligent  in  not  discover- 
ing the  ice  is  for  the  jury  (Thuringer 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  R.  Co.,  71  Hun, 
526;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  1087;  Lake 
Shore,  etc.  R.  Co  v.  Parker,  131 
111.  557  ;  23  N.  E.  237  [whether  loco- 
motive engineer  was  negligent  in 
approaching  at  a  particular  rate 
of  speed  a  switch,  which  was  mis- 
placed, when  his  view  was  obscured 
by  smoke] ;  Blaiser  v.  N.  Y,  Lake 
Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  110  N.  Y.  638  ;  17 
N.  E.  692  [plaintiff  struck,  at  cross- 
ing, by  engine  without  headlight  or 
warning]). 

1  Colegrove  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co., 
20  N.  Y.  492 ;  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co. 


v.  Jobe,  69  Miss.  452  ;  10  So.  672  ; 
s.  p.,  McKeller  v.  Monitor,  78  Mich. 
485  ;  44  N.  W.  412.  Much  less  that 
it  should  be  the  sole  cause  (Central 
Pass.  R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  [Ky.]  ;  22 
S.  W.  312;  North  Birmingham  R. 
Co.  v.  Calderwood,  89  Ala.  247  ;  7  So. 
360). 

2  See  §  87,  ante. 

3  Brand  v.  Schenectady,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  8  Barb.  368. 

*  Ochsenbein  v.  Shapley,  85  N.  Y. 
214.  Where  there  are  various  steps 
in  the  happening  of  an  accident, 
culminating  in  plaintiff's  injury,  his 
negligence  contributing  to  the  initia- 
tion of  the  events,  will  bar  his  re- 
covery for  injuries  sustained  by  the 
last  event,  though,  as  to  that,  he  was 
without  fault  (Rhing  v.  Broadway, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  53  Hun,  321;  6  N.  Y. 
Supp.  641  [plaintiff  trampled  on  by 
horses  after  collision  with  street 
car] ) . 

5  This  is  well  settled  (Wilds  v. 
Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  430; 
Grippen  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  40 
Id.  34  ;  Bigelow  v.  Reed,  51  Me.  325; 
Hoben  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  20 
Iowa,    562.     It  is  so  held,  even   in 


H7 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§97 


§97.  Effect  of  technical  trespass.— The  mere  fact  that  the 
plaintiff,  when  he  suffered  the  injury,  was  technically  trespass- 
ing on  the  defendant's  premises,  and  would  not  have  been 
injured  if  he  had  not  so  trespassed,  is  not  conclusive  evidence 
of  contributory  negligence.1  The  decisions  upon  this  point, 
even  in  the  same  court,  are  probably  not  reconcilable  with  each 
other;  and  they  certainly  cannot  be  reconciled  by  any  mere 
quotations  from  their  language.  But  a  principle  can  be  found 
which  will  reconcile  all  decisions  which  ought  to  stand,  includ- 
ing nearly  all  reported,  disregarding  dicta  and  looking  to  the 

54),  a  man  has  no  right  to  set  baits 
of  poisoned  meat  on  his  premises  for 
dogs  that  may  trespass  there,  and  is 
liable  to  their  owners  for  injuries  to 
such  dogs  (Gillum  v.  Sisson,  53  Mo. 


Illinois  (see  §  102,  post).  The  law 
does  not  undertake,  when  both 
parties  have  been  negligent,  to 
measure  the  degree  of  negligence  of 
each,  nor  will  it  allow  a  recovery  by 
the  party  least  in  fault  against  the    App.  516).    In  Townsend  v.  Wathen 


other  (McGrath  v.  N.  Y.  Central, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  408;  Long  v. 
Milford,  137  Pa.  St.  122  ;  20  Atl. 
425). 

1  Lowe  v.  Salt  Lake  City,  13  Utah, 
91  ;  44  Pac.  1050  [approving  our  text] ; 
Daley  v.  Norwich,  etc  R.  Co.,  26 
Conn.  591;  Birge  v.  Gardiner,  19  Id. 
507  ;  Brown  v.  Lynn,  31  Pa.  St.  510  ; 
Vicksburg,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McGowan, 
62  Miss.  682.  The  keeper  of  ferocious 
dogs  is  liable  to  a  technical  trespasser 
who,  without  warning,  approaches 
the  premises  and  is  attacked  by  them 
(Loomis  v.  Terry,  17  Wend.  496; 
Marble  v.  Ross,  124  Mass.  44  ;  Woolf 
v.  Chalker,  31  Conn.  121).  To  the 
same  effect,  Sherfey  v.  Bartley,  4 
Sneed,  58;  see  £  639,  post.  In  Bird 
v.  Holbrook  (4  Bing.  628),  the  defend- 
ant had  put  spring  guns  in  the 
ground,  for  the  obvious  purpose  of 
injuring  trespassers.  Not  having 
put  up  any  notice  of  warning,  he  was 
held  liable  to  a  trespasser  injured  by 
one  of  these  guns.  Recovery  al- 
lowed for  trespassing  colt,  injured  by 
vicious  mule  at  large  (Hill  v.  A.p- 
plegate,  40  Kans.  31  :  19  Pac.  315). 
Except  in  the  case  of  dogs  that  have 
killed  his  sheep   (Rev.   St.    1889.    c. 


(9  East,  277),  the  defendant  set  traps 
in  his  wood,  baited  with  strong- 
scented  meat.  The  wood  being  un- 
inclosed,  the  plaintiffs  dogs  entered 
it,  attracted  by  the  meat,  and  were 
caught  in  the  traps:  held,  plaintiff 
could  recover,  notwithstanding  his 
dogs  were  trespassers.  See  Wooton 
v.  Dawkins,  2  C.  B.  [N.  S.]  412;  Jor- 
dan v.  Crump,  8  Mees.  &  W.  782; 
Deane  v.  Clayton,  7  Taunt.  489,  in 
which  plaintiff  was  not  allowed  to 
recover  for  dog  killed  by  a  spike, 
placed  by  defendant,  ivith  notice. 
Compare  Johnson  v.  Patterson,  14 
Conn.  1;  Gray  v.  Coombs,  7  J.  J. 
Marsh,  478  ;  Hooker  v.  Miller,  37 
Iowa,  613.  A  person  may  protect 
his  house  from  burglary  by  setting 
a  spring  gun  (State  v.  Moore,  31 
Conn.  479).  Stepping  on  a  railroad 
track  to  rescue  another  from  injury 
by  an  approaching  train  is  not  a 
trespass  (Spooner  v.  Delaware,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  115  N.  Y.  22  :  21  N.  E.  696), 
nor  is  going  on  another's  premises 
where  a  fire  is  raging,  endangering 
life  and  safety,  for  the  honest  pur- 
pose  of  saving  life  or  property 
(Henry  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co., 
67  Fed".  426). 


§97]  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  148 

real  points  decided.  This  principle  appears  to  us  to  be  that, 
in  order  to  defeat  his  recovery,  the  plaintiff's  trespass  must  be 
culpable,  from  a  common-sense  point  of  view,  and  not  in  the 
technical  sense  which  would  include  every  neglect  to  comply 
with  the  letter  of  the  law.  Unless  the  plaintiff  has  done  some- 
thing which  persons  of  ordinar\r  prudence  and  moral  sense 
would  feel  to  be  careless  or  morally  wrong,  involving  a  reason- 
able possibility  of  injury  either  to  himself  or  to  the  person 
upon  whose  premises  he  is  trespassing,  he  should  not  be  de- 
barred from  his  right  of  action  for  negligence;  but  the  de- 
fendant should  be  left  to  recover  such  damages  as  he  can  for 
the  trespass.  Thus,  an  entry  upon  a  vacant,  unfenced  lot  is  a 
trespass,  just  as  truly  as  an  entry  into  a  house  with  closed 
doors ;  but  the  presumption  as  to  negligence  in  one  case  is 
vastly  different  from  that  in  the  other.  In  ®ne  of  th«se  vehe- 
ment opinions  which  make  some  of  the  Pennsylvania  reports 
such  entertaining  reading,  but  such  unsafe  guides,  it  was 
asserted  that  an  entry  upon  the  land  of  an  unfenced  railroad 
stood  upon  the  same  footing  with  an  entry  into  a  bedroom;2 
but  this  doctrine  confounds  all  moral  and  some  legal  distinctions. 
The  comparison  fails  at  every  point.  The  injury  which  a  stranger 
does  to  the  railroad  company  by  entering  upon  its  way  is  infini- 
tesimal; while  the  risk  to  himself  is  great.  The  injury  which 
he  does  to  his  neighbor  by  secretly  entering  his  bedroom  is 
great  ;  while  the  risk  to  himself,  if  undiscovered,  is  infinitesi- 
mal. In  each  case,  it  is  true,  the  effect  upon  the  trespasser's 
light  to  sue  for  damages  may  be  the  same;  but  this  will  be  for 
very  different  reasons.  If  he  walks  along  the  track,  he  know- 
ingly takes  the  risk  of  fatal  injuries,  and  should  not  recover, 
for  that  reason.  If  he  secretes  himself  in  the  bedroom  he 
knowingly  engages  in  a  gross  invasion  of  his  neighbor's  rights, 
and  should  not  recover,  for  that  reason.  Most  of  the  reported 
cases  which  appear  at  first  sight  inconsistent  with  this  proposi- 
tion, and  all  of  them  which  are  not  inconsistent  with  other 
and  better-considered  decisions,  will  prove,  upon  examination, 
to  be  cases  which  turned,  not  upon  contributory  negligence, 
but  upon  the  question  whether  the  defendant  owed  any  duty 
to  persons  in  the  plaintiff's  situation,  which  he  had  neglected 

2  Phil.  etc.  R    Co   v.  Hummell,  44  Pa.  St.  375  ;  see  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co. 
v.  Skinner,  19  Id.  301. 


149 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§97 


to  perform,3  which  is  an  entirely  different  matter.  Yet  noth- 
ing is  more  common  than  to  find  the  two  questions  confused 
with  each  other  in  judicial  opinions.  A  large  majority  of  the 
apparently  adverse  cases,  moreover,  are  railroad  cases,  in  which 
the  trespasser  knowingly  exposed  himself  to  injury.  They 
have,  therefore,  no  bearing  upon  the  question  of  the  effect  of 
a  mere  technical  trespass.  We  have  been  unable  to  find  any 
case  of  a  mere  trespass,  in  which  any  different  rule  is  applied 
from  that  which  is  applied  by  the  same  courts  to  the  case  of 
one  who  enters  by  a  bare  license.  In  both,  the  real  decision 
is  that  the  defendant  is  not  bound  to  anticipate  the  presence 
of  a  stranger,  and  therefore  is  not  negligent  in  failing  to  pro- 
tect him  against  injury.4 


3  For  examples  of  such  cases,  see 
Larmore  v.  Crown  Point  Iron  Co., 
101  N.  Y.  391;  Nicholson  v.  Erie  R. 
Co.,  41  Id.  525;  Severy  v.  Nickerson, 
120  Mass.  306  ;  Hounsell  v.  Smyth, 
7  C.  B.  [N.  S.]  731;  Parker  v.  Port- 
land Pub.  Co.,  69  Me.  173  [absence 
of  a  duty  insisted  on]  ;  Augusta  R. 
Co.  v.  Andrews,  89  Ga.  653 ;  16  S.  E. 
203. 

4  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.Hum- 
mell,  44  Pa.  St.  375  ;  N.  Y.  &  Erie 
R.  Co.  v.  Skinner,  19  Id.  301 ;  Matze 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  1  Hun,  417  ; 
Hunger  v.  Tonawanda  R.  Co.,  4 
N.  Y.  349  ;  Roberton  v.  New  Y^ork, 
7  Hisc.  645  ;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.13  ;  Ward 
v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  25  Oreg. 
433  ;  36  Pac.  166,  and  cases  cited. 
See  §  705,  post.  And  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed that  he  was  not  aware  of 
their  presence  (Chenery  v.  Fitch- 
burg  R.  Co.,  160  Hass.  211;  35  N.  E. 
544;  Holland  v.  Sparks,  92  Ga.  753; 
is  S.  E.  990;  Cablett  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  57  Ark.  461;  21  S.  W. 
1002).  In  all  the  folio  win.-'  cases. 
usually  cited  as  authorities  for  the 
proposition  that  a  trespasser  cannot 
recover  because  he  is  a  trespasser, 
tin-  cunts  really  decided  nothing 
more  than  is  stated  in  the  text. 
In   all,  travelers   took   shelter  from 


storms,  without  invitation:  Lary  v. 
Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  78  Ind.  323 
[taking  shelter  in  a  ruined  house]  ; 
Converse  v.  Walker,  30  Hun,  596 
[shelter  in  hotel]  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Bingham,  29  Ohio  St.  364 
[station  house]  ;  Parker  v.  Portland 
Publishing  Co., 69  Me.  173.  Plaintiff, 
a  boy,  going  through  a  lumber  yard 
was  injured  by  the  fail  of  lumber 
fifty  feet  from  the  highway  (Van- 
derbeck  v.  Hendry,  34  N.  J.  Law, 
467).  See,  also,  Jeffersonville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Goldsmith,  47  Ind.  43 ; 
Morgan  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  7 
Fed.  78.  Compare  Graves  v.  Thomas, 
95  Ind.  361,  as  distinguished  in 
Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Griffin, 
100  Id.  221;  Cahill  v.  Layton,  57 
"Wise.  600 ;  Davis  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  58  Id.  646;  Bransom  v.  Labrot, 
81  Ky.  638.  No  recovery  was  allowed 
in  the  following  cases:  Hargreaves 
v.  Deacon,  25  Mich.  1  [child  coming 
on  defendant's  premises,  some  dis- 
tance from  highway,  fell  into  an  un- 
covered  cistern];  McAlpine  v. 
Powell,  70  N.  Y.  126  [child  getting 
on  fire-escape  attached  to  house,  fell 
through  defective  trapdoor]  ;  Rouls- 
ton  v.  Clark,  3  E  D.  Smith.  306 
[going  through  a  building  in  pro- 
gress of  erection] ;  Kohn  v.  Lovett, 


§99]  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  1 50 

§  98.  Technical  trespass  no  bar.  —  The  overwhelming 
weight  (if  authority,  both  in  number  of  decisions  and  in  sound- 
ness of  reasoning,  by  which  is  established  the  right  of  little 
children  to  recover  damages  for  injuries  suffered  while  tres- 
passing, should  alone  be  sufficient  to  settle  this  question.1 
Innocence  and  mistake  are  no  excuse  for  a  trespass;2  and 
therefore  one  committed  by  a  child  is  just  as  truly  a  trespass 
as  if  committed  by  an  adult.  The  owner  of  premises  has  pre- 
cisely the  same  right  to  eject  a  child  therefrom,  as  he  has  to 
eject  a  full-grown  man.  He  has  the  same  right  to  recover 
nominal  damages  in  each  case.  But  when  he  is  sued  for  dam- 
ages caused  by  his  negligence  towards  a  trespasser,  he  finds 
that  there  is  a  wonderful  difference  between  the  probable 
result  of  the  suit,  if  the  plaintiff  is  a  child,  and  the  probable 
result  of  a  like  suit  by  an  adult.  Is  there  any  intelligible 
ground  of  distinction  to  account  for  this  difference,  except  that 
the  child  is  presumably  not  guilty  of  conscious  negligence, 
while  the  man  presumably  is?  When  the  man  proves  that  he 
was  ignorant  of  the  fact  that  he  was  trespassing,  or  shows  that 
his  trespass  was  only  technical,  and  such  as  he  might  reason- 
ablv  suppose  would  not  be  objected  to  by  the  defendant,  and 
did  not  in  fact  produce  any  appreciable  injury  or  annoyance, 
his  right  to  recover  is  just  as  good  as  that  of  an  infant.3  All 
this  is  well  settled.  And  what  inference  can  possibly  be  drawn 
from  such  decisions,  if  not  that  the  plaintiff's  trespass  is  only  a 
circumstance  tending  to  prove  contributory  fault  upon  his  part, 
and  not  in  and  of  itself  such  fault  or  attended  with  the  usual 
effects  of  such  fault? 

§  99.  Defendant's  later  negligence ;  rule  in  Davies  v. 
Mann. —  It  is  now  perfectly  well  settled  that  the  plaintiff  may 
recover  damages  for  an  injury  caused  by  the  defendant's  neg- 

44  Ga.  251   [plaintiff,  responding  to  '  See  §  73,  ante ;  Vicksburg  v.  Mc- 

a  fire  alarm,  ran  through  defendant's  Lain,  67  Miss.  4  ;  6  So.  774. 

store  and   fell   down   an   opening]  ;  '2  Per  Andrews,  J.,  Beck  v.  Carter, 

Zoebisch   v.    Tarbell,  10  Allen,    385  68  N.  Y.  283,  289. 

[plaintiff  going  into  a  room  of  fac-  3  Loomis  v.   Terry,   17  Wend.  496. 

tory  on  the  door  of  which  "  no  ad-  and  other  cases  cited  under  last  see- 

mittance"  was  painted]  ;s  p., Severy  tion.      Text    quoted    and    approved 

v.  Nickerson,  120  Mass.  306.  (Lowe  v.  Salt  Lake  City,  13  Utah,  M, 

44Pac.  1050). 


i;i 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


[§99 


ligence,  notwithstanding  the  plaintiff's  own  negligence  ex- 
posed him  to  the  risk  of  injury,  if  such  injury  was  more  imme- 
diately caused  by  the  defendant's  omission,  after1  becoming 
aware  of  the  plaintiff's  danger,2  to  use  ordinary  care3  for  the 
purpose  of  avoiding  injury  to  him.4     We  know  of  no  court  of 


1  Defendant's  negligence  must  be 
subsequent  to  plaintiff's.  Recovery 
cannot  be  had  for  the  killing  by  a 
train  of  a  trespasser,  by  reason  of 
the  fact  that  the  train  was  not  prop- 
erly equipped  with  appliances  for 
stopping  it  quickly  (Smith  v.  Nor- 
folk, etc.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  C.  72S  ;  19 
S.  E.  863,  923  ;  Sullivan  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  117  Mo.  214;  23  S.  W. 
149).  "The  obligation  is  mutual  to 
use  care  to  avoid  the  consequences 
of  each  other's  negligence"  (North- 
ern Central  R.  Co.  v.  Price,  29  Md. 
420,  and  see  §  101,  post. 

5  In  all  the  cases  cited  in  note  4, 
with  two  or  three  exceptions,  the 
defendant  was  fully  aware  of  the 
plaintiff's  danger. 

3  A  charge  that  defendant  is  liable 
unless  its  servants  did  everything  in 
their  power  to  prevent  the  accident 
prescribes  too  stringent  a  rule  (Mo- 
bile, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Watly,  69  Miss. 
145;  13  So.  825).  To  same  effect, 
Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunnaway 
93  Vr«.  29:  24  S.  E.  698. 

4  This  principle,  first  enunciated  in 
Davies  v,  Mann  (10  Mees.  &  W.  546), 
in  different  language,  has  been  ac- 
cepted in  this  form  by  every  court 
in  England,  including  the  House  of 
Lords  (Radley  v.  Northwestern  R. 
Co.,  L.  R.  1  App.  Cas.  754  ;  Scott  v. 
Dublin,  etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Irish  C.  L. 
837;  Dimes  v.  Petley,  15  Q.  B.  276, 
283  :  Tuff  v.  Warman,  5  C.  B.  [N.  S.  1 
573 ;  Wither  ley  v.  Regent's  Canal 
Co.,  12  Id.  2) ;  by  the  U.  S.  Supreme 
Court  (Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  v.  Ives, 
144  U.  S.  408 ;  12  S.  Ct.  679  [an  in- 
structive case]  ;  Inland,  etc.  Coasting 
Co.  v.  Tolson,  139  U.  S.   551  ;  11  S. 


Ct.  653) ;  and  by  every  court  in  the 
Union,  except  possibly  Pennsyl- 
vania. It  is  the  law  in  Alabama 
(Gothard  v.  Alabama,  etc.  R  Co., 
.67  Ala.  114 ;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hurt,  101  Id.  34;  13  So.  130); 
California  (Needham  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco, etc.  R.  Co.,  37  Cal.  409);  Col- 
orado (Kansas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cran- 
mer,  4  Colo.  524)  ;  Connecticut  (Isbell 
v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  27  Conn. 
393)  ;  Delaware  (Cummins  v.  Pres- 
ley, 4  Harr.  315);  Georgia  Macon, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  18  Ga.  679; 
Georgia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Neely,  56  Id. 
540)  ;  Illinois  ( Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hoffman,  67  111.  287 ;  Chicago  v. 
Donahue,  75  Id.  106  ;  Ohio,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Stratton,  78  Id.  88  ;  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  131  Id.  474  ;  23 
N.  E.  385  ;  City  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  61 
111.  App.  183  [attention  diverted  by  a 
runaway  team]);  Indiana (Jefferson- 
ville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams,  43  Ind. 
402;  Wright  v.  Brown,  4  Id.  95); 
Iowa  (Balcom  v.  Dubuque,  etc.  R. 
Co. ,  21  Iowa,  102  ;  Kuhn  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  42  Id.  420  ;  Searles  v. 
Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  35  Id.  490  ; 
Morris  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  45  Id. 
29;  Deeds  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
69  Id.  164  ;  28  N.  W.  488  ;  Conners 
v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  87  Iowa, 
147  ;  53  N.  W.  1092  ;  Haden  v.  Sioux 
City,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  92  Iowa,  226  ;  60  N. 
W.  537);  Kansas  (Kansas  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Whipple,  39  Kans.  531  ;  18  P. 
730);  Kentucky  (Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Collins,  2  Duvall,  116);  Louisi- 
ana (Johnson  v.  Canal,  etc.  R.  Co., 
37  La.  Ann.  53);  Maryland  (Balti- 
more, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mulligan.  45  Md. 
486  :  Baltimore,  etc.    R.   Co.  v.    Mc- 


§99]                          CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE.                              1 52 

last  resort  in  which  this  rule  is  any  longer  disputed  ;  although 
the  same  rule,  in  substance,  but  inaccurately  stated,  has  been 
made  the  subject  of  strenuous  controversy.5     But,  furthermore, 

Donnell,43Id.  534;  Consolidated  Gas  Steam  Co.,   15  Daly,  312;   6  N.    Y. 

Co.    v.  Crocker,  82  Id.   113;  33  Atl.  Supp.  528 ;  Whittaker  v.  Delaware, 

423  [entering  with  light  a  cellar  filled  etc.  Canal  Co.,  49  Hun,  400);  North 

with  gasj);  Massachusetts    (Lane  v.  Carolina    (Aycock   v.  Wilmington, 

Atlantic  Works,  107  Mass.  104  ;  Brit-  etc.  R.  Co.,  6  Jones,  231  ;  Gunter  v. 

ton   v.   Cummington,   Id.  347  ;  Hib-  Wicker,    85   N.    C.    310  ;    Manly    v. 

bard    v.    Thompson,    109    Id.    288;  Wilmington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  74  Id.  655 ; 

Steele    v.    Burkhardt,    104    Id.   59  ;  Doggett  v.  Richmond,   etc.   R.  Co., 

Lovett  v.  Salem,  etc.  R.  Co.,  9  Allen,  78  Id.   305  ;  Lay  v.  Richmond,  etc. 

557;  Spoffordv.   Harlow,  3  Id.  176);  R.  Co.,   106   Id.   404;  11  S.    E.   412; 

Michigan    (Underwood  v.  Waldron,  Clark  v.  Wilmington,   etc    R.   Co., 

33  Mich.  232);  Minnesota  (Donaldson  109    N.  C.  430;  14    S.  E.  43);  Ohio 

v.  Milwaukee,  etc.   R.  Co.,  21   Minn.  (Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Elliott,  28 

293  ;  Ingalls  v.   Adams   Ex.    Co.,  44  Ohio  St.  340  ;  Kerwhacker  v.  Cleve- 

Id.  128  ;  46  N.  W.  325  ;  Hepfel  v.  St.  land,  etc.  R.  Co.,  3  Id.  172  ;  Cincin- 

Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Id.  263;  51  N.  nati,  etc.   R.    Co.  v.  Kassen,  49  Id. 

W.  1049  ;  Evarts  v.  St.  Paul,    etc.  R.  230;    31    N.    E.    282);    Texas   (Gulf, 

Co.,   56   Minn.   141  ;  57  N.   W.    459);  etc.    R.    Co.    v.  Fox,  6   S.   W.    569); 

Mississippi  (Mississippi,   etc.    R.  Co.  Vermont  (Ross  v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co., 

v.  Mason,  51  Miss.  234;  Christian  v.  49  Vt.  364;  Trow   v.  Vermont,   etc. 

Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  71  Miss.  237;  12  R.   Co.,  24  Id.  487)  ;    West  Virginia 

So.  710) ;  Missouri  (Morrissey  v. Wig-  (Carrico  v.  West  Virginia  Cent.  etc. 

gins  Ferry  Co.,  43  Mo.  380  :  Boland  R.  Co.,  35  W.  Va.  389  ;  14  S.  E.  12); 

v.  Missouri  R.  Co.,  36  Id.  484  ;  Isabel  Wisconsin  (Woodward  v.  West  Side 

v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60  Id.  475  ;  R.  Co.,  71  Wise.  625  ;  38  N.  W.  347  ; 

Nelson   v.  Atlantic,  etc.    R.  Co.,  68  Little   v.   Superior,  etc.  R.    Co.,    88 

Id.  593  ;  Price  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Wise.    402  ;   60  N.  W.  705). 

Co.,  72  Id.  414;  Hanlan  v.  Missouri  -In  Pennsylvania,  Woodward,  J., 

Pac.  R.  Co.,  104  Mo.  381  ;  16  S.  W.  referring  to  Beers  v.  Housatonic  R. 

233;  Brill  v.  Eddy,  115  Mo.  596;  22  Co.    (19    Conn.   566),   criticised    the 

S.  W.  488  ;  Chamberlain  v.  Missouri  language  there  used,  and  added  :  "  I 

Pac.  R.  Co.,  132  Mo.  318  ;  33  S  W.  437) ;  prefer  our  own  mode  of  holding  the 

Nebraska    (Burnet    v.    Burlington,  law  ;  that  if  the  injury  result  from 

etc.  R.  Co.,  16  Neb.  332  ;  Sioux  City,  the  want  of   ordinary  care  of  both 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  22  Id.   775  ;  36  parties,  neither  has  remedy  against 

N.  W.  285  ;  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  the  other  ;  but  if  it  be  not  in  any  de- 

Mertes.  3!)  Nob.  448  ;  58  N.  W.  105) ;  gree  ascribable  to  the  negligence  of 

New  Hampshire  (Felch  v.  Concord  one  party  —  due  regard  being  had  to 

P.    K..G6N.    H.  318;    29   Atl.   557);  all   the   circumstances    of    his   posi- 

New    York    (Silliman   v.   Lewis,    49  tion  — he    may   have   redress    from 

49    N.  Y.    :!79  :    Button    v.  Hudson  the  other "  (Reeves  v.  Delaware,  etc. 

River  R.  Co..  18  N.  Y.  24S,  per  Har-  R.  Co.,  30  Pa.  St.  454).     But  in  that 

ris,  J.  ;  Austin  v.  N.   J.    Steamboat  case,  the  decision  was  in  favor  of 

Co.,    43   Id.    75;    Green   v.    Erie  R.  the  plaintiff,  and  we  think  that  the 

Co.,  11  Hun,  333  ;    Sweeney  v.  N.  Y.  doctrine  of  the  text  is  substantially 


153 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§99 


the  plaintiff  should  recover,  notwithstanding  his  own  negli- 
gence exposed  him  to  the  risk  of  injury,  if  the  injury  of  which 
he  complains  was  more  immediately  caused  by  the  omission  of 
the  defendant,  after  having  such  notice  of  the  plaintiff's  dan- 
ger as  would  put  a  prudent  man  upon  his  guard,  to  use  ordi- 
nary care  for  the  purpose  of  avoiding  such  injury.6  It  is  not 
necessary  that  the  defendant  should  actually  know  of  the  dan- 
ger to  which  the  plaintiff  is  exposed.  It  is  enough  if,  having 
sufficient  notice  to  put  a  prudent  man  on  the  alert,  he  does 
not  take  such  precautions  as  a  prudent  man  would  take  under 
similar  notice.      This  rule  is  almost  universally  accepted.7     The 


accepted  in  Pennsylvania.  Compare 
Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spearen, 
47  Id.  300  ;  Stiles  v.  Geesey,  71  Id. 
439;  Creed  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
86  Id.  139  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Norton, 
24  Id.  465;  CatawissaR.  Co.  v.  Arm- 
strong, 49  Id.  193  ;  Heil  v.  Glanding, 
42  Id.  493. 
„_  6Davies  v.  Mann,  10  Mees.  &  W., 
546.  The  celebrated  "  donkey  case." 
Davies  negligently  left  his  donkey 
on  the  highway,  fettered,  so  that  it 
could  not  escape.  Mann,  driving 
rapidly  and  carelessly,  ran  over  the 
donkey.  The  report  does  not  show 
whether  Mann's  driver  was  aware  of 
the  donkey's  presence  on  the  road  or 
not.  It  was  held  that  the  plaintiff 
was  entitled  to  recover,  on  the 
ground  that  ' '  although  the  ass  may 
have  been  wrongfully  there,  still 
the  defendant  was  bound  to  go 
along  the  road  at  such  a  pace  as 
would  be  likely  to  prevent  mischief." 
s.  p.,  Wynn  v.  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91 
Ga.  344  ;  17  S.  E.  649  [young  child 
trespassing  on  street  car] ;  Schulz  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57  Minn.  271  ;  59 
N.  W.  192  ;  Sullivan  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  c,,.,  117  Mo.  214:  23  S.  W.  149; 
Kelly  v.  Union  R.  Co..  95  Mo.  279  ; 
8  S.  W.  420  ;  Scoville  v.  Hannibal, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  80  Mo.  434  ;  Welsh  v.  Jack- 
son. Id.  466  [overruling  earlier  cases]  ; 
Chicago,  etc.    R.   Co.    v.   Grablin,  38 


Neb.  90  ;  56  N.  W.  796  ;  57  Id.   522  ; 
Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co.    v.  Wymore,  40 
Neb.  645  ;  58  N.  W.  1120  ;  Omaha  R. 
Co.  v.  Martin,  48  Neb.  65  ;  66  N.  W. 
1007 ;  Bottoms  v.    Seaboard,  etc.  R. 
Co.,     114   N.    C.    699;    19   S.  E.    730 
[child   on    track] ;    Lloyd   v.    Albe- 
marle, etc.  R.  Co.,  118  N.  C.  1011  ;  24 
S.  E.   805  [person  lying  helpless  on 
track]  ;  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.    Co 
v.  St.  John,  5  Sneed,  524  [boy  sleep 
ing  on   track]  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co 
v.  Crosnoe,  72  Tex.  79  ;  10  S.  W.  342 
Yoakum    v.    Mettasch,     [Tex.    Civ 
App.]  ;    26   S.    W.     129   [person    on 
track   at  private  crossing]  ;  Mitchell 
v.  Tacoma  R.   Co.,  9  Wash.  St.  120  ; 
37  Pac.  341  [child  on  track]  ;  Gunn  v. 
Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  37  W.  Va.  421  ;  16 
S.    E.    628  [same]  ;  and   other  cases, 
supra. 

"  In  a  very  few  cases,  courts  have 
refused  to  extend  the  rule  so  far 
(Keefe  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92 
Iowa,  182  ;  60  N.  W.  503  [compare 
Woc-8ter  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  74 
Iowa,  593  ;  38  N.  W.  425]  ;  Raines  v. 
Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39  W.  Va. 
50  ;  19  S.  E.  565.  Plaintiff  must 
show  that  defendant  had  actual 
knowledge  of  his  danger,  and  could 
have  avoided  the  injury  by  or- 
dinary care  ( Richmond,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Didzoneit,  1  App.  D.  C.  482 ; 
see  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Yea- 


§99] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


154 


most  reckless  persistence,  on  the  part  of  one  exposed  to  dan- 
ger, will  not  justify  another  in  consciously  refraining  from 
using  care  to  avoid  injury  to  him.3  This  qualification  of  the 
doctrine  of  contributory  negligence,  often  called  "the  rule 
in  Davies  v.  Mann,"  from  the  leading  case  on  this  subject, 
has  been  much  criticised.  But  those  criticisms  turn  mainly 
upon  the  language  used  by  Baron  Parke  in  that  case,  which 
is,  perhaps,  too  broad,  and  which  has  not  been  here 
adopted ;  although  it  has  been  literally  repeated  in  the 
highest  court  of  England,9  as  well  as  in  that  of  the  United 
States.10  It  is  possible,  too,  that  the  application  of  the 
principle  in  Davies  v.  Mann  was  erroneous;  but  that  does 
not  affect  the  validity  of  the  principle  which  lay  at  the 
foundation  of  that  case.  That  principle  is  that  the  party 
who  has  the  last  opportunity  of  avoiding  accident,  is  not 
excused  by  the   negligence  of  any  one  else.     His  negligence, 


mans,  86  Va.  860  :  12  S.  E.  946) .  In 
Denman  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.  (26 
Minn.  357),  it  was  held  that  the  neg- 
ligence of  one  who  sat  down  outside 
of  a  railroad,  6  or  8  inches  from  the 
rail,  fell  asleep  and  was  run  over,  was 
such  as  to  prevent  a  recovery,  though 
he  could  have  been  seen  by  the  en- 
gineer, but  was  not  actually  seen. 

8  The  wisdom  of  this  rule  is  strik- 
ingly illustrated  in  Spoon  er  v.  Dela- 
ware, etc.  R.  Co.  (115  N.  Y.  22  ;  21 
N.  E.  696),  where  plaintiff's  foot  was 
caught  in  the  rail  and  she  could  not 
escape. 

9Radley  v.  London  &  North- 
western R.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  App.  Cas. 
754.  In  that  case,  Lord  Penzance 
said:  "Though  the  plaintiff  may 
have  been  guilty  of  negligence,  and 
although  that  negligence  may  in 
fact  have  contributed  to  the  acci- 
dent, yet  if  the  defendant  could,  in 
the  result,  by  the  exercise  of  ordi- 
nary care  and  diligence,  have 
avoided  the  mischief  which  hap- 
pened, the  plaintiff's  negligence  will 
not  excuse  him." 


10  In  Inland,  etc.  Coasting  Co.  v. 
Tolson  (139  U.  S.  551,  558)  the  trial 
court  charged  that  even  if  the  plain- 
tiff had  been"  guilty  of  contributory 
negligence  .  .  .  yet  the  con- 
tributory negligence  on  his  part 
would  not  exonerate  the  defendant 
and  disentitle  the  plaintiff  from  re- 
covering, if  it  be  shown  that  the 
defendant  might,  by  the  exercise  of 
reasonable  care  and  prudence,  have 
avoided  the  consequences  of  the 
plaintiff's  negligence."  Held,  that 
this  charge  "contained  nothing  of 
which  the  defendant  has  a  right  to 
complain."  In  that  case,  however, 
defendant  was  fully  aware  of  the 
facts.  The  same  language  was  re- 
peated in  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  v. 
Ives  141  U.  S.  408,  429.  So.  also,  in 
other  American  cases  (Little  Rock, 
etc.  v.  Dick,  52  Ark,  402  ;  12  S  W. 
785  ;  Nathan  v.  Charlotte  St.  R.  Co., 
118  N.  C.  1066  ;  24  S.  E.  511  ;  Brown 
v.Sullivan.  71  Tex.  470;  10  S.  W. 
288;  Hall  v.  Ogden  R.  Co.,  13  Utah. 
243  ;  44  Pac.  1046). 


155 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


[§  ioo 


and  not  that  of  the  one  first  in  fault,  is  the  sole  proximate 
cause  of  the  injury.11 

§  ioo.  Illustrations  of  rule. —Thus,  one  who  negligently 
leaves  a  domestic  animal  on  a  highway  or  railroad,  may  recover 
from  one  who,  seeing  it,  or  being  in  fault  for  not  seeing  it, 
does  not  use  proper  care  to  avoid  running  over  it.1  So,  if  a 
vessel  fails  to  exhibit  proper  lights  and  take  the  proper  side 
of  the  channel,  this  is  no  defense  in  favor  of  one  who,  having 
warning,  fails  to  use  proper  care  to  avoid  doing  an  injury.2 
So,  if  a  locomotive  engineer  sees  persons  or  property  on  the 
track,  though  unlawfully  there,  he  must  use  ordinary  care  to 
avoid  a  collision.3      Even  if  a  trespasser  obstinately  remains 


11  Do  well  v.  Gen.  Steam  Nav.  Co., 
5  El  &  B.  195,  206;  Bostwick  v. 
Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2  N.  Dak. 
440  ;  51  N.  W.  781  ;  Hays  v.  Gaines- 
ville R.  Co.,  70  Tex,  602  ;  8  S.  W. 
491  ;  see  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown,  89  Va.  749  ;  17  S.  E.  132. 

1  Davies  v.  Mann,  10  Mees.  &  W. 
546  ;  Kerwhacker  v.  Cleveland,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  3  Ohio  St.  172  ;  Leavenworth, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Forbes,  37  Kans.  445  ; 
15  Pac.  595  ;  Card  v.  Harlem  R.  Co., 
50  Barb.  39.  The  American  cases, 
in  which  a  contrary  opinion  is  ex- 
pressed, will  be  found,  upon  analyz 
ing  them,  to  be  cases  in  which  the 
negligence  of  the  defendant  con- 
sisted merely  in  not  foreseeing  the 
negligence  of  the  plaintiff:  for 
which,  as  we  have  already  shown, 
the  defendant  is  not  responsible. 
See  §  92,  ante. 

•'  Tuff  v.  Warman,  5  C.  B.  (N.  S.) 
57-; ;  2  LI.  740;  Greenland  v.  Chap- 
lin, ■"">  Exch.  243;  Vennall  v.  Garner, 
I  <'r<>.  &  Mees.  21  ;  Inman  v.  Rock, 
L  R  ,  2  P.  C.  App.  25  :  Austin  v.  N. 
I  Steamboat  Co.,  43  N.  Y.  75;  see 
Foster  v.  Holly,  38  Ala.  76.  Where 
oysters  are  negligently  left  in  the 
channel  of  a  navigable  river,  officers 
of  a  vessel,  knowing  them  to  be 
there,  are  not  justified   in  running 


against  and  destroying  them,  there 
being  room  to  pass  without  doing  so 
(Colchester  v.  Brooke,  7  Q.  B.  339, 
377). 

3  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Mid- 
dlesworth,  46  111.  494  ;  Kerwhacker  v. 
Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  3  Ohio  St. 
172.  Where  a  wagon  stuck  in  the 
rails,  it  was  held  that  the  engineer 
had  no  right  to  assume  that  it  would 
be  taken  off  the  track  before  he 
reached  it,  but  was  bound  to  stop 
the  train  ; Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ho- 
garth, 38  111.  370).  And.  generally, 
an  engineer  ought  to  slacken  speed, 
on  seeing  a  child  on  the  track  (see 
Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spearen, 
47  Pa.  St.  300).  The  engineer  is  not 
absolutely  bound  to  stop,  however, 
even  if  he  sees  a  child  upon  the 
track  ;  for  if,  in  the  exercise  of  a 
sound  judgment  and  great  care,  he 
believes  that  the  child  can  easily 
escape,  and  will  do  so,  he  need  not 
slacken  speed  after  giving  tin'  usual 
signals  (Id.).  To  same  effect  :  Meyer 
v.  Midland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2  Neb.  320. 
Much  more  does  this  apply  to  a  per- 
son of  mature  age,  upon  the  track 
(Terre  Haul.',  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Graham, 
46  Ind.  23:)  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bixbv,  84  III.  82).  But  not  so,  if  he 
is  si)  situated  that  he  cannot  easily 


§  I02]  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  1 56 

upon  the  track,  in  spite  of  warnings,  the  train  must  be 
stopped,  if  necessary  to  avoid  injuring  him.4  Where  common 
experience  has  shown  that  persons  or  cattle  are  constantly 
upon  the  track,  a  recovery  may  be  had  for  injuries  suffered  by 
them  through  the  neglect  of  the  engineer  to  look  out  for 
them,  even  if  he  did  not  see  them.5 

§  101.  Plaintiff  last  in  fault. — The  foregoing  rule  obviously 
does  not  apply,  where  the  plaintiff's  contributory  negligence 
is,  in  order  of  causation,  either  subsequent  to1  or  concurrent 
with2  that  of  the  defendant.  Therefore,  while  one  negligently 
walking  upon  a  railroad  is  generally  entitled  to  recover  if 
an  engineer,  seeing  him,  makes  no  effort  to  check  the  train, 
he  cannot  recover  if,  after  becoming  aware  of  his  danger,  he 
makes  no  proper  effort  to  escape.3  So,  one  who,  after  notice 
that  a  boiler  is  to  be  tested  in  a  reckless  manner,  persists  in 
standing  by  until  it  explodes,  cannot  recover.4 

§  102.  Comparative  negligence. —  In  Illinois,  the  doctrine 
of  "  comparative  negligence  "  was,  until  recently,  firmly  esta- 
blished. It  is  not  easy  to  state  this  doctrine  with  accuracy ; 
but  in  most  of  the  decisions  it  was  said  that,  where  both 
parties  had  been  guilty  of  negligence  contributing  to  the 
injury,  the  plaintiff  could  nevertheless  recover,  if  his  negli- 
gence had  been  slight,  compared  with  that  of  the  defendant, 
which  had  been  gross.1      Although  similar  expressions  were 

escape  (Peirce  v.  Walters,  164  111.  560 ;  3  Holmes  v.  South.  Pac,  etc.  R.  Co., 

45  N.  E.  1068).     See  §§  428,  483,  484,  97  Cal.  161  ;  31  Pac.  834. 

post ;  also  g  99,  ante.  3  International,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gar- 

J  Erickson  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  cia,  75  Tex.  583  ;  13  S.  W.  223.     Ap- 

41  Minn.  500  ;  4:>  N.  W.  ?>-'>2.  plied  (two  judges   dissenting)  to  the 

.     5  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cauffman,  case   of    an    intoxicated     man.   not 

38  111.   424  ;  Chicago,   etc.   R.  Co.  v.  aware    of    his     danger    (Smith     v. 

Barrie,  55  Id.   226;  Cincinnati,  etc.  Norfolk,   etc.  R.    Co.  supra;    Louis- 

R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  22  Ohio  St.  227;  see  ville,  etc.  R.   Co.   v.  Webb,   90  Ala. 

Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  33Md.  185;    8  So.   518   [injury  at  railroad 

542  :  (  Ihicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.Wyrnore,  crossing]). 

40  Neb.  G  to  ;  58  N.  W.  1120.     Not  so,  4See  Ochsenbein  v.  Shapley,  85  N. 

where  engineer  has  no  reason  to  ex-  Y.  214. 

pert  them  (111.  Central  R.  Co.  v.  No-  '  An  instruction  "  that  if  plaintiff 

ble,  142  111.  57«  ;  32  N.  E   684).  was  guilty  of  some  negligence,  but 

1  Smith  v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  114  defendant  of  gross  negligence,  and 

N.  C  728  ;  19  S.  E  863,  923.  plaintiff's  negligence  was  slight  com- 


157 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


[§  1 02 


at  one  time  used  by  the  courts  in  other  states,2  this  dis- 
tinction was  not  finally  accepted  anywhere  else  in  America, 
Great  Britain  or  Ireland.3  It  has  now  been  abolished  in 
Illinois;4  and,  therefore,  we  omit  the  discussion  of  the 
question,    which    was    given    at    length    in    our    last    edition. 


pared  with  the  negligence  of  de- 
fendant, plaintiff  might  recover," 
correctly  states  the  former  law  of 
Illinois  as  to  comparative  negligence 
(Chicago  v.  Stearns,  105  111.  554; 
S.  P.,  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lee,  60 
Id.  501  ;  Chicago,  etc  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
wood,  90  Id.  435).  This  rule  was  first 
formulated  by  Breese,  J  ,  in  Galena, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Jacobs  (20  111.  478) ; 
and  was  continually  re-affirmed 
down  to  1891  (Indianapolis,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Stables,  62  111.  313;  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  70  Id.  276 ; 
Kewanee  v.  Depew,  80  Id.  119; 
Hayward  v.  Merrill,  94  Id.  349  ; 
Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wallace,  1 10 
Id.  114;  Jefferson  v.  Chapman,  127 
Id.  438  ;  20  N.  E.  33  ;  and  scores  of 
other  cases.  The  latest  seems  to  be 
[1891]  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Johnsen,  135  111.  641  ;  2ti  N.  E. 
510.) 

2  Ohio  (Kerwhacker  v.  Cleveland, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  3  Ohio  St.  172) ;  Indiana 
(Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lowder- 
milk,  15  Ind.  120  ;  Lafayette,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Adams,  26  Id.  76) ;  Wisconsin 
(Stucke  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
9  Wise.  182) ;  New  York  (Chapman 
v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  19  N.  Y.  341  ; 
Button  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  18 
Id.  248). 

3  The  doctrine  of  comparative 
negligence  has  been  expressly  re- 
jected in  Alabama  (Memphis,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Copeland,  61  Ala.  376) ;  Indi- 
ana (Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gra- 
ham. 95  Ind.  286) ;  Iowa  (Johnson  v. 
Tillson,  36  Iowa,  89  ;  Artz  v  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co. ,  44  Id.  284  ;  O'Keefe  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co..  32  Id. 467) :  Ken- 
tucky  (Digby   v.    Kenton  Works,    8 


Bush,  166 ;  Kentucky,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thomas,  79  Ky.  160;  but  see  Ken- 
tucky, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  93  Id. 
449;  20  S.  W.  392);  Massachusetts 
(xMarble  v.  Ross,  124  Mass.  44)  ;  Mis- 
souri (Hurt  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
94  Mo.  255  ;  7  S.  W.  1) ;  New  Jersey 
(Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Righter,  42 
N.  J.  Law',  180)  ;  New  York  (Wells  v. 
N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  24  N.  Y.  181  ; 
Wilds  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  Id. 
430);  Pennsylvania  (Potter  v.  War- 
ner, 91  Pa.  St.  362  ;  Stiles  v.  Geesey, 
71  Id.  439i;  Tennessee  (East  Tennes- 
see, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Aiken,  89  Tenn. 
245  ;  14  S.  W.  1082  ;  East  Tennessee, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hull,  88  Tenn.  33 ;  12 
S.  W.  419)  ;  Texas  (Houston,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Gorbett,  49  Tex.  573  ;  Mis- 
souri, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers,  89  Tex. 
675  ;  36  S.  W.  243  ;  Wisconsin  (Potter 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.,  21  Wise.  377; 
22  Id.  615  ;  Cunningham  v.  Lyness, 
Id.  236).  Some  decisions  in  Kansas 
(Union  Pacific  R  Co.  v.  Rollins,  5 
Kans.  167;  Sawyer  v.  Sauer,  10  Id 
466  ;  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Pointer, 
14  Id.  37;  Wichita,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  37  Id.  743  ;  16  Pac.  78)  seemed 
to  indicate  that  the  rule  of  compara- 
tive negligence  was  adopted  there. 
But  it  has  finally  been  decided  that 
it  is  not  (Kansas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Peavey,  29  Kans.  170  ;  Atchison,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Morgan,  31  Id.  77  ;  Atchi- 
son, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Henry,  Kans.  ; 
45  Pac.  576). 

4  ' '  The  doctrine  of  comparative 
negligence  has  been  abolished  in 
Illinois"  (Cicero,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Meix- 
ner,  160  111  321 :  43  N.  E.  823  ;  Lanark 
v.  Dougherty,  153  111.  163;  38  N.  E. 
892). 


§  'OoJ 


C<  >.\  TKIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


I53 


But  some  such  rule  has  been  adopted  by  statute,  in  South 
Carolina.5 

§  103.  Rule  in   Georgia,  Florida  and  Tennessee. — It  is 

frequently  said  that  the  rule  of  comparative  negligence  is  ac- 
cepted in  Georgia.1  One  or  two  Georgia  decisions  seem  to 
justify  this  statement;2  but  the  later  cases  seem  to  hold  a 
different  rule,  for  which  a  dissenting  judge  in  an  early  case 
struggled  hard,3  and,  as  it  appears,  in  the  end  successfully. 
This  is,  to  require  the  jury  to  mitigate  damages  in  proportion 
to    the    plaintiff's    contributory    negligence.4     In     Tennessee, 


*  In  South  Carolina,  by  Gen.  St. 
S.  C.  §5  1529,  plaintiff  cannot  recover 
where  the  injury  was  caused  by  de- 
fendant's negligence,  if  the  person 
injured  was,  at  the  time,  guilty  of 
gross  or  willful  negligence,  which 
contributed  to  the  injury.  See  Pet- 
rie  v.  Columbia,  etc.  R.  Co  ,  29  S.  C. 
303  ;  7  S.  E.  515. 

1  Wharton,  Negl.  g  334  ;  Marble  v. 
Ross,  124  Mass.  44  ;  O'Keefe  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Iowa,  467.  See 
the  cases  reviewed  in  Thompson, 
Negl.  1165  and  Beach,  Contr.  Negl. 
(2ded.)§88. 

2  Augusta,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McEl- 
murry,  24  Ga.  75  ;  Macon,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Davis,  27  Id.  113. 

3Benning.  J.,  Macon  R.  Co.  v. 
Wynn.  26  Ga.  250. 

4 '  •  For  the  same  reason  that  recov- 
ery is  wholly  defeated  when  plain- 
tiff's negligence  is  shown  to  have  been 
the  sole  cause  of  the  injury,  it  will  be 
defeated,  in  part,  when  his  negli- 
gence is  shown  to  have  been  part  of 
the  cause,"  per  Beckley,  J.  (Georgia, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v  Neely,  56  Ga.  540).  To 
recover  at  all,  plaintiff's  fault  must 
have  been  less  than  defendant's 
(Central  R.  Co.  v.  Newman,  94  Id. 
560;  21  S.  E.  219).  In  Georgia  R. 
Co.  v.  Pittman  (73  Ga.  325).  held, 
that  unless  the  decedent's  negligence 
must  of  itself  alone  have  caused  the 
death,  then  it  was  for   the  jury  to 


diminish  damages  "  in  proportion  to 
the  negligence  of  the  decedent." 
Compare  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Duggan,  51  Ga.  212;  Georgia  R. 
Co.  v,  McDade,  59  Id.  73  ;  Central, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  63  Id.  181  ; 
Savannah,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Folks,  76 
Id.  527  ;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Thomp- 
son, Id.  770  ;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Nash, 
81  Id.  580  ;  7  S.  E.  808.  Code,  Ga.  § 
2972,  provides  that  in  suits  for  per- 
sonal injuries,  if  by  ordinary  care 
the  plaintiff  could  have  avoided  the 
consequences  of  the  defendant's  neg- 
ligence, he  cannot  recover.  Section 
3034  provides  that,  if  the  plaintiff 
and  a  railroad  defendant  are  both  in 
fault,  the  former  may  recover,  but 
the  jury  shall  diminish  the  damage 
in  proportion  to  his  fault.  The  latter 
section  applies  only  to  cases  in  which 
the  plaintiff  could  not  have  avoided 
the  consequences  of  the  defendant's 
negligence  (Americus  R.  Co.  v. 
Luckie.  87  Ga.  6  ;  13  S  E.  105).  Code, 
§  2034,  has  no  application  where  the 
complainant  is  guilty  of  gross  negli- 
gence (Central  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  78 
Ga.  691  ;  3  S.  E.  397).  See  Atlanta, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Avers,  53  Ga.  12;  Fland- 
ers v.  Meath,  27  Id .  358  ;  compare 
Central,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gleason,  69 
Id.  200  :  Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.Wyly, 
65  Id.  120  ;  which  turn  upon  the 
meaning  of  statutes. 


159 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENXE. 


[§    104 


under  peculiar  statutes,  the  plaintiff's  contributory  negligence, 
unless  the  direct  cause  of  his  own  injury,  is,  in  actions  against 
railroad  companies,  not  a  bar  to  his  action,  but  is  to  be  consid- 
ered in  mitigation  of  damages.5  A  similar  statute  was  enacted 
in  Florida,  in  1887.6  This  is  substantially  an  adoption  of  the 
admiralty  rule;  which  is  certainly  nearer  ideal  justice,  if  juries 
could  be  trusted  to  act  upon  it. 

§  104.  Plaintiff's  violation  of  statute.—  If  the  plaintiff 
is  acting  in  violation  of  a  statute  or  ordinance  at  the 
time  of  the  accident,  and  such  violation  proximately  con- 
tributes to  his  injury,  he  is  guilty  of  contributory  fault, 
and  is  as  much  debarred  from  recovery,  as  in  other 
cases  of  contributory  negligence.1  But,  if  such  violation 
did   not   so   contribute   to   the    injury,   it   is   no   defense.2     In 


5  Dush  v.  Fitzhugh,  2  Lea,  307  ; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Walker,  11  Heisk. 
383  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Flem- 
ing, 14  Lea,  128  ;  East  Tennessee  R. 
Co.  v.  Fain,  12  Id.  35  :  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Howard,  90  Tenn.  144 ; 
19  S.  W.  116. 

6  The  statute  of  1887,  c.  3744,  §  1, 
provides  that  no  person  shall  recover 
damages  from  a  railroad  company 
for  injury  occurring  by  his  own  con- 
sent, or  through  his  own  negligence, 
but  that,  if  he  and  the  agents  of  the 
company  both  are  at  fault,  he  may 
recover  damages,  to  be  diminished 
by  the  jury  in  proportion  to  the 
amount  of  fault  attributable  to  him. 
Held,  that  in  giving  the  statute  in  a 
charge,  the  court  should  instruct 
that  the  jury  should  not  take  into 
consideration  any  negligence  of 
either  of  the  parties  which  did  not 
proximately  contribute  to  the  injury 
(Florida  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  37 
Fla.  406  ;  20  So.  558). 

1  So  held,  as  to  city  ordinances 
(Nevvcomb  v.  Boston  Prot.  Dep.,  146 
Mass  596 ;  16  N.  E.  555  ;  followed 
Broschart  v.  Tattle,  59  Conn.  1  :  21 
Atl.  025).  To  same  effect,  McGrath 
v.  City.  etc.  R.  Co..  93  Ga.   312;  20 


S.  E.  317 ;  Central  R.  Co  v.  Bruns- 
wick, etc.  R.  Co.,  87  Ga.  386  ;  13  S. 
E.  520. 

8  So  held,  as  to  ordinances  (Steele 
v.  Burkhard,  104  Mass.  59  ;  Hall  v. 
Ripley,  119  Id.  135;  Klipper  v.  Cof- 
fey, 44  Md.  117  ;  Baker  v.  Portland, 
58  Me.  199) ;  and  as  to  statutes  (Con- 
nolly v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co.,  114 
N.  Y.  104  ;  21  N.  E.  101  [child  on 
car  platform]  ;  Seymour  v.  Citizens' 
R.  Co.,  114  Mo.  266;  21  S.  W.  739 
[same]  ;  Atlanta  R.  Co.  v.  Walker, 
93  Ga.  462  ;  21  S.  E.  48  [violating  rule 
of  the  road]  ;  Quinn  v.  O'Keefe,  9  N. 
Y.  App.  Div.  68  :  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  116 
[same ;  proper  side  of  road  being 
obstructed];  Damon  v.  Scituate,  119 
Mass.  66  ;  Counter  v.  Couch,  8  Allen, 
436  ;  Spofford  v.  Harlow,  3  Id.  176  ; 
Griggs  v.  Fleckenstein,  14  Minn.  81 ; 
Neanow  v.  Uttech,  46  Wise.  581). 
In  Sutton  v.  Wauwatosa  (29  Wise. 
21),  the  subject  was  fully  discussed 
by  Dixon,  C.  J.,  who  said:  "To 
make  good  the  defense  [of  illegality] 
it  must  appear  that  a  relation  ex- 
isted between  the  act  or  violation  of 
law  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff,  and 
the  injury  or  accident,  of  which  he 
complains  ;    and    the  relation   must 


§  io4] 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


1 60 


Massachusetts'3  and  Maine,4  which  were  originally  one  state, 
and  in  Vermont,5  general  travel  on  a  highway  on  Sunday  has 
always  been  prohibited ;  and  it  is  therefore  held  in  those 
states,  that  an  ordinary  Sunday  traveler  cannot  recover  for 
injuries   suffered   from   obstacles  in   the  road6  or  other   negli- 


have  been  such  as  to  have  caused  or 
helped  to  cause  the  injury  or  acci- 
dent, not  in  a  remote  or  speculative 
sense,  but  in  the  natural  and  ordinary 
course  of  events  as  one  event  is 
known  to  precede  or  follow  another. " 
Hence  it  was  held  that  the  fact 
that  a  traveler  was  violating  the 
Sunday  law  had  no  natural  or 
necessary  tendency  to  cause  the  in- 
jury happening  to  him  from  a  defect 
in  the  highway,  and  that  he  could 
recover  for  the  injury,  s.  p.,  Bald- 
win v.  Barney,  12  R.  I.  392 ;  Platz  v. 
Cohoes,  39  N.  Y.  219. 

3  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  ch.  98,  §  3. 

4  Maine  Rev.  Stat.  ch.  124,  §  20. 
Traveling  on  Sunday,  after  sunset,  is 
not  a  violation  of  the  statute  in 
Maine  ;  because  the  "  Sabbath  "  ends 
then  (Bryant  v.  Biddeford,  39  Me. 
193). 

5  Vt.  Gen.  Stat.  ch.  93,  §  3.  "No 
one  shall  travel  on  the  Sabbath  or 
the  first  day  of  the  week,  except 
from  necessity  or  charity"  (lb.). 
The  New Hampshire  statute  declares 
that  "no  person  shall  do  any  work, 
business  or  labor  of  his  secular  call- 
ing to  the  disturbance  of  others,  etc. , 
on  the  first  day,  etc."  (N.  H.  Gen. 
Stat.  ch.  255  £  3).  In  that  state, 
traveling  on  Sunday,  in  such  a  man- 
ner as  not  to  disturb  others,  does  not 
bar  a  recovery  for  an  injury  by  a  de- 
fect in  the  highway  (Dutton  v. 
Weare,  17  N.  H.  34).  In  New  Jersey 
(Rev.  Stat.  1877  ;  Laws,  1884,  1885), 
all  traveling  and  all  worldly  business 
on  land  or  water,  necessity  and 
charity  excepted,  are  forbidden : 
one  passenger  train  may  be  run  each 
way,    and    ferryboats    may    make 


regular  trips.  A  few  other  states 
may  have  similar  prohibitions.  In 
Wisconsin  a  violation  of  the  Sun- 
day law  is  declared  to  be  no  defense 
to  an  action  for  an  injury  suffered 
on  Sunday,  and  every  one  may  be 
the  judge  of  the  necessity  of  travel- 
ing on  that  day  (Rev.  Stat.  1878, 
supplement  1879,  1884). 

6  Bosworth  v.  Swansey,  10  Mete. 
363  ;  Jones  v.  Andover,  10  Allen,  18  ; 
Hall  v.  Ripley,  119  Mass.  135;  Lyons 
v.  Desotelle,  124  Id.  387;  Smith  v. 
Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  120 Id.  490  ;  Hyde 
Park  v.  Gay,  120  Id.  589  ;  Connolly 
v.  Boston,  117  Id.  64;  Tillock  v. 
Webb,  56  Me.  100  ;  Cratty  v.  Ban- 
gor, 57  Id.  423.  Unless  the  traveler 
makes  it  appear  that  he  was  upon  an 
errand  of  charity  or  necessity,  he 
cannot  recover  (Feital  v.  Middlesex 
R.  Co.,  109  Mass.  398;  Bucher  v. 
Fitchburg,  etc  R.  Co.,  131  Id.  156; 
Davis  v.  Somerville,  128  Id.  594  ; 
Doyle  v.  Lynn  etc.  R.  Co.,  118  Id. 
195  ;  Hall  v.  Corcoran,  107  Id  251  ; 
O'Connell  v.  Lewiston,  65  Me.  34 ; 
Davidson  v.  Portland.  69  Id.  116). 
Walking  for  exercise  in  the  open  air 
on  Sunday  is  not  a  violation  of  the 
statute  (Hinckley  v.  Penobscot,  42  Me. 
89.)  In  Massachusetts,  it  has  been  said 
that  the  statute  does  not  prohibit  an 
act  which,  under  the  circumstances, 
is  morally  fit  and  proper  to  be  done 
on  the  Sabbath  (Commonwealth  v. 
Knox,  6  Mass.  76  ;  Commonwealth  v. 
Josselyn,  97  Id.  411  ;  Commonwealth 
v.  Sampson,  97  Id.  407:  Flagg  v. 
Millbury,  4  Cush.  243).  Hence,  exe- 
cuting a  will  on  Sunday  is  proper 
(Bennett  v.  Brooks,  9  Allen,  118).  So 
is  walking  for  the  purpose  of  making 


i6i 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§   104 


gence ;  though  he  can  recover  for  wanton  or  wilful  injuries.7 
It  would  seem  to  follow  that  any  one  who  is  actually  engaged, 
during  every  moment  of  the  time  in  which  he  suffers  an  injury 
by  the  negligence  of  another,  in  some  unlawful  proceeding, 
could  not  recover  for  such  injury  in  those  states.  But  this 
application  of  the  Sunday  law  has  been  repudiated  by  all  the 
other  courts  which  have  passed  upon  it.8    The  principle  stated 


a  social  call  (Barker  v.  Worcester, 
139  Mass.  74) ;  but  not  so,  as  to  rid- 
ing (Stanton  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co., 
14  Allen,  485).  In  Illinois,  it  is  held 
that  the  moral  fitness  and  propriety 
of  what  was  done  are  not  to  be  judged 
of  in  the  abstract,  but  are  to  be  de- 
termined under  the  circumstances  of 
«ach  particular  case  (Johnson  v. 
People,  31  111.  469).  As  matter  of  law, 
it  is  not  always  unnecessary  to  work 
on  Sunday  to  prevent  a  great  waste 
of  sap,  in  making  maple  sugar 
{Whitcomb  v.  Gilman.  35  Vt.  297). 
It  is  not  an  honest  belief  that  a  ne- 
cessity for  traveling  exists,  but  the 
actual  existence  of  the  necessity, 
which  renders  Sunday  traveling  law- 
ful (Johnson  v.  Irasburgh,  47  Vt.  28  ; 
see,  also.  Holcomb  v.  Danby,  51  Id. 
438  :  McCleary  v.  Lowell,  44  Me.  116, 
per  Wheeler,  J).  The  federal  courts 
will  recognize  as  binding  the  deci- 
sions of  a  state  court,  as  to  non- 
recovery  for  injuries  received  while 
traveling  on  Sunday  (Bucher  v. 
Cheshire  R.  Co.,  125  U.  S.  555  ;  8 
S.  Ct.  974). 

1 1n  Wallace  v.  Merrimac  River 
Nav.  Co.  (134  Mass.  95),  it  was  held 
that  if  the  injury  was  wantonly  or 
wilfully  inflicted,  the  fact  that 
plaintiff  was  traveling  on  Sunday  is 
no  defense.  See  §  64,  ante.  The 
plaintiff,  while  unlawfully  traveling 
on  Sunday,  was  bitten  by  defend- 
ant's vicious  dog.  Held,  that  he 
could  recover  (White  v.  Lang,  128 
Mass.  598).  It  is  no  defense  to  an 
action  for  a  conversion  of  property 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  — 11] 


that  it  was  let  to  defendant  on  Sun- 
day. Thus  one  who  hires  a  horse  to 
drive  three  miles,  on  Sunday,  but 
goes  six  miles  further,  and  by  over- 
driving kills  the  horse,  is  liable  for 
conversion  (Morton  v.  Gloster,  46 
Me.  520  ;  Woodman  v.  Hubbard,  25 
N.  H.  67) .  Compare,  to  the  contrary, 
Gregg  v.  Wyman,  4  Cush.  322  ; 
Whelden  v.  Chappel,  8  R.  I.  230,  233. 
In  Myers  v.  Meinrath  (101  Mass.  366), 
it  was  held  that  an  action  for  the 
conversion  of  a  chattel  delivered  on 
Sunday  in  exchange  for  another 
retained  by  the  defendant  notwith- 
standing the  return  of  the  other  by 
plaintiff,  would  not  lie.  Compare 
Tucker  v.  Mowrey,  12  Mich.  378. 
Relief  has  been  denied  to  one  who 
on  Sunday  was  aiding  the  owner  to 
clear  out  his  wheel  pit,  and  while 
doing  so  was  injured  by  the  negli- 
gence of  the  owner  (McGrath  v.  Mer- 
win,  112  Mass.  467)  ;  and  to  one  who 
was  defrauded  in  a  trade  of  horses 
on  that  day  (Robeson  v.  French,  12 
Mete.  24). 

8  New  Hampshire  (Dutton  v.  Weare, 
17  N.  H.  34;  Norris  v.  Litchfield,  35 
Id.  271  ;  Sewell  v.  Webster,  59  Id.  596, 
Wentworth  v.  Jefferson,  60  Id.  158 ; 
Allen  v.  Deming,  14  Id.  133  ;  Wood- 
man v.  Hubbard,  25  Id.  67)  ;  Rhode 
Island  (Baldwin  v.  Barney,  12  R.  I. 
392  ;  Whelden  v.  Chappel,  8  Id.  230) ; 
Connecticut  (See  Horton  v.  Norwalk, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  66  Conn.  272;  33  Atl. 
9 14) ;  New  York  (Carroll  v.  Staten 
Island  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y.  126 ;  Platz  v. 
Cohoes,  89  Id.  219  ;  Merritt  v.  Earl.  29 


§  iQ4j 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


lC)2 


in  the  early  Massachusetts  decisions  doubtless  exempted  towns 
from  liability  for  defects  in  highways,  causing  injuries  to  per- 
sons unlawfully  traveling  on  Sunday,  because  the  town  officers 
were  not  bound  to  anticipate  such  traveling;  but  it  is  an  un- 
justifiable extension  of  the  rule  to  hold  that  a  railroad  com- 
pany, for  example,  is  exempt  from  all  liability  for  its  negligent 
management  of  trains,  in  which  it  carries  passengers  on  Sunday. 
Such  decisions  are  plainly  subversive  of  the  rule  in  Davies  v. 
Mann.  Nevertheless,  such  is  the  common  law  of  Massa- 
chusetts.9 It  seems  desirable  to  retain  this  account  of  the  old 
Massachusetts  law,  since  the  discussion  elsewhere  could  not  be 
understood  without  reference  to  it.  But  the  whole  of  this 
judicial  construction  of  the  Sunday  law  was  abrogated  by 
statute  in  1884;10  and  that  law  affords  no  longer  any  defense 
to  an  action  for  personal  injury  in  Massachusetts. 


Id.  115);  New  Jersey  (Smith  v.  N.  Y., 
Susquehanna,  etc.  R.  Co.,  46  N.  J. 
Law,  7  ;  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Trautwein,  52  Id.  169  ;  19  Atl.  178) ; 
Pennsylvania  (Mohney  v.  Cook,  26 
Pa.  St.  342  ;  Piollet  v.  Simmers,  106 
Id.  95) ;  Maryland  (Philadelphia,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Lehman,  56  Md.  209) ;  Ken- 
tucky (Commonwealth  v.  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  80  Ky.  291  ;  Illinois  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.  v.  Dick,  91  Id.  434 ;  15  S. 
W.  665) ;  Indiana  (Yonoski  v.  State, 
79  Ind.  393 ;  Loeb  v.  Attica,  82  Id. 
175  ;  Wilkinson  v.  State,  59  Id.  416  ; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Frawley, 
110  Id.  18  ;  9  N.  E.  594 ;  compare 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Yopst, 
118  Ind.  248  ;  20  N.  E.  222) ;  Wisconsin 
(Sutton  v.  Wauwatosa,  29  Wise.  21  ; 
Knowlton  v.  Milwaukee  R.  Co.,  59 
Id.  278  ;  Mc  Arthur  v.  Green  Bay,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  34  Id.  139);  Minnesota  (Op- 
eahl  v.  Judd,  30  Minn.  126);  Iowa 
(Schmid  v.  Humphrey,  48  Iowa,  652)  ; 
Arkansas  (Stewart  v.  Davis,  31  Ark. 
518 ;  Tucker  v.  West,  29  Id.  386  ; 
State  v.  Goff,  20  Id.  289);  Federal 
Courts  (Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Phila.  etc.  Towboat  Co.  23  How  U.  S. 
209;  Armstrong  v.  Toler,  11  Wheat. 


258  ;  Sawyer  v.  Oakman,  7  Blatch. 
290).  As  to  West  Virginia,  see  State 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  24  West  Va.  783; 
Ohio,  see  McGatrick  v.  Wason,  4 
Ohio  St.  566.     See  §  92,  ante. 

8  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  a  street- 
car driver  or  conductor  cannot  re- 
cover for  injuries  sustained  by  a 
collision  with  the  car  of  another 
company  while  performing  his  ordi- 
nary duties  on  Sunday  (Day  v.  High- 
land St.  R.  Co.,  135  Mass.  113);  nor 
can  a  passenger  on  a  street-car, 
riding  on  Sunday,  for  the  purpose  of 
making  a  social  call,  recover  of  the 
car  company  for  injuries  (Stanton  v. 
Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  14  Allen,  485). 
A  locomotive  engineer,  performing 
the  ordinary  duties  of  his  employ- 
ment on  Sunday,  violates  the  statute, 
unless  the  running  of  the  train  is  a 
work  of  necessity  or  charity  ;  and  if 
it  is  not,  and  while  so  laboring,  he  is 
injured  by  a  defect  in  the  railroad 
track,  his  illegal  act  necessarily  con- 
tributes to  cause  his  injury  (Read  v. 
Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  140  Mass.  199). 

10  Stat.  1884,  ch.  37.  That  the  acci- 
dent occurred  on  Sunday  is  therefore, 
now,  no  defense  to  a  personal  injury 


163  CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE.  [§  106 

§  105.  Plaintiff's  fault  in  representative  capacity.—  Al- 
though the  point  is  not  made  entirely  clear  by  reported  cases, 
we  think  that  any  act  of  the  plaintiff  which  contributes  to  his 
injury,  although  done  by  him  purely  in  some  representative 
capacity  as  agent,  executor,  or  public  officer,  is  a  defense  to 
his  action,  as  much  as  if  it  had  been  done  in  his  individual 
capacity.  Thus,  where  an  executive  officer  had,  by  his  own 
fault  in  his  official  capacity,  failed  to  provide  for  the  proper 
repair  of  a  highway,  it  was  held  that  he  could  not  recover  for 
injuries  suffered  by  him  through  defect  of  such  highway.1  But 
of  course  the  plaintiff  must  be  in  fault,  in  a  legal  sense;  and  if 
he  has  made  an  error  which  contributes  to  his  injury,  but  for 
which  he  is  not  legally  in  fault,  this  is  no  defense  to  the  action. 
Thus,  a  public  officer,  deciding  in  a  semi-judicial  capacity  in 
favor  of  a  plan  for  certain  public  work,  is  not  deemed  guilty  of 
contributory  negligence,  in  his  action  for  damages  suffered  by 
him  through  defects  in  such  work,  although  such  defects  were 
the  result  of  the  adoption  of  that  plan ;  since  he  could  not  be, 
in  a  legal  sense,  in  fault,  in  his  decision.2 

§  106.  Burden  of  proof;  conflict  of  decisions. —  The  ques- 
tion as  to  which  party  bears  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  issue 
of  contributory  negligence,  has  been  the  subject  of  many  con- 
flicting decisions;  and  the  courts  are  still  divided  upon  it. 
Practically,  all  the  courts  agree  that  the  fact  of  contributory 
negligence  is  to  be  taken  into  account,  no  matter  how  it  ap- 

action  (Jordan  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  ground  that,  being  a  corporator  and 

165  Mass.  346  ;  43  N.  E.  Ill  ;  Barker  officer,     he     must    be     equally    in 

v.  Worcester,  139  Mass.  74).  fault  with  all  the  officers,  but  this 

1  Todd  v.    Rowley,    8    Allen,    51  ;  was  of  course  overruled  (Burbank  v. 

Wood  v.  Waterville,  4  Mass.  422;  5  West-Walker  Ditch  Co.,  13  Nev.  431). 

Id.   294  ;  6ee  Loker  v.  Brookline,  13  a  The  plaintiff,  while  a  member  of 

Pick.  343.     See  a  very  peculiar  case,  a  city  council,  concurred  with  it  in 

in  which  the  plaintiff,  being  an  officer  adopting  a  plan  for  a  bridge.     The 

of  the  defendant   corporation,   had  bridge  was  built,  and  the  abutments 

offered  to  do  certain  work  necessary  placed  so  that  they  obstructed  the 

to  avoid  injury  to  his  property  by  the  flow  of  the  water  more  than  was 

defendant's  ditch,  and  had  been  pre-  necessary,  in  consequence  of  which 

vented  from  doing  so  by  other  officers  plaintiff's  mill  was  stopped.     Held, 

of  the  corporation.    Injuries  resulted  that  plaintiff  could  recover  (Perry  v. 

to  him;  the  corporation  set  up  a  de-  Worcester,  6  Gray,  544).     The  dicta 

fense  of  contributory  negligence  in  of  this  case  go  beyond  the  text,  but 

his  action,  apparently  on  the  mere  cannot,  as  we  think,  be  sustained. 


§  107]  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  164 

pears,  whether  by  affirmative  evidence  on  the  part  of  the  de- 
fendant, or  by  inference  from  the  evidence  on  the  part  of  the 
plaintiff.  It  is  quite  immaterial  who  proves  the  fact,  so  long 
as  it  is  proved.1  This  is  a  just  rule,  and  may  be  considered 
universally  settled.  And  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  agreed  that 
the  plaintiff  need  not  produce  direct  evidence  of  his  having 
used  due  care,  if  the  fact  sufficiently  appears  upon  the  whole 
case.2  As  to  whether  the  plaintiff  is  bound  to  prove,  as  part 
of  his  case,  his  freedom  from  contributory  negligence,  three 
different  rules  have  been  proposed:  (1)  That  plaintiff's  care 
is  presumed,  and  if  plaintiff  can  prove  his  case  without  showing 
contributory  negligence,  the  burden  is  on  the  defendant.  (2) 
That  plaintiff's  care  is  not  presumed,  and  the  burden  is  on  him 
to  prove  affirmatively  the  exercise  of  due  care.  (3)  That,  in  the 
absence  of  evidence,  there  is  no  presumption  either  way,  i.  e., 
that  neither  care  nor  want  of  it  is  presumable,  and  that,  if  the 
facts  show  a  duty  of  care,  the  plaintiff  must  give  some  evidence 
from  which  the  jury  may  infer  that  he  exercised  it ;  otherwise 
he  need  not. 

§  107.  Burden  of  proof  on  plaintiff— In  Maine,  Massachu- 
setts, Connecticut,  New  York,  Indiana,  Michigan,  Illinois, 
Iowa,  Mississippi  and  Louisiana,  the  burden  rests  upon  the 
plaintiff  of  proving  either  that  he  was  free  from  contributory 
negligence  or  that  the  injury  is  in  no  degree  attributable  to  any 
want  of  ordinary  care  on  his  part.1 

1  Washington,     etc.      R.     Co.     v.  Mosher  v.  Smithfield,  84  Id.  334  ;  24 

Harmon,   147  U.   S.  571  ;    13  S.  Ct.  Atl.  876). 

557  ;  State  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  So  in  Massachusetts  (Planz  v.  Bos- 

69  Mil.  339  ;  14  Atl.   685  ;  Gerity  v.  ton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  157  Mass.  377  ;  32  N. 

Haley,  29  W.  Va.  98;  11  S.  E.  901;  E.   356;  Stock    v.   Wood/  136  Mass. 

Overby  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  353;   Hinckley  v.  Cape  Cod  R.  Co. 

37  W.  Va.  524  ;  16  S.  E.  813  ;  Chicago,  120  Id.  257  ;    Prentiss  v.  Boston,  112 

etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spilker,  134  Ind.  380  ;  Id.  43  ;    Lane  v.  Atlantic  Works,  107 

33  N.  E.  280  ;  34  Id.  218.  Id.  104  ;  Gaynor  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co., 

5  See  §  111,  post.  100  Id.  208  ;   Robinson    v.   Fitchburg 

1  So  held  in  Maine  (Chase  v  Maine  R.  Co.,  7  Gray,  92  ;  Parker  v.  Adams, 

Central  R.   Co.,  77  Me.  62;  Gleason  12  Mete.  415  ;  Bigelow  v.  Rutland,  4 

v.  Bremen,    50  Id.    222  ;  Buzzell   v.  Cush.  247;  Adams  v.  Carlisle,  21  Pick. 

Laconia  Manfg.  Co.,  48 Id.  113;  Per-  146;  Lane  v.  Crombie.  12   Id.   177). 

kins  v.  Eastern,  etc.  R.  Co.,  29  Id.  The  burden,   however,  is  upon  the 

307  ;  Kennard  v.  Burton,  25  Id.  39  ;  defendant  to  show  plaintiff's    gross 

French  v.    Brunswick,    21    Id.   29  ;  or  willful  negligence  (Copley  v.  New 


i65 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§   107 


Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  136  Mass.  6). 
In  an  action  under  the  Massa- 
chusetts statute  making  common 
carriers  liable  for  the  death  of  a  pas- 
senger, caused  by  their  negligence, 
it  is  not  necessary  for  the  plaintiff  to 
prove  that  the  deceased,  if  a  pas- 
senger, was  not  negligent  (McKimble 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  139  Mass.  542  ; 
2  N.  E.  97;  Commonwealth  v.  Bos- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.,  134  Mass.  211). 

So  in  Connecticut  (Ryan  v.  Bristol, 
63  Conn.  26  ;  27  Atl.  309  ;  Button  v. 
Frink,  51  Conn.  342  ;  Fox  v.  Glaston- 
bury, 29  Id.  204  ;  Beers  v.  Housa- 
tonic  R.  Co.,  19  Id.  5G6  ;  Park  v. 
O'Brien,  23  Id.   339). 

So  in  New  York  (Hart  v.  Hud- 
son River  Bridge  Co.,  84  Id.  56; 
1  Hale  v.  Smith,  78  Id.  480  ;  Holbrook 
v.  Utica,  etc.  R.  Co.,  12  Id.  236; 
Tolman  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co.,  98 
jr.  Y.  198  ;  Bond  v.  Smith,  113  N. 
Y.  378  ;  21  N.  E.  128  ;  Stone  v.  Dry 
Dock,  etc.  R.  Co.,  115  N.  Y.  104  ;  21 
N.  E.  712).  In  Gleeson  v.  Brummer 
(87  Hun,  465  ;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  375), 
Van  Brunt,  P.  J.,  dissenting,  held 
that  the  rule  was  seriously  modified 
by  Galvin  v.  New  York,  112  Id. 
223  ;  19  N.  E.  675.  In  Johnson  v. 
Hudson  River  R.  Co.  (20  N.  Y.  64 ; 
affi'g  6  Duer,  633),  Denio,  J.,  said: 
"  I  am  of  opinion  that  it  is  not  a  rule 
of  law,  of  universal  application,  that 
the  plaintiff  must  prove  affirmatively 
that  his  own  conduct  on  the  occa- 
sion of  the  injury  was  cautious  and 
prudent.  The  onus probandi  in  this, 
as  in  most  other  cases,  depends  upon 
the  position  of  the  affair,  as  it  stands 
upon  the  undisputed  facts.  The  cul- 
pability of  the  defendant  must  be 
affirmatively  proved  before  the  case 
can  go  to  the  jury,  but  the  absence  of 
any  fault  on  the  part  of  the  plaintiff 
maybe  inferred  from  circumstances  ; 
and  the  disposition  of  men  to  take 
care  of  themselves  and  keep  out  of 
difficulty  may  properly  be  taken  into 


consideration.  Nor  is  it  correct  to 
say,  as  a  general  rule,  that  the  de- 
fendant must  himself  prove,  in  order 
to  establish  his  defense,  that  the 
plaintiff  was  guilty  of  negligence. 
That,  as  well  as  the  absence  of  fault, 
may  be  inferred  from  the  circum- 
stances ;  and  the  negligent  act  of  the 
defendant  may  be  of  such  a  miti- 
gated character,  that  a  party  com- 
plaining of  an  injury  from  it  ought 
to  show  that  it  occurred  without 
fault  on  his  own  part.  .  .  .  The 
true  rule,  in  my  opinion,  is  this : 
The  jury  must  eventually  be  satis- 
fied that  the  plaintiff  did  not,  by  any 
negligence  of  his  own,  contribute  to 
the  injury.  The  evidence  to  estab- 
lish this  may  consist  in  that  offered 
to  show  the  nature  or  cause  of  the 
accident,  or  in  any  other  competent 
proof.  To  carry  a  case  to  the 
jury,  the  evidence  on  the  part  of  the 
plaintiff  must  be  such  as,  if  believed, 
would  authorize  them  to  find  that 
the  injury  was  occasioned  solely  by 
the  negligence  of  the  defendant.  It 
is  not  absolutely  essential  that  the 
plaintiff  should  give  any  affirmative 
proof  touching  his  own  conduct  on 
the  occasion  of  the  accident.  The 
character  of  the  defendant's  delin- 
quency may  be  such  as  to  prove 
prima  facie  the  whole  issue  ;  or  the 
case  may  be  such  as  to  make  it  neces- 
sary for  the  plaintiff  to  show,  by 
independent  evidence,  that  he  did 
not  bring  the  misfortune  upon  him- 
self. No  more  certain  rule  can  be 
laid  down."  We  quote  this  opinion 
thus  at  length,  because  it  is  the  best 
statement  of  the  rule  anywhere 
made,  and  it  was  followed  in  Galvin 
v.  New  York,  112  N.  Y.  223. 

The  most  stringent  rule  is  main- 
tained in  Indiana  (Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Stommel,  126  Ind.  35  ;  25  N. 
E.  863  ;  Richmond  Gas  Co.  v.  Baker, 
1  (6  End.  600;  39  N.  E.  552;  Cincinnati, 
etc.   R.    Co.  v.    Butler,  103  Ind.  31; 


§  io8] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


§  108.  Burden  of  proof  on  defendant.  —  In  the  Suprerru 
Court  of  the  United  States,1  and  in  Alabama,2  Arizona,8 
Arkansas,1  California,5  Colorado,6  Delaware,7  Florida,8  Georgia,9 


Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lockridge, 
93  Id.  191;  Rushvillev.  Poe.  85  Id. 
83 ;  Riest  v.  Goshen,  42  Id.  339  ; 
Ream  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49 
Id.  93;  Gramin  v.  Boener,  56  Id. 
497 ;  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Caudle,  60  Id.  112. 

So  also  in  Illinois  (Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Levy,  160  111.  385;  43  N.  E. 
357  ;  Missouri  Furnace  Co.  v.  Abend, 
107  111.  44  ;  Kipperley  v.  Ranisden, 
83  Id.  354 ;  Dyer  v.  Talcott,  16  Id. 
300  ;  Aurora  R.  Co.  v.  Grimes,  13  Id. 
585).  The  cases  are  fully  cited,  and 
the  rule  affirmed,  in  Calumet  Iron 
Co.  v.  Martin,  115  111.  358  ;  3  N.  E. 
456. 

So  also  in  Iowa  (Gregory  v.  Wood- 
worth,  93  Iowa,  246;  61  N.  W.  962  ; 
Slosson  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  51 
Iowa,  294  ;  Bonce  v.  Dubuque,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  53  Id.  278  ;  Murphy  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  45  Id.  661 ;  Way  v.  Illinois, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  40  Id.  341 ;  Carlin  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  37  Id.  316  ;  Ben- 
ton v.  Central  R.  Co.,  42  Id.  192). 
See  the  very  reverse  held  by  the 
same  court,  apparently  unaware  of 
its  own  decisions  (Willis  v.  Perry,  92 
Iowa,  297  ;  60  N.  W.  727). 

So  in  Michigan  (Mitchell  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co. ,  51  Mich.  236  ;  Teipel 
v.  Hilsendegen,  44  Id.  461  ;  Le  Baron 
v.  Joslin,41  Id.  313  ;  Michigan,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Coleman,  28  Id.  440;  Lake 
Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  25  Id. 
274 ;  Detroit  v.  Van  Steinburg,  17 
Id.  99  ;  see  Mynning  v.  Detroit,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  67  Mich.  677  ;   35  N.  W.  811). 

So  in  Mississippi  (Vicksburg  v. 
Hennessy,  54  Miss.  391  ;  Central,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Mason.  51  Id.  234) . 

So  in  Louisiana  (Moore  v.  Shreve- 
port,  3  La.  Ann.  045  ;  Ryan  v.  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.,  44  Id.  806  ;  11  So.  30). 


1  Washington,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Har- 
mon, 147  U.  S.  571 ;  13  S.  Ct.  557  ;  In- 
land, etc.  Coasting  Co.  v.  Tolson,  139 
U.  S.  551  ;  11  S.  Ct.  653 ;  Northern 
Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Mares,  123  U.  S. 
710  ;  8  S.  Ct.  321  ;  see  Union  Pacific 
R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  161  U.  S.  451  ;  16  S. 
Ct.  618  ;  Hough  v.  Railroad  Co.,  100 
TJ.  S.  213  ;  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hoist,  93  Id.  291  ;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Gladmon,  15  Wall.  401. 

2  Bromley  v.  Birmingham,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  95  Ala.  397  ;  11  So.  341  ;  Georgia, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  92  Ala.  300  ;  9  So. 
252 ;  Montgomery  Gas  Co.  v.  Mont- 
gomery, etc.  R.  Co.,  86  Ala.  372  ;  5 
So.  735  ;  O'Brien  v.  Tatum,  84  Ala. 
186 ;  4  So.  158  ;  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Crenshaw,  65  Ala.  566 ;  Holt  v. 
Whatley,  51  Id.  569 ;  Smoot  v.  We- 
tumpka,  24  Id.  112. 

3  Lopez  v.  Central,  etc.  Mining  Co., 
1  Ariz.  464  ;  2  Pac.  748. 

4  Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Eu- 
banks,  48  Ark.  460  ;  3  S.  W.  808. 

5  McDougall  v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
63  Cal.  431  ;  Nehrbas  v.  Central,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  62  Id.  320;  McQuilken  v. 
Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  50  Id.  7 ;  Robin- 
son v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  48  Id. 
409  ;  Gay  v.  Winter,  34  Id.  153. 

6  Platte,  etc.  Milling  Co.  v.  Dowell, 
17  Colo.  376  ;  30  Pac.  68 ;  Denver, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  17  Colo.  98  ;  28 
Pac.  79  ;  Sanderson  v.  Frazier,  8  Colo. 
79  ;   5  Pac.  632. 

1  Jefferson  v.  Brady,  4  Houst.  626. 

8  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Yniestra, 
21  Fla.  700. 

9  Augusta  v.  Hudson,  88  Ga.  599  ; 
15  S.  E.  678  :  Prather  v.  Richmond, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  80  Ga.  427  ;  9  S.  E.  530  ; 
Seats  v.  Georgia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  86  Ga. 
811  ;  13  S.  E.  88  [statutory  action 
for  death]. 


167 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


[§  108 


Idaho,10  Kansas,11  Kentucky,12  Maryland,13  Minnesota,14  Mis- 
souri,15 Montana,16  Nebraska,17  New  Hampshire,13  New 
Jersey,19  North  Dakota,20  Ohio,21  Oregon,22  Pennsylvania,23 
Rhode    Island,24    South    Carolina,25    South    Dakota,26   Texas,27 


10  Hopkins  v.  Utah  N.  R.  Co.,  2 
Idaho,  277  ;  13  Pac.  343. 

11  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Weaver, 
35  Kans.  412  ;  11  Pac.  408  ;  Kansas, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Phillibert,  25  Kans.  583  ; 
Kansas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Pointer,  9  Id. 
620  :  14  Id.  38. 

,s  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Goetz, 
79  Ky.  442  ;  Kentucky,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Thomas,  Id.  160  ;  Louisville  Canal 
Co.  v.  Murphy,  9  Bush,  522;  Padu- 
cah,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoehl,  22  Id.  43. 

13  Prince  George  County  v.  Bur- 
gess, 61  Md.  29  ;  State  v.  Baltimore, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  58  Id.  482  ;  Freeh  v.  Phila- 
delphia, etc.  R.  Co.,  39  Id.  574  ;  Mc- 
Mahon  v.  Northern  Central  R.  Co., 
Id.  438 :  Northern  Central  R.  Co.  v. 
State,  31  Id.  357.  So  far  as  Balti- 
more v.  Marriott  (9  Id.  160),  Irwin  v. 
Sprigg  (6  Gill,  200),  and  Owings  v. 
Jones  (9  Md.  108)  hold  the  contrary, 
they  are  overruled. 

14Engel  v.  Breitkreitz,  39  Minn. 
423  ;  40  N.  W.  519  ;  Hocum  v.  Wei- 
therick,  22  Minn.  152. 

16Crumpley  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  Mo.  152  ;  19  S.  W.  820  ;  Mit- 
chell v.  Clinton,  99  Mo.  153  ;  12  S. 
W.  793  ;  Stephens  v.  Macon,  83  Mo. 
345 ;  Buesching  v.  St.  Louis  Gas 
Light  Co.,  73  Id.  219  ;  Thompson  v. 
North  Missouri  R.  Co.,  51  Id.  190. 

16  Prosser  v.  Montana  Cent.  R.  Co., 
17  Mont.  372  ;  43  Pac.  81  ;  Nelson 
v.  Helena,  16  Mont.  21  ;  39  Pac. 
90.-. 

17  Anderson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
35  Nob.  95  ;  52  N.  W.  840  ;  Omaha 
v.  Aver,  32  Neb.  375  ;  49  N.  W.  445  ; 
Durrell  v.  Johnson,  31  Neb.  796 ;  48 
N.  W.  890  ;  Lincoln  v.  Walker,  18 
N'l.   244  ;  20  N.  W.  113. 

]*  Smith  v.  Eastern,  etc.  R.  Co.,  35 


N.  H.  366  ;  White  v.  Concord,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  30  Id.  207. 

19  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Toffey, 
38  N.  J.  Law,  525 ;  N.  J.  Express 
Co.  v.  Nichols,  32  Id.  166  ;  33  Id. 
434  ;  Durant  v.  Palmer,  29  Id.  544 ; 
Moore  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  24  Id.  268. 

20  Gram  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co., 
1  N.  Dak.  252  ;  46  N.  W.  972  ;  San- 
ders v.  Reister,  1  Dak.  151  ;  North- 
ern Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mares,  123  U. 
S.  710;  8  S.  Ct.  321  [a  Dakota 
casej. 

21  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Whit- 
acre,  35  Ohio  St.  627 ;  Cleveland,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Crawford,  24  Id.  636. 

22  Ford  v.  Umatilla  Co.,  15  Oreg. 
313 ;  16  Pac.  33  ;  Grant  v.  Baker,  12 
Oreg.  329  ;  7  Pac.  318;  distinguish- 
ing Walsh  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  10 
Oreg.  250. 

83  Baker  v.  Westmoreland,  etc. 
Gas  Co.,  157  Pa.  St.  593  ;  27  Atl.  789  ; 
Bradwell  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co., 
139  Pa.  St.  404  ;  20  Atl.  1046  ;  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.  v.  Weber,  76  Pa.  St. 
157  ;  Longenecker  v.  Pennsylvania 
R.  Co.,  105  Id.  328  ;  Reading,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ritchie,  102  Id.  425  ;  Mallory 
v.  Griffey,  85  Id.  275;  Weiss  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  79  Id.  387  ;  87 
Id.  447  ;  Penn.  Canal  Co.  v.  Bentley, 
66  Id.  30  ;  Erie  v.  Schwingle,  22  Id. 
384  ;  Beatty  v.  Gilmore,  16  Id.  463. 

94  Cassidy  v.  Angell,  12  R.  I.  447. 

25  Crouch  v.  Charleston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
21  S.  C.  495  ;  Carter  v.  Columbia,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  19  Id.  20;  Roof  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  4  Id.  61  ;  Danner  v.  South  Caro- 
lina R.  Co.,  4  Rich.  Law,  329. 

26  Smith  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4 
S.  Dak.  71  ;   55  N.  W.  717. 

21  San  Antonio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  v.  Ben- 
nett, 76  Tex.  151  ;  13  S.  W.  319  ;  Dal 


§109] 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


1 68 


Vermont,28  Virginia,29  Washington,30  West  Virginia,31  and  Wis- 
consin,82 the  burden  of  proof  as  to  contributory  negligence 
rests  upon  the  defendant,  and  it  must  therefore  be  established 
by  a  clear  preponderance  of  proof.33  Whatever  doubt  there 
may  have  been  as  to  the  rule  adopted  in  North  Carolina34  was 
set  at  rest  by  statute,  in  1887,  casting  the  burden  of  proving 
negligence  upon  the  defendant.35 

§  109.  Burden  ought  to  be  on  defendant. — The  weight  of 
authority  in  support  of  the  rule  that  the  burden  of  proof  of 
contributory  negligence  is  upon  the  defendant  is  now  so  com- 
pletely overwhelming,  that  we  omit  most  of  our  own  argument 
in  its  favor,  contained  in  earlier  editions,  when  a  majority  of 
decisions  were  the  other  way.  We  then  stated  that  our  own 
view  of  the  question  agreed  entirely  with  that  expressed  by 
the  late  Judge  Duer.1  That  able  judge  held  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  plaintiff  to  be  a  mere  matter  of  defense  to  be  proved 
affirmatively  by  the  defendant,  although  it  might,  of  course, 
be   inferred   from  the   circumstances  proved  by  the  plaintiff. 


las,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spicker,  61  Tex. 
427;  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v,  Cowser, 
57  Id.  293;  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Murphy,  46  Id.  356  ;  Murray  v.  Gulf, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  73  Tex.  2  ;    11  S.  W.  125. 

28  Walker  v.  Westfield,  39  Vt.  246  ; 
Hill  v.  New  Haven,  37  Id.  501 ;  Bar- 
ber v.  Essex,  27  Id.  62  ;  Hyde  v. 
Jamaica,  27  Id.  443  ;  Lester  v.  Pitts- 
ford,  7  Id.  158. 

29  Gordon  v.  Richmond,  83  Va.  436; 
2  S.  E.  727. 

30 Spurrier  v.  Front  St.  R.  Co.,  3 
Wash.  St.  659;  29  Pac.  346  ;  North- 
ern Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  1  Wash. 
St.  599  ;  21  Pac.  32. 

31Overby  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  37  W.  Va.  524;  16  S.  E.  813; 
Johnson  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co., 
36  W.  Va.  73 ;  14  S.  E.  432  ;  Fowler 
v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  18  W.  Va. 
579  ;  Sheff  v.  Huntington,  16  Id.  317; 
Snyder  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  11 
Id.  14. 

3SHoth   v.    Peters,    55  Wise.  405; 


Randall  v.  Northwestern  T.  Co.,  54 
Id.  147  ;  Prideaux  v.  Mineral  Point, 
43  Id.  513  ;  Bessex  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  45  Id,  477;  Hoyt  v.  Hud- 
son, 41  Id.  105 ;  overruling  some 
earlier  cases.  The  rule  is  not 
changed  by  the  statute  making  rail- 
road companies  liable  for  injuries  to 
employes  "  without  contributory 
negligence  on  his  part "  (Dugau  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85  Wise,  609  ;  55 
N.  W.  894). 

33  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mares, 
123  U.  S.  710  ;  8  S.  Ct.  321. 

34  See  Owens  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  88  N.  C.  502  ;  as  interpreted  in 
Aycock  v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
N.  C.  321  ;  Cornwall  v.  Charlotte,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  97  Id.  11  ;2S.  E.  659;  Smith  v. 
Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  99  N.  C.  241  'r 
5  S.   E.  896. 

35  Statutes,  1887,  ch.  33  ;  Jordan  v. 
Asheville,  112  N.  C.  743  ;  16  S.  E.  760. 

1  Johnson  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co., 
5  Duer,  21. 


169 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§  "O 


He  pointed  out  that  parties  were  never  required  to  prove 
negative  matters  of  this  kind,  and  also  that  it  had  never  been 
held  necessary,  in  a  complaint  upon  negligence,  to  aver  that 
the  plaintiff  had  taken  due  care.2  When  only  ten  states  out 
of  forty-five  adhere  to  a  rule  condemned  by  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States,  it  would  be  a  waste  of  time  to 
discuss  the  question  further. 

§  no.  Presumption  against  negligence  :  how  over- 
balanced.—  Slight  circumstances  may  overbalance  the  pre- 
sumption of  freedom  from  negligence  which  we  suppose  to 
exist  in  favor  of  a  plaintiff.  Thus,  his  being  found  in  a  posi- 
tion of  presumptively  needless  danger,  unexplained,1  his  in- 
toxication at  the  time  of  the  accident,2  even  to  a  slight  degree,3 
and  any  other  circumstances  which  might  cast  doubt  upon  his 
care  at  the  time,  must  be  considered  by  the  jury.  If  it  ap- 
pears that  any  defects  in  the  things  or  faults  in  the  persons 
employed  by  the  plaintiff  contributed  to  his  injury,  the 
burden  is  clearly  upon  him  to  show,  not  only  that  he  did  not 
know  or  suppose  that  such  defects  or  faults  existed,  but  also 
that  he  was   in  no  fault   for  not   knowing  of  their  existence.4 


2  This  is  now  settled  law  in  New 
York  (Lee  v.  Troy,  etc.  Gas  Co.,  98 
N.  Y.  115),  and  in  England  (Wakelin 
v.  Southeastern  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  12  App. 
Cas  41).  The  contrary  is  settled  in 
Indiana  (Rogers  v.  Overton,  87  Ind. 
411),  and  Iowa  (Gregory  v.  Wood- 
worth,  61  N.  W.  962).  As  to  Illinois, 
see  $  113,  post. 

1  See  Button  v.  Hudson  River  R. 
Co.,  18  N.  Y.  248  [injured  person 
6een  lying  upon  track,  before  train 
came  along].  The  slight  presump- 
tion that  deceased  stopped,  looked 
and  listened  before  crossing  a  rail- 
road track  is  overborne  by  evidence 
that  he  was  struck  by  a  moving  train 
the  instant  he  set  foot  upon  the 
track,  and  that  the  view  was  unob- 
structed (Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
Mooney.  126  Pa.  St.  244  :  17  Atl.  59(b. 
To  the   same  effect,  Burke  v.  N.  Y. 


Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73  Hun,  32  ;  25 
N.  Y.  Supp.  1009. 

2  Intoxication  is  competent,  but 
not  conclusive,  evidence  of  negli- 
gence (Stuart  v.  Machiasport,  48  Me. 
477  ;  Baker  v.  Portland,  58  Id.  199  ; 
Wynn  v.  Allard,  5  Watts  &  S.,  524  ; 
see  §  93,  ante,  and  §§  114,  472, post). 

3  Fitzgerald  v.  Weston,  52  Wise. 
354  ;  9  N.  W.  13. 

4  Winship  v.  Enfield,  42  N.  H.  197. 
The  fact  that  plaintiff  was  incapable 
by  reason  of  years  or  of  physical  or 
mental  infirmity  of  taking  the 
same  care  of  himself  as  ordinarily 
prudent  persons  take  is  competent 
evidence,  but  not  enough  of  itself 
(Curtis  v.  Avon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Barb. 
148  ;  Casey  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
6  Abb.  N.  C.  104  and  116,  note).  It 
cannot  be  laid  down  as  a  universal 
rule  that  it  is  negligence  for  a  blind 


§110] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


170 


Forgetfulness  of  that  which  was  well  known,  and  ought  to 
have  been  remembered,  is  some  evidence  of  negligence.5  And 
if  it  appears  certain  that  the  plaintiff  neglected  some  duty, 
and  highly  probable  that,  if  he  had  not  neglected  it,  he  would 
not  have  suffered  the  injury,  the  question  of  contributory 
negligence  cannot  be  left  to  the  jury,  but  must  be  decided 
adversely  to  the  plaintiff.6  Evidence  as  to  his  general  habits 
of  negligence,  unconnected  with  any  proof  that  he  gave  way 
to  such  habits  at  a  time  when  they  might  have  contributed  to 
his  injury,  is  not  usually  competent.7 

man  to  walk  in  public  street  un- 
attended. It  should  be  left  to  the 
jury  (Smith  v.  Wildes,  143  Mass.  81 ; 
10  N.  E.  446  [trap  door  in  sidewalk]  ; 
Franklin  v.  Harter,  127  Ind.  446  ;  26 
N.  E.  882  [cellar- way  in  sidewalk]) ; 
see  §  375,  Z)°st-  When  plaintiff's 
own  evidence  tends  to  show  con- 
tributory negligence,  the  burden  of 
proof  is  shifted  to  the  plaintiff  (North 
Birmingham  R.  Co.  v.  Calderwood, 
89  Ala.  247  ;  7  So.  360  ;  Overby  v. 
Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  37  W.  Va. 
524;  16  S.  E.  813). 

5  Attempting  in  the  dark  to  pass 
an  open  cellar-way  in  a  sidewalk, 
with  knowledge  of,  but  for  the  time 
forgetting  its  existence,  is  contribu- 
tory negligence  (Bruker  v.  Coving- 
ton, 69  Ind.  33),  and  will  cast  the 
burden  on  plaintiff  to  show  that  he 
was  justified  in  exposing  himself  to 
the  danger  (Coates  v.  Burlington, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  62  Iowa,  486  ;  s.  p.,  King 
v.  Thompson,  87  Pa.  St.  365  ;  Frost 
v.  Waltham,  12  Allen,  85  ;  Reed  v. 
Northfield,  13  Pick.  94  ;  see  Driscoll 
v.  New  York,  11  Hun,  101  ;  see  § 
101,  ante,  and  §  476,  post).  A  person 
running  along  a  lighted  street  with 
which  he  was  familiar  and  stumbling 
over  a  stepping-stone  at  the  edge  of 
the  sidewalk,  where  there  was 
abundant  room  for  him  to  pass. 
Held,  guilty  of  contributory  negli- 
gence (Dubois  v.  Kingston,  102  N. 
Y.  219 ;  6  N.  E.  273). 


6Sprong  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60 
Barb.  30 ;  Fink  v.  Coe,  4  Greene 
[Iowa],  555  ;  Stoeckman  v.  Terre 
Haute,  etc.  R.  Co.  15  Mo.  App.  503. 

1  There  is  no  rule  of  evidence  which 
authorizes  the  introduction  of  testi- 
mony to  prove  that  the  plaintiff, 
injured  by  a  defect  in  a  highway, 
was  habitually  reckless  or  careless 
(Brennan  v.  Friendship,  67  Wise. 
223  ;  29  N.  W.  902).  On  the  other 
hand,  evidence  that  plaintiff's  dri- 
ver had  always  been  a  very  care- 
ful driver  is  inadmissible  to  show 
that  the  driver's  negligence  did  not 
contribute  to  the  injury  (Wooster  v. 
Broadway,  etc.  Co.,  72  Hun,  197  ;  25 
N.  Y.  Supp.  378).  In  Hampson  v. 
Taylor  (15  R.  I.  83  ;  8  Atl.  332).  evi- 
dence of  plaintiff's  intemperate 
habits  was  held  inadmissible,  the 
court  saying:  "  If  the  plaintiff  was 
sober  when  he  fell  [on  an  icy  side- 
walk], the  fact  that  he  was  of  in- 
temperate habits  would  not  preclude 
his  recovery,  and  we  do  not  think 
that  the  mere  proof  that  he  was  of 
intemperate  habits  would  warrant 
the  inference  that  he  was  not  sober. 
The  accident  occurred  in  the  early 
morning,  and  the  sidewalk  was  ad- 
mittedly glazed  with  ice."  Compare 
Enright  v.  Atlanta,  78  Ga.  288.  Tes- 
timony as  to  plaintiff's  habits  of 
sobriety  is  inadmissible  to  contradict 
direct  evidence  that  he  was  intoxi- 
cated at  the   time  of  the  accident 


i7i 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


Km 


§  ill.  What  proof  of  care  sufficient.  —  In  the  few  courts 
which  require  the  plaintiff  to  prove  affirmatively  the  exercise 
of  due  care,  it  is  nevertheless  universally  held  that  such  proof 
need  not  be  direct,  but  may  be  inferred  from  circumstances;1 
and  that  the  exercise  of  such  care  may  be  inferred  from  the 
absence  of  all  appearance  of  fault  on  his  part,  under  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case.2  The  circumstances  may  be  considered 
in  connection  with  the  ordinary  habits,  conduct  and  motives 
of  men ; 3  and  the  fact  that,  when  last  seen,  a  deceased  person 
was  proceeding  with  due  care,4  or  was  found  in  a  situation 
indicating  the  exercise  of  such  care,5  will  sustain  a  finding  in 


(Carr  v.  West  End  R.  Co.,  163  Mass. 
360 ;  40  N.  E.  185).  Intoxication  may 
be  proved  by  opinions  of  eye-wit- 
nesses (People  v.  Eastwood,  14  N.  Y. 
562),  but  not  by  declarations  of  a  third 
person,  not  made  a  part  of  the  res 
gestae  (Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bell, 
79  111.  102).  See  $  60a,  ante.  Evi- 
dence of  plaintiff's  previous  boasts 
as  to  his  ability  to  keep  out  of  the 
way  of  trains,  and  escape  danger,  is 
admissible  as  bearing  upon  his  care- 
lessness and  readiness  to  take  risks 
(Brouillette  v.  Connecticut  River  R. 
Co.,  162  Mass.  198;  38  N.  E.  507). 
1  So  held  in  Maine  (French  v. 
Brunswick,  21  Me.  29  ;  Foster  v.  Dix- 
field,  18  Id.  380);  Massachusetts 
(Mayo  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  104 
Mass.  137  ;  Prentiss  v.  Boston,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  112  Id.  43 ;  Nichols  v.  Smith, 
115  Id.  332  ;  Hinckley  v.  Cape  Cod  R. 
Co.  120  Id.  257);  A'ew;  Yor k  (John- 
son v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y. 
64;  Ernst  v.  Hudson  River  Co.,  35 
Id  9  ;  Wilds  v.  Hudson  River  Co., 
24  Id.  430 ;  Palmer  v.  Dealing,  93 
Id.  7;  Tolman  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R. 
Co,  98  Id.  198;  Lee  v.  Troy,  etc. 
Gap.  Co.,  Id.  115  ;  Taberv.  Delaware, 
etc  R.  Co.,  71  Id.  489;  Maher  v. 
Central  Park,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67 Id.  52; 
Oalvin  v.  New  York,  112  N.  Y. 
223;  19  N.  E.  675:  Chisholm  v. 
State,    141  N.  Y.   246  ;  36  N.   E.  184  ; 


Sickles  v.  N.  J.  Ice  Co.,  80  Hun,  213  ; 
30  N.  Y.  Supp.  10);  Iowa  (Nelson 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  38  Iowa,  564  ; 
Murphy  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  45 
Id.  661);  Illinois  (Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.  v.  Cragin,  71  111.  177);  Indiana 
(Indiana,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Greene,  106 
Ind.  279  ;  Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Buck,  96  Id.  346,  36b)  ;  Louisiana 
(Clements  v.  Louisiana  Electric  Light 
Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  692  ;  11  So.  51.) 

3  In  a  collision,  the  presumption  is 
in  favor  of  a  plaintiff,  whose  vessel 
lies  at  anchor,  as  against  one  in 
motion  (Bill  v.  Smith,  39  Conn.  206). 

3  Johnson  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co., 
20  N.  Y.  64  ;  affi'g  6  Duer,  633.  It  is 
not  indispensable  that  the  plaintiff 
should  produce  eye-witnesses  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  the  accident 
occurred  to  show  due  care  on  the 
part  of  one  deceased;  but  that  fact 
may  be  inferred  from  the  circum- 
stances, in  connection  with  the  or- 
dinary habits  and  conduct  of  men 
in  the  presence  of  a  known  danger 
(Galvin  v.  New  York,  112  N.  Y. 
223  ;  19  N.  E.  675  ;  Illinois  Central 
R.  Co.,  v.  Nowicki,  148  111.  29  ;  35  N. 
E.  358  [collision  at  railroad  cross- 
ing])- 

4  Greenleaf  v.  Illinois  Central  R. 
Co..  29  Iowa,  14. 

6  Johnson  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co., 
supra.     In  California,    it  has    been 


§111] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


172 


his  favor.  An  inference  of  care  arises  in  favor  of  one  deceased, 
from  the  instinct  of  self-preservation;6  though  in  some  courts 
this  alone  is  not  enough  to  establish  the  fact ;  it  is  only  where 
there  is  no  reliable  proof  to  the  contrary,  or  there  is  a  rational 
doubt  upon  the  evidence  as  to  the  conduct  of  the  party,  that 
such  a  presumption  can  be  invoked.7  Evidence  that  the 
injured  person  was  careful  and  prudent,  and  that  he  had 
been  careful  on  other  occasions,  is  not  competent  to  disprove 
contributory    negligence,   where   he    is   living;8   but  if   he    is 


held  that  though  there  was  some  evi- 
dence showing  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  deceased,  for  whose 
death  the  action  was  brought,  yet  a 
verdict  for  plaintiff  might  be  sup- 
ported on  the  theory  that  the  jury 
did  not  consider  such  negligence 
the  proximate  cause  of  the  accident, 
but  as  caused  proximately  by  the  un- 
skillfulness  and  incompetency  of  the 
train-engineer  (Brown  v.  Central 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  68  Cal.  171  ;  7  Pac.  447  ; 
8  Id.  828). 

6  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gentry,  163 
U.  S.  353  ;  16  S.  Ct.  1104;  111.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.  v.  Nowicki,   148  111.  29  ; 
35  N.    E.    358;    Northern  Cent.    R. 
Co.  v.  State,    31   Md.    357;    Gay  v. 
Winter,  34   Cal.    153;    Mac   Dougal 
v.  Central  R.  Co.,  63  Id.  431  ;  Mor- 
rison v.  N.  Y.    Central  R.   Co.,    63 
N.  Y.  643;  Greenleaf  v.  Illinois  Cen- 
tral R    Co.,  29  Iowa,  14;  Hopkin- 
son  v.  Knapp,  etc.  Co.,  92  Id.  328  ;  60 
N.  W.  653).     See  Allen   v.  Willard. 
57  Pa.    St.    374  ;  Cleveland,    etc.    R. 
Co.  v.  Rowan.  66    Id.  393  ;  McBride 
v.  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.,  19  Oreg. 
64  ;  23  Pac.  814,  and  cases  supra.     In 
Reynolds  v.  Keokuk  (72  Iowa,  371  ; 
34  N.  W.  1H).  where  plaintiff  was  a 
witness  on   her  own   behalf,  it  was 
held    that    inferences   of    plaintiff's 
care  arising  from  the  instinct  of  self- 
preservation,  were  not  to  be  indulged 


7  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Steb- 
bing,  62  Md.  504  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bennett,  9  Ind.  App.  92  ;  35 
N.  E.  1033. 

8  Morris  v.  East  Haven,  41  Conn. 
254  ;  McDonald  v.  Savoy,  110  Mass. 
49  ;   compare    Dorman  v.   Kane,   5 
Allen,  38;    Atlanta,  etc.   R.   Co.  v. 
Smith,   94    Ga.    107  ;    20  S.    E.   763 
[train  hand  coupling  cars]  ;  Wells  v. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  W.  Ry.  Co.,  7  Utah, 
482  ;  27  Pac.  688  [brakeman  coupling 
carsj.     Evidence  that  a  prudent  man 
would  have  acted  in  the  same  man- 
ner as  plaintiff  acted  has  been  held 
to  be  admissible  (Burkett  v.  Bond, 
12  111.  87).     Evidence  that  one  killed 
at  a  railroad  crossing  was  a  sober  and 
industrious  man,  possessed  of  all  his 
faculties,  and  that  his  attention  was 
probably   distracted    by  two  trains 
passing  in  opposite  directions,  made 
a. prima  facie  case  of  due  care  on  his 
part  (Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v.  No- 
wicki,  148  111.  29  ;  35  N.  E.  358) ;  so, 
also,  that   evidence  that    a    person 
killed  by  the  explosion  of  a  boiler, 
under  his  management,  was  a  com- 
petent and  careful  engineer,  was  suf- 
ficient to  raise  a  presumption  of  due 
care  on  his  part,  at  the  time,  there 
being  no  eye-witnesses  of  the  occur- 
rence (Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey, 
145  111.  159  ;  33  N.  E.  1089).     See  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  108  111. 
113. 


173  CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  112 

dead,  such  evidence   is   admissible,9  especially   if   no   eye-wit- 
nesses can  be  found.10 

§  112.  Inference  from  circumstances. — In  the  same  courts, 
freedom  from  contributory  fault  may  be  inferred  in  favor  of  a 
deceased  person,  from  the  absence  of  all  appearance  of  such 
fault.1  Though  there  was  no  eye-witness  of  the  accident,  and 
although  its  precise  cause  and  manner  of  occurrence  are 
unknown,  an  inference  of  freedom  from  fault  on  the  part 
of  the  injured  person  becomes  possible,  if  the  surrounding 
circumstances  indicate  that  the  accident  might  have  hap- 
pened without  such  fault.  In  such  a  case,  a  question  of  fact 
arises,  to  be  solved  by  the  jury.  But  where  the  circum- 
stances do  not  tend  to  establish  the  existence  of  some  cause 
of  the  accident,  consistent  with  care  on  the  part  of  the  in- 
jured person,  and  contributory  negligence  is  the  only  and  nec- 
essary inference  to  be  drawn,  the  plaintiff  has  not  successfully 
borne  the  burden  resting  upon  him.2  Where  the  facts  sur- 
rounding the  occurrence  of  the  accident  are  only  partially 
disclosed,  and  they  are  equally  consistent  with  the  plaintiff's 

9  Overman  Wheel  Co:  v.  Griffin,  67    of  negligence,  and  the  court  erred 
Fed.   659;  14  C.   C.  A.  609;  Illinois     in  directing  a  nonsuit. 

Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Nowicki,  148  111.  29  ;  2  Tolman  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co., 

85  N.  E.  358.  98  N.  Y.  198  ;    Becht  v.    Corbin,  92 

10  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bailey,  145  N.  Y.  658  ;  Connelly  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
111.  159  ;  33  N.  E.  1089.  R.  Co.,  88  Id.  346  ;  Greany  v.  Long 

1  Mayo  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  104  Island  R.  Co.,  101  Id.  419 ;  Hinckley 

Mass.   137;    Prentiss  v.  Boston,   112  v.   Cape  Cod  R.  Co.,  120  Mass.  257  ; 

Id.  43  ;  Cook  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  Ince  v.  East  Boston  Ferry  Co.,  106 

98  Id.  361  ;  Maguire  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Id.    149 ;  Barstow  v.  Old  Colony  R. 

Co.,  146  Id.  379  ;  15  N.  E.  904  ;  Mc-  Co.,  143  Mass. 535  ;  10N.E.  255  ;  Ryan 

Intosh  v.    Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co.,  36  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  44  La.  Ann. 

Fed.  661.     In  Galvin  v.  New  York  806;    11  So.  30.     To  similar  effect, 

(112  N.  Y.  223  ;  19  N.  E.  675),  there  in  courts  holding  to  the  other  rule, 

being    no    affirmative    evidence   of  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Righter,  42 

negligence  on  the  part  of  deceased,  N.  J.  Law,  180  ;  N.J.  Express  Co. 

and  no  eye-witness  of  the   accident,  v.  Nichols,  33  Id.  434  ;  Flemming  v. 

and  no  question   as   to  defendant's  Western  Pacific  R.  Co. ,  49  Cal.  253  ; 

negligence,  held  it  was  for  the  jury  McQuilken  v.  Central  Pacific  R.  Co., 

to    determine    the    degree    of    care  50  Id.  7 ;  Donaldson  v.  Milwaukee, 

which  deceased  was  bound  to  exer-  etc.  R.  Co.,  21  Minn.  293  ;  Brown  v. 

cise,  to  infer  the  motive  which  led  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  22  Id.  165; 

him  to  the  hatchway  where  he  was  Callahan    v.   Warne,   40    Mo.    131 ; 

killed,  and  to  pass  upon  the  question  Myers  v.  Kansas  City,  108  Id.  480 ; 


§H3] 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


1/4 


care  on  the  one  hand,  and  want  of  care  on  the  other,  the  plain- 
tiff must  suffer  a  non-suit.3 

§  113.  Pleading  absence  of  fault.— In  those  courts  which 
hold  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiff,  it  is  never- 
theless the  general  rule  that  the  plaintiff  need  not  expressly 
aver  in  his  pleading  the  absence  of  contributory  fault.1  This 
inconsistency  is  explained  by  the  courts  on  the  ground  that 
the  absence  of  contributory  negligence  is  necessarily  implied  in 
an  averment  that  the  defendant  caused  the  injury,  since  (it  is 


18  S.  W.  914;  Dougherty  v.  West 
Superior  Iron  Co.,  88  Wise.  343  ;  60 
N.  W.  274. 

3  Crafts  v.Boston,  109  Mass.  519. 
In  New  York,  this  rule  has  been  ap- 
plied to  deceased  persons  (Hart  v. 
Hudson  River  Bridge  Co.,  84  N.  Y. 
66  ;  Hale  v.  Smith,  78  Id.  483  ;  Rey- 
nolds v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  58  Id. 
248  ;  Cordell  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
75  Id.  330  ;  Riordan  v.  Ocean  S.  S. 
Co.,  124  N.  Y.  655;  26  N.  E.  1027 
[stevedore  killed  coming  up  from 
hold  of  vessel]  ;  Wiwirowski  v.  Lake 
Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  124  N.  Y.  420  ;  26 
N.  E.  1023).  But  not  so  in  some  other 
states  adhering  to  the  general  rule 
(Teipel  v.  Hilsendegen,  44  Mich.  465  ; 
7  N.  W.  82;  111.  Central  R.  Co.  v. 
Nowicki,  148  111.  29  ;  35  N.  E.  358 ; 
Way  v.  R.  R.  Co. ,  40  Iowa,  345  ;  Gay 
v.  Winter,  34  Cal.  153).  The  New 
York  cases  are  mostly  obiter  dicta. 

1  So  held  in  Massachusetts  (Fuller 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  134  Mass.  491; 
May  v.  Princeton,  11  Mete.  442) ;  New 
York  (Lee  v.  Troy,  etc.  Gas  Co.,  98 
N.  Y.  115  ;  Hackford  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  6  Lans.  381;  affi'd  53  N.  Y. 
654);  though  it  is  not  improper  to 
allege  the  fact  (Lynch  v.  Second  Ave. 
R.  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  164  ;  39  N. 
Y.  Supp.  1103) ;  Illinois  (Consolidated 
Coal  Co.  v.  Wombacher,  134  111.  57  ; 
24  N.  E.  627  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hines,  132  111.  161;  23  N.  E.  1021: 
contra,  Calumet  Co.  v.  Martin,  115 


111.   358;    3  N.  E.  456);   Mississippi 
(Hickman  v.   Kansas  City,   etc.   R. 
Co.,  66  Miss.  154  ;  5  So.  225 ;  Vicks- 
burg  v.  McLain,  67  Miss.  4;  6   So. 
774).     Of  course  no  such  averment  is 
required  in  states  where  contributory 
negligence  is  a  mere  defense  (Smoot 
v.  Wetumpka,  24  Ala.  112  ;  Holt  v. 
Whatley,  51  Id.  569 ;  Thompson  v. 
Duncan,  76  Id.  334 ;  Columbus,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Bradford,  86  Id.  574 ;  6  So. 
90  ;  Wilson  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
85  Ala.  269  ;  4  So.  701 ;  South- West 
Va.  Co.  v.  Andrew,  86  Va.  270  ;  Balti- 
more,  etc.   R.    Co.  v.  Whittington, 
30    Gratt.     805;     Snyder    v.    Pitts- 
burgh,  etc.  R.    Co.,  11  W.  Va.  14  ; 
Georgia    Midland,    etc.     R.   Co.    v. 
Evans,    87    Ga.    673  ;   13  S.  E.   580). 
O'Connor  v.    Missouri  Pac.    R.  Co., 
94  Mo.  150  ;  7  S.  W.   106  ;  Thorpe  v. 
Missouri  Pac  R.  Co.,  89  Mo.  650  ;  2 
S.  W.   3 ;     Texas,    etc.    R.    Co.    v. 
Murphy,    46  Tex.    356  ;    Hocum    v. 
Witherick,  22  Minn.  152  ;  Smith  v. 
Eastern  R.  Co.,  35  N.  H.   356  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.    v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  20  Wis.  533 ;  Gram  v.  Northern 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  1  N.  Dak.  252  ;  46  N.  W. 
972  ;    Johnson   v.    Bellingham    Bay 
Imp.  Co.,  13  Wash.   St.  455  ;  43  Pac. 
370 ;  Boyd  v.  Oddous,  97  Cal.  510  ;  32 
Pac.  569  ;  Robinson   v.  Western  Pa- 
cific R.  Co.,  48  Cal.  409).     But  there 
is  one  strange  decision  to  the  con- 
trary, State  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co. 
(Md.),  26  Atl.  865. 


175 


CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE. 


C§"4 


said)  he  did  not  cause  it,  if  the  plaintiff  assisted  in  causing  it. 
This  is  very  unsatisfactory  reasoning;  and  the  logic  of  the 
Indiana  and  Iowa  courts,  which  require  the  plaintiff  expressly 
to  aver  in  his  pleading  the  fact  of  his  due  care,  since  he  must 
prove  it  on  the  trial,  is  far  more  sound.2  The  defense  of  con- 
tributory negligence,  where  it  is  a  matter  of  defense,  is  admis- 
sible under  the  general  plea  of  not  guilty  or  under  a  general 
denial.3 

§  114.  Questions  of  fact  and  law. — The  rule  as  to  what 
evidence  will  suffice  to  go  to  the  jury  on  the  issue  of  con- 
tributory negligence,  as  a  question  of  fact,  is  substantially  the 
same  as  that  which  governs  the  submission  to  the  jury  of  the 
defendant's  negligence,  subject,  of  course,  to  the  rule  held  by 
the  particular  court  as  to  the  burden  of  proof.  It  is  a  general 
rule,  applicable  in  all  courts,  that  the  question  is  to  be  sub- 


2Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hiatt,  17 
Ind.  102  ;  re-affirmed  in  Pennsylva- 
nia R.  Co.  v.  Gallentine,  77  Id.  322  ; 
Rogers  v.  Overton,  87  Id.  411 ;  Ohio, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Walker,  113  Id.  196  ; 
15  N.  E.  234  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sandford.  117  Ind.  265  ;  19  N.  E.  770. 
So  in  Iowa  (Gregory  v.  Wood  worth, 
61  N.  W.  962).  It  is  sufficient  to  al- 
lege that  the  injury  occurred  without 
plaintiff's  fault  (Rogers  v.  Overton, 
supra  ;  Gheens  v.  Golden,  90  Ind.  427 
Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Nickless,  71  Id.  271 
Michigan,  etc.  v.  Lautz,  29  Id.  528 
Indiana,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Overman,  110 
Id.  538;  10  N.  E.  575),  or  that  the 
injury  was  caused  wholly  by  the 
negligence  of  the  defendant  (Brink- 
man  v.  Bender,  92  Ind.  234  ;  Wilson 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  83  Ind.  326;  Ander- 
son v.  Hervey,  67  Id.  420  ;  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McDaniel,  134  Id.  166; 
32  N.  E.  728).  In  Texas,  it  is  held  that 
where  the  petition  discloses  a  state  of 
facts,  which  if  unexplained  would 
make  out  a  prima  facie  case  of  con- 
tributory negligence,  freedom  from 
fault  must  be  averred  (Tex.  etc.  R. 
Co.    v.    Murphy,   46  Tex.    356).     In 


Kentucky,  if  plaintiff's  contributory 
negligence  appears  on  the  face  of 
the  complaint,  it  is  demurrable 
(Favre  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  91 
Ky.  541  ;  16  S.  W.  370). 

3Holden  v.  Liverpool  Gas  Co.,  3 
C.  B.  1  ;  St.  Anthony's  Falls  v.  East- 
man, 20  Minn.  277  ;  Cunningham  v. 
Lyness,  22  Wise.  245  ;  Ellet  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Mo.  518 ;  Grey 
v.  Mobile  Trade  Co.  55  Ala.  387.  But 
otherwise  in  Missouri  (Stone  v.  Hunt, 
94  Mo.  475  ;  7  S.  W.  431),  in  Nebraska 
(South  Omaha  v.  Cunningham,  31 
Neb.  316  ;  47  N.  W.  930)  and  Texas 
(Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Watson, 
72  Tex.  631;  10  S.  W.  731).  Of 
course,  contributory  fault  may  be 
shown  under  a  general  denial  in 
courts  adhering  to  the  minority  rule 
(Jones  v.  Andover,  10  Allen,  18 ;  New 
Albany  v.  McCulloch,  127  Ind.  500  ; 
26  N.  E.  1074).  As  to  variance  be- 
tween proof  and  pleading,  see  McCoy 
v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  5  Del. 
599  ;  and  as  to  pleading  contribu- 
tory negligence,  see  12  Am.  St.  Rep. 
75,  note. 


§  ii4] 


CONTRIBUTORY    NEGLIGENCE. 


176 


mitted  to  the  jury,  not  only  where  there  is  sufficient  testimony 
as  to  the  actual  facts  to  leave  a  reasonable  doubt,1  but  also 
where  the  inferences  which  might  be  fairly  drawn  from  the 
facts  are  not  certain  and  invariable,  and  might  lead  to  different 
conclusions  in  different  minds.  The  court  is  not  at  liberty  to 
withhold  the  question  from  the  jury,  simply  because  it  is  fully 
convinced  that  a  certain  inference  should  be  drawn,  so  long  as 
persons  of  fair  and  sound  minds  might  possibly  come  to  a 
different  conclusion.2     Where  the  evidence  makes  out  a  clear 


1  Doyle   v.    Pennsylvania,   etc.    K. 
Co.,    139  N.   Y.  G37  ;   34  N.  E.  1063 
[conflict  as  to  ringing  bell]  ;  Hoff- 
man v.  Union  Ferry  Co.,  68  N.  Y. 
385  ["precautions  of  steamers] ;  Peil  v. 
Reinhart,  127  Id.  381 ;  27  N.  E.  1077 
[knowledge  of  defect  in  stairway]  : 
Parsons  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  113 
N.  Y.  355 ;    21  N.  E.  145  [alighting 
from  train] ;  Beck  with  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co. ,  54  Hun,  446  ;   affi'd  125  N. 
Y.  759  ;  27  N.  E.  408  [railroad  cross- 
ing] ;   Miller  v.    N.  Y.   Central    R. 
Co.,  82  Hun,  164  ;  affi'd  146  N.  Y.  367 
[railroad  crossing]  ;  Seeley  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  8  N.  Y.  App.   Div. 
402;    40   N.   Y.    Supp.    866   [same]; 
Keng  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  160 
Pa.   St.   644;    28  Atl.    940   [railroad 
crossing]  ;  Smith  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  158  Pa.  St.  82  ;  27  Atl.  847  [care 
at    crossing]  ;    Baker    v.    Maryland 
Coal    Co.,  84  Md.    19;    35    Atl.    10 
[knowledge  of  new  danger]  ;  Georgia 
Pac.   R.  Co.   v.   Propst,  83  Ala.  518 ; 
3  So.   764  [knowledge  of  rule].     To 
similar  effect,  North  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Eldridge,  151  111.  542  ;  38  N.  E. 
246  ;  Anderson  v.  Morrison,  22  Minn. 
274;  Garrett  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
36  Iowa,  121 ;  Kelly  v.  Hannibal,  etc. 
R.  Co. ,  70  Mo.  604 ;  Mauerman  v. 
Siemerts,  71  Id.  101  ;  Monroe  v.  Lat- 
tin,  25  Kans.  391  ;  Swaboda  v.  Ward, 
40  Mich.  420  ;  Teipel  v.  Hilsendegen, 
44  Id.  461  ;  7  N.  W.  82;  Kelley  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  53  Wise.  74  ;  John- 
son v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Id.  529; 


Hoyt  v.  Hudson,  41  Id.  105  ;  Kansas 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Twombly,  3  Colo.  125  ; 
Fernandes  v.  Sacramento  R.  Co.,  52 
Cal.  45  ;  International,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kindred,  57  Tex.  491  ;  Bierbach  v. 
Goodyear  Rubber  Co.,  14  Fed.  826; 
15  Id.  490.  Even  where  plaintiff's 
own  testimony  is  confused  and  con- 
tradictory as  to  whether  he  stopped, 
looked,  and  listened  at  a  place  where 
he  ought  to  have  done  so,  yet  he  is 
entitled  to  go  to  the  jury  (Ely  v. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  158  Pa.  St. 
233  ;  27  Atl.  970). 

s  Where  evidence  is  conflicting, 
or  is  capable  of  different  interpre- 
tations, or  if  the  inferences  to  be 
drawn  from  it  are  doubtful,  it  is 
the  province  of  the  jury  to  pass 
upon  it  (Belton  v.  Baxter,  58  N.  Y. 
411  ;  Hart  v.  Hudson  River  Bridge 
Co.,  80  Id.  622  ;  Weller  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  120  Mo.  635;  23  S.  W. 
1061  ;  25  Id.  532  ;  Cincinnati,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Grames,  136  Ind.  39  ;  34  N.  E. 
714  [disapproving  Conner  v.  Citizens' 
R.  Co.,  105  Ind.  62  ;  4  N.  E.  441] ; 
Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crawford,  24 
Ohio  St.  631 ;  Orr  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  94  Iowa,  423  ;  62  N.  W.  851). 
This  is  probably  the  rule  in  England 
(see  Brown  v.  Great  Western  R.  Co., 
52  Law  Times,  622  ;  reviewing  the 
cases) .  To  the  same  effect,  Robertson 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  160  Mass.  191 ; 
35  N.  E.  775  [continued  use  of  de- 
fective locomotive  while  repairing] ; 
Emery  v.  Raleigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  102  N. 


177 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§   "4 


case,  it  is  a  question  of  law.3  Where  it  is  the  rule  that  the 
burden  of  proof  rests  upon  the  plaintiff,  the  question  cannot 
be  left  to  the  jury,  if  all  the  facts  and  all  the  inferences 
C.  209  ;  9  S.  E.  139  ;  [continued  use 


of  brickyard  made  dangerous  by- 
defendant's  negligence]  ;  Spaulding 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  98  Iowa,  205  ; 
67  N.  W.  227  ;  [uncoupling  cars  in 
motion]  ;  Rolseth  v.  Smith,  38  Minn. 
14 ;  35  N.  W.  565 ;  [demurrer  to 
complaint] ;  and  see  Greany  v.  Long 
Island  R.  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  419  ;  5  N.  E. 
425  ;  KeUogg  v.  N.  Y.  Central R.  Co., 
79  N.  Y.  72  ;  Lee  v.  Troy,  etc.  Gas 
Co.,  98  Id.  115  ;  Sherry  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral, etc.  R.  Co.,  104  Id.  652;  10  N. 
E.  128  ;  Whittaker  v.  Delaware,  etc. 
Canal  Co.,  126  N.  Y.  544;  27  N.  E. 
1042  ;  Galvin  v.  New  York,  112  N. 
Y.  223,  229  ;  19  N.  E.  675  ;  Salter  v. 
Utica.  etc.  R.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  42  ;  Kain 
v.  Smith,  89  Id.  375 ;  Orange,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ward,  47  N.  J.  Law,  560 ;  N. 
J.  Express  Co.  v.  Nichols,  32  Id.  166; 
Berry  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  48  Id. 
141 ;  North  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirk,  90 
Pa.  St.  15  ;  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Long,  75  Id.  257.  In  Payne  v. 
Reese  (100  Pa.  St.  301),  a  workman  in 
a  colliery  walked  into  a  cloud  of 
6team  which  he  saw  coming  out  of 
hole  in  footpath  where  he  was  ac- 
customed to  walk,  the  steam  in  fact 
proceeding  from  a  defective  blow- 
pipe which  his  employer  should  have 
kept  in  repair.  Held,  question  of 
contributory  negligence  for  jury, 
and  it  was  error  for  court  to  decide 
it.  To  same  effect  Baltimore  v. 
Holmes,  39  Md.  243  ;  Sheff  v.  Hunt- 
ington, 16  W.  Va.  307  ;  Central  R. 
Co.  v.  Freeman,  66  Ga.  170  ;  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Goetz,  79  Ky. 
442  ;  Hill  v.  Gust,  55  Ind.  45 ;  Ramsey 
v.  Rushville  R.  Co.,  81  Id.  394  ;  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright,  80  Id. 
182  :  Albion  v.  Hetrick.  90  Id.  545. 
The  degree  of  care  required  under 
the  circumstances  is  a  question  for 
[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  1  —  12] 


the  jury  (Palmer  v.  Dearing,  93  N.  Y. 
7  ;  Mahoney  v.  Dore,  155  Mass.  513  ; 
30  N.  E.  366  ;  Finnegan  v.  Fall  River 
Gas  Works  Co.,  159  Mass.  311;  34  N. 
E.  523).   The  question  of  contributory 
negligence,  as  a  general  rule,  can- 
not resolve  itself  into  one  of  law,  but 
must  be  submitted  to  jury,  as  ques 
tion  of  fact  (O'Brien  v.  McGlinchy 
68  Me.  552  ;  Brown  v.  European,  etc 
R.  Co.,  58  Id.   384 ;  Sleeper  v.  Wor 
cester,    etc.  R.    Co.,  58   N.  H.  520 
Ruland  v.  South  Newmarket,  59  Id 
291  ;  Fassett  v.  Roxbury,  55  Vt.  552 
Willard  v.  Pinard,  44  Id.  34 ;  Brooks 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  135  Mass.  21 
Greenwood  v.  Callahan,  111  Id.  298 
O'Connor  v.   Adams,   120    Id.   427 
Beers  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  19  Conn 
566;   Park   v.   O'Brien,   23  Id.    339 
Smith  v.  Rio  Grande  R.  Co.,  9  Utah 
141  ;  33  Pac.  626).   Where  facts  con 
stituting  contributory  negligence  are 
so  disconnected  from  facts  constitut- 
ing defendant's  negligence  that  it 
cannot  be  determined  as  a  matter  of 
law  that  the  one  was  the  cause  or 
sequence  of  the  other,    their    rela- 
tion or  dependence  should  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury  (Smith  v.  Occi- 
dental   Co.,    99  Cal.   462;    34  Pac. 
84).    If  the  evidence  of  contributory 
negligence  is  not  so  conclusive  as  to 
warrant  setting  aside  a  verdict,  the 
question  should  be  left  to  the  jury 
(Washington,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Harmon, 
147  U.  S.  571 ;  13  S.  Ct.  557  ;  Northern 
Pacific  R.  Co.v.  Amato,  144  U.  S.  465 ; 
12  S.  Ct.  740  ;  Crane  Elevator  Co.  v. 
Lippert,  11  C.  C.  A.  521  ;  63  Fed.  942). 
3  Tolman  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co., 
98  N.  Y.  198  ;  and  other  cases  cited, 
see  §  112,  note  2,  ante ;  and  in  addi- 
tion. West  Jersey  R.  Co.  v.  Ewan,  55 
N.  J.  Law,  574  ;     27  Atl.  1064  [Ct.  of 
Errors] :  Mynning  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R. 


§IM] 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


78 


which  could  reasonably  be  drawn  therefrom  point  just  as  much 
to  the  contributory  negligence  of  the  plaintiff  as  to  its  absence, 
or  if  the  facts  do  not  justify  any  inference  upon  the  subject.4 
But  considerable  difficulty  is  experienced  in  applying  this 
principle  to  the  case  of  deceased  persons;  some  cases  applying 
it  strictly,5  and  others  holding  that  it  will  not  be  presumed  that 


Co.,  67  Mich.  677;  35  N.  W.  811  ;  Co- 
lumbus,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bradford,  86 
Ala.  574 ;  6  So.  90  ;  Gleason  v.  Ex- 
celsior M'f'g  Co.,  94 Mo.  201  ;  7  S.  W. 
188  ;  Missouri  Pac.  E.  Co.  v.  Moseley, 
57  Fed.  921  ;  6  C.  C.  A.  641.  Where 
the  fact  is  incontrovertible  that  a 
locomotive  engineer  was  brought 
into  the  peril  which  caused  his  death, 
in  part  by  his  disregard  of  the  com- 
pany's known  rules  as  to  rate  of 
speed,  having  observed  which  a  col- 
lision would  have  been  avoided,  his 
co-operating  negligence  is  an  infer- 
ence of  law ;  and  a  nonsuit  should 
be  granted  (Sutherland  v.  Troy,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y.  737  ;  26  N.  E.  609). 
*  Barker  v.  Savage,  45  N.  Y.  191  ; 
Ditchett  v.  Spuyten,  etc.  R.  Co.,  5 
Hun,  165  ;  67  N.  Y.  425  ;  Stuart  v. 
Machias,  48  Me.  477  ;  Alger  v.  Low- 
ell, 3  Allen,  402  ;  Thorp  v.  Brookfield, 
36  Conn.  321  ;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Boteler,  38  Md.  568;  Burns  v. 
Elba,  32  Wise.  605  ;  Cramer  v.  Bur- 
lington, 42  Iowa,  315  ;  O'Keefe  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Id.  467; 
Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cragin,  71  111. 
177  ;  Whalen  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  60  Mo.  323  ;  Wynn  v.  Allard,  5 
Watts  &  S.  534  ;  Southwestern,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hankerson,  61  Ga.  114  ; 
and  cases  cited  under  §  112,  ante. 
But  in  a  recent  Indiana  case,  it  was 
held  that  where  plaintiff  alleges  he 
was  not  negligent,  and  no  facts  ap- 
pear to  indicate  that  he  was,  the 
court  cannot  presume  contributory 
negligence  ( Bedford  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown,  142  Ind.  659  :  42  N.  E.  359  ); 
and.  in  New  York,  there  being  no 
proof    of    contributory   negligence, 


the  court  will  assume,  after  verdict 
for  plaintiff,  that  he  was  without 
fault  (Rowe  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  82  Hun,  153  ;  31  N.  Y.  Supp. 
304).  The  jury  have  the  right  to 
believe  the  plaintiff's  unsupported 
testimony  that  he  looked  and  listened 
for  the  train  at  a  highway  crossing 
(Hickey  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  8 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  123 ;  40  N.  Y.  Supp. 
484). 

5  So  held,  where  there  was  no 
direct  testimony  as  to  the  care  or 
negligence  of  the  deceased  ;  for  his 
general  reputation  for  carefulness 
and  the  natural  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  do  not  in  such  a  case 
afford  sufficient  proof  of  the  absence 
of  contributory  negligence  (Indi- 
ana, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Greene,  106  Iud. 
279 ;  Cordell  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  75  N.  Y.  330  [a  mere  obiter 
dictum] ;  Peaslee  v.  Chatham,  69 
Hun,  389  ;  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  628  ;  see 
State  v.  Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  76 
Me.  357  ;  see  §  111,  ante).  A  boy  of 
sixteen  was  found  dead  between 
tracks.  The  engine  by  which  he 
was  killed  could  have  been  seen  750 
feet  distant.  It  was  a  fair  day  and 
with  little  wind.  Held,  that  the 
proof  did  not  warrant  a  rinding  that 
there  was  no  negligence  on  the  part 
of  the  deceased  (Reynolds  v.  N.  Y. 
Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58  N.  Y.  248; 
s.  P.,  Wakelin  v.  Southeastern  R. 
Co.,  L.  R.  12  App.  Cas.  41  ;  Lee  v.  Pub- 
lishers, 55  Mo.  App.  390).  Where  the 
circumstances  point  as  much  to  de- 
cedent's negligence  as  to  its  absence, 
or  point  in  neither  direction,  a  non- 
suit is  proper  (Dorr  v.  McCullough, 


179 


CONTRIBUTORY   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§  114 


the  deceased  did  not  look  or  listen,  in  the  absence  of  any  cir- 
cumstances which  tend  to  raise  such  a  presumption.6  Of 
course,  in  those  courts  which  hold  that  the  burden  of  proof  is 
upon  the  defendant,  the  presumption  is  in  favor  of  a  deceased 
person  upon  all  such  points.7  In  all  courts,  when  there  is  any 
evidence  from  which  an  inference  of  contributory  negligence 
might  reasonably  be  drawn,  the  court  must  instruct  the  jury 
that  the  plaintiff  cannot  recover,  if  his  negligence  contributed 
to  produce  the  injury,  in  the  manner  hereinbefore  stated.8 


8  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  327;  40  N.  Y. 
Supp.  806  [railroad  crossing]  ;  Ward 
v.  Southern  Pac.  E.  Co.,  25  Oreg. 
433  ;  36  Pac.  166  ;  Kauffman  v. 
Cleveland,  etc.  E.  Co.,  144  Ind.  456; 
43  N.  E.  446). 

6  The  fact  that  there  is  no  affirma- 
tive evidence  showing  that  one  who 
was  killed  while  crossing  a  railroad 
track,  either  looked  or  listened  does 
not  justify  a  presumption  that  he 
did  not  look,  and  was,  therefore, 
negligent  (Massoth  v.  Delaware,  etc. 
Canal  Co.,  64  N.  Y.  524).  So,  as  to 
his  care  in  general  (Jones  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  E.  Co.,  28  Hun,  364  ;  affi'd, 
92  N.  Y.  628) ;  Oldenburg  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  E.  Co.,  124  N.  Y.  414;  26 
N.  E.  1021  [deceased,  looking  at 
rough  sidewalk,  killed  by  backing 
engine]  ;  Atkinson  v.  Abraham,  45 
Hun,  238  [falling  down  dark  hatch- 
way] ;  Troy  v.  Cape  Fear.  etc.  E. 
Co.",  99  N.  C.  298;  6  S.  E.  77 
[intoxicated  man's  foot  caught 
in  rail ;  run  over  at  crossing]. 

1  Where  the  plaintiff  did  not  prove 
affirmatively  that  deceased  had 
stopped  and  looked  and  listened,  it 
was  to  be  presumed  that  he  had  ;  and 
although  a  witness  testified  that  de- 
ceased could  have  seen  the  train 
coming,  if  he  had  looked,  this  was 
held  not  to  justify  an  instruction  to 


find  for  defendant  (Weiss  v.  Penn- 
sylvania E.  Co.,  79  Pa.  St.  387  ;  see, 
also,  Pennsylvania  E.  Co.  v.  Weber, 
76  Id.  157). 

6  Pittsburgh,  etc.  E.  Co.  v.  Krieh- 
baum,  24  Ohio  St.  119.  Where  there 
is  evidence  of  contributory  negli- 
gence an  instruction  ignoring  it  is 
erroneous  (Guenther  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  E.  Co.,  95  Mo.  286  ;  8  S.  W.  371). 
Where  the  court  charged  that  the 
plaintiff  cannot  recover  if  his  own 
negligence  contributed  to  the  injury, 
yet  so  instructed  the  jury  that  they 
might  reasonably  believe  that  this 
rule  only  applies  when  the  defendant 
is  not  negligent ;  held,  error  (Balti- 
more, etc.  E.  Co.  v.  Whittaker,  24 
Ohio  St.  642  ;  Dwinnell  v.  Abbott,  74 
Wise.  514  ;  43  N.  W.  496  ;  see  Patter- 
son v.  Philadelphia,  etc.  E.  Co.,  4 
Houst.  103).  As  to  necessity  of  ex- 
plicit instructions  on  this  point,  see 
Hart  v.  Delaware,  etc.  E.  Co.,  67 
Hun,  648  ;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  3  ;  Jung  v. 
Stevens  Point,  74  Wise.  547  ;  43  N. 
W.  513.  An  instruction  that  plain- 
tiff is  entitled  to  recover  for  injuries 
sustained  by  him,  if  caused  solely  by 
defendant's  negligence  and  want  of 
reasonable  care,  sufficiently  implies 
that  plaintiff  must  be  free  from  con- 
tributory negligence  (Hotel  Ass'n  v. 
Walter,  23  Neb.  280  ;  36  N.  W.  561). 


CHAPTER  VII. 


PARTIES  TO  ACTIONS  FOR  NEGLIGENCE. 


§  115.    Persons  directly  or  indirectly 
injured. 

116.  "Who  may  sue  on  breach  of 

contract. 

117.  Liability  for  selling  danger- 

ous goods. 

118.  Private  actions  upon   public 

obligations. 


119.  Reversioners  and  mortageea 

120.  Landlords  and  tenants. 
120a.  Railroads. 

121.  Infants  and  lunatics. 

122.  Who  are  jointly  liable. 

123.  Who  are  not  jointly  liable. 


§  115.  Persons  directly  or  indirectly  injured. — As  a  matter 
of  course,  the  person  directly  injured  by  negligence  is  a  proper 
plaintiff;  but  it  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to  maintain  such  an 
action,  that  the  plaintiff  should  have  been  thus  directly  injured. 
An  indirect  injury  will  suffice  to  give  a  cause  of  action.1  But 
the  injury  must  be  a  proximate  result  of  the  defendant's  fault. 
Thus,  a  master  can  recover  compensation  for  a  tort  which  de- 
prives him  of  the  labor  of  his  servant,2  although  the  servant 
can  recover  separate  damages  for  his  own  personal  loss ;  and  it 
is  upon  this  ground  that  a  parent  can  recover  for  an  injury  to 
his  child.3     So,  at  common  law,  a  husband  can  recover  dam 


1  See  cases  cited  under  §  24a, 
ante. 

3  Hall  v.  Hollander,  4  Barn.  &  Cr. 
660  ;  Martinez  v.  Gerber,  3  Man.  & 
G.  88  ;  3  Scott  N.  R.  386  ;  Gough  v. 
Bryan,  2  Mees.  &  W.  770 ;  Gilbert 
v.  Schwenck,  14  Id.  488  ;  Hodsoll  v. 
Stallebrass,  11  Ad.  &  El.  301  ;  Wood- 
ward v.  Washburn,  3  Denio,  369. 
As  to  the  measure  of  damages  in 
such  actions,  see  §  763,  post.  As  to 
imputing  servant's  negligence  to 
master,  see  §  71,  ante. 

3  AVhite  v.  Xellis,  31  N.  Y.  405  ; 
Kennedy  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  35  Hun,  186  ;  Gilligan  v.  Har- 
lem R.    Co.,   1   E.    D.   Smith,    453; 

[1 


Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly,  31  Pa. 
St.  372  ;  Oakland  R.  Co.  v.  Fielding, 
48  Id.  320  ;  Birmingham  v.  Dorer, 
3  Brewster,  69.  As  the  action  is 
based  upon  the  relation  of  master 
and  servant  which  exists  between 
the  parent  and  child  (Karr  v.  Parks, 
44  Cal.  46 ;  Hoover  v.  Heim,  7 
Watts.  62  ;  Cowden  v.  Wright,  24 
Wend.  429),  the  relation  must  exist 
or  the  action  does  not  lie,  as  where 
the  parent  has  relinquished  his  right 
to  the  child's  services,  or  the  child 
is  so  young  that  his  services  are 
worthless  (Hall  v.  Hollander,  4 
Barn.  &  Cr.  660 ;  compare  Franklin 
v.  Southeastern  R.  Co.,  3  Hurl.  &  N. 
80] 


i8i 


PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§   US 


ages  sustained  by  him  for  the  loss  of  the  services  and  society 
of  his  wife,  caused  by  the  act  of  a  third  person ;  or  an  action 
may  be  maintained  by  both  husband  and  wife  for  her  own 
injuries,4  or  by  the  wife  separately,  in  those  jurisdictions  where 
the  statute  has  changed  the  common  law  in  this  regard.5    And 


211;  Drew  v.  Sixth  Av.  R.  Co.,  26 
N.  Y.  49  ;  Abeles  v.  Bransfield,  19 
Kans.  16).  A  mother  cannot  sue 
for  injuries  to  minor  child  where 
father  was  living  at  the  time  of  the 
injury,  though  he  died  before  action 
brought  (Geraghty  v.  New,  7  N.  Y. 
Misc.  30  ;  27  N.  Y*.  Supp.  403). 

4  Brockbank  v.  Whitehaven,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  7  Hurlst.  &  N.  834  ;  Matteson 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  35  N.  Y. 
487 ;  Mowry  v.  Chaney,  43  Iowa, 
609  ;  Smith  v.  St.  Joseph,  55  Mo.  456  ; 
Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Chester,  57 
Ind.  297  ;  Hopkins  v.  Atlantic,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  36  N.  H.  9.  Where  the  action 
is  in  the  name  of  husband  and  wife 
for  an  injury  to  the  latter,  the  hus- 
band is  but  a  nominal  plaintiff,  and 
the  measure  of  damages  is  the  injury 
sustained  by  the  wife  ;  no  recovery 
can  be  had  for  the  husband's  loss  of 
her  services,  nor  for  his  expenses  of 
her  cure  (Brooks  v.  Schwerin,  54 
N.  Y.  343  ;  Fuller  v.  Naugatuck  R. 
Co.,  2t  Conn.  557  ;  Barnes  v.  Hurd, 
11  Mass.  59 ;  Barnes  v.  Martin,  15 
Wise.  263;  Heirn  v.  McCaughan,  32 
Miss.  17).  See  generally  Whitcomb 
v.  Barre,  37  Vt.  148:  Laughlin  v. 
Eaton,  54  Me.  156 ;  McKinney  v. 
Western  Stage  Co.,  4  Iowa,  420 ; 
Kavanaugh  v.  Janesville,  24  Wise. 
618  ;  Rogers  v.  Smith,  17  Ind.  323  ; 
Fry  v.  Derstler,  2  Yeates,  278  [hus- 
band and  wife  had  voluntarily  sepa- 
rated] ;  Hoard  v.  Peck,  56  Barb.  202 
[defendant  secretly  selling  large 
quantities  of  laudanum  to  plaintiffs 
wife].  Under  the  Louisiana  Code, 
a  suit  for  personal  injuries  and 
wrongs  done  to  a  wife  must  be 
brought  by  her  husband  in  his  own 


name  (Fournet  v.  Morgan's,  etc.  S. 
S.  Co.,  43  La.  Ann.  1202  ;  11  So.  541). 
As  to  actions  for  injuries  causing 
death,  see  post,  §  124,  et  seq.  As  to 
negligence  of  wife  imputed  to  hus- 
band, see  §  67,  ante. 

5  The  wife  must  sue  alone  for  her 
own  damages,  in  states  where  she  is 
given  the  right  to  do  so  (Hennies  v. 
Vogel,  66  111.  401  ;  Michigan,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Coleman,  28  Mich.  440 ;  Tut- 
tle  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  42  Iowa, 
518  ;  Musselman  v.  Galligher,  32  Id. 
383).  In  New  York,  since  L.  1890, 
c.  248,  amending  Co.  Civ.  Proa, 
§  450,  a  husband  is  not  a  necessary 
or  a  proper  party  to  an  action  for 
damages  to  the  person,  estate  or 
character  of  his  wife.  By  L.  1890,  c. 
51,  a  married  woman  is  given  a  right 
of  action  for  injuries  to  her  property, 
person,  etc.,  "in  all  cases  in  which 
an  unmarried  woman  or  a  husband 
now  has  a  right  of  action  by  law." 
This  legislation  supersedes  the  de- 
cision, in  Blaechinska  v.  Howard 
Mission,  etc.  (130  N.  Y.  497 ;  29  N.  E. 
755),  that  a  married  woman  could 
not  recover,  in  an  action  for  personal 
injuries,  consequential  damages  for 
loss  of  wages  received  from  her  hus- 
band as  a  seamstress  in  his  employ. 
As  to  the  right  in  New  York,  before 
1890,  of  a  married  woman  to  sue  in 
her  own  name  for  personal  injuries 
without  joining  her  husband,  see 
Weld  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  68  Hun,  249  ;  22  N.  Y.  Supp. 
974.  In  Connecticut,  under  Gen. 
St.  §  2673,  providing  that  "  any  per- 
son injured  in  person  or  property  by 
means  of  a  defective  road  or  bridge, 
may  recover  damages,"  etc.,  a  hus- 


§  "6] 


PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE. 


a  bailee  can  recover  to  the  consequent  loss  of  his  hire.6  Bu 
a  life  insurance  company  cannot  recover  from  a  railroad  com- 
pany the  amount  voluntarily  paid  by  the  former  upon  the 
death  of  a  person  killed  by  the  negligence  of  the  latter  com- 
pany, since  the  damages  are  too  remote  and  indirect,  even  if 
an  action  for  death,  at  the  suit  of  the  insurer,  would  lie  at  all, 
which  it  would  not.7 

§  116.  Who  may  sue  on  breach  of  contract. —  Negligence 
which   consists  merely  in    the  breach   of  a   contract  will  not 


band  cannot  maintain  an  action 
against  a  city  for  the  loss  of  his 
wife's  services  and  society,  resulting 
from  injuries  to  her  so  caused 
(Lounsbury  v.  Bridgeport,  06  Conn. 
361;  34  Atl.  93).  In  Pennsylvania, 
the  statute  giving  married  women 
control  of  their  property,  and  au- 
thorizing them  to  engage  in  business, 
does  not  authorize  a  woman  to  sue 
for  loss  of  ability  to  do  household 
work  (Walter  v.  Kensinger,  13  Pa. 
Co.  Ct.  222).  In  New  York,  a  mar- 
ried woman  has  such  freedom  of 
control  over  her  own  real  property 
that  her  husband  cannot,  without 
her  consent,  maintain  a  vicious 
domestic  animal  thereon,  and  she  is 
liable  for  injuries  committed  by  such 
animal,  although  it  is  owned  by  the 
husband  (Quilty  v.  Battie,  135  N.  Y. 
201  :  32  N.  E.  47). 

«McGill  v.  Monette,  37  Ala.  49. 
Both  the  bailee  and  general  owner 
of  chattels  may  recover  for  their  in- 
jury or  loss ;  a  recovery  by  one 
barring  a  recovery  by  the  other 
(Woodman  v.  Nottingham,  49  N.  H. 
387  ;  Rindge  v.  Coleraine,  11  Gray. 
157).  But  a  mere  bailee  of  a  chattel 
for  hire  cannot  recover  for  injuries 
to  it  (Buddin  v.  Fortunato,  10  N.  Y. 
Supp.  115  [carriage  left  with  plaintiff 
to  be  painted] ) ,  unless  he  has  un- 
dertaken to  return  it  in  good  condi- 
tion (St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Biggs, 
50  Ark.  169  ;  6  S.  W.  724  [agister  of 


cattle]  ).  Hence,  an  auctioneer,  to 
whom  a  horse  is  entrusted  for  sale, 
cannot  recover  for  defendant's  neg- 
ligent injury  of  the  animal,  he  being 
under  no  liability  therefor  to  the 
owner  (Claridge  v.  South  Stafford- 
shire Tr.  Co.  [1892],  1  Q.  B.  422). 
Two  or  more  tenants  in  common 
may  jointly  maintain  an  action 
against  a  third  tenant  in  common 
for  his  injury  to  the  common  pro- 
perty (Chesley  v.  Thompson,  3 
N.  H  9). 

7  Connecticut  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v. 
New  Haven  R.  Co.,  25  Conn.  265; 
Rockingham  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bosher,  39 
Me.  253.  "Insurers  have  been  per- 
mitted to  recover  against  the  authors 
of  their  losses  .  .  .  not  by  color 
of  their  own  legal  right,  but  under 
.  .  .  the  doctrine  of  subrogation  " 
(perStorrs,  J.,  Connecticut  Mut.  Life 
Ins.  Co.  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co., 
supra).  In  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Huitt  (1  Kans.  App.  788;  41  Pac. 
1051),  an  insurer  who  had  paid  the 
loss  on  property  burned  by  sparks 
from  defendant's  locomotive,  was 
brought  in  as  plaintiff  with  the 
owner,  on  a  separate  prayer  to  be 
subrogated  to  the  rights  of  the 
owner  under  an  agreement  with 
him.  Held,  under  the  Kansas  Code, 
that  the  insurer  was  a  proper  party  ; 
that  there  was  no  misjoinder  of 
causes  of  action,  and  that  a  verdict 
for  plaintiffs  would  not  be  disturbed. 


183 


PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§    "6 


afford  ground  for  an  action  by  any  one,  except  a  party  to  the 
contract,  or  a  person  for  whose  benefit  the  contract  was  avow- 
edly made.1  Therefore,  an  unborn  infant,  injured  by  an  injury 
to  its  mother,  caused  by  negligence  in  her  transportation  by  a 
common  carrier,  cannot,  after  his  birth,  sue  the  carrier.2  But 
where,  in  omitting  to  perform  a  contract,  in  whole  or  in  part, 
one  also  omits  to  use  ordinary  care  to  avoid  injury  to  third 
persons,  who,  as  he  could  with  a  slight  degree  of  care  foresee, 
would  be  exposed  to  risk  by  his  negligence,  he  should  be  held 
liable  to  such  persons  for  injuries  which  are  the  proximate 
result  of  such  omission.3  As  admirably  put  by  Mr.  Horace 
Smith:4  "The  true  question  always  is:  Has  the  defendant 
committed  a  breach  of  duty,  apart  from  contract  ?  If  he  has 
only  committed  a  breach  of  contract,  he  is  liable  to  those  only 
with  whom  he  has  contracted ;  but  if  he  has  committed  a 
breach  of  duty,  he  is  not  protected  by  setting  up  a  contract  in 
respect  of  the  same  matter  with  another  person."  This  prin- 
ciple is  not  stated  positively  in  any  decision  or  judicial  opinion, 
except  the  masterly  opinion  of  Lord  Esher,  in  Heaven  v. 
Pender,5  which   was  not   concurred   in   by  a  majority   of  the 


1  See  Heaven  v.  Pender,  L.  R.  11 
Q.  B.  Div.  503.  Thus,  a  master  can- 
not sue  upon  injuries  suffered  by  the 
servant  from  the  negligence  of  a  car- 
rier of  such  servant  (Alton  v.  Mid- 
land R.  Co.,  19  C.  B.  [N.  S  ]  213  ; 
Fairmount,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stutler,  54 
Pa.  St.  375).  In  Roddy  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  (104  Mo.  234  ;  15  S.  W. 
1112),  the  employee  of  one  with 
whom  defendant  had  contracted  to 
furnish,  on  his  own  side  track, 
properly  equipped,  cars  for  the 
transportation  of  stone,  was  held  not 
entitled  to  recover  for  injuries  re- 
sulting to  him  from  the  defendant's 
failure  to  furnish  cars  with  proper 
brakes,  as  agreed. 

''  Walker  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co., 
28  L.  R.,  Ir.,  69  — Q.  B.  D. 

3  This  is  substantially  the  rule 
which  we  stated  in  our  earlier 
editions,  modified  slightly  to  con- 
form to  the  opinion  of  Brett,  M.  R. 


(now  Lord  Esher),  which  will  be 
presently  quoted.  In  Thomas  v. 
Winchester  (6  N.  Y.  397),  the  dis- 
tinction was  said  to  be  between  acts 
which  were  dangerous  to  human  life, 
and  those  which  were  not.  But  in 
Winterbottom  v.  Wright  (10  Mees.  & ' 
W.  109),  and  George  v.  Skivington 
(L.  R.  5  Exch.  1),  the  rule  will  be 
found  nearly  as  we  have  stated  it 
above.  See  Longmeid  v.  Holliday,  6 
Exch.  761  [selling  a  lamp  unfit  for 
use  by  which  buyer's  wife  was  in- 
jured] ;  Pippin  v.  Sheppard,  11  Price, 
400  [apothecary  liable  for  administer, 
ing  improper  medicines  to  one  other 
than  the  party  contracting  with 
him]  ;  Dixon  v.  Bell,  5  Maule  &  Sel. 
198. 

4  Negligence,  Am.  ed.  10. 

6L.  R.  11  Q.  B.  Div.  503;  given 
fully  in  Smith,  12-17.  The  material 
part  of  this  opinion  is  as  follows : 
"  Plaintiff  was  a  workman  in  the  em- 


§  "6] 


1' ARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE. 


184 


court;  but  their  dissent  turned  rather  on  the  particular 
language  used  than  on  the  precise  principle  involved.  In  any 
event,  we  think  that  it  is  sound,  and  must  be  finally  accepted 


ploy  of  Gray,  a  ship-painter.     Gray 
entered  into  a  contract  with  a  ship- 
owner,  whose  ship   was   in  the  de- 
fendant's dock,  to  paint  the  outside 
of    the    ship.     The    defendant,    the 
dock-owner,  supplied,  under  a  con- 
tract with  the  ship  owner,  an  ordi- 
nary   stage,    to    be     slung    in     the 
ordinary  way  outside  of  the  ship  for 
the    purpose    of    painting    her.      It 
must  have  been  known  to  the  de- 
fendant's servants,  if  they  had  con- 
sidered the  matter  at  all,  that  the 
stage  would  be  put  to  immediate  use, 
that  it  would  not  be  used  by  the  ship- 
owner, but  would  be  used  by  such  a 
person  as  the  plaintiff,  a  working 
ship-painter.     The   ropes   by   which 
the  stage  was  slung,  and  which  were 
supplied  as  part  of  the  instrument 
by  the  defendant,  had  been  scorched 
and  were  unfit  for  use,   and  were 
supplied  without  a  reasonable  careful 
attention  to  their  condition.     When 
the  plaintiff  began  to  use  the  stage, 
the  ropes  broke,  the  stage  fell,  and 
the  plaintiff  was  injured.     The  court 
below  held  that  the  plaintiff  could 
not  recover.     .     .     .     The  questions 
which  we  have  to  solve  in  this  case 
are,  what  is  the  proper  definition  of 
the  relation  of  two  persons,   other 
than  the  relation  established  by  con- 
tract or  fraud,  which  imposes  on  the 
one  of  them  a    duty  towards    the 
other  to  observe,  with  regard  to  the 
person   or  property  of  such  other, 
such  ordinary  care  or  skill  as  may  be 
necessary  to  prevent  injury  to  his 
person  or  property  ;  and  whether  the 
present  case  falls  within  such  defini- 
tion.    When    two    drivers    or    two 
ships  are  approaching  each    other, 
Buch  a  relation  arises  between  them 


when    they    are    approaching    each 
other  in  such  a  manner  that,  unless 
they   use  ordinary   care  and  skill  to 
avoid  it,  there  will  be  danger  of  an 
injurious    collision    between     them. 
This  relation  is  established  in  such 
circumstances    between    them,    not 
only  if  it  be  proved  that  they  actually 
know  and  think  of  this  danger,  but 
whether  such  proof  be  made  or  not. 
It  is  established,  it  seems  to  me,  be- 
cause any  one    of    ordinary   sense, 
who  did  think,  would  at  once  recog- 
nize that  if  he  did  not  use  ordinary 
care  and  skill  under  such  circum- 
stances there  would  be  such  danger. 
And  every  one  ought,   by  the  uni- 
versally   recognized   rules    of  right 
and  wrong,  to  think  so  much  with 
regard  to  the  safety  of  others  who 
might  be  jeopardized  by  his  conduct ; 
and  if,  being  in  such  circumstances, 
he  does  not    think,    and    in  conse- 
quence neglects,  or  if  he  neglects  to 
use  ordinary  care  and  skill  and  in- 
jury ensues,    the  law,    which  takes 
cognizance  of  and  enforces  the  rules 
of  right  and  wrong,  will  force  him 
to  give  an  indemnity  for  the  injury. 
.     .     .     The  proposition  which  these 
recognized  cases  suggest,  and  which 
is   therefore    to   be    deduced     from 
them,  is  that  whenever  one  person  is 
by   circumstances   placed  in  such  a 
position  with  regard  to  another  that 
every  one  of  ordinary  sense  who  did 
think  would  at  once  recognize  that, 
if  he  did  not  use  ordinary  care  and 
skill  in  his  own  conduct  with  regard 
to    those    circumstances,   he   would 
cause  danger  of  injury  to  the  person 
or    property    of  the   other,    a  duty 
arises  to  use  ordinary  care  and  skill 
to  avoid  such  injury." 


1 85  PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE.  [§  117 

everywhere.      It    has    been    applied    in    New   Jersey6    and 
Virginia.7 

§  117.  Liability  for  selling  dangerous  goods. —  Applying 
this  principle,  most  of  the  adjudged  cases  fall  easily  into  line. 
Where  a  defective  article  is  sold,  with  a  warning  to  the  buyer 
that  it  is  dangerous,  the  seller  is  not  liable  to  a  third  person; 
because  it  is  the  fault  of  the  buyer  in  using  it,  not  of  the 
seller  in  selling  it,  which  is  the  proximate  cause  of  the  stran- 
ger's injury.1  Dangerous  things  may  lawfully  be  made  and 
kept,  if  they  are  kept  in  places  where  it  is  not  reasonable  to 
expect  that  any  one  can  be  injured  by  them ;  and  therefore 
the  seller's  responsibility  ends,  when  he  has  parted  with  them 
to  a  person  who  knows  as  much  about  them  as  he  does.2 
Searchers  of  public  records,  whether  public  officials  or  not,  do 
not  owe  any  general  duty  to  the  public  to  leave  no  erroneous 
certificates  of  search  lying  about ;  and,  therefore,  they  are  not 
liable  to  any  one  for  errors  in  searching,  except  the  persons 
who  directly  employ  them.3  But  one  who  knowingly  sells  an 
article  intrinsically  dangerous  to  human  life  or  health,  such  as 
poison,  explosive  oils  or  diseased  meat,  concealing  from    the 

6  In  Lechman  v.  Hooper  (52  N.  J.  See,  also,  Kellny  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Law,  253;  19  Atl.  215),  plaintiff's  Co.,  101  Mo.  67;  13  S.  W.  806. 
employer  and  the  defendant  con-  ]  So  held,  as  to  a  wheel,  liable  to 
tracted  for  separate  parts  of  a  build-  burst  at  anytime  (Loop  v.  Litchfield, 
ing,  the  latter  to  build  a  wall.  The  42  N.  Y.  351) ;  and  as  to  poison 
plaintiff,  while  at  work  on  the  build-  (Wohlfhart  v.  Beckert,  92  N.  Y.  490  ; 
ing,  was  injured  by  the  fall  of  the  Norton  v.  Sewall,  106  Mass.  143 :  and 
wall,  of  the  insecure  condition  of  as  to  gunpowder  (Abrahams  v.  Cali- 
which  he  had  no  notice.  Held,  the  fornia  Powder  Co.,  5  N.  Mex.  479  ;  23 
defendant  was  liable.  Pac.  785).     See  Glenn  v.  Winters,  17 

7  In  Johnson  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Misc.  597  ;  40  N.  Y.  Supp.  659  [unsafe 
Co.  (86  Va.  975  ;  11  S.  E.  829),  a  rail-  coach]. 

road    company  had  promised  dece-  2  A  manufacturer  of  fireworks  is 

dent's  employer,  with  whom  it  had  not  liable  for  damages  resulting  from 

contracted  to  straighten  its  line,  that  the  negligent  use  thereof  by  a  third 

its  trains  would  not  pass  the  scene  of  person  (Wyllie  v.  Palmer,  137  N.  Y. 

the  work   faster  than  six   miles  an  248 ;  33  N.  E.  381). 

hour.     Held,  that   plaintiff  was  en-  3  Savings  Bank  v.  Ward,  100  U.  S. 

titled  to  have  the  jury  charged  that  195  ;  Houseman  v.  Girard,  etc.  Asso. 

if  they  believed  such   promise  was  81  Pa.  St.  256  ;  Day  v.  Reynolds,  23 

made,  and  that  decedent's  death  was  Hun,  131  ;  see  Kahl  v.  Lene,  37  N.  J. 

caused  by  its  violation,  without  his  Law,  5;   and  §§  590,  616,  post. 
fault,  they  should  find  for  plaintiff. 


§  "8] 


PARTIES   TO    ACTION'S    FOR   NEGLIGENCE. 


1 86 


buyer  knowledge  of  that  fact,  is  responsible  to  any  person 
who,  without  fault  on  the  part  of  himself  or  any  other.person, 
sufficient  to  break  the  chain  of  causation,  is  injured  thereby.4 
And  we  see  no  reason  why  the  same  rule  should  not  apply  to 
articles  known  to  be  dangerous  to  property. 

g  118.  Private  actions  upon  public  obligations.  — As  any 
person  for  whose  benefit  a  contract  was  expressly  made  can 
sue  for  a  breach  thereof,  although  not  himself  a  party  to  the 
contract,1  it  follows  that  when  a  contract  is  made  with  the 
state2  or  a  municipality3  expressly  for  the  benefit  of  a  class  of 
persons,  any  one  of  that  class,  specially  injured  by  a  breach  of 
the    contract,    may    sue    thereon.      So,    if  a    specific    duty    is 


4  Wellington  v.   Downer  Oil  Co., 
104  Mass.  64  ;  Hourigan  v.  Nowell, 
110  Id.  470  ;  Elkins  v.  McKean,  79 
Pa.  St.  493.     In  Losee  v.  Clute  (51 
N.  Y.  494),  the  Commission  of  Ap- 
peals refused  to  apply  this  rule  to 
the  sale  of  a  defective  steam-boiler. 
But  we  agree  with  Judge  Thompson 
(Negl.  233),  that  this  decision  cannot 
be  sustained  on  this  ground,  if  on 
any.      The  Commission's   decisions, 
it  may  be  well  to  mention,  are  not 
as  binding  as  those  of  the  regular 
Court  of  Appeals.     The  rule  of  the 
text    has  been  constantly  affirmed 
(Blood  Balm  Co.  v.  Cooper,  83  Ga. 
457;  10  S.  E.  118  [patent  medicine]  ; 
Schubert  v.  Clark  Co.,  49  Minn.  331 ; 
51  N.   W.    1103   [ladder];    Craft  v. 
Parker,  96  Mich.  245  ;  55  N.  W.  812 
[spoiled  meat] ;  Lewis  v.  Terry,  111 
Cal.  39  ;    43  Pac.  398).      It  must  be 
shown  that  the  article  was  danger- 
ous (Heizer  v.  Kingsland,  etc.  M'f'g 
Co.,  1 10  Mo.  605  ;  19  S.  W.  630).     See 
Hattermann  v.  Siemann,    1    N.    Y. 
App.  Div.  486;  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  405 
[bailment    of     infected     clothing] ; 
Akers  v.  Overbeck,  18  Misc.  198  ;  41 
N.  Y.  Supp.  382  [bailor's  knowledge 
of  defect  essential]. 

»  Lawrence  v.   Fox,  20  N.  Y.  268  ; 
Burr  v.  Beers,  24  Id.  178. 


3  Robinson  v.  Chamberlain,  34  N. 
Y.  389  ;  Fulton  Ins.  Co.  v.  Baldwin, 
37  Id.  648;  Weet  v.  Brockport,  16 
Id.  161,  note;  Lyme  Regis  v.  Hen- 
ley, 1  Bing.  N.  C.  222  ;  Jones  v.  New 
Haven,  34  Conn.  1  ;  "Weightman  v. 
Washington,  1  Black,  39  ;  Phillips  v. 
Commonwealth,  44  Pa.  St.  197  ;  Saw- 
yer v.  Corse,  17  Gratt.  230.  The  cases 
of  Fish  v.  Dodge  (38  Barb.  163),  and 
Minard  v.  Mead  (Id.  174,  n.)  are  over- 
ruled. 

3McMahon  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co., 
75  N.  Y.  231  ;  Marvin  Safe  Co.  v. 
Ward,  46  N.  J.  Law,  19.  A  water 
company  contracted  to  supply  a  city 
with  water.  Failing  to  do  so,  the 
city  was  unable  to  extinguish  a  fire. 
Held,  the  company  was  not  liable  to 
a  citizen  who  suffered  damages  by 
the  fire  (Nickerson  v.  Bridgeport 
Hydraulic  Co.,  46  Conn.  24;  Davis 
v.  Clinton  Water  Works,  54  Iowa, 
59)  ;  Britton  v.  Green  Bay  Water 
Co.,  81  Wise.  48 ;  51  N.  W.  84  ;  s.  P., 
Water  Co.  v.  Duncan,  Ky.  ;  32 
S.  W.  478.  But  see  Lampert  v. 
Laclede  Gas  Co.  (14  Mo.  App.  376), 
where  a  gas  company  was  held 
liable  to  a  private  action  for  a  breach 
of  contract  with  the  city,  to  keep  its 
lamp-posts  and  lamps  in  repair.  See 
§§  280,  et  seq.  post. 


187 


PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§   119 


imposed  upon  any  person  by  law,  or  by  a  legal  authority,  an 
action  may  be  sustained  against  him  by  any  person  who  is 
specially  injured  by  his  failure  to  perform  that  duty.4  Both 
classes  of  actions  are  regarded  as  actions  in  tort  for  negligence  ; 
although  the  former  class  would  seem  to  be  technically  founded 
on  contract. 

§119.  Reversioners  and  mortgagees.— One  who  has  a 
fixed  reversionary  interest  in  property,  whether  real  or  personal,1 
has  a  right  to  sue  immediately  for  any  injury  to  such  property, 
which  will  depreciate  its  value  when  it  comes  into  his  hands;2 
and  is  entitled  to  recover  damages  to  the  extent  of  such  prob- 
able depreciations.3  Nor  is  it  any  bar  to  his  recovery,  that  the 
injury  of  which  he  complains  is  one  which  may  possibly  cease 
before  he  comes  into  possession,  if  it  is  in  its  nature  perma- 
nent, and  will  probably  continue,  in  the  absence  of  some 
affirmative  action.4  A  mere  trespass,  however,  having  no  per- 
manent effect  upon  the  property,  constitutes  no  cause  of  action 
in  favor  of  a  reversioner,  even  though  committed  for  the  pur- 


4  Adsit  v.  Brady,  4  Hill,  630  ;  Clay- 
burgh  v.  Chicago,  25  111.  440  ;  Wen- 
dell v.  Troy,  39  Barb.  329  ;  affi'd  4 
Abb.  Ct.  App.  563;  see  Robinson  v. 
Chamberlain,  supra.  Compare,  how- 
ever, Fuchs  v.  Schmidt,  8  Daly,  317; 
Heintze  v.  New  York,  50  N.  Y.  Su- 
perior, 295. 

1  Hawkins  v.  Phythian,  8  B.  Monr. 
515. 

5  Jesser  v.  Gifford,  4  Burr.  2141 ; 
Tomlinson  v.  Brown,  Sayer,  215. 
Building  an  adjoining  house  so  that 
the  rain  drips  upon  the  reversioner's 
land,  is  a  permanent  injury  within 
this  rule  (Tucker  v.  Newman,  11  Ad. 
&  El.  40).  So  is  an  excavation, 
causing  a  falling  of  the  soil  (Raine 
v.  Alderson,  4  Bing.  N.  C.  702 ;  6 
Scott,  691).  So  as  to  permanent 
overflow  of  land  (Kankakee,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Horan,  131  111.  288;  23  N.  E. 
621).  As  to  a  reversioner's  right  of 
action  against  an  elevated  railroad 
company  for  an  infringement  of  the 
appurtenant  easements  of  abutting 


land,  during  the  existence  of  a  pre- 
ceding life  estate,  see  Thompson  v. 
Manhattan  R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  360; 
29  N.  E.  264. 

3  Cases  cited  in  last  note.  One  in 
possession  of  land  under  a  contract 
to  purchase  is  considered  the  equit- 
able owner,  and  may  recover  dam- 
ages against  one  who  negligently 
sets  fire  to  woods  and  fences  (Rood 
v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co.,  18  Barb.  80 ; 
Hays  v.  Miller,  6  Hun,  320). 

4  Thus,  in  an  action  by  a  rever- 
sioner for  the  obstruction  of  ancient 
lights,  it  was  objected  that  the  ob- 
struction might  be  removed,  either 
by  the  voluntary  act  of  the  defend- 
ant, or  by  process  of  law,  before  the 
reversioner  came  into  possession. 
But  this  objection  was  overruled 
(Jesser  v.  Gifford,  4  Burr.  2141  ; 
Tomlinson  v.  Brown,  Sayer,  215). 
To  same  effect  see  (per  Tenterden, 
C.  J.)  Shadwell  v.  Hutchinson,  4 
Carr.  &  P.  333  ;  Moo.  &  M.  350. 


§  1 20]  PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE.  1 88    I 

pose  of  claiming  title,5  much  less  where  there  was  no  such  ' 
intention,  as  in  a  case  of  mere  negligence  there  could  not  be. 
Nor  does  the  continuous  repetition  of  an  injury  make  it  per- 
manent, within  the  meaning  of  this  rule.  Its  continuance, 
however  probable,  cannot  afford  a  present  cause  of  action  to 
the  reversioner,  if  it  depends  upon  the  affirmative  exercise  of 
human  volition.6  But  though  a  mortgagee  may  sue  for  trespass7 
upon  conversion8  of  the  mortgaged  property,  he  cannot  main- 
tain an  action  for  a  merely  negligent  injury  to  the  mortgaged 
premises,  even  though  he  has  thereby  lost  his  security.9  The 
owner  of  the  reversion,  even  after  he  enters  into  possession,  is  ' 
not  responsible  to  strangers  for  defects  in  the  condition  of  the  ; 
premises,  existing  when  he  took  possession,  if  he  had  no  notice 
thereof,  or  was  not  negligent  in  omitting  to  repair.  The  neg- 
ligence of  the  former  tenant  in  possession  will  not  be  imputed 
to  him.10     Much  less  is  he  liable  before  he  takes  possession.11 

§  120.  Landlords  and  tenants. — Where  injury  results  from 
the  negligence  of  a  landlord,  either  in  constructing  or  uphold- 
ing the  property,  he  is  responsible;  but  he  is  not,  in  general, 
responsible  for  the  negligence  of  his  tenant  in  the  use  of  it. 
If  an  injury  results  from  the  negligence  of  the  tenant,  in  any 

6  Thus,  a  landlord  cannot  maintain  '  Earle  v.  Hall,  2  Mete.  353  ;  Page 

an  action  for  a  mere  entry  upon  his  v.  Robinson,  10  Cush.  99  ;  Sanders  v. 

tenant's  land,  if  no  injury  is  done  to  Reed,  12  N.  H.  558. 

the  land    itself;    even    though   the  8BeUune  v.  Wallace,  2  Rich.  Law, 

entry  was  made  for  the  purpose  of  80  ;  Burton  v.  Tannehill,   6  Blackf . 

claiming  title  (Baxter  v.  Taylor,    4  470.     See  Coles  v.  Clark,  3  Cush.  399; 

Barn.   &  Ad.    72).      An  apparently  White  v.  Webb,  15  Conn.  302. 

opposing  opinion  of  Tenterden,  C.  J.,  'Gardner  v.  Heartt,  3  Denio,  232. 

in  Young  v.  Spencer  (10  Barn.  &  Cr.  But  see  Lane  v.  Hitchcock,  14  Johns. 

152),  has  been  restricted  in  its  effect  213. 

to  the  mutual  relations  of  landlord  10Ahern  v.  Steele,  115  N.  Y.  203  ; 

and  tenant  (Baxter  v.  Taylor,  4  Barn.  22  N.  E.  193.     So  held,   where  the 

&  Ad.  72,  Mumford  v.  Oxford,  etc.  defendant  had   purchased  the  land 

R.  Co.,  1  Hurlst.  &  N.  34).  shortly  before  the  plaintiff's  injury, 

*  Thus,  the  nuisance  of  perpetual  which  arose  from  a  defective  cellar- 
hammering  in  a  railway  company's  cover,  which  it  was  the  tenant's  duty 
workshop,  although  morally  certain  to  repair,  and  of  which  the  defend- 
to  continue,  affords  no  ground  for  ant  had  no  notice  (Woram  v.  Noble, 
an  action  by  the  landlord  of  adjoin-  41  Hun,  398). 

ing  leased  land  for  the  injury  to  his  "  Eisenbrey  v.  Pennsylvania  Co., 

reversion  (Mumford  v.  Oxford,  etc.  141  Pa.  St.  566  ;  21  Atl.  639. 
R.  Co.,  1  Hurlst.  &  N.  34). 


189  FARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE.  [§    120 

manner,  the  tenant  is  liable.  But  both  the  landlord  and  the 
tenant  may  be  liable  for  the  same  injury:  the  former  for 
negligent  construction,  and  the  latter  for  negligent  use  of  the 
premises.1  The  landlord  is,  of  course,  answerable  for  nui- 
sances existing  on  the  premises  when  he  made  the  lease;2  and 
of  which  he  has  had  notice;3  but  he  is  not  answerable  for  a 
nuisance  erected  afterward  on  the  premises  by  his  tenant,  un- 
less he  subsequently  renews  the  lease  with  knowledge  of  the 
nuisance.4  The  landlord  is  not  responsible  for  a  nuisance  which 
existed  on  the  land,  when  he  first  acquired  the  right  of 
possession,  until  he  has  notice  thereof.5  Nor,  in  the  absence 
of  a  covenant  in  the  lease,6  is  he  liable  for  the  consequences  of 
natural  decay  of  the  premises, —  as  where  fences  are  suffered 
by  the  tenant  to  fall  into  decay,  whereby  a  stranger's  cattle 
stray  and  are  injured.7  If  the  owner  of  land  constructs  a 
nuisance  (e.  g.,  an  excavation  underneath  the  sidewalk  con- 
necting with  his  premises),  he  must,  at  his  peril,  notwithstand- 
ing a  demise  of  the  premises,  keep  it  in  such  a  condition  as 
that  the  safety  of  travelers  shall  not  be  impaired  by  its  being 
there.  And  the  tenant  of  the  premises,  if  he  uses  and  enjoys 
the  benefit  of  them,  is  bound  to  the  same  vigilance.  Therefore, 
where  one  is  injured  by  falling  into  a  coal  hole  underneath  the 

'Per    Woodruff,     J.,     Eakin    v.  but  not  otherwise   (Ahern  v.  Steele, 

Brown,  1  E.  D.  Smith,  44.     See  Ir-  115  N.    Y.   203  ;  overruling  Rex  v. 

vine  v.  Wood,  51  N.  Y.  224  ;  Swords  Pedly,  1   Ad.  &  E.  827).  See  Gandy 

v.  Edgar,  59  Id.  34  ;  Folsom  v.  Lewis,  v.  Jubber,  5  Best  &  S.   78,   48.".  ;  re- 

85  Ga.  146  ;  11  S.  E.  606  ;  Gordon  v.  versed,  9  Id.  15  ;  Owings  v.  Jones,  9 

Peltzer,  56  Mo.  App.  599  ;  Weymouth  Md.  108.     In  Jessen  v.    Sweigert  (66 

v.  New  Orleans,  40  La.  Ann.  344  ;  4  Cal.   182) ,  a  landlord  was  held  re- 

So.  218  [grantee  of  franchise  of  pub-  sponsible  for    an   insecure    awning 

lie  market].  which  he  "  suffered  "  the  tenant  to 

2  Rosewell  v.    Prior,  12  Mod.  635  ;  put  up. 

1   Ld.    Raym.     713  ;     Congreve    v.  5  Ahern  v.  Steele,  supra. 

Smith,  18  N.  Y.  79,  84;  Clifford  v.  6  Payne  v.  Rogers,  2  H.  Blacks.  350. 

Dam,  81  Id.  52  ;  Swords  v.  Edgar,  59  '  Cheetham  v.    Hampson,  4  T.  R. 

LI  :',4  ;  Clancy  v.   Byrne,  56  Id.  129 ;  318;    Coupland   v.    Hardingham,  3 

Davenport  v.    Ruckman,  37  N.  Y.  Campb.   398 ;    Daniels  v.    Potter,   4 

568  :  Fish   v.   Dodge,  4  Denio,   312  ;  Carr.  &  P.  260  ;  Staple  v.  Spring,  10 

Amlerson  v.  Dickie,  26  How.  Pr.  105.  Mass.    74.     The    lessee's  liability   is 

t  otherwise  (Ahern  v.  Steele,  not  affected  by  the  fact  that  he  had 

115 N.  Y.  203;  22  N.  E.  193).  not  convenanted    to    make  repairs 

4  Then  he  is  (Sandford  v.    Clarke,  (Timlin  v.  Standard  Oil  Co.,  54  Hun, 

L.  R.  21  Q.  B.  Div.  398  [coal  hole]);  44  ;  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  158). 


§    UOa]         PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS    FOR   NEGLIGENCE.  190 

sidewalk  in  front  of  the  premises,  by  reason  of  the  cover  being 
left  unfastened,  he  has  his  remedy  against  the  owner  and  the 
tenant  jointly.8  So  where  the  lease  reserved  to  the  lessor  the 
right  to  use  as  much  of  the  premises  as  his  business  might 
require,  it  was  held  that  the  lessor  was  liable,  jointly  with  the 
lessee,  for  injuries  to  the  plaintiff  resulting  from  their  non- 
repair, both  being  in  its  joint  possession.9  But  where,  during 
the  term,  the  tenant  has  surrendered  exclusive  possession 
to  the  landlord,  for  a  brief  period,  for  the  purpose  of  repairing, 
the  landlord  is  solely  responsible  for  the  consequences  of  a 
negligent  maintenance  of  the  premises  during  the  interim  ;  his 
possession,  irrespective  of  ownership,  being  the  ground  of  his 
liability.10  The  tenant  of  part  of  a  building,  not  personally  in 
fault,  is  not  liable  to  a  tenant  of  another  portion  of  the  same 
building  for  damages  resulting  from  the  defective  construc- 
tion of  the  demised  premises,  or  from  the  insufficiency  of  a 
fixture  therein.11 

§  I20a.   Railroads. —  Railroad  franchises,  and  property  ac- 
quired thereunder,  inasmuch  as  they  are  largely  intended  for 

8  Irvine  v.    Fowler  and  Wood,  5  Standard  Oil  Co.,  54  Hun,  44  ;  7  N. 

Eobertson,  482  ;  4  Id.    138  ;  affi'd   51  Y.  Supp.  158  [ruinous  wall]). 

N.  Y.  224  ;  Timlin  v.    Standard  Oil  9  Cannavan   v.    Conklin,    1    Daly, 

Co.,  54  Hun,  44  ;  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  158  509. 

[fall  of  demised  building].  The  10  Leslie  v.  Pound,  4  Taunt.  649 
landlord's  liability  was  affirmed  in  [uncovered  cellar- way  opening  on 
Calder  v.  Smalley,  66  Iowa,  219.  highway].  In  Oxford  v.  Leathe, 
One  who  comes  into  possession  of  (165  Mass.  254  ;  43  N.  E.  92),  the  lease 
premises,  attached  to  which  there  of  a  building  for  public  exhibition 
is  an  excavation  encroaching  upon  purposes  provided  that  the  lessor 
the  highway,  may  be  regarded  as  so  should  take  charge  of  the  box  office 
sanctioning  it  as  to  be  liable  for  an  each  night  until  the  nightly  rental 
injury  sustained  by  a  passer-by  in  was  paid.  Held,  that  lessor  wns 
consequence  of  it  (Davenport  v.  liable  to  one  who,  waiting  outside 
Ruckman,  10  Bosw.  20  ;  affi'd  37  N.  for  the  doors  to  open,  was  injured 
Y.  568).  To  hold  a  lessee  liable  for  by  a  structural  defect  in  the  build- 
injuries  due  to  an  original  structural  ing. 

defect,  he  must   be  shown  to   have  n  Eakin  v.  Brown,  1    E.  D.  Smith, 

had  notice  or  knowledge  of  the  de-  36.     Owner  of  house  not   liable  for 

feet  (Silver  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  unauthorized    and    improper  throw- 

101    Mo.    79  ;  13  S.  W.    410  [bridge  ing  down   by  a   third    person   of  a 

piers  not  built  according  to  statutory  chimney   securely   built    (Scullin   v. 

requirements]  )■  Actual  notice,  how-  Dolan,  4  Daly,  163  ;  compare  Gray  v. 

ever  acquired,   is  enough  (Timlin  v.  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  114  Mass.  149). 


I9I 


PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE.         [§    I20a 


the  benefit  of  the  public,  stand  on  a  different  footing  from 
private  property,  in  respect  to  the  continuing  liability  of  the 
owner  for  their  proper  condition  and  management,  notwith- 
standing their  alienation.  The  principle  is  settled,  that  a  rail- 
road company  cannot  escape  the  performance  of  any  duty 
imposed  by  the  laws  of  its  incorporation,  or  the  general  laws 
of  the  state,  by  voluntarily  surrendering  its  franchises  and 
property  to  another,  by  lease,  mortgage  or  otherwise,  without 
the  consent  of  the  legislature.1  And  notwithstanding  the 
state's  consent  to  such  alienation,  the  company  will  still  con- 
tinue to  be  liable  for  injuries  to  third  persons,  by  reason  of  its 
failure  to  comply  with  a  statutory  requirement,  as  to  the  con- 
struction of  its  road,  such  as  fencing  its  track,  or  placing 
suitable  cattle  guards  at  proper  places.2  But  for  injuries  sus- 
tained in  the  operation  of  the  road  by  the  lessee,  over  which 
the  lessor  has  no  control,  the  lessee  is  solely  liable,3  unless  the 
lease  was  unauthorized,  in  which  case  both  lessor  and  lessee 
are  liable;4  the  latter,  his  servants  and  employees,  being 
regarded  as  the  servants  and  agents  of  the  former.  But  no 
such  relation  of  agency  exists  between  the  owner  of  a  railroad 


1  Thomas  v.  Railroad,  101  U.  S.  71  ; 
Railroad  Company  v.  Brown,  17 
Wall.  445  ;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  118  U.  S.  309  ; 
6  S.  Ct.  1094 ;  Feital  v.  Middlesex  R. 
Co.,  109  Mass.  398 ;  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  86  N.  Y.  107 ; 
Woodruff  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  25  Hun, 
246  ;  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunbar,  20 
111.  623  [loss  of  goods]  ;  Transporta- 
tion Co.  v.  Ullman,  89  Id.  244 ;  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.  v.  Morris,  68  Tex.  50  ;  3 
S.  W.  457  [lessee  refused  facilities 
for  shipping  goods ;  lessor  liable]  ; 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hambleton,  40  Ohio 
St.  496  [changing  grade  of  city 
street]  ;  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Chas- 
teen,  88  Ala.  591  ;  7  So.  94  ;  Acker  v. 
Alexandria,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84  Va.  648; 
5  S.  E.  688  ;  Ricketts  v.  Chesapeake, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  33  W.  Va.  433  ;  10  S.  E. 
801  [injury  to  passenger].  The  prin- 
ciple, of  course,  applies  to  other  pub- 
He  companies  (Quill  v.  Empire  State 


Tel.  Co.,  92  Hun,  545  ;  35  N.  Y.  Supp. 
470  [telegraph-pole  in  highway]. 

2  Arrowsmith  v.  Nashville,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  57  Fed.  165  [lessor  not  liable  to 
passenger]  ;  Hayes  v.  Northern  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  20  C.  C.'a.  52  ;  74  Fed.  279 
[lessor  not  liable  to  lessee's  em- 
ployee] ;  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
ris, 68  Tex.  50  ;  3  S.  W.  457  [refusal 
of  facilities  for  shipping  freight]  ; 
International,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Eckford, 
71  Tex.  274  8  S.  W.  679  [injury  to 
passenger]  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Curl,  28  Kans.  622  [track  without 
cattle  guards] ;  Whitney  v.  Atlantic, 
etc.  R.  Co.  44  Me.  362  [lack  of 
fence] ;  Fontaine  v.  Southern  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  54  Cal.  645  [same]  ;  and 
cases  cited  under  §  445,  post. 

3  See  §413,  post. 

4  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Ellett,  132 
111.  G54  ;  24  N.  E.  559  [collision  at 
highway  crossing].  See  cases  cited 
under  §  413,  pout. 


§  121] 


PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE. 


I92 


and  an  appointee  of  the  court,  under  whose  exclusive5  direc- 
tion the  property  is  operated.  In  such  case,  the  owning 
company  is  not,  in  general,  liable  for  the  negligence  of  the 
court's  officer  or  his  employees.6 

§  121.  Infants  and  lunatics.  —  Infants1  and  lunatics,2  with- 
out regard  to  their  degree  of  incapacity,3  are  liable,  in  a  civil 
action,  for  the  damage  caused  by  such  acts  of  theirs  as  would, 
in  sane  adults,  amount  to  a  tort,  of  either  willful  wrong4  or 
culpable  negligence.5     This  liability  rests,  not  upon  the  usual 


5  A  railroad  company  may  be 
liable  as  a  carrier,  notwithstanding 
the  appointment  of  trustees  for  it, 
where  the  road  is  not  in  their  exclu- 
sive possession  and  control,  to  the 
exclusion  of  the  officers  and  em- 
ployees of  the  company  (Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  155  U.  S.  333  ; 
15  S.  Ct.  136).  The  fact  that  the 
road  was  operated  at  the  time  of 
the  injury,  by  trustees  named  in  the 
company's  mortgage,  is  no  defense, 
where  they  were  not  acting  under 
the  order  of  any  court  ("Wisconsin 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Ross,  142  111.  9  ;  31  N. 
E.  412  ;  Lockhart  v.  Little  Rock,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  40  Fed.  631). 

6Metz  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58 
N.  Y.  61  [assignee  in  bankruptcy]  ; 
In  Kain  v.  Smith  (80  N.  Y.  458  ;  rev'g 
11  Hun,  552),  defendant  assumed 
management  of  property  in  addition 
to  that  of  which  he  was  appointed 
receiver.  Held,  he  was  personally 
liable  for  its  mismanagement.  To 
same  effect  Turner  v.  Hannibal,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  74  Mo.  602  :  Brockert  v.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co  ,  82  Iowa,  369  ;  47  N.  W. 
1026  ;  Howe  v.  St.  Clair,  8  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  101  ;  27  S.  W.  800  ;  and  other 
cases  cited  in  Thompson  on  Corpora- 
tions, §§  6366,  7128,  7148. 

1  Campbell  v.  Stakes,  2  Wend.  139  ; 
Bullock  v.  Babcock,  3  Id.  391 
["  willful  "  injury]  ;  Green  v.  Burke, 
23  Id.  490  ;  Wallace  v.  Moras.  5  Hill, 
391 ;  Conklin  v.  Thompson.  29  Barb. 


218  [boy  of  fourteen  throwing  squib] ; 
Fish  v.  Ferris,  5  Duer,  49  [overdriv- 
ing horse]  ;  Walley  v.  Holt,  35  Law 
Times,  631  [same] ;  Burnard  v.  Hag- 
gis, 14  C.  B.  N.  S.  45  [same];  Huchting 
v.  Engel,  17  Wise.  230  [child  under 
seven  trespassing] ;  Neal  v.  Gillett, 
23  Conn.  437  [negligence].  An  infant 
as  the  owner  or  occupant  of  lands  ia 
under  the  same  responsibility  as  any 
other  person  for  a  nuisance  or  for 
the  negligent  use  or  management  of 
the  property,  although  he  may  have 
a  general  guardian  (McCabe  v. 
O'Connor,  4N.  Y.  App.  Div.  354  ;  38 
N.   Y.  Supp.   572  [dangerous  wall]). 

2  Williams  v.  Hays,  143  N.  Y.  442  ; 
38  N.  E.  449  [negligent  order  of  ship- 
master] ;  Morse  v.  Crawford,  17  Vt. 
499  [killing  ox]  ;  Morain  v.  Devlin, 
132  Mass.  88  [nuisance] ;  Cross  v. 
Kent,  32  Md.  581  [burning  barn] ; 
Brown  v.  Howe,  9  Gray,  84  [burn- 
ing house]  ;  Beals  v.  See,  10  Pa. 
St.  56  ;  Krom  v.  Schoonmaker,  3 
Barb.  647  [false  imprisonment]  ;  see 
Williams  v.  Cameron,  26  Id.  172; 
Weaver  v.  Wood,  Hobart,  134. 

3  Neal  v.  Gillett,  23  Conn.  437; 
Huchting  v.  Engel,  17  Wise.  230 
[child  under  seven] ;  overruling  the 
opinion  expressed  in  Wharton,  Negl. 
§88. 

4  Most  of  the  cases  cited  belong  to 
this  category. 

6  Williams  v.  Hays,  143  N.  Y.  442  ; 
38  N.  E.  449,  quoting  with  approval 


193 


PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS    FOR   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§   I22 


principle  of  personal  fault  (for  there  may  be  none),  but  upon 
the  broad  ground  that,  where  one  of  two  innocent  persons 
must  bear  a  loss,  he  must  bear  it  whose  act  caused  it.6 

§122.  Who  are  jointly  liable.  —  If  several  persons  are 
jointly  bound  to  perform  a  duty,  they  are  jointly  and  severally 
liable  for  omitting  to  perform  or  for  performing  it  negligently.1 
Persons  who  co-operate  in  an  act  directly  causing  injury  are 
jointly  and  severally  liable  for  its  consequences,  if  they  acted 
in  concert,2  or  united  in  causing  a  single  injury,  even  though 
acting  independently  of  each  other.3     Thus  the  proprietors  of 


our  old  section  57,  in  which  we 
argued  this  point.  The  law  is  other- 
wise held  in  New  Hampshire  (Stack 
v.  Cavanaugh,  N.  H.  ;  30  Atl.  350. 
6  Williams  v.  Hays,  supra. 

1  Ferguson  v.  Kinnoull,  9  Clark  & 
F.  251. 

2  Kansas  City  v.  Slangstrom,  53 
Kans.  431  ;  36  Pac.  706  [city  and  pri- 
vate corporation]  ;  Elliott  v.  Field, 
21  Colo.  378  ;  41  Pac.  504  [city  and 
individual]  ;  Brookville  v.  Arthurs, 
152  Pa.  St.  334  ;  25  Atl.  551  [borough 
and  landowner]  ;  Holley  v.  Torring- 
ton,  63  Conn.  426  ;  28  Atl.  613  [bor- 
ough and  town].  In  Maine  and 
Massachusetts,  a  town  is  not  liable 
for  injuries  caused  by  defects  in 
the  highways,  arising  partly  from 
the  negligence  of  the  town,  and 
partly  from  that  of  a  private  per- 
son (Richards  v.  Enfield,  13  Gray, 
344;  Rowell  v.  Lowell,  7  Id.  100; 
Alger  v.  Lowell,  3  Allen,  402  ;  Shep- 
herd v.  Chelsea,  4  Id.  113  ;  Moulton 
v.  Sanford,  51  Me.  127).  But  this  is 
on  the  special  ground  that  municipal 
corporations  are  liable  in  such  cases 
only  by  force  of  the  statute,  and  that 
the  statute  does  not  cover  cases  of 
such  joint  negligence.  We  presume 
that  the  third  party  in  fault  wrould 
be  held  liable  for  the  entire  damage 
(see  Smith  v.  Smith,  2  Pick.  621  ; 
McCahill  v.  Kipp,  2  E.  D.  Smith, 
413 ;   Powell   v.    Deveney,    3    Cush. 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  13] 


300  ;  Mott  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  8 
Bosw.  345  :  ?  345,  post).  Where  an 
injury  is  the  result  of  two  concurring 
causes,  the  person  who  is  responsible 
for  one  of  these  causes  is  not  exempt 
because  the  person  who  is  responsible 
for  the  other  may  be  equally  culpable 
(Lake  v.  Milliken,  62  Me.  240  ;  Lane 
v.  Atlantic  Works,  107  Mass.  104; 
Booth  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73  N.  Y. 
38  ;  Harrison  v.  Great  Northern  R. 
Co.,  3Hurlst.  &C.231).  Two  railroad 
companies,  jointly  maintaining  a 
bridge  over  a  stream,  are  jointly  lia- 
ble for  the  consequences  of  an  origi- 
nal error  in  its  construction,  whereby 
ice  backs  up  and  destroys  a  bridge 
above  (Covington  v.  United  States, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  8  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  223  ;  40 
N.  Y.  Supp.  313).  s.  P.,  Lucas  v.  Penn- 
sylvania Co.,  120  Ind.  205  ;  119  Id.  583  ; 
21  N.  E.  972  [railroads  jointly  main- 
taining defective  platform]  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ransom,  56  Kans. 
559  ;  44  Pac.  6  [trains  in  collision]  ; 
Consol.  Ice  Machine  Co.  v.  Keif  er,  134 
III.  481  ;  25  N.  E.  799  [owner  and  con- 
tractor] ;  Faren  v.  Sellers,  39  La. 
Ann.  1011  ;  3  So.  363  [same];  Van 
Winkle  v.  American  Steam  Boiler 
Ins.  Co.,  52  N.  J.  Law,  240  ;  19  Atl. 
472  [inspector  of  boiler] ;  Guille  v. 
Swan,  19  Johns.  381  ;  see  Williams 
v.  Sheldon,  10  Wend.  654  ;  Hawks- 
worth  v.  Thompson,  99  Mass.  77. 
3  Colegrove    v.    Harlem   R.    Co.,  6 


§122] 


PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE. 


I94 


two  vehicles,  both  of  which  are  managed  so  carelessly  as  to 
injure  a  third  person  by  their  collision,  are  jointly  liable  for 
the  damage  done,  although  in  no  way  connected  in  business 
together.4  Two  municipal  corporations,  each  owning  half  a 
bridge  uniting  their  territories,  are  both  liable  for  its  negligent 
construction  or  management.5  And  so  the  owners  of  a  party 
wall,  dividing  their  two  lots,  are  jointly  liable  for  injuries  sus- 
tained in  consequence  of  its  falling,  through  decay  and  want  of 
repair.6  And,  where  a  master  is  liable  for  the  tortious  negli- 
gence of  his  servant,  the  latter  is  jointly  liable  with  him.7  In 
all   these   cases,  the   liability  is  several,  as  well  as  joint.     Any 


Duer,  382  ;  20  N.  Y.  492  ;  Slater  v. 
Mersereau,  64  N.  Y.  138;  Gray  v. 
Pullen,  5  Best  &  S.  790  ;  see  Wabash, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Shacklet,  105  111.  364 ; 
Cuddy  v.  Horn,  40  Mich,  596  ;  10  N. 
W.  32  ;  Schaefer  v.  Osterbrink,  67 
Wise.  495 ;  30  N.  W.  922.  All  per- 
sons who  aid  or  assist  in  creating  and 
maintaining  a  nuisance  are  liable  for 
the  damages  (Comminge  v.  Steven- 
son, 76  Tex.  642  ;  13  S.  W.  556).  So 
held,  where  electric  wires,  main- 
tained concurrently  by  different  par- 
ties, are  so  related  to  each  other  and 
so  erected  that  one  is  likely  to  fall 
across  the  other,  and  produce  de- 
structive consequences  (McKay  v. 
Southern  Tel.  Co.,  Ill  Ala.  337;  19  So. 
695  ;  Southwestern  Tel.  Co.  v.  Crank, 
[Tex.  Civ.  App.]  ;  27  S.  W.  38) ; 
and  where  live  electric  wires  became 
entangled  through  the  fault  of  two 
owners  (United  Electric  R.  Co.  v. 
Shelton,  89  Tenn.  423;  14  S.  W. 
863). 

4  Colegrove  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  20  N. 
Y.  492;  N.  Y.,  Phila.  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cooper,  85  Va.  939 ;  9  S.  E.  321 ;  Cen- 
tral Pass.  R.  Co.  v.  Kuhn,  86  Ky.  578 ; 
6  S.  W.  441  ;  Tompkins  v.  Clay,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  66  Cal.  163 ;  Kansas,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Stoner,  49  Fed.  209 ;  4  U.  S. 
App.  109  ;  1  C.  C.  A.  231.  And  where 
A.  lent  a  wagon  to  B.  and  C,  who 
each  furnished  a  horse,  and  then,  at 
their  invitation,  A.  rode  with  them, 


B.  driving,  it  was  held  that  all  three 
were  jointly  liable  for  the  negligence 
of  B.  in  driving  too  fast  (Bishop  v. 
Ely,  9  Johns.  294).  To  the  same 
effect  is  Davey  v.  Chamberlain,  4 
Esp.  229.  In  Smith  v.  Dobson  (3 
Man.  &  Gr.  59),  plaintiff's  barge  was 
sunk  by  a  swell  in  the  river,  caused 
by  two  steamers,  only  one  of  which 
was  owned  by  the  defendant.  The 
jury  gave  a  verdict  for  £20,  on  the 
ground  that,  the  total  damage  being 
£80,  this  was  a  fair  proportion  for 
the  defendant's  share  in  the  trans- 
action ;  and  the  court  refused  to  in- 
terfere with  the  verdict  on  plaintiff's 
motion. 

5  Weiserbeng  v.  Winneconne,  56 
Wise.  667  ;  14  N.  W.  871  ;  Lyman 
v.  Hampshire,  140  Mass.  311  ;  3  N.  E. 
211 ;  Brown  v.  Fairhaven,  47  Vt.  386  ; 
see  §  394,  post. 

6Klauder  v.  McGrath,  35  Pa.  St. 
128  ;  Tucker  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  124  N.  Y.  308  ;  26  N.  E.  916 
[fall  of  part  of  front  wall  of  three 
buildings  owned  by  defendants  in 
severalty  ;  all  liable]. 

1  Phelps  v.  Wait,  30  N.  Y.  78; 
Michael  v.  Alestree,  2  Levinz,  172  ; 
Steel  v.  Lester,  L.  R.  3  C.  P.  Div. 
121  ;  Campbell  v.  Portland  Sugar 
Co.,  62  Me.  552  ;  Mayer  v.  Thompson, 
etc.  Bldg  Co.,  104  Ala.  611  ;  16  So. 
620 ;  Green  v.  Berge,  105  Cal.  52  ;  38 
Pac.  539  ;  see  §  248,  post. 


195 


PARTIES   TO   ACTIONS   FOR   NEGLIGENCE. 


[§   123 


one  of  the  parties  in  fault  can,  therefore,  be  sued  alone,  and  is 
responsible  for  the  entire  damage.8 

§  123.  Who  are  not  jointly  liable. —  Persons  who  act  sepa- 
rately, each  causing  a  separate  injury,  cannot  be  made  jointly 
liable,  even  though  the  injuries  thus  committed  are  all  inflicted 
at  one  time,  and  are  precisely  similar  in  character.1  Thus  where 
a  stream  is  polluted  by  the  discharge  of  sewage  therein,  by 
different  parties,  each  from  his  own  premises,  and  each  acting 
separately  and  independently  of  the  others,  each  is  liable  to 
the  exent  of  the  injury  inflicted  only  by  him,  and  not  for  all 
the  injury  suffered  by  plaintiff.2  So  separate  owners  of  ani- 
mals cannot  at  common  law  be  made  jointly  liable  for  different 
injuries  committed  by  their  animals  respectively,  though  all 
happening  as  part  of  a  single  transaction.3  And  persons  who 
separately  rent  different  portions  of  a  single  building  are  not 
jointly  liable  for  their  negligent  use  of  the  premises.4  A 
sheriff  and  his  predecessor  in  office  cannot  be  made  jointly 
liable  for  the  loss  of  property  taken  or  held  by  either.5 


8Kain  v.  Smith,  80  N.  Y.  458,  468  ; 
Roberts  v.  Johnson,  58  Id.  613 ; 
Lyman  v.  Hampshire,  140  Mass.  311  ; 
Hume  v.  Oldacre,  1  Stark,  352,  and 
cases,  supra. 

'Williams  v.  Sheldon,  10  Wend. 
654.  Where,  through  the  sole  negli- 
gence of  one  or  two  persons  engaged 
in  a  common  purpose,  an  injury  is 
done,  the  person  actually  the  cause 
of  the  injury  is  alone  liable  (Boyd 
v.  Insurance  Patrol,  113  Pa.  St.  269  ; 
22  Rep.  666). 

'Chipman  v.  Palmer,  77  N.  Y.  51. 
"  The  fact  that  it  is  difficult  to  sepa- 
rate the  injury  done  by  each  one  from 
the  others  furnishes  no  reason  for 
holding  that  one  tort  feasor  should 
be  liable  for  the  acts  of  others  with 
whom  he  is  not  acting  in  concert." 
(per  Miller,  J.,  lb.)  A  joint  judg- 
ment against  both  defendants  not 
sustained,  where  there  was  no  con- 
cert of  action  between  them,  nor  a 
concurrent  neglect  of  a  duty  com- 
mon to  both  (Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.   Rolvink,    31    111.    App.    596  ;    see 


Independence  v.  Ott,  135  Mo.  301;  36 
S.  W.  624). 

3  Auchmuty  v.  Ham,  1  Denio,  495  ; 
Van  Steenburgh  v.  Tobias,  17  Wend. 
562. 

4  Where  persons  occupy  the  same 
building,  and  have  each  the  privilege 
to  use  the  water  pipes  under  his 
own  right  of  use  or  occupation,  each 
is  held  responsible  only  for  damages 
resulting  from  negligence  on  his  own 
part ;  and  neither  is  responsible  for 
the  negligence  of  the  others,  though 
they  may  be  jointly  liable  where 
their  right  is  joint  (Moore  v.  Goedel, 
7  Bosw.  591  ;  see  Eakin  v.  Brown,  1 
E.  D.  Smith,  36  ;  Payne  v.  Rogers, 
2H.  Blacks.  349). 

6  New  Orleans  Ins.  Asso.  v.  Harper, 
32  La.  Ann.  1165.  A  deputy  con- 
stable levied  an  execution  upon  the 
goods  of  another  than  the  execution 
debtor.  Held,  that  the  constable, 
the  deputy  and  the  constable's  sure- 
ties could  not  be  joined  in  one  action 
for  the  tort  of  the  deputy  (Hoge  v. 
Raymond,  25  Kans.  665). 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


DECEASED   PERSONS. 


124.  No  common-law  remedy  for 
injuries  causing  death. 

The  statutory  remedy. 

The  English  statute  (Lord 
Campbell's  act). 

American  statutes. 

128.  Peculiar  statutes. 

129.  Cumulative  statutes. 
[Omitted]. 
Action ;  when  brought  where 

injury  occurred. 
Action  ;  when  may  be  brought 
in  another  state. 


125. 
126. 

127. 


130. 
181. 

132. 


§  133.  Who  may  bring  action. 

134.  For  whose  benefit  action  may 

be  brought. 

135.  No  action  without  surviving 

statutory  beneficiary. 

136.  Illegitimates ;    when  entitled 

to  benefit  of  the  statute. 

137.  Pecuniary    injury ;    how  far 

essential  to  action. 

138.  Miscellaneous  points. 

139.  Effect  of  survival  statutes. 

140.  Effect  of  releases  and  settle- 

ments. 


§  124.  No  common-law  remedy  for  injuries  causing 
death. —  The  common  law  allowed  of  no  remedy,  by  way  of  a 
civil  action,  for  an  injury  causing  the  death  of  a  human  being.1 
Such  injury  must  necessarily  precede  death;  and  the  law  did 
not  allow  any  cause  of  action  for  an  injury  to  the  person  to 
survive  him.     The  husband  or  master  of  the  deceased  was  not 


1 A  private  criminal  action  was 
allowed  in  cases  of  murder.  The 
last  instance  of  this  kind  was  the 
famous  case  of  Ashford  v.  Thornton 
(1  Barn.  &  Aid.  405),  in  which  the 
defendant  insisted  upon  his  right  to 
trial  by  battle.  The  right  of  action 
was  soon  afterward  taken  away  by 
statute.  "It  is  a  singular  fact  that 
by  the  common  law  the  greatest  in- 
jury which  one  man  can  inflict  on 
another,  the  taking  of  his  life,  is 
without  a  private  remedy "  (Good- 
sell  v.  Hartford,  etc.  R.  Co.,  33  Conn. 
55).  "Since  it  is  now  established 
that  in  the  courts  of  the  United 
States  no  action  at  law  can  be  main- 


tained for  such  a  wrong  [causing 
death],  in  the  absence  of  a  statute 
giving  the  right,  and  it  has  not  been 
shown  that  the  maritime  law,  as  ac- 
cepted and  received  by  maritime 
nations  generally,  has  established  a 
different  rule  for  the  government  of 
courts  of  admirality  from  those 
which  govern  courts  of  law  in  mat- 
ters of  this  kind,  we  are  forced  to 
the  conclusion  that  no  such  action 
will  lie  in  the  United  States  courts, 
under  the  general  maritime  law" 
(Waite,  C.  J.,  The  Harrisburgh,  119 
U.  S.  199;  reaffirmed,  The  Alaska, 
130  U.  S.  201;  9  S.  Ct.  461). 


[196J 


197 


DECEASED    PERSONS. 


[§  124 


allowed  to  sue,  because  the  only  damage  recognized  by  the 
law  was  the  loss  of  service  during  the  lifetime  of  the  servant; 
and  the  death  of  the  servant,  therefore,  worked  no  injury  to 
the  master  of  which  the  law  could  take  notice.  And,  if  the 
act  causing  death  amounted  to  a  felony,  the  general  rule  of  the 
common  law,  forbidding  any  civil  suit  upon  a  felony,  would 
alone  have  sufficed  to  exclude  a  claim  for  damages.  Whatever 
may  be  said  of  these  arguments,  the  conclusions  thus  reached 
formed  a  settled  doctrine  of  the  common  law.  No  one, 
whether  as  executor,  master,  parent,  husband,  wife,  or  child,  or 
in  any  other  right  or  capacity,  could  maintain  an  action  for 
damages  on  account  of  the  death  of  a  human  being.2 


2  The  earliest  reported  decision 
upon  this  point  was  in  an  action  for 
the  battery  of  the  plaintiffs  wife, 
"whereby  she  died.*'  It  was  held 
that  the  right  of  action  was  merged 
in  the  felony  (Higgins  v.  Butcher, 
Yelv.  89 ;  1  Brownl.  &  G.  205).  The 
first  reported  case  of  negligence  in 
which  the  question  arose  was  before 
Lord  Ellenborough  (Baker  v.  Bolton, 
1  Cainpb.  493),  who  instructed  the 
jury  that  the  plaintiff,  who  sued  for 
the  loss  of  his  wife's  services,  could 
only  recover  for  his  loss  during  her 
lifetime,  although  her  death  was 
caused  by  the  defendant's  negli- 
gence. All  the  decisions  in  cases 
where  an  executor  or  administrator 
Bought  to  maintain  the  action  have 
been  one  way  (Whitford  v.  Panama 
R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  405  ;  affi'g  3  Bosw. 
67 ;  Crowley  v.  Panama  R.  Co. , 
30  Barb.  99;  Beach  v.  Bay  State 
Steamboat  Co.,  30  Id.  433).  A  hus- 
band cannot  6ue  for  the  death  of 
his  wife  (Green  v.  Hudson  River 
R.  Co.,  2  Abb.  Ct.  App.  277  ;  affi'g 
28  Barb.  9  ;  Eden  v.  Lexington,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  14  B.  Monr.  204  ;  Womack  v. 
Central  R.  Co.,  80  Ga.  132;  5  S.  E. 
63;  Grosso  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 
50  N.  J.  Law,  317  :  13  Atl.  233),  nor 
a  wife  for  the  loss  of  her  husband 


(Carey  v.  Berkshire  R.  Co.,  1  Cush. 
475  ;  Palfrey  v.  Portland,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  4  Allen,  55  ;  Wyatt  v.  Williams, 
43  N.  H.  102;  Hubgh  v.  New 
Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.,  6  La.  Ann.  495  ; 
Hermann  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  11  Id.  5;  State  v.  Baltimore, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  69  Md.  339;  17  Atl.  88), 
nor  a  parent  for  the  loss  of  his  child 
(Carey  v.  Berkshire  R.  Co.,  1  Cush. 
475  ;  Sherman  v.  Johnson,  58  Vt.  40  ; 
Sullivan  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.,  1 
McCrary  C.  C.  301  ;  Sheffler  v.  Min- 
neapolis, etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Minn.  125; 
compare  Edgar  v.  Costello,  14  S.  C. 
20),  nor  a  master  for  the  death  of 
his  servant  (Osborn  v.  Gillett,  L.  R. 
8  Exch.  88).  Neither  can  any  one 
maintain  an  action  for  any  indirect 
loss  which  he  sustains  by  the  death 
of  another  person,  such,  for  example, 
as  the  loss  which  an  insurer  of  the 
life  sustains  by  that  event  (Conn. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co., 
25  Conn.  265  :  see  §  115,  n.  6,  ante). 
In  Mobile  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Brame 
(95  U.  S.  754),  the  defendant  having 
willfully  killed  a  person  whose  life 
was  insured  by  the  plaintiff,  the  lat- 
ter sued  for  the  amount  of  the  policy 
paid  by  it,  as  damages  caused  to  it 
by  defendant's  act.  The  action  was 
not  sustained. 


§   127] 


DECEASED    PERSONS. 


I98 


8  125.  The  statutory  remedy.— The  multiplication  of  fatal 
accidents  in  later  times,  and  the  practical  impossibility  of 
securing  the  punishment  of  mere  carelessness  by  means  of 
criminal  proceedings,  induced  the  British  legislature  to  inter- 
fere;  and,  by  the  statute  known  as  "  Lord  Campbell's  Act," 
passed  in  1846,  a  remedy  by  civil  action  was  given  to  the  per- 
sonal representative  of  every  person  killed  by  the  fault  of 
another,  and  leaving  a  parent,  husband,  wife,  or  child.  Beginning 
with  New  York,  in  1847,  tms  statute  has  been  in  substance  in- 
corporated into  the  legislation  of  every  American  state;  the 
points  of  difference  being  only  in  relation  to  the  persons  by 
whom  or  for  whose  benefit  the  action  may  be  brought,  the 
form  of  action  (which  in  some  cases  is  by  indictment),  and  the 
measure  of  damages.  Under  any  of  these  statutes,  proof  of 
death  by  the  defendant's  act  is  not,  per  se,  enough  to  warrant 
a  recovery.  There  must  be  some  proof  of  the  defendant's 
wrong-doing  in  the  matter.1  And  the  death  must  appear  to 
be  the  proximate  result  of  his  wrongful  act  or  neglect.2 

§  126.  The  English  statute  (Lord  Campbell's  act).— The 
English  statute  after  which  our  own  statutes  are  largely 
modeled,  is  as  follows:  "Whensoever  the  death  of  a  person 
shall  be  caused  by  wrongful  act,  neglect,  or  default,  and  the 
act,  neglect,  or  default  is  such  as  would  (if  death  had  not 
ensued)  have  entitled  the  party  injured  to  maintain  an  action 
and  recover  damages  in  respect  thereof,  then,  and  in  every 
such  case,  the  person  who  would  have  been  liable  if  death  had 
not  ensued,  shall  be  liable  to  an  action  for  damages,  notwith- 
standing the  death  of  the  person  injured,  and  although  the 
death  shall  have  been  caused  under  such  circumstances  as 
amount  in  law  to  felony."  x 

§  127.  The  American  statutes. —  The  earlier  American 
statutes,  like  that  of  New  York,1  closely  copied  the  phraseology 
of   the    English   original ;  others,   of   later  dates,    modified    it 


1  Evans  v.  Newland,  34  Ind.  112. 

2  Wagner  v.  Woolsey,  1  Heisk. 
235  ;  Thompson  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  91  Ala.  496;  8 So.  406  :  Randall  v. 
New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.,  45  La. 
Ann.  778  ;  13  So.  166. 


1  9  &  10  Vict.  c.  xciii,  §  1.  In  1864 
(27  and  28  Vict,  xcv.)  the  statute 
was  amended  in  respect  to  the  par- 
ties by  whom,  or  for  whose  benefit, 
the  action  might  be  brought. 

•L.  1847,  ch.  450. 


199  DECEASED    PERSONS.  [§  127 

more  or  less,  besides  extending  the  liability  to  corporations, 
particularly  railroad  companies  ;  or  to  persons  engaged  in  par- 
ticular occupations,  e.  g.,  carriers  of  passengers,  mine  owners, 
etc. ;  or  to  particular  wrongful  acts,  such  as  dueling.  States 
which  had  not,  at  the  date  of  our  last  edition,  adopted  similar 
legislation,  have  since  done  so,  as  have  all  the  recently  admitted 
states,  the  organized  territories,  and  the  District  of  Columbia. 
In  New  York,  the  Constitution  of  1894  declares  that  the  right 
of  action  for  damages  for  injuries  resulting  in  death  shall  never 
be  abrogated,  and  the  amount  recoverable  shall  not  be  limited 
by  statute.2  And  by  the  Constitution  of  Mississippi,  it  is 
declared  that  "  where  death  ensues  from  any  injury  to 
employees,  the  legal  or  personal  representatives  of  the  person 
injured  shall  have  the  same  right  and  remedies  as  are  allowed 
by  law  to  such  representatives  of  other  persons."  3  The  pres- 
ent New  York  statute  provides  that  "  the  executor  or  adminis- 
trator of  a  decedent,  who  has  left,  him  or  her  surviving,  a 
husband,  wife,  or  next  of  kin,  may  maintain  an  action  to 
recover  damages  for  a  wrongful  act,  neglect,  or  default  by 
which  the  decedent's  death  was  caused,  against  a  natural  per- 
son who,  or  a  corporation  which,  would  have  been  liable  to  an 
action  in  favor  of  the  decedent,  by  reason  thereof,  if  death  had 
not  ensued."  A  reference  to  the  latest  statutes  of  the  several 
states  and  territories  is  given  in  the  note.4 

''  Art.  1,  £  18.  The  provision  of  through  willful  act  or  omission,  or 
Co.  Civ.  Pro.  §  1904,  which  had  gross  negligence."  See  Winnt  v.  In- 
limited  the  damages  to  a  sum  "not  ternational,  etc.  R.  Co.,  74  Tex.  32; 
exceeding  $5,000,"  was  amended  US.  W.  907  ;  Ritz  v.  Austin,  1  Tex. 
accordingly,  by  striking  out  the  Civ.  App.  455  ;  20  S.  W.  1029. 
limitation  (L.  1895,  ch.  946),  the  *  Alabama  (Code,  1887,  §  2589). 
amendment  taking  effect  January  1,  Arizona  (Rev.  Stat.  1887,  art. 
1896.  2145,  subd.  2.  et  seq). 

3 Const.  1890,  §  193.     Substantially  Arkansas  (Dig.  Stat.  1894,  §  5911). 

the  same  provision  appears  in   the  California  (Code  Civ.  Pro.  §§376, 

Kentucky  Constitution  of  1891(§  241),  377). 

under  which  it  is  held  that  a  legal  Colorado    (Miles'    Stat.    1891,    §§ 

representative  of  tbe  decedent,  hav-  1509-1511). 

Ing  neither  widow  nor  child,  may  Connecticut  (Gen.  Stat.  1888,    §§ 

maintain  the  action  (Lexington,  etc.  1008-9). 

R.  Co.  v.  Huffman,     Ky.     ;  32  S.  W.  Delaware   (Rev.  Stat,  1852,  c.  105, 

611 ).     The  Texas  Constitution  (art.  as  am'd,  1874  ;  see  L.  1866,  c.  31), 

16,  §  26)  gives  a  right  of  action  for  District   Columbia     (Comp.    Stat, 

exemplary  damages  for  "homicide  1894,  ch.  49). 


§   128] 


DECEASED    PERSONS. 


?0O 


§  128.  Peculiar  statutes. —  In  Georgia,  the  remedy  given  is 
for  "homicide,"  which  word  the  statute  defines  as  including  all 
cases  where  the  death  of  a  human  being  results  from  a  crime  or 
from  crminal  or  other  negligence.1  In  Massachusetts,  remedies 
are  given  where  the  life  of  a  passenger  is  lost  by  reason  of  the 


Florida  (Rev.  Stat.  1892,  §§  2342- 
44). 

Georgia  (Code,  1887,  §  588). 
Idaho  (Rev.  Stat,  of  Terr,  adopted 
by  state,   Jan.    28,    1891,    §§  4099, 
4100). 

Illinois  (Rev.  Stat.  1895,  chap.  70, 
§§1.2). 

Indiana  (Rev.  Stat.  1894,   §  285  ; 
see  §  267). 
Iowa  (Rev.  Stat.  1888,  §$2525-27). 
Kansas    (Comp.     L.    1885,    c.    80, 
§  422,  as  am'd  1889,  c.  131). 

Kentucky  (Gen.  Stat.  c.  57,  §  3  ; 
see  stat.  1894,  c.  1,  §  6). 

Louisiana  (Rev.  Civil  Code,  1889, 
art.  2315). 

Maine  (Stat.  1891,  c.  124). 
Maryland  (Pub.    Gen.    L.    [Poe's 
Code,  1888],  art.  67,  §§  1-4). 

Massachusetts  (Pub.  Stat.  1882,  c. 
52,  §  17 ;  c.  73,  §  6  ;  c.  112,  §  212  [as 
am'd  1883]  ;  Stat.,  1886,  c.  140). 

Michigan  (Howell's  Stat.  1883, 
§  8313). 

Minnesota  {Gen.  Stat.  1894,  §5913). 
Mississippi,  (Code,  1892,  §  663). 
Missouri  (Rev.  Stat.,  1889,  §  4426). 
Montana  (Code  Civ.  Pro.  1895,  §§ 
578-9). 

Nebraska    (Comp.    Stat.,   1895,   § 
2503). 
Nevada  (Comp.  Laws,  1885,  §3898). 
New  Hampshire  (Pub.  Stat.  1891, 
c.  191,  §§  8-14). 

New  Jersey  (Rev.  L.  1877,  p.  293 
[act  of  Mar.  3,  1848]). 

New  Mexico  (Comp.  Laws,  1885, 
§  2309,  as  am'd  L.  1891,  c.  49). 

Neiv  York  (Code  Civ.  Pro.  §§  1902- 
4,  as  am'd  1895). 
North  Carolina  (Code,  1883,  §  1498). 
North  Dakota  (Code,  1895,  §  5974). 


Ohio  (Rev.  Stat.    1894,  §  6134) . 

Oklahoma      (Comp.     Stat.      1893, 
§§4311,  4313). 

Oregon     (Code    Civ.    Pro.,     1892, 
§371). 

Pennsylvania     (Brightly's     Purd. 
Dig.  1894,  p.  1603,  §§  1-7). 

Rhode    Island    (Pub.    Stat.   1882, 
c.  204,  §20). 

South  Carolina  (Rev.  Stat.  1893, 
§  2315). 

South    Dakota    (Comp.    L.    1887, 
§§  5498-9;  L   1891,  c.  4). 
^  Tennessee  (Code,  1896,  §§4025-29). 

Texas  (Rev.  Stat.  1888,  §  2899). 

Utah  (Comp.  L.  1888,  §  2961 ;  see 
§§3178,3179). 

Vermont  (Comp.  Stat.  1894,  §  2451). 

Virginia  (Code,  1887,  §  2902). 

Washington  (Code  Pro.  1891, 
§138). 

West  Virginia  (Code,  1891,  c. 
103,  §  5). 

Wisconsin  (Annot.  Stat.  1889, 
§4255). 

Wyoming   (Code,   1887,  §  2364a). 

Mr.  Tiffany's  "  Law  of  Death  by 
Wrongful  Act"  [St.  Paul,  1893]  con- 
tains a  full  compilation  and  analy- 
sis of  the  statutes  of  the  several 
states. 

1  The  facts  that  defendant  fur- 
nished liquor  to  a  third  person  while 
the  latter  was  drunk,  and  failed  to 
protect  plaintiff's  husband  from  such 
person,  and  that  the  latter  killed 
plaintiff's  husband  in  defendant's 
saloon,  while  defendant  was  present, 
deceased  not  being  there  as  a  guest, 
do  not  render  defendant  liable  for 
the  killing  (Belding  v.  Johnson,  86 
Ga.  177  ;  12  S.  E.  304). 


201 


DECEASED   PERSONS.  [§  1 29 


negligence  of  the  proprietors  of  a  steamboat,  stage  coach,  or 
common  carriers  of  passengers,  or  by  the  unfitness  or  gross  negli- 
gence or  carelessness  of  their  servants  or  agents ;  also  where 
the  life  of  a  person  is  lost  by  reason  of  a  defect  or  want  of 
repairs  of  a  highway,  tramway,  causeway  or  bridge,  or  for 
want  of  suitable  rails  on  such  way  or  bridge ;  also  where,  by 
reason  of  the  negligence  or  carelessness  of  a  corporation  operat- 
ing a  railroad,  or  street  railway,  or  the  unfitness  or  gross  negli- 
gence or  carelessness  of  its  servants  or  agents,  the  life  of  a 
passenger,  or  of  a  person  being  in  the  exercise  of  due  dili- 
gence, and  not  a  passenger  or  in  the  employment  of  such  cor- 
poration, is  lost ;  also  where,  by  reason  of  the  negligence  or 
carelessness  of  a  corporation  operating  a  street  railway,  or  of 
the  unfitness  or  gross  negligence  or  carelessness  of  its  servants 
or  agents,  the  life  of  a  passenger  or  of  a  person  being  in  the 
exercise  of  due  diligence,  and  not  a  passenger  or  in  the 
employment  of  such  corporation,  is  lost.2  In  Pennsylvania, 
where  the  decedent  lost  his  life  while  lawfully  engaged  or 
employed  on  or  about  the  roads,  works,  depots  and  premises 
of  a  railroad  company,  or  in  or  about  any  train,  or  car  therein 
or  thereon,  of  which  company  such  person  is  not  an  employee, 
the  right  of  action  and  recovery  against  the  company  is  only 
such  as  would  exist  if  such  person  were  an  employee;  but  this 
limitation  does  not  apply  to  passengers.3  In  Virginia,  it  is 
specially  provided  that  a  libel  may  be  brought  against  a  ship 
or  vessel  and  its  owners.4 

§  129.   Cumulative    statutes.  —  In   certain    states,    special 
remedies  are  given,  in  addition  to  those  provided  generally  for 

2  See    Commonwealth   v.    Boston,  may  proceed  at  the  same  time  (Bowes 

etc.  R.  Co.,  126  Mass.  61  [licensee  of  v.  Boston,  155  Mass.  344;  29  N.  E. 

private  track] ;  Daley  v.  Boston,  etc.  633) . 

R.  Co.,  147   Mass.  101  ;  16  N.  E.  690  3  See  Moe  v.  Smiley,  125  Pa.  St. 

[death  of  one  unloading  coal  from  136 ;  17  Atl.  228 ;  Mulherrin  v.  Dela- 

vessel  into  defendant's  cars].      The  ware,    etc.  R.  Co.,  81   Pa.  St.   366; 

right  of  action  given  to  an  adminis-  Ricard  v.  North  Penn.  R.  Co.,  89  Id. 

trator  for  the  benefit  of  the  widow  193  ;  Penn.   R.  Co.   v.  Price,  96  Id. 

and  children,  is  independent  of  the  267  ;  Richter  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  104  Id. 

administrator's  right  to  sue  for  dam-  511;  Cummings  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc. 

ages  suffered  by  the  intestate  during  R.  Co.,  92  Id.  82. 

his  lifetime  from  the  injury  which  4  Code,  1887,  §  2902. 
caused  his  death,  and  both  actions 


fi   i2g]  DECEASED    PERSONS.  202 

death  caused  by  wrongful  act,  or  declaring  that  causes  of  action 
for  personal  injury  survive  the  death.  In  Alabama,1  Indiana,2 
Iowa,3  Oregon,4  Utah,5  Idaho,  Montana,  California  and 
Washington,  special  additional  statutes  exist  relating  to 
the  death  of  minors.  In  Arizona,6  Colorado,7  Connecticut,8 
South  Dakota,9  Maine,10  Minnesota,11  Missouri,12  Nebraska,13 
New  Mexico,14  Rhode  Island,15  Texas16  and  Wisconsin,17 
special  provision  is  made  for  actions  against  common  car- 
riers. In  Arkansas,18  special  provision  is  made  for  the  killing 
of  an  adult  by  a  railroad  company.  In  Kentucky,  special 
remedies  are  given  for  killing  by  the  use  of  fire-arms,  or  by 
certain  dangerous  weapons  ;  also  for  killing  in  a  duel.19  In 
Michigan,  special  actions  are  maintainable  against  railroad 
companies,  and  against  railroad-station  and  depot  companies.20 
In  Rhode  Island,  an  action  is  given  for  loss  of  life  due  to  fail- 
ure to  maintain  fire  escapes.21  In  Washington,  special  pro- 
vision is  made  for  death  by  duelling,  falling  through  holes  in 
sidewalks  and  streets,  and  in  other  cases,  where  decedent 
was  a  minor.22  Alabama,  Colorado,  Florida,  Indiana,  Iowa, 
Kansas,    Massachusetts,    Mississippi,    Missouri,    New    Mexico 

1  Code,  1887,  §  2588 ;  see  Williams  W.    76  ;    Buddenberg    v.    Chouteau 

v.  South,  etc.  R.   Co.,  91  Ala.   635  ;  Tr.  Co.,  108  Mo.  394  ;  18  S.  W.  970  ; 

9   So.  77;  Harris  v.   McNamara,  97  Lynch  v.   Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  112 

Ala.  181 ;  12  So.  103  ;  Alabama,  etc.  Mo.  420 ;  20  S.  W.  642. 

R.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  97  Ala.  126  ;  11  So.  13  Comp.  Stat.  1895,  §  4014. 

803.  14  Comp.  Laws,    1885,  §  2308  ;  see 

3  R.  S.  1894,  §  267.  Lutz  v.   Atlantic,  etc.   R.    Co.,      N. 

3  Code,  1888,  §  2556.  Mex.     ;  30  Pac.  912. 

*  Code  Civ.  Pro.  1892,  §  34.  15  Comp.  Stats.  1882,  ch.  240,  §  15. 
s  Comp.  Laws,  1888,  §  3178.  1S  Rev.  Stat.  1888,  art,  2899,  subd. 

•  Rev.  Stat.  1887,  art.  2145,  subd.  1.  1  ;  see  Hendrick  v.  Walton,  69  Tex. 
'  Miles'  Stats.  1891,  art.  1508.  192  ;  6  S.  W.  749  ;  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co. 

8  Gen.  Stat.  1888,  §  1383.  v.  Geiger,  79  Tex.  13  ;  15  S.  W.  214. 

9  Comp.  Laws,  §  5498.  "  Annot.  Stat.  1889,  §  1816  a. 

10  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  c.  51,  §§  68,  69,        18  Dig.  Stat.  1894,  §  5910. 

c.  52,  §  7.  19  Stats.  1894,  c.  1,  §§  4,  5,  6,  10. 

11  Gen.  Stat.  1894,  8  1950.  !0  Annot.  Stat.     1882,    §$  3391-92  ; 

12  Rev.  Stat.  1889,  §  4425  ;see  Proc-     3491-92. 

tor  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.  64  Mo.  2I  L.  1890,  c.  826,  §  8. 
112;  Sullivan  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  M  Code,  1891,  §§  138-9  ;  see  North- 
Co.,  97  Id.  113  ;  10  S.W.  852  ;  Crump-  ern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Ellison,  3  Wash, 
ley  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co..  98  Mo.  St.  225;  28  Pac.  333;  Hendrick  v. 
34  ;  11  S.W.  244  :  Magoffin  v.  Missouri  Ilwaco  R.  Co.,  4  Wash.  St.  400  ;  30 
Pac.    R.   Co.,    102  Mo.    540:    15    S.  Pac.  714. 


203  DECEASED    PERSONS.  [§131 

and  Wisconsin  have  followed  the  example  of  England  in 
enacting  Employers'  Liability  Acts,  which  are  collated  at 
the  end  of  chapter  X. 

§  130.  [Omitted.] 

§  131.  Action  ;  when  brought  where  injury   occurred. — 

These  statutes  are  not  to  be  construed  as  giving  a  right  of 
action  upon  injuries  which  occur  outside  of  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  state  enacting  the  statute,  and  in  a  territory  where  no  such 
rule  of  law  prevails.1  Being  contrary  to  the  common  law,  it 
will  not  be  presumed  that  similar  statutes  exist  elsewhere;2 
and  therefore  an  action  of  this  kind  cannot  be  maintained,  if 
the  fatal  injury  occurred  outside  of  the  jurisdiction  of  the  state 
in  which  the  statute  relied  upon  was  enacted.  The  complaint, 
in  such  an  action,  ought  to  show  affirmatively  that  the  injury 
occurred  within  a  territory  where  the  law  gives  the  remedy 
in  such  cases ;  and  it  states  no  cause  of  action,  if  it  leaves  this 
in  doubt;3  much  more,  if  it  shows  that  the  injury  occurred  out- 
side of  the  state,  without  averring  a  law  in  that  place,  giving  a 
remedy.4  It  makes  no  difference  in  this  respect  that  both 
parties  to  the  injury  were  citizens  of  the  state  by  which  the 
statute  was  enacted,  or  that  the  wrong-doer  was  a  corporation 

'Debevoise  v.    N.   Y.,  Lake  Erie,  Co.,  31  Minn.  11;  Hyde  v.  Wabash, 

etc.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  377  ;  Whitford  etc.  R.  Co.,  61  Iowa,  441  ;  16  N.  W. 

v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  23  Id.  465  [injury  351  ;  S.  P.,  applied  to  actions,  under 

in  New  Granada] ;  Crowley  v.  Pan-  foreign  statutes,  for  injuries  not  re- 

ama  R.  Co.,  30  Barb.  99  ;  Beach  v.  suiting  in  death ;  Njus  v.  Chicago, 

Bay  State  Steamboat  Co.,  30  Id.  433;  etc.  R.  Co.,  47  Minn.  92  ;  49  N.  W. 

Vanderwerken   v.    New    Haven   R.  527  ;  Alexander  v.  Pennsylvania  Co., 

Co.,  27  Id.  244 ;  State  v.  Pittsburgh,  48  Ohio  St.  623  ;  30  N.   E.  69  ;  Ala- 

etc.   R.  Co.,  45  Id.  41;   Selma,  etc.  bama,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fulghum,  87  Ga. 

R.  Co.  v.  Lacy,  43  Ga.  461  ;  Wood-  263 ;  13  S.  E.  649. 

ard  v.  Michigan,  etc.  R.  Co.,  10  Ohio  2Debevoise  v.  N.  Y.,   Lake  Erie, 

St..    121  ;     Hover    v.    Pennsylvania  etc.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  377  ;  Armstrong 

R.  Co.,  25  Id.  667 ;  Nashville,  etc.  R.  v.  Beadle,  5  Sawyer,  484,  and  cases 

Co.  v.  Eakin,  6  Coldw.  582  ;  McCar-  under  last  note. 

thy  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  18  Kans.  3  Beach  v.   Bay  State  St.  Co.,   30 

46:  Willis  v.  Mo.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  61  Barb.  433. 

Tex.  432;  Belt  v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4  4Debevoise  v.    N.   Y.,   Lake  Erie, 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  231;  22 S.  W.  1062  [text  etc.    R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  377;  Kahl  v. 

quoted  and  followed]  ;  Alabama,  etc.  Memphis,  etc.,  R.  Co,  95  Ala.  337  ; 

R.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  97  Ala.  126;  11  So.  10  So.   661  ;   Jackson  v.  Pittsburgh, 

803  :  Herrick  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  etc.  R.  Co.,  140  Ind.  241;  39  N.  E.  663. 


§  132]  DECEASED    PERSONS.  204 

chartered  by  that  state,5  or  that  the  injury  was  caused  by 
breach  of  a  contract  entered  into  in  that  state,6  or  (except  in 
Michigan7)  that  the  decedent  was  brought  into  the  state  while 
living.8  But  if  the  injury  happened  at  sea,  the  statutory  action 
will  lie,  if  the  vessel  was  at  the  time  within  the  maritime  juris- 
diction of  a  state  having  such  a  statute,9  or  if  the  vessel  was 
duly  registered  there.10 

§  132.  Action  ;  when  may  be  brought  in  another  state. — 

If  such  an  action  is  authorized  by  the  law  of  the  state  where 
the  injury  occurred,  it  may  be  brought  in  any  state  having  a 

5  Whitf ord  v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  23  a  short  distance  of  the  New  York 
N.  Y.  465  ;  3  Bosw.  67  ;  Crowley  v.  shore.  Held  (rev'g  45  Barb.  226),  that 
Panama  R.  Co.,  30  Barb.  99.  the  state  court  had  jurisdiction,   as 

6  Cases  under  last  note.  In  Belt  v.  the  sound  was  a  mere  inland  arm  of 
Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  (4  Tex.  Civ.  App.  the  sea.  New  York  courts  will  en- 
231;  22  S.  W.  1062),  the  injuries  caus-  tertain  an  action  for  death  caused  on, 
ing  death  were  inflicted  in  the  board  a  British  ship  on  the  high  seas, 
Indian  Territory  by  decedent's  fellow  founded  on  the  English  statute 
servant;  both  were  employed  in  (Cavanagh v.  Ocean  Steam  Nav.  Co. 
Texas  by  the  defendant,  which  was  [Sp.  T.]  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  540  ;  19  Civ. 
chartered  in  Texas,  and  the  road  was  Pro.  R.  391),  or  on  board  a  vessel  ly- 
operated  by  orders  issued  from  offices  ing  in  a  foreign  port  not  more  than 
in  that  state.  Held,  nevertheless,  two  miles  from  shore,  provided  such 
an  action  could  not  be  maintained  death  is  actionable  by  the  law  of  the 
for  the  death  in  Texas,  upon  a  dis-  foreign  country  (Geoghegan  v.  Atlas 
similar  statute  of  the  Indian  Terri-  S.  S.  Co.  [Com.  PI.]  3  Misc.  224 ;  22 
tory.  N.  Y.  Supp.  749). 

7  In  Michigan,  the  statute  provides  I0  So  held  in  England  (The  Ex- 
that  though  the  injury  was  inflicted  plorer,  L.  R.  3  Adm.  289),  and  in 
on  the  high  seas  or  in  any  other  navi-  New  York  (McDonald  v.  Mallory,  77 
gable  waters,  or  on  land  without  the  N.  Y.  546).  There  the  injury  occur- 
state,  yet  if  the  injured  person  died  red  on  a  New  York  registered 
within  the  state,  in  consequence  of  steamer,  on  a  voyage  to  Galveston, 
such  injury,  the  criminal  offense  Held,  that  an  action  would  lie  under 
may  be  prosecuted  in  the  state  the  statute  in  New  York.  "The 
(Howell's  Stat.  18S2,  £  9420) .  locus  in  quo  was  not  within  the  act- 

8  Needham  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  ual  territorial  limits  of  any  state  or 
38  Vt.  294  ;  DeHani  v.  Mexican  R.  nation,  nor  was  it  subject  to  the  laws 
Co..  Tex.  Civ.  App.  ;  22  S.  W.  249  of  any  government,  unless  the  rule 
[injury  occurred  in  Mexico,  which  which  exists  from  necessity  is  ap- 
gives  no  such  remedy].  plied,  that  every  vessel  on  the  high 

'Mahler  v.  Norwich,  etc.  Tr.  Co.,  seas  is  constructively  a  part  of  the 
35  N.  Y.  352.  In  that  case,  the  in-  territory  of  the  nation  to  which  she 
jury  occurred  on  a  sloop,  sunk  by  a  belongs,  and  its  laws  are  operative  on 
collision  in  Long  Island  Sound,  within   board  of  her  "  (per  Rapallo,  J.). 


20  t 


DECEASED    PERSONS. 


[§  132 


similar  law.1  The  Federal  courts  hold  that  it  may,  in  that 
case,  be  brought  in  any  state  ; 2  and  we  think  this  the  correct 
opinion,  although  the  Massachusetts3  and  some  other  courts 
hold  the  contrary.  No  doubt,  if  the  statute  is  a  penal  one,  it 
should  not  be  enforced  outside  of  the  state  enacting  it ;  but  most 
of  these  statutes  are  not  penal ;  although  one  of  the  Massa- 
chusetts statutes  is.4  The  Federal  courts  have  jurisdiction  of 
an  action  under  the  state  statute;  and  such  jurisdiction  is  not 
subject  to  limitation  by  a  proviso  in  the  statute  that  the  statu- 
tory damages  are  recoverable  in  the  state  courts  only.5 


1  A  "  substantial  similarity  "  is  all 
that  is  required.  The  fact  that,  by 
the  statute  of  the  state  where  the 
fatal  injury  happened,  the  action 
would  lie  against  receivers  of  rail- 
roads, while  it  would  not  under  that 
of  the  state  where  the  action  against 
a  receiver  was  brought,  is  not  such 
an  inconsistency  as  will  forbid  the 
action  (Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  145 
U.  S.  593;  12  S.  Ct.  905).  To  same 
effect.  Wooden  v.  Western,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  126  N.  Y.  10;  26  N.  E.  1050; 
Leonard  v.  Columbia  Nav.  Co.,  84 
X.  Y.  48  ;  Debevoise  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake 
Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  98  Id.  377  ;  West- 
ern, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Strong,  52  Ga. 
461  ;  So.  Carolina  R.  Co.  v.  Nix,  68 
Id.  572  ;  Bruce  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  83  Ky.  174;  Morris  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co. ,  65  Iowa,  727 ;  Nashville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sprayberry,  9  Heisk. 
852  ;  Nelson  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  88  Va.  971;  14  S.  E.  838; 
Burns  v.  Grand  Rapids,  etc.  R.  Co., 
113  Ind.  169;  15  N.  E.  230;  Cincin- 
nati, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McMullen,  117 
Ind.  439  ;  20  N.  E.  287 ;  Hanna  v. 
Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  41  111.  App. 
116  [Illinois  action  entertained  on 
the  Canadian  statute,  the  "policy 
of  the  statutes  of  both  being  the 
same  "].  Since  the  right  of  action  in 
Arkansas  is  dissimilar  to  that  in 
Texas,  the  Texas  courts  will  not 
undertake    to  enforce    a  cause    of 


action  arising  under  the  Arkansas 
statute  (St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
McCormick,  71  Tex.  660  ;  9  S.  W. 
540). 

2Dennick  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  103  U. 
S.  11  ;  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  145 
Id.  593  ;  12  S.  Ct.  905  ;  Northern 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Babcock,  154  U.  S. 
190  ;  14  S.  Ct.  978. 

3Le  Forest  v.  Tolman,  117  Mass. 
109  ;  Richardson  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  98  Id.  85  ;  Davis  v.  New  Eng- 
land R.  Co.,  143  Id.  301  ;  9  N.  E. 
815  [but  see  now,  Higgins  v.  Central, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  155  Mass.  176;  29  N.  E  534]; 
Woodard  v.  Michigan,  etc.  R.  Co., 
10  Ohio  St.  121  ;  Vawter  v.  Mo. 
Pacific  R.  Co.,  84  Mo.  679;  Lime- 
killer  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  33 
Kans.  83 ;  see  Railroad  Co.  v.  Lacy, 
43  Ga.  461 . 

4  By  Mass.  St.  (c.  112,  §  212)  a  rail- 
road company  may  be  punished 
by  a  fine  or  "  assessed  "  for  damages 
for  negligently  causing  death.  Being 
penal,  no  action  will  lie  upon  it  in 
Rhode  Island  (O'Reilly  v.  N.  Y.  & 
New  England  R.  Co.,  16  R.  I.  388; 
17  Atl.  906),  or  Vermont  (Adams  v. 
Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  67  Vt.  76;  30  Atl, 
687). 

5  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitton, 
13  Wall.  270 ;  American  Steamboat 
Co.  v.  Chase,  16  Id.  522  ;  Harper  v. 
Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  36  Fed.  102; 
Goff  v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  36  Id. 


§133] 


DECEASED  PERSONS. 


2QO- 


§  133.  Who  may  bring  action.  —  The  action  is  to  be  brought 
by  the  party  to  whom  the  right  of  action  is  given  by  the  stat- 
ute. It  is  not  thought  of  sufficient  general  interest  to  give,  in 
detail,  the  diverse  provisions  of  the  several  state-statutes  which 
designate  the  particular  persons,  or  class  of  persons,  to  whom 
the  right  of  action  is  given.  In  general,  it  may  be  said  that 
most  of  the  states  give  the  right  of  action  to  the  decedent's 
personal  representatives,  i.  e.  the  executor  of  his  will  or  the 
administrator  of  his  goods,  etc.;1  while  in  others  it  is  given  to 
his  legal  representatives,2  or  else  directly  to  the  person  or  per- 
sons for  whose  benefit  the  remedy  is  afforded.  In  those  states 
in  which  special  provision  is  made  for  the  wrongful  death  of  a 
minor,  the  right  of  action  is  generally  given  to  the  father,  or, 


299  ;  Weaver  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R. 
Co..  21  D.  C.  499).  The  proviso  of 
the  Wisconsin  statute  (§  4255)  requir- 
ing an  action  under  it  to  be  brought 
in  a  court  of  Wisconsin,  has  been 
held,  by  a  Federal  court,  void  as  a 
condition  on  the  right  previously 
granted,  which  would  operate  to  ex- 
clude the  jurisdiction  of  Federal 
courts  (Bigelow  v.  Niekerson,  17  C.  C. 
A.  1;  70  Fed.  113).  As  to  jurisdic- 
tion of  admiralty  courts,  independ- 
ent of  statute,  see  The  Harrisburg, 
119  U.  S.  199 ;  7  S.  Ct.  140  ;  The 
Alaska,  130  U.  S.  201  ;  9  S.  Ct.  461 ; 
The  Columbia,  27  Fed.  704  ;  The 
Ward,  23  Id.  900. 

1  This  is  the  meaning  of  statutes 
giving  "personal  representatives" 
the  right  to  sue  (Kramer  v.  Market 
St.  R.  Co.,  25Cal.  435;  Indianapolis, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stout,  53  Ind.  143  ; 
Needham  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  38 
Vt.  294  ;  Whiton  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  21  Wise.  310).  The  "  legal  and 
personal  representatives,"  as  used  in 
the  Mississippi  Constitution,  are  held 
to  mean  the  executors  or  adminis- 
trators (Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Hun- 
ter, 70  Miss.  471;  12  So.  482). 

2  The  California  Code  (§  377)  al- 
lows decedent's  "heirs"  to  recover 


for  an  adult's  death.  Held,  that  this 
includes  all  those  capable  of  inherit- 
ing from  the  deceased  generally, 
uncontrolled  by  limitation  of  stat- 
utes relating  to  the  distribution  of 
community  property,  including  mi- 
nor children  of  deceased  (Redfield  v. 
Oakland  Consol.  R.  Co.,  110  Cal.  277; 
42  Pac.  822) .  Hence,  in  one  action,  a 
husband  may  recover,  personally, 
and  as  guardian  ad  litem  of  minor 
children,  for  the  death  of  their  wife 
and  mother  (lb.).  Only  one  action 
can  be  brought,  and  a  recovery  by 
the  executor  is  a  bar  to  an  action  by 
the  heirs  (Hartigan  v.  Southern 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  86 Cal.  142;  24  Pac.  851). 
In  Louisiana,  a  widow  may  sue  for 
the  death  of  the  husband  and  father 
individually  and  as  tutrix  of  her 
minor  son,  both  having  an  equal  in- 
terest in  the  same  cause  of  action, 
by  inheritance  (Curley  v.  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  40  La.  Ann.  810  ;  6  So. 
103).  A  ruling  under  the  former 
Kentucky  statute  that  "heir,"  used 
therein,  meant  child  and  did  not  in- 
clude parents  or  collateral  relatives 
(Jordan  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
Ky.  40  ;  11  S.  W.  1013)  seems  to  be 
superseded  by  the  revision  of  1894. 


207 


DECEASED    PERSONS. 


[§  133 


if  he  is  not  living,3  or  has  deserted  his  family,4  or  is  imprisoned,5 
to  the  mother  of  the  minor.6  In  Montana,  the  guardian  of  a 
minor  may  sue  for  the  death  of  his  ward.  In  Missouri  and 
Colorado,  if  decedent  was  a  minor,  or  unmarried,  the  father 
and  mother  may  sue  jointly,  and  each  have  an  equal  interest 
in  the  judgment  recovered.7  In  Rhode  Island,  in  addition  to 
an  action  in  favor  of  the  widow  and  kindred  of  the  decedent,  a 
like  action  may  be  maintained  for  damages  for  such  loss  of  life 
by  "  any  person  having  a  direct  pecuniary  interest  in  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  life  of  such  deceased  person."  8  In  Florida, 
where  none  of  the  class  of  decedent's  relatives  named  in  the 
statute  survived  him,  the  action  may  be  brought  by  one  who 
was  dependent  on  him  for  support.9     When  the  right  of  action 


3  So  in  Alabama  (Code,  1887,  § 
2588),  and  Indiana  (Rev.  Stat.  1894, 
§  267).  Only  one  action  can  be 
brought  (Mayhew  v.  Burns,  103  Ind. 
328 ;  2  N.  E.  793). 

4  California  Co.  Civ.  Pro.  §  376.  So, 
too,  in  Pennsylvania  (Kerr  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.,  169  Pa.  St.  95;  32 
Atl.  V»6). 

»  Iowa  Code.  §  2556. 

6  So  in  Arkansas.  If  the  mother 
sues,  she  must  generally  show 
affirmatively  and  positively  that  the 
father  is  dead.  It  is  not  enough  to 
allege  that  she  is  a  widow  (St  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Yocum,  34  Ark.  493). 
But  in  Louisiana  she  may  sue  alone, 
even  if  her  husband  is  living  (Civ. 
Code,  1889,  art.  2315).  In  Georgia, 
a  wife,  living  apart  from  her  hus- 
band, may  maintain  an  action  in 
the  husband's  name  for  her  own  use, 
for  the  death  of  their  minor  son,  who 
supported  her  (East  Tennessee,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Maloy,  77  Ga.  237;  2  S.  E. 
941).  The  Georgia  statute  gives  the 
cause  of  action  to  the  mother,  or,  if 
no  mother,  to  the  father.  Held,  that 
where,  at  the  time  of  a  child's  death, 
the  mother  was  living,  but  subse- 
quently died,  without  suing,  the 
husband  could  not  bring  the  action 


(Frazier  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  96  Ga.  785; 

22  S.  E.  936). 

1  Mo.  Rev.  Stat.  1889,  §  4425.  On 
death  of  one  parent  pending  action, 
the  parent  surviving  at  the  date  of 
judgment  has  the  right  to  the  full 
amount  of  the  forfeiture  (Senn  v. 
Southern  R.  Co.,  124  Mo.  621;  28  S. 
W.  66).  Colo.  Gen.  Stat.  1891,  arts. 
1508-10.  See  Hayes  v.  Williams,  17 
Colo.  465  ;  30  Pac.  352;  Brennan  v. 
Molly  Gibson  Co.,  44  Fed.  795;  Pierce 
v.  Conners,  20  Colo.  178;  37  Pac.  721. 

8R.  I.  Pub.  Stat.  1882,  §  17.  See 
Goodwin  v.  Nickerson,  17  R.  I.  478  ; 

23  Atl.  12. 

9  See  Duval  v.  Hunt,  34  Fla.  85  ; 
15  So.  876.  A  similar  statute  in 
Massachusetts  (St.  1887,  c.  270,  §  2) 
provides  that  the  next  of  kin,  who 
are  dependent  on  an  employee  for 
support,  may  maintain  an  action  for 
his  death.  Held,  under  it,  that  a 
daughter  to  whom  her  father  paid 
over  all  his  wages,  and  who  managed 
the  household,  and  received  board 
money  from  her  brothers,  without 
accounting  to  her  father,  could  main- 
tain an  action  for  her  father's  death 
(Houlihan  v.  Connecticut  River  R. 
Co.,  164  Mass.  555;  42  N.  E.  108.) 


§  133] 


DECEASED    PERSONS. 


208 


is  given  to  a  child,  a  child  en  ventre  sa  mere  can  sue.10  In 
Texas  and  Arizona,  the  action  may  be  brought  by  one  or  more 
members  of  the  class  named  in  the  statute  to  whom  the  right 
of  action  is  given,  for  the  benefit  of  all.11  In  Maine  and  in 
Massachusetts  (in  certain  cases)  the  remedy  is  by  indictment ; 
and  in  Maryland,  the  action  is  to  be  brought  in  the  name  of 
the  state,  though  in  every  respect  it  is  a  civil  action.12  An 
action  brought  in  another  jurisdiction  than  that  in  which  the 
fatal  injury  was  inflicted,  can  only  be  maintained  by  one  who 
could  maintain  a  similar  action  in  the  jurisdiction  where  the 
injury  occurred  ;13  and,  if  suing  as  a  personal  representative,  he 


10  A  child  en  ventre  sa  mere  is  en- 
titled to  sue  under  Lord  Campbell's 
act,  on  the  death  of  the  father  by- 
negligence  (The  George  and  Rich- 
ard, 3  L.  R.  Adni.  466).  In  Texas, 
a  child,  unborn  at  the  death  of 
its  father,  is  a  "surviving  child," 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute 
allowing  surviving  children  to  bring 
suit  for  damages  for  the  death  of 
their  parents  (Texas,  etc.  R.  Co  v. 
Robertson,  82  Tex.  657  ;  17  S.  W. 
1041  ;  Nelson  v.  Galveston,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  78  Tex.  621 ;  14  S.  W.  1021). 

11  See  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Henry,  75  Tex.  220  ;  12  S.  W.  828 
[wife  sued  for  death  of  son,  without 
joining  husband];  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Berry,  67  Tex.  238  ;  5  S.  W.  817 ; 
[widow  having  child  sued  for  death 
of  husband]. 

15  Code,  1888,  art.  67,  TH  1-4  ;  see 
Albert  v.  State,  66  Md.  325  ;  7  Atl. 
697 ;  State  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
69  Md.  339;  17  Atl.  88. 

13  Hence  a  widow  cannot  sue,  aa 
such,  in  Pennsylvania,  for  the  death 
of  her  husband  in  New  Jersey, 
where  the  statute  gives  the  cause  of 
action  to  the  decedent's  personal 
representatives,  though  by  the  Penn- 
sylvania statute  the  remedy  is  given 
to  the  widow  (Usher  v.  West  Jersey 
R.  Co.,  126  Pa.  St.  206  ;  17  Atl.  597). 
So  the  widow  of  one  killed  in  Penn- 


sylvania may  sue  as  such  in  New 
York,  although  by  the  statute  of  the 
latter  state  only  personal  represen- 
tatives can  maintain  an  action  for 
death  (Wooden  v.  Western,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  126  N.  Y.  10;  26  N.  E.  1050). 
To  same  effect,  Lower  v.  Segal,  59  N. 
J.  Law,  66 ;  34  Atl.  945  ;  Ash  v.  Bal- 
timore, etc.  R.  Co.,  72  Md.  144;  19 
Atl.  643;  Oates  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co., 
104  Mo.  514  ;  16  S.  W.  487 ;  Hamil- 
ton v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39 
Kans.  56  ;  18  Pac.  57.  If  the  cause 
of  action  does  not  survive  in  the 
state  where  the  death  was  caused, 
no  action  can  be  maintained  in  an- 
other state,  though  a  survival  of  such 
actions  is  provided  for  in  the  latter 
state.  So  held  in  Davis  v.  New 
England  R.  Co.  (143  Mass.  301;  9  N. 
E.  815),  before  the  survival  of  actions 
for  personal  injuries  was  given  (1888) 
by  Connecticut,  where  the  cause  of 
action  arose.  Since  1888,  actions  for 
death,  by  personal  representatives 
of  a  decedent  injured  in  Connecti- 
cut, have  been  maintained  in  Massa- 
chusetts (Higgins  v.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  155  Mass.  176;  29  N.  E.  534; 
Chandler  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co., 
159  Mass.  589  ;  35  N.  E.  89).  If  the 
cause  of  action  survived  in  the  state 
where  the  death  was  caused,  the  fact 
should  be  pleaded  in  an  action  in 
another   state  where  such  a  cause  of 


209 


DECEASED   PERSONS. 


[§i35 


must  have  been  appointed  or  empowered  to  act  in  the  state 
where  he  sues.14  His  right  of  action,  of  course,  depends  upon 
the  powers  he  was  entitled  to  exercise  in  his  own  state.13 

§  134.  For  whose  benefit  action  may  be  brought.— These 
statutes  are  not  designed  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  of  the 
deceased.  By  providing,  as  nearly  all  these  statutes  do,  for 
a  particular  distribution  of  the  recovery,  creditors  are  ex- 
cluded.1 The  persons  for  whose  benefit  the  recovery  is  to  be 
had  have  a  vested  right  in  such  recovery  from  the  moment 
of  the  death;  and  if  they  die  before  judgment  is  had,  their 
representatives  take  its  benefits.2 

§  135.  No  action  without  surviving  statutory  beneficiary. — 

The  action  cannot  be  maintained  at  all  under  the  statutes 
of  England,  New  York,  Indiana  or  any  similar  ones,  unless  the 
deceased  left  at  least  one  surviving  relative  of  the  class  specified 
in  the  statute.1  Where,  as  in  New  York,  Vermont,  New  Jersey, 
North  Carolina,  Ohio,  Illinois  and  Michigan,  the  statute  uses 
the  conjunctive  form,  and  allows  an  action  for  the  benefit  of 

action  does  not  survive  (O'Reilly  v.     peculiar    statute    of    Rhode    Island 


New  England  R.  Co.,  16  R.  I.  388; 
17  Atl.  906.) 

14  So  held  in  Indiana  (Memphis, 
etc.  Packet  Co.  v.  Pikey,  142  Ind.  304; 

40  N.  E.  527  ;  Jeffersonville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hendricks,  26  Ind.  228 ;  s.  c, 

41  Id.  48) ;  Illinois  (Union  R.  Co.  v. 
Shacklet,  119  111.  232  ;  10  N.  E.  896  ; 
Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Shacklet,  105 
111.  364);  Kansas  (Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.  Cutter,  16  Kans.  568  ;  see  L.  1889, 
ch.  131  ;  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
pTapole,  55  Kans.  401;  40  Pac.  669)  ; 
Nebraska  (Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lewis,  24  Neb.  848  ;  40  N.  W.  401); 
Kentucky  (Bruce  v.  Cincinnati,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  83  Ky.  174 ;  Marvin  v.  Mays- 
ville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Fed.  436). 

15  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Babcock, 
154  U.  S.  190  ;  14  S.  Ct.  978  ;  Lime- 
kill*-r  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  33 
Kans,  83;  5  Pac.  401  ;  Hulbert  v. 
Topeka.  34  Fed.  510. 

1  Chicago  v.  Major,  18  111.  349  ;  see 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  14] 


(Pub.  Stat.  1882,  §  17),  and  of  Min- 
nesota (Gen.  L.  1891,  c.  123,  g  1; 
State  v.  Dakota  county,  51  Minn. 
241;  53  N.  W.  463). 

3  Waldo  v.  Goodsell,  33  Conn.  432. 

1  Safford  v.  Drew,  3  Duer,  627 ; 
Lucas  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  21 
Barb.  245 ;  Commonwealth  v.  Bos- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.,  121  Mass.  36;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Morris,  26  111. 
400 ;  see  Andrews  v.  Hartford,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  34  Conn.  57.  The  complaint 
must  allege  the  existence  of  such  kin 
(Stewart  v.  Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co., 
103  Ind.  44  ;  2  N.  E.  208  ;  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Barber,  44  Kans.  612  ; 
24  Pac.  969  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Pitt,  91  Tenn.  86  ;  18  S.  W.  118  ;  East 
Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lilly,  90 
enn.  563  ;  18  S.  W.  243 ;  Lilly  v. 
Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32  S.  C.  142;  10 
S.  E.  932;  Sorensen  v.  Northern  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  45  Fed.  407  [a  Montana  case]). 


R   ,36]  DECEASED    PERSONS.  2IO 

■•  a  widow  and  next  of  kin,"  the  action  can  be  sustained  where 
there  is  a  widow  but  no  kindred  of  the  deceased,2  or  where  he 
leaves  kindred  but  no  widow.3  In  Vermont,  New  Jersey,  Ohio, 
Illinois,  Michigan  and  Indiana,  the  statute  mentions  only 
widows  and  next  of  kin  as  entitled  to  its  benefits.  A  husband, 
not  being,  as  such,  of  kin  to  his  wife,  is  therefore  not  within 
the  benefit  of  the  statute;  if  the  deceased  left  a  husband  only, 
the  action  cannot  be  maintained.4  Such  was  the  law  in  New 
York  until -April,  1870,  when  an  act  was  passed  including  hus- 
bands among  the  beneficiaries  of  the  statute.5  It  is  held  under 
the  Tennessee  code,  which  provides  that  the  right  of  action 
shall  pass  to  the  decedent's  widow,  or  to  his  personal  repre- 
sentatives for  the  benefit  of  his  widow,  or,  if  there  is  no  widow, 
for  the  benefit  of  his  next  of  kin,  that,  where,  pending  an 
action  by  an  administrator  for  the  benefit  of  a  widow,  the  lat- 
ter dies,  the  action  cannot  be  revived  by  the  administrator  for 
the  benefit  of  surviving  next  of  kin.6 

§  136.  Illegitimates;  when   entitled  to  benefit  of  act  — 

Where,  as  in  England,  Maine,  New  Hampshire,  Massachusetts, 
Maryland,  Pennsylvania,  Louisiana,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Missouri 
and  Kansas,  and  other  states,  the  statute  specifies  the  "  child" 
of  the  deceased,  an  illegitimate  child  is  not  within  the  descrip- 
tion;1 but  in  Ohio,  where  the  statute  gives  the  recovery  to  the 

a  See  Oldfield  v.  Harlem  R.   Co.,  •  Louisville,  etc.  E.  Co.  v.  Bean,  94 

14  N.  Y.  310.  Tenn.  388  ;  29  S.  W.  370. 

3  Oldfield  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  14  N.  !  An  illegitimate  child  is  not  with- 
Y.  310 ;  Quin  v.  Moore,  15  Id.  432  ;  in  the  9  &  10  Vict.  c.  93,  giving  a 
Tilley  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  24  Id.  right  of  action  for  the  benefit  of  the 
471  ;  McMahon  v.  New  York,  33  Id.  wife,  husband,  parent,  or  child  of  a 
642  ;  Lyons  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  person  whose  death  has  been  caused 
7  Ohio  St.  336 ;  Chicago  v.  Major,  18  by  wrongful  act,  neglect,  or  default 
111.  349.  (Dickinson  v.  Northeastern  R.  Co. ,  2 

4  Lucas  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  21  Hurlst.  &  C.  735).  A  bastard  is  not 
Barb.  245  ;  Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Wynn,  a  child,  within  the  Indiana  statute 
42  Ga.  331  ;  Scott  v.  Central.  R.  Co.,  giving  a  father  a  right  of  action  for 
77  Id.  450  ;  Snell  v.  Smith,  78  Id.  355  ;  death  of  a  child  (McDonald  v.  Pitts- 
see  Dickins  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  burgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  144  Ind.  459;  43 
23  N.  Y.  158.  N.    E.   447).     One    who  marries  the 

6  In  New  York,  "  next  of  kin"  in-  mother  of  a  bastard  child,  which  he 

elude  all  those  entitled  to  a  share  of  receives  into  his  home  as  a  member  of 

unbequeathed  assets,  under  the  stat-  his  family,  cannot  sue  for  the  death 

ute  of  distributions  except  a  husband  of  the  child   (Thornburg   v.  Ameri- 

or  wife  (Code  Civ.  Pro.  §  1870).  can   Strawboard   Co.,  141   Ind.  443; 


211  DECEASED    PERSONS.  [§  1 37 

"  next  of  kin,"  and  another  statute  makes  an  illegitimate  child 
heir  to  its  mother,  if  the  latter  leaves  no  lawful  child,  an  ille- 
gitimate child  so  left  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  statute.2 
And  the  statute  being  the  same  in  New  York,3  we  have  no 
doubt  that  the  same  decision  will  be  made  there  whenever  the 
case  arises,  inasmuch  as  the  reasoning  appears  to  us  conclusive. 

§137.  Pecuniary  injury;  how  far  essential   to   action. — 

Although  the  statutes  of  New  York  and  of  most  other  states, 
upon  this  subject,  are  substantially  like  that  of  England,  they 
have  not  been  construed  with  entire  uniformity.  In  England, 
it  is  held  that  pecuniary  injury  to  some  one  of  the  relatives  of 
the  deceased,  specified  in  the  statute,  is  an  indispensable  ele- 
ment of  the  cause  of  action,  and  that,  without  evidence  of 
such  injury,  the  action  is  not  maintainable,  even  for  nominal 
damages;  indeed,  nominal  damages  in  such  an  action  are 
deemed  inadmissible.1  In  New  York,  however  (the  words  of 
the  statute  upon  this  point  being  at  that  time  exactly  the 
same  as  in  the  English  statute),  it  was  held  that  such  evidence 
was  not  at  all  essential  to  the  cause  of  action,  and  that  nom- 
inal damages,  at  least,  were  recoverable  in  every  case  of  death 
by  a  wrongful  act  or  default;  and  this  is  the  universal  law  in 
this  country.2     It  follows,  as  a  matter  of  course,  that  the  action 

40  N.  E.  1062).  Under  the  Missouri  Tilley  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  24  Id. 
statute,  1889,  §  4425,  providing  that  471  ;  S.  C,  29  Id.  252  ;  Mclntyre  v.  X. 
if  the  deceased  be  a  minor  and  un-  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  37  Id.  287  ;  O'Mara 
married,  whether  such  deceased  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  38  Id.  445  ; 
unmarried  minor  be  a  natural  born  Ihl  v.  Forty-second  St.  R.  Co.,  47  Id. 
or  adopted  child,  the  father  and  317 ;  Bierbauer  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
mother  may  join  in  the  suit,  and  Co.,  15  Hun,  559  ;  77  N.  Y.  588  :  Bar- 
each  shall  have  an  equal  interest  in  linger  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  92 
the  judgment  ;  only  natural  born  Id.  661;  Houghkirk  v.  Delaware, 
legitimate  children  arc  intended,  etc.  Canal  Co.,  92  Id.  219.  The  fart 
and  no  action  can  be  maintained  by  that  next  of  kin  are  not  able  (<»  show 
a  mother  for  the  death  of  her  bas-  any  direct,  specific,  pecuniary  loss* 
tard  child  (Marshall  v.  Wabash  R.  arising  from  the  death  of  a  person 
Co.,  46  Fed.  269).  by  negligent    act,   does    not   affecl 

sMuhl  v.  Southern,  etc.  R.  Co.,  10  their  right  to   recover  but  the  con- 

Ohio  St.  272.  dition    and    circumstances    both   <>f 

8N.  Y.  Stat.  1855,  ch.  547.  deceased    and  <>f    the   nexl   of   kin 

1  Duckworth  v.  Johnson,  4  Hurlst.  are   to   he  considered,  and  the  best 

&  N.  653.  estimate    possible    made  therefrom 

5  Oldfield  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  14  X.  (Lockwood  v.  X.  Y.f  Lake  Erie,  etc. 

Y.  310;  Quin  v.  Moore,  15  Id.  432;  R.Co.,  98  N.  Y.  523).     s.  P.,  Pennsyl- 


DECEASED   PERSONS. 


212 


§    137] 

can  be  sustained  without  showing  that  any  of  the  relatives 
for  whose  benefit  the  action  is  brought  were  dependent 
upon  the  decedent  for  support,3  and  although  the  decedent 
left  neither  widow  nor  children  having  a  legal  claim  for 
support.  It  is  only  necessary  to  show  that  some  one  of 
such  beneficiaries  exist.4  It  is  not  necessary,  even  in  Eng- 
land, to  show  that  the  relatives  have  lost  by  the  death 
something  to  which  they  had  a  legal  title.  The  action  is  main- 
tainable if  they  had  a  reasonable  expectation  of  an  advantage 
from  the  continuance  of  the  life  of  the  deceased,  capable  of 
appreciation  in  pecuniary  values.5  And  as  the  English  statute 
contemplates  the  injury  to  individuals,  rather  than  to  a  class, 
an  action  may  be  maintained  where  the  death  causes  a  pecu- 
niary loss  to  one  or  more  of  the  relatives,  even  though  it 
should  cause  a  gain  to  the  others  equal  to  or  exceeding  the 
loss  of  the  former.6  In  states  where  the  remedy  is  given 
directly,  e.  g.  to  a  father  or  mother   for  the  death  of  a  child, 

vania  R.  Co.  v.  Ogier,  35  Pa.  St.  60  ;  to  the  pecuniary  injury,"  it  is  held 

Lyons  v.  Cleveland,  etc.  E.  Co.,  7  that  pecuniary  injury  must  be  al- 

Ohio  St.  336;   Donaldson  v.  Missis-  leged    and  proved  (Coops  v.    Lake 

sippi,  etc.  R.  Co.,  18  Iowa,  280;  An-  Shore,    etc.    R.    Co.,   66  Mich.    448; 

drews  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  86  Id.  Hurst  v.  Detroit  R.  Co.,  84  Id.  539  ; 

677  ;  53  N.  W.  399  ;  Atchison,  etc.  R.  48  N.  W.  44  ;  Charlebois  v.  Gogebic, 

Co.  v.  Weber,  33  Kans.  543  ;  6  Pac.  etc.  R.  Co.,  91  Mich.  59  ;  51  N.  W.  812; 

877;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Shannon,  Topping  v.  St.  Lawrence,  86  Wise. 

43  111.  338  ;  Chicago  v.  Keefe,  114  Id  526;  Orgall  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co., 

222  ;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilbert,  46  Neb.  4;  64  N.  W.  450;  Denver,  etc. 

157  111.  354;  41  N.  E.  724  ;  Korrady  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  12  Colo.  20  ;  20  Pac. 
v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  131  Ind. 
261;  29  N.  E.  1069. 

3  Keller  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co. ,  2 
AM..  Ct.  App.  480  .     This  proposition 


340).     On  the  question  of  the  dam- 
ages recoverable   in  an  action    for 
death,  see  §§  766-772,  post. 
4  Safford    v.    Drew,  3   Duer,    627  ; 

was  necessarily  involved  in  the  de-    Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Morris,  26  111. 

cisii  m  of  Quin  v.  Moore,  15  N.  Y.  432;    400 ;  Quincy  Coal  Co.  v.  Hood,  77  Id. 


Oldfield  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  14  Id.  310; 
Birkett  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co., 
110  Id.  504  ;  18  N.  E.  108  ;  Keenan  v. 
Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  145  N.  Y.  348  ;  40 


68 ;  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hes- 
sions,  150  Id.  546;  Indianapolis,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Keeley,  23  Ind.  133. 
6  Franklin  v.  Southeastern  R.  Co., 


N.  E.  15.  The  same  decision  has  3  Hurlst.  &  N.  211;  Dalton  v.  South- 
been  made  in  other  states  (Chicago  eastern  R.  Co.,  4  C.  B.  N.  S.  296; 
v.  Major,  18  111.  349,  and  cases  cited  Pym  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  4 
under    last    note).      In    Michigan,  Best  &  S.  396. 

Wisconsin,  Nebraska  and  Colorado,  6  Pym  v.  Great  Northern  R.  Co.,  4 

whose  statutes,  substantially  identi-  Best  &  S.  396. 
cal,  allow  damages  "  with  reference 


213  DECEASED   PERSONS.  [§  I  39 

but  upon  condition  of  being  dependent  upon  the  decedent  for 
support,  proof  of  such  dependence  is  necessary  to  maintain 
the  action.7 

§  138.  Miscellaneous  points. —  In  some  of  the  states  the 
statute  specifies  the  time  within  which  an  action  for  injuries 
causing  death  should  be  begun.  In  others  the  statute  is  silent 
on  the  subject.  Where  this  is  the  case,  the  rule  is  that  the 
time  begins  to  run  from  the  date  of  the  death.1  The  time  is 
governed  by  the  law  of  the  place  where  the  injury  occurred, 
not  by  that  of  the  state  where  the  action  is  brought.2  Many 
questions  arising  under  the  various  statutes  relating  to  the 
measure  of  damages,  the  right  to  exemplary  and  punitive 
damages  are  reserved,  as  more  properly  belonging  to  the 
chapter  on  Damages.  The  subject  of  contributory  negligence, 
in  connection  with  this  class  of  actions,  has  already  been 
treated  (§  62). 

§  139.  Effect  of  survival  statutes. —  Statutes  have  been 
enacted  in  several  states,  beginning  with  Massachusetts,1  and 
followed  in  New  Hampshire,  Connecticut,  Delaware,  Ken- 
tucky, Tennessee,  Arkansas,  Iowa,  Louisiana  and  South 
Dakota,  providing  for  the  survival  and  continuance,  to  his 
personal  representative,  of  the  right  of  action  which  a  per- 
son killed  by  an  injury  would  have  had  in  case  he  had  not 
died.  In  Massachusetts  and  Mississippi,  it  is  held  that  such  a 
statute  does  not  give  to  the  representatives  a  right  to  sue 
upon  an  injury  which  caused  instantaneous  death,  upon  the 
ground  that  the  deceased   could  never  have   had  a  cause   of 

'The  Georgia  Code  gives  the  right  Stat.  1887,  c.  270,  §  2  ;   McCarthy  v. 

of  recovery  to  a  father  or  mother  for  New  England  Order,  etc.,  153  Mass. 

death  of  a  child  on  whom  he  or  she  314 ;  Daly  v.  New  Jersey  Steel  Co.. 

was  dependent,  or  who  contributed  to  155  Id.  1;  Hodnett  v.  Boston,  etc.  R. 

his  or  her  support.     It  is  not  enough  Co.,  156  Id.  86  ;  30  N.  E.  224. 

to    show      merely     that      decedent  '  Waldo  v.  Goodsell,  33  Conn.  432  ; 

contributed    to  a    parent's   support,  see  Needham  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co., 

(Clay  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  84  Ga.  345;  38  Vt.  294;  Atlanta,   etc  R.  Co.  v. 

10  S.  E.  967) ;  though  it  is  not  neces-  Venable,  67  Ga.  697. 

sary  that   the   parent   should   have  5  Weaver  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co., 

been  wholly  dependent  (Daniels  v.  21  D.  C.  499. 

Savannah,  etc.  R.  Co.,  86  Ga.  236  ;  12  '  Stat.    1842,   c.  89  ;  Stat.   1882,  c. 

S.  E.  365) .  See  decisions  under  Mass.  165. 


§  139] 


DECEASED    PERSONS. 


214 


action  for  his  own  death.3  If  the  deceased  lingered,  even  for 
the  short  est  appreciable  space  of  time,  it  is  held  that  he  had  a 
cause  of  action,  which  survives  under  the  statute.3  But  it  is 
further  held  that  only  such  damages  can  be  recovered  by  the 
representative  as  the  deceased  person  could  have  recovered  on 
account  of  what  he  suffered  up  to  the  time  of  his  death,  and 
therefore  that  if  he  was  always  entirely  unconscious,  and 
suffered  nothing,  his  representatives  can  only  recover  nominal 
damages.4  In  Connecticut,  under  a  similar  statute,  it  was  held 
that  there  could  be  no  such  thing  as  literally  instantaneous 
death,  that  is  to  say,  death  happening  absolutely  simul- 
taneously with  the  injury  causing  it,  and  therefore  that  a 
sufficient  cause  of  action  for  substantial  (though  not  for  penal) 
damages  survived  to  the  representative,  in  all  cases.5  We 
think  that  the  latter  construction  of  the  statute  is  correct. 
The  interval  between  injury  and  death  may  be  inappreciable; 
but  it  is  impossible  that  there  should  be  none.6  A  more  diffi- 
cult question  arises  where,  as  in  Kentucky  and  South  Dakota, 
a  single  statute  provides  for  two  distinct  actions  by  distinct 
persons,  in  different  rights,  for  the  same  injury.  In  those 
states,  the  statute  provides  that  the  cause  of  action  belonging 
to  the  deceased  person  shall  survive  to  his  personal  representa- 
tive, and  also  that  certain  specified  relatives  of  the  deceased 
may  recover  for  the  injury  suffered  by  the  family  from  the 
death.     In  South  Dakota,  it  is  held  that  this  clearly  indicates 


"Hollenbeck  v.  Berkshire  R.  Co., 
9  Cush.  478;  Kearney  v.  Boston  & 
Wore.  R.  Co.,  Id.  108  ;  followed  in 
many  cases,  e.  g.,  Mulchahey  v. 
Washburn  Car  Wheel  Co.,  145  Mass. 
281;  14  N.  E.  106;  Beckman  v.  Georgia 
Pae.  R.  Co.,  Miss.  ;  12  So.  956; 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Pendergrass, 
6'J  Miss.  425  ;  12  So.  954. 

3  Bancroft  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
11  Allen,  34. 

4  Mulchahey  v.  Washburn  Car 
Wheel  Co.,  145  Mass.  281  ;  14  N.  E. 
106. 

5  Murphy  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co.,  30 
Conn.  184.  The  statute  has  since 
been  amended  so  as  to  embody  this 
decision.     The  cause  of  action  does 


not  arise  in  favor  of  an  administra- 
tor, in  Connecticut,  until  he  is  ap- 
pointed (Andrews  v.  Hartford,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  34  Conn.  57). 

6  On  this  point  Comstock,  J.,  has 
well  said  (Whitford  v.  Panama  R. 
Co.,  23  N.  Y.  465,  486):  "  The  death 
may  be  sudden ;  in  common  lan- 
guage, instantaneous.  But  in  every 
fatal  casualty  there  must  be  a  con- 
ceivable point  of  time,  however 
minute,  between  the  violence  and 
the  total  extinction  of  life.  .  .  . 
During  its  continuance  the  right  of 
compensation  for  the  wrong  belongs 
to  the  victim,  and  is  capable  of  dev- 
olution, like  other  rights,  upon  his 
representative." 


215  DECEASED   PERSONS.  [§  140 

an  intention  on  the  part  of  the  legislature  to  exclude  from  the 
recovery  of  the  representative  all  compensation  for  death, 
since  otherwise  the  party  in  fault  would  be  required  t«  pay  for 
the  same  injury  twice  over.7  In  Kentucky,  this  difficulty  is 
solved  by  holding  that  the  representative  can  recover  only 
actual  damages,  while  the  family  can  recover  exemplary 
damages.8  The  latter  reasoning  would  not  be  satisfactory 
where,  as  is  generally  the  case,  exemplary  damages  are  not 
recoverable  at  all.  In  Iowa,  where  the  statute  provides,  in  the 
simplest  possible  terms,  for  a  survival  of  the  right  of  action, 
the  representative  is  entitled  to  recover  full  (though  not  puni- 
tive) damages,  even  in  case  of  instantaneous  death  ;9  and  such 
also  is  the  rule  in  Louisiana.10  Under  any  of  the  other 
statutes  that  we  have  mentioned,  it  is  of  no  importance 
whether  the  decedent  died  instantly  from  the  effect  of  the 
injury  or  lingered  for  some  time.11 

§  140.  Effect  of  releases  and  settlements  out  of  court. — 

Where  the  right  of  action  is  given  only  by  a  survival  statute 
(that  is,  continuing  the  right  of  the  injured  person,  after  his 
death),  it  is  too  plain  for  argument  that  a  release  from  the  de- 
ceased in  his  lifetime  is  a  bar  to  any  action.1  But,  further- 
more, it  has  been  held,  under  the  broader  statutes,  that  the 
foundation  of  every  action  of  this  kind  is  in  the  injury  which 
caused  the  death,  and  not  merely  in  the  fact  of  death  itself; 
and,  therefore,  that   if  an  injured  person  recovers  damages  for 

■•  Beluing  v.  Black  Hills,    etc.    R.  R.  Co.,  37   S.  C.  42;  16  S.    E.   289; 

Co.,  3  S.  Dak.  369;  53  N.  W.  750.  Haley  v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  7  Bax- 

8  Givens  v.  Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co.,  ter,  239;  International  R.  Co.  v. 
89  Ky.  231;  12  S.  W.  257.  Kindred,  57  Texas,  491  ;   Nashville, 

9  Conners  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Prince,  2  Heisk.  580  ; 
Co.,  71  Iowa,  490  :  32  N.  W.  465.  overruling  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 

10  In  Louisiana,  where  an  infant  Burke,  6  Coldvv.  45.  In  Maine,  the 
child  is  negligently  run  over  by  an  death  must  be  instantaneous  to  give 
engine,  and  instantly  killed,  a  cause  a  statutory  right  of  action  ;  because, 
of  action  accrues  to  the  child  and  if  it  were  not  instantaneous,  the 
survives  to  the  parents  ;  but  the  cause  of  action  survived,  inde- 
right  to  recover  punitive  damages  pendent  of  statute  (Sawyer  v.  Perry, 
does  not  survive  (Hamilton  v.  Mor-  88  Me.  42  ;  88  Atl.  660  ;  State  v.  Grand 
gan's  S.   S.    Co.,  42   La.  Ann.   824;  Trunk  R.  Co.,  61  Me.  114). 

8  So.  586).  'Price  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 

"  Brown  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,     33  S.  C.  556  ;  12  S.  E.  413. 
22  N.  Y.  191  ;  Reed  v.  Northeastern 


§i4o] 


DECEASED    PERSONS. 


2l6 


that  injury  during  his  lifetime,2  or  releases  his  claim,3  or  (under 
peculiar  English  statutes)  if  he  had  contracted  with  his  em- 
ployer that  the  benefit  of  the  statute  should  not  be  claimed,4 
his  representatives  cannot  maintain  any  action  upon  his  subse- 
quent death,  resulting  from  the  injury.  A  release  given  to 
the  person  liable,  by  all, those  entitled  to  the  amount  recover- 
able for  death  caused  by  a  wrongful  act,  has  been  held,  in 
Minnesota,  a  bar  to  a  subsequent  action  brought  by  the  per- 
sonal representative  of  deceased.5  But  not  so  in  Indiana.6 
Certainly  all  the  parties  in  interest  must  unite  in  such  release, 
to  make  it  an  effectual  bar.7  A  release  from  the  party  having 
the  first  right  to  sue  is- conclusive  against  others,  having  only 
a  subordinate  right.8  The  effect  of  a  recovery  by  one  person 
upon  the  right  of  action  of  another  upon  the  same  death 
varies,  under  different  statutes.9 


*  Littlewood  v.  New  York,  89  N. 
Y.  24 ;  overruling  Schlichting  v. 
Wintgen,  25  Hun,  626. 

3  Read  v.  Great' Eastern  R.  Co.,  L. 
R.  3  Q.  B.  555 ;  Dibble  v.  N.  Y.  & 
Erie  R.  Co. ,  25  Barb.  183  ;  see  the  re- 
sult of  the  appeal  in  this  case,  23  N. 
Y.  484;  Fowlkes  v.  Nashville,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  5  Baxt.  [Tenn.]  663 ;  see,  how- 
ever, Southern,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sulli- 
van, 59  Ala.  272.  The  effect  of  the 
decision  in  Robinson  v.  Canadian 
Pac.  R.  Co.  (1892  App.  Cas.  481  ;  rev'g 
19  Can.  S.  C.  292)  on  these  cases  is 
worth  consideration  ;  for  it  recog- 
nizes death  as  a  new  and  separate 
cause  of  action. 

4  Griffiths  v.  Earl  Dudley,  L.  R.  9 
Q.  B.  Div.  357.  In  Iowa,  where  the 
statute  gives  a  remedy  to  railroad 
employes  for  injuries  caused  by  neg- 
ligence of  other  employes,  it  is  ex- 
pressly provided  that  no  agreement 
exempting  the  company  from  liabil- 
ity shall  be  binding  (Iowa  Stat.  1888, 
%  1807;  so  by  Wis.  Rev.  Stat.  1878, 
§  1816  ;  repealed  in  1880).    Under  the 


Iowa  statute,  a  contract  exempting  a 
railroad  company  from  liability  for 
injury  to  a  passenger  is  invalid  (Rose 
v.  Des  Moines  Valley  R.  Co. ,  39  Iowa 
246). 

6  Sykora  v.  Case  Mach.  Co.,  59 
Minn.  130;  60  N.  W.  1008. 

6  Yelton  v.  Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
134  Ind.  414;  33  N.  E.  629. 

7  An  action  by  an  administrator  for 
the  wrongful  death  of  his  intestate 
"  for  the  use  and  benefit  of  the 
widow  and  children,"  cannot  be  com- 
promised by  the  widow  without  the 
consent  of  the  children  or  adminis- 
trator (Knoxville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Acuff,  92  Tenn.  26;  20  S.  W.  348). 

8  Holder  v.  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
92  Tenn.  142;  20  S.  W.  537. 

9  Compare  Legg  v.  Britton,  64  Vt. 
652  ;  24  Atl.  1016  ;  Hecht  v.  Ohio,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  132  Ind.  507  ;  32  N.  E.  302  ; 
Nelson  v.  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  78 
Tex.  621  ;  14  S.  W.  1021  ;  Putnam  v. 
Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  21  Oreg.  230 ; 
27  Pac.  1033. 


PART  II. 


LIABILITIES     ARISING     OUT    OF     PERSONAL 
RELATIONS. 


Chapter  IX.    Liability  of  Masters  for  Servants. 
X.    Liability  of  Masters  to  Servants. 
XL    Liability  of  Servants. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


LIABILITY  OF  MASTERS  FOR  SERVANTS. 


§  141.  General  rule  of  liability.  §  157. 

142.  Principle  of  the  rule. 

143.  [Omitted].  158. 

144.  Agency    necessary  to  create 

responsibility.  159. 

145.  Master's  liability  for  servant's 

acts  under  implied  authority.        160. 

146.  Master  liable  for  acts  in  course       161. 

of  employment. 

147.  What  acts  are  within  employ-       162. 

ment.  163. 

148.  Master  not  liable  for  acts  out- 

side of  employment.  164. 

149.  [Omitted].  165. 

150.  Liability  for  servant's  willful 

acts.  166. 

151.  Ostensible  authority  for  will- 

ful acts.  167. 

152.  [Omitted].  168. 

153.  Willful     acts;     when   conse- 

quence of  negligence.  109. 

154.  Liability  for  negative  results 

of  willful  acts.  170. 

155.  Disobedience    of    master's       171. 

orders. 

156.  [Omitted]. 

[217] 


Liability  for  sub-agents  or 
strangers. 

Implied  liability  of  owner  of 
vehicle. 

Ownership  of  other  property; 
how  far  implies  liability. 

Who  is  to  be  deemed  a  master. 

Nominal  master  when  not 
liable. 

Liability  for  servant  hired  out. 

Liability  of  trustees  for  em- 
ployee's acts. 

Who  is  a  "  contractor." 

When  contractor  and  when 
servant. 

Effect  of  employer's  control 
over  contractor. 

Effect  of  right  of  dismissal. 

Employer  not  liable  for  con- 
tractor's negligence. 

Negligence  of  subcontractor 
ami  jia  it-contractor. 

[Omitted]. 

Employer  liable  for  persons 
selected  by  him. 


S  142 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


218 


170.  Liability  for  servant  roinpul- 
sorily  employed  —  pilots. 

17o.  Liability  of  owner  for  persons 
employed  on  land. 

174.  Liability  of  employer  for  his 
own  fault. 


§  175.  Employer  liable  for  act  con- 
tracted for. 
176.  Omission  of  duty  not  excused 
by  contracting  to  have  it 
done. 


§  141.  General  rule  of  liability. — It  is  an  old  and  thoroughly- 
established  doctrine  that,  where  the  relation  of  master  and  ser- 
vant exists,  the  master  is  responsible  to  third  persons  for  the 
damage  caused  by  the  wrongful  acts  or  omissions  of  his  servants, 
in  the  course  of  their  employment  as  such.1  This  liability  is 
not  confined  to  the  mere  negligence  of  servants,  but  extends 
also  to  their  willful  acts,  though  unauthorized  or  even  forbidden 
by  the  master,  so  far  as  such  acts  deprive  third  persons  of  a 
benefit  which  the  master  was  bound  to  confer  upon  them,  or,  for 
any  other  reason,  have  occurred  in  the  course  of  the  servant's 
employment.  This  responsibility  for  willful  wrongs,  not  au- 
thorized by  the  master,  may  still  fall  under  the  law  of  negli- 
gence. The  master  may  be  considered  in  such  case  guilty, 
not  of  the  wrongful  act  itself,  but  only  of  neglect  to  restrain 
his  servant  from  committing  it.2 

§  142.  Principle  of  the  rule. —  The  principle  which  lies  at 
the  foundation  of  this  rule  has  been  differently  stated  in 
several  judicial  opinions;1  and  the  abstract  justice  of  the  rule 


1  Whiteley  v.  Pepper,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B. 
Div.  276  ;  Coughtry  v.  Globe  Woolen 
Co.,  56  N.  Y.  124  ;  Kennedy  v.  Ryall, 
67  Id.  379  ;  Simonton  v.  Loring,  68 
Me.  164;  The  Rheola,  22  Blatchf. 
124;  Tuel  v.  Weston,  47  Vt.  634; 
Phelon  v.  Stiles,  43  Conn.  426;  Oil 
Creek,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Keighron,  74 
Pa.  St.  316  [servant  let  oil  car  come 
into  collision  with  a  locomotive, 
which  set  fire  to  the  car,  burning 
plaintiff's  house] ;  Andrews  v.  Boe- 
decker,  126  111.  605 ;  18  N.  E.  651  ; 
and  cases,  infra. 

5  See  §§  153,  154,  post. 

1  ' :  The  reason  of  [the  rule]  is  that 
every  act  which  is  done  by  a  servant 
in  the  course  of  his  duty  is  regarded 
as  done  by  his  master's  orders,  and 


consequently  is  the  same  as  if  it 
were  the  master's  own  act "  (per 
Lord  Chelmsford,  in  Bartonshill 
Coal  Co.  v.  McGuire,  3  Macq.  H.  L. 
306).  "The  responsibility  of  the 
master  for  the  acts  of  a  servant  rests 
upon  the  express  or  implied  authori- 
zation of  the  act  by  the  master,  who, 
in  the  employment  of  another  to  act 
for  him,  assumes  all  the  risks  of  a 
wrongful  execution  of  his  duties" 
(per  Allen,  J.,  in  Mott  v.  Consumers' 
Ice  Co.,  73  N.  Y.  543).  The  master's 
liability  "is wholly  irrespective  of 
any  contract,  express  or  implied,  or 
any  other  relation  between  the 
injured  party  and  the  master  "  (per 
Grier,  J.,  in  Philadelphia,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.   Derby,   14  How.  U.  S.    468, 


219 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


[§  H2 


itself  has  been  occasionally  questioned.2  But  the  soundness  of 
the  principle  and  the  necessity  of  the  rule,  which  we  have 
inherited  from  the  Roman  law,3  have  received  new  and  con- 
vincing illustrations  in  the  immense  development  of  modern 
corporations.  If  the  rule  of  respondeat  superior  were  now  to 
be  abrogated,  it  would  be  almost  impossible  to  carry  on  the 
present  complex  business  of  society.  Every  person  having 
any  pecuniary  responsibility  would  shelter  himself  behind  the 
forms  of  a  corporation,  which  would,  in  such  case,  be  free  from 
all  responsibility  for  the  negligence  and  violence  of  its  agents, 
without  direct  evidence  of  authority  for  their  acts ;  while  such 
evidence  could  be,  in  almost  every  instance,  suppressed.  In 
short,  the  rule  is  one  of  those  elementary  ones,  established  so 


485).  "  It  is  this  right  to  control  the 
conduct  of  the  agent  which  is  the 
foundation  of  the  doctrine  that  the 
master  is  to  be  affected  by  the  acts 
of  his  servant "  (X.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Steinbrenner,  47  N.  J.  Law, 
161).  In  Wilson  v.  Owens  (16  L.  R.  Ir. 
225),  Dowse  B.,  says:  "There  is  no 
material  difference  whether  the 
party  committing  the  injury  is  a 
Bervant  or  agent  of  the  defendant. 
A  servant  is  an  agent.  The  princi- 
pal is  responsible  for  the  act  of  his 
agent,  and  this  case  is  only  an  appli- 
cation of  the  doctrine  of  '  respondeat 
superior.'"''  See  Cooley  on  Torts, 
539.  The  rule  "is  founded  on  the 
soundest  considerations  of  public 
policy,  and  which  the  courts  are  not 
at  lrberty  to  relax  "  (per  Thompson, 
J.,  in  Siegrist  v.  Arnot,  10 Mo.  App. 
197).  "  The  rule  is  necessary  to  pre- 
vent fraud  and  encourage  confi- 
dence in  dealing"  (per  Tenney,  C. 
J.,  Stickney  v.  Munroe,  44  Me.  204). 
2  "We  never  apply  this  rule  [re- 
spondeat superior]  without  a  sense 
of  its  hardships  on  the  master  ;  but 
it  has  been  settled  on  a  broad  bal- 
ancing of  reason  and  equities,  and 
judicis  est  dicere,  noil  donare,  legem  " 
(per  Fenner,  J.,  Shea  v.  Reems,  36 
La.    Ann.     966).     "It    is    very  im- 


portant that  the  principle  [respond- 
eat superior]  should  be  upheld  and 
maintained  for  the  sake  of  the  gen- 
eral security  of  society,  yet  it  is 
often  attended  with  much  seeming 
hardship.  To  visit  a  man  with 
heavy  damages  for  the  negligence 
of  a  servant,  when  he  is  able  to 
show  that  he  exercised  all  possible 
care  and  precaution  in  the  selection 
of  him,  is  apt  to  strike  the  common 
mind  as  unjust"  (per  Shars wood,  J., 
Hays  v.  Millar,  77  Pa.  St.  238).  In 
Collett  v.  Foster  (2  Hurlst.  &  N.  356), 
where  a  client  was  made  liable  for 
the  tortious  acts  of  his  attorney  in 
the  conduct  of  a  suit,  though  he 
was  wholly  ignorant  of  the  particu- 
lar act,  Bramwell,  B.,  expressed  a 
great  desire  to  limit  the  doctrine  of 
respondeat  superior,  no  as  to  make 
the  actual  wrong-doer  alone  respon- 
sible. See,  also,  Smith  v.  Keal,  L. 
R.  9  Q.  B.  Div.  340. 

3 "  The  true  explanation  of  the 
doctrine  seems  to  be  historical,  dat- 
ing back  to  the  period  of  the  Roman 
law  when  servants  were  slaves,  for 
whom  the  pater  familiaa  was  respon- 
sible, as  part  of  his  general  responsi- 
bility for  the  family  which  he  repre- 
sented and  governed"  (2  Kent 
Com.  12th  ed.  260,  n.  1). 


§144] 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


220' 


early  in  the  history  of  civil  society  that  the  evils  which  led  to 
its  establishment  have  utterly  passed  away,  leaving  scarcely  a 
trace  in  history;  and  it  is  precisely  such  rules  and  principles 
which  are  most  questioned  in  modern  times,  simply  because 
no  human  memory  and  no  written  record  enables  us  to  recall 
the  state  of  facts  out  of  which  reason  developed  them. 


§  143.  [Omitted.] 

§  144.  Agency  necessary  to   create  responsibility.  —  No 

one  is  responsible  for  the  act  or  omission  of  another,  unless 
that  other  is  his  agent.1  The  relation  of  parent  or  child  is  not 
of  itself  enough  to  make  the  parent  responsible  for  the  negli- 
gence of  even  a  minor  child2  in  his  custody  and  care,  much 
less  for  that  of  an  adult  child.3  Nor  is  the  child  responsible 
for  any  act  of  the  parent,  as  such.4  Neither  does  the  relation 
of  husband  and  wife,  of  itself,  bring  either  of  them  within  the 
scope  and  meaning  of  this  chapter.  Under  the  rules  of  the 
common  law,  the  husband  was  often  liable  for  his  wife's  torts  ; 


1  See  §  65,  ante.  To  render  one 
liable  for  the  negligence  of  another, 
the  relation  of  master  and  servant, 
or  principal  and  agent,  must  exist 
(Stevens  v.  Armstrong,  6  N.  Y.  435  ; 
McGuire  v.  Grant,  25  N.  J.  Law, 
356  ;  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Russ,  57  Id.  126  ; 
30  Atl.  524  ;  Larock  v.  Ogdensburgh, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  26  Hun,  382  ;  Fisher  v. 
Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  34  Id.  433). 
"It  is  absolutely  essential,  in  order 
to  establish  a  liability  against  a 
party  for  the  negligence  of  others, 
that  the  relation  of  master  and  ser- 
vant should  exist"  (Hexamer  v. 
Webb,  101  X.  Y.  377  ;  4  N.  E.  755). 
S.  P.,  McCullougli  v.  Shoneman,  105 
Pa.  St.  169 ;  Thorp  v.  Minor,  109  N. 
C.  152;  13  S.  E.  702.  The  fact  that 
a  railway  company  permitted  an  en- 
gine to  be  run  on  its  tracks  by  a  con- 
tractor in  performing  his  contract 
with  third  parties  does  not  render  it 
liable  for  an  injury  occurring 
through  his  negligent  operation  of 
such  engine    (City,    etc.    R.    Co.   v. 


Moores,  80  Md.  348 ;  30  Atl.  643) ; 
Holmes  v.  Union  Tel.  Co.,  62  Hun, 
618  ;  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  563  [licensor  of 
use  of  telegraph  poles  not  liable  for 
licensee's  negligence]  ;  Fluker  v. 
Georgia  R.  Co.,  81  Ga.  461  ;  8  S.  E. 
529  [license].  The  superintendent 
and  an  inmate  of  a  hospital  do  not 
sustain  towards  each  other  the  rela- 
tion of  master  and  servant  (Schrubbe 
v.  Connell,  69  Wise.  476  ;  34  N.  W. 
503).  A  servant  may  so  serve  two 
independent  masters  that  both  shall 
be  liable  (Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v. 
King,  69  Miss.  852  ;  13  So.-824  ;  Fisher 
v.  Cook,  125  111.  280;  17  N.  E.  763). 
s.  p.,  Smith  v.  Belshaw,  89  Cal.  427  ; 
26  Pac.  834  [leased  mine]. 

2  Baker  v.  Morris,  33  Kans.  580 ;  7 
Pac.  267  [minor  son  negligently  fired 
a  gun,  killing  plaintiff's  horse  ;  father 
not  liable]  ;  Brohl  v.  Lingeman,  41 
Mich.  711 ;  3  N.  W.  199. 

3  Way  v.  Powers,  57  Vt.  135. 

4  See  cases  on  Contributory  Negli- 
gence, ante,  §§  70-79. 


221 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS. 


[§  144 


but  that  liability  stands  upon  a  different  ground  from  the  lia- 
bility of  a  master  for  the  act  of  his  servant ;  and  it  does  not  now 
exist  in  most  of  the  United  States.  The  wife  never  was  liable 
for  the  torts  of  the  husband;  and  there  is  no  principle  under 
which  she  can  be  made  so  liable  now.  Nor  is  the  mere  fact 
of  employment  always  sufficient  to  make  the  employer 
responsible  for  the  acts  of  the  person  employed.5  Every  one, 
with  whom  a  contract  is  made  to  do  or  to  furnish  a  thing,  may 
be  said  to  be  employed  for  this  purpose  by  the  person  for 
whom  the  act  is  to  be  performed  ;  but  such  a  contract  does 
not  necessarily  create  the  relation  of  master  and  servant  or 
principal  and  agent ;  and,  where  that  relation  is  not  created, 
the  responsibility  here  defined  does  not  arise.6  It  makes  no 
difference  that  the  employer,  in  such  a  case,  puts  some  of  his 
property,  whether  real  or  personal,  into  the  charge  or  control 
of  the  employed,  and  that  the  latter  uses  that  identical  prop- 
erty in  such  a  wrongful  manner  as  to  injure  a  stranger  there- 
with.7 Much  less  can  the  owner  of  the  property  be  made 
responsible  for  injuries  caused  by  the  contact  of  such  property 
with  the  person  or  property  of  another,  without  proof  or  pre- 
sumption of  any  other  circumstance,  and  on  the  mere  ground 
of  his  ownership.8     The  relation  of  landlord  and  tenant,  there- 


6  King  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  66 
N.  Y.  181,  where  Andrews,  J.,  said  : 
"  It  is  not  enough,  in  order  to  estab- 
lish a  liability  of  one  person  for  the 
negligence  of  another,  to  show  that 
the  person  whose  negligence  caused 


ing  no  right  or  power  to  direct  the 
movements  of  its  trains  while  on  the 
track  of  the  other  company,  was  not 
liable  for  the  negligence  of  those  in 
charge  of  its  train  while  running 
over  such  tracks,  though  employed 


the  injury  was  at  the  time  acting    and  paid  by  it  (At wood  v.  Chicago, 
under  an  employment  by  the  person    etc.  R.  Co.,  72  Fed.  447). 


who  is  sought  to  be  charged.  It 
must  be  shown,  in  addition,  that  the 
employment  created  the  relation  of 
master  and  servant  between  them." 
Tlir  defendant  company  used  an- 
other company's  tracks  under  an 
agreement  that  the  latter  should 
have  the   exclusive   right  to  make 


6  See  post,  %%  164,  168. 

1  See  post,  §§  158,  159,  173  ;  Brohl 
v.  Lingeman,  11  Mich.  711 ;  3  N.  W. 
199  ;  Byrne  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  61  Fed.  605;  9  C.  C.  A.  666. 

8  See  Kelly  v.  New  York,  11  N.  Y. 
432;  Park  v.  Same,  8  [d.222  ;  Gour- 
dier  v.  Cormack,  2  E.  D.Smith,  254  ; 


rules  for  the  operation  of  that  part  Higgs  v.  Maynard,  11   Weekly  Rep. 

of  the  railroad  used  by  the  parties  610;   12   Jur.  N.  S.  705;    Samuelson 

jointly,  and  that  all  trains  should  v.    Cleveland,    etc.    Mining   Co.,   49 

move  in  accordance  with  the  order  Mich.  164;  Pettigrew  v.   St.    Louis, 

of  the  superintendent  of  the  latter  etc.  Steel  Co.,  14  Mo.  A.pp.  Ill;  Cin- 

company.  Held.that  defendant,  hav-  cinnati,  etc.    R.    Co.    v.    Wright,  54 


§  U5.1 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS. 


fore,  does  not  impose  upon  the  landlord  any  liability  for  the 
negligent  vise  of  the  leased  premises  by  the  tenant,  to  the 
injury  of  a  stranger.9 


§  145.  Master's  liability  for  servant's  acts  under  implied 
authority. — A  master  is,, of  course,  responsible  for  any  act  of 
his  servants  committed  by  his  express  command,  however  un- 
lawful it  may  be.  He  is  also  responsible  for  the  acts  of  a 
servant  under  an  implied  authority — that  is  to  say,  an 
authority  which  he  gave  the  servant  himself,  or  the  person 
dealing  with  him,  reasonable  ground  to  believe  had  been  given, 
or  which  is  usually  given  under  similar  circumstances.1  It 
may  well  be  that  a  servant  can  have  no  implied  authority  to 
do  that  which  it  cannot  be  lawful,  under  any  circumstances,  or 


Ohio  St.  181 ;  43  N.  E.  688.  A.  was 
injured  by  collision  with  a  car, 
driven  by  a  servant  of  B.,  the  car 
being  owned  by  C.  Held,  that  action 
was  properly  brought  against  B. 
(Weyant  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  3  Duer, 
360)" 

Wolf  v  Kilpatrick,  101  N.  Y. 
146;  4  N.  E.  188;  Edwards  v.  Har- 
lem R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  249  ;  Miller  v. 
N.  Y.  Lackawanna,  etc.  R.  Co.,  125 
LI.  lis  ;  20  X.  E.  35  [lessor  of  rail- 
road not  liable  for  injuries  to  ad- 
jacent property  by  embankment 
built  by  lessee,  though  bound  by 
terms  of  lease  to  pay  latter  for  its 
new  construction- work],  s.  p.,  Phil- 
ips  v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  62  Hun,  233  ; 
16 N.  Y.  Supp.  909  [lessor  of  railroad]. 
But  the  lessor  of  a  railroad,  in  whose 
exclusive  interest  it  is  operated  by 
the  lessee,  is  liable  for  injuries  re- 
I  through  iIm' negligent  opera- 
tion of  the  road  (Southern  R.  Co.  v. 
Bouknight,  17  C.  C.  A.  181  ;  70  Fed. 
41.'  ;  see  g  120a,  ante,  and  i  413, 
The  defendant,  having  a 
license  to  run  a  ferry,  leased  it  to 
another  ;  and  through  the  negligence 
of  the  lessee's  servant,  A.  was 
drowned.     Held,  that  the  relation  of 


master  and  servant  did  not  exist  be- 
tween lessee  and  defendant,  who 
was  therefore  not  liable  (Blackwell 
v.  Wiswall,  24  Barb.  355) .  To  same 
effect,  Felton  v.  Deall,  22  Vt.  171. 
The  lessor  of  a  quarry  was  held  not 
liable  to  an  enrployee  of  the  lessee, 
for  the  lessee's  negligence  ;  it  not 
appearing  that  any  duty  of  the  lessor 
remained  unperformed,  even  though 
the  one  injured  was  originally  a 
servant  of  the  lessor,  and  supposed 
that  he  was  so  at  the  time  of  the 
accident  (Crusselle  v.  Pugh,  67  Ga. 
430  ;  distinguishing  Lake  Superior 
Iron  Co.  v..  Erickson,  39  Mich.  492). 
Compare  Northeastern  R.  Co.  v.  Bar- 
nett  (89  Ga.  399  ;  15  S.  E.  492),  where, 
on  the  facts,  a  verdict  against  the 
lessor  was  not  disturbed.  One  who 
has  let  out  his  farm  and  stock  on 
shares  is  not  engaged  in  the  joint 
undertaking  of  carrying  on  the  farm 
with  the  tenant  so  as  to  render  him 
personally  liable  for  the  latter's  neg- 
ligence Marsh  v.  Hand,  120  N.  Y., 
315;  24  N.  E.  463). 

1  Allen  v.  Southwestern  R.  Co.,  L. 
R.  6Q.  B,  65,  per  Blackburn,  J.;  Bar- 
wick  v.  English  Joint  Stock  Bank, 
L.  R.  2  Ex.  259. 


22$  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS    FOR   SERVANTS.  [§  I45 

in  any  manner,  for  either  him  or  his  master  to  do.2  But  that 
does  not  justify  the  proposition  that  a  master  is  never  liable  for 
the  act  of  his  servant,  in  doing  that  which,  under  the  particu- 
lar circumstances,  would  have  been  entirely  unlawful  for  his 
master  to  do,  or,  where  the  master  is  a  corporation,  an  act 
beyond  its  corporate  power.  On  this  point  some  confusion 
has  arisen.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that  where  a  railway  corpo- 
ration had  no  power  to  cause  the  arrest  of  the  plaintiff  upon  a 
certain  specified  ground,  it  could  not  be  held  responsible  for 
the  act  of  its  agent  in  arresting  the  plaintiff  on  that  ground, 
although  the  agent  acted  in  good  faith,  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
tecting his  employer's  interest.3  But  this  decision  was  clearly 
wrong.  There  is  not,  and  never  could  have  been,  any  doubt 
that  such  a  corporation  had  power  to  cause  persons  to  be  ar- 
rested and  detained  for  some  offenses ;  and,  such  being  the 
case,  it  is  uniformly  held  that  the  corporation  is  responsible 
for  the  act  of  an  agent  who,  in  good  faith,  believed  that  there 
was  sufficient  ground  for  making  the  arrest.4     For,  where   a 

2 In  Mali  v.  Lord  (39  N.  Y.  381)  Lynch  v.  Metropolitan  El.  R.  Co. 
the  superintendent  of  defendant's  (90  N.  Y.  77),  defendant  was  held 
store  called  in  a  policeman  and  liable  for  the  unlawful  detention  of 
directed  him  to  arrest  and  examine  a  passenger  by  a  gate-keeper,  who 
the  person  of  the  plaintiff,  a  lady,  refused  to  allow  him  to  leave  the 
suspected  of  stealing  goods,  which  station  without  producing  his  ticket 
was  done,  without  defendant's  ex-  or  paying  his  fare.  s.  p.,  Moore  v. 
press  authority .  Held,  that  the  Metropolitan  R.  Oo. ,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  36 
servant  was  not  impliedly  authorized  [false  imprisonment  of  passenger  not 
by  his  master  to  do  that  which  the  paying  proper  fare];  Bayley  v.  Man- 
master  himself,  being  present,  would  Chester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  148 
not  be  authorized  to  do.  See  §  151,  [porter  pulling  passenger  back  from 
post.  train  in  motion];  Seymour  v.  Green- 

3Poulton  v.  Southwestern  R.  Co.,  wood,  7  Hurlst.  &  X.  356  [assault  of 

L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  534.  passenger  by  omnibus  guard].  There 

4  Where   officers  of   railway  com-  are   many  similar  decisions,  but  as 

panies,  intrusted  with  the  execution  they     mainly    lie     outside    of     our 

of  by-laws  relating  to  imprisonment,  province,    we   only   refer   to  a   few, 

and  intending  to  act  in  the  course  of  holding  the  master  liable  for  arrest; 

their  duty,   improperly   imprisoned  Staples  v.  Schmid,  \H  R.  I.  224  ;  26 

persons  who  are  supposed  to  come  Atl.    198    [salesman    in   charge   of 

within  the  terms  of  the  by-laws,  the  Btore];  Mallach  v.  Ridley, 24  AM..  N. 

companies  are  liable  (Goff  v.  Great  < '.  172;  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  922;  qualify- 

Northern  R.  Co.,  3  El.  &  El.  672,  ex-  ing  s.  <■.  before,  48  Hun,  :::;(', .  Clark 

plaining  Roe  v.  Birkenhead  R.  Co.,  7  V     Starin,     17    II.    846;   Toomey    v. 

Ex.  36;  and  see  Barry  v.  Midland  R.  Delaware,  etc.   R.  Co.,  4  Misc. 

Co.,   Irish   Rep.    1    C.   L.   180).    In  24  N.  Y.  Supp.   108;  Atchison,  etc. 


§  14^.1 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


224 


servant  is  authorized  to  do  acts  which  may  or  may  not  be  law- 
ful, according  to  circumstances,  the  master  may  be  liable  for 
Mich  an  act,  although  no  circumstances  existed  to  justify  it.5 
The  master  is  clearly  liable  for  the  servant's  negligence  in 
incomplete  performance  of  an  authorized  act,  even  though  by 
reason  of  such  omission,  the  act  becomes  criminal.6 


§  146.  Master  liable  for  acts  in  course  of  employment.— 

The  master  is  responsible  for  the  negligent  acts  or  omissions 
of  his  servants  in  the  course  of  their  employment,  though  un- 
authorized1 or  even  forbidden2  by  him,  and  although  outside 


R.  Co.  v.  Henry,  55  Kans.  715 ;  41 
Pac.  952  [brain  conductor];  Laffitte 
v.  New  Orleans  E.  Co.,  43  La.  Ann. 
34;  8  So.  701  [car  driver]  ;  compare 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Brewer,  78  Md. 
394 ;  28  Atl.  615  [president  not  au- 
thorized ;  a  strange  decision];  see 
Abrahams  v.  Deakin  (1891),  1  Q.  B. 
516;  60  L.  J.  Q.  B.  238. 

5  See  post,  £  148  ;  Limpus  v.  Lon- 
don Omnibus  Co.,  1  Hurlst.  &  C, 
526  [racing  omnibuses] ;  Regina  v. 
Stephens,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  702  ;  Dickson 
v.  Waldron,  135  Ind.  507;  34  N.  E. 
506 ;  35  Id.  1  [assault  by  special 
policeman].  A  servant  employed 
"to  do  general  farm  work,"  negli- 
gently driving  out  of  the  field  a  tres- 
passing cow,  killed  it  Avith  a  stone. 
The  master  was  held  liable,  though 
\w  had  K^'en  no  orders  in  regard  to 
driving  cattleoutof  the  field  (Evans 
v.  Davidson,  53  Md.  245). 

*  Osborne  v.  McMasters,  40  Minn. 
103;  41  N.  W.  543  [selling  poison 
without  label  |. 

1  Limpus  v.  London  Omnibus  Co., 
1  Hurlst.  &  C.  526;  Croft  v.  Alison, 
4  Barn.  &  AM.  590  ;  Page  v.  Defries, 
7  Best  &  S.  137  ;  Luttrell  v.  Hazen,  3 
Sneed,  20.  To  same  effect,  South- 
wick  v.  Estes,  7  Cush.  385  ;  Cosgrove 
v.  Ogden,  49  N.  Y.  255.     The  test  of 


the  liability  of  a  master  for  the  torts 
of  his  servant  is,  whether  the  latter 
was  at  the  time  acting  within  the 
scope  of  his  authority,  and  not 
whether  the  act  was  done  in  accord- 
ance with  instructions  (Gregory  v. 
Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  37  W.  Va.  606  ;  16 
S.  E.  819 ;  Clark  v.  Koehler,  46  Hun, 
536  ;  Tierney  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co., 
85  Id.  146  ;  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  627).  The 
fact  that  the  engine  was  moved  by  a 
brakeman,  without  authority,  is  im- 
material (Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stewart  [Tex.  Sup.].  17  S.  W.  33). 
2  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Derby, 

14  How.  U.  S.  468 ;  Weed  v.  Panama 
R.  Co.,  17  N.  Y.  362  ;  Columbus,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Powell,  40  Ind.  37  [conduc- 
tor putting  aged  passenger  off  train 
in  motion] ;  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Gorbett,  49  Tex.  573  [brakeman  put- 
ting passenger  off  train]  ;  Dolan  v. 
Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co.,  71  N.  Y. 
285  [negligence  of  flagman  at  rail- 
road crossing]     Duggins  v.  Watson f 

15  Ark.  118  ;  McClung  v.  Dearborne, 
134  Pa.  St.  396  ;  19  Atl.  698  ;  Driscoll 
v.  Carlin,  50  N.  J.  Law,  28 ;  11  Atl. 
482  ;  Mound  City  Paint  Co.  v.  Con- 
Ion,  92  Mo.  221  ;  4  S.  W.  922  ;  Bileu 
v.  Paisley,  18  Oreg.  47 ;  21  Pac.  934 ; 
Gross  v.  Pennsylvania,  etc.  R.  Co., 
62  Hun,  619 ;  16  N.  Y,  Supp.  616. 


225 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS 


[§H6 


of  their  "line  of  duty,"3  and  without  regard  to  their  motives.4 
He  cannot  limit  his  responsibility  for  any  servant,  by  employ- 
ing him  only  with  reference  to  a  single  branch  of  the  business. 
If  a  servant  under  such  limited  employment  nevertheless  un- 
dertakes to  serve  his  master  in  any  other  matter  connected 
with  the  general  business,  and  the  limitation  of  his  employment 
is  not  clear  or  is  not  known  to  the  persons  with  whom  he  deals, 
the  master  is  responsible  for  the  acts  of  such  a  servant,  in  those 
matters,  as  much  as  for  those  of  any  other  servant.5     There  is 


3  It  is  not  correct,  and  leads  to  an 
erroneous  result,  to  describe  the  mas- 
ter's freedom  from  liability  as  arising 
where  the  servant  has  departed  from 
his  "line  of  duty  in"  his  master's 
business.  Such  a  statement  of  the 
law  might  excuse  every  deviation 
from  the  master's  orders,  and  substi- 
tute a  new  and  very  dangerous  test 
of  liability  (Quinn  v.  Power,  87  N. 
Y.  535 ;  approved  in  Pittsburgh,  etc. 
E.  Co.  v.  Kirk,  102  Ind.  399 ;  1  N.  E. 
849).  Master  liable  for  act  of  fore- 
man in  stretching  a  guy  rope  across 
a  railroad  to  aid  in  taking  down  a 
derrick  when  foreman  had  general 
charge  of  the  work,  though  in- 
structed to  employ  a  derrick  special- 
ist when  moving  derricks  (Reinke 
v.  Bentley,  90  Wise.  457  ;  63  N.  W. 
1055  ;  see  Burns  v.  Poulsom,  L.  R.  8 
C.  P.  563). 

4  Stewart  v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co., 
90  N.  Y.  588;  Bryant  v.  Rich,  106 
Mass.  180 ;  Phelon  v.  Stiles,  43  Conn. 
426.  Yet  the  motive  is  often  taken 
into  account,  as  an  element  of  proof 
on  the  main  question  (see  The  Polaria, 
25  Fed.  735  ;  Burns  v.  Poulsom,  L.  R. 
8  C.  P.  563;  Birmingham  Water- 
Works  Co.  v.  Hubbard,  85  Ala.  179  ; 
4  So.  607).  A  master  instructed  liis 
servant  to  go  to  a  certain  place  and 
"kill  a  beef."  The  servant,  finding 
no  animal  there  but  the  plaintiff's 
bull,  killed  it,  honestly  attempting 
to  carry  out  the  master's  order.  The 
master  was    held    liable    (Maier  v. 

[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  1  —  15] 


Randolph,    33    Kans.    340  ;     6    Pac. 
625). 

5  It  is  no  defense  that  the  servant's 
duties  were  in  another  department 
of  the  business,  and  that  his  act  was 
without  the  express  authority  of  the 
master  (Hardegg  v.  Willards,  12 
Misc.  17;  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  25).  In 
Courtney  v.  Baker  (60  N.  Y.  l),the 
master  was  held  liable  for  injuries 
caused  by  a  clerk  watching  for  thefts, 
without  orders.  Rapallo,  J.,  said  : 
"  It  may  be  that  he  was  not  bound 
to  watch  for  thieves,  there  being  a 
watchman  charged  with  that  duty  ; 
but  if,  casually,  suspicious  signs  came 
to  his  notice,  we  think  his  general 
duty  to  his  employers  justified  him 
in  endeavoring  to  ascertain  what 
was  being  done."  Defendant,  a 
blacksmith,  had  only  two  men  work- 
ing, one  of  whom  shod  the  horse  and 
injured  him.  Held,  that  defendant 
was  liable,  though  he  swore  that 
the  man  was  employed  as  a  mere 
helper  and  not  to  put  on  shoes 
(Leviness  v.  Post,  6  Daly,  321). 
Plaintiff  was  employed  by  a  shipper 
to  load  a  car  with  lumber  ;  it  was  the 
duty  of  defendant's  yard  master  to 
enter  cars  on  his  shipping  hook, 
when  reported  ready  for  transporta- 
tion, and  see  thai  they  were  properly 
Loaded  and  securely  staked  ;  the  yard 
master  inspected  the  car  in  question, 
and  required  other  stakes  to  be  placed 
thereon  ;  and  while  plaintiff  was  re- 
moving a  defective  stake  the  yard 


§  147 


1  [ABILITY   OF   MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


226 


no  difference,  in  this  respect,  between  a  servant  who  is  a  general 
agent  and  one  who  is  employed  for  a  particular  purpose;  al- 
though such  a  distinction  has  been  sometimes  taken.6  The 
fact  that  the  servant  is  employed  only  for  a  single  purpose 
may  be  material  in  determining  whether  his  negligence  or  other 
misconduct  happens  in  the  course  of  his  employment ;  but  if 
it  does,  the  master's  liability  is  exactly  the  same  as  if  the  ser- 
vant were  a  general  agent." 


§  147.  What  acts  are  within  employment. —  In  determin- 
ing whether  a  particular  act  is  done  in  the  course  of  the  ser- 
vant's employment,  it  is  proper  first  to  inquire  whether  the 
servant  was  at   the  time  engaged   in  serving  his  master.1     If 


master  broke  off  another  stake,  caus- 
ing the  lumber  to  fall  on  plaintiff. 
The  car  had  been  entered  in  the  ship- 
ping book  by  the  yard  master,  who 
understood  that  it  was  to  be  ready 
to  go  on  the  morning  of  the  accident. 
Held,  proper  to  refuse  to  instruct 
that  if,  at  the  time  of  the  accident, 
the  car  had  not  been  reported  to  de- 
fendant as  ready  for  shipment,  but 
was  at  that  time  under  plaintiff's 
control,  then  the  yard  master,  when 
he  broke  the  stake,  was  not  acting  in 
the  line  of  his  duty,  and  defendant 
would  not  be  liable  (Pollard  v. 
Maine  Cent.  R.  Co.,  87  Me.  51;  33 
All.  735). 

6  See  Wilson  v.  Peverly,  2  N.  H. 

548  ;    Oxford   v.    Peter,    28   111.   434. 

These    cases    have    been    overruled 

midt   v.    Adams,    18  Mo.   App. 

432). 

'  Cases  cited  in  note  5,  supra,  and 
under  next  section. 

'A  master,  who  permits  his  ser- 
vant to  go  to  a  fair  for  his  own 
pleasure  with  the  master's  horse  and 
cart,  is  not  liable  for  damages  aris- 
ing from  the  servant's  negligent  man- 
agement of  the  horse  (Bard  v.  Yohn, 
26  Pa.  St.  482).  In  Aycrigg  v.  N.  Y. 
&  Erie  R.  Co.  (30  N.  J.  Law,  460), 
master  of  a  ferry-boat,  without  au- 


thority, took  a  burning  barge  in  tow. 
Held,  owners  not  liable  for  injuries 
done  by  the  barge.  The  gatekeeper 
of  a  toll-road  company,  who  had 
charge  of  the  gate  at  all  times,  but 
was  not  required  to  collect  toll  after 
9  o'clock  P.  M.,  negligently  let  the 
beam  of  the  gate  down  upon  a  trav- 
eler, who  was  attempting  to  pass 
after  that  hour,  and  injured  him. 
Held,  the  act  was  in  the  course  of 
his  employment,  and  the  company 
responsible  (Noblesvilie,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Gause,  76  Ind.  142).  In  Marrier 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.  (31  Minn.  351; 
17  N.  W.  952),  it  was  sought  to  hold 
a  railroad  company  liable  for  the 
destruction  of  the  plaintiff's  hay  by 
fire,  communicated  from  afire  negli- 
gently left  burning  by  the  company's 
section  men,  which  fire  they  had 
kindled  for  the  purpose  of  warming 
their  coffee.  But  the  court  held  the 
company  not  liable.  Where  a  ser- 
vant, whose  duty  was  to  peddle 
goods  for  his  master,  was  driving  to 
the  store,  in  a  team  of  his  own,  to 
get  goods,  the  master  was  held  lia- 
ble for  an  injury  inflicted  upon  a 
third  person  by  negligent  driving, 
though  no  goods  were  then  in  tie 
wagon  (Shea  v.  Reems,  36  La.  Ann. 
966).    See  cases  under  next  section. 


227 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS. 


[§   H7 


the  act  is  done  while  the  servant  is  at  liberty  from  service,  and 
pursuing  his  own  ends  exclusively,  there  can  be  no  question  of 
the  master's  freedom  from  all  responsibility,2  even  though  the 
injury  complained  of  could  not  have  been  committed  without 
the  facilities  afforded  to  the  servant  by  his  relation  to  his  mas- 
ter.3 On  the  other  hand,  where  a  servant  is  allowed  by  his 
master  to  combine  his  own  business  with  that  of  the  master, 
or  even  to  attend  to  both  at  substantially  the  same  time,  no 
nice  inquiry  will  be  made  as  to  which  business  the  servant  was 
actually  engaged  in,  when  a  third   person  was  injured  by  his 

2  A  servant  of  a  railroad  company  where    the  owner  of  a    horse  and 

was  driving  the    company's  horses  wagon  intrusted  them   generally  to 

home  in   the  usual    way,  when  an-  a   driver,    with   authority  to   secure 

other  servant  of  the  company,  not  such  business  as  he  could,  and  the 

at  the  time  actually  engaged  in  its  latter,     after    having    delivered    a 

service,  struck  them,  rendering  them  trunk,  went  out  of  his  direct  return 

unmanageable,    in    consequence    of  route  to  get  a  load  of  poles  for  him- 

which  they  ran    over  the  plaintiff,  self,  and  while   taking   them   back, 

Held,   that    the    company  was  not  negligently  ran  over  plaintiff.     The 

responsible   (Weldon   v.  Harlem   R.  owner  was    held    liable.     To    same 


Co.,  5Bosw.  576).   s.  P.,  Dells  v.  Stol- 

lenwerk,  78  Wise.  339;  47  N.  W.  431. 

3  Where  a  carman,  whose  duty  it 

was  to  attend  to  putting  up  a  horse 


effect,  Venables  v.  Smith,  L.  R.  2  Q. 
B.  Div.  279.  Mitchell  v.  Crasswel- 
ler  was  followed  in  Sheridan  v. 
Charlick    (4    Daly,    338),    where    a 


and  cart,  drove  in  an  opposite  direc-  coachman,    after    having    used   his 

tion    without    the    consent    of   his  master's  team  upon  an  errand  for 

employer,  and,  on  his  way  back,  in-  his  master,  used  it  upon  an  errand 

jured   a    third    person,  it   was  held  of    his    own,   without   his    master's 

that    his   employer    was   not    liable  knowledge    or   consent,    and   while 

(Mitchell  v.    Crassweller,    13  C.   B.  doing  so,  injured    plaintiff's  horse. 


237).  S.  P.,  Storey  v.  Ashton,  L.  R.  4 
Q.  B.  476.  These  cases  were  distin- 
guished in  Stevens  v.  Woodward  (L. 
R.  6  Q.  B.  Div.  318),  which  was  the 
case  of  a  clerk  of  a  solicitor  who, 
contrary  to  express  orders  not  to 
enter  a  room,  went  in  to  wash  his 
hands,  and  negligently  left  water 
turned  on,  so  that  premises  under- 
neath were  flooded.  Held,  the  em- 
ployer was  not  liable.  But  where  a 
servant  was  not  forbidden  to  use  a 
lavatory,  the  master  was  held  liable 
(Ruddiman  v.  Smith.  60  L.  T.  708; 
37  W.  R.  528).  Mitchell  v.  ( Irass- 
weller  was  further  distinguished  in 
Mulvehill  v.    Bates  (31    Minn.   364), 


Held,  that  the  master  was  not  liable. 
To  precisely  same  effect,  Cavanagh 
v.  Dinsmore,  12  Hun,  465:  also  Ray- 
ner  v.  Mitchell,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  Div. 
357;  Chicago  Bottling  Co.  v.  M<  mi- 
nis. 51  111.  App.  325.  To  similar 
effect,  see  Way  v.  Powers,  57  Vt. 
135;  Stone  v.  Hills,  45  Conn  I  I.  So 
in  Cousins  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co. 
(66  Mo.  572),  where  the  superintend- 
ent of  defendant's  round-house 
took  a  locomotive,  without  authority, 
ran  it  on  defendant's  track  to  gel  a 
doctor  and  killed  plaintiff's  mule  on 
the  trip.  Held,  defendant  not  lia- 
ble. 


§  148] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS. 


228 


negligence  ;  but  the  master  will  be  held  responsible,  unless  it 
clearly  appears  that  the  servant  could  not  have  been,  directly 
or  indirectly,  serving  his  master  in  the  act,  the  negligent  per- 
formance of  which  caused  the  injury.4  And  slight  deviations 
from  the  strict  path  of  service  will  not  suffice  to  relieve  the 
master.5 


§  148.  Master  not  liable  for  acts  outside  of  employment. — 
The  fact  that  the  servant  was,  at  the  time  of  the  injury,  en- 
gaged  in  the  service  of  his  master,  is  not  conclusive  of  the 
master's  liability.  The  mere  fact  that  one  is  master  and  the 
other  servant  does  not,  of  itself,1  make  the  master  responsible 
for  any  act  or  omission,  which  has  no  relation  to  the  servant's 
employment.2      The   act   complained   of  must   be  within   the 


4  The  defendant's  agent  was  driv- 
ing with  his  own  horse  and  gig,  for 
his  own  purpose,  but  proposed,  with 
the  knowledge  of  the  defendant, 
though  without  his  express  assent,  to 
stop  on  the  way  upon  defendant's 
business,  and,  before  so  stopping, 
ran  against  plaintiff's  horse.  Held, 
that  the  defendant  was  liable 
(Patten  v.  Rea,  2  C.  B.  N.  S.  606). 

5  In  Joel  t.  Morison  (6  Carr.  &  P. 
501),  a  servant,  driving  his  master's 
cart,  on  his  master's  business,  made 
a  slight  detour  for  some  purpose  of 
his  own.  Held,  the  master  was  lia- 
ble for  an  injury  done  by  him,  on 
the  way.  This  ease  was  apparently 
approved  in  Burns  v.  Poulsom  (L. 
R.  8  C.  P.  563) :  and  the  same  decision 
was  made  in  Ritchie  v.  Waller  (63 
Conn.  155;  28  Atl.  29).  Where  the 
pilot  in  charge  of  the  defendants' 
ferry-hoat,  diverging  from  his  course 
to  favor  a  passenger,  collided  with 
a  canal-boat,  the  defendants  were 
held  liable,  though  they  neither 
knew  of  nor  consented  to  their  ser- 
vant's acts  (Quinn  v.  Power,  87  N. 
Y.  535:  compare  Brown  v.  Purvi- 
ance,  2  Harr.  &  G.  316). 

1  This  qualification  is  very  material, 
as  will  be  seen   later  on.      Thus,  a 


bailee,  for  hire,  is  responsible  for 
damage  done  to  the  chattel,  through 
negligence  of  the  bailee's  servant, 
though  not  in  the  course  of  his  em- 
ployment (Coupe  Co.  v.  Maddick, 
1891,  2  Q.  B.  413;  60  L.  J.  Q.  B. 
676). 

2  Walton  v.  N.  Y.  Central  Sleeping 
Car  Co.,  139  Mass.  556  ;  2  N.  E.  101 
[car  porter,  throwing  out  his  own 
things]  ;  Smith  v.  Spitz,  156  Mass. 
319  ;  31  N.  E.  5  [billposter  leaving 
bills  about]  ;  Driscoll  v.  Scanlon,  165 
Mass.  348  ;  43  N.  E.  100  [teamster's 
invitation  to  ride,  and  to  drive  the 
team]  ;  Searle  v.  Parke,  N.  H.  ; 
34  Atl.  744  [theft]  ;  Smith  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  78  Hun,  524;  29 
N.  Y.  Supp.  540  [agent  amusing 
himself  with  torpedo]  :  Wyllie  v. 
Palmer.  63  Hun,  8;  17  N.  Y.  Supp. 
434  [firing  rockets]  ;  Brunner  v. 
American  Tel.  Co.,  151  Pa.  St. 
447;  25  Atl.  29  [dynamite  as  amuse- 
ment] :  Shaw  v.  Reed,  9  Watts  &  S. 
72  ;  Aycrigg  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co., 
30  N.  J.  Law.  460  ;  Adams  v.  Cost, 
62  Md.  264  ;  Harris  v.  Mabry,  1  Ired. 
N.  C.  Law,  240  ;  Mayer  v.  Thompson, 
etc.  Bldg.  Co.,  104  Ala.  61 1 ;  16  So.  620; 
Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Carper,  112 
Ind.    26  ;    13   N.  E.    122   [conductor 


229 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   FOR    SERVANTS. 


[§    ISO 


scope  of  authority  which  the  servant  had  from  the  master,3  or 
which  the  master  gave  the  servant  reasonable  cause  to  believe 
that  he  had,  or  which  servants  employed  in  the  same  capacity 
usually  have,4  or  which  third  persons  have  a  right  to  infer  from 
the  nature  and  circumstances  of  the  employment.5  The  mere 
fact  that  the  injury  complained  of  was  caused  by  negligence 
of  the  servant  in  the  performance  of  an  act  which,  taken  per  se, 
was  within  the  scope  of  his  employment,  will  not  impose  a 
liability  upon  the  master,  if  the  act  was  merely  incidental  to 
the  servant's  attempt  to  perform  an  act  entirely  beyond  the 
scope  of  his  authority.6 

§  149.   [Omitted.] 

§150.   Liability  for  servant's  willful  acts.  —  There   is   no 
such  broad  rule  of   law  as   that  a  master  is  not  liable  for  the 


directing  passenger  where  to  go  after 
leaving  train]  ;  Keating  v.  Michigan 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  97  Mich.  154  ;  56  N.  W. 
346  [advice  to  passenger]  ;  Wiltse  v. 
State  Bridge  Co.,  63  Mich.  639 ;  30 
N.  W.  370  [horse  frightened  by  pri- 
vate property  of  servant]  ;  Walker 
v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  121  Mo.  575  ; 
26  S.  W.  360  [freight  carried  without 
authority]  ;  Yates  v.  Squires,  19 
Iowa,  26  ;  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Mullins,  44  Neb.  732  ;  62  N.  W.  880  ; 
Dawkins  v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  77  Tex. 
232  ;  18  S.  W.  984  [hand-car  used  for 
private  purpose]  ;  International,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Cooper,  88  Tex.  607;  32S.W. 
517  [engineer's  invitation  to  ride  on 
locomotive]. 

3  Ratification  of  an  unauthorized 
act  will  make  the  principal  liable  for 
an  injury  resulting  from  the  negli- 
gence of  the  agent  in  doing  the  act 
(Nirns  v.  Mt.  Hermon  School,  160 
Mass.  177  ;  35  N.  E.  776). 

4It  is  within  the  Bcopeof  authority 
of  the  conductor  and  driver  of  a 
horse-car  to  receive  and  let  off  a  pas- 
senger without  payment  of  fare 
(Brennan  v.  Fair  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co., 
45  Conn.  284). 

5  Chicago,  etc.  R.   Co.  v.  Casey,  9 


111.  App.  632,  639.  In  that  case,  de- 
fendant was  charged  with  its  engi- 
neer's negligence  in  giving  permis- 
sion to  a  boy  to  get  upon  a  train 
while  in  motion.  It  was  held  not 
liable,  Bailey,  J.,  saying:  "  The  en- 
gineer, then,  in  giving  the  boys  per- 
mission to  ride,  acted  not  only  with- 
out actual  authority  from  the  com- 
pany, but  also  without  any  authority 
which  third  persons  had  a  right  to 
infer  from  the  nature  and  circum- 
stances of  his  employment  ;  in  other 
words,  without  any  apparent  author- 

ity." 

6  Coomes  v.  Houghton,  102  Mass. 
211  ;  Olive  v.  Whitney  Marble  Co., 
103  N.  Y.  292;  affi'g  8.  C.  36  I  Inn, 
640.  In  Burke  v.  Shaw  (59  Miss. 
443),  1 1  ie  owners  of  a  foundry  had  for 
years  given  tin'  ashes  to  their  engi- 
neer, in  consideration  of  his  remov- 
ing them  after  working  hours  ;  and 
lie  deposited  1  hem,  to  t  he  know  ledge 
of  his  employers,  on  an  un inclosed 
lot  opposite  tin'  foundry,  owned  by 
third  persons.  Hold,  Buch  employers 
were  d<  >t  liable  for  injuries  caused  to 
a  young  child  who,  running  across 
the  lot,  tell  into  a  quantity  of  1  lie  hot 
ashes  and  was  burned. 


g    i;  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS.  230 

unauthorized,  willful  and  wrongful  acts  of  his  servants;  and, 
though  such  a  doctrine  has  often  been  propounded  in  judicial 
opinions,1  it  is  now  so  thoroughly  overruled  as  to  need  no 
further  notice.  The  only  ground  upon  which  a  master  can 
avoid  liability  for  unauthorized  and  willful  acts  of  a  servant  is 
that  they  are  not  done  in  the  course  of  the  servant's  employ- 
ment. When  they  are  so  done,  the  master  is  responsible  for 
them.-  When  not  so  done,  yet  if  they  directly  cause  a  failure 
to  perform  a  duty  incumbent  upon  the  master,  he  is  responsi- 
ble on  that  ground.3    In  other  cases  he  is  not  responsible  at  all.4 


1  See  Harris  v.  Nicholas,  5  Munf. 
4s:: ;  Moore  v.  Sanborne,  3  Mich.  519  ; 
Johnson  v.  Barber,  5  Gilm.  425,  and 
cases  infra. 

9  See  Weed  v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  17 
N.  Y.  362  ;  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Finney,  10  Wise.  388 ;  Corrigan  v. 
Union  Sugar  Refinery,  98 Mass.  577  ; 
Smith  v.  Webster,  23  Mich.  298.  A 
master  was  held  liable,  as  matter  of 
law,  for  the  reckless  and  disobedient 
conduct  of  a  servant,  while  in  the 
plain  line  of  his  employment  and  in- 
tending to  promote  his  master's  in- 
terest  (Ochsenbein  v.  Shapley,  85  N. 
Y.  214).  In  Spaulding  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  (33  Wise.  582  ;  S.  c.,  on 
former  appeal,  30 Wise.  110),  defend- 
ant's fireman  threw  a  burning  stick 
from  locomotive.  A  refusal  to  charge 
that  if  the  act  was  willful  the  de- 
fendant was  not  liable,  was  sus- 
tained. A  railroad  servant  throwing 
water  in  the  face  of  a  boy  trespass- 
ing upon  the  cars,  for  the  purpose  of 
removing  him  —  held  within  the 
of  his  employment  (Clark  v. 
N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  40 
Hun,  605;  citing  Higgins  v.  Water- 
vie  t  Turnpike,  etc.  Co..  46  N.  Y.  23  : 
Is  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64 
Id.  129  ;  (oh.  n  v.  Dry  Dock,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  69  Id.  170:  Hoffman  v.  N.  Y. 
Central,  etc.  R.  Co..  s?  Id.  25). 

Cases  cited  under  j>    154,  post. 
Stewart  v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90 


N.  Y.  588  ;  Weed  v.  Panama  R.  Co., 
17  N.  Y.  362  [conductor  willfully, 
and  contrary  to  orders,  detained  a 
train  of  cars  upon  the  road  ;  com- 
pany liable  to  a  passenger].  A  pas- 
senger may  recover  of  a  railway 
company  for  the  act  of  a  conductor 
in  throwing  him  from  the  car, 
though  such  act  was  willful  and 
malicious  (Schultz  v.  Third  Ave.  R. 
Co.,  89  N.  Y.  242,  citing  Jackson  v. 
Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  47  Id.  274; 
Rounds  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64 
Id.  129  ;  Day  v.  Brooklyn  R.  Co.,  76 
Id.  593  ;  affi'g  12  Hun,  435). 

4  A  master  cannot  be  made  liable 
for  the  willful  injuries  or  trespasses 
of  his  servants,  committed  outside  of 
their  line  of  employment  (Snodgrass 
v.  Bradley,  2  Pa.  43  ;  Little  Miami  R. 
Co.  v.Wetmore,  19  Ohio  St.  110  ;  Mc- 
Keon  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co.,  42  Mo.  79  ; 
Alabama,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Harris,  71 
Miss.  74  ;  14  So.  263)  ;  and  for  personal 
motives  (Murphy  v.  Central  Park 
R.  Co.,  48  N.  Y.  Superior,  96).  A 
declaration  setting  forth  an  unlaw- 
ful and  malicious  assault  upon  plain- 
tiff by  "defendant's  servant,"  was 
held  insufficient  by  reason  of  the 
lack  of  an  allegation  that  the  same 
was  committed  while  the  servant 
was  acting  within  the  scope  of  his 
employment  (McCann  v.  Tillinghast, 
140  Mass.  327  ;  5  N.  E.  164).  In  North 
v.  Smith  (10  C.  B.  N.  S.  572).  defend- 


231 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


L§  151 


We  do  not  undertake  to  define  the  master's  liability  for  wrong- 
ful acts  of  his  servant,  beyond  the  line  of  negligence,  as  for 
assault  and  battery,  false  imprisonment,  malicious  prosecution 
and  other  affirmative  injuries.  The  master's  liability  is  not 
confined  to  mere  acts  of  negligence;  but  its  full  definition 
belongs  to  a  treatise  on  Agency.  We  make  a  brief  reference 
to  such  cases  in  the  notes.5 


§  151.  Ostensible  authority  for  willful  acts. —  Where  a 
servant  has  authority  to  commit  an  act  of  violence  or  other 
aggression,  under  certain  contingencies,  the  master  is  liable  for 
the  consequences  of  such  an  act,  when  committed  by  the  ser- 
vant under  the  belief  that  such  a  contingency  had  occurred, 
although  in  fact  it  had  not.1     This  authority  may  of  course  be 


ant's  groom  struck  his  spurs  into 
plaintiff's  horse  as  he  was  passing  : 
defendant  held  not  liable.  A  bank 
receiving  money  on  special  deposit, 
for  safe  keeping  only,  was  held  not 
responsible  for  an  embezzlement  by 
its  cashier  (Foster  v.  Essex  Bank,  17 
Mass.  479).  The  soundness  of  this 
decision  may  well  be  questioned. 
See  United  So.  of  Shakers  v.  Under- 
wood, 9  Bush,  609  [conversion  of 
special  deposit  by  bank  officers]. 

5  Master  held  liable  for  assaults 
(Dickson  v.  Waldron,  135  Ind.  507  ; 
35  X.  E.  1  ;  affi'g  34  Id.  506  ;  O'Con- 
nell  v.  Samuel,  81  Hun,  357 ;  30  N. 
Y.  Supp.  889  ;  Canfield  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  59  Mo.  App.  354  ;  Ward 
v.  Young,  42  Ark.  542) ;  for  arrest 
(Harris  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  35 
Fed.  116;  Palmeriv.  Manhattan  R. 
Co.  60  Hun,  579,  mem. ;  14  N.  Y.  Supp. 
468  [arrest  and  abusive  language]). 
Master  held  not  liable  for  an  assault 
(Cofield  v.  McCabe,  58  Minn.  218;  59 
N.  W.  1005 ;  Meehan  v.  Morewood, 
52  Hun,  566;  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  710 
[foreman  of  store]  ;  Campbell  v. 
Northern  Par.  R.  Co..  51  Minn.  I"  : 
63  X.  W.  768  [surgeon]  :  Texas,  etc. 
R  Co.  v.  Black,  M7  Tex.  160;  27  S. 
W.  118[brakeman];  Candiff  v.  Louis- 


ville, etc.  R.  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  477; 
7  So.  601  [conductor  shooting  stran- 
ger] ;  Thorburn  v.  Smith,  10  Wash. 
St.  479  ;  39  Pac.  124  [miners  shoot- 
ing]); nor  for  willfully  firing  building 
to  injure  his  master  (Collins  v.  Ala- 
bama, etc.  R.  Co.,  104  Ala.  390;  16  So. 
140)  ;  nor  for  willful  murder  (Fraser 
v.  Freeman,  43  N.  Y.  566  ;  Golden  v. 
Newbrand,  52  Iowa,  59  ;  2  N.W.  537) 
Under  the  Georgia  Code  (§  3033), 
which  renders  railroad  companies 
liable  for  damages  caused  by  their 
employees,  unless  their  agents  have 
exercised  reasonable  care  and  dili- 
gence, such  company  is  liable  for 
the  homicide  of  a  person  lawfully 
on  its  premises,  by  its  agent  who 
was  known  to  be  insane  when  em- 
ployed (Christian  v.  Columbus,  etc. 
R.  i;.  Co.,  79  Ga.  460;  7  S.  E.  216). 

•The  defendants  directed  guards 
to  remove  disorderly  passengers. 
Deeming  an  inoffensive  person  dis- 
orderly, a  guard  ejected  him  with 
excessive  force.  Held,  that  the 
guard  had  implied  authority  t"  de- 
termine wlin  were  disorderly,  and 
defendants  were  liable  (Seymour  v. 

Green* 1,  7  Eurlst.   &  X.  855;  6 

1.1.  :;."»'.)  ,s.  P.,  Passenger  R  <  fc>.  v. 
Young,  21  Ohio  St.  518).     In  Bayley 


g  I5]  i  [ABILITY    OF   MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS.  232 

given  by  implication,2  as  well  as  by  express  assent ;  and,  where 
an  act  of  violence  is  usually  authorized  under  particular  cir- 
cumstances, the  master  is  liable  for  such  an  act  on  the  part  of 
the  servant,  if  he  believes  that  the  circumstances  authorizing 
it  exist/  Where  a  contingency  occurs  which  justifies  the  ser- 
vant in  using  violence,  yet  if  he  uses  unnecessary  violence,  or 
resorts  to  it  in  a  time  or  a  manner  which  make  its  conse- 
quences unnecessarily  injurious,  the  master  is  liable,4  notwith- 
standing any  precaution  that  he  may  have  taken  in  his  instruc- 
tions to  avoid  the  occurrence  of  such  excessive  or  ill-timed  use 
of  the  power  intrusted  to  the  servant.5  Thus  a  railroad  com- 
pany is  liable  for  an  injury  suffered  by  a  passenger  who, 
for  refusing  to  pay  fare,  is  put  off  by  its  servant,  while  the 
cars  are  in  motion,6  or  with  unnecessary  violence;7    or  if  the 


v.  Manchester,  etc.  R.  Co.  (L.  R.  8 
C.  P.  148),  a  passenger  was  pulled 
by  a  porter  out  of  a  carriage,  after 
the  train  had  started,  under  the 
erroneous  impression  that  the  pas- 
senger was  in  a  wrong  carriage.  It 
was  his  duty  to  prevent  persons 
from  traveling  in  wrong  carriages  : 
but  he  had  no  authority  to  remove  a 
passenger  from  a  carriage.  Held, 
that  a  jury  might  find  that  the  por- 
ter was  acting  within  the  course  of 
his  employment. 

-See  Mali  v.  Lord,  39  N.  Y.  381  ; 
and  g  145,  ante. 

3  Croft  v.  Alison,  4  B.  &  Aid.  590, 
where  plaintiff  recovered  ;  and  Mc- 
Manus  v.  Crickett,  1  East,  106,  where 
plaintiff  was  nonsuited.  McManus  v. 
( Irickett  is  discussed  in  Howe  v.  New- 
march,  94  Mass.  49.  It  really  de- 
cided only  that  "  trespass"  would  not 
lie,  and  that  "  case"  was  the  proper 
remedy. 

4  Master  held  liable  in  Rogahn  v. 
Mm, re  MTg.  Co.  79  Wise.  573; 
4  s  N.  W.  669  [expelling  with  vio- 
lence] :  Jones  v.  Glass,  13  Ired.  N. 
C.  Law,  305  [excessive  punishment]. 

6HiKffins  v.  Watervliet  Turnp.  Co., 
46  N.  Y.  23;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Wood,  113  Ind.  544  ;   14  N.  E.  572. 


6Sanford  v.  Eighth  Ave.  R.  Co., 
23  N.  Y.  343  ;  Higgins  v.  Watervliet 
Turnp.  Co.,  46  Id.  23;  Pennsylvania 
R.  Co.  v.  Vandiver,  42  Pa.  St.  365; 
Healey  v.  City  Pass.  R.  Co.  28  Ohio 
St.  23.  See  cases  cited  under  last 
section.  In  Harlinger  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.  (15  Week.  Dig.  392  ;  affi'd, 
without  opinion,  92  N.  Y.  661),  a 
car  porter  removed  a  trespasser  from 
his  car  while  the  train  was  in 
motion,  causing  his  death.  Held, 
the  company  was  liable,  though  the 
porter  acted  with  negligence,  want 
of  judgment  and  violence  of  temper. 
Contra,  Williams  v.  Pullman  Car 
Co.,  40  La.  Ann.  87  ;  3  So.  631  ;  not 
to  be  followed.  In  ejecting  a  pas- 
senger the  train  must  be  stopped 
Gallena  v.  Hot  Spring  R.  Co.,  13 
Fed.  116 ;  State  v.  Kinney.  34  Minn. 
311;  25  N.  W.  705),  at  a  regular 
station  (Hall  v.  Memphis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  15  Fed.  57).     See  §  493,  post. 

7  Perkins  v.  Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co., 
55  Mo.  201  :  Hufford  v.  Grand 
Rapids,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53  Mich.  118  ;  31 
N.  W.  544  ;  Jackson  v.  Second  Ave. 
R.  Co.,  47  N.  Y.  274  ;  Kline  v.  Cen- 
tral Pacific  R.  Co. ,  37  Cal.  400.  So, 
where  the  servant  uses  excessive 
force  and   abusive  language  to  com- 


233 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS. 


[§153 


passenger's  property  is  seized  for  fare.8  It  is  liable  for  excessive 
and  wanton  violence  used  in  ejecting  a  trespasser,9  and  for  the 
wrongful  ejection  of  one  whom  its  servant  erroneously  believed 
to  be  a  trespasser.10 

§  152.  [Omitted]. 

§  153-  Willful  acts  ;  when  consequence  of  negligence. —  A 

servant's  negligence  in  his  master's  business  may  involve  him 
in  difficulties,  out  of  which  he  cannot  escape  without  pur- 
posely doing  an  injury  to  a  third  person.  In  such  a  case,  if  a 
prudent  regard  to  his  master's  interest  would  dictate  such  a 
course,  he  has  an  implied  authority  from  his  master  to  com- 


pel the  double  payment  of  fare,  the 
carrier  is  liable  (Goddard  v.  Grand 
Trunk  R.  Co.,  57  Me.  202). 

s  Ramsden  v.  Boston  &  Alb.  R.  Co., 
104  Mass.  117. 

9  It  is  part  of  the  duty  of  a  street- 
car driver  to  keep  trespassers  off  his 
car,  and,  therefore,  where  he  com- 
pels a  boy  to  jump  off  while  the  car 
was  in  rapid  motion,  such  act, 
though  wanton  and  reckless,  is  with- 
in the  scope  of  his  employment 
(Baber  v.  Broadway,  etc.  R.  Co.,  9 
Misc.  20  ;  affi'd,  149  N.  Y.  584,  mem., 
43  N.  E.  985;  Healey  v.  City  Passen- 
ger R.  Co.,  28  Ohio  St.  23  ;  Haehl  v. 
Wabash  R.  Co.,  119  Mo.  325  ;  24  S. 
W.  737).  s.  P.,  Shea  v.  Sixth  Av.  R. 
Co.,  62  N.  Y.  180  [forcing  lady  off]. 
So  as  to  conductors(North  Chicago  R. 
Co.  v.  Gastka,  128  111.  613  ;  21  N.  E. 
522  ;  Southern  Pac.  Co.  v.  Kennedy, 
9  Tex.  Civ.  App.  232  ;  29  S.  W.  394 
[conductor  shooting  trespasser])  ;  so 
as  to  an  engineer  (Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  West,  125  111.  320  ;  17  N.  E.  788 
[forcing  child  off]).  A  brakeman 
has  implied  authority  to  remove 
from  his  train,  in  a  lawful  manner, 
a  trespasser  found  on  a  car,  and  the 
company  is  liable  for  bis  errors  and 
excesses  in  so  doing  (Smith  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  95  Ky  11  ;  28 
S.  W.    052  :  Hoffman   v.  N.  Y.   Gen- 


tral  R.  Co.  87  N.  Y.  25  [brakeman, 
kicking  boy  from  train  running  ten 
miles  an  hour]  ;  Lang  v.  N.  Y., 
Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  51  Hun,  603 ; 
S.  C.,  again,  80  Hun,  275  ;  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.,  137  [brakeman  throwing  coal 
at  boy]  ;  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Seaes, 
100  Ala.  368  ;  13  So.  917  [wanton  in- 
jury]). Contra,  as  to  brakemen, 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Latham,  72 
Miss.  32  ;  16  So.  757  ;  Georgia  R.  Co. 
v.  Wood,  94  Ga.  124 ;  21  S.  E.  288  ; 
Farber  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  32 
Mo.  App.  378.  In  Texas  and  Arkan- 
sas, some  evidence  of  the  brake- 
man's  authority  is  required  (Texas, 
etc.  R.Co.  v.  Moody  [Tex.  Civ.  App.], 
23  S.  W.  41):  but  when  given,  the 
company  is  responsible  (Texas,  etc. 
U.  Co.  v.  Mother,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
87;  84S.W.79;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.Hendricks,  48  Ark.  177;  2  S.  W. 
783  ;  Bess  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co., 
:;.-,  \V.  Va.  492  ;  14  S.  E.  234  [busi- 
ness of  Bervanl  "  unknown  *'|  .  In 
Molloy  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.Co.  (10 
Daly,  453),  the  rule  was  erroneously 
declared  not  to  apply  to  the  ca 
an  employee  who  kicks  or  pushes  a 
person  merelj  running  alongside  the 

train. 

Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  I  '<>.  v.  Rosen- 
zweig,   11:;  l'a.  m.  •">!!»;  6  Atl.   646. 


§  i54j 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


234 


mit   the  injury;  and  the  master  is,  of  course,   answerable   for 
the  consequences.1 

§  154.  Liability  for  negative  result  of  willful  acts.— Where 
the  servant,  by  his  wrongful  act,  deprives  the  plaintiff  of  the 
benefit  of  some  act  which  it  was  the  duty  of  the  master  to  per- 
form, and  the  performance  of  which  is,  in  whole  or  in  part, 
delegated  to  that  servant,  the  master  is  responsible  for  the 
servant's  act,  no  matter  how  willful,  malicious  and  unauthorized 
it  may  be.1  Nor  would  it  alter  the  case  to  prove  that  the 
servant  not  only  knew  his  act  to  be  unauthorized,  but  was  im- 
pelled to  the  act  by  a  desire  to  injure  his  master.2  This 
doctrine  is  peculiarly  applicable  to  common  carriers,  who  are 
bound  to  protect  their  passengers  from  insult  and  injury,  so 
far  as  lies  reasonably  within  their  power,  and  absolutely  so, 
against  their  own  servants.3     But  it  applies  also  to  every  case 


1  Defendant's  team  was  driven  so 
negligently  by  his  servant  as  to  put 
him  in  danger,  from  which  he  could 
only  escape  by  intentionally  driving 
against  plaintiff's  wagon.  Held, 
that  defendant  was  liable  (Wolfe  v. 
Mersereau,  4  Duer,  473  ;  see,  also, 
Croft  v.  Alison,  4  B.  &  Aid.  590). 
So  a  locomotive  engineer  has  im- 
plied authority  to  run  over  cattle,  if 
necessary  to  save  the  train.  See 
§  429,  post. 

1  Stewart  v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co., 
90  X.  Y.  088  ;  Schultz  v.  Third  Ave. 
R.  Co.,  89  Id.  242.  A  railroad  pas- 
senger  was  expelled  by  the  con- 
ductor from  the  car.  Held,  that  the 
company  was  liable  (Milwaukee, 
etc.  Et.  Co.  v.  Finney,  10  Wise.  388). 

5Blackstock  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R. 
Co.,  20  X.  V.  48. 

Stewart  v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co., 
90  X.  Y.  588;  overruling  Isaacs  v. 
Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  47  Id.  122.  In 
tli^  former  case,  a  carrier  was  held 
liable  to  a  passenger  win.  was,  with- 
out any  cause,  cruelly  beaten  by  the 
driver  of  the  car.  s.  P.,  Fisher  v. 
Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  34  Hun.  433. 
In  Schultz  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (89 


N.  Y.  242),  the  carrier  was  held 
liable  for  willful  act  of  the  conductor 
in  throwing  plaintiff  off  the  plat- 
form into  the  street  without  asking 
for  his  fare.  A  railroad  company, 
being  bound  to  protect  its  passengers 
from  the  violence  and  insult  of  its 
servants,  is  liable  for  an  assault  by 
the  conductor,  though  made  will- 
fully and  maliciously,  and  in  no 
manner  connected  with  the  con- 
ductor's duties  (Dillingham  v.  An- 
thony, 73  Tex.  47;  11  S.  W.  139). 
To  same  effect,  Indianapolis  Union 
R.  Co.  v.  Cooper,  6  Ind.  App.  202 ; 
33  N.  E.  219  [railway  gateman]; 
Mulligan  v.  Rockaway  Beach  R. 
Co.,  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  456  ;  GO  Hun,  579, 
mem.  [arrest  of  passenger  for  offer- 
ing counterfeit  money].  To  the  con- 
trary is  a  palpably  erroneous  de- 
cision in  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Douglass,  69  Miss.  723;  11  So.  933 
[baggage-master  forcing  passenger 
off  train].  In  Daniel  v.  Petersburg 
R.  Co.  (117  N.  C.  592;  23  S.  E.  327), 
a  passenger,  calling  to  receive  his 
baggage,  was  shot  by  the  depot- 
agent  on  account  of  the  former's 
abusive   language   to   him.     Carrier 


235 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS. 


[§  154 


in  which  the  wrongful  act  of  the  servant  results  in  a  breach  of 
any  duty  of  the  master.4  These  principles  have  been  often 
overlooked;  as  where  the  master  of  a  vessel  wantonly  ran  into 
another,  without  quitting  his  direct  route,5  and  where  an 
engineer  purposely  ran  over  or  frightened  a  person  or  an 
animal.6  But  these  decisions  have  been  since  disapproved.7 
They  overlook  the  duty  which  the  owner  of  a  dangerous  instru- 


held  liable.  But  a  carrier  is  not 
liable  for  an  injury  to  a  passenger 
by  its  servant  under  circumstances 
which  free  the  servant  from  all 
criminal  or  civil  responsibility  (New- 
Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Jopes,  142 
r.  S.  18  ;  12  S.  Ct.  109  [shooting  in 
self-defense]).  Carrier  not  liable 
for  assault  by  servant,  after  contract 
for  carriage  fully  performed  (Cen- 
tral R.  Co.  v.  Peacock,  69  Md.  257  ; 
14  Atl.  709  ;  Dwindle  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral, etc.  R.  Co.,  45  Hun,  139). 

4  The  gate-keeper  of  defendant's 
fair,  authorized  to  eject  those  who 
were  not  rightfully  on  the  grounds, 
wrongfully  ejected  plaintiff  and  in- 
flicted malicious  injury  on  him. 
Defendant  liable  (Oakland  Agric. 
Soc.  v.  Bingham,  4  Ind.  App.  545  ; 
31  X.  E.  383).  A  company,  keeping 
a  "  union  depot,"  for  the  accommo- 
dation of  passengers  coming  on 
several  railways,  is  liable  for  the  vio- 
lence of  a  brutal  servant,  to  the 
same  extent  as  a  carrier  (Dean  v. 
St.  Paul  Union  Depot  Co.,  41  Minn. 
860;  43  X.  AY.  54). 

Vanderbilt    v.    Richmond   Turn- 
pike  Co.,  2  X.  Y.  479. 

6  Cooke  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  30 
Iowa,  202:  Stephenson  v.  Southern 
Par.  R.  Co.,  93  Cal.  558;  29  Pac. 
234. 

'  Wallace  v.  Merrimack,  etc.  Co. 
134  Mass.  95  :  45  Am.  Rep.  301  ;  Dug- 
gin-   v.  Watson,  15  Ark.   114.     The 
er  is  civilly  liable  for  the  act  of 
rvant,  whether  the  ad  i-  one 
of  "mission  or  commission,  whether 


negligent,  fraudulent  or  deceitful,  if 
the  act  is  done  in  the  course  of  the 
servant's  employment  (Hanson  v. 
European,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  62  Me.  84 ; 
Goddard  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co., 
57  Id.  202 ;  Bryant  v.  Rich,  106  Mass. 
180  ;  Ramsden  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
104  Id.  117  ;  Craker  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  36  Wise.  657;  Chicago,  etc. 
R  Co.  v.  Flexman,  103  111.  546; 
Chicago,  etc.  P.  Co.  v.  Dickson,  63 
Id.  151  ;  Sherley  v.  Billings,  8  Bush, 
147  ;  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Starnes, 

9  Heisk.  52  ;  Wetmore  v.  Little  Miami 
R.  Co.,  19  Ohio  St.  110 ;  McKinley  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  44  Iowa,  314; 
Philadelphia  R.  Co.  v.  Derby,  14 
How.  U.  S.  468  ;  see  40  Am.  Rep. 
227,  n.  and  §  150,  ante,  and  §  513, 
post).  Railroad  companies  have 
been  repeatedly  held  responsible  for 
the  act  of  an  engineer,  in  maliciously 
spurting  steam  (Cobb  v.  Columbia, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  37  S.  C.  194  ;  15  S.  E.  878 ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Dickson,  63 
111.  151  ;  Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Newsome, 
60  Ga.  492;  Philadelphia,  etc.  P.  Co. 
v.  Brannen  [Perm.],  33  Alb.  L.  J. 
216);  or  blowing  a  whistle  (Texas, 
etc.  i;.  <'o.  v.  Scoville,  62  Fed.  730; 

10  C.  C.  A.  479i  t<>  frighten  animal-, 
,-t.-.  See  ?  126,  post.  The  general 
principle    of    the    Vanderbill    case 

{supra,   n.   5)    has,   however,    l d 

mentioned    with    approval    in    the 

-.iiih-    court     (Rounds    v.     Delaware, 

etc.  I:.  Co.,  64  N.  Y.  129,  185;  Mott 
v.  I  lonsumers'  Ece  I  "..  7:;  M.  543, 
548). 


§  155 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


236 


ment  owes  to  the  public,  not  to  set  it  in  motion  without 
keeping  it  under  proper  guidance.  Thus  a  master  who  entrusts 
a  servant  with  the  charge  of  some  inherently  dangerous  thing 


(<■ 


an 


explosive)  is  responsible   for  the   omission   of  the 


servant  to  keep  it  safely;  and,  therefore,  for  his  malicious  use 
of  it  for  mischievous  purposes.8  If  an  engine  or  a  vessel  is 
started  without  the  permission  of  its  owner,  by  a  servant  not 
entrusted  with  its  care,  a  different  question  is  presented.9 


§  155.  Disobedience  of  master's  orders.  —  Unintentional 
disobedience  of  a  master's  orders  should  always  be  deemed 
mere  negligence,  for  the  consequences  of  which,  if  the  master 
would  otherwise  be  liable,  his  orders  should  not  protect  him 
from  liability.1  Even  the  willful  disobedience  of  a  servant 
does  not  necessarily  exonerate  his  master.2  Where  the  master 
is  bound  by  law  or  contract  to  render  a  particular  service  to  a 
third  person,  he  is  liable  for  the  non-performance  of  such  ser- 
vice, although  arising  solely  from  the  willful  refusal  of  a  servant 
to  do  his  duty,  whatever  may  be  the  motive.  Thus,  a  carrier 
is  liable  for  a  delay  in  the  transportation  of  persons3  or  prop- 


8  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Shields, 
47  Ohio  St.  387  ;  24  N.  E.  658. 

9  Mars  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
54  Hun,  625  ;  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  107. 

1  Armstrong  v.  Cooley,  5  Gilm.  509 
[prairie  fire].  Defendant  directed 
servant  to  cut  trees  along  the  line  of 
his  land.  The  servant  ignorantly 
cut  timber  upon  another  man's  land. 
Held,  defendant  was  liable  (Luttrell 
v.  Hazen,  3  Sneed,  20;  see,  also,  Car- 
man v.  N.w  York,  14  Abb.  Pr.  301). 
Defendant's  servants,  employed  in 
removing  obstructions  from  a  stream, 
gently,  and  contrary  to  instruc- 
entered  upon  plaintiff's  land 
bordering  upon  the  stream.  Held, 
defendants  wen-  liable  (Southwick 
v.  Estes.  7  Cush.  385).  Compare 
Bolingbroke  v.  Swindon,  L.  R.  9  C. 
P.  575.  Defendant  permitted  his  in- 
fant son  to  drive  slaves  from  cane 
patch  with  a  gi  n,  but  cautioned  him 
not  to  hit  any  one.     The  son  fired  at 


a  trespasser  and  killed  him.  Held, 
defendant  was  responsible  (Priester 
v.  Augley,  5  Rich.  Law,  44). 

2  See  many  cases  cited  under  §  146. 
But  where  defendant's  employees,  in 
direct  disobedience  of  his  orders,  pur- 
posely start  a  fire  in  clearing  defend- 
ant's field,  which  spreads  to  plaintiff's 
field,  defendant  is  not  liable  (An- 
drews v.  Green,  62  N.  H.  436).  Sed 
quaere  ?  To  the  precise  contrary, 
see  Keith  v.  Keir,  Hay,  8. 

3  Weed  v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  17  N.YT. 
362.  The  conductor  of  a  passenger 
train  willfully  kept  it  standing  all 
night,  from  motives  of  his  own. 
Strong,  J.,  said  :  "  The  obligation  to 
be  performed  was  that  of  the  master, 
and  delay  in  performance,  from  in, 
tentional  violation  of  duty  by  an 
agent,  is  the  negligence  of  the 
master."  s.  P.,  Philadelphia,  etc 
R.  Co.  v.  Derby,  14  How.  U.  S.  468. 


2T,7  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS.  [§  1 57 

erty,4  caused  by  the  willful  act  of  his  servants,  directly  contrary 
to  his  orders,  and  even  though  committed  for  the  purpose  of 
injuring  him.5  And  where  a  servant  is  employed  to  do  a 
certain  act,  and  is  specially  forbidden  to  adopt  a  particular 
method  of  doing  it,  yet  willfully  adopts  that  method,  the 
master  is,  nevertheless,  liable  for  injuries  thereby  caused  to 
third  persons,  if  the  servant  did  the  forbidden  thing  as  a  real 
means  for  the  performance  of  his  master's  work.6  So,  if  the 
master  is  bound  to  guard  an  animal  from  doing  mischief,  and 
for  this  purpose  employs  a  servant,  who,  by  an  act  of  willful 
disobedience,  abandons  his  post,  the  master  is  liable  for  the 
consequences  of  the  want  of  a  guard.7 

§  156.    [Omitted.] 

§  157.  Liability  for  sub-agents  or  strangers. — The  master 
is,  of  course,  liable  for  the  negligence  of  one  whom  his  servant 
employs,  by  his  authority,  to  aid  such  servant  in  the  master's 
business.1  Such  authority  need  not  be  express,  but  may  be 
implied  from  the  nature  of  the  business,  or  the  course  of  trade. 
Thus,  such  an  authority  would  almost  necessarily  be  implied 
in  favor  of  a  servant  intrusted  with  the  whole  care  of  a  farm,  or 
the  construction  of  a  building,  or  the  transportation  of  a  large 
quantity  of  goods,  or  any  other  task  which  could  not  be  per- 
formed within  a  reasonable  time  by  one  man.2  But  a  question 
of  some  difficulty  may  arise,  where  a  servant,  without  having 

4  Blackstock   v.  N.  Y.   &   Erie  R.  so  as  to  compel  submission  to  their 

Co.,  20  N.  Y.  48  ;  Galena,  etc.  R.  Co.  demands.      Held,   all  this  made  no 

v.  Rae,  18  111.  462.      But  where  the  difference. 

carrier's    servants    left   his  service,  6  A  railroad  company  may  be  re- 

and  violently  prevented  new  serv-  sponsible  for  the  acts  of  its  servants, 

ants   from   acting  ;    held,    that    the  though  in  direct  violation  of  its  rules 

carrier  was  not  liable   (Geismer  v.  (Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Harmon,  47 

Lake  Shore,  etc.   R.  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  111.  298). 

563;  7  N.  E.  828).  'Whatman  v.   Pearson,    L.    R.    3 

6  Blackstock   v.   N.  Y.   &  Erie  R.  C.  P.  422. 

Co.,  supra.  All  the  engineers  on  the  '  Wanstall  v.    Pooley,  0  Clark  & 

road   having    struck,    the   company  Fin.  910,  n. 

was  unable  to  deliver  plaintiff's  po-  "Bucki   v.   Coin-,  25  Fla.  1  ;  6  So. 

tatoes  in   time.     Defendant  offered  160  [logging];  Gleason  v.  Amsdel,  9 

to  prove  that  the  engineers  were  en-  Daly.    393  [master  saw  assistant  at 

tirely  in   the  wrong;  it  was  obvious  work], 
they  meant  to  injure  the  company, 


8   !-S|  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS.  23S 

any  real  or  ostensible  authority  to  do  so,  employs  an  assistant, 
by  whose  negligence,  in  the  performance  of  work  assigned  to 
the  former  servant,  a  third  person  is  injured.  The  master 
would  not  be  bound  by  a  contract  made  in  his  name  by  such  a 
sub-agent,  even  though  it  were  exactly  such  as  he  had  author- 
ized his  own  servant  to  .make  ;  and  from  this  it  might  not 
unreasonably  be  inferred  that  he  could  not  be  made  liable  for 
the  torts  of  one  whose  contracts  would  not  bind  him.3  On  the 
other  hand,  manifest  inconvenience  is  certain  to  ensue  to  the 
public  at  large  from  thus  shifting  the  responsibility  from  mas- 
ters, who,  as  a  class,  are  able  to  meet  it,  and  who  receive  the 
benefit  of  the  service,  upon  servants  who,  as  a  class,  are  entirely 
unable  to  compensate  for  the  injuries  thus  caused.  Public 
policy,  therefore,  requires  that  masters  should  be  held  liable 
for  the  consequences  in  such  cases;  and  so  the  courts  have 
held,  although  without  laying  down  any  general  rule  upon  the 
subject.4  But  the  rule  does  not  extend  so  far  as  to  hold  a 
master  liable  where  a  third  person  is  injured  through  the  neg- 
ligence of  a  stranger  who  intrudes  into  and  acts  in  the  master's 
business,  without  the  assent  of  the  servant  in  charge,  although 
the  conduct  of  the  latter  gave  opportunity  for  the  intrusion.5 

§  158.  Implied  liability  of  owner  of  vehicle.— When  the 
plaintiff  has  suffered  injury  from  the  negligent  management  of 
a  vehicle,  such  as  a  boat,  car  or  carriage,  it  is  sufficient  prima 
facie  evidence  that  the  negligence  was  imputable  to  the  de- 
fendant, to  show  that  he  was  the  owner  of  the  thing,  without 

3 In  Jewell  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  gon  Pac.  R.  Co.,  15  Oreg.  220;  15 
(55  N.  H.  84),  defendant  was  held  Pac.  641).  In  Carson  v.  Leathers 
net  t< »  Vie  liable  for  the  negligence  of  (57  Miss.  650),  the  owners  of  a  steam- 
on.  employed  by  its  servant,  without  boat  were  held  liable  to  a  passenger 
authority,  to  assist  him  in  moving  a  who  disembarked  at  a  wrong  land- 
crate  <>f  crockery.  ing    pursuant   to   the    directions    of 

4  Althorf    v.  Wolfe,  22  N.  Y.  355;  strangers,  deputed  by  the  clerk, 

where  defendant  directed  his  servant  5  In  Edwards  v.   Jones   (67  How. 

to  clear  the  -now  off  the  roof.     The  Pr.   177),   defendant's  servant  left  a 

servant  employed   another   man    to  horse  which   he   had   been  driving, 

help  him;  through  negligence  of  the  and  was  absent  tenor  fifteen  min- 

latter,  a  mass  of  snow  thrown  into  utes.      During  this  time,  a  strange 

the  street  killed  plaintiff's  intestate,  man  took  hold  of  the  horse,  and   by 

Beld,   defendant  was  liable.     So  as  his  negligence,   plaintiff's  boat  was 

to  stranger  left  in  c>.?-ge  of   loco-  damaged.     Defendant  was  held   not 

motive   by  engineer  (Lakin  v.  Ore-  liable. 


239  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS.  [§  1 59 

proving  affirmatively  that  the  person  in  charge  was  the  de- 
fendants' servant.  It  lies  with  the  defendant  to  show  that  the 
person  in  charge  was  not  his  servant,1  leaving  him  to  show, 
if  he  can,  that  the  property  was  not  under  his  control 
at  the  time,  and  that  the  accident  was  occasioned  by  the 
fault  of  a  stranger,  an  independent  contractor,  or  other 
person,  for  whose  negligence  the  owner  would  not  be  answer- 
able. This  view  is  supported  by  decisions,  in  which  it  was 
held  sufficient  evidence  of  the  defendant's  negligence  to  show 
that  the  plaintiff  was  injured  by  something  falling  out  of 
the  window  of  the  defendant's  house,2  or  from  hoisting  appara- 
tus belonging  to  the  defendant.3  Acquiescence  in  the  con- 
stant use  of  a  vehicle  may  make  the  owner  responsible  for 
the  negligence  of  those  using  it  in  connection  with  his  busi- 
ness.4 And  where  an  injury  is  caused  by  defects  in  a  vehicle 
or  its  loading,  which  the  owner  was  bound  to  remedy,  it  is 
immaterial  whether  the  persons  in  charge  were  his  servants  or 
not.5 

§  159.  Ownership  of  other  property  ;  how  far  implies 
liability.  —  It  would  seem  to  be  reasonable  that  the  same  doc- 
trine should  apply  to  every  species  of  property,  which,  in  the 
ordinary  course  of  affairs,  is  managed  by  its  owner  or  his  ser- 
vants, and  that  the  mere  fact  of  its  mismanagement  should 
raise  a  presumption  that  the  owner  was  responsible  therefor.1 

1  Proof  of  defendant's  ownership  4Eeilly  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94 
of  a  wagon  is  prima  facie  evidence,  Mo.  600  ;  7  S.  W.  407  [locomotive]  ; 
to  charge  him  with  responsibility  for  Lovingston  v.  Bauchens,  34  111.  A.pp. 
its   management   (Norris  v.  Kohler,  544  [team]. 

41  N.  Y.  42;  see  Boniface  v.  Relyea,  ;'  Haugh  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.Co.,  7:; 

6Robt.  097  ;  Svenson  v.  Atlantic  Mail  Iowa,  66  ;  35  X.  W.  1 16. 

S.  S.  Co.,57N.  Y.  108;  affi'g33N.  Y.  'Houston   v.    Brush,  66   Vt.   :;:;i  ; 

Superior  Ct.  277  :  McCoun  v.  N.   Y.  29   Atl.    380.      As  the   owner  of    a 

Central  R.  Co.,  66  Barb.  338  [men  at  building    adjoining    a    highway    is 

work    on    locomotive]  ;     Smith    v.  bound  to  take  reasonable  care  thai 

Bailey  [1891],  2  Q.  P..  403;  60  L.  J.  it  is  kepi    in  proper  condition,  the 

Q.   B.   779);   see  Atchison,    etc.    R.  mere  falling  of  the  building  raises  a 

Co.  v.  Cochran.  43   Kans.   225;    23  presumption  of  Degligence,  and  the 

Pac.   151   [shareholder  not    a    part  burden  is  on  the  owner  of  showing 

owner]).  ordinary  care   (Mullen   v.  St.  John, 

2  Byrne  v.  Boadle,  2  Hurlst.  &  C.  r,7  X.  V.  567;  compare  English  v. 
722.  Brennan,  60   N.  Y.  609\     B    P  .  Ste- 

3Scott    V.     London     Dock      Co.,   Ii      venSOD  v.  Joy,  152  Mass,  45;  25  X.  Iv 

Hurlst.  &  C.  596.    See  §  59,  ante.         78  [uncovered  coal-hole  in  sidewalk 


§  i6o] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   FOR  SERVANTS. 


240 


(  )i  course,  the  circumstances  may  be  such  as  to  raise  a  pre- 
sumption that  the  property  was  not,  at  the  time  of  the  acci- 
dent, under  the  defendant's  actual  control;  and  in  such  case 
the  usual  presumption  of  the  defendant's  negligence,  arising 
out  of  his  supposed  custody  of  the  thing,  is  rebutted,  and  fur- 
ther evidence  must  be  adduced.2  And  it  has  been  well  sug- 
gested that,  where  it  is  the  usual  course  of  business  to  employ 
a  contractor  to  do  certain  work  on  property,  no  presumption 
should  arise,  from  the  mere  fact  that  such  work  was  going  on, 
that  it  was  done  by  servants  of  the  owner.3 


§  160.    Who  is  to  be  deemed  a  master.—  He    is    to   be 

deemed    the    master,    who    has    the    supreme     choice,1    con- 


in  charge  of  agent  of  owner  of  abut- 
ting building].  The  falling  of  a 
piece  of  wood  from  a  building  dur- 
ing the  repairs  is  prima  facie  evi- 
dence of  negligence  in  the  owner 
(Clare  v.  National  City  Bank,  1 
Sweeney,  539).  So  is  the  fall  of  any- 
thing from  a  window  (Byrne  v. 
Boadle,  2  Hurlst.  &  C.  722 J.  In  Leb- 
anon Light  Co.  v.  Leap  (139  Ind.  443  ; 
39  N.  E.  57),  a  gas  company  contrac- 
ted for  the  construction  of  a  gas 
plant.  The  contractor  sublet  the  con- 
tract for  boring  the  gas  wells.  The 
sub-contractor,  after  boring  one 
well,  laid  pipe,  which  was  furnished 
by  the  contractor,  to  get  gas  from 
tin'  well  to  use  in  boring  others.  Part 
of  the  pipe  so  laid  was  taken  up  by  the 
contractor,  and  the  rest  used  in  con- 
ducting gas  to  a  town  for  the  use  of 
the  company.  Held,  that,  though  the 
plant  had  not  been  turned  over  to 
tin-  company,  it  and  both  contractors 
were  liable  for  injuries  caused  by 
the  negligent  manner  in  which  the 
pipe  was  laid.  s.  P.,  Wichita,  etc. 
R  Co.  v.  Gibbs,  47  Kans.  274;  27 
Pac.  991  [railroad  in  hands  of  con- 
struction-company] :  Chattanooga, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Whitehead,  90  Ga.  47; 
15  S.  E.  44  [same]  ;  Johnson  v. 
Spear,  76  Mich.   139  ;  42  N.  W.  1092 


[owner's  hoisting  apparatus  used  by 
contractor]. 

2  Plaintiff  was  injured  by  being 
knocked  down  by  a  van  belonging 
to  defendants,  and  which  they  lent 
to  A.,  who  attached  his  own  horses 
to  the  van,  and  provided  a  driver. 
Held,  as  the  horse  was  the  property, 
and  the  driver,  strictly  speaking,  the 
servant,  not  of  defendants,  but  of  A., 
defendants  were  not  liable  (Shiells  v. 
Edinburgh,  etc.  E.  Co.,  Hay,  254  ;  18 
Dunlop,  1199). 

3  Welfare  v.  Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co., 
L,  R.  4  Q.  B.  693. 

1  General  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v,  Brit- 
ish, etc.  Nav.  Co.,  L.  R.  3  Exch.  330; 
Dalyell  v.  Tyrer,  El.  B.  &  El.  899. 
He  is  the  master  who  employs  and 
has  the  power  to  discharge.  "This 
is  the  only  test  by  which  to  deter- 
mine which  is  the  master,  and,  as 
such,  liable  to  the  person  injured  " 
(Michael  v.  Stanton,  3  Hun,  462).  See 
other  illustrations,  §  162,  post.  The 
owners  of  a  vessel,  by  employing  a 
tug  to  draw  it,  do  not  necessarily  be- 
come responsible  for  negligence  of 
the  tug,  "as  they  neither  appoint 
the  master  of  the  tug  nor  employ  the 
crew,  nor  can  they  displace  either 
one  or  the  other  "  (The  Clarita,  23 
Wall.  1) .     There,  the  master  of  a  tug 


241 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


[§  160 


trol 2  and  direction  of  the  servant,  and  whose  will  the  servant  rep- 
resents, not  merely  in  the  ultimate  result  of  his  work,  but  in  all 


having  a  burning  ferry-boat  in  tow, 
allowed  the  latter  to  drift  against  li- 
belant's vessel  and  set  it  on  fire.  A. 
sold  to  B.  a  box  in  the  loft  of  A.'s 
store  ;  B.  sent  his  porter  to  take  it 
away ;  and  the  porter,  while,  with 
the  permission  of  A.,  getting  the  box 
down,  suffered  it  to  fall  on  plaintiff. 
Held,  in  letting  down  the  box,  the 
porter  was  the  servant  of  B.,  not  of 
A. .  and  A.  was  not  liable  (Stevens 
v.  Armstrong,  6  N.  Y.  435).  Legal 
competency  to  dischai'ge  a  servant, 
being  an  essential  attribute  of  the 
master,  it  has  been  doubted  whether 
the  relation  can  exist  between  hus- 
band and  wife,  in  such  sense  as  to 
sustain  an  action  by  a  stranger 
against  one  for  negligently  retaining 
the  other  (Curtis  v.  Dinneen,  4  Dak. 
245  ;  30  N.  W.  148) ;  where  it  was 
sought  to  hold  a  woman,  proprietor 
of  a  tavern,  liable  for  negligence  in 
having  in  her  employment  her  fe- 
rocious husband,  who  had  removed 
the  eye  of  a  guest.  But  a  husband 
has  always  been  held  liable  for  his 
wife's  acts,  when  employed  by  him. 
And  the  wife  could  have  dismissed 
the  husband  from  her  employment, 
although  not  from  the  house.  And 
see,  as  to  power  to  discharge  sub 
modo,  Zeigler  v.  Danbury,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  52  Conn.  483. 

'*  McGuire  v.  Grant,  25  N.  J.  Law, 
356.  The  liability  of  a  master  for  the 
acts  of  his  servants  is  precisely  com- 
mensurate with  the  extent  of  his 
right  to  control  them  (Callahan  v. 
Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  23  Iowa,  562  ; 
see  Clapp  v.  Kemp,  122  Mmss.  481  ; 
and  S  164,  pout).  A  lessee  of  tin' 
penitentiary  placed  a  convict  in 
charge  of  Ids  orchard,  with  author- 
ity to  protecl  it.  Plaintiff,  a  boy, 
entered  therein  with  a  gun,  to  shoot 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1—16] 


birds.  The  convict  ordered  him  out 
and  struck  the  boy.  It  was  contended 
that  the  relation  of  master  and  ser- 
vant could  not  exist  between  the 
lessee  of  the  penitentiary  and  a  con- 
vict. But  the  lessee  was  held  liable 
(Ward  v.  Young,  42  Ark.  542).  In 
Bradley  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.  (3 
T.  &  C.  287 ;  affi'd,  62  N.  Y.  99),  a 
track  master  engaged  plaintiff,  a  far- 
mer, to  aid  with  his  team  in  scraping 
snow  from  defendant's  track,  in 
which  operation  he  was  injured 
through  the  track  master's  negli- 
gence. Defendant  contended  plain- 
tiff was  its  servant,  and  without 
remedy  for  the  negligence  of  a  co- 
employee,  but  this  view  was  rejected. 
"The  presumption  is  that  a  minor 
child  living  with  his  father,  and  using 
his  team  and  conveyance  in  and 
about  the  business  of  such  father,  is 
acting  in  his  behalf  and  upon  his  di- 
rection "  (Schaefer  v.  Osterbrink,  67 
Wise.  495  :  30  N.  W.  922).  The  cap- 
tain of  a  tug,  having  a  canal  boat  in 
tow,  was  held  not  to  be  master  of 
the  boat,  so  as  to  make  the  owner 
of  the  tug  chargeable  with  negligence 
of  the  boat  crew  in  not  putting  out 
lights,  whereby  a  collision  occurred 
and  a  third  vessel  was  sunk  (Arctic 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Austin,  69  N.  Y.  470). 
Plaintiff,  having  discovered  a  leak- 
age of  gas,  due  to  defendant's  negli- 
gence, called  in  a  plumber  to  ascer- 
tain the  location  of  the  leak,  and  the 
latter  entered  witli  a  lighted  candle, 
causing  an  explosion.  Held,  that  the 
plumber  was  not  the  plaintiff's  ser- 
vant .  so  as  to  make •  plaint  i IT  answera- 
ble tor  liis  negligence,  and  that  both 
defendant  and  tin'  plumber  were  re- 
sponsible (Schermerhorn  v.  Metro- 
politan Gas  Co.,  5  Daly.  144). 


§i6o] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS. 


242 


its  details.8  The  payment  of  an  employe  by  the  day,1  or  the 
control  and  supervision  of  the  work  by  the  employer,"'  though 
important  considerations,  are  not  in  themselves  decisive  of  the 
fact  that  the  two  are  master  and  servant.  It  has  been  well 
said  by  a  Connecticut  judge:  "To  get  at  the  truth,  we  must 
l.x.k  further,  and  see  if  the  person  said  to  be  a  servant  is  act- 
ing at  the  time  for  and  in  the  place  of  his  master,  in  accord 
ance  with  and  representing  his  master's  will,  and  not  his  own."  6 
Where  this  is  not  the  case,  the  employer  is  not  a  master,  nor 
the  person  employed  his  servant.7     Where  the  relation  of  mas- 


3  See  §§  162,  163,  post ;  Williamson 
v.  Wadsworth,  49  Barb.  294.  In 
Coggin  v.  Central  R.  Co.  (62  Ga. 
6bo),  plaintiff,  an  employee  of  a  tele- 
graph company,  was  injured  by  the 
carelessness  of  an  engineer  in  taking 
up  the  "slack  "  of  his  train,  engaged 
in  distributing  telegraph  poles  along 
the  line  ;  all  the  operatives  except 
the  engineer  and  conductor  being 
servants  of  the  telegraph  company, 
and  one  of  the  latter  being  in  com- 
mand of  the  train.  Held,  the  engi- 
neer was  the  servant  of  the  railroad 
company,  and  plaintiff  could  re- 
cover ;  there  being  no  evidence  that 
any  telegraph  agent  interfered  or 
had  a  right  to  interfere  with  the  ap- 
plication of  steam  or  with  manipu- 
lating the  engine. 

4  Plaintiff  contracted  with  defend- 
ant to  build  a  stone  dam,  for  which 
he  was  to  receive  a  certain  price  per 
day  for  himself  and  each  of  his  men; 
defendant  furnishing  the  powder  for 
blasting  and  superintending  the 
building  of  the  dam,  but  having  no 
control  over  the  blasting.  Held,  the 
relation  of  master  and  servant  did 
not  exist,  and  defendant  was  not  lia- 
ble to  indemnify  plaintiff  for  dam- 
ages recovered  from  him  by  a  third 
party,  injured  by  the  negligence  of 
men  employed  upon  the  Masting 
(C.,rl. in  v.  American  Mills.  27  Conn. 
874).      The  Louisiana  Code  (art.  163) 


defines  servants  as  those  who  let, 
hire  or  engage  their  services  ' '  to 
another  in  this  state,  to  be  employed 
therein  at  any  work,  commerce  or 
occupation  for  the  benefit  of  him 
who  has  contracted  with  them,  for 
a  certain  price  or  retribution,  or 
upon  certain  conditions."  Under 
this  section  it  has  been  held  that 
where  a  person  was  employed  to 
peddle  goods  at  a  fixed  wage  per 
week,  with  certain  additional  com- 
missions, the  payment  of  wages  es- 
tablished the  relation  of  master  and 
servant,  so  as  to  make  the  hirer  re- 
sponsible for  his  servant's  negligence 
in  the  course  of  his  employment 
(Shea  v.  Reems,  36  La.  Ann.  966). 

5Corbin  v.  American  Mills  Co.,  27 
Conn.  274  ;  Gerlach  v.  Edelmeyer, 
47  N.  Y.  Superior,  292  ;  affi'd,  88  N. 
Y.  645  ;  Wray  v.  Evans,  80  Pa.  St. 
102  [work  to  be  to  satisfaction  of  de- 
fendant's engineer]. 

6  Corbin  v.  American  Mills,  27 
Conn.  274. 

'  A  railroad  company  is  not  re- 
sponsible for  United  States  postal 
clerks  on  its  trains  (Poling  v.  Ohio 
River  R.  Co.,  38  W.  Va.  645  ;  18  S. 
E.  782).  One  riding  in  a  friend's 
wagon,  for  a  specific  trip,  does  not 
thereby  become  liable  for  negligence 
of  the  friend's  driver  (Muse  v.  Stern, 
82  Va.  33). 


243  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS.  [_$  l&1 

ter  and  servant  exists  in  fact,  the  master  cannot  avoid  liability 
by  any  arrangement  between  them  for  concealing  the  fact  from 
others8  nor  by  an  express  agreement  to  the  contrary  between 
themselves,  even  in  good  faith.9  A  servant  may  at  the  same 
time  serve  two  or  more  distinct  masters ;  each  of  whom  will  be 
responsible  for  his  acts.10 

§  161.  Nominal  master  when  not  liable. —  Servants  who 
are  employed  and  paid  by  one  person  may  nevertheless  be,  ad 
hoc,  the  servants  of  another  in  a  particular  transaction,  and 
that,  too,  even  where  their  general  employer  is  interested  in 
the  work.1  Obviously  they  may  desert  the  service  of  their 
lawful  master,  and  work  for  another;  or  he  may  lend  their 
services  to  another  person,  abandoning  to  the  latter  all  control 
over  them;2  or  they  may,  without  consulting  their  master,  but 
in  good  faith,  assist  a  person  independently  employed  to  do 
something  which  will  benefit  their  master,  but  with  which 
neither  he  nor  they  have  any  right  to  interfere,  and  in  which 
they  act  entirely  under  the  control  of  such  other  person.3  In 
these  cases  the  nominal  master  is  not  responsible  to  strangers 

8  Singer  Manufg  Co.  v.  Rahn,  132  employed  by  a  contractor  who  hired 

TJ.  S.  518  ;  10  S.  Ct.  175  [canvasser],  out  the  driver,  horse  and  wagon,  to 

J  Tiffin  v.  McCormack,  34  Ohio  St.  a  city  by  the  day,  to  aid  in  paving 

638 ;  see  Southern  Exp.  Co.  v.  Brown,  streets,  was  held  to  continue  as  the 

07  Miss.  260  ;  7  So.  318  ;  8  Id.  425.  contractor's  servant,  so  as  to  render 

10  Brow  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  157  his  master  liable  for  damage  caused 

Mass.  399;   32  N.  E.   362;  Union  R.  by   the   driver's   negligent    manage- 

Co.  v.  Kallaher,  114  111.  325  ;  2  N.  E.  ment  of  the  horse.     In  Denver,  etc. 

77;  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Schnei-  R.   Co.    v.  Gustafson    (21  Colo.  398  ; 

der,  45  Ohio  St.  678;    17  N.  E.  321  ;  41   Pac.    505),   a   railroad   company 

Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  75  Tex.  which  knowingly  availed  itself  for  a 

151  ;  12  S.  W.  972.  number  of  years  of  the  services  at  a 

'Oil  Creek,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Keigh-  street  crossing  -.1   the  flagman  em- 

ron,74Pa.  St.  316;  where  the  superin-  ployed  and  (.aid  by  another  company, 

tendent  of  a  petroleum  company,  in-  was  held  liable  as  an  employer. 
trusted  by  the  defendant,  a   railroad         2  Donovan  v.  Lain-.  I  Reports.317; 

company,  with  the  management  of  [1893]  1  0-  !'••  629;  Murray  v  Currie, 

cars,  washeldtobe  defendant's  ser-  L.  R.  6  C.  P.  24;  Bee  McGatrick  v. 

vant,  pro  hac  vice,  so  as  to  render  it  Wason,  I  Ohio  Si.  566  ;  :'  162,  post 
liable  to  a  third  person  injured  by        ' Murphey  v. Caralli.  8 Hurls!   &C. 

the  superintendent's  negligence.     In  162;    see   Elder   v.    Bemis,   2  Mete 

Huff  v.  Ford  (126  Mass.  24),  a  driver  599. 


§   [62] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


244 


for  their  acts  or  omissions,4  while  the  person  really  controlling 
them  is.8 

§  162.  Liability  for  servant  hired  out. — A  master  who 
hires  out  one  of  his  servants  to  work  for  another  person,  is 
liable  to  the  hirer  for  such  servant's  negligence  in  the  work, 
and  this  even  though  the  particular  servant  was  selected  by 
the  hirer  himself; 1  and  unless  the  master  abandons  the  entire 
control  of  his  servants  to  the  hirer,  he  remains  liable  to  strang- 
ers for  their  negligence.2  The  hirer  cannot  properly  be  said 
to  have  control  of  the  servants,  unless  he  has  the  right  to  dis- 
charge them  and  employ  others  in  their  places  in  case  of  their 
misconduct  or  incapacity  ;  that  being  the  only  practicable 
means  by  which    free   servants  can    be   controlled.     If,  there- 


4  Murray  v.  Currie,  L.  R.  6  C.  P. 
24  ;  Murphey  v.  Caralli,  3  Hurlst.  & 
('.  462;  Manning  v.  Adams,  32  W. 
R.  430.  In  the  last  case,  plaintiff,  in 
the  employ  of  a  stevedore  as  fore- 
man, was  injured  while  unloading  a 
ship  with  the  assistance  of  the  crew, 
through  the  negligence  of  one  of 
these.  In  an  action  against  the  shijj- 
owners,  held  plaintiff  could  not  re- 
cover. 

5  Kimhall  v.  Cushman,  103  Mass. 
194. 

1  Defendant's  servant  hired  him- 
self, on  his  own  account,  to  plaintiff 
to  do  thatching.  The  servant  hav- 
ing left  his  work,  defendant  told 
plaintiff  that  if  the  servant  did  the 
work,  he,  defendant,  must  be  paid 
for  it.  Afterward  the  servant  re- 
Bumed  work;  defendant  sent  another 
to  assist  him  and  received  pay  for 
both.  An  injury  having  occurred, 
the  thatching  being  defective,  it  was 
held  defendant  was  responsible 
(  Holmes  v.  Onion,  2  C.  B.  N.  S  790). 
Cork  burn,  C.  J.,  said:  "Although 
true  it  is  thai  where  a  man  employ- 
ing a  tradesman  selects  a  particular 
Bervant  or  workman  to  do  the  job, 
the  master  may  be  relieved  from 
responsibility  for  the  consequences 


of  the  man's  incompetency,  it  is,  I 
think,  going  too  far  to  say  that  he  is 
relieved  from  all  responsibility  if  the 
servant  is  guilty  of  negligence." 
Defendant  hired  of  plaintiff  a  team 
and  driver,  through  whose  negli- 
gence the  horses  were  drowned. 
Held,  although  the  horses  and  driver 
were  under  the  control  and  manage- 
ment of  defendant,  who  was  respon- 
sible for  whatever  was  done  in  pur- 
suance of  his  orders,  plaintiff  must 
bear  the  results  of  the  driver's  in- 
competency, as  he  was  bound  to  fur- 
nish a  suitable  servant  (Ames  v.  Jor- 
dan, 71  Me.  540). 

2  Coyle  v.  Pierrepont,  37  Hun,  379; 
overruling  s.  c.,  33  Id.  311.  Defend- 
ants hired  to  H.  for  a  day  a  steamer 
and  crew.  The  crew  were  hired, 
paid  and  entirely  controlled  by  de- 
fendants, who  also  had  power  to  sub- 
stitute others  in  their  place.  By  the 
negligence  of  the  crew  an  injury 
was  occasioned  to  the  plaintiff. 
Held,  defendants  were  liable:  the 
crew  were  their  servants,  and  not 
those  of  H.  (Daly ell  v.  Tyrer,  El.  B. 
<fe  El.  899  ;  see,  also,  Fenton  v.  Dublin 
Steam  Packet  Co.,  8  Adol.  &  El. 
835). 


245  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS.  [§  163 

fore,  the  hirer  has  no  such  power,  he  is  not  responsible  to  any- 
one for  the  faults  of  the  servants.3  If  the  hirer  is  vested  for 
the  time  with  exclusive  control  with  the  right  to  discharge  the 
servants  and  to  employ  others,  he  alone  is  responsible  for  their 
defaults.4  Where  a  person  hires  the  personal  property  of  an- 
other, who  supplies,  under  the  contract,  a  servant  charged 
with  the  general  management  and  control  of  the  property, 
although  the  hirer  acquires,  to  a  limited  degree,  a  dominion 
over  the  servant,  with  a  right  to  superintend  and  direct  his 
conduct,  the  latter  still  continues  the  servant  of  the  owner, 
who  is  responsible  for  his  negligence,  though  it  occurs  in  the 
performance  of  work  in  which  the  hirer  alone  is  interested.5 

§163.  Liability  of  trustees  for  employee's  acts.— Trustees 
are  personally  liable  to  third  persons  for  the  negligence  of 
persons  employed  in  the  discharge  of  the  trust,  unless  they 
are  themselves  acting  as  mere  agents,  with  a  responsible  prin- 
cipal behind  them.  Thus,  while  the  directors  of  a  railroad 
company  are  not  in  general  personally  liable  for  the  negligence 
of  its  servants,  trustees  of  bondholders,  who  take  possession 
of  a  railroad  under  the  provisions  of  a  mortgage,  and  run  it  for 
the  benefit  of  the  bondholders,  cannot  require  persons  injured 
by  the  negligence  of  servants  on  the  road  to  sue  the  bond- 
holders, but  must  personally  answer  for  the  damage.1  The 
receiver  of  a  railroad  is  liable,  to  the  extent  of  his  trust  funds 
(but  no  further),  for  the  negligence  of  his  servants.2  Where 
appointed   in    involuntary  proceedings,  he  is  not  the  agent  or 

3  Burke  v.  De  Castro,  etc.  Co.,  11  5  Per  Cooper,  J.,  in  New  Orleans, 
Hun,  354  ;  compare  Gerlack  v.  Edel-  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Norwood,  62  Miss, 
meyer,  88  N.  Y.  645.  565. 

4  Murray  v.  Currie,  L.  R.  6  C.  P.  '  Ballou  v.  Farnum,  9  Allen,  47. 
24;  Rourke  v.  White  Moss  Colliery  2Meara  v.  Holbrook,  30  Ohio  St. 
Co.  (L.  R.  2C.  P.  Div.  205;  Quin  v.  137.  But  he  is  liable  only  to  that 
Complete  Elect.  Co.  46  Fed.  506;  extent ;  and  a  judgment  against  him 
Sweeney  v.  Murphy,  32  La.  Ann.  personally,  for  such  a  cause,  will  be 
628.  In  such  case,  the  former  mas-  reversed  or  amended  (Camp  v.  Bar- 
ter may  pay  the  servants'  wa^es,  ney,  4  Hun,  373  ;  see  D.ilton  v.  Re- 
being  repaid  by  the  real  master,  reivers  of  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co.,  1 
without  becoming  liable  as  master  Hughes,  180).  There  arc  now  in- 
(Cotter  v.  Lindgren,  106  Cal.  602;  89  numerable  reported  cases,  in  whioh 
Pac.  950  ;  Ditberner  v.  Rogers,  66  receivers  have  been  thus  held  liaUe. 
How.  Pr.  35  ;  13  Abb.  N.  C.  486). 


§  .64 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS    FOR  SERVANTS. 


24.6 


servant  of  the  corporation,  so  as  to  render  it  liable  for  the 
negligence  of  himself  or  his  employes,  whereby  a  passenger 
is  injured.8  But  a  corporation,  having  public  duties  {e.g.  a 
railroad  company),  cannot  get  rid  of  its  liabilities  by  a  volun- 
tary surrender  to  trustees  under  a  mortgage.4 

§  164.  Who  is  a  "contractor."  —  Although,  in  a  general 
sense,  every  person  who  enters  into  a  contract  may  be  called  a 
"contractor,"  yet  that  word,  for  want  of  a  better  one,  has 
come  to  be  used  with  special  reference  to  a  person  who,  in  the 
pursuit  of  an  independent  business,  undertakes  to  do  a  specific 
piece  of  work  for  other  persons,  using  his  own  means  and 
methods,  without  submitting  himself  to  their  control  in  respect 
of  all  its  details.1  The  true  test  of  a  "contractor"  would  seem 
to  be,  that  he  renders  the  service  in  the  course  of  an  independ- 


"Metz  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58 
N.  Y.  61.     See  §  120  a.,  ante. 

4  Xaglee  v.  Alexandria,  etc.  R.  Co., 
83  Ya.  TOT  ;  3  S.  E.  369. 

1  Morgan  v.  Smith,  159  Mass.  570  ; 
35  X.  E.  101.  In  Ferguson  v.  Hub- 
bell  (9T  N.  Y.  507),  defendant  leased 
to  H.  certain  land  to  work  upon 
shares,  defendant  was  to  pay  H.  ten 
dollars  per  acre  for  clearing  the  lot. 
Held,  in  clearing  the  land  by  fire,  H. 
was  an  independent  contractor,  and 
not  a  servant.  But  where  M.  agreed 
to  clear  defendant's  land  at  a  fixed 
price,  and  defendant  advised  him  to 
fire  log  heaps,  held,  M.  was  a  mere 
workman,  and  defendant  was  liable 
for  plaintiff's  fence  which  was 
burned  (Johnston  v.  Hastie,30  Upper 
Can.  [Q.  B.]  232).  In  Pierrepont 
v.  Loveless  (72  N.  Y.  211),  defend- 
ants contracted  with  third  persons 
to  drive  logs  into  a  river.  Held,  that 
the  log  drivers  were  contractors, 
Rapallo  J.,  says:  "The  absence  of 
control  was  more  complete  than  in 
any  of  the  cases  on  the  subject."  So 
in  Fuller  v.  Citizens'  Nat.  Bank  ('5 
Fed.  '-T"))  where  a  land  owner  let, 
the  whole  work  of  excavating  a 
vault  to  A.  reserving  no  control  over 


the  manner  of  performance,  though 
he  wastofurnish  materials  ;  held,  A. 
was  a  contractor.  So  in  Bennett  v. 
Truebody  (66  Cal.  509),  where  the 
owner  of  a  building  was  absolved 
from  responsibility  to  one  who  fell 
through  a  trap-door,  left  open  by 
servants  of  a  plumber.  But  a  master 
cannot  convert  a  servant  into  a  con- 
tractor, by  agreeing  to  exercise  no 
control  over  him  in  the  manner  of 
doing  his  work  (Tiffin  v.  McCor- 
mack,  34  Ohio  St.  638).  The  following 
persons  were  held  to  be  contractors, 
not  servants.  A  person  employed  by 
a  railroad  company  to  clear  rubbish 
from  its  right  of  way  at  so  much  per 
mile,  who  hires,  pays  and  controls 
his  own  help  (St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Yonley,  53  Ark.  503  ;  14  S.  W.  800  ; 
13  Id.  333) ;  a  railroad  company, 
building  telegraph  lines  (Hackett  v. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  80  Wise. 
187  ;  49  N.  W.  S22)  ;  an  ore  digger, 
paid  per  car  load  (Harris  v.  McNa- 
mara,  97  Ala.  181  :  12  So.  103);  see 
Carlson  v.  Stocking,  91  Wise.  432; 
65  NT.  W.  58  [question  for  jury  to  say 
whether  one  in  charge  of  a  log  drive, 
he  supplying  men  and  supplies,  was 
an  independent  contractor  or  not]. 


247  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS.  [§   165 

ent  occupation,  representing  the  will  of  his  employer  only  as 
to  the  result  of  his  work,  and  not  as  to  the  means  by  which  it 
is  accomplished.2  If  he  never  serves  more  than  one  person, 
there  is  usually  a  presumption  that  he  has  no  independent 
occupation;  but  this  presumption  is  not  conclusive.  A  single 
large  railroad  company,  for  example,  might  find  work  enough 
for  a  contractor  to  occupy  his  whole  lifetime,  yet  leave  him  to 
work  in  perfect  independence,  accepting  the  results  of  his 
labor,  without  ever  interfering  with  his  choice  of  the  mode  and 
instruments  of  working.  On  the  other  hand,  one  may  have 
many  employers  within  a  short  space  of  time,  yet  be  a  mere 
servant  to  each  of  them  in  turn.  The  mere  fact  of  direction 
as  to  things  to  be  done,  without  control  over  the  method  or 
means  of  doing  them,  does  not  make  a  contractor  a  servant.3 

§165.  When  contractor  and  when  servant. —  One  who 
has  an  independent  business,  and  generally  serves  only  in  the 
capacity  of  a  contractor,  may  abandon  that  character  for  a 
time,  and  become  a  mere  servant  or  agent,  and  this,  too,  with- 
out doing  work  of  a  different  nature  from  that  to  which  he  is 
accustomed.  If  he  submits  himself  to  the  direction  of  his  em- 
ployer as  to  the  details  of  the  work,  fulfiling  his  wishes,  not 
merely  as  to  the  result,  but  also  as  to  the  means  by  which  that 
result  is  to  be  attained,  the  contractor  becomes  a  servant  in  re- 
spect to  that  work.1  And  he  may  even  be  a  contractor  as  to 
part  of  his  service,  and  a  servant  as  to  part.  Whether  he  works 
as  contractor  or  as  servant,  is  a  question  of  mingled  law  and 
fact,  which  it  is  scarcely  possible  to  decide  by  any  fixed  rule 
which  will  accurately  govern  those  cases  where  the  one  occu- 
pation borders  closely  upon  the  other.  In  most  instances,  the 
distinction  is  easily  observed.  Thus,  one  who  contracts  to  do 
a  specific  piece  of  work,  furnishing  his  own  assistants,  and  cxc- 

5  This    clause    was    originally   in-  111.  App.  213,  where  this  test  is  de- 

serteil  without   the  support  of  any  clared  to  he  the  true  one. 

express  authority.   It  has  now,  how-  3  Morgan  v.  Smith,   supra,  note  1, 

ever,   been  quoted  and  adopted  in  and  §  166,  post. 

Hexamer  v.   Webb  (101  N.  Y.  377,  'Savannah,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Phillips, 

385;  4  N.  E.  755),   and  in  Tunning-  90  Ga.  829  ;  17  S.   E.  82  [contractor 

ham  v.  International  R.  Co.  (51  Tex.  accepting    control    in   details].     See 

503);  see  Robinson  v.  Webb.  11  Bush.  Bracket!    v.    Lubke,    I    Allen,    138; 

464  ;  anJ  Andrews  v.  Boedecker,  17  Moir  v.  Hopkins,  16  111.  818. 


§  ><.;] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


248 


Cuting  the  work  cither  entirely  according  to  his  own  ideas,  or 
in  accordance  with  a  plan  previously  given  to  him  by  the  per- 
son for  whom  the  work  is  done,  without  being  subject  to  the 
orders  of  the  latter  in  respect  to  the  details  of  the  work,  is 
clearly  a  contractor,  and  not  a  servant.8  The  fact  that  such  an 
employee  is  paid  by  the  day,8  or  that,  in  all  the  work,  he  con- 
sults and  defers  to  the  wishes  of  his  employer,  makes  no 
difference;  although  an  express  contract  to  pay  by  the  job  is 
always  strong  evidence  that  the  relation  of  master  and  servant 
does  not  exist.1  On  the  other  hand,  one  who  is  at  all  times 
subject  to  the  will  of  his  employer,  and  who  cannot  properly 
refuse  to  obey  his  directions  as  to  the  mode  in  which  the  work 
shall  be  done  and  the  persons  to  be  employed  upon  it,  is  not  a 
contractor,  but  a  servant;5  and  this,  although  the  employer 
should  never  exercise  such  control,6  and  the  employee  should 
be  paid  by  the  job,  instead  of  by  the  day.7  But  the  fact  that 
no  price  is  fixed,8  and  no  specifications   are   made,  as  to  the 


8  Pack  v.  New  York,  8  N.  Y.  222  ; 
Kelly  v.  New  Y^ork,  11  Id.  432; 
rev'g  4  E.  D.  Smith,  291  ;  Forsyth 
t.  Hooper,  11  Allen,  419 ;  Allen 
v.  Hayward,  7  Q.  B.  960  ;  Painter  v. 
Pittsburgh,  46  Pa.  St.  213  ;  Allen 
v.  Willard,  57  Id. '374;  McCarthy  v. 
Portland,  71  Me.  31S  (where  the  text 
is  quoted  with  approval);  Hale  v. 
Johnson,  80  111.  185  (where  the  text 
is  cited  and  its  doctrine  applied). 

3  Geer  v.  Darrow,  61  Conn.  230  ;  23 
Atl.  1087;  Corbin  v.  American  Mills, 
27  Conn.  274. 

4  See  Forsyth  v.  Hooper,  11  Allen, 
419. 

6 For  examples  of  nominal  "con- 
tractors" held  to  be  servants,  see 
Hughbanks  v.  Boston  Inv.  Co.,  92 
Iowa,  267  ;  60  N.  W.  640  ;  Waters  v. 
Greenleaf  Lumber  Co.,  115  N.  C. 
648  ;  20  S.  E.  718 ;  Jensen  v.  Bar- 
bour, 15  Mont.  582  ;  39  Pac.  906  [con- 
tract to  furnish  car  and  driver]. 

6  Linnehan  v.  Rollins,  137  Mass. 
123. 

7In  Sadler  v.  Henlock  (4  El.  & 
B.   57C;    defendant  employed  P.  to 


clean  out  a  drain.  P.  was  a  common 
laborer  not  in  defendant's  service. 
P.  cleaned  out  the  drain  without  the 
further  direction  or  inspection  of 
defendant.  He  received  five  shillings 
for  the  job  ;  held,  P.  was  not  a  con- 
tractor, but  a  servant,  s.  P.,  Burgess 
v.  Gray,  1  C.  B.  578.  So,  where 
lessees  of  a  building  employed  a  car- 
penter to  repair  an  awning  over  a 
public  way,  and  made  no  special  con- 
tract. Held,  they  were  liable  to  a 
third  person,  injured  through  negli- 
gence of  the  carpenter  (Brackett  v. 
Lubke,  4  Allen,  13S).  s.  P.,  Ber- 
nauer  v.  Hartman  Steel  Co.,  33  111. 
App.  491  [plumber]. 

8  Fuller  v.  Citizen's  Nat.  Bank,  15 
Fed.  875.  One  engaged  in  deliver- 
ing coal  at  so  much  a  load,  and  sub- 
ject to  control  as  to  mode  of  delivery, 
is  a  servant  and  not  an  independent 
contractor  (Waters  v.  Pioneer  Fuel 
Co.,  52  Minn.  474;  55  N.  W.  52). 
s.  p.,  Clapp  v.  Kemp,  122  Mass.  481. 
Laborers  gi-ading  a  roadbed,  subject 
to  the  direction  of  the  chief  engineer, 
are  not  independent  contractors,  but 


249 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS. 


[§166 


work  to  be  done,  does  not  of  itself  create  the  relation  of  mas- 
ter and  servant  between  the  parties.9 

§  166.  Effect   of  employer's   control   over  contractor.  — 

It  is  now  practically  settled  that  the  reservation,  in  a  contract, 
of  the  right  to  inspect  the  work  at  all  times  and  to  have  it 
done  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  employer,  without  any 
right  to  dictate  the  details  of  method  or  to  interfere  with  ser- 
vants, does  not  make  the  contractor  a  servant.1  Thus,  in  New 
York,  Pennsylvania,  and  other  states,  it  has  been  held  that  a 
clause  requiring  the  contractor  to  conform  to  such  further 
directions,  of  a  specified  nature,  as  might  be  given  by  the 
employer,2  or  requiring  him  to  do  the  work  "  under  the  direc- 
tion and  to  the  satisfaction  "  of  a  servant  of  the  employer,3  did 
not  make  the  contractor  a  servant  of  the  employer.  So,  where 
a  contractor  subcontracts  a  portion  of  the  work,  reserving  no 
control  over  the  manner  of  performance,  save  generally  to  in- 
sist that  the  work  be  done  according  to  the  terms  of  the  sub- 


are  servants  (St.  Johns,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Shalley,  33  Fla.  397  ;  14  So.  890). 

9  In  Hexamer  v.  Webb  (101  N.  Y. 
377  ;  4  N.  E.  755),  defendant  engaged 
B.,  a  roofer,  to  prevent  pigeons  from 
making  nests  under  the  eaves  of  his 
roof.  B.  was  to  work  in  his  own 
way,  the  contract  containing  no  re- 
strictions as  to  time  or  amount  or 
specific  services  to  be  rendered.  Held, 
that  defendant  was  not  liable  for 
B.'s  negligence,  B.  being  an  inde- 
pendent contractor. 

1  Casement  v.  Brown,  148  U.  S.  615 
13  S.  Ct.  67^  ;  Bibb  v.   Norfolk,  etc 
R.    Co.,  87   Va.   711;  14  S.    E.    163 
Crenshaw  v.  Ullman,  113  Mo.  633. 
20  S.  W.  1077. 

5  Pack  v.  New  York,  8  N.  Y.  222. 
Reserving  the  right  to  "vary,  ex- 
tend or  diminish  the  quantity  of 
work  during  its  progress,'*  and  di- 
recting changes  in  grade  of  side- 
walk, leaves  him  still  an  independ- 
ent contractor  (Charlock  v.  Freel, 
125  N.  Y.  357  ;  26  N.  E.  262).  See, 
also,   "Vincennes  Water-Supply  Co., 


v,  White,  124  Ind.  376;  24  N.  E. 
747. 

3  Kelly  v.  New  Y'ork,  11  N.  Y.  432. 
Selden,  J.,  there  said:  "The  object 
of  the  clause  relied  upon  was  not  to 
give  the  right  to  interfere  with  the 
workmen,  and  direct  them  in  detail 
how  they  should  proceed,  but  to  en- 
able them  to  see  that  every  pent  inn 
of  the  work  was  satisfactorily  com- 
pleted. It  authorized  them  to  pre- 
scribe what  was  to  be  done,  but  not 
how  it  was  done,  nor  who  should  do 
it."  The  same  decision  has  been 
made  in  Pennsylvania  (Allen  v.  Wil- 
lard,  57  Pa.  St.  374  ;  Hunt  v.  Penn. 
R.  Co.,  51  Id.  475):  and  Massachusetts 

(Harding  v.  Boston.  163  Mass.  14; 
39  N.  E.  411).  To  the  same  effect  is 
Clare  v.  National  (  ity  Bank,  40  X.  Y. 
Superior,  104.  The  mere  righl  of 
"supervision'*   does    not    make    the 

employer  responsible  (Samuelson  v. 
Cleveland  Mining  Co.,  49  Mich.  104). 
To  tin-  contrary,  sec  Schwartz  v. 
Gilmore,  45  111'.  465;  St.  Paul  v. 
Seitz,  3  Minn.  297. 


§  167] 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS    FOR   SERVANTS. 


250 


contract,  the  subcontractor  is  not  his  servant.4  In  Connecticut 
and  South  Carolina,  a  very  large  measure  of  control  is  permit- 
ted, without  making  the  employer  liable  for  a  contractor's 
negligence.5  But  in  Ohio,  under  a  contract  which  provided 
not  only  that  the  contractor  should  do  the  work  "  under  the 
direction  "of  the  employer's  agent,  but  also  that  such  agent 
should  "have  entire  control  over  the  manner  of  doing  and 
shaping  all  or  any  part  of  the  same,  and  whose  direction  must 
be  strictly  obeyed,"  it  was  held  that  the  contractor  was  a  mere 
servant  of  his  employer.6  The  right  to  complete  control 
makes  the  employer  liable,  even  though  he  never  exercised  it.7 

§  167.  Effect  of  right  of  dismissal. —  It  is  presumably  in- 
consistent with  the  legal  character  of  a  contractor  that  he 
should  be  subject  to  dismissal  by  his  employer  at  any  moment, 
at  pleasure;1  but  this  presumption  is  not  conclusive,  where 
other  circumstances  exist    inconsistent  with  that   idea.2     The 


4  Slater  v.  Mersereau,  64  N.  Y.  138. 

6  Norwalk  Gas  Co.  v.  Norwalk,  63 
Conn.  495;  28  Atl.  32;  Rogers  v. 
Florence  R.  Co.,  31  S.  C.  378  ;  9  S.  E. 
1059. 

"Cincinnati  v.  Stone.  5  Ohio  St. 
38.  So  in  Missouri  (Speed  v.  Atlan- 
tic, etc.  R.  Co.,  71  Mo.  303) ;  where 
the  business  of  loading  and  unload- 
ing freight  "  was  to  be  done  in  a 
manner  satisfactory  to  the  superin- 
tendent of  defendant  and  subject  to 
his  control."  See,  also,  Annett  v. 
Foster,  1  Daly,  502.  But  not  so,  if 
the  contractor  is  employed  to  do  the 
work  according  to  his  own  method, 
and  is  subject  to  control  only  as  re- 
gards the  result  (Burns  v.  McDon- 
ald, 57  Mo.  App.  599).  A  written 
contract  that  the  "  work  of  demoli- 
tion is  to  be  carried  out  according  to 
the  directions  of  the  supervising 
architect,  whose  decisions  on  all 
points  I  agree  to  accept  as  final," 
created  the  relation  of  master  and 
servant  (Faren  v.  Sellers,  39  La. 
Ann.  1011  ;  3  So.  363). 
1  Linnehan  v.  Rollins,  137  Mass.  123; 


conceded    in    Norwalk    Gas  Co.    v. 
Norwalk,  supra. 

1  The  fact  that  the  person  em- 
ployed is  liable  to  dismissal  at  pleas- 
ure is  strong  evidence  that  he  is  a 
servant  and  not  contractor  (Blake  v. 
Thirst,  2  Hurlst.  &  C.  20  ;  Morgan  v. 
Bowman,  22  Mo.  538  ;  see  Charles  v. 
Taylor,  L.  R.  2  Ex.  251).  In  Tiffin 
v.  McCormack  (34  Ohio  St.  638), 
where  the  owner  of  a  quarry  hired  a 
person  to  quarry,  break  and  pile  up 
stone,  and  had  no  further  control  over 
the  employee,  who  was  to  find  pow- 
der and  tools,  and  receive  compensa- 
tion at  piece  rates  :  Held,  defendant 
was  liable  for  employee's  negligence 
in  blasting  ;  Mcllvaine,  J.,  pointing 
out  that  there  was  no  defined  quan- 
tity of  work  contracted  for  ;  the  em- 
ployee's services  might  be  deter- 
mined at  pleasure,  and  the  compensa- 
tion was  to  be  measured  by  the 
amount  of  labor  performed. 

2  In  Robinson  v.  Webb  (11  Bush, 
464),  defendant  contracted  with  the 
builder  that  the  latter  should  con- 
struct a  building,  furnishing  all  the 


251  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS    FOR   SERVANTS.  [§   1 68 

owner  of  a  house,  for  example,  must  surely  have  the  right  to 
stop  the  work  of  a  plumber  at  any  time  or  to  discontinue  an 
alteration  which  proves  to  be  no  improvement  without  becom- 
ing a  "master"  over  the  contractor.  As  to  the  effect  of 
reserving  a  right  to  dismiss  any  of  the  contractor's  servants, 
authorities  differ.  In  Illinois  and  Missouri 3  it  is  held  that  a 
contractor  under  such  a  restriction  is  a  servant.  In  England  4 
and  New  Jersey5  it  is  held  that  he  is  not.  The  discharge  of 
servants,  who  give  reasonable  cause  of  complaint  to  the  con- 
tractor's employer,  without  any  general  agreement  to  do  so, 
has  certainly  no  effect  upon  the  relation  of  the  parties.6 

§  168.  Employer  not  liable  for  contractor's  negligence.— 

It  appearing,  from  the  definition  which  we  have  given  of  a 
contractor,  that  he  is  not  the  agent  or  servant  of  his  employer 
in  relation  to  anything  but  the  specific  results  which  he  under- 
takes to  produce,  it  follows  that  his  employer  is  not  responsible 
to  third  persons  for  his  negligence,  nor  for  the  negligence  of 
his  servants,  agents,  or  subcontractors,  in  the  execution  of  the 
work.1     To   use  the   language   of   Baron   Rolfe :    "  The  party 

materials  and  labor.     The  work  was  killed  ;  held,  the  company  was  not 

to  be  done  under  the  supervision  of  liable,  although  it  reserved  to  itself 

an  architect  authorized,  in  case  of  the  right  of  dismissing  incompetent 

delay,   to  employ  another  builder,  workmen  (Reedie  v.    Northwestern 

and    without    whose    consent    the  R.  Co.,  4  Exch.  244). 

builder  was  not  to  sublet  any  of  the  5  Cuff  v.  Newark,  etc.  R.  Co.,  35 

work.     Held,  a  third  person  dam-  N.  J.  Law,  17.     See,  also,  Rogers  v. 

aged  by  the  falling  of  a  wall  could  Florence  R.  Co.,  31  S.  C.  378  ;  9S.  E. 

not  recover  from  defendant.  1059. 

3  Chicago  v.  Joney,  60  111.  383  ;  6  Harris  v.  McNamara,  97  Ala. 
where  the  city  contracted  with  third  181  ;  12  So.  103. 

persons  for  the  deepening  of  a  canal,  'Casement  v.  Brown,  148  IT.  S. 
retaining  a  supervisory  control  over  615  ;  13  S.  Ct.  672  ;  Chicago  v.  Rob- 
the  work,  and  power  finally  to  dis-  bins,  2  Black,  418;  Kelly  v.  New 
miss  any  person  employed  on  the  York,  11  N.  Y.  432 ;  Hexamer  v. 
icork ;  Larson  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Webb,  101  Id.  377;  Duncan  v.  Find- 
Co  .,  110  Mo.  234;  19  S.  W.  416  [con-  later,  6  Clark  &  F.  894;  Allen  v. 
tractor  agreeing  to  dismiss  servants  Hayward,  7  Q.  B.  960:  Reedie  v. 
not  obeying  owner's  orders].  S.  P.,  North  western  R.  Co..  4  Exch.  244; 
Blumb  v.  Kansas  City,  84  Mo.  112.  Eaton   v.    European,  etc.   R.  Co.,  59 

4  Where  a  railroad  company  en-  Me.  520  ;  Clark  v.  Vermont,  etc.  R. 
gaged  a  contractor  to  make  a  via-  Co,  28  Vt.  103;  Hilliard  v.  Richard- 
duct,  and.  through  the  negligence  son  3  Gray  849:  Ulen  v  Willard, 
of  the  latter's  workmen,  a  man  was  57  Pa.  St.  374 ;  Smith   v.   Simmons, 


$  169]  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS.  252 

employing  has  the  selection  of  the  agent  employed  ;  and  it  is 
reasonable  that  he  who  has  made  choice  of  an  unskillful  or 
careless  person  to  execute  his  orders,  should  be  responsible  for 
any  injury  resulting  from  his  want  of  skill  or  want  of  care. 
But  neither  the  principle  of  the  rule  nor  the  rule  itself  can 
apply  to  ;i  case  where  the  party  sought  to  be  charged  does  not 
Stand  in  the  character  of  employer  to  the  party  by  whose 
negligent  act  the  injury  has  been  occasioned  ;"  2  though  the 
employer  is  liable  for  such  consequences  as  naturally  flow  from 
the  execution  of  the  work  in  a  careful  manner.3  The  principle 
here  stated  is  now  perfectly  well  settled,  both  in  England  and 
America;  but  this  conclusion  has  been  reached  through  a 
series  of  contradictory  decisions,  some  of  which  have  not  been 
overruled  by  name,  and  may  therefore  mislead  the  student.4 
The  chief  difficulty  has  arisen  from  an  attempt  to  distinguish 
between  the  obligations  of  owners  of  real  and  of  personal 
property,  to  which  we  shall  presently  allude ; 5  an  attempt  no 
longer  made  by  any  court.  To  this  exemption  from  responsi- 
bility, there  is  a  single  important  qualification  —  that  the 
employer  must  have  used  ordinary  care  to  select  a  contractor 
of  proper  skill  and  prudence.6 

§  169.  Negligence  of  subcontractor  and  part-contractor. — 

The    same    principle    is   applicable   to   the    case    of    subcon- 

103  Id.    32:    Chartiers    Gas    Co.    v.  v.  Willis  (Kans.)  16  Pac.  728  ;  Easter 

Lynch,  118  Id.  362  ;  12  Atl.  435  [lay-  v.  Hall,  12  Wash.  St.  160  ;  40  Pac.  728. 

ing  gas  mains] ;  Conway  v.  Furst,  57  2  Reedie  v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  4 

N.  J.  La w,  645;  32  Atl.  380;  Deford  v.  Exch.   244;  cited  with   approval  in 

State,  30  Md.  179  ;  Bibb  v.  Norfolk,  Pack  v.  New  York,  8  N.  Y.  222,  225  ; 

etc.  R.  Co.,  87  Va.  711  ;  14  S.  E.  163  Kelly  v.    New  York,    11    Id.    432; 

[construction  of  railroad]  ;  Hunt  v.  Blake  v.  Ferris,  5  Id.  48. 

Vanderbilt,   115  N.  C.  559  ;  20  S.  E.  3  See  §  175.  post. 

168 ;    Atlanta,  etc.   R.  Co.   v.  Kim-  4  The  leading  cases  in  error  are 

berly,  87  Ga.  161  ;  13  S.  E.  277  [rail-  Bush  v.  Steinman,  1  Bos.  &  P.  404 ; 

road] ;  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Chasteen,  Randleson  v.   Murray,  8  Ad.  &  El. 

88  Ala.  591 ;  7  So.  94  [same]  ;  Kep-  109.     They  are  entirely  overruled, 

perly  v.   Ramsden,   83  111.   354  ;   De  6  See  §  173,  post. 

Forrest  v.    Wright.    2    Mich.    368  ;  6  Norwalk  Gas  Co.  v.  Norwalk,  63 

Riedel  v.  Moran.  103  Mich.  262;  61  N.  Conn.  495  ;  28  Atl.  32  ;  Berg  v.  Par- 

W.  r,09  :   Charleboia  v.  Gogebic,  etc.  sons,  84  Hun,  60  ;  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  1091; 

R.  Co.,  91  Mich.  59  ;   51    N.  W.  812  ;  Brannock  v.  Elmore,  114  Mo.  55  ;  21 

Barry  v.  St.  Louis.  17  Mo.  121  ;  Wood  S.  W.  451.     This  limitation  has  often 

v.  School  Dist..  44  Iowa.  27;  Miller  been  recognized  (Burns  v.  McDon- 

v.  Minnesota,  etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Id.  655  ;  aid,  57  Mo.  App.  599). 
39  N.  W.  188  ;   St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co. 


253  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS.  [§  169 

tractors.  A  contractor  who  employs  another  contractor  to 
execute  the  whole  or  a  part  of  his  job,  leaving  to  the  latter 
that  freedom  in  the  choice  of  means  heretofore  described  as 
part  of  the  attributes,  of  a  contractor,  is  not  liable  to  strangers 
for  the  negligence  of  the  subcontractor ;  l  and  the  subcon- 
tractor may  again  sublet  all  or  a  part  of  his  work  and  thus 
avoid  liability  for  its  details.2  Of  course,  the  original  em- 
ployer is  not  liable.3  And  the  rule  is  applicable  to  the  case  of 
a  contractor  who  is  intrusted  with  only  part  of  an  entire  job, 
as  much  as  if  he  had  charge  of  the  whole.  Thus,  if  the  owner 
of  land  makes  separate  contracts  with  a  stone-mason,  a  brick- 
layer, a  carpenter  and  a  plumber,  each  to  do  the  work  of  his 
own  trade  upon  a  single  house,  each  of  these  mechanics  is  a 
contractor,  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule  already  stated,  as 
much  as  if  he  had  agreed  to  put  up  the  entire  building.4 
Even  if  a  single  species  of  work  upon  a  single  piece  of  property 
should  be  divided  between  two  or  more  contractors,  they 
would  not  thereby  necessarily  lose  the  character  of  contractors, 
and  if  their  employer  had  no  further  control  over  them  than 
he  would  have  over  a  contractor  for  the  whole  work,  he  would 
not  be  liable  for  their  negligence.5 

1  The  head    contractor    was  held  engaged  B.  to  lay  the  brick,  agreeing 

not  liable  in  Wray  v.  Evans,  80  Pa.  to  pay  him  a  price  per  yard,  and  re- 

St.  102  [trench  left  open  by  subcon-  quested    him     to     provide     lamps, 

tractor] ;  Slater  v.  Mersereau,  64  N.  Plaintiff,  passing  at  night,  no  lamps 

Y.   138  [water  accumulated  in  eel-  being    visible,    was  injured.     Held, 

lar]  ;  Pearson  v.  Cox,  L.  R.  2  C.  P.  defendants  were  liable  ;  B.  was  only 

Div.  369  [subcontract  for  plastering  a  servant  (Wilson  v.  White,  71  Ga. 

house];  Overton  v.    Freeman,  11  C.  506).     But     a    decision    upon    this 

B.  867  ;  Rapson  v.  Cubitt,  9  Mees.  &  point    was    unnecessary.     The     de- 

W.    710   [gas-fittings]  :    Boniface   v.  fendants  were  liable,  because  it  was 

Relyea,  5  Abb.  N.  S.  259  ;  36  How.  their    duty  to  provide    lamps.    See 

Pr.    457   [undertaker  not  liable  for  §  176,  post. 

carriage  at  funeral]  ;  Powell  v.  Vir-  -  King  v.  Livermore,  9  Hun,    298  ; 

ginia   Const.  Co.,   88  Tenn.  692;  13  affi'd,  71  N.  Y.  605  :  Wray  v.  Evan., 

S.   W.    691    [railroad  construction].  80  Pa.    St.    102.     Knight   v.   Fox  (5 

But  evidence  of  a  subcontract  must  Exch.  721)  is  a  doubtful  case. 

be  clear,  as  this  claim  for  exemption  a  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Knott,  54 

is  looked  upon  with   some  suspicion  Ark.  424  ;  16  S.  W.  9. 

(see  Allen  v.  Willard  57  Pa.  St.  374  ;  4  Martin  v.  Tribune  Asso.,  30  Bun, 

Berberich  v.  El.ach,  131  Id.  165;  18  391. 

Atl.    1008).     Defendants  contracted  ""When    we  once  arrive  al    the 

to  lav  a  pavement  in  the  street.     To  principle  thai  employment,  control, 

this  end  they  piled  up  bricks.     They  and  supervision,  or  the  righttosuchi 


§  [72]  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS.  254 

§  170.  [Omitted], 

*J  171.  Employer  liable  for  servants  selected  by  him.— 
But  servants  appointed  by  the  principal  employer  are  his 
servants  even  though  their  wages  are  paid  by  the  contractor.1 
This  is  not,  however,  to  be  understood  as  implying  that  the 
mere  recommendation  of  a  new  servant  to  a  contractor,  by  the 
latter' s  employer,  is  enough  to  make  the  employer  responsible 
for  such  servant's  acts.  In  order  to  have  such  an  effect,  the 
recommendation  must  be  in  substance  a  dictation  of  the 
choice.  Much  less  does  the  employer  of  a  contractor  assume 
any  liability  for  a  servant  of  the  latter,  by  simply  expressing  a 
preference  for  that  servant  over  others,  and  thus  inducing  the 
contractor  to  assign  to  him  the  work.  Indeed,  so  long  as  the 
employer  confines  his  selection  to  one  of  several  servants 
already  employed  by  the  contractor,  he  does  not  become  re- 
sponsible for  such  servant.2  Where,  however,  the  servants 
actually  employed  upon  the  work  receive  their  wages  directly 
from  the  person  for  whose  benefit  the  work  is  done,  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  they  are  his  servants,  although  they  are 
selected  and  superintended  by  another  person  hired  by  the 
former  to  render  that  service.3  But  this  presumption  is  not  at 
all  conclusive. 

§  172.  Liability  for  servant  compulsorily  employed  — 
pilots. —  A  pilot,   when  taken  on  board  a  vessel  without  any 

over  a  person  whose  neglect  was  the  have  made  all  the  difference  "  (Quar- 

immediate  cause  of  the  injury,  is  to  man  v.  Burnett,  6  Mees.  &  W.  499). 

test  all  these  cases,  the  logical  result  -  Quarman  v.  Burnett,  6  Mees.  & 

seems  inevitable,  that  such  rule  is  as  W.   499    [defendants  hired  from   a 

applicable  to   contracts  for  distinct  livery  stable  a  particular  driver,  who 

portions  of  a  building  as  to  a  con-  always  drove  for  them];    Jones    v. 

tract  for  the  whole "  (per  Hoffman,  Liverpool,  L.  R.,  14  Q.  B.    Div.    890. 

J.,  Potter  v,  Seymour,  4  Bosw.   140,  In  Joslin  v.  Grand  Rapids  Ice  Co. 

(50  Mich.  516  ;  45  Am.  R.  54),  Cooley, 

1  Tims,   it  was  said  by  Parke,  B.,  J.,    says  :     "  The    case     is    directly 

where  defendants  bad  lured  a  driver  within  Quarman  v.  Burnett,  which, 

from  the  keeper  of  a  livery  stable  :  whether   correctly   decided    or   not, 

"  If,  indeed,  the  defendants  had  in-  has  been  too  often  and  too  generally 

sistcd  upon  the  horse  being  driven,  recognized  and  followed  to  be  ques- 

not  by  one  of  the  regular  servants,  tioned  now." 

but  by  a  stranger  to  the  job-master,  3  Samyn  v.  McClosky,  2  Ohio  St. 

appointed   by  themselves,    it  would  53G. 


255  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS.  [§  1 73 

legal  compulsion,  is  considered  the  servant  of  the  owner,  who 
is  responsible  for  the  negligence  of  the  pilot  to  the  same  ex- 
tent as  for  that  of  any  other  servant ; J  but  if  the  owner  is  com- 
pelled by  law  to  take  a  particular  pilot,  who  is  entitled  to 
control,  he  is  not  thus  responsible.2  The  owner  is,  however, 
liable  to  third  persons  for  the  negligence  of  the  master  and 
crew  in  all  cases,  even  though  a  compulsory  pilot  is  on  board.3 
And  where  the  owner  is  at  liberty  to  make  a  selection  among 
pilots,4  all  qualified  for  the  service,  or  to  dispense  with  a  pilot 
altogether,  subject  to  the  payment  of  pilotage  for  service  not 
rendered,5  he  has  been  held  liable  for  the  pilot's  negligence. 
There  is  no  implied  contract  between  the  owners  of  a  ship  and 
a  pilot  whom  they  are  compelled  to  employ,  that  the  latter 
shall  take  upon  himself  the  risk  of  injury  from  the  negligence 
of  the  ship-owner's  servants.6  On  similar  principles,  owners  of 
mines  have  been  exempted  from  liability  to  their  own  servants 
for  the  negligence  of  a  mining-boss,  whom  they  are  forced  to 
employ  by  statute.7 

§  173.  Liability  of  owner  for  persons  employed  on  land. — 

There  is  nothing  in  the  nature  of  real  property  which  requires 
that  its  owner  should  be  held  to  a  stricter  liability  than  the 
owner  of  personal  property  ;  and  he  is  not,  therefore,  respon- 
sible for  the  negligence  of  persons  employed  upon  his  land, 
any  further  than  he  would  be   if  they  were  employed   about 


1  Yates  v.  Brown,  8  Pick.  23 
Bussy  v.  Donaldson,  4  Dallas,  206 
Shaw  v.  Reed,  9  Watts  &  S.  72 
Fletcher  v.  Braddick,  5  Bos.  &  P 
182  ;  The  Stettin,  Brow.  &  Lush.  199 
21  L.  J.  [P.  &  D.]  208  ;  The  Lion,  L 


258;  Ritchie  v.  Bowsfield,  Id.  309). 
If  the  pilot  does  not,  as  of  right, 
supersede  the  master  hut  is  merely 
his  adviser,  the  owners  are  not  ex- 
empt from  liability  (The  Augusta, 
57  Law  Times,  32G  ;  affi'g  5G  Id.  58 


R.  2  Adm.  102.  "The   Queen,    Law   Rep.   2   Adm. 

3  Thus,  the  owner  is  exempt  if  re-  354;   The  Protector,  1  W.  Rob.  4"i  ; 

quired  to  employ  the  first  pilot  that  The  Diana,  1  W.  Rob.  131  ;  Smith  v. 

offers  (National  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v.  Condry,   17  Peters,  20  ;   1  How.  [U. 

British,  etc.   Nav.   Co.,   Law  Rep.  3  S.]  28. 

Exch.  330  ;  Story  on  Agency,  §  450a  ;  '  Martin  v.  Temperely,  4  Q.  B.  298. 

The  Halley,  L.  R.  2  P.  C.  193) .  Other  Is  this  consistent  with   the  rule  in 

English   decisions    go    farther,    hut  Quarman  v.  Burnett  (supra),  query? 

they  are  founded  on  peculiar  statutes  6  Williamson  v.  Price,  10  Martin, 

(see  Lucey  v   Ingram,  6  Mees.  &  W.  399  ;  rates  v.  Brown,  8  Pick.  28. 

802;   Mcintosh  v.  Slade.  6  Barn.  &  '  Smith  v.  Steele,  L.  B.  10  Q.  15.  126. 

Cr.  657;  Bennet  v.  Moita,  7  Taunt.  1  See  post,  $  231. 


§  173] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FUR    SERVANTS. 


256 


his  chattels.1  Many  attempts  have  been  made  to  establish 
such  a  distinction,  and  to  make  the  owner  of  land  responsible 
for  the  misuse  of  his  property  by  contractors  and  their  serv- 
ants ;  and  for  a  long  time  the  courts  gave  it  a  certain  recog- 
nition; but,  on  more  thorough  consideration,  they  repudiated 
it  altogether.8  Even  though  the  injury  be  caused  by  actual 
contact  of  the  soil  with  the  person   or  property  of  the    plain- 


Reedie  v.  Northwestern  R.  Co.,  4 
Exch.  244;  Overton  v.  Freeman,  11 
C.  B.  867 ;  Peachey  v.  Rowland,  13 
Id.  182  ;  Blake  v.  Ferris,  5  N.  Y.  48; 
Pack  v.  New  York,  8  Id.  222;  Kel- 
ley  v.  New  York,  11  Id.  432;  King 
v."  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  66  Id.  181; 
Bexamer  v.  Webb,  101  Id.  377;  Hil- 
liard  v.  Richardson,  3  Gray,  349; 
Conners  v.  Hennessey,  112  Mass.  96  ; 
Painter  v.  Pittsburgh,  46  Pa.  St. 
213  ;  Conway  v.  Furst,  57  N.  J.  Law, 
645  ;  32  Atl.  380  ;  affi'g  Cuff  v.  New- 
ark, etc.  R.  Co.,  35  N.  J.  Law,  17; 
Prairie,  etc.  Co.  v.  Doig,  70  111.  52  ; 
Du  Pratt  v.  Lick,  38  Cal.  691;  Rob- 
inson v.  Webb,  11  Bush,  464.  The 
propositions  of  the  text  were  cited 
with  approval  in  McCafferty  v.  Spuy- 
ten,  etc.  R.  Co.  (61  N.  Y.  178),  where 
a  railroad  company  was  held  not  lia- 
ble for  damage  caused  by  rocks  cast 
into  plaintiff's  grocery  through  an 
overcharge  of  powder  used  by  a 
contractor  in  blasting  for  defend- 
ant's road.  S.  P.,  Edmundson  v. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Ill  Pa. 
St.  316. 

-  The  history  of  the  decisions  and 
dicta  upon  this  point  is  worth  re- 
viewing. The  distinction  seems  to 
have  been  first  suggested  by  Eyre, 
('.  J.,  in  Bush  v.  Steinman  (1  Bos.  & 
P.  404).  The  other  judges  did  not 
put  their  decisions  upon  that  ground. 
In  Laugher  v.  Pointer  [1826]  (5  Barn. 
&  Cr.  547),  the  court  was  equally 
divided  upon  the  question  whether 
the  rule  in  Bush  v.  Steinman  should 
apply  to  owners  of  movable  prop- 


erty, and  the  judges  who  held  that 
it  should  not,  relied  much  upon  this 
distinction.     In    Quarman   v.    Bur- 
nett [1840]  (6Mees.  &  W.    499),  the 
court  said  Bush  v.    Steinman  could 
not    be    supported     on    any    other 
ground,  but  intimated  it  might  well 
stand  upon  this.     The  same  opinion 
was  expressed  in  Rapson  v.  Cubitt 
[1842]  (9  Mees.  &  W.  710).     In  Milli- 
gan  v.  Wedge  [1840]  (12  Ad.  &  El. 
737),  the  validity  of  this  distinction 
was  doubted  ;  and  in  Allen  v.   Hay- 
ward   [1845]    (7  Q.    B.    960),  it  was 
practically   denied  ;  but  it  was   not 
until  1849  that  it  was  finally  passed 
upon.     It  was    then    overruled,    in 
Reedie  v.  N.  W.  R.  Co.  (4  Exch.  244), 
and   again,  in   Overton  v.   Freeman 
(1851,  11  C.   B.  867),  which  was  de- 
cided in  the  same  court   which  de- 
cided  Bush  v.   Steinman.     In  Gay- 
ford  v.  Nichols  (1854,  9   Exch.  702), 
Bush   v.  Steinman  was  again  cited 
and  overruled;  and  since  that  time 
we  cannot  find  that  it  has  ever  been 
quoted  as  an  authority  in  England. 
In  this  country  the  doctrine  of  Bush 
v.  Steinman  was  approved  and  ap- 
plied in  Lowell  v.  Boston  &  Lowell 
R.  Co.,  23  Pick.  24  ;    Stone  v.  Che- 
shire R.  Co.,  19  N.  H.  427  ;  Wiswall 
v.   Brinson,    10  Ired.    [N.    C]   Law, 
554   (Ruffin,  C.  J.,  dissenting);  and 
New  York  v.    Bailey,  2   Denio,  433 
(per  Walworth,  Ch.,  and  Hand,  Sen- 
ator).    But  it  has  since  been  wholly 
repudiated  in   New  York    (Blake  v. 
Ferris,  5   N.    Y.    48 :   Pack   v.    New 
York,  8  Id.  222  ;  McCafferty  v.  Spuy. 


257  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS.  [§   1 74 

tiff,  yet  if  such  contact  arises  from  the  act  of  a  mere  contrac- 
tor or  his  servant,  the  owner  of  the  soil  is  not  liable.3 

§  174.  Liability  of  employer  for  his  own  fault.—  If  the  in- 
jury complained  of  is  the  consequence  of  the  neglect  of  a  duty 
which  was  incumbent  upon  the  employer,  and  not  upon  the 
contractor,  the  existence  of  the  contract  is  no  defense.1  This 
is  obvious  when  stated  as  a  general  principle;  but  in  the  prac- 
tical application  of  the  general  rule  exempting  employers  from 
liability  for  contractors'  negligence,  this  consideration  is  in 
danger  of  being  overlooked.  Thus,  in  the  leading  case  in  the 
courts  of  New  York  upon  the  general  rule,  the  employer  was 
held  not  liable  to  third  persons  for  the  want  of  proper  guards 
to  a  sewer,  which  the  contractor  dug  in  a  public  street.2  It 
was  assumed  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  contractor  to  place 
such  guards  around  the  excavation.  But  in  the  later  cases  it 
has  been  held  that,  in  the  absence  of  positive  stipulations  to 
that  effect,  the  contractor  owes  no  such  duty  to  his  employer, 
whatever  he  may  owe  to  third  persons.3  The  correctness 
of  the  actual  decision  in  Blake  v.  Ferris  has  therefore  been 
justly  questioned  in  the  court  which  made  it;4  while  the  cor- 
rectness of  the  doctrine  expressed  in  that  case  has  always  been 
acknowledged.  And  it  has  been  rightly  held  that  where  a 
plaintiff  has  been  damaged  by  the  want  of  proper  precautions 

ten, etc.  R.  Co.,  61  Id.  178,  185  ;  King  with  a  city  for  the  grading  of  a 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66  Id.  public  street  injured  the  plaintiff  by 
181,  184;  and  other  cases);  in  Massa-  blasting  rock  (Pack  v.  New  York,  8 
■chusetts  (Hilliard  v.  Richardson,  3  N.Y.  222;  Kelley  v.  New  York,  11  Id. 
Gray,  349);  in  New  Jersey  (Cuff  v.  432;  Blunib  v.  Kansas  City,  84  Mo. 
Newark,  etc.  R.  Co.,  35  N.  J.  Law,  112);  and  so,  under  like  contracts 
17);  in  Pennsylvania  (Painter  v.  for  constructing  railways  (Edmund- 
Pittsburgh,  46  Pa.  St.  213;  Allen  son  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Ill 
v.  Willard,  57  Id.  374  ;  Reed  v.  Alle-  Pa.  St.  316  ;  McCafferty  v.  Spuyten, 
gheny.  79  II.  300);  in  Illinois  (Prai-  etc.,  R.  Co.,  61  N.  Y.  178).  To  same 
rie,  etc.  C  >.  v.  Doig,  70  111.  52);  in  effect,  Gourdier  v.  Cormack,  2  E.  D. 
Texas  (Cunuinghani  v.  International  Smith,  254. 

R.  Co.,    51    Tex.    503);  and   most  of  '  Pendlebury  v.  Greenhalgh,  L.  R. 

the   other    states.      No   case,    which  1  Q.  B.  Div.  36. 

was  once  esteemed  as  authority,  has  3  Blake  v.  Ferris,  5  N.  Y.  48. 

been    more    completely    overthrown  3  Buffalo  v.  Holloway,  7  N.  Y.  493. 

(Cuff  v.  Newark,  etc.  R.   Co.,  35  N.  4Per  Comstock,  J.,  Storrs  v.  Utica, 

J.  Law.  17.  22).  17  N.  Y.  104. 
3  So    held,    where    the   contractor 
[Lvw  of  Neo.  Vol.  1  —  17] 


§  174J 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   FOR   SERVANTS. 


25S 


against  injury  to  the  public  from  work  done  by  a  contractor, 
the  employer  could  not  escape  liability,  without  at  least  show- 
ing that  the  contractor  had  neglected  to  perform  a  duty  in  the 
premises  which  the  employer  had  a  right  to  enforce.5  Where 
an  injur}-  is  caused  by  defects  in  the  building  or  materials  fur- 
nished by  the  employer,  he  is  responsible,  even  though  no 
injun-  would  have  happened,  but  for  the  use  prudently  made 
thereof  by  a  contractor.6  So,  if  the  employer  undertakes  to 
supply  the  contractor  with  anything  necessary  to  enable  the 
latter  to  avoid  injury  to  others  from  the  work,  the  employer, 
if  he  fails  to  supply  it,  cannot  avoid  liability  for  the  contrac- 
tor's neglect  to  avoid  such  injury.7  But,  as  in  other  cases,  the 
employer  is  liable  only  for  the  proximate  consequences  of  his 
neglect ;  and,  therefore,  where  he  had  simply  neglected  to 
furnish  necessary  materials  as  fast  as  the  contractor  was  ready 
for  them,  and  the  contractor  thereupon  recklessly  proceeded 
without  them,  the  employer  was  held  not  liable  for  the  conse- 
quences of  this  recklessness.8 

6  Defendants,  who  had  contracted    against    accidents    only    while    his 
to  build  a  house,  employed  a  black-     workmen  were  on  the  premises  ;  and 


smith  to  put  in  a  grating  on  the 
front  area,  the  opening  for  which 
was  left  without  a  cover  or  fence. 
Plaintiff  fell  through  it.  As  it  did 
not  appear  that  the  blacksmith  was 
bound  to  protect  the  opening,  except 
while  engaged  on  his  own  work,  the 
defendants  were  liable  (McCleary  v. 
Kent,  3   Duer,  27).     So,   where  de- 


the  responsiblity  did  not  attach  to 
the  first  opening  of  the  passage,  but 
to  the  subsequent  neglect  (Milne  v. 
Smith,  2  Dow,  290). 

« Whitney  v.  Clifford,  46  Wise. 
138  ;  49  N.  W.  835. 

7  Defendant  engaged  contractors  to 
erect  a  building.  He  agreed  to  furnish 
iron  pipe   necessary  for  it,   and,   in 


fendant,  owner  of  a  store,  contracted     consequence  of  his  delay,  plaintiff's 


with  a  builder  for  a  new  roof,  but 
did  not  bind  the  latter  to  use  means 
to  keep  out  the  rain  during  the  pro- 
gress of  the  work,  defendant  was 
held  liable  for  damage  to  his  tenants 
by  rain  (Sulzbacher  v.  Dickie,  6  Daly, 
469).  In  an  early  case,  A.  being  em- 
ployed to  plaster  a  house,  caused  two 


premises  were  injured  by  water. 
Held,  defendant  was  liable,  notwith- 
standing another  person  had  con- 
tracted with  him  to  furnish  the  pipe 
(Gilbert  v.  Beach,  5  Bosw.  445,  455). 
Where  a  mining  company  contracted 
for  certain  work  in  the  mine,  but 
agreed    to  provide    props,  etc.,    for 


openings  to   be   made   through   the  protection  of  the   contractor's  serv- 

wall.      He  did  not  close  them  up  ants,  it  was  liable  to  them  for  neglect 

when  he  left  his  work,  but  they  con-  to  do  so  (Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.  v. 

tinued  to  be  used  by  other  parties ;  Erickson,   39    Mich.    492 ;    Kelly   v. 

and,   B.,   accidentally   entering   one  Howell,  41  Ohio  St.  438). 

of  them,  fell  through  the  floor  and  8  Slater  v.  Mersereau,  64  N.  Y.  138; 

was  injured.     Held,  by  the   House  affi'g  5  Daly,  445.     See  ante,  §  31. 
of  Lords,  A.  was  bound  to  provide 


259 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS. 


L§  175 


§  175.  Employer  liable  for  the  act  contracted   for.— The 

employer  always  remains  responsible  for  the  natural  conse- 
quences of  the  act  which  he  directs  or  contracts  to  have  done, 
when  it  is  done  in  the  manner  contemplated  by  the  contract,1 
or  with  ordinary  care.2  If,  therefore,  a  contractor  is  employed 
to  do  an  unlawful  act,3  e.  g.,  to  make  an  excavation  in  a  high- 
way, without  authority  from  the  proper  public  officer,4  or  to 
create  a  nuisance,5  or  do  work,  intrinsically  dangerous  to  others, 
as  employing  a  contractor  to  blast  under  dangerous  cir- 
cumstances, without  proper  safeguards,6  a  person  injured   by 


1  Brannock  v.  Elmore,  114  Mo.  45  ; 
21  S.  W.  451  ;  Lancaster  v.  Conn. 
Mut.  L.  Ins  .Co.,  92  Mo.  460  ;  5  S. 
W.  23  ;  Norwalk  Gaslight  Co.  v. 
Norwalk,  63  Conn.  495  ;  28  Atl.  32 
[blasting]  ;  Koch  v.  Sackman-Phil- 
lips  Co.,  9  Wash.  St.  405  ;  37  Pac. 
703  [piling  sand  against  adjoining  lot 
and  buildings]. 

2  Chicago  v.  Robbins,  2  Black,  418  ; 
see  O'Rourke  v.  Hart,  7  Bosw.  511  ; 
Carman  v.  Steubenville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
4  Ohio  St.  399  ;  Engel  v.  Eureka  Club, 
137  N.  Y.  100  ;  32  N.  E.  1052, 

3  Where  defendant  contracts  for 
the  repair  of  its  canal,  with  soil  taken 
from  plaintiff's  land,  defendant  is 
liable  (Williams  v.  Fresno  Canal  Co., 
96  Cal.  14  ;  30  Pac.  961).  s.  P.,  Cren- 
shaw v.  Ullman.  113  Mo.  633  ;  20  S. 
W.  1077  [excavating  on  stranger's 
land].  Defendant  employed  a  con- 
tractor to  shore  up  plaintiff's  wall, 
to  prevent  it  from  falling  into  an 
excavation  which  defendant  was 
making  on  an  abutting  lot.  In  doing 
this,  plaintiff's  property  was  injured. 
It  was  not  claimed  that  the  work 
was  negligently  or  improperly  J^one. 
Held,  that  the  work  done  was  neces- 
sarily injurious  to  plaintiff,  and  de- 
fendant was  not  relieved  from 
liability  by  the  fact  that  it  was  done 
by  an  independent  contractor 
(Ketchain  v.  ( !ohn,  2N.  Y.  Misc.  427  ; 
22  N.  Y.  Supp.  181). 


4  Where  plaintiff  was  injured  by  a 
pile  of  stones  left  in  a  public  street 
by  servants  working  under  a  con- 
tract made  by  their  master  with  de- 
fendants, unlawfully  to  excavate  in 
a  public  street,  defendants  were  held 
liable  (Ellis  v.  Sheffield  Gas  Co.,  2 
Ellis  &  B.  767.)  Lord  Campbell,  C. 
J.,  said:  "It  would  be  monstrous 
if  the  party  causing  another  to  do  a 
thing  were  exempted  from  liability 
for  that  act,  merely  because  there 
was  a  contract  between  him  and  the 
person  immediately  causing  the  act 
to  be  done ''  (lb.).  The  same  point 
was  decided  in  Congreve  v.  Morgan, 
5  Duer.  495,  affi'd,  sub  110m.  Con- 
greve v.  Smith,  18  N.  Y.  79  ;  Creed 
v.  Hartmann,  29  N.  Yr.  591  ;  Ohio  So. 
R.  Co.  v.  Morey,  147  Ohio  St.  207  ;  24 
N.  E.  269  ;  and  other  cases  cited  un- 
der §  298,  post. 

5  Water  Co.  v.  Ware,  16  Wall. 
556  ;  s.  c,  below,  2  Abb.  U.  S.  261  ; 
Robbins  v.  Chicago,  4  Wall.  657  ; 
Cincinnati  v.  Stone,  5  Ohio  St.  38 ; 
Clark  v.  Fry,  8  Id.  358;  Brusso  v. 
Buffalo,  90  N.  YT.  679  ;  St  oris  v. 
[Jtica,  17  Id.  104;  Logansport  v. 
Dick.  70  Ind.  65;  Jones  v.  Chantry, 
1  Hun,  613.  See,  to  same  effect, 
Himdhausen  v.  Bond,  36  AVisc.  29. 

•Joliei  v.  Earwood,  86  111.  110 ; 
Brannock  v.  Elmore,  ill  Mo.  •r>"> :  21 
S.  w.  451.  See,  also,  I've  v.  Faxon, 
156  Mass.   471  ;   31  N.   E.  640.     But 


§  i;o 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    1-'<>R   SERVANTS. 


260 


such  unlaw  ful  act,  or  by  any  result  of  it,  may  recover  damages 
from  either  the  contractor  or  the  employer,  or  both.  In  such 
cases,  the  negligence  is  not  that  of  the  contractor  alone:  it  is 
that  of  the  employer,  in  directing  him  to  do  an  act  which  in 
its  nature  was  wrongful. 

£  176.  Omission  of  duty  not  excused  by  contracting  to 
have  it  done.  —  Neither  can  any  one  escape  from  the  burden 
of  an  obligation  imposed  upon  him  by  law,  by  engaging  for 
its  performance  by  a  contractor.  Whatever  he  is  bound  to 
do,  must  be  done ;  and  though  he  may  have  a  remedy  against 
his  contractor  for  the  failure  of  the  latter  to  discharge  his 
duty,  strangers  to  the  contract  are  still  at  liberty  to  enforce 
the  rights  conferred  upon  them  by  the  law,  without  noticing 
the  contract.1     Thus,  since  a   municipal  corporation  is   bound 


blasting  is  not,  per  se,  injurious,  and 
one  contracting  to  have  it  done  is 
not  liable  for  injuries  caused  by  the 
negligence  of  the  contractor  in  doing 
the  work,  as  by  failure  to  give  warn- 
ing (Herrington  v.  Lansingburgh,  110 
N.  Y.  145  ;  McCafferty  v.  Spuyten 
Duyvil  R.  Co.,  Gl  Id  178).  But  to 
the  contrary,  see  Jones  v.  McMini- 
my,  93  Ky.  471  ;  20  S.  W.  435. 

1  Mersey  Docks  v.  Gibbs,  L.  R.  1 
H.  L.  93  ;  Pickard  v.  Smith,  10  C. 
B.  N.  S.  480  ;  City  R.  Co.  v.  Moores, 
80  Md.  348  ;  30  Atl.  643.  The  occupier 
of  a  house  is  not  excused  from  lia- 
bility for  an  open  coal-hole  in  the 
street,  by  the  fact  that  is  was  left 
open  by  a  coal-carrier,  who  ought  to 
have  closed  it  (Pickard  v.  Smith, 
supra);  although  the  coal-carrier  is 
primarily  liable  (Whiteley  v.  Pepper, 
L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  Div.  276).  In  Allison 
v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.  (64  N.  C.  382), 
the  hirer  of  a  slave  was  held  liable 
for  an  injury  caused  by  gun-powder 
placed  by  the  servant  of  a  contractor 
in  the  room  which  the  slave  was  di- 
rected by  the  hirer  to  occupy.  This 
principle  was  applied  where  railroad 
companies  sought,  under  the  plea  of 


"contractor,"  to  escape  liability  for 
failure  to  perform  their  duty  to  pas- 
sengers (Carrico  v.  West  Va.  R.  Co., 
39  W.  Va.  86;  19  S.  E.  571)  or  the 
public  (Hole  v.  Sittingbourne  R.  Co., 
6  Hurlst.  &  N.  488 ;  Donovan  v. 
Oakland  R.  Co.,  102  Cal.  245;  36 
Pac.  516).  In  Bower  v.  Peate  (L.  R. 
1  Q  B.  Div.  321),  the  owner  of  one  of 
two  adjoining  houses  employed  a 
contractor  to  pull  down  his  house, 
excavate  and  rebuild,  the  con- 
tractor agreeing  to  support,  as 
far  as  might  be  necessary,  the  ad- 
joining buildings.  The  adjoining 
house,  which  was  entitled  to  the  sup- 
port of  the  soil,  was  injured  by  the 
excavation.  Held,  the  owner  was 
liable.  Cockburn,  C.  J.,  says:  "There 
is  an  obvious  difference  between 
committing  work  to  a  contractor  to 
be  executed,  from  which,  if  properly 
done,  no  injurious  consequences  can 
arise,  and  handing  over  to  him 
work  to  be  done  from  which  mis- 
chievous consequences  will  arise  un- 
less preventive  measures  are  adopt- 
ed." To  similar  effect,  Spence  v. 
Schultz.  103  Cal.  208  ;  37  Pac.  220. 
A  building  so  defectively  constructed 


26l 


LIABILITY    OF"    MASTERS    FOR    SERVANTS. 


[§    l/"6 


to  keep  its  streets  in  a  safe  condition,  it  is  liable  for  an  injury- 
caused  by  the  want  of  proper  guards  around  an  excavation, 
made  in  the  street  by  a  contractor  at  its  request.2  So  one, 
who  is  bound  to  keep  premises  in  repair,  cannot  relieve  him- 
self by  contracting  for  repairs;3  nor  can  one  do  so,  who  is 
bound  by  statute  to  cover  up  or  refill  excavations.4  So  one, 
who  obtains  permission  to  excavate  in  a  highway,  is  personally 
bound  to  repair  it,  and  cannot  delegate  that  duty  by  contract,5 
and  where  one  obtained  a  license  from  a  city  to  incumber  its 
street,  in  order  to  perform  certain  work,  which  he  thereupon 
let  to  a  contractor,  he  could  not  shield  himself  by  such  con- 
tract from  liability  for  the  abuse  of  the  license  by  the  contractor, 
amounting  to  a  nuisance.6  Much  less  can  one  relieve  himself 
from  responsibility  for  the  non-performance  of  his  own  express 
contract,  by  making  a  contract  with  another  person  to  perform 
it.  And  this  principle  is  especially  to  be  borne  in  mind,  when 
considering  a  claim  on  the  part  of  a  contractor  to  be  relieved 
from  responsibility  for  the  defaults  of  a  subcontractor.  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  only  a  person  in  whose  favor  the  contract 
creates  a  duty  who  can  take  advantage  of  this  rule. 


as  to  be  dangerous  is  a  nuisance,  and 
the  doctrine  of  independent  con- 
tractors does  not  apply  (Wilkinson 
v.  Detroit  Steel  Works,  73  Mich.  405  ; 
41  N.  W.  490). 

2  Storrs  v.  Utica,  17  N.  Y.  104  ;  St. 
Paul  v.  Seitz,  3  Minn.  297.  To  same 
effect,  Robbins  v.  Chicago.  4  Wall. 
657  ;  Brusso  v.  Buffalo,  90  N.  Y.  079  : 
Ironton  v.  Kelly,  38  Ohio  St.  50  ; 
Circleville  v.  Neuding,  41  Id.  465  ; 
Wilson  v.  Wheeling,  19  West  Va. 
323;  Jefferson  v.  Chapman,  127  111. 


438  ;  20  N.  E.  33  ;  limited,  Shute  v. 
Princeton,  58  Minn.  337  ;  59  N.  W. 
1050. 

3  Curtis  v.  Kiley,  153  Mass.  123;  26 
N.  E.421  ;  Brennan  v.  Ellif,  70  Hun, 
472  ;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  426. 

4  Gray  v.  Pullen,  5  Best  &  S.  970, 
981. 

5  Colgrove  v.  Smith,  102  Cal.  220; 
36Pac.  411. 

6  Darmstaetter  v.  Moynahan,  27 
Mich.  188. 


CHAPTER    X. 


LIABILITY  OF  MASTERS  TO   SERVANTS. 


£   177.     Limitations  of   master's  lia- 
bility to  servant. 

178.  Reason  assigned  for  rule. 

179.  The  real  reason. 

180.  The  general  rule. 

181.  Who  are  servants. 

182.  Volunteer,  when  considered 

servant. 

183.  Who  is  a  volunteer  assistant. 

184.  Master    does    not   insure 

against  risks. 

185.  What  risks  servants  assume. 
185a.  What  risks  servants  do  not 

assume. 
185b.  What    facts    servants    may 
presume. 

186.  Risks  assumed  under  special 

orders. 
186a.  Risks  of  service   outside  of 
ordinary  employment. 

187.  Master    liable    for    his  own 

negligence. 

188.  Concurrent  negligence. 

189.  Degree  of  care  required  of 

master. 

190.  Duration    of    master's  duty 

and  exemption. 

191.  Duty    to     select    competent 

fellow-servants. 

192.  Evidence    of    negligence    in 

employment  of  servant. 

193.  Duty    to    employ    sufficient 

force. 

194.  Duty  to  provide  proper    in- 

strumentalities. 
194a.  Duty  of  inspection  and  repair. 

195.  Lii.iits  of   master's    liability 

for  instrumentalities. 


§  196. 


197. 

198. 
198a. 

199. 
200. 
201. 
202. 

203. 


203a. 
204. 

205. 

206. 

207. 
207a, 

207b. 

208. 

209. 

209a 

210. 
211. 


[262] 


Master's  duty  as  to  instru- 
mentalities not  his  own 
property. 

Illustrations  of  master's  lia- 
bility. 

Low  bridges. 

Low  bridges ;  contributory 
fault. 

Low  bridge  cases  limited. 

[Omitted.] 

Other  dangerous  projections. 

Master's  duty  to  prescribe 
and  enforce  rules. 

Master's  duty  to  guard 
and  warn  against  unusual 
risks. 

Duty  of  supervision. 

Delegation  of  master's  per- 
sonal duties. 

Illustrations  of  non-transfer- 
able duties. 

What  is  sufficient  notice  to 
master . 

Contributory  negligence. 

What  is  not  contributory 
negligence. 

Disobedience  of  rules  and 
orders. 

Basis  of  imputed  assumption 
of  risks  from  master's  neg- 
ligence. 

Servant  accepting  employ- 
ment with  notice  of  defects. 

Servant  continuing  with 
notice  of  defects. 

Effect  of  refusal  to  repair. 

True  rule  as  to  effect  of  serv- 
ant's knowledge. 


2C3 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  177 


§  211a.  Special  risks  incurred  under 
coercion. 

212.  Test  of  servant's  prudence. 

213.  Excusable  omissions  of  usual 

care. 

214.  Notice   of     defect,    without 

notice    of    danger,   imma- 
terial. 

215.  Effect  of  master's  promises 

and  assurances. 

216.  Presumption  as  to  servant's 

knowledge. 

217.  Means   of  knowledge  ;   duty 

to  investigate. 

218.  Application  of  rule  to  minors. 

219.  Special  duties  of  masters  to 

minors. 
219a.  Inexperienced  servants. 

220.  Servant's  knowledge  of  mas- 

ter's personal  defects. 

221.  Servant's  duty  to  warn  and 

complain. 

222.  Burden  of  proof. 

223.  What  is  sufficient  proof. 

224.  Who  are  fellow-servants. 

225.  Who  are  not  fellow-servants. 

226.  American   rule  ;  vice-princi- 

pals not  fellow-servants. 

227.  British   rule  ;    no    vice-prin- 

cipals. 

228.  British  rule  criticised. 

229.  British    rule  condemned  at 

home. 


§  230.     Who    are    vice-principals ; 
general  managers. 

231.  Who    are    vice-principals; 

New  York  rule. 

232.  Principle  of  New  York   de- 

cision generally  accepted. 

233.  In  what  duties  servants  act 

as  vice-principals. 
233a.  Examples  of  who  are,  or  are 

not,  vice-principals. 
2336.  Peculiar  local  rules. 

234.  Servants  must  be  in  common 

employment. 

235.  Common  employment ;  gen- 

eral rule. 

236.  Who  are  in  common  employ- 

ment under  general  rule. 

237.  Who  are  not  in  common  em- 

ployment. 

238.  Common  employment ;  asso- 

ciation rule. 

239.  Illustrations  of  common  em- 

ployment. 

240.  [Omitted.] 

241.  Illustration    of    fellow-serv- 

ant in  common  employ- 
ment under  all  rules. 

241a.  Effect  of  statutes  and  codes. 

241  b.  Statutes  of  general  applica- 
tion. 

241c.  Statutes  applying  to  railroad 
companies. 

241d.  Exemption  from  liability  by 
special  contract. 


§  177.  Limitations  of  master's  liability  to  servant.  —  We 

now  have  to  consider  the  limitations  which  have  been  devised 
by  judges  to  the  general  rule  of  a  master's  liability  for  the 
negligence  of  his  servants,  by  force  of  which  his  own  servants 
have  less  claim  against  him  than  any  one  else  has.  In  our 
first  three  editions,  we  acquiesced  in  the  principal  English  and 
American  decisions  on  this  question,  outside  of  the  intolerable 
rulings  of  the  Massachusetts  courts,  partly  because  we  had 
elsewhere  criticised  so  many  judicial  opinions,  that  we  began 
to  feel  ourselves  in  danger  of  just  censure  for  presumption. 
But  no  part  of  this  treatise  has  been  more  useful  or  more  ap- 
proved by  the  highest  courts,  than  that  in  which  it  opposed 
and  rejected  ill-considered  decisions;    while  most  of  the  parts 


8   177]  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS  TO   SERVANTS.  264 

which  have  been  overruled  are  those  which  followed  the 
apparent  drift  of  authority.  In  our  fourth  edition,  therefore, 
we  undertook  to  discuss  all  these  questions  in  the  light  of 
reason  and  on  some  basis  of  principle;  and  wc  continue  to  do 
so.  The  general  rule  of  limitation  will  not  be  disputed; 
although  the  reasons  given,  even  for  that,  have  been  often 
declared  unsatisfactory  or  incomprehensible,  by  judges  who 
assented  to  the  rule  itself.1  But,  while  starting  from  the 
same  foundation,  the  English  and  American  decisions  have 
been  gradually  diverging,  the  former  in  favor  of  the  mas- 
ter and  the  latter  against  him,  until  English  decisions  upon 
new  questions  of  difficulty  are  practically  useless  in  most 
American  courts.  Some  of  the  principal  English  and  Massa- 
chusetts decisions,  moreover,  having  been  made  under  the  in- 
fluence of  a  class-interest,  and  looking  solely  to  the  interest 
and  convenience  of  a  single  class,  have  gone  so  far  as  to  shock 
the  moral  sense  of  that  very  class,  and  have  compelled  legisla- 
tures, composed  almost  exclusively  of  masters,  to  overrule 
these  decisions  by  statute.  Since  the  whole  of  this  new  law 
consists  of  judicial  legislation,  the  example  of  the  British  Par- 
liament, composed  almost  in  solid  mass  of  wealthy  employers, 
in  repudiating  judge-made  law,  invented  solely  for  the  benefit 
of  that  class,  should  have  a  powerful  influence,  in  every  court 
not  yet  tied  up  by  precedents,  in  the  direction  of  enlarging 
the  responsibility  of  the  employing  class,  rather  than  of 
diminishing  it.  It  is  gratifying  to  observe  that  the  judges  of 
England  and  Massachusetts,  within  the  last  five  or  six  years, 
have  manifested  a  disposition  in  this  direction,  so  far  as  the 
harsh  decisions  of  their  predecessors  would  permit. 

1  In  Lovell  v.  Howell  (L.  R.  1  C  P.  its  range.     It  must  be  conceded  that 

D.  161,  167),  Brett,  J.,  says:  "Now,  it  cannot  rest  on  reasonsdrawn  from 

I  decline  to  say,  because  I  feel  a  considerations  of  justice  or  of  public 

difficulty  in  understanding  or  defin-  policy"  (per  Carpenter,  J.,  in  Zeigler 

ing  it,  what  is  the  precise  principle  v.  Danbury,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52  Conn.  543; 

on  which  the  immunity  of  the  master  and  see  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ross, 

in  these  cases  rests.  But  I  am  bound  112  U.  S.  377,  383).    "  The  limitation 

by  law  and  by  the  authority  of  de-  has  no  foundation  in  abstract  or  nat- 

<  id.  -d  cases  to  say  that  such  immun-  ural  justice;    and  all  attempts    to 

ity   does  exist."     "The  defense  of  place  it  upon  any  other  foundation 

common  employment  has  little  of  than  that  of  public  policy  will  prove 

reason  or  principle  to  support  it,  and  unsatisfactory"  (Earl,  J.,  Crispin  v. 

the  tendency  in   nearly  all  jurisdic-  Babbitt,  81  N.  Y.  516,  528). 
tions  is  to  limit  rather  than  enlarge 


265 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§  178 


§  178.  Reason  assigned  for  rule. —  The  reason  usually  as- 
signed for  the  exemption  of  masters  from  liability  to  their  serv- 
ants, is  that  a  servant,  in  bargaining  for  his  wages,  takes  into 
account  all  the  ordinary  risks  of  the  business  upon  which  he 
enters,  and  obtains  a  compensation  which,  upon  the  average, 
covers  these  risks,  among  which  are  reckoned  the  negligence 
of  fellow-servants.1  Dr.  Wharton  thinks  that  this  principle  will 
not  sustain  the  rule,  because,  he  says:  "  no  agreement  that  a 
party  shall  be  held  irresponsible  for  his  negligence  *  *  * 
is  valid."2  That  ought  to  be  the  law,  if  it  is  not;3  but  it  does 
not  prove  that  a  contract  against  liability  for  an  agent's  negli- 
gence is  void.  And  the  cases  cited  by  him  only  hold  that  a 
principal  cannot  enforce  an  unreasonable  restriction  of  his  lia- 
bility for  his  agent's  negligence;4  a  principle  which  we 
thoroughly  approve.  But  even  this  principle  is  not  universally 
accepted.     Decisions  can  now  be  found  both  ways.5     The  in- 


1  "The  general  rule,  resulting  from 
considerations  as  well  of  justice  as 
of  policy,  is,  that  he  who  engages  in 
the  employment  of  another  for  the 
performance  of  specified  duties  and 
services,  for  compensation,  takes  up- 
on himself  the  natural  and  ordinary 
risks'  and  perils  incident  to  the  per- 
formance of  such  services,  and  in  a 
legal  presumption,  the  compensation 
is  adjusted  accordingly.  And  we  are 
not  aware  of  any  principle  which 
should  except  the  perils  arising  from 
the  carelessness  and  negligence  of 
those  who  are  in  the  same  employ- 
ment ;  peril,  which  the  servant  is  as 
likely  to  know,  and  against  which 
he  can  as  effectually  guard,  as  the 
master  "  (Farwell  v.  Boston  &  Wor- 
cester R.  Co.,  4  Mete.  49).  To  same 
effect,  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  El- 
liott, 1  Coldw.  [Tenn.]  611  ;  Holden 
v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  129  Mass.  268; 
Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Townsend, 
41  Ark.  382  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Black,  88  111.  112  ;  Harrison  v.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.,  31  N.  J.  Law,  293  ;  State 
v.  Malster,  57  Md.  287  ;  Mad  River 
R.   Co.    v.    Barber,    5  Ohio  St.   541  ; 


Morgan  v.  Vale  of  Neath  R.  Co.,  L. 
R.  1  Q.  B.  149 ;  Warburton  v.  Great 
Western  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  2  Exch.  30. 
See  also  the  following,  which  are  less 
distinct  and  explicit  in  holding  that 
the  risks  included  are  presumed  to 
have  been  considered  in  estimating 
the  compensation  :  Gibson  v.  Erie  R. 
Co.,  63  N.  Y.  449  ;  Sweeney  v.  Berlin, 
etc.  Co.,  101  Id.  520  ;  Bartonshill  Co. 
v.  Reid,  3  Macq.  H.  L.  265,  266. 

2  Wharton,  Negligence,  §  199. 

3  See  Harrison  v.  Central  R.  Co., 
31  N.  J.  Law,  293,  298. 

4  See  cases  cited,Wharton  on  Negl., 
§  589,  and  g  505,  post. 

5  It  is  not  the  common  law  of  Eng- 
land (McCawley  v.  Furness,  etc..  R. 
Co.,  L.  R.  8  Q.  B.  59);  nor  of  New 
York  (Blair  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  66  N.  Y. 
313  ;  Poucher  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  49  N.  Y.  263;  Wilson  v.  N.  Y. 
Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  97  Id.  87);  New 
Jersey  (Kinney  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  82 
N.  J.  Law,  407);  Maryland  (Balti- 
more, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brady,  82  Md. 
333);  Illinois  (IU.  Central  R.  <'«>.  v. 
Read,::;  III.  484);  Michigan  (Hawkins 
v.  Great   Western    R.    Co.,    17  Mich. 


§  178] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


266 


genious  invention  of  Chief  Baron  Pollock,  that  no  member  of 
an  establishment  could  maintain  an  action  against  its  head  for 
the  fault  of  another  member,  which  he  was  never  weary  of  re- 
peating,8 lias  never  been  accepted  as  a  basis  for  this  rule;  and 
Dr. Wharton's  proposed  principle,  that  a  co-adventurer  assumes 
the  consequences  of  all  risks  incidental  to  the  business,  is  no 
more  satisfactory.7  How  can  one  "assume,"  by  mere  force 
^i  circumstances,  a  risk  which  he  is  not  allowed  to  assume  by 
express  contract?  Chief  Justice  Shaw's  theory,  that  public 
policy  requires  that  servants  should  have  no  remedy  against 
their  masters,  in  such  cases,  because  the  absence  of  any  remedy 
will  make  them  more  careful  of  their  own  safety  than  they 
would  otherwise  be,8  reminds  us  of  nothing  so  much  as  the 
opinion  of  Chief  Justice  Rumn,  in  the  days  of  slavery,  that  the 
law  denied  any  remedy  for  any  amount  of  torture  to  a  slave, 
short  of  murder,  out  of  humane  regard  to  the  best  interests  of  the 
slaves  themselves.9  There  is  quite  as  much  to  be  said  on  behalf 


57).  In  Virginia,  a  principal,  e.  g., 
a  railroad  company,  cannot,  by  con- 
tract, exempt  itself  from  liability  for 
personal  injuries  to  a  stranger,  caused 
by  the  negligence  of  its  servants 
(Johnson  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 
80  Va.  975  ;  11  S.  E.  829).  Contracts 
exempting  masters  from  the  liability 
to  their  servants,  imposed  by  law, 
were  held  valid  in  Griffiths  v.  Dudley, 
L.  R.  9  Q.  B.  Div.  357  ;  Western,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Strong,  52  Ga.  401  ;  Gallo- 
way  v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57  Id. 
512 ;  see  Ingersoll  v.  Randall,  14 
Minn.  400.  They  were  held  void,  as 
against  public  policy,  in  Roesner  v. 
Hermann,  8  Fed.  782  ;  10  Bissell,  486  ; 
Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Spangler, 
44  Ohio  St.  471  ;  8  N.  E.  467  ;  Little 
Rock,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Eubanks,  48 
Ark.  46'J;  3  S.  W.  808.  In  Massa- 
chusetts, Iowa,  Kansas,  and  Ala- 
bama,  some  contracts  of  this  kind 
are  made  void  by  statute  (see  Kansas, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Peavey,  29  Kans.  169). 
The  British  Employers' Liability  Bill 
(1893)  was  lost,  only  because  the 
Lords  insisted  upon  an  amendment 


allowing  such  contracts  in  certain 
cases,  while  the  Commons  refused  to 
assent  thereto. 

6  In  Abraham  v.  Reynolds,  5  Hurlst. 
&  N.  143,  and  other  cases. 

1  Wharton,  Negligence,  §  199. 

8  Farwell  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4 
Mete.  49,  59.  With  regard  to  the 
"supposed  public  policy"  at  the 
foundation  of  the  rule,  Field,  J.,  well 
says:  "It  is  assumed  that  the  ex- 
emption operates  as  a  stimulant  to 
diligence  and  caution  on  the  part  of 
the  servant  for  his  own  safety  as 
well  as  that  of  his  master, 
but  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the 
exemption  has  the  effect  thus  claimed 
for  it.  We  have  never  known  parties 
more  willing  to  subject  themselves  to 
danger  of  life  or  limb,  because  .  .  . 
damages  could  be  recovered  by  their 
representatives  or  themselves  for  the 
loss  or  injury"  (Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Ross,  112  TJ.  S.  377,  383  ;  5  S.  Ct. 
184). 

9  State   v.    Mann,   2   Dev.    [N.    C] 
Law,  263. 


2$J  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  1 79 

of  the  latter  proposition  as  of  the  former;  perhaps  more.  We 
fully  agree  with  Mr.  Horace  Smith,10  and  with  the  British  Par- 
liament,11  that  true  public  policy  is  opposed  to  the  whole  rule 
of  exemption  to  masters  as  against  their  servants,  and  that 
accidents  would  be  far  less  frequent,  and  the  public  interest 
better  served,  if  the  rule  were  entirely  abolished.  The  true 
rule,  in  our  opinion,  would  be  to  hold  masters  to  the  obliga- 
tion of  ordinary  care  in  each  of  their  agents,  as  well  toward 
fellow-servants  as  toward  strangers;  but,  in  consideration  of 
the  well-attested  fact  that  the  familiarity  of  servants  with  dan- 
ger always  makes  them  more  careless  of  their  own  safety  than 
strangers  to  such  work  would  be,  there  should  be  a  presump- 
tion of  contributory  negligence  on  their  part,  not  to  be  over- 
come without  positive  evidence  of  their  due  care  at  the  time 
of  the  accident,  or,  if  that  is  impracticable,  as  in  cases  of  death 
or  loss  of  reason,  evidence  of  their  constant  habit  of  care  at 
other  times. 

§  179.  The  real  reason.  —  If  the  exemption  of  masters  from 
liability  to  servants  for  the  negligence  of  fellow-servants  is 
founded  upon  any  principle  whatever,  it  must  be  upon  an 
assumption  that,  in  a  majority  of  cases  so  large  as  to  constitute 
a  rule  for  all  others,  both  employer  and  employee  tacitly 
understand,  when  the  employment  begins,  that  the  employee  is 
not  to  expect  indemnity  from  the  employer  against  the  negli- 
gence of  other  persons  in  the  same  common  employment.1  If 
it  is  true  that  such  is  the  universal  understanding  between  the 
parties,  though  unexpressed,  and  that  such  was  the  case  before 
the  question  had  ever  been  passed  upon  by  the  courts,  there 
is  a  good  foundation  for  the  rule,  in  all  cases  in  which  an  ex- 
press contract  to  the  same  effect  would  be  binding.  For, 
upon  a  familiar  principle  of  the  law  of  contracts,  where  both 
parties  to  the  contract  of  hiring  have,  in  fact,  each  understood 
the  contract  in  that  sense,2  or  where  the  employee  entered  into 

10  Smith's  Negligence  [Whit,  ed.],  '  Harrison  v.  Central  R.  Co.  31  N. 

138.  J.  Law,  203. 

"A  bill  abolishing  this  exemption  2See  Scrantom  v.  Booth,  29   Barb. 

passed  both  houses  of  Parliament,  in  171;  Saltus  v.  Pruyn,  18   Bow.    Pr. 

1893;  yet  it  fell  through,  on  account  512;  Hartford,  <-t.-.   R.  Co.  v.  Jack- 

of  amendments  by  the  Lords,  which  son.  21  Conn.    .",11;   Bazard   v.    New 

the  Commons  rejected.  England  Ins.  Co.  1  Sumn.218;  Pare. 

Contr.  (6  ed.)475,  note  (a). 


§  l8o]  i  [ABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  268 

the  contract  of  service  knowing  or  believing  that  the  employer 
understood  this    condition  to    be   implied,3   the    condition    is 
implied,  just  as  effectually  as  if  it  had  been  put  down  in  writing. 
And  if  such  a  mutual  understanding  has  always  existed,  in  the 
vast   majority  of  cases,  and  a  contrary  understanding  has  not 
been   known  to  exist  in  any  appreciable  number  of  cases,  such 
a  state  of  facts  creates  a  settled  usage,  the  terms  of  which  are 
implied  in  every  contract  from  which  they  are  not   expressly 
excluded,4  even  though  one  of  the  parties  may  not  have  known 
of   the   usage  or  intended  to  assent  to  it,  so  long  as  the  other 
party  w^as   not  aware   of  that  circumstance.     These   are  well 
known  principles  in  the  law  of  contracts;  and  they  are  prop- 
erly   applicable    to    the    law    of    master    and    servant.      And, 
whatever  may  have  been  the  fact   fifty  years  ago,  when   the 
courts  began  to  evolve  this  branch  of  the  law,  we  think  that 
it  must  be  conceded  that  their  long  course  of  decisions,  whether 
originally  correct  or  not,  have  established  a  general  and  notori- 
ous usage,  which  every  intelligent  man  now  takes  into  account, 
when  entering  into  a  contract  of  service.     We  shall  adopt  this 
principle,  as  the  only  one  which  can  justify  any  limitation   of 
the   masters    liability  to  a   servant,   as  distinguished   from   a 
stranger,  and  shall  apply  this  test  to  all  questionable  decisions 
and    doubtful    cases.     Those  adjudications   which    can    stand 
under  this  test,  ought  to  stand  ;  and  the  sooner  all  others  are 
overruled,  the  better  will  be  the  state  of  the   law.     If  those 
cases,  in  which  it  has  recently  been  held  that  all   express  con- 
tracts limiting  the   liability  of  masters  to  their  servants  are 
void,  as  against  public  policy,  were  correctly  decided,  then  the 
rule  of  limitation  is  founded  upon  no  reason  whatever  ;  for  no 
intelligible   reason,  other  then   that    of  implied    contract,  has 
ever  been  suggested  by  the  courts;  and  they  have  always  as- 
signed that  reason,  even  when  suggesting  others. 

§  180.  The  general  rule. —  Under  the  principles  before 
stated,  it  must  be  conceded  to  be  settled  at  common  law  that 
a  master  is  not  liable  for  injuries  personally  suffered  by  his 
servant  through  the  ordinary  risks  of  the  business,1  including 

3  Barlow  v.  Scott,  24  X.  Y.  40:  617  ;  Pollock  v.  Stables,  12  Q.  B.  765; 
White  v.  Hoyt.  78  Id.  505.  Dale  v.  Humfrey,  EL,  B.  &  El.  1004. 

"FifM  v.  Lelean,   6  Hurlst.  &  N.         ]  See  §  184,  post. 


269 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[$  ISO 


the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant,3  acting  as  such,3  while 
engaged  in  the  same  common  employment,4  unless  the  master 
is  chargeable  with  negligence  in  the  selection  of  the  servant  in 
fault,5  or  in  retaining  him  after  actual  or  constructive  notice  of 
his  incompetency.6  This  "bad  exception  to  a  bad  rule,"  as 
Lord  Esher  called  it,  in  his  testimony  before  a  parliamentary 
committee,  was  first  suggested  in  1837,  in  an  English  court,  in 
Priestly  v.  Fowler,7  where  the  precise  point  did  not  arise. 
That  case,  however,  is  always  spoken  of  as  the  foundation  of 
the  rule.  The  first  real  decision  of  the  question  was  made  in 
South  Carolina  in  1841.8  This  was  cited  and  approved  by 
Chief  Justice  Shaw,  of  Massachusetts,  in  1842,  in  the  Farwell 
case,9  which  is  the  leading  case  on  the  question,  and  contains 
all  the  reasoning  in  favor  of  the  rule  which  is  worth  mention- 
ing.10    His  opinion  was  followed  in  New  York  in  1847. u     The 


s  Hutchinson  v.  York,  etc.  R.  Co., 
5  Exch.  343.  As  to  who  are  fellow- 
servants,  see  §  224,  et  seq.,  post.  In 
Wilson  v.  Merry  (L.  R.,  1  Sc.  App. 
326),  Lord  Cairns  objected  to  the  use 
of  the  term  "  fellow-servant,"  as  in- 
adequate to  express  the  rule  cor- 
rectly. It  certainly  did  not,  if  the 
doctrines  advanced  by  him  were 
sound.  But,  as  will  presently  appear, 
these  doctrines  are  not  accepted  by 
any  court  in  the  United  States,  and 
have  been  condemned  by  the  British 
Parliament  as  contrary  to  natural 
justice. 

3  When  a  fellow-servant  acts  in 
place  of  the  master,  the  rule  does 
not  apply  :  see  §  204,  post. 

4  This  is  a  necessary  condition. 
See  §  234,  post.  Contributory  negli- 
gence of  a  fellow-servant  of  a  plain- 
tiff is  no  defense  for  a  defendant 
who  is  not  the  master  of  either 
(Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Chambers, 
15  C.  C.  A.  327;  68  Fed.  148). 

6  This  is  conceded  in  all  the  fore- 
going cases.     See  §  191,  post. 

6$S  191,  192,  post.  See  Weger  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  55  Pa.  St.  460 ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stafford,  16 
111.  App.  84 ;  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Collarn.  73  Ind.  261. 


T3  Mees.  &  W.  1.  "  Meeson  & 
Welsby"  have  been  often  said,  in 
England,  to  have  produced  more  bad 
law  than  can  be  found  in  many  times 
the  same  number  of  volumes  else- 
where. Lord  Abinger,  who  deliv- 
ered this  judgment,  and  who,  as  Sir 
James  Scarlett,  was  esteemed  as  the 
ablest  advocate  at  the  bar,  was  (for 
the  same  reasons)  considered  to  be 
one  of  the  poorest  judges. 

8  Murray  v.  South  Carolina  R.  Co., 
1  McMull,  Law,  385. 

9  Farwell  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4 
Mete.  49. 

10  Perhaps  we  should  mention  the 
slashing  opinion  in  Ryan  v.  Cumber- 
land R.  Co.  (33  Pa.  St.  384),  which, 
however,  consists  mainly  of  argu- 
ments which  have  since  been  almost 
universally  rejected. 

"  Tlit-  Farwell  case  was  cited  with 

approval   in   New  Sorb  in   1844,  in 

Brown  v.  Maxwell,  (!  Hill,  592;  and 
expressly  adopted  in  1847,  in  CoOD  v. 
Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co.,  6  Barb.  231; 
affi'd,  1851,  5  X.  V.  492.  The  courts 
assigned  no  reasons  <>f  their  own, 
and  counsel  dill  cot  even  argue  this 
question.  See  report  in  6  Barb. 
231. 


^iSoJ 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


2JO 


precise  point  was  first  decided  in  England  in  1850,  and  fol- 
lowed ever  since.12  Since  then  the  rule  has  been  forced  upon 
Scotland,  by  the  votes  of  English  judges,  overruling  the 
Scotch  courts;18  and  it  has  been  accepted  by  all  American 
courts,  both  Federal  and  state,11  with  only  some  qualifications 


19  Hutchinson  v.  York,  etc.  R.  Co., 
5  Exch.  343;  Wigmore  v.  Jay,  Id.  354; 
Tarrant  v.  Webb,  18  C.  B.  797;  Mor- 
gan v.  Vale  of  Neath  R.  Co.,  L.  R.  1 
Q.  B.  149;  Searle  v.  Lindsay,  11  C. 
B.  [N.  S.]  429;  Griffiths  v.  Gidlow,  3 
Hurlst.  &  N.  648. 

13  See  a  review  of  this  doctrine  in 
Dixon  v.  Ranken  (14  Dunlop,  480), 
where  the  courts  of  Scotland  em- 
phatically repudiated  it;  although 
the  House  of  Lords,  on  a  subsequent 
appeal,  declared  the  law  of  Scotland 
to  be  the  same  in  this  respect  as  that 
of  England  (Bartonshill  Coal  Co.  v. 
Reid,  3  Macq.  H.  L.  266) .  This  was 
a  gross  example  of  bald  judicial 
legislation  :  three  English  judges, 
who  knew  nothing  of  Scotch  law, 
overruling  fifteen  Scotch  judges, 
who  had  made  it  a  lifelong  study. 

14  So  held  in  the  courts  of  the 
United  States  (Randall  v.  Baltimore, 
etc.  R.  Co.  109  U.  S.  478);  in  Canada 
(O'Sullivan  v.  Victoria  R.  Co.,  44 
Upper  Canada,  128) ;  in  New  York 
(Coon  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co..  5  N. 
Y.  492  ;  Keegan  v.  Western  R.  Co., 
8  Id.  175  ;  Russell  v.  Hudson  Riv.  R. 
Co.,  17  Id.  134  ;  Crispin  v.  Babbitt, 
81  Id.  516) ;  Alabama  (Cook  v.  Par- 
ham,  24  Ala.  21,  36  ;  Mobile,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Thomas,  42  Ala.  672,  682) ;  Cali- 
fornia (Yeomans  v.  Contra  Costa  S. 
N.  Co.,  44  Cal.  71  ;  Hogan  v.  Central 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  49  Id.  128  ;  Civil  Code. 
§  1070)  ;  Colorado  (Summerhays  v. 
Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co. .  2  Colo.  484 ; 
Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Farrow,  6 
Id.  498)  ;  Connecticut  (Burke  v.  Nor- 
wich,  etc.  R.  Co.,  34  Conn.  474;  Dar- 
rigan  v.  N.  Y.,  New  Iiaven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  52  Id.  285);  Florida  (Parrish  v. 


Pensacola,  etc.  R.  Co.,  28  Fla.  251  ;  9 
So.  696) ;  Georgia(see Georgia,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Rhodes,  56  Ga.  645; ;  Idaho 
(Minty  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  2  Idaho, 
437 ;  21  Pac.  660);  Illinois  (Honner 
v.  Illinois,  etc.  R  Co.,  15  111.550; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Murphy,  53 
Id.  336;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Powers,  74  Id.  341) ;  Indiana  (Madi- 
son R.  Co.  v.  Bacon,  6  Ind.  205 ; 
Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams, 
105  Id.  151);  Iowa  (Sullivan  v.  Mis- 
sissippi, etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Iowa,  421  ; 
Benn  v.  Null,  65  Id..  407) ;  Kansas 
(Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Young,  8 
Kans.  638) ;  Maine  (Blake  v.  Maine 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  70  Me.  60);  Maryland 
(O'Connell  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
20  Md.  212;  Hanrathy  v.  Northern 
Cent.  R.  Co.  46  Id.  280) ;  Massachu- 
setts (Farwell  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
4  Mete.  49  ;  Clifford  v.  Old  Colony 
R.  Co.  141  Mass.  564;  6  N.  E.  751); 
Michigan  (Davis  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R. 
Co  ,  20  Mich.  105  ;  Michigan  Cent. 
R.  Co.  v.  Dolan,  32  Id.  510) ;  Minne- 
sota (Fraker  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co., 
32  Minn.  54;  19  N.  W.  349);  Mis- 
souri  (Rohbach  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  43 
Mo.  187;  Lee  v.  Detroit,  etc.,  Works, 
62  Id.  565;  Ryan  v.  McCully,  123 
Mo.  636  ;  27  S.  W.  533) ;  New  Jersey 
(McAndrews  v.  Burns,  39  N.  J.  Law, 
118  ;  Colly er  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  49  N. 
J.  Law,  59  ;  6  Atl.  437);  North  Caro- 
lina (Ponton  v.  Wilmington,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  6  Jones,  Law,  245;  Hardy  v. 
Carolina  Cent.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  C.  5  ; 
Hagins  v.  Cape  Fear  R.  Co.,  106  Id. 
537 ;  11  S.  E.  590)  ;  Ohio  (Mad  River, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Barber,  5  Ohio  St.  541, 
562 ;  Whaalan  v.  Mad  River,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  8  Id.    249);  Oregon    (Willis  v. 


271 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§181 


in  Kentucky15  and  some  Western  and  Southern  states; 
which,  however,  turn  rather  upon  the  interpretation  of  the 
rule  than  upon  the  rule  itself.16 

§  181.  [New.1]  Who  are  servants.— The  same  principles 
are  applied  to  determining  who  is  a  servant,  for  the  purpose  of 
settling  a  question  as  to  the  master's  liability  or  non-liability 
■  to  him,  as  are  applied  to  the  question  of  his  liability  for  him. 
Persons  who,  in  a  sense,  serve  another  person,  but  are  not  his 
"  servants,"  within  the  definition  heretofore  given,2  stand  upon 
the    same    footing  as   strangers.3     Thus  an  independent   con- 


Oregon  R.  etc.  Co.,  11  Oreg.  257; 
4  Pac.  121);  Pennsylvania  (Ryan  v. 
Cumberland  R.  Co.,  23  Pa.  St.  384; 
Reese  v.  Biddle,  112  Id.  72 ;  3  Atl. 
813):  South  Carolina  (Murray  v.  S. 
Carolina  R.  Co.,  1  McMull.  Law,  385; 
Boatwright  v.  Northeastern  R.  Co., 
25  S.  C.  128) ;  Tennessee  (Fox  v.  Sand- 
ford,  4  Sneed  [Tenn.],  36);  Texas 
(Price  v.  Houston  Nav.  Co.,  46  Tex. 
535;  citing  numerous  cases;  Railroad 
Co.  v.  Miller,  51  Tex.  270)  ;  Vermont 
(Noyes  v.  Smith,  28  Vt.  59  ;  Hard  v. 
Vermont,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  82  Id.  473), 
and  Virginia  (Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Nuckols,  91  Va.  193  ;  21  S.  E.  342). 
Wisconsin  at  first  denied  this  judge- 
made  law  (Chamberlain  v.  Milwau- 
kee, etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Wise.  248);  but 
the  same  court,  solely  out  of  defer- 
ence to  the  overwhelming  current  of 
authority  in  other  states,  fell  into 
line  (Cooper  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  23  Wise.  668):  and  remains 
there  (Craven  v.  Smith,  89  Wise.  119; 
61  N.  W.  317). 

'5  In  Kentucky,  a  master  is  held 
liable  to  his  servant  for  the  gross 
negligence  of  a  superior  fellow-serv- 
ant (Louisville,  etc.  R,  Co  v.  Rob- 
inson. 4  Bush,  507  ;  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Filbern.  6  Id  574),  but  for 
nothing  short  of  that  (Robinson 
v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  [Ky.]  ; 
24  S.  W.  625):  nor  even  for  gross 
negligence  of   a   fellow-servant,    of 


the  same  grade  or  rank,  and  engaged 
in  the  same  field  of  labor  (Volz  v. 
Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  95  Ky. 
188;  24  S.  W.  119;  Fort  Hill  Stone 
Co.  v.  Orm,  84  Ky.  183). 
16  See  §§233b,  238,  post. 

1  In  our  last  edition,  §  181  was  de- 
voted to  the  "effect  of  statutes." 
The  multiplication  of  these  statutes 
makes  it  necessary  to  devote  several 
sections  to  them  at  the  end  of  this 
chapter. 

2  Ante,  %%  160,  164.  See  a  curious 
question  as  to  what  constitutes  a 
servant  within  this  rule  in  Fowler  v. 
Lock,  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  272.  See,  also, 
Bradley  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  3 
T.  &  C.  288  ;  affi'd,  62  N.  Y.  99 ; 
Kelly  v.  Johnson,  128  Mass.  530; 
where  A.,  a  servant  of  B.,  recovered 
of  C.  for  the  negligence  of  C.'s  ser- 
vants, while  A.  was  aiding  them  in 
pursuance  of  their  false  representa- 
tions that  B.  had  directed  him  so  to 
do.  A  postal  clerk  on  a  train,  what- 
ever may  l><  his  precise  status,  is  not 
a  servant  of  the  railroad  company 
(Houston,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Earn pt on, 
64  Tex.  427).  A  servant  cannot,  by 
neglecting  to  act  as  such,  entitle  him- 
self to  the  rights  of  a  stranger 
(Evans  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  <  !o.,  62 
Mo.  49). 

3  For  some  peculiar  cases,  in  which 
one  who  is  not  a  "servant"  may 
claim  the  same   protection   from  in- 


8    [82]  LIABILITY    OV    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  272 

tractor  or  the  servant  of  such  contractor  is  not  within  the  rule  ; 
and  he  may  recover  against  the  employer  of  such  contractor 
in  like  manner  with  any  stranger.4  On  the  other  hand,  he  has 
no  greater  rights  than  any  mere  stranger  has.5  The  wife,  child 
or  servant  of  a  servant  is  of  course  not  a  servant  of  his  master  in 
any  sense.  And  the  legal  fiction,  by  which  a  servant  is  held  to 
assume  certain  risks,  does  not  bind  him  to  assume  any  risks  to 
his  family.  He  has,  therefore,  the  same  right  to  recover  from 
his  master  damage  caused  to  him  by  injuries  suffered  by  his 
wife,  child  or  servant,  as  any  one  else  has.6  Prisoners,  com- 
pelled to  work  in  or  out  of  prison,  are  not  servants  of  the 
persons  controlling  them  nor  fellow-servants  with  each  other.7 

§  182.  Volunteer,  when  considered  servant. —  One  who, 
without  being  requested  or  authorized  by  the  master  to  do  so, 
assists  his  servants  to  serve  him,  is  deemed  to  be  so  far  their 
fellow-servant  as  to  limit  the  liability  of  the  master  to  him, 
even  though  he  would  not  be  regarded  as  a  servant  so  far  as  to 
make  the  master  liable  to  strangers  for  his  negligence.1  This 
is  so  where  such  assistance  is  given  at  the  request  of  the  serv- 
ants;2 and  it  can  make  no  difference  in  his  favor  that  the 
person   rendering  such  assistance   does    so    unasked   or    even 

jury  that  a  servant  can,  see  Hannigan  7  Buckalew  v.  Tennessee  Coal  Co. , 

v.  Union  Warehouse  Co.,  3  N.  Y.  112  Ala.  146  ;  20  So.  606  ;  Boswell  v. 

App.   Div.  618 ;  38  N.  Y.   Supp.  272  Barnhart,  96  Ga.  521  ;  23  S.  E  414. 

[duty  to  furnish  safe  implements]  ;  '  Degg  v.  Midland  R.  Co. ,  1  Hurlst. 

Hartwig  v.  Bay  State  Shoe  Co.,  43  &  N.    773;    Potter   v.    Faulkner,    1 

Hun,  425  [same,  in  favor  of  convict  Best&  S.  800  ;  Osborne  v.  Knox,  etc. 

against  contractor]  ;  and  so  where  no  R.  Co.,  68  Me.  49. 

such  duty  can  be  claimed     (Bibb  v.  2  Osborne    v.    Knox,    etc.  R.  Co., 

Norfolk,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  87  Va.  711  ;  14  supra;  Johnson   v.    Ashland  Water 

S.  E.  163;  Hanna  v.    Chattanooga,  Co.,  71  Wise.   553:   37  N.  W.  823; 

etc.    R.  Co.,  88Tenn.  310  ;  12  S.  W.  Bonner  v.  Bryant,  79  Tex.  540;  15 

718).  S.  W.  491  ;  Helm  v.  Louisville,  etc. 

4Galvin  v.  New  YTork,   112  N.  Y.  R.  Co.,  [Ky.]  ;  33  S.  W.  396.     The 

223  ;    19  N.    E.    675  ;    Neimeyer    v.  contrary  decision  was  made  in  the 

Weyerhaeuser,  95  Iowa,  497;  64  N.W.  Scotch  case  of  Little  v.  Summerlee 

416;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  Iron   Co.,   27  Jur.   135;  17   Dunlop, 

26  Neb.  645  ;  42  N.  W.  703.  310.     In  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Galla- 

6  Floette  v.  Third  Av.  R.  Co  ,  10  N.  her  (40  Ohio  St.  637).  an  employee  of 

Y.  App.  Div.  308  ;  41  N.  Y.  Supp.  792.  a  railroad  company,  while  repairing 

*  Gannon  v.  HousatonicR.  Co.,  112  a  freight  car,   called  upon  his   son 

Mass.    234  ;    Campbell  v.  Harris,   4  aged  eleven  years,  to  assist  him,  who, 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  636  ;  23  S.  W.  35.  while  doing  so,  was  injured  by  other 


2/3 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§I83 


against  the  will  of  the  master  or  of  the  servants,  or  both.  In 
such  case  he  may  be  a  trespasser;  and  if  so,  he  diminishes  his 
right  to  recover  for  an  injury  received  under  such  circum- 
stances by  his  contributory  fault.3  On  the  other  hand,  if  his 
assistance  is  rendered  at  the  request  of  the  master  or  his 
authorized  agent,  he  becomes  for  the  time  a  servant  in  every 
legal  sense,  with  the  benefits  4  as  well  as  the  burdens  of  that 
position. 

§  183.  Who  is  a  volunteer  assistant.—  It  is  not  every  act 
of  literal  assistance  to  a  servant  that  makes  the  person  doing 
it  an  "  assistant  "  within  the  scope  of  the  term  as  we  have  just 
used  it.  The  act  must  be  done  with  the  intention  of  rendering 
a  service  to  the  master.  If  done  for  the  benefit  of  himself  or 
any  one  else,  and  the  person  doing  it  does  so  only  because  he 
cannot  otherwise  effect  his  own  purpose,  he  may  be  a  tres- 
passer, but  he  is  not  in  any  sense  a  servant   of  that  master.1 


servants  of  the  company  backing  a 
train  down  on  him.  The  company 
was  held  liable  ;  the  court  consider- 
ing that  the  father  had  an  implied 
authority  to  call  for  mechanical 
assistance. 

3  It  has  been  held  that  where  a  rail- 
road company  has  not  given  its  con- 
ductor express  or  apparent  author- 
ity to  employ  help,  and  there  is  no 
exigency  requiring  extra  help,  a  boy 
of  15  who  willingly  obeys  his  re- 
quest to  assist  on  a  car,  is  a  trespasser, 
and,  if  injured,  cannot  recover  from 
the  company  in  the  absence  of  will- 
ful or  gross  negligence  (Hot  Springs 
R.  Co.  v.  Dial,  58  Ark.  318  ;  24  S.  W. 
500 1.  That  case  is  one  of  many,  in 
which  bad  law  was  invented  in  order 
to  overcome  a  perverse  verdict 
against  the  obvious  weight  of  evi- 
dence. 

4  A  person  who  without  pay  assisl  - 
as  a  brakeman  in  making  up  a  rail- 
road train  by  the  direction  or  with 
the  express  permission  of  a  yard- 
master,  who  has  authority  to  employ 
necessary    assistants   in   his   depart- 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  18] 


ment,  is  not  a  trespasser  on  the  train, 
but  a  servant  of  the  company,  and 
it  will  be  liable  to  him  for  an  injury 
resulting  from  the  use  of  a  defective 
brake  (Central  Trust  Co.  v.  Texas, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Fed.  448). 

1  The  cases  of  Degg  v.  Midland  R. 
Co.  and  Potter  v.  Faulkner  were 
distinguished  in  Wright  v.  North- 
western R.  Co.,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  Div. 
252,  where  the  defendant  was  held 
liable  to  one  who  was  assisting  its 
servants  in  delivering  to  him  his  own 
goods,  for  an  injury  caused  to  liini 
during  the  process  of  delivery  by 
the  negligence  of  defendant's  ser- 
vants. Coleridge,  C.  J.,  says  :  "It  i- 
plain,  therefore,  that  the  plaintiff 
was  not  acting  merely  as  a  volun- 
teer .  .  .  nor  was  it  the  case  of 
master  and  servant.  .  .  .  Hut 
the  defendants  being  bound  by  con- 
tract to  deliver  the  heifer  to  the 
plaintiff,  they  .  .  .  allowed  the 
plaintiff  to  take  part  in  the  delivery, 
and  they  were,  therefore,  bound  to 
see  th.it  he  did  not  gel  injured  by  the 

negligence  Of  their  servants."     This 


§  1 84] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


2/4 


Thus,  it"  a  horse  is  running  away  and  is  stopped  by  a  person 
otherwise  in  danger  of  being  run  over,  such  person  does  not 
therein-  become  in  any  degree  a  servant  of  the  owner  of  the 
horse.  So  one,  whose  house  is  threatened  by  the  spread  of  a 
fire  in  his  neighbor's,  does  not  lose  any  rights  as  a  stranger  by 
helping  to  put  out  the  fire. 


§  184.  Master  does  not  insure  against  risks. — The  master 
is  not  bound  to  protect  his  servants,  at  all  hazards,  against 
defects  in  materials  or  instruments  used  in  his  work,  nor  against 
the  risks  and  perils  of  the  business.  The  contract  of  employ- 
ment does  not  imply  an  absolute  warranty  that  the  materials 
and  instruments  furnished  shall  be  sound  or  fit  for  the  pur- 
poses to  which  they  are  applied,1  nor  that  the  servant  shall  not 


case  was  followed  where  a  street 
railway  company  was  held  liable  to 
a  passenger  who,  at  the  request  of 
the  driver,  assisted  in  pushing  a  car, 
for  an  injury  suffered  through  neg- 
ligence of  the  driver  of  another  car 
(Mclntire  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Bolton,  43 
Ohio  St.  224  ;  Stastney  v.  Second  Ave. 
R.  Co.,  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  800).  The  fol- 
lowing hard  case  seems  to  be  opposed 
to  these  decisions  :  Defendant  was 
delivering  a  large  fly-wheel  at  the 
factory  of  B.,  plaintiff's  employer, 
and  the  servants  of  both  defendant 
and  B.  were  jointly  engaged  in  un- 
loading the  wheel.  Defendant's 
foreman  called  for  help  as  the  wheel 
was  being  lowered,  and  B.'s  foreman 
ordered  plaintiff  to  assist,  and  while 
executing  this  order  plaintiff  was 
caught  under  the  wheel  and  injured. 
Held,  that  plaintiff  assumed  the  re- 
lation of  servant  to  defendant,  even 
though  ordered  to  assist  by  his  em- 
ployer's foreman  at  the  request  for 
help  from  defendant's  foreman,  and 
that  he  could  not  recover  for  the 
negligence  of  the  other  servants  of 
defendant  (Wischam  v.  Rickards, 
13G  Pa.  St.  109  ;  20  Atl.  532).  See 
also  Billows  v.  Moors,  162  Mass.  42  ; 
37  N.  E.  750. 


1  Armour  v.  Halm,  111  U.  S.  313  ; 
4  S.  Ct.  433  [projecting  timber  giving 
way]  ;  Devlin  v.  Smith,  89  N.  Y. 
470  ;  Dillon  v.  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.,  97 
Id.  627.  This  is  substantially  the 
form  in  which  the  doctrine  is  stated 
in  the  following  cases,  where  mas- 
ters were  held  not  liable  to  servants 
for  defects  in  materials,  etc.  :  Or- 
mond  v.  Holland,  EL,  Bl.  &  El.  102  ; 
Hard  v.  Vermont,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Vt. 
473  ;  Columbus,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Webb, 
12  Ohio  St.  475  ;  Mad  River,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Barber,  5  Id.  541  ;  Indian- 
apolis, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Love,  10  Ind- 
554  ;  Murphy  v.  Crossan,  98  Pa.  St. 

495  ;  Sykes  v.  Packer,  99  Id.  465  [in 
construction  of  building,  plaintiff,  a 
rigger,  injured  by  falling  rafters]  ; 
Ladd  v.  New  Bedford,  etc.  R.  Co., 
119  Mass.  412  [roadmaster  injured 
by  breaking  of  switch];  Indianapolis, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Toy,  91  111.  474  [fire- 
man injured  by  explosion  of  boiler]; 
Richardson  v.  Cooper,  88  111.  270 
[machine  which  had  previously  been 
abundantly  sufficient,  but  fell  out 
of  repair,  unknown  to  master];  Bry- 
mer  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  90  Cal. 

496  ;  27  Pac.  371  ;  Watts  v.  Hart,  7 
Wash.  St.  178 :  34  Pac.  423,  771  ; 
Memphis,  etc.   R.  Co.   v.  Askew,  90 


275 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§   184 


be  exposed  to  extraordinary  risks.2  A  master  is  not  liable  to 
his  servant  for  any  defects  in  the  materials  furnished  to  the 
latter  for  use  in  the  master's  service,  unless  he,  or  those 
entrusted  by  him  with  the  selection  or  inspection  of  such 
materials,  had  notice  of  such  defects  or  could  have  discovered 
them  by  the  use  of  ordinary  care  in  selection  or  inspection,3 
and  negligently  omitted  to  warn  the  servant  of  their  defects. 
A  railroad  company  is,  therefore,  not  prima  facie  liable  to 
any  of  its  servants  for  defects  in  its  rolling  stock,4  rails,5  ties,6 


Ala.  5  ;  7  So.  823  :  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Jagerman,  50  Ark.  98 ;  26  S. 
W.  591  ;  Van  Winkle  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  93  Iowa,  509  ;  61  N.  W. 
929. 

2  Riley  v.  Baxendale,  0  Hurlst.  & 
N.  446  ;  Lasky  v.  Canadian  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  83  Me.  4G1  ;  22  Atl.  367  ;  Toledo, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Conroy,  68  111.567; 
Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Philips,  49 
Id.  234  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thompson,  56  Id.  138.  Compare  also, 
Gibson  v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  46  Mo.  163  ; 
Crown  v.  Orr,  140  N.  Y.  450  ;  35  N.  E. 
648.  The  test  of  liability  is  the  negli- 
gence of  the  master,  not  the  danger 
of  the  employment,  though  the 
danger  of  the  employment  may  help 
to  determine  the  ordinary  care  re- 
quired in  the  case  (Knight  v.  Cooper, 
36  W.  Va.  232;  14  S.  E.  999). 

z  Washington,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Dade,  135  U.  S.  554  :  10  S.  Ct.  1044  ; 
Devlin  v.  Smith,  89  N.  Y.  470  ;  De- 
Graff  v.  N.  Y.  Central  etc.  R.  Co., 
76  Id.  125  [defect  in  brake  chain,  not 
discoverable  by  usual  means]  ;  Han- 
rathy  v.  Northern  Central  R.  Co.,  46 
Md.  280  [alleged  defect  in  steam 
hammer]  ;  Allerton  Packing  Co.  v. 
Egan,  86  111.  253  [explosion  of  steam 
tank]  ;  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Jones,  9  Heisk.  273  [explosion  of 
boiler];  Jones  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  22  Hun,  284  [brakeman killed 
by  breaking  of  a  ladder  on  freight 
car] ;  Smoot  v.  Mobile,   etc.   R.   Co., 


67  Ala.  13  [brakeman  injured  while 
coupling  cars,  by  reason  of  a  broken 
strap  which  supported  bumper]  ; 
Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Duffey,  35 
Ark.  602  [trackman  injured  by  a  de- 
fective spike  maul]  ;  Lake  Shore  R. 
Co.  v.  McCormick,  74  Ind.  440 
[brakeman  injured  by  catching  his 
foot  in  switch  frog,  while  coupling 
cars]  ;  Riley  v.  Baxendale,  6  Hurlst. 
&  N.  446  [porter  killed  at  a  station 
by  a  railway  truck]  :  Seaver  v.  Bos- 
ton &  Maine  R.  Co.,  14  Gray,  466 
[carpenter  riding  from  work,  injured 
by  breaking  of  axle,  and  lack  of 
safety  beams]  ;  Gunfcer  v.  Granite- 
ville  Mfg.  Co.,  15  S.  C.  443  [cotton 
machinery].  So  held  where  the 
origin  of  the  defect  did  not  appear 
(Warner  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  39  N.  Y.  163; 
Ormond  v.  Holland,  El.,  Bl.  &  El. 
102  ;  Flynn  v.  Beebe,  98  Mass,  575  ; 
Columbus,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Webb,  12 
Ohio  St.  475  :  Hayden  v.  Smithville 
Mfg.  Co.,  29  Conn.  548;  Buzzell  v. 
LaconiaMfg.  Co.,  48  Me.  113  ;  Priest- 
ley v.  Fowler,  3  Mees.  &  V 

*  Hard  v.  Vermont,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32 
Vt.  473;  Mad  River,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Barber,  5  Ohio  St.  541  ;  De  Graff  v. 
N.  V.  Central,  <■(<•.  R.  <'<>.,  76  N.  Y. 
125. 

5  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  <  '<>.  v.  Love, 
in  [nd.  554  ;  Colorado  R.  Co.  v. 
Ogden,  3  Colo.  499. 

'  Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  <'<-•  v.  Town- 
send,  41  Ark.  382. 


0  -   I 


1  [ABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


276 


or  bridges,7  even  where  such  servant  is  not  employed  upon  the 
particular  thing  which  is  defective,  but  upon  work  wholly 
unconnected  therewith."  In  short,  the  master  does  not  insure 
the  safety  of  his  servants.'' 

§  1S5.  What  risks  servants  assume.— A  servant  is  held  to 
assume  the  ordinary  risks  of  the  business  upon  which  he 
enters,1  so  far  as  those  risks,  at  the  time  of  his  entering  upon 


•  Warner  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  39  N.  Y. 
468  ;  rev'g  S.  C,  49  Barb.  558. 

-  Where    the    plaintiff    was    ein- 
ployed  by  a  railroad  company  upon 
work  unconnected  with  its  trains  or 
tracks,  and  daily  passed  over  its  road 
free  of  charge,  to  and  from  his  work, 
and    the    train    carrying    him    was 
thrown   from    the  track,    in   conse- 
quence of  some  rails  not  being  prop- 
erly joined  together,  it  was  held  that 
the  company  was  not  liable    (Sea- 
ver  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R.  Co.,  14 
Gray,  466  ;  Moss  v.  Johnson,  22  111. 
633).      These  decisions  can  only  be 
supported  upon  the  assumption  that 
no  negligence  in  selecting  or  inspect- 
ing the  rails  was  proved  (Compare 
§  194).     The  reasoning  in  the  latter 
case  is  very  feeble  ;  and  it  is  practi- 
cally overruled  in  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Conroy,  68  111.  567.     Where  a  de- 
duction was  made  on    account   of 
such   transaction,   from    the   wages 
that  would  otherwise  have  been  al- 
lowed, it  was  held  that  the  servant 
had    for  the  time  all   the  rights  of 
other      passengers     (O'Donnell     v. 
Allegheny  Valley   R.    Co.,    59  Pa. 
St.    239).     The  opposite  ruling    was 
made  in  Vick  v.   X.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  95    N.  Y.   267.      The    question 
on  which  the  two  courts  differed 
was    whether    the    contract   really 
amounted   to    payment  of    fare  by 
the  servant,  or  whether  he  was  car- 
ried  free,  as  a  servant,  and  was  in 
service,   while   traveling.     If  a  ser- 
vant  is  required  to    pay   any  fare 


whatever,  on  his  way  to  work,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  he  has  all  the 
rights  of  a  passenger. 

9  Need  ham  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  85  Ky.  423;  11  S.  W.  306  ;  Bry- 
mer  v.  Southern  Pacific  R.  Co.,  90 
Cal.  496  ;  27  Pac.  371  ;  Colorado  R. 
Co.  v.  Ogden,  3  Colo.  499. 

1  Sweeney  v.  Berlin,  etc.  Co.,  101 
N.  Y.    520;  5  N.  E.    358,  and  cases 
cited  ;    Dysinger  v.  Cincinnati,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  93   Mich.  646  ;  53  N.  W.  825 
[car  coupling]  ;  Lewis  v.  Seifert,  116 
Pa.  St.  628  ;  11  Atl.  514  ;  Lee  v.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.,  86  Ga.  231  :  12  S.  E.  307  ; 
Rutledge  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  110 
Mo.  312  ;  19  S.  W.  38.    A  servant  as- 
sumes such  risks  as,  from  the  nature 
of  the   business  as   ordinarily  con- 
ducted, he  must  have  known,    and 
those  risks  which  the  exercise  of  his 
opportunities  for  inspection    would 
have  disclosed   to  him  (Linton  Coal 
Mining  Co.  v.  Persons,  Ind. 
43  N.   E.    651).       To   similar  effect, 
Smith  v.  Sellars,    40  La.  Ann.   527  ; 
4  So.  333  ;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Sims,  80 
Ga.  749  ;    7  S.  E.  176  [jerk  of  train]. 
An  employee   assumes  not  only  the 
risks  which   always  attend  his  em- 
ployment,   but    those,    also,    which 
commonly  do  so  (Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v 
Kizziah.  86  Tex.  81  ;  23  S.  W.  578). 
In    a    cold     climate,    railroad    em- 
ployees assume  risks  incident  to  ac- 
cumulation of  snow  and  ice  on  the 
tracks     (Lawson     v.    Truesdale    60 
Minn.  410;  62  N.  W.  546). 


277 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[8  *S5 


the  business,2  are  known  to  him,  or  should  be  readily  discerni- 
ble by  a  person  of  his  age  and  capacity,  in  the  exercise  of 
ordinary  care,3  and  whether  the  business  is  dangerous  or  not.4 
Notwithstanding  the  general  rule  that  the  master  is  bound 
to  use  due  care  to  furnish  safe  and  sound  materials,  machinery, 
etc.,  yet  the  servant  assumes  the  risk  of  obvious  defects  in 
things  which  he  voluntarily  uses,5  if  his  work  consists,  in  whole 


'Gibson  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  63  X.  Y. 
449  ;  DeForest  v.  Jewett,  88  Id.  264 ; 
Shaw  v.  Sheldon,  103  Id.  667  ;  Haas 
v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  40  Hun,  145. 

3  Servant  assumes  all  obvious  risks 
(Crown  v.  Orr,  140  X.  Y.  450  ;  35  N. 
E.  648  ;  Hoosier  Stone  Co.  v.  McCain, 
133  Ind.  231  ;  31  N.  E.  956  ;  Berger 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  78  ; 
38  N.  W.  814  [roller,  worked  long 
time,  danger  obvious]  ;  Burnell  v. 
West  Side  R.  Co.,  87  Wise.  387  ;  58  N. 
W.  772  [obvious  danger  of  cleaning 
electric  motor]  ;  Ohio  Val.  R.  Co. 
v.  McKinley,  [Ky.J;  33  S.  W.  186; 
Linton  Coal  Co.  v.  Persons,   Ind. 

;  43  N.  E.  651  [coal  mining]). 

4  Stewart  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  40 
W.  Va.  188  ;  20  S.  E.  922  ;  Southern 
Pac.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  16  C.  C.  A.  317  ; 
69  Fed.  559  [locomotive] ;  Kennedy 
v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  33  Hun,  457 
[signal-man  assumes  risk  of  want  of 
side  platform  to  enable  him  to  escape 
from  passing  trains]  ;  Murphy  v.  X. 
Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  11  Daly,  122 
[laborer  upon  tracks  in  a  yard  as- 
sumes risk  of  car  coming  behind 
him]  ;  Hopkins  Bridge  Co.  v.  Bur- 
nett, 85  Tex.  16  ;  19  S.  W.  886  ;  and 
Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Conrad,  62 
Tex.  627  [injuries  by  clippings  from 
good  tools]  ;  Boyle  v.  X.  Yr.  &  X. 
England  R.  Co.,  151  Mass.  102  ;  23 
X.  E.  827  ;  Mcintosh  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  58  Mo.  App.  281  [men  in- 
jured while  coupling  cars  from  the 
ends  of  which  rails  projectedj;  Lake 
Shore  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Knittal,  33  Ohio 
St.  468  ;  [risks  attending  known  cus- 
tom of  making  "  flying  switches"  ] ; 


Railroad  Co.  v.  Leech,  41  Ohio  St. 
388  [section  hand,  riding  on  hand- 
car run  over  by  delayed  train]  ;  Do- 
well  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62 
Iowa,  629  [brakeman  injured  by  con- 
tact with  snow  bank  formed  by  snow 
plow]  ;  Coolbroth  v.  Maine  Central 
R.  Co.,  77  Me.  165  [plaintiff  injured, 
after  three  weeks'  experience  in 
throwing  mail  bags  into  train  in  mo- 
tion] ;  Penn.  R.  Co.  v.  Wachter,  60 
Md.  395  [trackman  injured  on  hand- 
car, by  collision  with  a  special  train, 
running,  according  to  a  custom 
known  to  him,  without  notice] ;  Tay- 
lor v.  Carew  Mfg.  Co.,  140  Mass. 
150  ;  3  X.  E.  21  [employee  in  mill 
going  to  adjust  a  belt,  ordered  by 
foreman  to  hurry,  fell  into  an  un- 
guarded elevator  well]  ;  Walsh  v. 
St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co. .  27  Minn.  367 
[freight  handler  rolling  heavy 
grindstone  over  uneven  floor].  An 
employer  is  not  liable  for  the  death 
of  an  employee  who  was  killed  by 
the  igniting  of  the  funics  of  black 
varnish  with  which  he  was  painting, 
where  deceased  had  used  black  var- 
nish for  twelve  years,  and  the  torch 
from  which  the  fire  occurred  was 
used  at  his  suggestion,  and  the  vax- 
ni>li  was  of  the  same  quality  as  that 
he  had  always  used  (Lyons  v.  Boston 
Towage  Co.,  163  Mass.  158  ;  39  X.  E. 
800). 

'Kaare  v.  Troy  Steel  Co.,  139  N. 
Y.  369  ;  34  X.  E.  919  [wheeling  on 
narrow  incline];  La  Pierre  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co..  99  Mich.  212;  58 
X.  W.  60;  Shaffer  v.  Haish,  110  Pa. 
St.    575    [loose    belting     slipping] ; 


§i85] 


LIABILITY  OF  MASTERS  TO    SERVANTS. 


278 


or    in    part,  in    dealing   with   dangerous,6   unsafe  or   unsound 


Davis  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  25 
Atl.  498;  L52  I'a.  St.  314  [box  car 
Used  as  caboose]  ;  Denver  Tramway 
Co  v.  Nesbit,  22  Colo.  408;  45  Pac. 
40.1  [no  guard  to  car  wheels]  ;  Patton 
v.  Central  [owa  1!.  Co.,  7;?  Iowa, 
806  ;  3~>  N.  W.  149  [unfenced  road] ; 
Scharenbroich  v.  St.  Cloud  Fiber 
Co.,  59  Minn.  116;  GO  N.  W.  1093 
[1  lippery  floor  ami  unguarded  pin- 
ion] ;  Graves  v.  Brewer,  4  N.  V.  App. 
Div.  327  :  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  5G6  [cogs 
of  machine  uncovered  in  violation 
of  Factory  Act :  danger  obvious]  ; 
Boyd  v.  Harris,  176  Pa.  St.  484;  35 
Atl.  222  [projections  from  side  tracks, 
well  known]  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Stutts,  22  Ala.  3G8  ;  17  So.  29  [ob- 
viously defective  engine].  Especially 
is  this  the  rule  where  a  servant,  en- 
tirely of  his  own  accord,  goes  into 
known  danger  (Bunt  v.  Sierra,  etc. 
Co.,  138  U.  S.  483  ;  11  S.  Ct.  4G4). 
A  servant  who  stands  upon  an  un- 
railed  platform  two  feet  wide  and 
attempts  to  pry  a  pulley  off  with  a 
piece  of  scantling  assumes  the  risk 
of  the  scantling  breaking  and  caus- 
ing him  to  fall  (Chesapeake, etc.  R.Co. 
v.  McDowell  [Ky.];  24  S.  W.  G07). 

*Bormann  v.  Milwaukee,  93  Wise. 
524;  67  N.  W.  924  [wild  animals  en- 
closed] ;  Wood  v.  Heiges,  83  Md.  257  ; 
34  Atl.  872  [very  dangerous  iron- 
breaker  in  constant  use]  ;  Burke  v. 
Parker,  107  Mich.  88  ;  64  N.  W.  1065 
[benzine  paint,  properly  used  in 
business]  ;  Thomas  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  109  Mo.  187  ;  18  S.  W.  980 
[unusual  couplings]  ;  Content  v. 
New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  165  Mass. 
267  ;  43  N.  E.  94  [extra  large  cars,  pro- 
jecting over  track]  ;  Bagley  v.  Con- 
solidated Gas  Co.,  5  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
432  ;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  302  [planks  fall- 
ing from  scaffold].  An  employee 
working  with  and  about  two  cylin- 
ders in  contact  with  each  other  and 


revolving  inwardly,  and  in  plain 
view,  cannot  recover  for  injuries 
caused  by  her  fingers  being  caught 
between  such  cylinders  (Connolly  v. 
Eldredge,  160  Mass.  566  ;  36  N.  E. 
469:  s.  P.,  Walsh  v.  Com'l.  Laundry 
Co.,  11  N.  Y.  Misc.  3;  31  N.  Y. 
Supp.  S33  ;  Daigle  v.  Lawrence  Mfg. 
Co.,  159  Mass.  378  ;  34  N.  E.  458  [re- 
volving cylinder];  Arkadelphia  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Bethea,  57  Ark.  76  ;  20  S. 
W.  808  [dangerous  cylinder  of  knives, 
used  in  dangerous  position]  ;  Good- 
now  v.  Walpole  Emery  Mills,  146 
Mass.  261  ;  15  N.  E.  576  [dangerous 
revolving  screw  :  obvious  :  extra  pay 
for  special  work]  ;  Darracott  v. 
Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  83  Va.  288  ; 
2  S.  E.  511  [dangerous  couplings  in 
common  use]  ;  Hulett  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Mo.  239  [similar]; 
Hatter  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co ,  69 
Miss.  642;  13  So.  827  [coupler  not 
defective,  but  dangerous]).  One  who 
is  employed  to  dig  out  gravel  from 
under  a  thin  stratum  of  clay  cannot 
recover  for  injuries  received  from 
the  clay  falling  on  him  (Griffin  v. 
Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  124  Ind.  326;  24 
N.  E.  888).  One  engaged  in  digging 
and  removing  earth  from  a  nearly 
perpendicular  bank  assumes  the 
risk  (Pederson  v.  Rushford,  41  Minn. 
289;  42  N.  W.  1063).  To  similar  effect, 
Swanson  v.  La  Fayette,  134  Ind.  625  ; 
33  N.  E.  1033  ;  Carlson  v.  Sioux  Falls 
Water  Co.,  8  S.  Dak.  47  ;  65  N.  W. 
419  [digging  in  unsafe  soil]  ;  Evans- 
ville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Henderson,  134 
Ind.  636  ;  33  N.  E  1021  [construction 
train  on  obviously  unfinished  road]  ; 
Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes, 
137  Ind.  306  ;  36  N.  E.  1092  ;  Walling 
v.  Congaree  Constr.  Co.,  41  S.  C. 
388  ;  19  S.  E.  723  ;  Titus  v.  Bradford, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  136  Pa.  St.  618;  20  Atl. 
517  [transferring  broad  gauge  cars 
to  narrow  tracks]). 


2/9 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[g    I85 


things,7  known  to  him  to  be  so,  or  obviously  so,  and  which,  by 
the  very  nature  of  the  business,  must  be  used  while  in  that 
condition,  he  assumes  the  risk  of  doing  so.  Thus,  a  railway 
servant,  employed  to  remove  damaged  cars  to  a  repair  shop, 
has  no  right  to  complain  of  injuries  suffered  from  the  known 
defects  of  such  cars.3  And,  where  a  business  is  obviously 
dangerous,  and  is  conducted  in  a  manner  which  is  fully  known 
to  the  servant  at  the  outset,  he  assumes  the  risk  of  its  con- 
duct in  that  manner,  although  a  safer  method  could  have 
been   adopted.9     The  ordinary   risks  of  a   particular  business 


'Arnold  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  125  N.  Y.  13  ;  25  N.  E.  1064  [mov- 
ing defective  cars]  ;  Anglin  v. 
Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60  Fed.  553  ;  9 C.  C. 
A.  130  [moving  "dead"  engine]; 
Dartmouth  Spinning  Co.  v.  Achord, 
84  Ga.  14  ;  10  S.  E.  449  [repairing 
imperfect  machinery]  ;  Carlson  v. 
Oregon  Short-Line  R.  Co.,  21  Oreg. 
450;  28  Pac.  497  [repairing  dilapidated 
track,  after  storms]  ;  Moore  v.  Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.,  167  Pa.  St.  495 ;  31 
Atl.  734  [dismantling  trestle] .  A  ser- 
vant, employed  to  watch  a  dilapi- 
dated building  which  is  apparently 
liable  to  fall  at  any  moment  (Paland 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  44  La.  Ann. 
1003  ;  1 1  So.  707). 

8  Flannagan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
50  Wise.  402  ;  7  N.  W.  337  ;  s.  C,  on 
former  appeal,  45  Wise.  98  ;  for  simi- 
lar cases,  see  Watson  v.  Houston, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  58  Tex.  434  ;  Yeaton  v. 
Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  135  Mass.  418. 

9  Xaylor  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53 
Wise.  661  ;  11  N.  W.  24  [bank  exca- 
vation]. Cited  and  followed  in  Gal- 
veston, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lempe,  59  Tex. 
19  [workman,  repairing  a  well,  in 
obviously  dangerous  condition];  Gal- 
veston, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Arispe,  81  Tex. 
517;  17  S.  W.  47  [trains  constantly 
moved  backwards].  A  servant  as- 
sumes the  risk  of  an  unusually  and 
extra  hazardous  way  of  performing 
work  in  which  he  is  experienced, 
wbere  the  danger  is  obvious,  and  he 


has  knowledge  of  the  nature  and 
extent  of  the  risk  (Claybaugh  v. 
Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56  Mo.  App, 
630).  A  trackman,  whose  duty  it  is 
to  watch  for  wild  trains,  assumes 
the  danger  of  collision  between  a 
wild  train  and  a  hand  car  which  he 
is  pushing  (Sullivan  v.  Fitchburg  R. 
Co.,  161  Mass.  125;  36  X.  E.  751.) 
Where  it  is  the  known  and  estab- 
lished practice  of  a  railway  company 
to  run  special  trains  at  any  time, 
without  notice,  sending  out  such  a 
train  with  snow  plow,  in  a  storm, 
without  such  notice,  was  not  negli- 
gence, but  the  attendant  risks  to 
trackmen  are  assumed,  if  they 
knew,  or  ought  to  have  known,  that 
such  a  train  might  be  expected  (Ol- 
son v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  38  Minn. 
117;  35  N.  W.  866);  s.  p.,  where 
about  one-third  of  the  trains  were 
extra  trains,  not  running  on  sched- 
ule time  (Larson  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  43  Minn.  423;  45  X.  W.  722). 
A  railroad  hand,  working  where  he 
knows  there  is  no  one  to  give  notice 
of  approaching  trains,  assumes  the 
risk  (Rutherford  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  57  Minn.  237;  59  N.  W.  302). 
As  it  is  the  general  usage  on  the 
Mississippi  to  land  steamboats,  for 
tin  oil  livery  of  freight,  by  running  the 
bow  into  the  shore,  and  holding 
the  vessel  in  position  by  revolutions 

of     till-     wheel,    without      putting     out 

lines,  any    risk    attendant    on    this 


§  185J 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


2bO 


arc  those  which  arc  part  of  the  natural  and  ordinary  method 
of  conducting  that  business,  even  although  they  might  fairly 
be  called  extraordinary  with  reference  to  a  different  busi- 
ness, or  a  different  department  of  the  same  business.10  While 
a  person  engaged  for  a  particular  service  only  agrees  to  en- 
counter the  dangers  of  that  service,  yet  if,  being  assigned  to 
the  performance  of  duties  not  within  his  contract,  he  volun- 
tarily,11 or,  it  has  been  sometimes  wrongly  held,  even  under 
some  coercion,12  determines  to  perform  them,  he  assumes  the 
necessary  risks  attendant  thereon.  But  this  does  not  apply  to 
risks,  caused  by  the  master's  fault ;  and  doubt  has  been  cast 
upon  the  whole  of  these  decisions.13  In  the  absence  of  other 
evidence  of  negligence,  where  master  and  servant  are  equally 


method  is  assumed  by  employees  de- 
livering or  receiving  freight  (Red 
River  Line  v.  Cheatham,  60  Fed. 
517;  9  C.  C.  A.  124).  One,  who 
works  on  tracks  for  several  hours  at 
a  place  where  ties  are  piled  near  the 
tracks,  assumes  the  risk  of  their 
preventing  his  getting  out  of  the 
way  of  a  train  (Bengtson  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  47  Minn.  486;  50  N.  W. 
531). 

10  If  the  business  is  essentially 
attended  with  extraordinary  dan- 
gers, these  are  among  the  risks  as- 
sumed (Joyce  v.  Worcester,  140 
Mass.  245;  4  N.  E.  565  [fall  of  der- 
rick, while  workman  pulling  up 
planks  from  trench];  Kelley  v.  Silver 
Springs,  etc.  Co.,  12  R.  I.  112  [gig 
tender  injured  by  exposed  gears]; 
Morse  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  30 
Minn.  465  [engineer  killed  while 
"  bucking"  snow  off  track];  Derr  v. 
Lehigh  Y.  R.  Co.,  158  Pa.  St.  365;  27 
Atl.  1002  [nearly  the  same];  see  Fos- 
ter v.  Pusey,  8  Houst,  [Del.]  168  ;  14 
Atl.  545);  South-West  Imp.  Co.  v. 
AiHlrew,  86  Va.  270;  9  S.  E.  1015 
[very  dangerous  work  in  coal  mines, 
carefully  inspected].  Where  plain- 
tiff,   who   had   been   engaged    as    a 


weaver,  after  being  laid  off  till  a  new 
mill,  in  which  alterations  were  being 
made,  was  started  up,  was  employed 
to  assist  in  moving  into  the  new  mill 
and  making  alterations,  he  assumed 
the  increased  risk  incident  to  altera- 
tions (Rooney  v.  Carson,  161  Pa.  St. 
26;  28  Atl.  996).  A  brakeman  on  a 
freight  train  was  standing  on  a  flat 
car,  and,  while  approaching  a  bridge, 
the  engineer  signaled  for  brakes. 
The  brakeman  sprang,  caught  the 
ladder  on  the  side  of  a  box  car,  and, 
swinging  himself  to  ascend,  came  in 
contact  with  the  bridge  with  such 
force  that  he  was  thrown  from  the 
train,  and  killed.  Held,  that  his 
death  "was  one  of  the  accidents 
incident  to  his  employment"  (Illick 
v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Mich.  632;  35 
N.  W.  708). 

11  Paule  v.  Florence  Min.  Co.  80 
Wis.  350  ;  50  N.  W.  189  ;  Ft.  Smith 
Oil  Co.  v.  Slover,  58  Ark.  168  ;  24 
S.  W.  106. 

12  Leary  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.  139 
Mass.  580  ;  2  N.  E.  115  [truckman 
directed  to  act  as  fireman  on  a  switch 
engine]. 

13  See  post,  §§  208a,  209,  210,  and 
especially  211a. 


28l 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS.  [§  185a 


acquainted  with14  or  equally  ignorant  of15  the  dangers  the 
servant  assumes,  much  less  can  the  master  be  held  liable,  if  the 
servant  knows  of  the  hazardous  character  of  the  work  which 
he  undertakes,  and  is  injured  by  an  accident  which  could  not 
be  foreseen  by  his  employer.16 


§  185a.  What  risks  servants  do  not  assume.— A  servant 
does  not  assume  any  risks  which  are  not  thus  known  or  dis- 
cernible,1  nor  any  which  do  not  exist   at   the   time  when  he 


14  Mississippi  Logging  Co.  v. 
Schneider,  20  C.  C.  A.  390;  74  Fed.  195; 
[manifest  risk  of  coupling  buffer  en- 
gine with  car]  ;  Wormell  v.  Maine 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  T9  Me.  397  ;  10  Atl.  49  ; 
Prentice  v.  Wellsville,  66  Hun,  634  ; 
21  N.  Y.  Supp.  820  ;  Weeklund  v.  So. 
Oregon  Co.,  20  Oreg.  591 ;  27  Pac.  260. 
Where  a  section  hand,  engaged  at 
night  in  taking  up  and  relaying  track, 
was  injured  in  consequence  of  an- 
other workman  stumbling  and 
dropping  a  rail,  held  that,  in  view  of 
the  nature  of  the  work,  this  was  a 
risk  assumed  by  the  servant,  as  was 
a  deficiency  of  light,  of  which  the 
servant  must  have  been  as  well 
aware  as  the  master  (Gulf,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Jackson,  65  Fed.  48;  12  C.  C. 
A.  507). 

1  Watts  v.  Hart,  7  Wash.  St.  178  ; 
34  Pac.  423. 

'"Easton  v.  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
39  Fed.  6> ;  Gowen  v.  Harley,  56 
Fed.  973;  6  C.  C.  A.  190  ;  Fisher  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  77  Mich.  546  ; 
43  N.  W.  92G.  Where  there  is  an  in- 
creased hazard  in  the  employment  of 
a  firenian  upon  a  passenger  train,  on 
account  of  the  use  of  switches  with- 
out lamps,  and  the  fireman  knows 
that  he  is  exposed  to  that  hazard 
every  time  he  goes  over  the  road 
after  dark,  and  makes  no  objection, 
it  will  be  presumed  that  he  assents 
to  it,  and  that  it  is  one  of  the  risks 


incident  to  his  employment  (Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Swisher,  61  111.  App. 
611). 

1  Myers  v.  Hudson  Iron  Co.,  150 
Mass.  125  ;  22  N.  E.  631  [bucket 
descending  mine]  ;  Nicholds  v.  Crys- 
tal Plate  Co.,  126  Mo.  55;  28  S.  W. 
991  [latent  defects]  ;  Kearney  Elec- 
tric Co.  v.  Laughlin,  45  Neb.  390; 
63  N.  W.  941  ;  Nail  v.  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  129  Ind.  260  ;  28  N.  E.  Gil  ; 
Murtaugh  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
49  Hun,  456  ;  3  N.  Y.  Supp.  483 
[latent  defects  in  wheel]  ;  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Reagan,  96  Tenn.  128  ; 
33  S.  W.  1050  [latent  defects  in 
drawbar]  ;  Kennedy  v.  Lake  Supe- 
rior R.  Co.,  93  Wise.  32;  66  N.  W. 
1137  [ashes  covered  with  snow]  ; 
Fitzgerald  v.  Connecticut  Paper  Co., 
155  Mass.  155  :  29  X.  E.  464  [<langer 
not  obvious]  ;  Blanton  v.  Dold,  109 
Mo.  64;  18  S.  W.  1149  [concealed 
risk  of  sudden  starting  machinery  ]  ; 
Clapp  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
36  Minn.  6;  29  X.  W.  340  [rails  to,, 
light;  broken  rail;  no  notice] ;  Mc- 
Dermotl  v.  Iowa  Falls  R.  < '"..  85 
Iowa,  lso  ;  47  X.  W.  1037  [ice  coated 

^ates].  An  employee  does  qoI  as- 
sume the  risk  of  a  grindstone  burst- 
ing from  excessive  speed,  he  being 

ignorant  of  what  was  an  unsafe  rate 

of  speed  (Helfenstein  v.  Medart, 

Mo.     ;  86  S.  W.  863). 


§  [85a]  LIABILITY   OV   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


282 


enters  into  his  master's  service,-  and  of  which  he  has  not  notice 
in  time  to  protect  himself  against  them.8  He  does  not  even 
assume  risks,  which  he  knows  to  exist,  if  he  has  no  notice  that 
he  will  be  exposed  to  them.4  He  does  not  assume  extra- 
ordinary risks,  unusual  in  his  business,  of  which  he  has  not 
timely  notice."'  These  risks,  moreover,  must  not  arise  from 
defect^  in  the  master's  discharge  of  his  personal  duties,  as  else- 
where defined  ; '''  at  all   events,   not   from   such   defects  as   the 


•  Libby  v.  Scherman,  146  111.  540; 
34  N.  E .  801 .  "  The  servant  assumes 
no  risks,  except  such  as  exist  at  the 
beginning  of  the  employment,  and 
such  as  arc  incidental  to  the  busi- 
ness, or  which  exist  during  the 
course  of  the  employment,  of  which 
the  employee  has  knowledge,  or  is 
bound  to  have  knowledge  "  (Sowden 
v.  Idaho,  etc.  Mining  Co.,  55  Cal. 
443) ;  where  defendant  introduced  a 
new  blasting  powder.  If  the  risk  is 
increased,  the  servant  is  entitled  to 
notice  of  the  change  (Hawkins  v. 
Johnson,  105  Ind.  29  ;  4  N.  E.  172)  ; 
where  a  way  passing  under  a  revolv- 
ing shaft  was  raised  without  notice. 
A  servant,  by  entering  an  employ- 
ment necessitating  use  of  steps,  does 
not  assume  the  risk  of  their  subse- 
quent icy  condition,  where,  when 
the  contract  was  made,  the  steps 
were  not  icy,  nor  was  there  any  rea- 
son to  suppose  that  the  business  in- 
volved a  risk  in  regard  to  them 
(Fitzgerald  v.  Connecticut  Paper 
Co.,  155  Mass.  155;  29  N.  E.  464). 

3  Knowledge  by  servant  of  risk  of 
employment  does  not  constitute  an 
assumption  of  such  risk  unless  the 
knowledge  comes  in  time  to  be  of 
use  (Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelly, 
63  led.  407  ;  11  C.  C.  A.  260  ;  Meloy 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  77  Iowa,  743  ; 
42  N.  W.  5(53  [civil  engineer,  injured 
on  new  road  which  he  was  laying 
out]). 

4Hosic  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  75 
Iowa,  683  ;  37  N.  W.  963. 


6  Bergquist  v.  Chandler  Iron  Co., 
49  Minn.  511  ;  52  N.  W.  136 ;  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Triplett,  54  Ark. 
289  ;  15  S.  W.  831  [no  warning  ;  un- 
usual operation]  ;  Fordyce  v.  Low- 
man,  57  Ark.  160;  20  S.  W.  1090 
[improper  custom  ;  needless  hazard  ; 
no  notice]  ;  Brazil  Coal  Co.  v.  Hood- 
let,  129  Ind.  327 ;  27  N.  E.  741  [black- 
smith called  into  mine]  ;  Moynihan 
v.  Hills  Co.,  146  Mass.  586  ;  16  N.  E. 
574  [unexplained  breaking  of  ma- 
chine]. 

6  A  servant  does  not  assume  the 
risks  incident  to  the  negligence  of  his 
superior  (Mattise  v.  Consumers'  Ice 
Co.,  46  La.  Ann.  1535  ;  16  So.  400  ; 
Nicholds  v.  Crystal  Plate  Glass  Co. , 
126  Mo.  55 ;  28  S.  W.  991  ;  [non- 
repair of  appliances]  ;  Houlihan  v. 
Connecticut  River  R.  Co.,  164  Mass. 
555  ;  42  N.  E.  108  ;  [defects  in  planks]; 
Goldie  v.  Werner,  151  111.  551  ;  38  N. 
E.  95  [defective  plank  in  scaffold]; 
Coots  v.  Detroit,  75  Mich.  628  ;  43  N. 
W.  17  [fireman:  street  in  bad  condi- 
tion]; Kucera  v.  Merrill  Lumber  Co., 
91  Wise.  637;  65  N.  W.  374  [unguarded 
Hines  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  78 
wheel;  boy  16;  working  at  night]; 
Hun,  239  ;"  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  829  ["tell- 
tale "  out  of  order]).  The  risk  conse- 
quent upon  the  failure  of  the  master 
to  properly  discharge  his  duty  to  the 
servant  is  not  a  risk  incident  to  his 
employment  (Promer  v.  Milwaukee, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  90  Wise.  215;  63  N.  W. 
90).  A  servant  assumes  all  ordinary 
risks  of  his  employment,  but  not  un- 


283  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS.  [§  185b 

servant  has  a  right  to  believe  will  be  remedied  within  a  reason- 
able  time.7  He  does  not  assume  risks  arising  through  the 
consent  of  his  master  to  an  unlawful  act  of  a  stranger;  such 
as  the  joint  use  of  a  railroad,  contrary  to  law ; 3  and  his  master 
is  responsible  for  the  consequences.9  The  master  cannot  cast 
upon  the  servant  any  new  risk,  simply  by  giving  him  notice 
that  he  must  assume  it.10  Of  course  he  does  not  assume  any 
risks  as  to  strangers.  It  is  only  his  own  master  who  can  claim 
the  benefit  of  the  limitation  of  liability.11  As  to  risks  not 
assumed,  masters  are  not  necessarily  liable  to  their  servants  ; 
but  they  are  liable  to  the  same  extent  as  they  would  be  to 
strangers.  Thus,  with  respect  to  such  non-assumed  risks, 
masters  are  liable  for  the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant ;  and 
they  are  held  to  as  high  a  degree  of  care  as  they  would  be 
towards  strangers  in  the  same  situation. 

§  185b.  What  facts  servants  may  presume. —  A  servant 
has  the  right  to  presume,  and  to  act  upon  the  presumption, 
that  his  master  or  his  vice-principal  has  performed  and  will 
continue  to  perform  every  duty  incumbent  upon  him;1  that 
there  are  no  risks  attending  the  business  other  than  such  as 
usually   attend  business  of  that  general  nature,   and   existed 

known  perils  arising  from  negligent  will  not  establish  liability  of  master 

direction  of  the    work     (Schroeder  (Sweeney  v.  Berlin,  etc.  Co.  101  N. 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  108  Mo.  322  ;  Y.  520  ;  5  N.  E.  358). 

18  S.    W.    1094  ;     Gagnon  v.    Sea-  8  A  railroad  company  is  liable  for 

connet  Mills,  165  Mass.  221;  43  N.  E.  82  injury  to  its  servant  caused  by  the 

[inexperienced  servant,  obeying  dan-  negligence    of     another    company 

gerous    order]).     See    §§    187,    204,  while  using  a  section  of  its  road  by 

post.  its  permission,  but  without  legisla- 

1  Harris  v.  Hewitt,      Minn.      ;  65  tive    authority     (Central  R.   Co.  v. 

N.  W.  1085  [promise  to  repair  rail];  Passmore,  90  Ga.  203  ;  15  S.  E.  760). 

Atchison,   etc.   R.  Co.  v.  Lannigan,  *Id. 

58  Kan.  109  ;  42  Pac.  343  [promise  to  10  So  held  where  the  servant  made 

repair  lantern]  ;  HomestakeMin.  Co.  no    objection    (Fairbank     Canning 

v.  Fullerton,    16   C.    C.  A.    545;    69  Co.  v.  Innes,  125  111.  410;  17  N.   E. 

Fed.   923  [  promise  to  cover  shaft].  720    [elevator    without    proper    ap- 

See  §  215,  post.     A  request  that  the  pliances]}. 

master  procure  a  new  appliance,  not  "  Penn.  Co.  v.  Backes,  133  111.  255  ; 

ordinarily  attached    to   similar   ma-  24  N.  E.  568. 

chinery,  which  is  not  followed  by  a  '  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Everett, 

promise  to  procure   it,  nor  new  in-  152  U.   S.   107;  14   S.   Ct.   471   [may 

ducements  to   undertake    the    risk,  assume  that  car  is  properly  loaded]; 


§  185b]  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS  TO   SERVANTS. 


284 


when  he  entered  into  the  service,2  or  such  as  have  been 
explained  to  him8  or  are  known  by,  or  perfectly  obvious  to 
him;4  that  it  is  safe  to  obey  orders;5  that  his  fellow-servants 
are  competent  and  careful  ; <;  that  they  are  under  such  proper 
supervision  as  the  case  may  require  ;7  that  they  will  do  their 
duty  as  faithfully  as  such  men  usually  do;8  that  the  place  of 
work  is  safe  '•'  and  the  materials  and  appliances  reasonably  good 
and  adequate;10  that  dangerous  things  are  properly  secured  ;  n 
that  proper  repairs,  supports  or  supplies,  of  the  need  of  which 
the  master    has    notice,    will    be    promptly    provided ; 12  that 


Wallace  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  138 
N.  Y.  30i  ;  33  N.  E.  1069  [statu- 
tory duty] ;  Western  Coal  Co.  v. 
Ingraham,  17  C.  C.  A.  71  ;  70  Fed. 
219  ;  Helm  v.  O'Rourke,  46  La.  Ann. 
178  ;  15  So.  400  ;  Gorman  v.  McArdle, 
67  Hun,  484 ;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  479 
[statutory  duty]  ;  Eastman  v.  Curtis, 
07  Vt,  432  ;  32  Atl.  232  [proper  con- 
struction of  elevator]  ;  Lynch  v. 
Allyn,  160  Mass.  248 ;  35  N.  E.  550 
[reliance  on  superintendent  return- 
ing]- 

8  Libby  v.  Scherman,  146  111.  540  ; 
34  N.  E.  801;  §  185ft,  note  2. 

3  See  many  examples,  £  203,  post. 

4  The  doctrine  that  a  servant  has 
a  right  to  assume  that  his  master 
has  furnished  a  safe  place  in  which 
to  work,  does  not  apply  where  dan- 
gers are  apparent  (Jennings  v.  Ta- 
coma  R.  Co.,  7  Wash.  St.  275  ;  34 
Pac.  937  ;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Bur- 
gett,  7  Ind.  App.  338  ;  34  N.  E.  650). 

5  Crowley  v.  Cutting,  165  Mass.  436  ; 
43  N.  E.  197. 

6  A  section  hand  working  on  track, 
did  not  assume  risk  of  foreman's 
negligence  (Davis  v.  New  Haven  R. 
Co.,  159  Mass.  532;  34  N.  E.  1070; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Champion,  9 
Ind.  App.  510  ;  36  N.  E.  221  ;  Id.,  37 
N.  E.  21).     And  see  §  185a,  ante. 

1  See  §  203a,  post. 

8Hau«h  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73 
Iowa,  66;  35  N.  W.  116  [ear  badly 
loaded]. 

9Vanesse  v.    Catsburg     Coal  Co., 


159  Pa.  St.  403 ;  28  Atl.  200  [en- 
trance to  mine]  ;  Western  Coal  Co. 
v.  Ingraham,  17  C.  C.  A.  71  ;  70  Fed. 
219  (U.  S.  App.) ;  Union  Pacific  R. 
Co.  v.  Jarvi,  53  Fed.  65  ;  10  U.  S. 
App.  444  [mines]  ;  Consolidated  Coal 
Co.  v.  Bruce,  47  111.  App.  444  [mine]  ; 
Taylor,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  79  Tex. 
1C4 ;  14  S.  W.  918  [unsafe  railroad 
track]  ;  Diamond  Iron  Co.  v.  Giles 
(Del.),  11  Atl.  189  [defective  roof]. 

10  Bushby  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  107  N.  Y.  374  ;  14  N.  E.  407 
[car];  Smith  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co., 
72  Hun,  545:  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  638 
[coupling] ;  Ingebregtsen  v.  N.  D. 
Lloyd  S.  S.  Co.,  57 N.  J.  Law,  400  ;  31 
Atl.  619  ;  Evans  v.  Chamberlain,  40 
S.  C.  104  ;  18  S.  E.  213  [latent  defects 
in  bumpers  of  cars]  ;  Heltonville 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Fields,  138  Ind.  58  ;  36 
N.  E.  529;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hines,  132  111.  161  ;  23  N.  E.  1021  ; 
Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Nunnally,  88 
Va.  546;  14  S.  E.  367;  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Orr,  91  Ala.  548 ;  8  So. 
360  ;  Grannis  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. , 
81  Iowa,  444  ;  46  N.  W.  1067  ;  Banks 
v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  40  Mo.  App.  458. 

11  A  servant,  who  is  directed  by 
his  superintendent  to  steady  a  stone 
which  is  being  hoisted,  is  not,  as  a 
matter  of  law,  guilty  of  negligence 
in  doing  so,  in  a  proper  manner; 
having  the  right  to  assume  that  the 
stone  is  properly  fastened  (Crowley  v. 
Cutting,  165  Mass. 436;  43  N.  E.  1*97) . 

18  Delude  v.    St.    Paul  R.   Co.,  55 


2S5  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§   185b 

obstacles  will  be  removed,  within  the  proper  time;13  that  warn- 
ing of  danger  will  be  given  whenever  it  ought  to  be  given  ;  u 
and  that,  if  there  is  any  defect  or  if  any  change  takes  place, 
with  respect  to  incidents  of  the  business,  increasing  his  perils, 
he  will  receive  timely  notice  thereof.13  He  is  especially 
entitled  to  rely  implicitly  upon  the  truth  of  his  master's  state- 
ments 16  and  upon  his  master's  performance  of  his  promises.17 
But  these  are  all  mere  presumptions;  and  if  the  servant 
becomes  aware  that  any  of  them  are  contrary  to  the  fact,  he 
cannot  justify  himself  in  shutting  his  eyes  to  the  truth.  In 
short,  he  cannot  be  heard  to  say  that  he  relied  upon  that  which 
he  did  not  believe.  These  are  familiar  conditions  in  the  law  of 
estoppel.  These  presumptions  moreover  are  stated  here  only 
as  affording  a  standard  by  which  to  judge  of  the  servant's  pru- 
dence. Masters  are  not  bound  to  make  all  these  presumptions 
good.     The  extent  of  their  duty  to  do  so  is  stated  elsewhere- 


Minn.  63;  5G  N.  W.  461  [repairs  coup- 
ling cars];  Chicago,  etc.  Coal  Co.  v, 
Peterson,  39  111.  App.  114  [props  for 
mine]. 

13  McChesney  v.  Panama  R.  Co., 
74  Hun,  150;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  245. 

14  Wallace  v.  Cent.  Vt.  R.  Co.,  138 
N.  Y.  302;  33  N.  E.  1069  [low  bridge; 
"  tHl-tale"  out  of  order];  Savannah, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Day,  91  Ga.  676;  17  S. 
E.  959  [same];  Rehman  v.  Minne- 
apolis, etc.  R.  Co.,  43  Minn.  42  ;  44 
N.  AY.  522  [engine  backing];  Shum- 
way  v.  Walworth  Mfg.  Co.,  98  Mich. 
411;  57  N.  W.  251  [machinery  started 
without  warning]  ;  Anderson  v. 
Northern  Mill  Co.,  42  Minn.  424;  44 
N.  W.  315  [usual  signal  omitted]; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hanning, 
131  Ind.  528;  31  N.  E.  187.  When  a 
servant  is  placed  in  a  situation  of 
danger,  where  engrossing  duties  are 
required  of  him,  he  has  a  right  to 
assume  that  the  master  will  not 
without  warning  subject  him  to 
other  perils  unknown  to  him  (Mich- 
ael v.  Roanoke  Mach.  Works,  90  Va. 
432;  19  S.  E.  261).     A  section  hand, 


working  on  a  track,  was  justified  in 
relying  on  receiving  from  the  fore- 
man warning  of  approach  of  any 
train  (Davis  v.  New  Haven  R.  Co., 
159  Mass.  532;  34  N.  E.  1070) ;  s.  p., 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Amato,  144 
U.  S.  465;  12  S.  Ct.  740 ;  Bradley  v. 
N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  62  N.  Y.  99. 

15  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cham- 
pion,  9  Ind.  App.  510  ;  36  N.  E.  221  ;  37 
Id.  21  [employment  of  inexperienced 
servants] ;  Grannis  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  81  Iowa,  444 ;  46  N.  W.  1067 
[appliances] :  Donahoe  v.  Old  Colony 
R.  Co.,  153  Mass.  356;  26  X.  E.  868 
[defect  in  cars]:  St.  Louis,  etc.  II.  I '". 
v.  Holman,  155  111.  21;  39  N.  E.  573. 

16  Lawrence  v.  Hagemeyer,  93  Ky. 
591;  20  S.  W.  7<>1  [assurance  repairs 
done];  Atchison  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  M<- 
Kee,  37  Kans.  592;  15  Pac.  484  [may 
assume  truth  of  statements];  8.  P., 
as  to  condition  of  works,  Morbach  v. 
Home  Min.  Co.,   :>:>>   Kans.   ;:)1  ;   37 

Pac.  122. 

11  Floettl  v.  Third  A  v.  R.  Co.,  ION. 
Y.  \pp.  Div.  808;   II  X.  Y. Supp.  793. 


§  lS6]  LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  286 

§  186.  Risks  assumed  under  special  orders. — Where  a 
servant,  seeing  a  defect,  and  notifying  his  master  thereof,  is 
nevertheless  ordered  to  continue  his  work,  without  any  ex- 
press or  implied  promise  of  a  remedy,  it  has  sometimes  been 
held  that  he  cannot  recover,  on  the  theory  that  from  that  time 
he  assumes  the  risk.1  But  this  is  unsound.  A  master's  order 
is  at  least  as  much  justification  for  the  servant's  continuance 
as  would  be  another's  invitation;  and  we  have  seen  (§  91)  that 
a  mere  invitation  is,  in  some  cases,  enough  to  acquit  the  per- 
son acting  upon  it  from  the  imputation  of  contributory  negli- 
gence. The  true  rule,  in  this,  as  in  all  others  cases,  is  that,  if 
the  master  gives  the  servant  to  understand  that  he  does  not 
consider  the  risk  one  which  a  prudent  person  should  refuse  to 
undertake,  the  servant  has  a  right  to  rely  upon  his  master's 
judgment,  unless  his  own  is  so  clearly  opposed  thereto  that, 
in  fact,  he  does  not  rely  upon  the  master's  opinion.  So,  if  the 
peculiar  risk  of  the  act  commanded  by  the  master  is  not  obvi- 
ous, the  servant  has  a  right  to  assume  that  he  is  not  sent  into 
ain-  unusual  peril,  and  he  is  not  bound  to  investigate  into  the 
risk,  before  obeying  his  orders.2  A  servant  is  not  called  upon 
to  set  up  his  own  unaided  judgment  against  that  of  his 
superiors ;  and  he  may  rely  upon  their  advice  and  still  more 
upon  their  orders,  notwithstanding  many  misgivings  of  his 
own.3  If  the  master  directs  the  servant  to  do  some  act  which 
is  dangerous,  but  which  could  be  made  less  dangerous  by  the 
use  of  special  care  on  the  part  of  the  master,  the  servant  has 
a  right  to  assume  that   such  special  care   will   be   taken,  and 

1  See  Linch  v.  Sagamore  Mfg.  Co.,  required  to  make  such  examination 

14:;  Mass.  206;  9  N.  E.  728.  into  the  danger  of  the  operation  as 

-  Stephens  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  he  would  have  been  under  other  cir- 

96  Mo.  207  ;  9  S.  W.   589.     It  is  the  cumstances  "    (Howard   Oil   Co.    v. 

duty  of  a  servant  to  obey  an  order  Farmer,  56  Tex.   301).      "Where,  by 

given  by  one  in  authority  over  him,  orders  of  the  master,  the  servant  is 

if  not  manifestly  unreasonable  ;  and  carried  beyond  his  employment,  he 

where  by  such  order  he  is  directed  is  relieved  from  his  implied   under- 

to  work  in  an  unsafe  place,  and  is  taking  to  assume  risks   incident  to 

injured,  the   master  is  liable  there-  the  employment  (Pittsburgh,  etc.  R. 

for   1  Illinois    Steel   Co.   v.    Schyma-  Co.  v.  Adams,  105  Ind.  151  [section- 

Dowski.  59111.  App.  32).     "Being  di-  hand  ordered  to  couple  cars]), 

rected  to  perform  the  act  by  an , ex-  3  Cited  and  adopted,    Harrison  v. 

perienced    man.   the    representative  Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.,  7  Utah,  523  ;  27 

of  the  defendant,  plaintiff  was  not  Pac.  728. 


287 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§  1 86 


does  not  take  the  greater  risk  upon  himself.4  If  the  master 
calls  suddenly  upon  the  servant,  under  circumstances  which 
give  no  time  for  consideration,5  or  if  he  asks  the  servant  to 
extricate  him  from  danger,6  he  is  bound  to  indemnify  the  ser- 
vant for  injuries  sustained  through  obedience  to  such  a  call. 
The  servant's  dependent  and  inferior  position  is  to  be  taken 
into  consideration;  and,  if  the  master  gives  him  positive  orders 
to  go  on  with  the  work,  under  perilous  circumstances,  the  ser- 
vant may  recover  for  an  injury  thus  incurred,  if  the  work  was 
not  obviously  so  dangerous  that  no  man  of  ordinary  prudence 
would  have  obeyed.7     More  especially  is   this  the  case  where 


4  Plaintiff  was  sent  to  repair  a 
wrecked  caboose  on  the  line  of  its 
road.  It  was  extremely  cold,  and  a 
village  9  miles  away  was  the  nearest 
point  at  which  he  could  get  food  and 
shelter.  He  was  not  provided  with 
food  or  sufficient  clothing  for  expos- 
ure to  such  weather.  The  company 
knew  this,  and  that  he  relied  on  its 
sending  for  him  in  the  evening.  It 
did  not  do  so,  and  he  walked  to  the 
village.  By  the  exposure  he  con- 
tracted rheumatism,  and  was  per- 
manently injured.  Held,  that  he 
was  not  guilty  of  contributory  neg- 
ligence; that  the  company  was  negli- 
gent; and  whether  the  injury  was 
the  proximate  result  was  for  the 
jury  (Schumaker  v.  St.  Paul,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  46  Minn.  39;  48  N.  W.  559). 

6  Adopted  in  Rush  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  36  Kans.  129  ;  12  Pac.  582  ; 
followed  in  Birmingham  R.  Co.  v. 
Allen,  99  Ala.  359  ;  13  So.  8. 

6  In  Lorentz  v.  Robinson  (61  Md. 
64) ,  a  master  was  held  liable  to  his 
servant  for  injuries  sustained  by  the 
fall  of  an  elevator,  on  which  the 
master  was  ascending,  when,  find- 
ing it  unmanageable,  he  called  the 
servant  to  his  aid,  and  thereby  him- 
self escaped  unharmed. 

7Hawley  v.  Northern  Central  R. 
Co.,  82  N.  Y.  370;  affi'g  s.  C.  17 
Hun,  115;   Kain  v.    Smith,  89  X.  Y. 


375  ;  Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  76  Pa.  St.  389  ;  Lebanon  v.  Mc- 
Coy, 12  Ind.  App.  500  ;  40  N.  E.  700  ; 
Greene  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
31  Minn.  248  ;  Flynn  v.  Kansas  City, 
etc.  R.  Co. ,  78  Mo.  195  ;  Kroy  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Iowa,  357  ;  Light 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 92 Iowa,  ;  61 
X.  W.  380  ;  Colorado,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ogden,  3  Colo.  499.  In  an  action  for 
injuries  to  a  youthful  servant  from  a 
dangerous  machine  which  he  was 
cleaning  while  in  motion,  their  was 
evidence  that  the  foreman  told  plain- 
tiff to  hurry  up  with  his  machine,  as 
he  would  have  to  clean  another.  Held, 
that  defendant  was  liable  if  plain- 
tiff was  not  aware  of  the  danger,  ami 
he  obeyed,  because  he  thought  the 
foreman  knew  better,  or  because  he 
was  afraid  to  disobey  (Tagg  v.  '!'■- 
George,  155  Pa.  St.  368;  26  Atl.  671, 
following  Lee  v.  Woolsey,  109  Pa. 
St.  124,  and  Kehler  v.  Schwenk,  151 
Id.  519  :  25  All.  180).  A  laborer, 
jumping  off  a  train  moving  <>nh  fi  iur 
miles  an  hour,  in  obedience  to  con- 
ductor's orders,  may  be  acquitted  of 
negligence  by  the  jury  (Northern 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v."  Egeland,  168  U.  S.  98; 
16  S.  Ct.  975  ;  affi'g  B.  C,  12  U.  S 
App.  271  ;  56  Fed.  200;  5  C.  C  L 
471).  Jumping  off  even  a  swiftly 
moving  train,  in  obedience  to  or- 
ders, may  be  justified,  especially  by 


§136] 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS  TO   SERVANTS. 


288 


the  master  insists  upon  the  servant  proceeding  with  the  work, 
cither  with  a  promise  of  inspection 8  or  repair1'  or  with  an 
assurance  that  there  is  no  danger.10  This,  we  are  glad  to  say, 
i-^  now  settled  law.  In  short,  the  law  of  estoppel  applies  to 
such  cases.  The  master  is  estopped  from  alleging  the  falsity 
of  his  own  representations,  unless  it  appears  clearly  that  the  ser- 
vant did  not  rely  upon  them.11  Yet  there  are  extreme  cases  in 
which  "  the  danger  was  so  glaring  that  no  prudent  man  would 
hue  entered  into  it,  even  under  orders."13  In  such  cases,  ser- 
vants cannot  generally  recover  for  risks  thus  assumed.13  Yet, 
if  it  is  the  duty  of  the  servant  to  obey  such  an  order,  even  in 
the  face  of  a  known  danger,  as  it  would  be  in  the  case  of  a 
seaman,  he  is  entitled  to  indemnity  against  the  risk.14     And 


a  new  hand  (Patton  v.  Western, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  96  N.  C.  455;  t  S.  E. 
863).  So  as  to  a  brakeman 
coupling  moving  cars,  in  obedience 
to  conductor's  order  (Mason  v. 
Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  482  ; 
16  S.  E.  698).  But  a  general  com- 
mand by  a  conductor  to  go  between 
cars  when  couplings  cannot  other- 
wise be  made,  does  not  justify  the 
brakeman  in  so  doing  several  months 
later,  when  under  the  control  of  an- 
other conductor  ( Mason  v.  Rich- 
mond, etc.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  C.  718  ;  19 
S.  E.  362). 

8Schlackerv.  Ashland  Iron  Co.,  89 
Mich.  253  ;  50  N.  "W.  839. 

9  Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  76  Pa.  St.  389. 

,0Keegan  v.  Kavanugh,  62  Mo. 
230  ;  Daley  v.  Schaaf,  28  Hun,  314  ; 
Hoffman  v.  Dickinson,  31  W.  Va. 
142;  6S.  E.  53;  Schlacker  v.  Ash- 
land Iron  Co.,  supra  ;  Haas  v.  Balch, 
12  U.  S.  App.  534  ;  56  Fed.  984  ;  6  C. 
C.  A.  201. 

11  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bayfield, 
37  Mich.  205  ;  Schlacker  v.  Ashland 
Ming  Co.  89  Mich.  253;  50  N.  W. 
839  ;  Rettig  v.  Fifth  Ave.  Tr.  Co.,  6 
N.  V.  Misc.  328  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  896. 

12Shortel   v.   St.  Joseph,  104  Mo. 


114  ;  16  S.  W.  397  ;    Miller  v.  Union 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  12  Fed.  600. 

13Kean  v.  Detroit,  etc.  Mills,  66 
Mich.  277  ;  33  N.  W.  395  ;  Gavigan 
v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Mich.  ; 
67  N.  W.  1097 ;  Drake  v.  Union  P. 
R.  Co.,  2  Idaho,  453  ;  21  Pac.  560  ;  Wil- 
son v.  Tremont  Mills,  159  Mass.  154; 
34  N.  E.  90  ;  Roul  v.  East  Tennessee, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  85  Ga.  197;  11  S.  E.  558 
[getting  on  rapidly  moving  train]  ; 
see  also  Lake  v.  Mining  Co.,  71  Mich. 
364  ;  Bradshaw  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  [Ky.];  21  S.  W.  346  [getting  on 
overcrowded  hand  car].  One  who 
knowingly  engages  in  dangerous 
work,  because  he  is  told  he  will  lose 
his  place  if  he  refuses  to  do  so,  as- 
sumes the  risk  (Dougherty  v.  West 
Superior  Iron  Co.  88  Wise.  343  ;  60  N. 
W.  274).  But  this  ruling  is  opposed 
to  the  later  and  sounder  decisions 
(see  §  211a,  post). 

uThis  principle,  which  we  ad- 
vanced in  opposition  to  some  New 
York  decisions,  has  now  been 
adopted  by  the  highest  court  (Eld- 
ridge  v  Atlas  S.  S.  Co.,  134  N.  Y.  187; 
32  N.  E.  66  [seaman,  under  compul- 
sion] ;  Hosic  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
75  Iowa,  683  ;  37  N.  W.  963  [brake- 
man  obeying  danger  signal]). 


289 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS,  [§   lS6a 


a  risk  must  be  voluntarily  assumed,  to  relieve  the  master  from 
liability.      Risks  incurred  under  coercion  are  not  assumed.15 

§  186a.  Risks  of  service,  outside  of  ordinary  employ- 
ment.—In  many  cases  it  has  been  said,  in  general  terms,  that 
a  servant  does  not  assume  the  risks  attendant  upon  services 
which  he  is  called  upon  to  render,  outside  of  his  regular  em- 
ployment,  and  more  hazardous.1  But  it  has  been  pointed  out 
that,  in  all  these  cases,  the  real  liability  incurred  by  the  mas- 
ter was  simply  for  his  omission  to  give  due  warning  of  the 
risks  which  were  especially  attendant  upon  the  new  and  strange 
work  to  which  the  servant  was  suddenly  assigned.2  A  servant, 
thus  directed  to  undertake  work  outside  of  that  which  he  had 
engaged  to  do,  is  not  presumed  to  be  aware  of  its  peculiar 
risks;3  and    therefore,  if  the   master   does   not    fully   explain 


15  See  §  211a,  post. 

1  Where  a  servant  is  ordered  by 
his  master  to  do  work  outside  of  his 
regular  duties,  and  bringing  him 
into  contact  with  a  different  class  of 
fellow-servants,  the  latent  risks  inci- 
dent to  the  new  work  are,  as  to  birn, 
extra  hazardous,  because  additional 
to  the  risks  of  his  regular  duties 
(Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Haenni,  146 
111.  614;  35  N.  E.  162  ;  Lehman  Co.  v. 
Siggeman,  35  111.  App.  161  ;  East 
Line.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,  68  Tex.  694  ; 
5  S.  W.  501  ;  Cincinnati,  etc.  E.  Co. 
v.  Lang.  118  Ind.  579  ;  21  N.  E.  317  ; 
Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams, 
105  Ind.  151;  5  N.  E.  187:  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bayfield,  37  Mich.  210  ; 
Mann  v.  Oriental  Works,  11  R.  I. 
152).  A  servant  ordered  to  more 
dangerous  work  than  he  was  em- 
ployed  to  perform,  can  protect  him- 
self by  protest  (Jones  v.  Lake  Shore, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Mich.  573  [brakeman 
recovered  for  injuries  sustained 
while  doing  yard  work,  pursuant  to 
orders  of  the  superintendent]).  The 
complaint  alleged  that  plaintiff  was 
employed  as  trackman;  that  he  was 
ordered  to  assist  in  unloading  rails 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  — 19] 


from  a  train,  —  work  which  was  out 
of  the  line  of  his  duty,  and  much 
more  hazardous  than  that  which  it 
was  his  duty  to  perform  ;  that  while 
thus  engaged  he  received  the  inju- 
ries complained  of.  Held  to  state  a 
cause  of  action  (Cincinnati,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Madden,  134  Ind.  462  ;  34  N.  E. 
227). 

2  The  liability  of  a  master,  in  cases 
of  injury  to  his  servant,  received  in 
a  dangerous  employment  outside  of 
that  for  which  he  had  engaged, 
arises  not  from  the  direction  of  the 
master  to  the  servant  to  depart  from 
the  one  service  and  engage  in  the 
other  and  more  dangerous  work,  hut 
from  failure  to  give  proper  warning 
of  the  attendant  danger  in  cases 
where  the  danger  is  not  obvious,  or 
where  the  Bervant  is  of  immature 
years,  or  unable  t<>  comprehend  the 
danger  (Reed  v.  Stockmeyer,  20  C.  C. 
A.  381  ;  74  Fed.  186).  To  this  should 
be  added:  "Or  has  not  ample  time 
to  become  aware  of  the  danger  be- 
fore entering  upon  the  work." 

3  Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v.  Baenni, 
146  111.  014;  35  N.  E.  163. 


§  1 86a] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


290 


them  to  the  servant,  before  putting  him  at  such  new  work, 
the  servant  is  entitled  to  assume  that  it  has  no  greater  risks 
than  those  which  attach  to  his  regular  work,  either  in  the 
nature  of  the  work  itself  or  in  the  habits  of  fellow-servants 
with  whom  it  brings  him  into  contact.4  Nor  is  the  servant 
bound  to  make  any  inquiries  on  these  subjects.5  In  such  cases, 
the  master  must  indemnify  the  servant  against  injuries  then 
suffered;6  provided  the  master  knew  or  ought  to  have  known 
of  the  defect  causing  the  injury,  but  not  otherwise.7  If,  how- 
ever, the  servant  knows  what  the  new  dangers  are,8  or  if  they 
are  obvious  to  persons  thus  suddenly  called  to  do  such  work,9 
and  he  is  able  to  appreciate  the  peril  involved,10  and  is  not  act- 
ing under  such  coercion  as  would  in  other  cases  excuse  him,11 
he  assumes  the  risks  of  this  new  work,  to  the  same  extent  as 
he  did  those  of  his  regular  employment.  The  liability  of  the 
master  in  such  cases  depends  upon  the  principles  stated  here- 
after, in  section  203. 


4  See  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ad- 
ams, 105  Ind.  151;  5  N.  E.  187.  This 
much,  indeed,  is  implied  in  all  the 
decisions. 

6  U.  S.  Rolling  Stock  Co.  v.  Wil- 
der, 116  111.  100;  5  N.  E.  92. 

6  Where  an  employee  is  ordered, 
out  of  the  line  of  his  employment,  to 
work  upon  machinery  with  the  man- 
agement of  which  he  is  ignorant, 
and  is  not  warned  of  the  danger  in- 
cident thereto,  the  master  is  liable 
for  personal  injuries  resulting  there- 
from (Quinn  v.  Johnson  Forge  Co., 
9  Houst.  338;  32  Atl.  858).  To  same 
effect,  Linderberg  v.  Crescent  Min. 
Co.,  9  Utah,  163  ;  33Pac.  692  [miner] ; 
Colorado  Electric  Co.  v.  Lubbers,  11 
Colo.  505  ;  19  Pac.  479  [carpenter  sent 
to  handle  electric  wires];  Cole  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  71  Wise.  114 ;  37 
N.  W.  84. 

8  Where  a  servant  of  mature  years 
deviates  from  the  original  contract 
with  a  full  knowledge  of  the  new 
risks,  he  is  looked  upon  as  entering 
into  a  new  contract  (Houston,  etc.  R. 


Co.  v.  Fowler,  56  Tex.  452  [yardmas- 
ter  ordered  to  run  a  relief  train  to  a 
wreck,  after  a  violent  storm,  and 
himself  wrecked  in  a  culvert]  ;  Pren- 
tiss v.  Manufacturing  Co.,  63  Mich. 
478  ;  30  N.  W.  109  ;  Wheeler  v.  Berry, 
95  Mich.  250 ;  54  N.  W.  876  [circular 
saw:  plaintiff  protested,  but  was  fa- 
miliar with  its  use]). 
t  9  See  Alford  v.  Metcalf,  74  Mich. 
369;  42  N.  W.  52.  But  in  none  of 
the  cases  in  this  and  the  last  note 
was  any  real  negligence  proved 
against  the  defendants.  The  opin- 
ions on  risks  assumed  are,  therefore, 
obiter. 

10  Not  otherwise  (Railroad  Co.  v. 
Fort,  17  Wall.  553  ;  Consol.  Coal  Co. 
v.  Haenni,  supra;  s.  P.,  Broderick 
v.  Detroit  Depot  Co.,  56  Mich.  261; 
22  N.  W.  802;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bayfield,  37  Mich.  205). 

11  Kehler  v.  Schwenk,  151  Pa.  St. 
505 ;  25  Atl.  130  ;  Eldridge  v.  Atlas 
S.  S.  Co.,  134  N.  Y.  187;  32  N.  E.  66. 
See  further,  §  211a,  post. 


291 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§187 

§  187.  Master  liable  for  his  own  negligence.—  A  master 
is  liable  to  his  servants,  as  much  as  to  any  one  else,  for  his  oiun 
negligence.1  Therefore,  a  servant  can  recover  for  any  injury 
caused  by  the  personal  negligence  of  the  master,  as,  for 
example,  by  a  defect  in  a  thing  made  under  his  direct  super- 
vision,2 or  by  the  fall  of  a  heavy  substance  down  a  pit  which 
the  master  was  personally  guarding,3  or  by  the  fall  of  an 
elevator  which  the  master  was  personally  operating,4  or  by  a 
defect  in  the  work  of  a  contractor,  resulting  from  the  master's 
interference'.5  The  negligence  of  any  member  of  a  partnership, 
in  conducting  the  partnership  business,  is,  of  course,  for  the 
purposes  of  a  civil  liability,  attributed  to  every  other  partner.5 
As  in  every  other  case,  the  master  is  not  liable,  on  the  ground 


1  Hough  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100 
U.  S.  213 ;  Brydon  v.  Stewart,  2 
Macq.  H.  L.  30  ;  Johnson  v.  Bruner, 
61  Pa.  St.  58  ;  Leonard  v.  Collins,  70 
N.  Y.  90  ;  Booth  v.  Boston,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  73  Id.  38  ;  and  many  other  cases 
cited  under  §  185a,  note.  To  warrant 
a  recovery  against  the  master  for  an 
act  of  negligence  on  his  part,  the  act 
complained  of  must  be  pleaded  as 
the  cause  of  action  :  to  permit  a  re- 
covery upon  an  act  not  pleaded,  but 
incidentally  revealed,  would  be 
obviously  unfair  (Georgia,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Oaks,  52  Ga.  410).  A  com- 
plaint against  a  corporation,  alleg- 
ing "  the  defendant's  negligence," 
may  properly  be  construed  as  charg- 
ing defendant  with  personal  negli- 
gence (Fifield  v.  Northern  R.  Co., 
42  N.  H.  225  :  Harrison  v.  Central 
R.  Co.,  31  N.  J.  Law,  293  ;  McKin- 
ney  v.  Irish  Northw.  R.  Co.  Irish  R. 
2C.  L.  600). 

2  Weems  v.  Mathieson,  4  Macq.  H. 
L.  215  ;  Roberts  v.  Smith,  2  Hurlst. 
&  N.  213  [scaffold]. 

3  The  plaintiff,  a  servant  of  two 
partners,  was  at  work  at  the  bottom 
of  a  coal  shaft.  The  mouth  of  the 
ehaft    being  carelessly  guarded  by 


one  partner,  a  piece  of  iron  fell 
down  the  shaft  and  injured  the 
plaintiff.  Held,  that  such  partner 
was  liable,  on  the  ground  of  his  per- 
sonal negligence,  and  that  the  other 
partner  was  liable  merely  as  such 
(Ashworth  v.  Stanwix,  3  El.  &  El. 
701  ;  approved,  Mellors  v.  Shaw,  1 
Best  &  S.  437  ;  S.  P.,  Daley  v. 
Schaaf,  28  Hun,  314  ;  Rickhoff  v. 
Heckman,  54  Hun,  637 ;  7  X.  Y. 
Supp.  471  ;  Moran  v.  Harris,  63 
Iowa,  390). 

4  Lorent*  v.  Robinson,  61  Md.  64. 

5  The  building  was  constructed  by 
a  contractor,  and  defendants  re- 
served no  control  over  the  erection, 
but  told  the  builder  that  they 
guessed  "single  top  plates"  would 
do.  Defendants  knew  the  number 
of  tiebeams  in  the  section  which 
fell.  Held,  that  the  jury  were  justi- 
fied in  saying  thai  defendants  were 
responsible  for  any  weakness  result- 
ing from  the  single  top  plate  and 
insufficient  tiebeams  when  they 
set  plaintiff  at  work  (Meier  v.  Mor- 
gan, 82  Wis.  289  ;  52  N.  \V.  174). 

'  Ashworth  v.  Stanwix,  3  El.  & 
El.  701. 


§  1 88] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


292 


of  his  personal  negligence,  for  any  injury  of  which  his  negli- 
gence  was  not  the  proximate  cause.7 

8  188  [New].*  Concurrent  negligence.  —  Where  an  injury 
to  a  servant  is  proximately  caused  '  in  part  by  an  act  or  omis- 
sion for  which  the  master  is  responsible,  and  in  part  by  one  for 
which  he  is  not  responsible,  the  master  is  liable  for  all  the 
damage,  in  conformity  to  the  general  rule  as  to  several  con- 
tributory wrong-doers.a  Therefore,  it  is  no  defense  for  a  mas- 
ter, by  whose  personal  negligence,3  or  by  the  negligence  of 
whose  vice-principal/  a  servant  has  suffered  damage,  to  prove 
that  the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant  in  common  employ- 
ment,"' or  the  fault  of  a  stranger,6  contributed  to  the  injury. 


7  Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Tohill 
[Ind.],  41  N.  E.  709.  A  railroad 
company  is  liable  for  a  defective 
roadbed,  only  where  such  defect  was 
such  as  might  have  boen  expected  to 
result  in  such  an  injury.  (McGowan 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 91  Wise.  14?  ; 
64  N.  W.  891). 

*The  old  §  188  has  been  divided 
under  other  sections ;  to  which  it 
properly  belongs. 

1  Not  otherwise  (Kevern  v.  Provi- 
dence Min.  Co.,  70  Cal.  392  :  11  Pac. 
740  ;  Steinke  v.  Diamond  Match  Co., 
87  Wise.  477  ;  58  N.  W.  842). 

2  See  §  65,  ante,  where  many  cases 
are  cited. 

3  Cayzer  v.  Taylor,  10  Gray,  274  ; 
Elmer  v.  Locke,  135Mass.  575  ;  Boyce 
v.  Fitzpatrick,  80  Ind.  526. 

4  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  v.  Cum- 
mings,  106  U.  S.  700 ;  Flike  v.  Bos- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  549;  Booth 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  73  Id.  38  ; 
Paulmier  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  34  N.  J. 
Law,  151  ;  Stetler  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co..  46  Wise.  497;  s.  C,  again,  49 
Wise.  609;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Henderson,  37  Ohio  St.  549  [imme- 
diate cause  of  injury,  negligence  of  a 
fellow-servant]  ;  Cone  v.  Delaware, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  81  N.  Y.  206  [defective 


engine  ;  fellow-servant  in  fault]  ; 
Towns  v.  Railroad  Co.,  37  La.  Ann. 
630  ;  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Phelps, 
90  Va.  665;  19  S.  E.  652;  Norfolk, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomas,  90  Va.  205  ; 
17  S.  E.  884  [fellow-servants  in  fault]. 

6  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  v.  Cum- 
mings,  10G  IT.  S.  700  ;  Northwestern 
Fuel  Co.  v.  Danielson,  57  Fed.  915  ; 
6  C.  C.  A.  636  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Kenley,  92  Tenn.  207  ;  New  Jersey, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Young,  1  U.  S.  App.  96  ; 
49  Fed.  723  ;  Coppins  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  122  N.  Y.  55?  ;  25  N.  E  915  ; 
Lilly  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  107  N.  Y. 
566  ;  14  N.  E.  503  [defective  brakes] ; 
Morrisey  v.  Hughes,  65  Vt.  553  ;  27  Atl. 
205  ;  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  George, 
88  Va.  223 ;  13  S.  E.  429  [broken  car 
bumper]  ;  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Nuckols,91  Va.  193;  21 S.  E.  342;  Bean 
v.  Western  N  C.  R.  Co.,  107  N.  C. 
731  ;  12  S.  E.  600  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Kenley,  92  Tenn.  207  ;  21  S. 
W.  326  [defect  in  car  :  negligent  en- 
gineer] ;  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kizziah, 
86  Tex.  81 ;  23  S.  W.  578  [machinery]  ; 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McClain,  80 
Tex.  85;  15  S.  W.  789. 

6  Toomey  v.  Donovan,  158  Mass. 
232  ;  33  N.  E.  396  [independent  con- 
tractor]. 


293 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§   189 


§  189.  Degree  of  care  required  of  master.— The  master  is 
bound  to  use  ordinary  care,  diligence  and  skill  for  the  purpose 
of  protecting  his  servants  from  encountering  unnecessary  risks 
in  his  service ; 1  but  he  is  not  bound  to  use  any  higher  deo-ree 
of   care.2     A  railroad   company,  for  example,  although   bound 


Tex.  85  ;  15  S.  W.  789  ;  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Berkey,  136  Ind.  1S1  ; 
35  N.  E.  3  [coupling]  ;  Island  Coal 
Co.  v.  Risher(Ind.  App.),  40  X.  E.  158 
[roof  of  mine]  ;  Rogers  v.  Leyden, 
127  Ind.  50  ;  26  N.  E.  210  [same]  ; 
Pullman  Car  Co.  v.  Laack,  143  111. 
242  ;  32  N.  E.  285  [appliances]  ;  Town 
v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  84  Mich. 
214  ;  47  N.  W.  665  [open  switch  ;  no 
lights]  ;  Hunn  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R. 
Co  ,  78  Mich.  513  ;  44  N.  W.  502  ; 
Sherman  v.  Menominee  Lumber  Co., 
72  Wise.  122;  39  N.  W.  365  ;  Craven 
v.  Smith,  89  Wise.  119  ;  61  N.  W.  317  ; 
Cowan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  80 
Wise.  284  ;  50  N.  W.  ISO  [brake-rod] ; 
Delude  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  55  Minn. 
63;  56  N.  W.  461  ;  Franklin  v.  Win- 
ona, etc.  R.  Co.,  37  Minn.  409  ;  34  N. 
W.  898  ;  Browning  v.  Wabash  R.  Co., 
124  Mo.  55  ;  27  S.  W.  644  ;  Deweese 
v.  Meramec  Iron  Co.,  128  Mo.  423; 
31  S.  W.  110. 

1  Hough  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100 
U.  S.  213  ;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rowan.  104  Ind.  88  ;  Tissue  v.  Balti- 
more, etc.  R.  Co.,  112  Pa.  St.  91; 
Noyes  v.  Smith,  28  Vt.  59 ;  Ryan 
v.  Fowler,  24  N.  Y.  410;  see  Paterson 
v.  Wallace,  1  Macq.  748.  A  doubt 
as  to  the  existence  of  this  obligation 
was  expressed  in  Seaver  v.  Boston  & 
Maine  R.  Co.,  14  Gray,  466.  But  the 
opinions  of  Massachusetts  courts,  on 
questions  like  these,  down  to  a 
recent  period,  were  greatly  biased 
by  undue  sympathy  with  corporate 
interests,  and  should  be  cautiously 
scrutinized. 

8  In  an  action  by  a  servant  for  in- 
juries sustained  by  reason  of  dun- 
gerous  machinery  furnished  by  the 


master,  an  instruction  that  "  defend- 
ant was  not  a  guarantor  of  the  sa  fel  y 
of  its  machinery,  and  was  only  bound 
to  use  ordinary  care  and  prudence  in 
the  selection  and  arrangement  there- 
of, and  had  a  right  to  use  and  employ 
such  as  the  experience  of  trade  and 
manufacture  sanctioned  as  reason- 
ably safe,"  is  not  erroneous  (Wash- 
ington, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McDade,  135 
U.  S.  554  ;  10  S.  Ct.  1044).  Such  is 
the  rule  in  Neiv  York  (Probst  v. 
Delamater,  100  N.  Y.  200  ;  Burke  v. 
Witherbee,  98  Id.  5G2  ;  Leonard 
v.  Collins,  70  Id.  90  [excavating 
overhanging  bank  of  earth];  Devlin 
v.  Smith,  89  Id.  470)  ;  Pennsyl- 
vania (Payne  v.  Reese,  100  Pa. 
St.  301) ;  Massachusetts  (Ladd  v. 
New  Bedford,  etc.  R.  Co.,  119  Mass. 
412);  Vermont  (Hard  v.  Vermont, 
etc.  R  Co.,  32  Vt.  473;  Noyes  v. 
Smith,  28  Id.  59) ;  India  mi  (Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Orr,  84  Ind.  50 
[crab  for  hoisting  timbers,  which 
had  nothing  to  prevent  it  from  riv- 
ing out  of  gear]) ;  Missouri  |  McM  il- 
lan  v.  Union  Brick  Co.  ,0  Mo.  App. 
434;  Aldridge  v.  Midland,  etc.  Fur- 
nace Co.,  78  Mo.  559  [excavating 
overhanging  earth  bank]):  Iowa 
(Cooper  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  44  bun, 
134)  ;  Minnesota  (Gates  v.  Southern 
Minn.  R.  Co.,  28  Minn.  110)  :  Kansas 
(Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Winston, 
56  Kans.  456;  43  Pac.  777)  ;  Cali. 
fornia  (Rodgers  v.  Central  Pac.  R, 
Co.,  07  Cal.  007;  h  Pac.  877;  Civil 
Code,  §  1971):  South  Carolina  1  Ex 
parte  Johnson,  19  S.  C.  492;  Sanders 
v.  Etiwan  Phosphate  I  !o..  hi.  510) ; 
Alabama  (Smool  v.  Mobile,  etc.  h\ 
Co.,  07  Ala.    18);    Texas  (Missouri 


§  t89J 


I.TABII.ITV    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


294 


to  use  the  utmost  care  and  diligence  for  the  protection  of  its 
passengers  from  injury,  owes  no  such  duty  to  its  own  servants, 
although  they  may  be  exposed  to  the  same  perils. ;i  Ordinary 
care,  however,  means  such  as  is  commensurate  with  the  perils 
of  the  situation  ;  '  ami  it  requires  that,  in  all  occupations 
attended  with  great  and  unusual  danger,  all  appliances  readily 
attainable,  known  to  science,  should  be  used  for  the  prevention 
of  accidents  5  This  rule,  recently  affirmed  by  our  highest 
national  court,  has  too  often  been  practically  denied.  It  is 
founded    upon  the   sound    principle  that  "  ordinary  care,"  in 


Par.  R.  Co.  v.  Lyde,  57  Tex.  503). 
Threats,  which  had  not  been  com- 
municated to  the  mine  owners,  did 
not  require  the  duty  of  special  dili- 
gence to  guard  against  fire  ;  and 
their  failure  to  use  such  diligence 
did  not  render  them  liable  for  the 
death  of  a  miner  through  incendia- 
rism (Coal  Creek  Min.  Co.  v.  Davis, 
90  Tenn.  711:  18  S.  W.  387).  Where 
it  was  not  customary  for  a  switch 
engine,  running  through  the  com- 
pany's yard,  to  ring  or  whistle, 
omission  to  do  so  is  not  negligence, 
so  far  as  employees  are  concerned 
(Galvin  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  162 
Mass.  533;  39  N.  E.  186). 

3  See  railroad  cases  in  last  previous 
note,  and  many  cases  cited  under 
§§  194,  195.  A  railroad  company 
need  exercise  ordinary  care  and  dili- 
gence, and  only  such,  in  furnishing 
its  employees  reasonably  safe  ma- 
chinery and  appliances  (Atchison.etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Wagner,  33  Kans.  660;  7 
Pac.  204  ;  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ryan,  52  Kans.  637 ;  35  Pac.  292 ; 
Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wells,  81  Tex. 
6S3;  17  S.  W.  511;  Nutt  v.  Southern 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  25  Oreg.  291  ;  35  Pac. 
6"::  So  as  to  tracks  (Williams  v. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  119  Mo.  316  ; 
24  S.  W.  782 ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Weaver.  35  Kans.  412;  11  Pac.  408  ; 
Intt-rnational,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bell,  75 
Tex.  50;  12  S.  W.  321).  An  instruc- 
tion "that  a  railway  company  owes 


the  duty  to  its  employees  to  do  all 
that  human  care,  vigilance  and  fore- 
sight can  do,  consistently  with  the 
practical  operation  of  its  road,  in 
providing  a  safe  road,  roadbed, 
track,  ties  and  rails,  and  to  keep  the 
same  in  repair,"  is  erroneous  (Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  148  111.  605; 
35  N.  E.  1117).  Where  a  railroad 
company  voluntarily  employs  a 
physician  for  its  injured  employee, 
it  is  only  bound  to  exercise  reason- 
able care  in  selecting  a  competent 
person,  and  is  not  liable  for  the  phy- 
sician's negligence  or  tortious  acts 
(Pittsburg,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan, 
141  Ind.  83  ;  40  N.  E.  138 ;  Atchison, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Zeiler,  54  Kans.  340; 
38  Pac.  282  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Howard,  45  Neb.  570  ;  63  N.  W.  872  ; 
Quinn  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 
94  Tenn.  713;  30  S.  W.  1036). 

4  Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  McDaniels,  107 
U.  S.  454;  2  S.  Ct.  932;  Central  R  Co. 
v.  Ryles.  84  Ga.  420;  11  S.  E.  499. 
In  Alabama,  "due"  care  and  dili- 
gence are  required  (Ala.,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Waller,  48  Ala.  459). 

5 "  In  all  occupations  attended 
with  great  and  unusual  danger  there 
must  be  used  all  appliances  readily 
attainable  known  to  science  for  the 
prevention  of  accidents,"  and  the 
neglect  to  provide  such  readily  attain- 
able appliances  is  proof  of  culpable 
negligence  (Mather  v.  Rillston,  156 
U.  S.  391;  15  S.  Ct.  464). 


295 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  I90 


extraordinary  dangers,  means  what  would  be  extraordinary 
care,  in  ordinary  dangers.6  Ordinary  care  requires  obedience 
to  statutes  or  valid  ordinances,  enacted  for  the  protection  of 
servants,  whether  separately,  as  a  class,  or  as  a  part  of  the 
public.7  The  master  is  allowed  a  reasonable  time  in  which  to 
discover  defects  which  he  ought  to  remedy.8 

§  190.  Duration  of  master's  duty  and  exemption.— The 

obligations  of  the  master,  as  stated  in  this  chapter,  continue 
in  force,  not  only  during  all  the  time  in  which  his  servants  are 
actually  engaged  in  his  service,1  but  also  during  the  time 
reasonably  occupied  by  them  on  his  premises  in  going  to  and 
returning  from  their  work,2  and  in  intervals  of  rest  between.3 


6  A  railroad  company,  in  putting  a 
car  on  a  repair  track,  whereon  are 
other  cars,  under  which  its  em- 
ployees are  at  work,  should  exercise 
that  degree  of  care  which  very  care- 
ful and  prudent  men  exercise  in 
their  own  affairs  (Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Davis,  91  Ala.  487;  3  So.  552). 

7  Where  a  city  ordinance  limits 
the  speed  of  locomotives,  within  the 
city,  to  five  miles  an  hour,  it  is  neg- 
ligence, per  se,  as  to  employees 
whose  duty  requires  them  to  cross 
or  be  on  the  tracks,  to  violate  the 
ordinance  by  running  at  a  higher 
speed  ( Central  Railroad  Co.  v.  Brant- 
ley, 93  Ga.  259  ;  20  S.  E.  98). 

8  Hansen  v.  Schneider,  58  Hun,  60; 
11  N.  Y.  Supp.  347  [defective  eleva- 
tor in  building,  newly  occupied  by 
defendant]. 

1  The  fact  that  a  workman  was  ad- 
vised by  vice-principal  of  defendant 
not  to  work  beyond  a  certain  hour, 
but  that  he  worked  longer,  did  not 
sever  the  relation  of  master  and  serv- 
ant or  show  contributory  negligence 
so  as  to  prevent  recovery  for  his 
death  resulting  from  defendant's 
negligence  (McElligott  v.  Randolph, 
61  Conn.  157;  22  Atl.  1094).  It  is  a 
question  for  the  jury  whether  de- 
ceased was  in  the  line  of  his  duty 


when  killed  by  a  boiler  explosion 
some  minutes  before  working  hours, 
where  it  appears  that  he  often  came 
early,  using  his  time  in  oiling  and 
getting  ready  his  machine  (Walbert 
v.  Trexler,  156  Pa.  St.  112  ;  27  Atl. 
65). 

2  Brydon  v.  Stewart,  2  Macq.  H. 
L.  30  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Artery, 
137  U.  S.  507 ;  11  S.  Ct.  129  [return- 
ing on  hand  car] ;  Ewald  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  70  Wise.  420  ;  36  N.  W 
12. 

3  Cleveland,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Martin, 
13  Ind.  App.  485  :  39  N.  E.  759  [escape 
of  steam  in  dinner-time]  ;  Broderick 
v.  Detroit  Union  Depot,  56  Mich.  261 
[workman  while  eating  dinner  was 
askeil  by  foreman  to  open  ventilator 
and  did  so ;  being  defective,  it  fell 
and  crushed  his  hand]  ;  Atlanta 
Cotton  Co.  v.  Speer,  60  Ga.  137  [child 
playing  after  work].  Servanl  while 
at  work  at  4  a.  m.  obtained  permis- 
sion to  go  into  a  building  to  warm 
himself,  and  while  attempting  to 
enter,  fell  into  an  uncovered  cistern 
containing  boiling  water.  Eeld, 
jury  justified  in  finding  thai  "at  the 
time  of  I  lis  injury  the  employee  waa 
engaged  in  the  line  of  his  duty  " 
(Parkinson  Sugar  Co.  v.  i;ii. 
Kans.  401  ;  81   Pac.  1090). 


§  1 90  I  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  296 

He  is  bound  to  use  the  same  degree  of  care  for  the  purpose  of 
making  their  access  and  departure  safe,  as  for  the  purpose  of 
providing  a  safe  and  proper  place  in  which  the  work  is  to  be 
done.  So  far,  therefore,  as  their  road  to  his  work  lies  through 
his  premises,  he  is  bound  to  use  ordinary  care  to  keep  those 
premises  in  a  safe  condition  for  their  entry  at  all  times  when 
he  invites  such  entry;  and  he  is  bound  to  use  such  care  for  the 
purpose  of  enabling  them  to  depart  in  safety,  whether  their 
departure  is  rightful  or  wrongful.1  But  he  is  under  no  obliga- 
tion to  keep  in  safe  condition  for  their  use  any  part  of  the 
premises  to  which  their  duties  do  not  call  them  and  to  which 
he  has  not  given  them  permission  to  go.5  On  the  other  hand, 
the  master's  exemption  from  liability  for  risks  which  the 
servant  is  held  to  assume,  continues  for  the  same  time.  So 
long  as  he  is  required  to  use  care  for  the  servant's  protection, 
as  a  servant,  he  is  only  liable  as  far  as  a  master  is  liable  to  a 
servant.6  Outside  of  these  limits,  these  respective  liabilities 
and  limitations  cease ;  and  each  party  has  the  same  rights  and 
duties  as  any  other  strangers  have  towards  each  other  under 
similar  circumstances.  Thus,  a  servant  of  a  common  carrier, 
riding  in  his  master's  vehicle  on  the  same  footing  with  strangers 

4  In  Brydon  v.  Stewart,  2  Macq.  liable  (Belford  v.  Canada  Shipping 
H.  L.  30,  a  miner  who  wished  to  Co  ,  35  Hun,  347 ;  s.  p. ,  "Wright  v. 
leave  his  employment,  while  coming  Ravvson,  52  Iowa,  329).  Where  an 
up  from  the  pit  for  that  purpose,  was  employee's  work  was  on  the  ground, 
killed  by  a  defect  due  to  the  defend-  and  he  climbed  up  an  elevated  rail- 
ant's  personal  fault.  Held,  that  the  road  structure,  in  building  which  he 
defendant  was  liable ;  having  let  the  was  employed,  for  his  own  purposes, 
workman  down,  he  was  bound  to  before  commencing  work,  his  em- 
bring  him  up  in  safety,  even  if  he  ployer  is  not  liable  (Cowhill  v.  Rob- 
came  up  without  lawful  excuse  or  erts,  71  Hun,  127  ;  24  N.  Y.  Supp. 
proper  cause.  533).     But   one    working  in  a   ship, 

6  Baker  v.  Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co.,  who,  after  the   work  is  finished  or 

95  Iowa.  163;  63  N.  W.  G67  [walking  suspended,  goes  into  the  hold  to  get 

on  track].     A  carpenter,    who  was  his  coat,  is  lawfully  there,  and  the 

working  on  the  upper  deck  of  de-  shipowner  is  liable  for  want  of  rea- 

fendant's  steamer,  on  quitting  work  sonable  care  (Boden  v.  Demwolf ,  56 

at  night  went  to  the  lower  deck  with  Fed.  846). 

the  engineer,  who  hid  his  tools  in  the        6  McDonough  v.  Lanher,  55  Minn. 

boiler,  and  on  going  to  get  his  tools  501  ;  57  N.  W.  152  [servant  riding  to 

next  morning  he  fell  into  a   bunk  work  on  elevator], 
hole.     Held,  that  defendant  was  not 


297 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§  191 


and  not  on  service/  or  a  railroad  servant  crossing  the  track 
when  off  duty,  and  neither  going  to  nor  returning  from  his 
work,8  has  as  much  right  to  recover  for  injuries  caused  by  neg- 
ligence of  his  fellow-servants  as  any  stranger  would  have,  but 
no  more.9 


§  191.  Duty  to  select  competent  fellow-servants.— Among 
the  duties  which  the  master  personally  owes  to  his  servants  is 
that  of  using  ordinary  care  to  select  competent  servants,1  that 
is,  servants  of  sufficient  care,  skill,  prudence  and  good  habits 
to  make  it  probable  that  they  will  not  cause  injury  to  each 
other,  and  to  dismiss  servants  who  show  such  a  want  of  these 
qualifications  as  to  give  reasonable  ground  for  apprehension 
that  they  will  injure  their  fellow-servants.2  Ordinary  care, 
in  such  cases,  implies  the  usual  diligence,  which  a  prudent 
man,  in  the  same  line  of  business,  would  use  in  making  inquiry, 
for  the  purpose  of  protecting  himself  from  danger.3  If  he  fails 
in  the  performance  of  this  duty,  the  master  is  liable  to  any 
servant  for  the  consequences  of  such  negligence  or  incompe- 


TJode  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  162 
Mass.  56  ;  37  N.  E.  770.  See,  also, 
Richardson  v.  Coal  Co.,  6  Wash.  52  ; 
Sagers  v.  Nuckolls,  3  Colo.  App.  95  ; 
Vormus  v.  Coal  Co.,  97  Ala.  326; 
Christian  v.  Railway  Co.,90Ga.  124. 

8  Savannah,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Flanna- 
gan,  82  Ga.  579  ;  9  S.  E.  471  [killed 
at  street  crossing]  ;  Cincinnati,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Conley,  89  Ky.  402  ;  20  S. 
W.  816. 

9  Wink  v.  Weiler,  41  111.  App.  336 
[going  home  in  master's  wagon]. 

1  Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  McDaniels,  107 
U.  S.  454  ;  Curley  v.  Harris,  11  Allen, 
112,  121;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Harney,  28  Ind.  28  ;  Laning  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  521;  New 
Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  49 
Miss.  258  ;  Porter  v.  Waters-Allen 
Co.,  94  Tenn.  370;  29  S.  W.  227; 
Lewis  v.  Emery,  108  Mich.  641  ;  66 
N.  W.  569.  A  competent  man  is  one 
who  may  be  relied  on  to  execute  tin 
rules  of  the  master,  unless  prevented 


by  causes  beyond  his  own  control. 
Hence,  incompetency  exists,  not 
alone  in  physical  or  mental  attri- 
butes, but  in  the  disposition  with 
which  a  servant  performs  his  duties. 
If  he  habitually  neglects  these  duties, 
he  becomes  unrelial ile,  and  although 
he  may  be  well  able  to  do  all  that  is 
required  of  him,  his  disposition 
makes  him  an  incompetent  man 
(Coppins  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  122 
N.  Y.  557  ;  25  N.  E.  ill."")).  That  tins 
is  the  master's  personal  duty  is  con- 
ceded in  every  court,  even  by  the 
British  Lords,  in  Wilson  v.  Merry, 
L.  R.  1  Scotch  App.  320. 

2  Laning  v.  X.  Y.  Central  It.  Co., 
49  N.  Y.  521  ;  Tonnesen  v.  Ross,  58 
Hun,  115;  12  X.  Y.  Supp.  L50 ;  Gates 
v.  ( Jhicago,  etc.  R.  ('"..  2  S.  Dak. 
422 ;  50  N.  w.  '.ii.;  ;  Norfolk,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Nuckols,  '.'l  \'a.  1  :t;  21  S.  B. 
842. 

Jungnitsch  v.  Michigan  Iron  Co., 
105  Mi.  Iv  2T0;  03  N.  W.  296. 


§  i9»] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


298 


tency,  on  the  part  of  a  servant  thus  negligently  employed  or 
retained,  as  might  reasonably  be  anticipated  as  not  unlikely 
to  occur,  from  such  information  as  could  have  been  obtained 
about  such  servant,  by  the  use  of  ordinary  care.4  Much  more 
is  he  responsible,  if  he  has  actual  notice  of  the  negligent  habits 
or  incompetency  of  a  servant  employed  by  him.5  But  even 
the  master's  knowledge  of  this  fact  is  only  some  evidence  of 
negligence  on  his  part ;  and  the  issue  must  still  be  left  to  the 
jury.6  It  is  held,  in  New  York,  that  a  master  is  not  bound  to 
use  as  much  diligence  in  inquiring  about  a  servant's  habits, 
while   employed,  as  he  is  when  selecting  the  servant.7     And 


*  Faulkner  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  49  Barb. 
324 ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Swett, 
45  111.  197  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Harney,  28  Ind.  28 ;  see  Thayer  v. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  22  Id.  26  ;  Nor- 
dyke  etc.  Co.  v.  Van  Sant,  99  Id. 
188;  Blake  v.  Maine  Central  R.  Co., 
70  Me.  60 ;  Baulec  v.  N.  Y.  Central, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  356  ;  Mann  v. 
Delaware  etc.  Canal  Co.,  91  Id.  495 
[engineer  of  a  train  killed  by  col- 
lision through  inefficiency  of  brake- 
man,  who  was  a  new  hand  without 
proper  knowledge  of  the  signals : 
question  for  the  jury]  ;  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  63  111.  293  [serv- 
ant causing  injury  was  in  charge  of 
a  gravel  train,  while  intoxicated 
and  his  character  as  intemperate 
must  have  been  known  to  the  com- 
pany]. But  the  mere  fact  that  an 
engineer  of  a  locomotive  is  near- 
sighted is  not  sufficient  to  establish 
negligence  in  retaining  him  (Texas, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrington,  62  Tex. 
597). 

5  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mares, 
123  U.  S.  710  ;  8  S.  Ct.  321  ;  Laning 
v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y. 
521  ;  Oilman  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  10 
Allen,  233 ;  Huntingdon,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Decker,  84  Penn.  St.  419  [habitu- 
ally intemperate  conductor,  whose 
unfitness  was  known  to  superin- 
tendent] ;  Smith  v.  Backus  Lumber 


Co.,  64  Minn.  447;  67  N.  W.  358. 
This  is  conceded  in  all  the  cases  cited 
under  §  180.  In  Illinois  Central  R. 
Co.  v.  Jewell  (46  111.  99),  the  fact 
that  the  incompetency  of  an  engineer 
was  known  to  some  officers  of  the 
company  (not  apparently  directors), 
was  held  sufficient  to  make  the  com- 
pany liable  to  a  brakeman  for  the 
engineer's  fault.  A  single  instance 
of  negligence  in  a  servant  does  not 
necessarily  make  it  the  duty  of  his 
master  to  discharge  him  (Baulec  v. 
Harlem  R.  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  356  ;  Sum- 
merhays  v.  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.,  2 
Colo.  484).  An  employer  is  liable 
for  injury  to  an  employee,  caused  by 
the  incompetency  of  a  co-employee 
whom  the  employer,  with  knowl- 
edge of  his  incompetency,  retains  in 
his  service,  if  such  incompetency 
was  not  known  to  the  person  injured 
(Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  89 
Tex.  519;  35  S.  W.  1042).  Where 
the  master  has  been  notified  of  the 
incompetency  of  a  servant,  he  can- 
not defend  by  showing  that  he  con- 
sidered such  servant  competent  (Ross 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2  McCrary, 
235:  affi'd,  112  U.  S.  337). 

6  Hoey  v.  Dublin,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Irish 
Rep.  5  C.  L.  206. 

7  Chapman  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  55  N.  Y. 
579. 


299 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[1  192 


the  master  does  not  become  responsible  for  the  incompetency 
of  a  servant,  of  which  he  had  originally  neither  actual  nor  con- 
structive notice,  until  he  has  had  sufficient  time  to  inquire  and 
act  upon  subsequent  notice.8  But  he  must  use  ordinary  care 
and  diligence  to  keep  himself  informed.9  He  must  maintain 
watch  and  supervision  over  his  servants  ; 10  and  he  is  responsible 
to  every  servant  for  his  failure  to  do  so.  Putting  a  servant, 
generally  competent,  to  a  task  for  which  he  is  incompetent, 
with  notice,  is  as  culpable  as  the  employment  of  a  servant 
equally  incompetent  for  all  purposes.11 

§  192.  Evidence  of  negligence  in  employment  of  servant. — 
The  burden  of  proving  negligence  in  selecting  or  continu- 
ing an  unfit  servant  is  upon  the  plaintiff.1  He  must  prove  (1) 
the  specific  negligent  act  on  which  the  action  is  founded,2 
which  may,  in  some  cases,  but  not  generally,3  be  such  as  to 
prove  incompetency,   but    never  can,    of  itself,    prove    notice 


8  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Breed- 
love,  10  Ind.  App.  657  ;  38  N.  E.  357  ; 
Lake  Shore  R.  Co.  v.  Stupak,  123 
Ind.  210;  23  N.  E.  246.  Where  a 
flagman's  unfitness  for  the  posi- 
tion was  known  to  the  defendant 
long  enough  before  the  accident  to 
enable  it  to  procure  some  one  else, 
the  liability  of  defendant  is  a  ques- 
tion for  the  jury  (Hughes  v.  Balti- 
more, etc.  R.  Co.,  164  Pa.  St.  178; 
30Atl.  383). 

9  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Nuckols, 
91  Va.  193  ;  21  S.  E.  342. 

10  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hen- 
thorne,  19  C.  C.  A.  623  ;  73  Fed.  634. 
There  was  evidence  that  the  engi- 
neer, during  two  weeks,  had  re- 
peatedly disobeyed  signals.  Held, 
that  it  was  error  to  grant  a  nonsuit 
on  the  ground  that  deceased  had  the 
same  means  of  knowledge  as  to  the 
engineer's  negligence  as  defendanl 
had  (Daly  v.  Sang,  91  Wise.  336;  64 
N.  W.  997). 

11  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Patton, 
[Tex.    Civ.    App.]  ;    25    S.    W.    839 


[engineer,  never  before  on  road,  sent 
out  after  storm]  ;  Core  v.  Ohio  River 
R.  Co.,  38  W.  Ya.  456;  18  S.  E.  596 
[inexperienced  fireman  in  charge  of 
engine] ;  Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Guy  ton,  115  Ind.  450  ;  17  X.  E.  101 
[brakemen  set  to  run  wild  train]. 

1  Cameron  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
145  N.  Y.  400:  40  N.  E.  1;  Mentzer 
v.  Armour,  18  Fed.  373  ;  ami  all 
other  cases  cited  under  this  section. 

-  It  is  astonishing  that  any  decision 
to  this  effect  should  ever  have  been 
called  for ;  but  it  seems  that  efforts 
have  been  made  to  recover  on  mere 
proof  of  previous  negligence  or 
general  incompetency,  without  prov- 
ing any  fault  connected  with  the 
plaintiff's  injury.  Of  course  such 
attempts  have  always  failed  (Kersey 
v.  Kansas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  T'.t  Mo 
Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Faber,  77 
Tex.  158;  8  8.  W.  84). 

*  Sullivan  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  83  Conn.  30fi  :  28  Ail  Til  ;  <  raig 
v.  ( Ihicago,  etc.  R  Co.,  "il  Mo.   \p|>. 


§    192] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


300 


thereof  to  the  master;1  (2)  incompetency,  by  inherent  unfit- 
ness B  or  previous  specific  acts  of  neligence,  from  which  incom- 
petency may  be  inferred;6  and  (3)  either  actual  notice  to  the 
master    of    such    unfitness    or    bad    habits,7    or    constructive 


*  Conrad  v.Gray,  109  Ala.  130;  19  So. 
398.  See  Murphy  v.  Pollock,  15  Irish 
C.  1-  224  :  Wright  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
!;  Co.,  25  N.  Y.  562;  Harvey  v.  N. 
Y    Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  88  Id.  481. 

Evans  v.  Chamberlain,  40  S.  C. 
K>4  ;  18  S.  E.  213  [engineer  ;  no  proof 
of  incompetency].  Jury  may  find 
.servants  given  to  drink  incompe- 
tent (Campbell  Co.  v.  Roediger, 
78  Md.  601  ;  28  Atl.  901  ;  Laning 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  49  N. 
Y.  521  ;  Kean  v.  Detroit  Rolling 
Mills,  66  Mich.  277  ;  33  N.  W.  395 ; 
Williams  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  109 
Mo.  475;  18  S.  W.  1098  [engineer]). 
Examples  of  evidence  insufficient  to 
prove  negligence  in  employing:  Ohio, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunn,  138  Ind.  18 ;  36 
X.  E.  702;  Baltimore  v.  YVarr,  77  Md. 
593  ;  27  Atl.  85  [recommendation  of 
politician]  ;  Timm  v.  Michigan  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  98  Mich.  220  ;  57  N.  W.  110  ; 
Kansas,  etc.  Coal  Co.  v.  Brownlie, 
60  Ark.  582  ;  31  S.  AY.  453  [boy  over 
14.  as  trapper  in  mine]  ;  Smillie  v.  St. 
Bernard  Dollar  Store,  47  Mo.  App. 
402  [boy  12,  to  run  elevator]  ;  Suther- 
land v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  125  N.  Y. 
737  ;  s.  c.,  more  fully,  20  N.  E.  609 
[telegraph  operator  of  17]  ;  Cosgrove 
v.  Pitman,  103  Cal.  208  :  37  Pac.  232 
[engineer  occasionally  under  the  in- 
fluence of  drink].  Competency  was 
held  well  proved  in  Roblin  v.  Kansas 
City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  119  Mo.  47G  ;  24  S. 
AY.  1011  [engineer]. 

6Baulec  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  59  N. 
Y.  356,  300  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Ruby,  38  Ind.  294  :  Evansville,  etc. 
T;  (  1.  v.  Guyton,  115  Ind.  450  ;  17  N. 
E.  101:  Hilts  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  I  '<>., 
55  Mich  437;  21  X.  AY.  878  ;  Grube 
v.  Missouri  Pac  R.  Co.,  9s  Mo.  330; 
11  S    W.  730;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co. 


v.  Camp,  65  Fed.  952 ;  13  C.  C.  A. 
233.  See  Coppins  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  122  N.  Y.  557  ;  25  N.  E.  915.  To 
the  contrary,  on  the  ground  that 
such  evidence  multiplied  the  issues, 
were  Frazier  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  38  Pa. 
St.  104  ;  Connors  v.  Morton,  100  Mass. 
333  ;  35  N.  E.  860  ;  Hatt  v.  Nay,  144 
Mass.  18G  ;  ION.  E.  807  ;  Robinson 
v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  7  Gray,  92.  The 
former  decision  was  reviewed  and 
condemned  in  Baulec  v.  N.  Y.  & 
Harlem  R.  Co.,  59  N.  Y.  356  ;  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ruby,  38  Ind. 
294. 

1  Some  notice  is  indispensable  to 
liability  (Cameron  v.  N.  Yt  Central  R. 
Co.,  145  N.  Y.  400  ;  40  N.  E.  1  ;  Burke 
v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co.,  69  Hun,  21  ; 
23  N.  Y.  Supp.  458  [switchman  of  17J; 
Jungnitsch  v.  Michigan  Malleable 
Iron  Co.,  105  Mich.  270:  63  N.  W.  296 
[boy  of  16  ;  arm  broken,  but  this  un- 
known]. Actual  notice  was  held 
proved  in  Laning  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y*.  521  [servant 
known  to  be  drunk]  ;  McPhee  v. 
Scully,  103  Mass.  216  ;  39  N.  E.  1007 
[servant  obviously  drunk]  ;  Wabash 
R.  Co.  v.  Brow,  65  Fed.  941  ;  13  C. 
C.  A.  222  [servant  drunk  at  accident, 
drunk  before  at  similar  accident  ; 
notice].  Notice  to  any  agent  of  the 
master,  entrusted  with  the  power  of 
dismissing  the  servant  in  fault,  is 
clearly  enough  (Chapman  v.  Erie  R. 
Co.,  55  N.  Y.  579;  Sutton  v.  N.  Y.. 
Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co..  66  Hun,  632  ; 
21  N.  Y.  Supp.  312  [conductor's  neg- 
ligence known  to  superintendent]). 
Notice  to  an  agent  without  authority 
to  hire  or  discharge  such  servants 
cannot  be  imputed  to  the  company 
(Reiser  v.  Pennsylvania  Co.,  152  Pa. 
St.  38;  25  Id.  175). 


30i 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  192 


notice,8  by  showing  that  the  master  could  have  known  the 
facts,  had  he  used  ordinary  care  in  "  oversight  and  super- 
vision," 9  or  by  proving  general  reputation  of  the  servant  for  in- 
competency or  negligence  ;10  and,  (4),  that  the  injury  complained 
of  resulted  from  the  incompetency  proved.11  For  evidence  of 
a  defect  or  bad  habit  is  of  no  effect,  if  the  injury  complained 
of  was  in  no  way  brought  about  by  that  defect  or  habit.1' 
The  mere  fact  of  the  incompetency  of  a  servant  for  the  work 
upon  which  he  was  employed  is  not  enough  to  warrant  a  jury 


8  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Arispe, 
81  Tex.  517;  17  S.  W.  47. 

9  Whittaker  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Ca- 
nal Co.,  126  N.  Y.  544  ;  27  N.  E.  1042  ; 
Ohio.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Collarn,  73  Ind. 
261.  Continuous  negligence  for  two 
weeks,  held  sufficient  to  go  to  jury 
as  evidence  of  such  want  of  over- 
sight (Daly  v.  Sang,  91  Wise.  336  ; 
64  N.  W.  997).  Proof  of  unfitness  of 
a  servant,  at  the  time  of  his  employ- 
ment, makes  out  a  prima  facie  case 
against  the  master,  and  throws  upon 
him  the  burden  of  disproving  negli- 
gence in  the  selection  (Crandall  v. 
Mcllrath,  24  Minn.  127;  Fines  v. 
Sillery,  73  Hun,  549  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp. 
181  [no  inquiries  made  on  employing 
servant]). 

10  Common  reputation  is  admissi- 
ble to  charge  master  with  notice  of 
incompetency,  without  bringing  no- 
tice of  such  reputation  home  to  the 
master  (Monahan  v.  Worcester,  150 
Mass.  439  ;  23  N.  E.  228  ;  Driscoll  v. 
Fall  River,  163  Mass.  105  ;  39  N.  E. 
1003  ;  Lake  Shore  R.  Co.  v.  Stupak, 
123  Ind.  210  ;  23  N.  E.  246  ;  Davis  v. 
Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  20  Mich.  105  ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sullivan,  6  3  111. 
293:  Western  Stone  Co.  v.  Whalen, 
151  111.  472;  38  N.  E.  241;  Norfolk, 
etc.  R  Co.  v.  Hoover,  79  Md.  253; 
29  Atl.  994  ;  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Johnson.  89  Tex.  519  ;  35  S.  W.  1042  ; 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Henthnrne  ; 
1!)  C.  C.  A.  623;  73  Fed.  634  ;  Park 


v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  85  Hun,  184; 
82  N.  Y.  Supp  4S2).  Evidence  of 
reputation  for  incompetency  is  no 
proof  of  incompetency  in  fact  (Gier 
v.  Los  Angeles  R.  Co.,  108  Cal.  129; 
41  Pac.  22),  except  in  Massachusetts 
(Hatt  v.  Nay,  144  Mass.  186;  10  N.  E. 
80?) ;  Missouri (Grube  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  98  Mo.  330  ;  11  S.  W.  736),  and 
perhaps  Pennsylvania.  General  repu- 
tation of  a  servant  for  competency 
and  care  at  the  time  and  place  of 
employment,  of  such  character  as  to 
imply  information  to  the  employer, 
is  admissible  as  tending  to  disprove 
alleged  negligence  in  employing  such 
servant  (Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Mor- 
rissey,  45  111.  App.  127). 

11  Core  v.  Ohio  River  R.  Co.,  38  W. 
Va.  456;  18  S.  E.  596  [fireman  in 
charge  engine].  Plaintiff  cannot  re- 
cover merely  on  proof  of  reputation 
for  recklessness  and  carelessness, 
without  also  proving  that  the  ser- 
vant was  in  fact  reckless  ami  care- 
less <  Her  v.  Los  Angeles  R.  Co.,  108 
Cal.  129;  41  Pac.  22). 

12  Cosgrove  v.  Pitman,  103  Cal.  268; 
37  Par.  232  [intoxication] ;  Earring- 
ton  v.  N  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  50  Hun, 
6C2;  4N.Y.Supp.  640 [foreman some- 
times drunk,  but  sober  at  time  ac- 
cident] ;  Engelhardt  v.  1  >elau  are, 
etc.  B.  Co.,  7^  Bun,  588;  29  X.  Y. 
Su|>;>.  425  [short  Bight,  not  oausing 
injury]. 


§  19-^1 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


;o2 


in  finding  the  master  guilty  of  negligence  in  employing  him,13 
But  the  evidence  by  which  such  incompetency  is  proved  may 
be  of  such  a  nature  as  to  raise  a  fair  inference  that  the  master 
either  had  notice  of  the  fact,14  or  else  omitted  to  make  such 
inquiries  as  common  prudence  would  have  dictated.15  Thus, 
proof  of  the  employment  of  one,  who  had  always  been  a  mere 
clerk,  or  a  common  laborer,  to  run  a  steam  engine,  would  justify 
a  finding  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  master,  without 
showing  that  he  had  actual  notice  of  the  servant's  antece- 
dents;16 for  it  would  be  improbable  that  the  master  could  be 
so  grossly  deceived  if  he  had  made  any  inquiry.  Evidence 
of  only  one  other  negligent  act  of  the  servant  in  fault  is 
not   usually   sufficient,17  especially  if  no  injury  resulted    from 


13  The  bare  fact  of  habitual  negli- 
gence of  a  servant,  without  proof 
that  it  came  to  the  notice  of  the 
master  or  of  any  agent  charged 
with  the  duty  of  reporting  it,  or  of 
some  circumstance  which  should 
have  called  attention  to  it,  is  not 
enough  to  charge  the  master  with 
notice  (Cameron  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  145  N.  Y.  400  ;  40  N.  E.  1  ;  Moss 
v.Pacific  R.  Co.,  49  Mo.  167  ;  Jor- 
dan v.  Wells,  3  Woods,  527;  East 
Tenn,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gurley,  12  Lea, 
46  ;  Huffman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R  Co., 
78  Mo.  50  [engineer  alleged  to  have 
run  his  train  too  fast,  to  the  damage 
of  brakeman]  ;  Chapman  v.  Erie  R. 
Co.,  55  N.  Y.,  579  [employee  original- 
ly competent,  subsequently  became 
unfit]  ;  Harvey  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  88  N.  Y.  481  [negligent  but  not 
incompetent  switchman]  ;  Pilkinton 
v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  70  Tex.  226  ;  7 
S.  W.  805).  Proof  of  incompetency 
alone  does  not  throw  upon  the  mas- 
ter the  burden  of  showing  care  in 
selection  (Murphy  v.  St.  Louis,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  71  Mo.  202;  contra,  Skerritt 
v.  Scallan,  11  Irish  R.  C.  L.  389). 
Master  must  have  notice  in  some 
form  to  be  chargeable  (Stevens  v. 
San  Francisco,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100  Cal. 
554  ;  35  Pac.  165  ;  Reiser  v.  Pennsyl- 


vania Co.,  152  Pa.  St.  38;  25  Atl. 
175 ;  Mulhern  v.  Lehigh  Val.  Coal 
Co.,  161  Pa.  St.  270  :  28  Atl.  1087 
[rule  not  changed  by  statute,  1885]). 
,40'Loughlin  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  87  Hun,  538  ;  34  N.  Y.  Supp. 
297  [conductor  forced  to  act  as 
switchman]. 

15  Evidence  of  incompetency  and 
notice  held  sufficient  to  go  to  jury, 
in  Coppins  v.  N.  YT.  Central  R.  Co., 
122  N.  Y.  557  ;  25  N.  E.  915  [habit  of 
leaving  post  of  duty]  ;  Hilts  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  55  Mich.  437  ;  21 
N.  W.  878  [locomotive  engineer  had 
for  nine  months  habitually  been 
noticeably  drunk]  ;  Wall  v.  Dela- 
ware, etc.  R.  Co.,  54  Hun,  454 ;  7  N. 
Y.  Supp.  709  [frequent  acts]. 

16  Such  proof  will  sustain  a  verdict, 
but  it  does  not  raise  a  legal  presump- 
tion. It  is  entirely  for  the  jury 
(Joch  v.  Dankwardt,  85  111.  331), 
See  Bunnell  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co., 
29  Minn.  305,  where  one,  who  had 
never  learned  the  trade  of  carpenter, 
was  employed  as  foreman  of  a  gang 
of  carpenters. 

11  Hathaway  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  92  Iowa,  337;  60  N.  W.  651. 
Proof  of  single  act  may  be  enough 
with  other  facts  (East  Line.  etc.  R.Co. 
v.  Scott,  71  Tex.  703  ;  10  S.  W.  298) 


303 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  193 


it.18  A  jury  cannot  be  allowed  to  decide,  merely  from  the  looks 
and  manner  of  a  servant  appearing  before  them,  that  he  was 
incompetent,  and  that  the  master  ought  to  have  known  it.19 

§193.  Duty  to  employ  sufficient  force.  —  Another  duty 
which  the  master  owes  to  his  servants  is  that  of  employing  a 
sufficient  number  to  do  the  work,  so  far  as  may  be  necessary  to 
enable  them  to  do  it  in  safety ; !  but,  as  in  other  cases,  he  is 
only  bound  to  use  ordinary  care  for  this  purpose.2  It  is  not 
always  consistent  with  such  care,  however,  to  provide  a  force 
just  sufficient  for  the  regular,  every-day  course  of  business. 
Preparation  must  be  made  for  those  extraordinary  emergencies 
which,  although  they  do  not  frequently  occur,  are  still  known 
in  common  experience  to  be  likely  to  occur  occasionally. 
Thus,  in  case  of  a  sudden  flood,  washing  away  a  part  of  a  rail- 
road, the  company  must  have  men  promptly  stationed  at 
points  of  danger,  to  warn  servants  who  are  unconscious  of  it.3 


18  Holland  v.  Southern  Pac.  E.  Co., 
100  Cal.  240;  34  Pac.  666  [running 
train  too  fast]. 

19 Corson  v.  Maine  Central  R.  Co., 
76  Me.  244.  See  Peaslee  v.  Fitch- 
burg  R.  Co.,  152  Mass.  155  ;  25  N.  E. 
71.  Yet  the  court  on  appeal  cannot 
say,  as  matter  of  law,  that  the  con- 
duct of  the  servant,  in  presence  of 
the  jury,  in  connection  with  other 
testimony,  will  not  warrant  a  find- 
ing of  his  incompetency  (Keith  v. 
New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  140  Mass. 
175;  3N.  E.  28). 

1  Flike  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53  N. 
Y.  549  ;  Booth  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
73  Id.  38  ;  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lavalley.  36  Ohio  St.  221  ;  Burling- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crockett.  1!)  Neb. 
138  ;  26  N.  W.  921  [absence  of  watch- 
man] ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor, 
69  111.  461.  A  railroad  company  is 
liable  for  the  death  of  an  employee, 
caused  by  the  absence  from  a  train, 
for  the  purpose  of  getting  something 
to  eat,  of  part  of  a  train  crew,  who 
were  required  to  remain  on  duty  19 
hours  without  any  way  of  getting 
meals,  though  decedent  was  a  fellow- 


servant  (Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  McCaf- 
frey, 139  Ind.  430  ;  3S  N.  E.  G7).  See 
Thorpe  v.  Mo.  Pacific  R  Co.  (89  Mo. 
650),  where  it  was  held  that  if  the 
insufficiency  of  the  staff  or  force  em- 
ployed to  do  the  work  is  obviously  so 
great  that  even  with  use  of  great 
caution  there  is  imminent  danger  to 
those  actually  taking  part,  they  are 
chargeable  with  contributory  negli- 
gence in  uniting  in  it. 

2  See  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v. 
Herbert,  116  U.  S.  642  ;  6  S.  Ct.  590; 
Saxton  v.  Hawksworth,  2G  L.  T.  851  ; 
Skipp  v.  Eastern  Counties  R.  Co.,  9 
Exch.  223. 

8  Hardy  v.  Carolina  Central  R.  Co., 
7«;  N.  ( '.  5.  in  thai  case,  a  brake- 
man  uxdefendant's  employment,  was 

killed  by  the  wrecking  of  his  train 
in  a  washout,  immediately  after  an 
extraordinary  storm.  The  corpora- 
tion was  held  liable  on  the  ground  of 

their  failure  t"  have  a  man  at  the 
break  in  the  road,  to  warn  the  train  ; 
Read,  •'..  Baying:  "There  must  he  a 

man    for  every    place,    as  need   may 

be"  (see  74  N.  C.  734). 


§  '94] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


304 


If  men  enough  arc  not  previously  engaged,  new  ones  should 
be  instantly  procured;  or,  if  there  is  not  time  to  do  this,  some 
part  of  the  general  business  must  be  suspended,  so  as  to 
release  a  sufficient  number  of  men  to  attend  to  the  new  and 
more  pressing  duty. 

§  194.   Duty  to  provide  proper   instrumentalities.  —  The 

master  personally1  owes  to  his  servants  the  duty  of  using  ordi- 
nary care  and  diligence2  to  provide  for  their  use  reasonably  safe 
instrumentalities  of  service.3  Among  these  are  a  reasonably 
safe  place  in  which  to  do  their  work4  or  to  stay  while  waiting 

70  Fed.  944).  A  railroad  company 
owes  to  its  servants  a  greater  degree 
of  diligence  and  care,  according  as 
the  service  in  which  they  are  en- 
gaged is  more  dangerous  (Central  R. 
Co.  v.  Ryles,  84  Ga.  420  ;  11  S.  E.  499). 

3  Gardner  v.  Mich.  Central  R.  Co., 
150  IT.  S.  349  ;  14  S.  Ct.  140  ;  Central 
R.  Co.  v.  Keegan,  160  U.  S.  259  ;  16 
S.  Ct.  269.  The  rule  applies  to  ani- 
mals as  well  as  inanimate  appliances 
(Hammond  Co.  v.  Johnson,  38  Neb. 
244 ;  56  N.  W.  967  [horses]  ;  Wrought 
Iron  Range  Co.  v.  Martin  [Tex.  Civ. 
App.]28S.  W.  557). 

4  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien, 
161  U.  S.  451;  Plank  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  60  N.  Y.  607  [trench  in  place 
where  brakemen  were  required  to 
stand]  ;  Benzing  v.  Steinway,  101  N. 
Y.  547;  5  N.  E.  449  [platform]; 
Kranz  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  123  N. 
Y.  1  ;  25  N.  E.  206  [trench]  ;  Wilson 
v.  Willimantic  Linen  Co.,  50  Conn. 
433  [defective  shafting  ;  making 
workshop  dangerous].  Servant 
crushed  between  a  car  and  a  build- 
ing while  moving  the  car  in  obedi- 
ence to  orders,  recovered  ;  space  be- 
tween track  and  building  being  too 
narrow,  and  constantly  narrow- 
ing ;  but  plaintiff  did  not  know,  and 
could  not  reasonably  be  expected  to 
know,  this  (Ferren  v.  Old  Colony  R. 
Co.  143  Mass.  197,  9  N.  E.  608). 
Deceased   was    digging    in    a    deep 


'The  master  is  bound  to  use  due 
care  in  furnishing  safe  instru- 
mentalities for  performing  the  work. 
This  is  a  personal  obligation,  which 
cannot  be  escaped  by  delegating  it 
(Gardner  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 
150  U.  S.  349  ;  14  S.  Ct.  140  ;  Northern 
Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Herbert,  116  U.  S. 
642  ;  6  S.  Ct.  590  ;  Fuller  v.  Jewett,  80 
N.  Y.  46  ;  Pullman  Car  Co.  v.  Laack, 
143  111.  242  ;  32  N.  E.  285 ;  Morton  v. 
Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  81  Mich.  423;  46  N. 
W.  Ill  ;  Bushby  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  107'  N.  Y.  374 ;  14  N.  E. 
407;  Kranz  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co., 
123  N.  Y.  1  ;  25  N.  E.  206,  and,  in 
fact,  all  the  cases  cited  under  this 
section). 

2  Ordinary  care  is  always  required. 
It  is  error  to  charge  that  anything 
less  will  suffice  in  any  case  (St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Eggmann,  161 
111.  155;  43  N.  E.  620).  Ordinary 
care  implies  such  care  in  the  matter 
as  the  master  would  take  if  it  were 
possible  for  him  to  occupy  at  the 
same  time  the  position  of  both  mas- 
ter and  servant  (Morrisey  v.  Hughes, 
•65  Vt.  553;  27  Atl.  205).  The  or- 
dinary care  which  a  railroad  com- 
pany is  bound  to  use  to  furnish  safe 
machinery  and  appliances  is  meas- 
ured by  the  character  and  risks  of 
the  business  (Mather  v.  Rillston,  156 
U.  S.  391  ;  16  S.  Ct.  464  :  Texas,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Thompson,  17  C.  C.  A.  524; 


3^5 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§  1 94 


orders,5  reasonably  safe  ways  of  entrance  and  departure,6  an 
adequate  supply  7  of  sound  and  safe  materials,  implements  and 
accommodations/  with  such  other  appliances  as  may  reason- 


trench,  the  sides  of  which  were  not 
braced,  and  on  one  side  of  which  a 
water  pipe  had  been  buried ;  and 
this  side  caved  in.  Held,  that  a 
verdict  against  the  master  could  not 
be  set  aside  (Van  Steenburgh  v. 
Thornton  [Ct.  Errors],  58  N.  J.  Law, 
160;  33  Atl.  380).  It  is  the  duty  of  a 
master  to  exercise  reasonable  care  to 
see  that  the  place  furnished  for  a 
servant  to  work  is  reasonably  safe, 
and  if  he  leaves  the  performance  of 
such  duty  to  other  servants,  he  is 
liable  for  the  manner  in  which  they 
perform  it,  without  regard  to  his 
personal  knowledge,  or  notice  of 
dangerous  conditions  (Hess  v.  Rosen- 
thal. 160  ID.  621 ;  43  N.  E.  743).  To  the 
same  effect,  Phil.  &  Reading  R.  Co. 
v.  Trainor,  137  Pa.  St.  148 ;  20  Atl. 
632  ;  Big  Creek  Stone  Co.  v.  Wolf, 
138  Ind.  496  ;  38  N.  E.  52  ;  Engstrom 
v.  Ashland  Iron  Co.,  87  Wise.  166  ; 
58  N.  W.  241  ;  Kelley  v.  Ryus,  48 
Kans.  120  ;  29  Pac.  144 ;  Hammond 
Co.  v.  Mason,  12  Ind.  App.  469  ;  40 
N.  E.  642 :  Gisson  v.  Schwabacher, 
99  Cal.  419  ;  34  Pac.  104  [dark  room 
with  dangerous  machinery]  ;  Akeley 
Lumber  Co.  v.  Rauen,  58  Fed.  668  ; 
7  C.  C.  A.  424  [dangerous  place,  in- 
sufficiently lighted].  A  railroad 
track  is  the  "place  of  work"  for 
trainmen  ;  and  the  master  is  bound 
to  see  to  its  safety  (Union  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  O'Brien,  161  U.  S.  451; 
Pidgeon  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  87 
Hun,  43 ;  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  870;  Bessex 
v.  '  hicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  45  Wise. 
477  [track]  ;  Hulehan  v.  Green  Bar, 
etc.  R.  Co..  58  Id.  319  ;  17  N.  W.  17 
[track]  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Robbins,  57  Ark.  377  ;  21  S.  W.  886  ; 
Fordycev.  Briney,  58  Ark.  206;  24 
S.  W.  250;  Davis  v.  Button.  78  Cal. 
[Law  of  Neck  Vol.  1  —  20] 


247  ;  18  Pac.  133  [bridge]  ;  Woods  v. 
Lindvall,  4  U.  S.  App.  49  ;  1  C.  C.  A. 
37  ;  48  Fed.  62  [defective  trestle]). 

5  Peters  v.  Harrison  Wire  Co.,  14 
Mo.  App.  599  [heavy  wheel,  left  un- 
fastened on  an  inclined  track  over  a 
place  where  plaintiff,  a  servant,  was 
waiting  to  go  to  his  work,  and  an- 
other servant  set  in  motion  the 
wheel,  which  fell  upon  plaintiff]. 
So  while  eating  meals  during  short 
interval  (Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Martin  [Ind.  App.],  39  N.  E.  759). 

6  Brydon  v.  Stewart,  2  Macq.  H.  L. 
30;  s.  P.,  Buzzell  v.  Laconia  Mfg. 
Co.,  48  Me.  113. 

1  Supply  of  tools  and  appliances 
must  be  sufficient  (Cleveland,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  20  C.  C.  A.  147;  73 
Fed.  970).  The  neglect  to  provide 
readily  attainable  appliances  for  the 
prevention  of  accidents,  in  occu- 
pations attended  with  unusual  dan- 
ger, is  proof  of  culpable  negligence. 
(Mather  v.  Rillston,  156  TJ.  S.  391  ; 
15  S.  Ct.  464). 

8  Paterson  v.  Wallace,  1  Macq.  H. 
L.  748  ;  Brydon  v.  Stewart,  2  Macq. 
H.  L.  30  ;  Buzzell  v.  Laconia  M  fg. 
Co.,  48  Me.  113;  Keegan  v.  West- 
era  R.  Co.,  8  N.  Y.  175  ;  Ryan  v. 
Fowler,  24  Id.  410  ;  Lanin-;  v.  N.  .  Y 
Central  R.  Co.,  49  Id.  521;  Houston 
v.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331  ;  29  Atl.  380 ; 
Fifield  v.  Northern  R.  Co.,  12  N.  11. 
225  ;  Hanley  v.  Grand  Trunk'  R.  Co., 
62  Id.  274;  Moynihan  v.  Hills  Co., 
146  Mass  586;  16 N.  E.  574  [machine]; 
Elkins  v.  Penn.  It.  Co.,  171  Pa.  St. 
121  ;  33  Atl.  71  [defecl  in  Bteps  <>f 
freighl  car]  ;  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  <  !o.  v. 
Jackson,  85  V*.  489:  6  S.  E.  220 
[cross-grained  defective  push-pole]; 
( lampbell  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R  <  '<>.. 
109  Ala..  520;  l9So.  875  [defective car 


8  194] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


;o6 


ably  be  required  to  insure  their  safety,9  while  at  their  work  or 
passing  over  his  premises  to  or  from  work.10  These  things 
must,  moreover,  be  adapted  to  the  work  in  hand.  It  is  not 
enough  that  they  should  be  good,  under  ordinary  conditions. 
They  must  be  suitable  for  the  work  to  which  they  are  applied 
by  the  master,  and  properly  adjusted  to  each  other.11  If, 
therefore,  the  master  knows1'-  or  would  have  known  if  he 
had  used  ordinary  care  to  ascertain  the  facts,13  that  the  build- 


brake];  Nordyke,  etc.  M.  Co.  v.  Van 
Sant,  90  Ind.  188  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
( !o.  v.  Swett,  45  111.  197  [a  very  em- 
phatic decision]  ;  Perry  v.  Ricketts, 
55  Id.  234 ;  Fink  v.  Des  Moines  Ice 
Co.,  84  Iowa,  321;  51  N.  W.  155  [slide 
in  ice  house]  ;  Rodney  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  127  Mo.  G76  ;  28  S.  W.  887 
[car]  ;  Kelley  v.  Ryus,  48  Kans.  120  ; 
29  Pac.  144  [machinery]  ;  Prosser  v. 
Montana  R.  Co.,  17  Mont.  372;  43 
Pac.  81  [bent  brakestaff]  ;  Hallower 
v.  Henley,  6  Cal.  209;  Johnson  v. 
Bellingham  Imp.  Co.,  13  Wash.  St. 
455  ;  43  Pac.  370  [rotten  plank].  It  is 
the  duty  of  an  employer  to  exercise 
ordinary  care  in  providing  reason- 
ably safe  and  suitable  machinery  for 
the  use  of  his  servant,  and,  in  the 
absence  of  notice  to  the  contrary, 
the  servant  is  warranted  in  assum- 
ing that  his  employer  has  performed 
this  duty  (Richland's  Iron  Co.  v.  El- 
kins,  90  Va.  249  ;  17  S.  E.  890). 

*  Hough  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100 
TJ.  S.  213 ;  Benzing  v.  Steinway,  101 
N.  Y.  547  ;  5  N.  E.  449  ;  Corcoran  v. 
Holbrook,  59  N.  Y.  517  [laborer  in 
cotton  mill,  injured  through  failure 
of  general  agent  to  keep  an  elevator 
in  repair] ;  Vosburgh  v.  Lake  Shore, 
etc.  R.  Co.,94N.Y.  374. 

iC  Cases  cited,  note  6,  supra.  This 
principle  applies  to  vehicles  and 
wavs  in  or  over  which  the  master 
carries  the  servant  to  or  from  work 
(Conlon  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  23 
Oreg.  499  :  32  Pac.  397  [servant 
riding    over    bridge    to    his   work]; 


San  Antonio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Adams, 
6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  102  ;  24  S.  W.  839 
[bridge]  ;  Pendergast  v.  Union  R. 
Co.,  10  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  207;  41  N. 
Y.  Supp.  927  [cars]). 

11  Where  machinery  was  perfect, 
of  its  kind,  and  in  good  repair,  but 
unsuitable  for  the  purpose  for  which 
it  was  used,  the  master  was  held  lia- 
ble (Geloneck  v.  Dean  Pump  Co., 
165  Mass.  202;  43  N.  E.  85).  The 
proper  adjustment  of  brake-rods  is 
a  master's  duty  (Woods  v.  Long 
Island  R.  Co.  11  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  16 ; 
42  N.  Y.  Supp.  140). 

12  Ryan  v.  Fowler,  24  N.  Y.  410 ; 
Keegan  v.  Western  R.  Co.,  8 Id.  175; 
Cayzer  v.  Taylor,  10  Gray,  274; 
Perry  v.  Ricketts,  55  111.  234. 

13  Benzing  v.  Steinway,  101  N.  Y. 
547  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son, 55  111.  492  ;  Gibson  v.  Pacific  R. 
Co.,  46  Mo.  163  ;  Elliott  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Mo.  272;  Spicer  v. 
South  Boston  Iron  Co.,  138  Mass. 
426  [flaw  in  iron  hook  used  to  raise 
furnace  door,  which  a  careful  in- 
spection would  have  revealed];  Texas, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McAtee,  61  Tex.  695 
[defect  in  car- brake,  of  which  the 
master  should  have  known] ;  Hous- 
ton v.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331;  29  Atl.  880; 
Noyes  v.  Smith,  28  Vt.  59  [defect  in 
fire-box  of  engine,  which  master 
might  have  discovered  by  proper 
vigilance]  :  Paine  v.  Eastern  R. 
Co.,  91  Wise.  340;  64  N.  W.  1005). 
Where  a  piece  of  mechanism  is  mani- 
festly incomplete,  and    is  used    in 


307 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  '94 


ings,  ways,  machinery,  tools  or  materials  which  he  pro- 
vides for  the  use  of  his  servants  are  unsafe,  and  a  servant, 
without  contributory  fault,  suffers  injury  thereby,  the  master 
is  liable  therefor ; u  although  he  is  not  thus  liable,  in  the 
absence  of  actual  or  constructive  notice.15  The  master  is 
not  entitled  to  time  to  discover  defects  in  things  which  are 
defective  when  put  in  use.  He  should  examine  them  before 
putting  them  in  use.16  He  cannot  evade  his  responsibility  in 
these  respects,  by  simply  giving  general  orders  that  servants 


that  condition,  the  master  cannot 
shield  himself  from  responsibility 
by  alleging  ignorance  of  its  condi- 
tion and  of  the  danger  thereof 
(Broderick  v.  Detroit,  etc  Depot  Co., 
56  Mich.  261  [defective  ventilator  in 
grain  elevator]  ;  Ogden  v.  Ru  lu- 
mens, 3  Fost.  &  F.  751  [arch  fell 
and  killed  a  workman ;  defendant 
held  liable  if  he  had  reasonable 
cause  to  apprehend  the  fall]).  Where 
a  servant  was  injured  by  the  giving 
way  of  wood  which  had  been  al- 
lowed to  remain  in  the  soil  an  un- 
reasonable length  of  time,  he  was 
held  entitled  to  recover  against  his 
master  (who  owned  the  wood  and 
soil)  without  proof  of  an  actual 
scienter  (O'Donnell  v.  Allegheny 
Valley  R.  Co.,  59  Pa.  St.  239  ;  Webb 
v.  Rennie,  4  Fost.  &  F.  608).  The 
plaintiff's  son  was  at  work  for  the 
defendant  under  a  cylinder  sus- 
pended by  chains  and  bolts,  and 
the  tackle  being  insufficient  for  the 
purpose,  the  cylinder  fell  and  killed 
the  plaintiff's  son.  The  manner  in 
which  the  cylinder  was  suspended 
was  unusual  and  dangerous,  and 
was  suggested  by  the  defendant 
himself.  Held,  that  the  defendant 
was  liable  (Weems  v.  Mathieson,  4 
Macq.  H.  L.  215).  When  an  eleva- 
tor fell  a  second  time  and  injured  a 
servant,  proof  of  the  former  fall  was 
held  admissible  to  show  the  master's 
knowledge  of  its  defective  cl  aracter 
(Malone  v.  Hawley,  46  Cal.  409). 


14  Complaint  alleging  that  "de- 
fendant, by  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
care,  might  have  known,"  states 
cause  of  action  (Seckinger  v.  Phili- 
bert  Co.,  129  Mo.  590;  31  S.  W. 
957).  Master  who  himself  made 
ladder  furnished  servant,  chargeable 
with  knowledge  of  such  defects  as 
ordinary  care  during  manufacture 
would  have  disclosed  (Standard  Oil 
Co.  v.  Bowker,  141  Ind.  12;  40  N. 
E.  128).  In  that  case,  the  master 
being  a  corporation,  was  of  course 
held  responsible  for  neglect  of  its 
servants  in  the  course  of  manu- 
facture. 

15  AVelfare  v.  Brighton,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  696;  Priestly  v. 
Fowler,  3  M.  &  W.  1  ;  Indianapolis, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Love,  10  Ind.  554  ; 
Wright  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  25 
N.  Y.  566  ;  Hayden  v.  Smithville 
Mfg.  Co.,  29  Conn.  548;  Buzzell  v. 
Laconia  Mfg.  Co.,  48  Me.  113;  Hull 
v.  Hall,  78  Id.  114;  3  Atl.  38.  See 
§  195,  note  3;  Schulz  v.  Rohe,  L49 
N.  Y.  132  ;  43  N.  E.  420  [no  notice  of 
particular  defect]. 

16  If  appliances  furnished  by  the 
master  "are  shown  to  have  been 
originally  defective  and  unsafe,  the 
burden  does  not  rest  on  an  employee, 

When   injured  by  SUCh  defect,  (.1  prO- 

duce  further  evidence  thai  Hie  mas- 
ter had  notice  thereof  "  I  Union  Pa- 
cific U.  ('•'.  v.  -:  i  l'"1-  1001  ." 
6C.  C.  A.  217). 


§  1 94a]  LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


303 


shall  examine  for  themselves,  before  using  the  place,  materials, 
etc.,  furnished  by  him.  The  fact  that  a  servant  could,  by  care 
and  caution,  so  operate  a  defective  and  dangerous  machine  as 
not  to  produce  injury  to  his  fellow-servants,  does  not  exempt 
the  master  from  his  liability  for  an  omission  to  exercise  rea- 
sonable care  ami  prudence  in  furnishing  safe  and  suitable 
appliances.17  The  master  fails  to  supply  a  "  safe  place"  for 
work,  if  he  allows  work  to  be  conducted  there  habitually,  in  a 
manner  needlessly  dangerous  to  servants. 18 


§  194a.  Duty  of  inspection  and  repair. —  The  master  is  also 
personally  l  bound,  from  time  to  time,2  to  inspect  and  examine 


11  Stringham  v.  Stewart,  100  N.  Y. ' 
51(5 ;  3  N.  E.  573  [warehouse  eleva- 
tor which  fell,  in  consequence  of 
lack  of  safety-guard].  See  McGee 
v.  Boston  Cordage  Co.,  139  Mass. 
445 ;  1  N.  E.  715,  and  note. 

18 Doing  v.  N.  Y.,  Ontario  etc.  R. 
Co.,  151  N.  Yr.  579;  45  N.  E.  1028; 
Fredenhurg  v.  Northern  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  114  N.  Y.  582  ;  21  N.  E.  1049. 

1  The  duty  of  a  railroad  company 
to  exercise  reasonable  care  in  fur- 
nishing adequately  safe  trains  for 
the  use  of  its  employees  is  not  dis- 
charged by  simply  using  reasonable 
care  to  employ  and  retain  only 
competent  and  diligent  inspectors, 
but  it  is  liable  if  its  inspectors,  in 
fact,  fail  to  discover  a  defect  which  a 
reasonable  examination  would  have 
disclosed  (Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Daniels,  152  U.  S.  684  ;  14  S.  Ct.  756  ; 
affrg  Daniels  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co., 
6  Utah,  357;  23  Pac.  762).  In  short, 
their  duty  of  inspection  and  repair 
cannot  be  delegated  (Id.;  Jaques  v. 
Great  Falls  Mfg.  Co.,  66N.H.  482  ;  22 
Atl.  552  ;  Houston  v.  Brush,  66  Vt.  33; 
29  Atl.  380  ;  Davis  v.  Central  R.  Co., 
53  Yt.  84  [derrick];  Daley  v.  Boston 
cV  A.  P.  Co.,  147  Mass.  101;  16  N.  E. 
690  [  !cf ective  rope];  Myers  v.  Hud- 
son Iron  Co.,  150  Mass.  J  25  [mining 
machinery  recently   inspected,    but 


defective] ;  Elmer  v.  Locke,  135 
Mass.  576 ;  Ingebregtsen  v.  Nord 
Deutscher  S.  S.  Co.  [Ct.  Errors],  57; 
N.  J.  Law,  400  ;  31  Atl.  619  ;  Torians 
v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84  Va.  192 ; 
4  S.  E.  339;  Carter  v.  Oliver  Oil 
Co.,  34  S.  C  211;  13  S.  E.  419;  Bean 
v.  Western N.  C.  R.  Co.,  107  N.  C.  731; 
12  S.  E.  600  [loose  rocks  falling 
on  track;  track-walker  employed]; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kneirim,  152 
111.  458 ;  39  N.  E.  324  ;  Romona  Stone 
Co.  v.  Phillips,  11  Ind.  App.  118  ;  39  N. 
E.  96  ;  Coontz  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
121  Mo.  652  ;  26  S.  W.  661).  The  duty 
of  keeping  its  track  in  proper  repair 
rests  on  the  master  (McClarney  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  80  Wise.  277; 
49  N.  W.  963;  Fox  v.  Spring  Lake 
Iron  Co.,  89  Mich.  387;  50  N.  W.  872 
[hoisting  apparatus]  ;  Van  Dusen  v. 
Letellier,  78  Mich.  492  ;  44  N.  W.  572 
[dock  on  which  work  was  done]). 

2  Snow  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co. ,  8  Al- 
len, 441;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Con- 
roy,  68  111.  560;  Quincy  Coal  Co.  v. 
Hood,  77  Id.  68 ;  Wedgwood  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co. ,  44  Wise.  44  ;  Hous- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Dunham,  49  Tex. 
1S1 ;  Bridges  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
6  Mo.  App.  389  ;  Smith  v.  Peninsular 
Car  Works,  60  Mich.  501  ;  27  N.  W. 
662  [icy  walk,  on  which  workman 
slipped  while  carrying  melted  iron] ; 


309  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§   194a 

all  instrumentalities  furnished  by  him,  and  to  use  ordinary 
care,  diligence  and  skill  to  keep  them  in  good  and  safe  con- 
dition.3 "  The  duty  of  inspection  is  affirmative  and  must  be 
continuously  fulfilled  and  positively  performed."  4  Such  duty 
is  not  discharged  by  giving  directions  for  its  performance,5  or 
by  promulgating  rules  requiring  it  to  be  performed,6  or  by  em- 
ploying competent  and  careful  persons  for  that  purpose.7  The 
master  is  not  responsible  for  the  want  of  repairs  when  he  has 
neither  actual  nor  constructive  notice  of  their  need;  and  this 
notice  is  not  presumed,  but   must  be  proved  by  the  servant.8 


Cooper  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  24 
W.  Va.  37,  51.  Strips,  used  to  hold 
lumber  upon  a  flat  car,  are  part  of 
the  equipment,  which  the  railroad 
company  was  obliged  to  make  rea- 
sonably safe  for  the  use  of  its  em- 
ployees (Dougherty  v.  Rome,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  64  Hun,  633  ;  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  841). 
Company  liable  for  an  injury  caused 
by  section  boss  allowing  blocks  of 
wood  to  remain  on  the  ti'acks  (Hule- 
han  v.  Green  Bay,  etc.  R.  Co.,  68 
Wise.  5-20  ;  32  N.  W.  529).  In  Web- 
ber v.  Piper  (109  N.  Y.  496 ;  17  N.  E. 
216),  it  was  held  that  mere  dullness 
of  a  saw,  resulting  from  use,  is  not  a 
"  defect  "  within  the  meaning  of  this 
rule.  S.  P.,  Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Duffey,  35  Ark.  602.  But  where 
part  of  a  machine  is  so  worn  by  use 
as  to  be  dangerous,  defendant's  neg- 
ligence was  a  question  for  the  jury 
(Sneider  v.  Treichler,  56  Hun,  309; 
9  N.  Y.  Supp.  584  ;  Myers  v.  Hudson 
Iron  Co.,  150  Mass.  125;  22  N.  E.  631 
[worn  brake  on  hoisting  machinery]). 
3  Goodrich  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.  116  N.  Y.  398  ;  22  N.  E.  397  [car- 
bumper  fallen  out  of  place]  ;  Jaques 
t.  Great  Falls  Mfg.  Co..  66  N.  H.  482  ; 
22  Atl.  552  [shuttle  flying  out  of 
loom] ;  Hannah  v.  Connecticut  River 
R.  Co.,  154  Mass.  529  ;  28  N.  E.  682 
[switch-rod]  ;  Myers  v.  Hudson  Iron 
Co.,  150  Mass.  125;  22  N.  E.  631 
[shoe-brake  on  mining  bucket  |  ;  Sim 
mons  v.  Peters,  85  Hun,  93  ;  32  N.  Y. 


Supp.  680  [door  to  elevator  shaft]  ; 
New  York,  etc.  Min.  Co.  v.  Rogers, 
11  Colo.  6  ;  16  Pac.  719  [frozen  rope 
to  mining  bucket].  A  switch  must 
be  kept  properly  connected  and  a 
new  lock  furnished  when  required 
(Coleman  v.  AVilmington,  etc.  R.  Co., 
25  S.  C.  446) 

4  Brann  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53 
Iowa,  595  ;  6  N.  W.  5  ;  Cooper  v. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  24  W.  Va. 
37,  56  ;  Settle  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  K. 
Co.,  127  Mo.  336  ;  30  S.  W.  125  ;  Hous- 
ton v.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331  ;  29  Atl.  380. 

5  Van  Dusen  v.  Letellier,  78  Mich. 
492  ;  41  X.  W.  572  ;  see,  also,  §  204, 
post;  and  note  1,  ante. 

6  Bailey  v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  139 
N.  Y.  302  ;  34  N.  E.  918  ;  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  McElyea,  71  Tex.  386 ; 
9  S.  W.  313. 

7  See  cases  cited  under  note  1 ;  Sweat 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  156  Mass.  284  ; 
31  X.  E.  296  [platform]  ;  Fuller  v. 
Jewett,  BON.  Y.  46. 

8Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Heaton,  187 
Ind.  1  :  35  X.  E.  (isT  ;  William-  v. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  ('<>.,  119  Mo.  816  ; 
24  s.  W.  782  ;  Colfax  Coal  Co.  v. 
Johnson,  52  111.  a.pp.  388  ;  Illinois 
Cut.    R.   Co.    v.    Harris.   53    |,1.   502; 

Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v,  Dixon,  49  Id. 
292.  The  master  is  not  liable  at  all 
for  want  of  repairs,  if  he  is  not 
chargeable  with  notice  of  their  need 
(Howd  v.  Mississippi,  etc.  R.  Co.,  50 
Miss.   178).     In  Ohio,   by  statute,  a 


§    [94a]  LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


3IO 


And  it  must  be  proved  that  he  was  chargeable  with  notice  of 
the  particular  defect  complained  of.9  But  he  is  chargeable 
with  constructive  notice  of  whatever,  by  the  use  of  ordinary 
care  and  diligence,  he  might  have  discovered,10  or  avoided  the 


railroad  company  is  chargeable  with 
knowledge  of  defects  in  its  cars,  loco- 
motives, and  machinery  (Act,  April 

2,  1890,  §  '-3).  to  overcome  which  it 
must  show  that,  in  fact,  it  did  not 
have  such  knowledge,  and  that  it 
used  due  diligence  to  ascertain  and 
reined  v  such  defects  (Columbus,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Erick,  51  Ohio  St.  146  ;  37 
N.  E.  128). 

•  Schulz  v.  Rohe,  149  N.  Y.  132;  43 
N.  E.  420. 

,0  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  mas- 
ter have  actual  knowledge  of  the  de- 
fect, but  it  is  sufficient  to  show  that 
he  could  have  discovered  the  defect 
by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care 
and  diligence  (Houston  v.  Brush,  G6 
Vt.  331  ;  29  Atl.  380  :  Daniels  v. 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  152  IT.  S.  084  ;  14 
S.  Ct.  756  ;  affi'g  6  Utah,  357  ;  23 
Pac.  762;  Texas,  etc.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Barrett  14  C.  C.  A.  373  ;  67  Fed.  214; 
Babcock  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co  ,  150 
Mass.  467  ;  23  N.  E.  325  [obstructions 
near  track]  ;  Mooney  v.  Connecti- 
cut Lumber  Co.,  154  Mass.  407  ;  28 
N.  E.  352  [machinery  known  to  start 
of  itself]  ;  McCarragher  v.  Rogers, 
120  N.  Y.  526  ;  24  N.  E.  812  [defect 
in  machine  known]  ;  Bailey  v.  Rome. 
etc.  R.  Co.,  139  N.  Y.  302  ;  34  N.  E. 
918  [defect  in  brake  visible  only  by 
inspection  under  car,  question  for 
jury]  ;  Bird  v.  Long  Is.  R.  Co.,  11 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  134,  42  N.  Y.  Supp. 
888  [defect  in  station  platform  not 
obvious];  Bennett  v.  Standard  Glass 
Co.,  158  Pa.  St.  120;  27  Atl.  874  ; 
Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Nunnally,  88 
Va.  546  ;  14  S.  E.  367  [car  couplings]  : 
Richmond,  etc.  R  Co.  v.  Burnett.  88 
Va.  538  :  14  S  E.  372  [brake]  ;  Lake 
Erie.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McHenry.  10 
Ind.  App.  525  ;  37  N.  E.  186  [engine] ; 


Monmouth  Min.  Co.  v.  Erling,  148 
111.  521  ;  36  N.  E.  117  [nut  missing 
two  weeks]  ;  Cowan  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  80  Wise.  284  ;  50  N.  W.  180 
[brake-rod]  ;  Paine  v.  Eastern  R.  Co., 
91  Wise.  340  ;  64  N.  W.  1005  [appli- 
ance worn  out]  ;  Kennedy  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  57  Minn.  227  ;  58  N.  W. 
878  [jack-screw  not  inspected]  ; 
Sheedy  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  55 
Minn.  357  ;  57  N.  W.  60  [brake]  ; 
Coontz  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  121 
Mo.  652  ;  26  S.  W.  661  ;  Gutridge  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  105  Mo  520; 
16  S.  W.  943  [defect  not  apparent 
to  the  eye]  ;  Southw.  Tel.  Co.  v. 
Woughter,  56  Ark.  206 ;  19  S.  W. 
575  [telegraph  pole]  ;  St.  Louis,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Higgins,  53  Ark.  458  ;  14 
S.  W.  653  [caboose]  ;  Gulf,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Pettis,  69  Tex.  689  ;  7  S.  W. 
93  [rotten  ties]  ;  Eddy  v.  Prentice 
8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  58;  27  S.  W.  1063 
[brake-rod]  ;  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Templeton.  87  Tex.  42  ;  26  S.  W. 
1066  [brake  out  of  place]).  Evidence 
of  actual  notice  to  officers  of  a  cor- 
poration of  the  defective  condition 
of  a  boiler  is,  of  course,  proper  1  Bal- 
lard v.  Hitchcock  Mfg.  Co..  71  Hun, 
582  ;  24  N.  Y.  Sup.  1101).  For  cases 
of  actual  notice,  see  Glossen  v.  Geh- 
man,  147  Pa.  St.  619 ;  23  Atl.  843 
[defendant  personally  knew]  ;  Union 
Stock- Yards  Co.  v.  Larson,  38  Neb. 
492  ;  56  N.  W.  1079  [superintendent 
knew]  ;  Mattise  v.  Consumers'  Ice 
Co.,  46  La.  Ann.  1535  ;  16  So.  400 
[engineer  in  charge  knew].  The 
same  rule  applies  to  the  continuance 
of  negligent  and  dangerous  methods 
of  work  for  a  long  time  (Doing  v. 
N.  Y..  Ontario,  etc.  R.  Co.,  151  N. 
Y.  579.) 


3" 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


L§   195 


danger  incident  thereupon.  He  is  entitled  to  reasonable 
time,  after  notice  of  a  defect,  within  which  to  make  repairs;11 
and  if,  during  that  period,  or  while  he  is  repairing,  an  injury- 
occurs  to  a  servant,  the  question  of  a  master's  negligence 
depends  upon  his  diligence  under  all  the  circumstances.1'  A 
distinction  is  sometimes  made  between  repairs  generally  and 
those  ordinary  repairs,  which  a  machine  rod  or  other  imple- 
ment requires  from  day  to  day:  the  latter  being  held  to  be 
not  within  the  master's  personal  duty.13  This  is  largely  based 
upon  the  superior  knowledge  of  the  servants  and  the  impossi- 
bility of  the  most  careful  master  knowing  when  the  repair  is 
called  for. 


§195.  Limits  of  master's  liabilities  for  instrumentalities.— 
The  master  is  not  required  to  use  more  than  ordinary  care  and 
diligence  (as  already  defined)  for  the  protection  of  his  servants,1 


11  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sloan, 
11  Ind.  App.  401  ;  39  N.  E.  174.  It 
has  been  held  that  a  railroad  com- 
pany is  under  no  obligation  to  its 
servants  to  repair  track  which  be- 
comes unsafe  ;  but  it  must  give  them 
due  and  timely  notice  of  the  injury, 
with  warning  to  keep  off  that  por- 
tion of  the  track,  and  then  may  take 
whatever  time  it  deems  proper  to 
make  the  repairs  (Henry  v.  Lake 
Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Mich.  495 :  fol- 
lowed in  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Morgart,  45  Ark.  318). 

»  Murphy  v.  Crossan,  98  Pa.  St. 
495  [question  for  jury]. 

13  McGee  v.  Boston  Cordage  Co.. 
139  Mass.  445  ;  1  N.  E.  745  [hackling 
pins  supplied  but  not  replaced]  ; 
Johnson  v.  Boston  Towboat  Co.,  135 
Mass.  209  [new  ropes  supplied  but 
not  used]  ;  approved  and  followed 
in  Cregan  v.  Marston,  126  N.  Y. 
568  ;  27  N.  E.  952.  See  Webber  v. 
Piper.  109  N.  Y.  496  ;  17  N.  E.  216. 

1  No  more  than  ordinary  care  is 
required.  The  master  is  not  to  be 
held  as  warranting  the  absolute 
safety,   under  all  circumstances,  or 


the  perfection  in  all  parts  of  the 
machinery  or  apparatus  provided  for 
the  use  of  servants  (Baltimore,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Maekey,  157  XT.  S.  72;  15 
S.  Ct.  491  ;  Soderman  v.  Kemp,  145 
N.  Y.  427:  40  N.  E.  212;  Fenderson 
v.  Atlantic  City  R.  Co.  [Ct.  Errors], 
56  N.  J.  Law,  708  ;  31  Atl.  707  ;  Sul- 
livan v.  N.  Y.,  N.  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  62  Conn.  209  ;  25  Atl.  711  :  Bart 
v.  Naumburg,  123  N.  Y.  641  ;  25  N. 
E.  385  [elevator]  ;  Mancuso  v.  Cata- 
ract Construction  Co.,  87  Hun,  519; 
34  N.  Y.  S.  273  [dynamite  inplaceof 
work];  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Jack- 
son, 85  Va.  489  ;  8  S.  E.  370  ;  Annia- 
ton  Pipe  Works  v.  Dickey,  93  Ala. 
418;  9  So.  720;  Park  BoteJ  Co.  v. 
Lockhart,  59  Ark.  465  ;  2s  S.  \Y.  28  ; 
Eddy  v.  Adams,  Tex.  ;  is  s.  \V. 
490  :  Trinity  Lumber  <  V>.  v.  1  >enham, 
85  Tex.  56;  19  8.  W.  L012;  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  148  III.  605 
N.  E.  1117  ;  Kansas  City,  etc.  1 
v.  Ryan,  52  Kane.  687  ;  85  Pac.  392  ; 

Williams  v.    St.    Louis,   etc.,  R 

119  Mo   816  :  24  s.  W,  782  .  Fosburg 
t.  Phillips  Fuel  Co.,  98  Iowa,  54:  61  N 

W.  400).     Only  reasonable  'are  re 


g  195] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


even  under  circumstances  which  would  entitle  a  passenger  or 
stranger  to  the  use  of  great  or  extreme  care.*  He  is  not  liable 
to  a  servant  for  defects  of  which  he  had  no  notice  and  which 
he  could  not  discover  by  the  use  of  ordinary  care.3     The  mas- 


quired  (Anderson  v.  Michigan  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  107  Mich.  591  :  65  N.  W.  585 ; 
Brymer  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  90 
Cal.  496  ;  27  Pac.  371).  Therefore,  it 
is  error  to  charge  that,  for  the  pro- 
tection  of  employees  in  its  shops,  a 
railroad  company  is  bound  to  have 
its  machinery  "  safe  so  far  as  human 
skill  and  foresight  can  make  it" 
(East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Aiken, 
89  Tenn.  245  ;  14  S.  W.  1082) ;  or  that 
"  it  is  the  duty  of  the  master  to  pro- 
vide safe,  sound  and  suitable  appli- 
ances and  instrumentalities  for  the 
use  of  the  servant,  and  to  provide 
generally  for  his  safety  in  the  course 
of  the  employment,  and  to  use 
proper  diligence  to  avoid  exposing 
the  servant  to  extraordinary  risk." 
(Bertha  Zinc  Co.  v.  Martin,  93  Va. 
791;  22S.  E.  869). 

s  Although  a  railroad  company  is 
bound  to  use  the  highest  degree  of 
care  to  keep  its  track  and  machinery 
in  safe  condition  for  the  protection 
of  its  passengers,  it  is  error  to  charge 
that  it  is  bound  to  use  the  same 
degree  of  care  for  that  purpose  for 
the  protection  of  its  servants  (Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  148  111.  605  ; 
35  N.  E.  1117).  The  master  discharges 
his  duty  by  applying  ordinary  tests, 
and  is  not  bound  to  employ  experts 
or  apply  the  highest  tests  (Clyde  v. 
Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65  Fed.  482). 
See  note  11,  post. 

3  Unless  the  alleged  defect  was  or 
ought  to  have  been  known  to  the 
master,  no  recovery  can  be  had  (De- 
Graff  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
76  N.  Y.  125  [defective  brake-chain]  ; 
Feltham  v.  England,  L.  R.  3  Q.  B. 
83  [defective  tramway]  :  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Piatt,  89  111.  141  ;  East 


St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hightower, 
92  Id.    139  ;  Ballou  v.   Chicago,  etc. 
R.    Co.,    54    Wise.    257;    Hobbs   v. 
Stauer,  63  Id.  108  ;  Atchison,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.Ledbetter,  34  Kans.326  [switch- 
man injured  by  defective  draw-bar]  ; 
Baldwin  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  68 
Iowa,  37  ;  25  N.  VV.  918  [fall  of  lum- 
ber pile,  properly  constructed  origi- 
nally, but  weakened  by  the  cutting 
of  cross  strips]  ;  Johnson    v.   Chesa- 
peake, etc.  R.  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  73  :  14 
S.  E.  432  [car  coupling]  ;  Dunlap  v. 
Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  81  Ga.   136; 
7  S.  E.  283  [railroad  track]  ;  Georgia 
R.  Co.  v.  Nelms,  83  Ga.  70  ;  9  S.  E. 
1049    [latent     defect    in    hammer]  ; 
Hooper  v   Snead  Iron  Works,  [Ky.]  ; 
14     S.     W.     542;     Louisville,     etc. 
R.    Co.    v.    Hinder,    [Ky.]  ;    30    S. 
W.   399   [invisible  defect]  ;  Sack   v. 
Dolese,  137  111.  129  ;  27  N.  E.  62  [for- 
eign car]  ;  Doyle  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  42  Minn.  79  ;  4:J  N.  W.  787  [rail- 
road track]  ;  Allen  v.  Union  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  7  Utah,  239  ;  26  Pac.  297  [cars] ; 
Moran  v.  Racine  Wagon  Co.,  74  Hun, 
454  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  852  [elevator]). 
It  must  be  shown  that  the  master 
knew  of  the  defect,  or  that  it  was  of 
such  a  nature  or  had  existed  for  such 
a  time  that  defendant  ought  to  have 
discovered  it(Carruthers  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  55Kans.  600;  40  Pac.  915). 
The  company  is  not  chargeable  with 
negligence   unless  it  is  shown  that 
the  defect  in  the  track  had  existed 
long  enough    to    be  discovered  by 
careful  inspection,  and  had  not  been 
repaired  (Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Webb,  97  Ala.  157.  11  So.  888).     A 
brakeman  cannot  recover  for  injur- 
ies caused  by  a  pile  of  ashes  wrong- 
fully   dumped    by    a    fireman    and 


3^3 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§   195 


ter  is  not  bound  to  provide  the  very  best  materials,  imple- 
ments or  accommodations  which  can  be  procured,4  nor  those 
which  are  absolutely  the  most  convenient  or  most  safe.5  His 
duty  is  sufficiently  discharged  by  providing  those  which  are 
reasonably  safe  and  fit.6     Still  less  is  he  bound  to  furnish  every 


negligently  left  there  by  section- 
men,  without  proof  of  actual  or 
constructive  notice  to  the  railroad 
company  (Loranger  v.  Lake  Shore, 
etc  R.  Co.,  104  Mich.  80;  62  N.  W. 
137). 

4 Kern  v.  De  Castro  Eef'g  Co.,  125 
N.  Y.  50  ;  25  N.  E.  1071  [elevator]  ; 
Bajus  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co.,  103 
N.  Y.  312  ;  Burke  v.  Witherbee,  98 
Id.  562  ;  Bertha  Zinc  Co.  v.  Martin, 
93  Ya.  791  ;  22  S.  E.  869.  Railroad 
companies  are  not  "  bound  to  pro- 
cure the  best "  machinery  and  ap- 
pliances (Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
McCormick,  74  Ind.  440  ;  Umback 
v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  83  Id.  191; 
Lyttle  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84 
Mich.  289  ;  47  N.  W.  571 ;  Smith  v. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  69  Mo.  32). 

5  Jones  v.  Granite  Mills,  126  Mass. 
84  [tire  escape]  ;  Payne  v.  Reese, 
100  Pa.  St.  301  [question  held  one 
for  jury]  ;  Cagney  v.  Hannibal, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  69  Mo.  416  [shaping- 
machine,  without  guard  or  fender]  ; 
Sappenfield  v.  Main  St.  R.  Co., 
91  Cal.  48;  27  Pac.  590;  Pierce  v. 
Atlanta  Cotton  Mills,  79  Ga.  782 ;  4 
S.  E.  381;  Friel  v.  Citizens'  R.  Co., 
115  Mo.  503  ;  22  S.  W.  498  ;  Nutt  v. 
Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  25  Oreg.  291; 
35  Pac.  653  ;  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lewis,  24  Neb.  848;  40  N.  W.  401; 
McGinnis  v.  Canada  So.  Bridge  Co., 
49  Mich.  466  ;  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  McCormick,  74  Ind.  440  [three 
unblocked  "frog*'  cases];  Phila- 
delphia, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Keenan.  108 
Pa.  St.  124  [pushinjr-pole,  used  for 
shifting  cars  in  making  up  trains, 
which  lacked  a  handle];  Western, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bishop,  50  Ga.  465;  and 


Burns  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  69 
Iowa,  450  [car-coupling  not  of  the 
most  approved  kind];  Wonder  v. 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Md.  411 
[car-brake  having  a  hook  instead  of 
an  eye-bolt,  the  point  of  the  hook 
turned  in  wrong  direction].  A 
master  is  not  liable  to  a  servant  for 
injuries  sustained  through  the  use  of 
machinery,  merely  on  the  ground  of 
failing  to  discard  a  machine  or  a 
part  of  a  machine,  and  supply  its 
place  with  something  safer  (Sweeney 
v.  Berlin,  etc.  Envelope  Co.,  101  N. 
Y.  520;  5  N.  E.  35S).  It  is  not 
negligence  per  se  to  adopt  a  device 
for  coupling  cars,  not  before  in 
use  on  road,  without  discarding 
those  already  in  use,  although  the 
use  of  the  two  together  may  be 
more  hazardous  than  the  use  of 
either  alone  (Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Henly,  48  Ohio  St.  608  ;  29  X.  E. 
575).  The  use  of  cars  of  unequal 
height  and  mismatched  couplings 
is  not  negligence  per  se  (Norfolk, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  91  Va.  668  ;  22 
S.  E.  496).  Only  defect  in  a  car 
was  a  slight  straightening  of  one 
hook,  not  enough  to  allow  (he  car 
to  dump  when  fastened.  Held,  that 
a  verdict  for  plaintiff  was  not  justi- 
fied (Soderman  v.  Kemp,  1  15  N,  V. 
457;  40  X.  E.  212). 

6  A  master  is  not  hound  to  furnish 
the  besl  known  appliances  for  the 
work,  hut  only  such  a-,  arc  reason- 
ably tit  and  safe  ( I [arley  v.  Buffalo 
Car  Ml--  Co.,  142  N.  V.  81  j  86  N.  E. 
813  ;  Stringham  v.  Hilton,  111  N  A'. 
188;  18  N,  E.  870  [elevator]  :  Benfleld 
v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.,  76  Hun  209;  87 
N.  Y.  Sujip.   16  [no  light  proi  Ided 


§  195] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


3H 


now  improvement  or  invention;7  but  he  may  wait,  even  where 
a  question  of  safety  is  involved,  until  an  alleged  improvement 
has  been  tested  and  has  come  into  somewhat  general  use.8 
( >nly  such  appliances,  safeguards  and  tests  as  are  usual  can  be 
required.9  Materials,  implements  and  appliances,  so  long  as 
not  dangerous  generally,  need  not  be  better  in  quality  or  con- 
dition than  is  required  by  the  purpose  for  which  they  are 
intended.10  A  master  who  purchases  materials,  etc.,  for  the 
use  of  his  servants  is  not  required  to  apply  to  them  such  tests 


near  tank  of  explosive  oil] ) .  The 
master's  duty  does  not  require  him 
to  provide  machinery  similar  to  that 
used  in  other  establishments,  though 
less  dangerous  than  that  tised  by  him, 
but  merely  to  furnish  proper  and 
suitable  machinery,  which  is  to  be 
determined  by  its  actual  condition, 
and  not  by  comparing  it  with  ma- 
chines used  by  other  establishments 
for  similar  work  (Wood  v.  Heiges, 
83  Md.  257  ;  34  Atl.  872). 

7  France  v.  Rome,  etc.  Co.,  88  Hun, 
318  ;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  408  [hand-brakes 
when  air-brakes  were  not  general]  ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Armstrong, 
62  111.  App.  228.  See  Steinweg  v. 
Erie  R.  Co.,  43  N.  Y.  123.  In  Con- 
way v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  (50  Iowa, 
4651,  the  company  was  held  not  li- 
able to  a  brakeman  for  not  using  the 
crooked  link  which  was  a  better  ap- 
pliance for  coupling  cars  of  different 
heights  than  the  one  actually  in  use. 
A  company  is  not  bound  to  change 
machinery  and  appliances  which  are 
safe,  for  a  newer  and  yet  safer  ap- 
pliance (Bradley  v.  Nashville,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  14  Lea  [Tenn.],  374)  ;  and  the 
jury  must  consider  that  the  new  in- 
vention, while  guarding  against  one 
danger,  might  introduce  new  ones 
(Chicago  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Few,  15 
Bradwell,  125). 

8  Delaware  Iron  Works  v.  Nuttall, 
119  Pa.  St.  149;  13  Atl.  65;  Norfolk 
&  W.  R.  Cc.  v.  Jackson's  Adm'r,  85 
Va.  489;  8  S.  E.  370. 


9  Augerstein  v.  Jones,  139  Pa.  St. 
183  ;  21  Atl.  24  [emery  stone]  ;  Mackin 
v.  Alaska  Refrigerator  Co.,  100  Mich. 
276;  58  N.W.  999  [screen  over  planer] ; 
Coal  Creek  Min.  Co.  v.  Davis,  90 
Tenn.  711  ;  18  S.  W.  387  [wooden 
buildings  at  coal  mine] ;  Grant  v. 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  45  Fed.  673  [lights 
on  switches].  The  master  has  abso- 
lute discretion  to  select  any  method 
in  general  use,  according  to  his  own 
judgment  (Kehler  v.  Schwenk,  144 
Pa.  St.  348;  22  Atl.  910).  Even  as 
to  these,  there  may  be  question 
(Rooney  v.  Sewall  etc.  Cordage  Co., 
161  Mass.  153  ;  36  N.  E.  789).  Defend- 
ant's liability  could  not  be  tested  by 
comparing  its  appliances  with  the 
similar  appliances  of  five  other  rail- 
road companies  (Richmond,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Weems,  97  Ala.  270;  12  So. 
186) .  A  test  impracticable  and  never 
employed,  cannot  be  left  to  the  jury 
(Atz  v.  Newark  Lime  Co.,  59  N.  J. 
Law,  41;  34  Atl.  980). 

10  Hickey  v.  Taaffe,  105  N.  Y.  26  ; 
12  N.  E.  286.  Thus  a  freight  eleva- 
tor need  not  be  made  safe  for  passen- 
gers (Kern  v.  De  Castro  Sugar  Co., 
125  N.  Y.  50  ;  25  N.  E.  1071).  Worn 
brakes  are  good  enough,  if  they  hold 
effectively  (Smith  v.  N.  Y.  Centra] 
R.  Co.,  118  N.  Y.  645 ;  23  N.  E.  990  ; 
East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 93  Ga.  570  ;  20  S.  E.  70  [cross 
ties];  s.  p.,  Graham  v.  Chicago,  St. 
Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62  Fed.  896). 


3i5 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  195 


as  are  appropriate  only  to  the  process  of  manufacture.11  The 
master  performs  his  whole  duty  by  using  as  much  care  in  fur- 
nishing  instrumentalities  for  the  use  of  his  servants  as  a  man 
of  ordinary  prudence,  in  the  same  line  of  business,  acting  with 
a  prudent  regard  to  his  own  safety,  would  use  in  supplying 
similar  things  for  himself,  if  he  were  doing  the  work.12  He  is 
not  in  fault  without  proof  of  notice  of  the  defect ; 13  nor,  as  to 
repairs  and  replacements,  until  he  has  had  a  reasonable  time, 
after  actual  or  constructive  notice,  to  perform  his  duty.14  The 
master  is  not  expected  to  stand  over  each  servant  every 
moment,  to  discover  instantly  a  defect  in  good  materials  and 
tools,  caused  by  their  careless  use.15  Nor  is  he  bound  to  keep 
such  a  close  watch  over  the  details  of  the  work,  as  to  enable 
him  to  repair  every  deterioration  in  instrumentalities  of  work, 
resulting  from  a  servant's  use  thereof,  as  soon   as  it   occurs.16 


11 A  master  is  not  bound  to 
apply  to  iron  girders,  which  he  pur- 
chases from  others,  such  tests  as  are 
usually  applied  in  course  of  manu- 
facture (Carlson  v.  Phenix  Bridge 
Co..  132  N.  Y.  273;  30  N.  E.  750; 
Roughan  v.  Boston,  etc.  Block  Co., 
161  Mass.  24  ;  36  N.  E.  461  ;  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Campbell,  97 
Ala.  147 ;  12  So.  574  [brake-rods]  ; 
Breen  v.  St.  Louis  Cooperage  Co. ,  50 
Mo.  App.  202  [shaft]  ;  Clyde  v. 
Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65  Fed.  482  ; 
Ballard  v.  Hitchcock  Mfg.  Co.,  51 
Hun,  188  ;  4N.  Y.  Supp.  940  [boiler]; 
s.  p.,  Prentice  v.  Wellsville,  66  Hun, 
634  ;  21  N.  Y.  Supp.  820  [explosives]; 
Shea  v.  Wellington,  163  Mass.  364  ; 
40  N.  E.  173  [explosives]). 

'••'Marsh  v.  Chickering,  101  N.  Y. 
396 ;  5  N.  E.  56  ;  Ford  v.  Lyons,  41 
Hun,  512. 

13  See  note  3,  supra. 

14  Knowledge  by  a  master  of  the 
defective  condition  of  machinery 
does  not  make  him  liable  for  injuries 
resulting  therefrom  to  one  of  his 
servants,  unless  he  had  a  reasonable 
opportunity,  after  acquiring  such 
knowledge,  to    remedy   the  defect 

Seaboard  M'f'g  Co.  v.  Woodson,  94 


Ala.  143 ;  10  So.  87 ;  11  So.  733).  See 
Miller  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90 
Mich.  230  ;  51  N.  W.  370.  The  cases 
in  which  masters  have  been  ex- 
empted from  liability  for  places  or 
implements,  suddenly  made  unsafe 
by  the  fault  of  a  co-servant,  really 
depend  upon  this  rule.  Of  such  are 
Fenderson  v.  Atlantic  City  R.  Co. 
[Ct.  Errors],  56  N.  J.  Law,  708  ;  31 
Atl.  767;  Filbert  v.  Delaware,  etc. 
Canal  Co.,  121  N.  Y.  207;  23  X.  E. 
1104;  Anthony  v.  Leeret,  105  X.  V. 
591  ;  12  N.  E.  561  (trapdoor  left 
open]  ;  Pawling  v.  Hoskins,  132  Pa. 
St.  617  ;  19  Atl.  301  [same]. 

15  Jennings  v.  Iron  Bay  Co.,  17 
Minn.  Ill  ;  49  N.  W.  685  [planks  out 
of  position]  ;  Donnelly  v.  Brown,  13 
Hun,  470  [ladder  not  secured]. 

16  It  is  not  the  master's  duty  to  re- 
pair defects  arising  in  thr  daily  use 
of  the  appliance,  for  which  proper 
and  suitable  materials  an-  supplied 
and  which  may  easily  l»'  remedied 
by  tlic  workmen,  and  are  aol  <>f  a 
permanent    character  or    requiring 

the  help  of  skilled  1 ihanics    (Cre- 

gan  v.  Marston,  L36  N.  Y.  668;  27 
N.  E.  952  [rope  breaking] ). 


§i95] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTKKS    TO    SERVANTS. 


16 


He  is  not  bound  to  keep  the  place  of  work  constantly  safe, 
when  the  servant's  work,  in  its  very  nature,  renders  the  place 
for  the  time  unsafe,17  nor  when  the  very  work  which  the 
servant  is  employed  to  do  is  to  make  a  dangerous  place 
safe.18  A  master  who  has  provided  an  ample  supply  of 
proper  appliances,  ready  at  hand,  is  not  necessarily  respon- 
sible to  a  servant  for  the  neglect  of  a  fellow-servant  to  use 
such  appliances.19  The  adjustment  and  adaptation  of  imple- 
ments to  the  work  in  hand,  according  to  its  varying  needs, 
belong  to  the  sphere  of  servants,  not  of  masters ;  and,  there- 
fore, a  servant's  negligence  in  these  matters  to  the  injury  of 
a  fellow-servant  is  not  presumably  imputable  to  the  master.20 


11  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson,  12 
C.  C.  A.  507  ;  65  Fed.  48. 

18  Finlayson  v.  Utica  Mining  Co., 
14  C.  C  A.  492  ;  67  Fed.  507  [mining]  ; 
Grant  v.  Varney,  21  Colo.  329;  40  Pac. 
771  [same]  ;  Clark  v.  Liston,  54  111. 
App.  578  [tearing  down  building]  ; 
Collins  v.  Crimmins,  11  Misc.  24;  31 
N.  Y.  Supp.  860  [digging  trench]. 

19  Thyng  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  156 
Mass.  13 ;  30  N.  E.  160  [defective 
coupling  pin  used  when  good  ones 
at  hand]  ;  Cregan  v.  Marston,  126  N. 
Y.  568  ;  27  N.  E.  952  [rope]  :  Pres- 
cott  v.  Ball  Engine  Co.,  176  Pa.  St. 
459;  35  Atl.  224  [ropes]  ;  Webber  v. 
Piper,  109  N.  Y.  496  ;  17  N.  E.  216 
[saw]  ;  Harley  v.  Buffalo  Car  Mfg 
Co.,  142  N.  Y.  31  ;  36  N.  E.  813 
[ample  supply,  not  enough  used], 
s.  p.,  Kaare  v.  Troy  Steel  Co.,  139  N. 
Y.  369  ;  34  N.  E.  901  [torches  on 
hand]  ;  Ross  v.  Walker,  139  Pa.  St. 
42  ;  21  Atl.  157  [material  for  scaf- 
fold] ;  Kehoe  v.  Allen,  92  Mich.  464  ; 
52  N.  AY.  740  [flasks  for  molds]  ;  Van 
DenHeuvelv.  National  Furnace  Co., 
84  Wise.  636  ;  54  N.  W.  1016  [planks]  ; 
Hefferen  v.  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co., 
45  Minn.  471  ;  48  N.  W.  526  [tools]  ; 
Fraser  v.  lied  River  Lumber  Co.,  45 
Minn.  235  ;  47  N.  W.  785  [planks]  ; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Petty,  67 
Miss.  255  ;  7  So.  351  [sand  in  engine]  ; 


Moran  v.  Brown,  27  Mo.  App.  487 
[axe  handle];  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co. v. 
Brown,  20  C.  C.  A.  147;  73  Fed.  970; 
and  see  Railroad  Co.  v.  Keegan,  160 
U.  S.  259  ;  16  S.  Ct.  269  ;  Railroad 
Co.  v.  Peterson,  162  U.  S.  346;  16 
S.  Ct.  843  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Charless, 
162  U.  S.  359;  16  S.  Ct.  848.  No 
action  against  a  master  for  in- 
juries caused  by  a  defective  tool  will 
lie  where  the  employee  injured  could 
have  obtained  a  proper  one  at  any 
time  (Allen  v.  Smith  Iron  Co.,  160 
Mass.  557  ;  36  N.  E.  581).  But  where, 
in  an  action  for  injuries  caused  by 
the  falling  of  a  scaffold  from  the 
breaking  of  a  ledger  board,  there  is 
evidence  that  the  wood  provided  by 
defendant  for  ledger  boards  was  un- 
suitable, the  question  of  whether 
defendant  used  due  care  in  furnish- 
ing materials  was  for  the  jury, 
though  there  was  evidence  that  the 
carpenters  who  built  the  scaffold 
were  careless  in  selecting  the  piece 
of  board  which  broke  (Twomey  v. 
Swift,  163  Mass.  273;  39  N.  E.  1018). 
20 Hudson  v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  110 
N.  Y.  625;  17  N.  E.  342  [slipping 
skid]  ;  McGinty  v.  Athol  Reservoir 
Co.,  155  Mass.  183;  29  N.  E.  510  [set- 
ting up  derrick]  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Needham,  11  C.  C.  A.  56; 
63     Fed.     107    [operating    switch] . 


3*7 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  195 


Thus  the  manner  in  which  cars  are  loaded  is  a  detail  of 
servants'  work;  and  the  master  is  not  held  to  as  strict  respon- 
sibility for  the  condition  of  the  car,  when  loaded,  as  when  not 
loaded.21  An  important  distinction  is  taken  between  instru- 
mentalities which  the  master  undertakes  to  furnish  for  the  ser- 
vants' use  and  those  which  he  employs  the  servants  to  furnish 
for  themselves  and  their  fellow-servants  in  the  same  work. 
Negligence  in  making  the  former  is  the  master's  negli- 
gence,22 but  negligence  about  the  latter  is  the  negligence 
of  a  fellow-servant.23  This  is  illustrated  in  the  well-known 
series  of  "  scaffold  cases."  If  a  servant  is  engaged  to  work 
upon  a  scaffold  or  platform,  ready  made,  the  master  is  held 
responsible  for  personal  care  to  make  it  a  safe  place  on  which 
to  work.24     But  if  a  number  of  associated  servants  are  employed 


Miller  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  20 
Oreg.  285  ;  26  Pac.  70  [same]  ;  Kennj 
v.  Cunard  Steamship  Co.,  55  N.  Y. 
Super.  Ct.  558  [tightening  chain]  ; 
Eieheler  v.  St.  Paul  Furniture  Co., 
40  Minn.  263  ;  41  N.  W.  975  ;  [ad- 
justing machinery]  ;  Weeklund  v. 
Southern  Oregon  Co.,  20  Oreg. 
591  ;  27  Pac.  260  [rollers  in  saw-mill]. 
'•'Ford  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
117  N.  Y.  638 ;  22  N.  E.  946  ;  Byrnes 
v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  II.  Co.,  113 
N.  Y.  251 ;  21  N.  E.  50  ;  Hanley  v. 
Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.,  62  N.  H.  274  ; 
Jarman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  98 
Mich.  135  ;  57  N.  W.  32  ;  Dewey  v. 
Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  97  Mich.  329; 
56  N.  W.  756.      But  the  failure  of  a 


Law,  400  ;  31  Atl.  619 ;  Cadden  v. 
American  Steel-Barge  Co.,  88  Wise. 
409  ;  60  N.  W.  800  [scaffold] ;  Sims  v. 
Am.  Steel-Barge  Co.,  56  Minn.  68; 
57  N.  W.  322. 

23  The  rule  that  a  master  is  bound 
to  furnish  safe  appliances,  and  can- 
not escape  liability  for  failure  to  do 
so  by  intrusting  the  duty  to  a  serv- 
ant, by  whose  negligence  a  fellow- 
servant  is  injured,  does  not  apply 
where  several  persons  are  employed 
to  do  certain  work,  and  by  the  con- 
tract of  employment,  express  or 
implied,  they  are  to  adjust  the  ap- 
pliances by  which  the  work  is  to  be 
done  (Burns  v.  Sennett,  09  Cal.  363  ; 
33  Pac.  916  ;  Lindvall  v.  Woods,  41 


railroad  company  to  properly  secure  Minn.   212  ;  42  N.  W.  1020  [trestle]  ; 

lumber  loaded  on  a  car  for  trans-  s.  P.,  Jones  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Packet 

portation,  in  consequence  of  which  Co. ,  43  Mo.  App.  398  ;  Weeklund  v. 

a  trainman  on  another  train  is  in-  Southern  Oregon  Co.,  20  Oreg.  591; 

jured,  is  negligence   for  which  the  27  Pac.   260  [chute  for  saw-mill]). 

company  is  liable  to  the  injured  em-  This  distinction  is  approved  in  Inge- 

ployee  (Ryan  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  bregtsen  v.  Nord  D.  Lloyd  S.  S.  Co., 


Co.,  88  Hun,  269;  34   N.   Y.    Supp. 
665  . 

•  .Manning  v.  Hogan,  78  N.  Y.  615  ; 
Grant  v.  Varney,  21  Colo.  329  ;  40 
Pac.  771  [mine],  and  cases  cited  in  Arkerson  v.  Dennison,  117  Mass. 
note  24 ;  Ingebregtsen  v.  Nord  D.  407  ;  Sims  v.  Am.  Steel-Barge  Co., 
Lloyd  SS.  Co.  [Ct.  Errors],  57  N.  J.     56  Minn.  68  ;  57  N.  W.  322  ;  Cadden 


supra  ;     citing     Collyer    v.     Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.,  49  N.  J.  Law,  59  ;  6 
Atl.  4:57. 
84  Manning  v.  Hogan,  78  N.  Y.  615  ; 


§195] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


3IS 


to  make  the  scaffold  or  other  standing  place,  as  well  as  to  use 
it  when  made,  the  master  is  no  further  responsible  for  negli- 
gence in  its  making  than  he  is  for  negligence  in  work  done 
upon  it,  when  made.25  The  use  of  dangerous  machinery  is  not 
necessarily  negligence;26  nor  is  the  lack  of  guards  or  covers 
thereto,  in  the  absence  of  proof  that  such  protection  was 
reasonably  practicable.27  It  has  already  been  stated  (§  185) 
that  a  servant,  who  knows  or  ought  to  know  that  the  very 
things  upon  or  with  which  he  voluntarily  agrees  to  work  are 
defective  or  dangerous,  assumes  the  risk.  The  neglect  of  his 
fellow-servants  to  use  proper  care  in  using  such  things,  so  as 
to  protect  him  from  such  risks,  is  not  chargeable  to  the  master.28 


v.  American  Steel-Barge  Co.,  88 
Wise.  409  ;  60  N.  W.  800.  A  master 
who  employs  men  to  work  upon  a 
scaffold,  ready-made,  is  responsible 
for  defects  in  it  (McNamara  v.  Mac- 
Donough,  102  Cal.  575  ;  36  Pac.  941  ; 
Bowen  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  95 
Mo.  277;  8  N.  W.  230;  Solarz  v. 
Manhattan  R.  Co.,  31  Abb.  N.  C. 
426  :  8  Misc.  653  ;  29  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1123  ;  Rice,  etc.  Malting  Co.  v.  Paul- 
sen, 51  111.  App.  123. 

"Hogau  v.  Smith,  125  N.  Yr.  774  ; 
26  N.  E.  742  [staging  on  vessel]  ;  Jud- 
son  v.  Oleun,  22  N.  E.  555;  s.  C., 
without  opinion,  116  X.  Y.  055  ;  But- 
ler v.  Townsend,  126  N.  Y.  105  ;  26 
N.  E.  1017  [decided  by  a  bare  major- 
ity]: followed  in  Marsh  v.  Herman,  47 
Minn.  537  ;  50  N.  W.  611  [scaffold]  ; 
Noyes  v.  Wood,  102  Cal.  3S9  ;  36  Pac. 
766;  Beesley  v. Wheeler  Co.,  103  Mich. 
196 ;  01  N.  W.  658  ;  s.  P. ,  Benn  v. 
Null,  65  Iowa,  407  ;  21  N.  W.  700  ; 
Killea  v.  Foxon,  125  Mass.  485  ;  Hoar 
v.  Merritt,  62  Mich.  386  ;  29  N.  W. 
15;  applied  to  roof  of  mine  (Petaja 
v.  Aurora  Mining  Co.,  Mich.,  64  N. 
W.  335  ;  66  Id.  951  ;  Consol.  Min.  Co. 
v.  Clay,  51  Ohio  St.  542  ;  38  N.  E. 
610) ;  to  construction  of  frame  work 


of  windmill,  when  all  given  out  as 
one  job  (Peschel  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  62  Wise.  338  ;  21  N.  W.  269). 

86  Lafflin  v  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co., 
106  N.  Y.136;  12  N.  E.  599. 

87  McGuerty  v.  Hale,  161  Mass.  51  ; 
36  N.  E.  682 ;  Young  v.  Burlington 
Mattress  Co.,  79  Iowa,  415  ;  44  N.  W. 
693  ;  Carroll  v.  Williston,  44  Minn. 
287  ;  46  N.  W.  352  ;  French  v.  Aulls, 
72  Hun,  442  ;  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  188. 
A  mill  owner  is  not  liable  for  injury 
to  an  employee  in  operating  a  saw, 
because  of  the  absence  of  a  guard  : 
the  machine,  which  was  one  of  the 
best  make,  and  in  good  condition, 
not  being  constructed  with  a  view  to 
having  such  guard  (Arizona  Lum- 
ber Co.  v.  Mooney,  Ariz.  ;  42 
Pac.  952). 

28  Where  plaintiff  was  employed  to 
aid  in  taking  defective  cars  from 
trains,  the  neglect  of  the  customary 
precaution  of  chaining  or  propping 
a  defective  draw-head  in  such  a  car, 
whereby  plaintiff  was  injured,  if  not 
chargeable  in  some  degree  to  plain- 
tiff, was  the  neglect  of  his  co-serv- 
ants, and  not  that  of  the  master 
(Arnold  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
125  N.  Y.  15  ;  25  N.  E.  1064). 


319 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§196 


As  in  all  other  cases,  the  master's  negligence  involves  no  lia- 
bility, if  it  is  not  a  proximate  cause  of  the  injury.29 

§  196.  Master's  duty  as  to  instrumentalities  not  his  own 
property.—  The  duty  of  the  master  to  inspect  the  materials, 
machinery,  etc.,  used  by  his  servants,  in  the  course  of  his  busi- 
ness, extends  not  only  to  those  things  which  are  his  property 
or  are  directly  furnished  by  him,  but  also  equally  to  all  things 
which  it  becomes  the  duty  of  his  servants  to  use,  in  the  course 
of  their  employment.  Thus,  where  a  railroad  company  requires 
its  servants  to  handle  cars  not  belonging  to  it,1  or  to  run  trains 


29  Hope  v.  Fall  Brook  Coal  Co.,  3 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  70  ;  38  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1040.  A  brakeinari  having  his  hand 
crushed  in  coupling  cars,  cannot  re- 
cover on  the  ground  that  the  draught 
irons  on  the  two  cars  were  at  differ- 
ent heights,  when  there  is  no  evi- 
dence that  this  fact  contributed  to 
produce  the  accident  (Kruse  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  82  Wise.  568;  52 
N.  W.  755).  The  fact  that  a  stop 
block  at  the  end  of  a  trestle  was  de- 
fective, will  not  render  the  company 
liable  for  the  death  of  an  engineer 
who  ran  his  engine  off  the  end  of  the 
trestle,  where  the  accident  was 
caused  by  running  the  engine  at 
such  a  speed  that  no  block  would 
have  been  effective  (Louisville  &  N. 
R.  Co.  v.  Stutts,  105  Ala.  368 ;  17  So. 
29).  As  the  injury  was  due  pri- 
marily to  the  slipping  of  the  shipper 
out  of  the  servant's  hand,  and  a  catch 
(the  absence  of  which  was  alone 
complained  of)  would  not  have  pre- 
vented this,  the  defendant  was  not 
liable  (Sullivan  v.  Wamsutta  Mills, 
155  Mass.  200;  29  N.  E.  516). 

1  A  railroad  company  is  under  a 
legal  duty  not  to  expose  its  employees 


brake]  ;  Goodrich  v.  X.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  116  N.  Y.  398  ;  22  N.  E.  397  ; 
Spaulding  v.  Flynt  Granite  Co.,  159 
Mass.  587  ;  34  X.  E.  1134  ;  Elkins  v. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.,  171  Pa.  St.  121  ; 
33  Atl.  74  ;  Mason  v.  Richmond,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  482  ;  16  S.  E.  698  ; 
Joliet,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Velie,  140  111.  59 ; 
26  N.  E.  1086  ;  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co. 
v.  Smithson,  45  Mich.  212  ;  Interna- 
tional R.  Co.  v.  Kernan,  78  Tex.  294  ; 
14  S.  W.  668  ;  Bomar  v.  Louisiana, 
etc.  R  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  983,  1206  ; 
8  So.  478  ;  9  So.  244 ;  Mateer  v.  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.,  105  Mo.  320  ;  16 
S.  W.  839  ;  15  S.  W.  970  ;  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Barber,  44  Kans.  612  ; 
24  Pac.  969  [foreign  cars  used  on 
line]  ;  Atchinson,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Pen- 
fold,  57  Kans.  148;  45  Pac.  574).  See 
also  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Avery, 
109  111.  314.  So,  under  Mass.  Stat. 
1887  (Bowers  v.  Connecticut  River 
R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  312  ;  38  N.  E.  508). 
The  rule  is  the  same  where,  by 
statute,  railroads  are  compelled  to 
receive  and  transport  cars,  of  a  con- 
necting road,  without  delay  or  dis- 
crimination, for  they  are  not  obliged 
to  move  such  cars  when  not  provided 


to  dangers  arising  from  such  defects    with  the  appliances  which  ordinary 


in  foreign  cars  ;is  may  he  discovered 
by  reasonable  inspection  before  such 
cars  are  admitted  into  its  train  (Bal- 
timore, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mackey,  157 
U.  S.   72 ;    15   S.  Ct.   491    [defective 


care  requires  (Dooner  v.  Delaware, 
etc.  Canal  Co.,  164  Pa.  St.  17  ;  30  Atl. 
269;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 95  Ky  199;  24  S.W.I).  So 
as  to  anything  near  enough  to  the 


§  197] 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


32O 


over  a  track  belonging  to  another  company,2  it  is  liable  to  them 
for  such  defects  in  these  things  as  could  be  discovered  by  ordi- 
nary care  in  inspection.  But  the  mere  fact  of  such  "  foreign  " 
materials  being  different  from  those  used  by  the  master  is  not 
necessarily  a  "  defect,"  especially  in  the  case  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany  receiving  from  another  company  cars  of  a  pattern  differ- 
ent from  its  own.3  If  such  differences  are  a  cause  of  danger, 
servants  unfamiliar  with  them  are  entitled  to  warning.4  But 
where  a  servant,  without  authority,  uses  the  property  of  a 
stranger,  even  in  good  faith,  for  t\\<*  benefit  of  his  master,  he 
does  so  entirely  at  his  own  risk.5 

§  197.    Illustrations  of  liability  for  instrumentalities. — 

Thus,  the  master  has  been  held  liable  for  injuries  suffered  by 
his  servants  from  defects  in  ropes,1  ladders,2  derricks,3  shafts  of 

place  of  work  to  make  it  dangerous 
(Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Cagle, 
53  Ark.  347 ;  14  S.  W.  89).  But  rail- 
road companies  have  a  right  to  pre- 
sume that  cars  delivered  to  them  by- 
connecting  lines  are  in  proper  condi- 
ion  (Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Dud- 
ley, 90  Va.  304  ;  18  S.  E.  274).  And 
masters  are  not  liable  for  injuries 
caused  by  defects  in  foreign  cars  of 
which  they  are  justifiably  ignorant 
(McMullen  v.  Carnegie  Bros.  &  Co., 
158  Pa.  St.  518 ;  27  Atl.  1043).  A 
railroad  company  is  not  responsible 
to  its  switchman  for  injuries  caused 
by  defects  in  a  foreign  car,  if  it  has 
warned  him  of  its  defects  (Atchison, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Myers,  11  C.  C  A.  439  ; 
63  Fed.  793).  As  to  defective  loading 
of  foreign  cars,  compare  Dewey  v. 
Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Mich.,  52  N.  W. 
942  [company  liable]  ;  Mexican  Cent. 
R.  Co.  v.  Shean,  Tex.,  18  S.  W.  151 
[not  liable]. 

2Stetler  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  46 
Wise.  497  ;  S.  c.,  again,  49  Wise.  609. 
A  railroad  company  is  not  guilty 
of  negligence  in  receiving  into  its 
yards  and  passing  over  its  lines  cars 
different  from  those  owned  by  itself 
(Kohn  v.  McNulta,  147  U  S.  238  ;  13 
S.  Ct.  298  [unusual  "bumpers"]); 
especially    where    the     receipt    of 


freight  cars  is  compulsory  by  law 
(Thomas  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  109 
Mo.  187;  18  S.  W.  980). 

4  Reynolds  v.  Boston  &  Me.  R.  Co., 
64  Vt.  66  ;  24  Atl.  134. 

5  An  employee  of  a  telegraph  com- 
pany, who,  in  climbing  a  pole  belong- 
ing to  another  company,  to  get  wires 
out  of  the  way,  was  injured  by  rea- 
son of  defects  in  the  pole,  could  not 
recover  from  his  employer  (Dixon  v. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.  [C.  C]  68 
Fed.  630). 

1  Baker  v.  Allegheny,  etc.  R.  Co., 
95  Pa.  St.  211  [rotten,  though  ap- 
parently sound,  rope  on  derrick]  ; 
Warden  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  137 
Mass.  204  [worn-out  rope]  ;  Perry  v. 
Ricketts,  55  111.  234  [insecure  rope 
used  for  lowering  into  coal  mine]  ; 
Lund  v.  Hersey  Lumber  Co.,  41  Fed. 
202. 

2  Burns  v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  84  Ga. 
709;  11  S.  E.  493  [missing  step]; 
Denning  v.  Gould,  157  Mass.  563  ;  32 
N.  E.  862  [ladders  tied  together] ; 
Williams  v.  Clough,  3  Hurlst.  &  N. 
258  ;  Reber  v.  Tower,  11  Mo.  App. 
199 ;  The  Truro,  31  Fed.  158. 

3  Houston  v.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331  ;  29 
Atl.  380;  Holden  v.  Fitchburg  R. 
Co.,  128  Mass.  268  [derrick  left  stand- 
ing in  dangerous  position]. 


321 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§    '97 


a  mine,4  buildings,5  platforms,6  locomotives,"  cars,8  car-buffers,9 


4  Mellors  v.  Shaw,  1  Best  &  S.  437  ; 
Brydon  v.  Stewart,  2  Macq.  H.  L. 
30.  See,  also,  Buzzell  v.  Laconia 
Mfg.  Co.,  48  Me.  113 ;  Pantzar  v. 
Tilly,  etc.  Mining  Co.,  99  N.  Y.  368. 

5  Thus  where,  in  consequence  of 
the  want  of  proper  support  to  a 
privy,  of  which  defendant  was  aware, 
it  gave  way,  defendant  was  held 
liable  (Ryan  v.  Fowler,  24  N.  Y. 
410).  See,  also,  Horner  v.  Nichol- 
son, 56  Mo.  220  [careless  use  of  old 
and  defective  walls  in  remodeling 
building]. 

6  Benzing  v.  Steinway,  101  N.  Y. 
547 ;  5  N.  E.  449  ;  Arkerson  v.  Den- 
nison,  117  Mass.  407;  Behm  v.  Ar- 
mour, 58  Wise.  1  ;  15  N.  W.  806 
[elevated  platform  for  shoveling  coal 
into  barge]  ;  Hobbs  v.  Stauer,  62 
Wise.  108  ;  22  N.  W.  153.  A  scaffold, 
however,  is  an  appliance  not  a  place 
of  work  (Butler  v.  Townsend,  126  N. 
Y.  105;  26  N.  E.  1017).  The  master 
may,  therefore,  have  it  built  by  a 
contractor  of  good  repute,  and  is 
then  not  bound  to  inspect  it  (Id.) 
Or  if  the  making  of  the  scaffold  is 
part  of  the  servant's  work,  jointly 
with  others,  the  master  is  not  liable 
for  their  negligent  use  of  materials 
furnished  by  him^Kimmer  v. Weber, 
151  N.  Y.  -417  ;  45  N.  E  860). 

7  Hough  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100 
U.  S.  213  [insecurely  fastened  steam 
whistle  on  locomotive]  ;  Stevenson 
v.  Jewett,  16  Hun,  210  [broken  stay- 
bolts  and  corroded  outside  sheet  of 
boiler]  ;  Crutchfield  v.  Richmond, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  76  N.  C.  320  [defective 
locomotive  and  road-bed].  Where  a 
fireman  was  injured  by  explosion  of 
a  boiler,  the  dangerous  condition  of 
which  bad  often  been  reported  to  the 

[Law  of  Neq.  Vol.  I  —  21] 


master,  the  master  was  held  liable 
(Keegan  v.  Western  R.  Co.,  8  N.  Y. 
175  ;  S.  P.,  Cayzer  v.  Taylor,  10  Gray, 
274  ;  Bean  v.  Oceanic  Steam  Nav. 
Co.,  24  Fed.  134).  In  a  similar  case, 
employer  was  not  excused  by  the 
facts  that  there  was  no  personal  neg- 
ligence on  his  part,  that  proper  in- 
structions had  been  given  for 
thorough  repair,  and  that  the  fault 
lay  with  mechanics  directed  to  uiaKe 
the  repairs  (Fuller  v.  Jewett,  80 
N.  Y.  46). 

8  O'Neill  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
3McCrary,  423  [freight-car]  ;  Palmer 
v.  Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Id.  635  [ca- 
boose cai-]  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Jackson,  55  111.  492  ;  Toledo,  etc.  It. 
Co.  v.  Ingraham,  77  Id.  309  ;  Siela 
v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  82  Mo. 
430  [handle  of  hand  car]  ;  Ander- 
son v.  Minnesota,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39 
Minn.  523  ;  41  N.  W.  104  [same].  The 
ends  of  freight  cars  should  be  fur- 
nished with  such  handles,  ladders, 
or  safeguards  as  are  in  common, 
ordinary  use  (Dooner  v.  Delaware, 
etc.  Canal  Co.,  164  Pa.  St.  17  ;  30 
Atl.  269 ;  Settle  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  127  Mo.  336  ;  30  S.  W.  125  [bent 
handle]).  No  sand-box  on  trolley  car 
(Van  Dyke  v.  Atlantic  Ave.  R.  Co., 
67  Fed.  296).  Where  a  brakeman 
was  injured  by  falling  from  some 
machinery  loaded  in  an  open  car 
over  which  he  had  to  pass,  held, 
that  the  jury  were  justified  in  find- 
ing that  the  company  was  negligent 
in  not  providing  foot-boards  over  the 
car(Hosic  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  75 
Iowa,  683;  37  N.  W.  963). 

*  Cowles  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 
84  N.  C.  309  ;  Ellis  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake 
Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  95  N.  Y.  546. 


§  i9/i 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


brakes,10  couplings,11  railroad   tracks,1'  machinery  13  and   eleva- 


10  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mackey, 
157  U.  S.  72  ;  15  S.  Ct.  491  ;  Lilly  v. 
N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  107  N.  Y.  566  ; 
14  N.  E.  503  ;  Chicago  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Tavlor,  69  111.  461  ;  Johnson  v.  Rich- 
mond, etc.  R.  Co.,  81  N.  C.  453; 
Henry  v.  Wabash  W.  R.  Co.,  109 
Mo.  488 ;  19  S.  W.  239  ;  Prosser  v. 
Montana  Cent.  R.  Co.,  17  Mont.  372; 
43  Pac.  81  [brake-staff  bent]. 

11  Gravelle  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  11  Fed.  569 ;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Fredericks,  71  111.  294.  Defective 
drawheads  or  drawbars  (Lucco  v. 
N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  87  Hun,  612  ; 
34  N.  Y.  Supp.  277 ;  Bowers  v. 
Connecticut  River  R.  Co.  162  Mass. 
312 ;  38  N.  E.  508  ;  Rodney  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  127  Mo.  676; 
28  S.  W.  887).  Where  a  railroad 
uses  cars  with  drawheads  of  differ- 
ent heights,  it  is  a  question  for  the 
jury  whether,  in  failing  to  furnish 
crooked  links  suitable  to  the  coupling 
of  such  cars,  it  was  in  fault  (Bennett 
v.  Greenwich,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84  Hun, 
216  ;  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  457  ;  s.  P.,  Den- 
ver, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Simpson,  16  Colo. 
55;  26  Pac.  339). 

12  Fredenburg  v.  Northern  Central 
R.  Co.,  114  N.  Y.  582  ;  21  N.  E.  1049 
[trench  in  track  where  cars  were 
coupled  in  dark]  ;  Pennsylvania  Co. 
v.  McCormack,  131  Ind.  250  ;  30  N. 
E.  27  [tracks  too  close  to  each  other]  ; 
Killian  v.  Augusta,  etc.   R.   Co.,   78 


Ga.  749  ;  3  S.  E.  621  [track] ;  Brooke 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  81  Iowa, 
504  ;  47  N.  W.  74  [defective  track]  ; 
Knapp  v.  Sioux  City  R.  Co.,  65  Iowa, 
91;  Meloy  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
77  Id.  743  ;  42  N.  W.  563  [civil  en- 
gineer recovered  for  defects  in  new 
track  he  was  laying]  ;  St.  Louis,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Robbins,  57  Ark.  377  ;  21 
S.  W.  886 ;  Swadley  v.  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  118  Mo.  268  ;  24  S.  W. 
140;  Burdick  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  123  Mo.  221 ;  27  S.  W.  453  [road- 
bed] ;  Sadowski  v.  Michigan  Car  Co., 
84  Mich.  100 ;  47  N.  W.  598  [ditch 
across  track]  ;  s.  P.,  Gulf,  etc.  R 
Co.  v.  Redeker,  67  Tex.  181 ;  2  S.  W. 
513  ;  Madden  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R 
Co.,  32  Minn.  303  ;  20  N.  W.  317 
[defective  road-bed]  ;  Brickman  v. 
South  Car.  R.  Co.  8  S  C.  173  [defec 
tive  trestle  over  culvert].  So  as  to 
lack  of  drains  to  carry  off  water 
(Stoher  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  105 
Mo.,  192;  16  S.  W.  591  [track  sink- 
ing under  flood];  Balhoff  v.  Mich. 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  106  Mich.  606;  65  N.  W. 
592  [ice  on  track];  McPherson  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  97  Mo.  253  ;  10  S. 
W.  846).  Where  a  railroad  com- 
pany erects  a  cattle  guard  at  a  point 
which  its  employees  are  constantly 
compelled  to  cross  in  switching  cars, 
the  guard  must  be  made  reasonably 
safe  for  that  purpose  ;  it  is  not 
enough  that  it  be  made  sufficient  and 


13  Wilson  v.  Willimantic  Co.,  50 
Conn.  433  [shafting]  ;  Atchison,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  McKee,  37  Kans.  592 ;  15 
Pac.  484  ;  O'Donnell  v.  East  Rirer 
Gas  Co.,  91  Hun,  184  ;  36  N.  Y.  Supp. 
288  [pipe  not  cleaned]  ;  Quaid  v. 
Cornwall,  13  Bush,  601  [defective 
machinery  in  factory,  putting  out 
employee's  eye]  ;  McGatrick  v. 
Wason,  4  Ohio  St.  566;  Schall  v. 
Cole,  107  Pa.  St.  1  [wooden  rim  at- 
tached to  iron  pulley,  in  order  to  in- 


crease velocity  of  planing  machine]. 
Master  is  not  responsible  for  an  in- 
jury to  an  employee  arising  from 
defects  in  machinery,  if  the  proxi- 
mate cause  of  the  injury  is  careless- 
ness of  the  engineer  in  managing 
the  defective  machine  ;  the  engineer 
and  injured  employee  being  fellow- 
servants  (Philadelphia  Iron,  etc. 
Co.  v.  Davis,  111  Pa.  St.  397 ;  4  AtL 
513). 


3^3 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§   197 


tors,14  of  which  the  master  was  aware  or  which  he  could  have 
ascertained  by  careful  inspection,  even  though  he  did  not 
know  of  them.  And  the  master  has  been  absolved  from  lia- 
bility, where  the  only  ground  of  complaint  was  that  appliances 
were  furnished  which  required  special  care  and  skill  for  their 
use,  as,  for  example,  cars  with  "double  deadwoods,"  though 


safe  to  turn  stock  (Ford  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  91  Iowa,  179  ;  59  N.  W.  5). 
A  railroad  company  owes  no  duty 
to  a  brakeman  to  ballast  storage  or 
switch  tracks  so  as  to  prevent  his 
foot  being  caught  between  the  ties 
(Finnell  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 
129  N.  Y.  669  ;  29  N.  E.  825  ;  S.  P., 
Rosenbaum  v.  St.  Paul  &  D.  R.  Co., 
38  Minn.  173  ;  36  N.  W.  447).  Com- 
panies have  been  held  responsible  to 
servants  for  tracks  insecurely  fas 
tened  (Suter  v.  Park,  etc.  Lumber 
Co.,  90  Wise.  118  ;  62  N.  W.  927) ;  rail- 
road switches  left  unfastened  without 
lock  (Birmingham  R.  Co.  v.  Allen,  99 
Ala.  359  ;  13  So.  8) ;  sand  washed  on 
the  tracks  by  heavy  rain,  an  hour 
before  the  accident  (Kansas  City, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirksey,  60  Fed.  999  ; 
9  C.  C.  A.  321)  ;  old  accumulations 
of  snow  on  tracks,  provided  injury 
was  caused  thereby  (see  McClarney 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  80  Wise.  277  ; 
49  N.  W.  963)  ;  but  compare,  as  to 
similar  accumulations  of  coal  or 
coke,  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mealer,  6  U.  S.  App.  86 ;  50  Fed.  725  ; 
1  C.  C.  A.  633.  Whether  a  railroad 
company,  in  removing  snow  from 
the  track,  by  piling  it  within  a  few 
feet  of  the  track,  acted  with  ordinary 
care  for  the  safety  of  employees,  is  a 
question  for  the  jury  (Lawson  v. 
Truesdale,  60  Minn.  410 ;  62  X.  W. 
546).  For  insufficiency  of  evidence, 
in  an  icy  track   case,  see  Orttel  v. 


Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89  Wise.  127; 
61  N.  W.  289  ;  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Johnson,  76  Tex.  421  ;  13  S.  W.  463 
[defective  spring  in  switch].  The 
court  properly  charged  that,  if  de- 
fendant's roadbed  and  track  were 
not  in  a  reasonably  safe  condition 
for  the  passage  of  trains  at  the  place 
of  the  accident  on  account  of  rotten 
ties,  or  failure  to  properly  ballast  the 
roadbed,  or  on  account  of  the  inside 
rail  of  the  curve  being  higher  than 
the  outside  rail ;  and  defendant 
knew,  or  by  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
care  might  have  known,  of  the  con- 
dition of  the  ties,  roadbed  and  track 
before  the  accident ;  and  if  defend- 
ant provided  for  use  in  the  train  a 
caboose  with  a  defective  brake,  and 
placed  in  the  train  a  car  so  heavily 
loaded  that  it  would  not  adjust  itself 
to  the  track  in  passing  over  the 
same  ;  and  by  reason  of  any  or  all  of 
these  conditions,  if  they  were  found 
to  exist,  plaintiff  was  injured  with- 
out his  fault,  defendant  was  liable 
^Gorhani  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 
113  Mo.  408;  20  S.  W.  1060).  En- 
gineer does  not  assume  risks  caused 
by  faulty  construction  and  mainte- 
nance of  the  roadbed  and  track,  even 
though  liability  to  accidents  thereby 
was  increased  because  the  road  was 
built  in  proximity  to  mountain 
ranges(TJnion  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien, 
4  U.  S.  App.  221  ;  1  C.  C.  A.  354 ;  49 
Fed.  538 ;  affi'd,  161  U.  S.  451). 


14Stringham  v.  Stewart,  100  N.  Y.  Gonigle  v.   Kane,  20  Colo.    292;  38 

516;  3  N.  E.  575;  Corcoran  v.  Hoi-  Pac.  367  ;  Thompson  v.  Johnston  Co., 

brook.  59  N  Y.  517  :  Wise  v.  Acker-  86  Wise.  576  ;  57  N.  W.  298. 
man,  76  Md.  375  ;  25  Atl.  424 ;  Mc- 


§  I98]  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS  TO   SERVANTS.  324 

received  on  a  line  where  they  were  not  already  in  use.15  Until 
recently,  the  use  of  unblocked  frogs  was  not  regarded  as 
sufficent  evidence  of  negligence  to  go  to  a  jury  without  affirma- 
tive proof  that  blocking  was  necessary  to  safety  and  had  come 
into  general  use  among  careful  employers,16  and  that  blocking 
would  not  increase  the  danger  to  servants,  rather  than  dimin- 
ish it."  Whether  this  rule  is  fully  maintained  or  not,  in  view 
of  the  widely  extended  use  of  blocked  frogs,  yet  the  use  of 
such  frogs  cannot  be  required,  where  the  evidence  leaves  these 
questions  in  doubt.13  Masters  have  been  held  responsible  for 
allowing  dangerous  accumulations  of  ashes,  snow  or  ice  on 
places  where  servants  had  to  work.19 

§  198.  Low  bridges.  —  Owing  to  the  hasty  and  careless 
manner  in  which  most  railroads  in  America  are  originally  con- 
structed, bridges  are  very  generally  built  over  railroads  at  as 
little  height  as  can  possibly  be  managed,  in  order  to  save  the 
cost  of  lowering  the  track  or  of  gradually  raising  the  highway 
at  each  end  of  the  bridge.  Still  worse,  the  roofs  of  bridges 
are  made  low  to  save  a  few  dollars,  in  timber  or  metal.  These 
bridges  remain  unaltered,  while  the  height  of  freight  cars  is 
steadily  increased,  in  order  to  make  each  car  available  for 
more  freight.  For  the  sake  of  avoiding  the  expense  of  a  better 
brake  system,  the  old  method  of  brakes  on  the  top  of  the  cars 
is  continued ;  and  a  small  number  of  brakemen  are  employed 
upon  such   trains,    who   are   necessarily  required  to   be    upon 

15  Kohn  v.  McNulta,  147  IT.  S.  238  ;  Central  R.  Co. ,  67  Hun,  196  ;  22  N.  Y. 

13  S.  Ct.  298  ;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  Supp.  100  ;  but  see  contra,  Lake  Erie, 

v.  Blake,  11  C.  C.  A.  93  ;  03  Fed.  45  ;  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Craig,  19  C.  C.  A.  631 . 

Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Smithson.  73  Fed.  642  ;  Meek  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R; 

45  Mich.  212;  Baldwin  v.  Chicago,  Co.,  69  Hun,  488  ;  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  420. 

etc.  R.  Co.,  50  Iowa,  680.  19  Thus  servants  have  been  allowed 

16McGinnis  v.  Canada  Br.  Co.,  49  to    recover    for    corrosion     of    iron 

Mich.  466;   13  N.  W.  819 ;    Missouri  roof  from    accumulation    of    ashes 

Pac.   R.   Co.   v.  Lewis,  24  Neb.  848  ;  and  dirt  from   defendant's    furnace 

40  N.  W.  401  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.   Co.  (Engstrom  v.   Ashland  Iron   Co.,  87 

v.  Lonergan,   118  111.  41  ;  7  N.  E.  55  Wise.  166  ;  58  N.  W.   241)  ;  fall  of  a 

[three  judges  dissenting].  shed,   from   accumulation    of   snow, 

'"McGinnis    v.    Canada    Br.    Co.,  etc.  (Johnson  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  79 

supra.  Wise.  414;  48  N    W    712);  an    icy 

lH  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Seley,  152  path  (Murray  v.   Knight,    156  Mass. 

U.  S    145  ;  14  S.  Ct.  530  ;  rev"g  Seley  518  ;      31     N.    E.    646) ;      icy    stairs 

v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  6 Utah,  319  ;  (Mahoney  v.  Dore,  155  Mass.  513;  30 

23  Pac.  751  ;  s.  p.,  Spencer  v.  N.  Y.  N.  E.  366). 


3^5 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§198 


the  roofs  of  the  cars  while  in  motion.  Thus  it  has  come  to 
be  an  ordinary  occurrence,  even  upon  some  of  the  best  rail- 
roads, for  bridges  over  the  track,  or  the  covers  of  bridges,  t ) 
be  so  low  that  no  freight  brakeman  can  pass  under  them,  while 
in  the  discharge  of  his  regular  duties,  without  imminent  peril 
to  his  life.  He  must  stoop  or  be  killed.  The  maintenance  of 
such  bridges,  or  similar  overhead  obstructions,  has  been 
repeatedly  adjudged  to  be  ample  ground  for  a  verdict  of  neg- 
ligence,1 and  in  some  cases,  gross  negligence,2  although  in  two 
courts  it  has  been  held  that  their  existence  may  be  justified  by 
public  convenience  for  highways  and  other  excuses,  which  all 
resolve  themselves  into  one  — proper  bridges  might  cost  too 
jtiucli  ! 3  The  maintenance  of  bridges  or  roads  less  than  seven 
feet  clear  of  the  cars,  on  railroads  operated  by  brakemen  who 
are  peremptorily  required  to  walk  along  the  roofs  of  those 
cars,  is  in  itself  a  crime,  and  ought  to  be  punished  as  such.4 
It  is  not  an  act  of  mere  negligence ;  it  is  a  willful  wrong.  We 
do  not  overlook  the  difficulties  arising  from  the  necessity  for 
numerous  bridges  and  the  great  cost  of  making  them  as  higdi 


1  A  railroad  company  which  know- 
ingly maintains  a  bridge  over  the 
tracks  so  low  that  brakemen  cannot, 
with  reasonable  safety,  perform  their 
duty  on  top  of  the  cars,  is  liable  to  a 
brakeman  who,  having  no  knowledge 
of  its  dangerous  character,  is  struck 
by  the  bridge  while  in  the  perform- 
ance of  such  duty  (Baltimore,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Rowan,  104 Ind.  88;  3N.  E.  627; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wright.  115 
Ind.  378  ;  16  X.  E.  145  ;  IT  X.  E.  5s4  ; 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Sears,  106  Ind. 
460  ;  34  X.  E.  15  [passing  at  night]  ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  110 
111.  206;  4  X.  E.  381).  The  main- 
tenance of  a  bridge  over  a  railroad 
track  so  low  as  to  make  it  unsafe  for 
brakemen  is  primafacie  negligence 
(Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rowan,  55 
Kans.  270;  09  Pac.  1010  :  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Irwin,  07  Kans.  701  ; 
16  Pac.  140).  The  law  only  requires 
thai  such  bridges  shall  be  of  such 
height  that  the  employees  can  per- 
form  their    duties  with   reasonable 


safety  (Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Walter.  147  111.  60  ;  35  X.  E.  529 ; 
Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  8  Tex. 
Civ.  Ap.  289  ;  27  S.  W.  962). 

3  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Samp- 
son, 97 Ky.  65;  30  S.  W.  12.  Whether 
a  railway  company  which  persists  in 
maintaining  for  many  years  a  bridge 
over  its  tracks  so  low  as  to  be 
dangerous  to  brakemen  standing  on 
top  of  cars,  is  guilty  of  grosss  negli- 
gence, is  a  question  for  the  jury 
(Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Love,  57 
Kans.  36;  45  Pac.  59).  Contra, 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Banks,  104 
Ala.  508  ;  16  So.  547  [not  willful  or 
wanton  negligence]  ;  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hall,  87  Ala.  708  ;  6  So. 
277. 

3  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall,  87 
Ala.  70S  ;  C,  So.  277  ;  Baylor  v.  Dela- 
ware, etc.  R.  Co.,  40  X.  J.  Law,  23. 

1  In  (  'anada,  the  erection  or  main- 
tenance of  such  bridges  is  strictly 
prohibited  (Railway  Consolidation 
Act,  1879). 


§   198a]  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  326 

as  they  should  be.  But  these  difficulties  form  no  excuse  for 
such  reckless  disregard  for  human  life.  The  bridges  or  roofs 
should  be  raised  ;  or  the  cars  should  be  lowered  ;  or  a  new 
system  of  brakes  should  be  introduced.  Of  course,  these 
criticisms  apply  only  to  cases  in  which  railroad  servants  are 
required  by  their  duties  to  be  on  the  roofs  of  moving  cars. 
Where  no  such  duty  exists,  a  railroad  may,  with  perfect  pro- 
priety, be  covered  with  bridges  not  more  than  a  few  inches 
above  the  cars.5 

§  198a.  Low  bridges;  contributory  fault.  —  The  main 
difficult}'  in  low  bridge  cases  arises  on  the  question  of  con- 
tributory negligence.  All  agree  that  a  servant  who,  with  full 
knowledge  of  the  existence  of  such  an  obstruction,  refuses  to 
stoop,  or  who,  knowing  that  he  is  so  near  to  it  that  he  ought 
to  look  out  for  it,  recklessly  takes  his  chances  without  looking, 
is  guilty  of  contributory  negligence,  barring  his  recovery.1 
But  in  Pennsylvania,  Vermont  and  Iowa,  the  courts  have  held 
that,  by  remaining  in  the  service,  with  knowledge  of  the  exist- 
ence of  such  bridges,  servants  assume  all  the  risks  thereof ; 2 
while  in  Maryland,  Virginia,  Alabama,  Missouri,  and  the  lower 

5  In  Gibson  v.  Erie  R.  Co.  (63  N.  Y.  l  This  was  the  test  applied  in  Cin- 

449;    rev'g   S.    C,   5  Han,    31),    the  cinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sampson,     65 

injured    party    was    a    conductor,  Ky.     97;   30  S.   W.   12,    where   the 

whose  duties  did  not  call  him  to  ex-  company  was  held  liable  ;  and  Derby 

pose   himself   to   such   risks  ;  at   all  v.   Kentucky  R.  Co.  [Ky.],  4  S.  W. 

e%-ents,  the  court  so  assumed.     More-  303,  where  it  was  held   not  liable- 

over,    the    obstruction    was    not    a  because     the     bridges     were     high 

bridge,  but  a  station  roof  projecting,  enough  to  admit  all   its  own   cars 

So  in  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sent-  safely,     and     the     injured     person 

merer  (92  Pa.  St.  276),  the  injured  knowingly  took  a  higher  foreign  car 

brakeman  was  not  called    by  any  in  the  train. 

duty  to  be  on  the  roof  of  the  car.  ■  In  Carbine  v.  Bennington,  etc.  R. 
Where  the  lessor  railroad  company  Co.,  61  Yt.  348  ;  17  Atl.  491  ;  Bross- 
constructs  its  bridges  of  sufficient  man  v.  Lehigh  Yal.  R.  Co.,  113  Pa. 
height  to  permit  the  operation  of  St.  490  ;  6  Atl.  226  ;  and  Wells  v. 
ordinary  cars  through  them,  but  the  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  56  Iowa,  520  ; 
lessee  company  receives  into  its  9  N.  W.  364,  it  was  held  that  brake- 
train  a  car  of  unusual  height,  failing  men,  by  simply  continuing  in  ser- 
to  give  notice  thereof  to  its  em-  vice,  with  knowledge  of  such 
ployees,  and  one  of  them  is  killed  on  bridges,  and  without  complaint, 
that  account,  the  lessor  is  not  liable  assumed  all  the  risks  thereof.  To 
(Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore  [Tex.  same  effect,  Goff  v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R. 
Civ.  App.],  27  S.  W.  962).  Co.,  36  Fed.  299. 


3^7 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  199 


courts  of  New  Jersey,  it  has  been  held  that  a  servant,  who 
knows  in  a  general  way  of  the  existence  of  such  dangerous 
bridges,  cannot  recover  for  injuries  suffered  from  collision 
with  them,  when  necessarily  exposed  thereto  by  the  discharge 
of  his  duties,  and  even  when  acting  in  such  haste  that  he  did 
not  have  time  to  make  his  usual  calculation  of  the  precise 
number  of  inches  which  stood  between  him  and  death.3 
Decisions  more  shocking  to  the  moral  sense  are  scarcely  con- 
ceivable.4 In  other  cases  contributory  negligence  has  been 
clearly  proved.5 

§  199.  Low  bridge  cases  limited.— In  New  York,  Georgia, 
Indiana,  Illinois,  Kentucky,  Kansas  and  some  of  the  Federal 
courts,  it  is  held  that  a  railway  servant  does  not  assume  all 
risks  from  low  bridges,  by  simply  continuing  in  service  after 
notice  of  their  existence,  but  may  be  excused  by  a  jury  for 
forgetting  the  existence  or  proximity  of  a  low  bridge,  even  in 
the  daytime  and  much  more  at  night.1     It  is  conceded  in  Ala- 


3  Baylor  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 
40  N.  J.  Law,  23 ;  Baltimore,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Strickler,  51  Md.  47  ;  Rains  v. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71  Mo.  164  ; 
Devitt  v.  Pacific,  etc.  R.  Co.,  50  Id. 
303  ;  Clark  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 
78  Va.  709  ;  re-affirmed  in  a  par- 
ticularly bad  case  (Chesapeake,  etc. 
R  Co.  v.  Hafner,  90  Va.  621  ;  19  S. 
E.  166),  where  the  brakeman  did 
stoop,  but  mistakenly  believed  that 
he  had  stooped  long  enough,  and 
raised  his  head  too  soon. 

4  In  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rowan 
(104  Ind.  88  ;  3  N.  E.  627),  the  severe 
language  of  Mr.  Beach  (Contr.  Neg., 
£  363),  in  condemnation  of  these 
rulings,  is  quoted  with  approval. 

5  The  center  of  the  bridge  was  high 
enough  to  allow  deceased  to  stand 
in  the  center  of  a  car  or  at  the 
brakes,  but  it  sloped  on  the  sides,  so 
as  to  be  but  two  or  three  feet  above 
the  outer  edges  of  the  car.  Deceased 
had  passed  under  the  bridge  almost 
daily  for  four  months,  and  the  acci- 
dent   happened    at    midday.      His 


proper  place  was  at  the  brakes  or  on 
the  center  of  the  car,  but  at  the  time 
of  the  accident  deceased  was  sitting 
on  the  edge  of  the  car.  Held,  that 
he  was  guilty  of  contributory  negli- 
gence (Schlaff  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  100  Ala.  377  ;  14  So.  105). 

1  A  brakeman  on  top  of  a  moving 
train,  with  his  face  towards  the  rear, 
intent  on  the  discharge  of  his  duty 
at  a  place  where  there  is  danger  that 
the  train  may  break  in  two,  is  not, 
as  matter  of  law,  chargeable  with 
contributory  negligence  because  he 
fails  to  take  notice  that  the  train  is 
approaching  a  low  bridge  (Wallace 
v.  Central  Vermont  R.  Co.,  138  N. 
Y.  302  ;  33  N.  E.  1069  ;  rev'g  s.,  c.  63 
Hun,  632,  and  overruling  all  the 
cases  usually  cited  from  New  York). 
In  Williams  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co. 
(110  X.  Y.  628  ;  22  N.  E.  1117),  the 
plaintiff  proved  his  own  negligence 
and  gave  no  excuse  for  it.  Held,  by 
a  bare  majority,  nonsuit  proper. 
Doubted  in  Wallace  v.  Central  Vt. 
R.  Co.  stipra.     The  question  of  con- 


199] 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


328 


bama  that  .1  bridge  so  low  that  brakemen  could  not  escape  dan- 
ger by  stooping,  is  a  nuisance,-  and  that  different  rules  apply, 
li  is  also  conceded  in  New  Jersey,  that  contributory  negli- 
gence is  not  to  be  imputed,  as  matter  of  law,  where  a  mere 
beam  or  bar  of  a  bridge  proves  to  be  lower  than  a  brakeman 
has  reason  to  expect.3  Statutes  in  some  states  (e.  g.,  New 
York,  Massachusetts,  and  Georgia)  require  "tell-tales  "  to  be 
placed,  as  warnings  of  low  bridges.4  Brakemen  have  a  right 
to  assume  that  such  "  tell-tales  "  will  be  placed  and  kept  in  such 
order,  as  to  give  timely  warning,  and  are  not  in  fault  for  rely- 
ing thereon.5  But  if  they  know  that  a  particular  tell-tale  is 
out   of  order,  they  must  use  due  care  to  watch  for  the  bridge.* 

§  200.  [Omitted]. 


tributary  negligence  is  for  the  jury 
(Stirk  v.  Central  Railroad  Co.,  79 
Ga.  495  ;  5  S.  E.  105  ;  Atchison,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Rowan,  55  Kans.  270  ;  39 
Pac.  1010  ;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mortenson,  63  Fed.  530  ;  11  C.  C.  A. 
335  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mat- 
thews, 48  111.  App.  361  [dark  night  ; 
no  warning]).  The  law  does  not  re- 
quire of  a  brakeman  that  he  should 
absolutely  know  all  of  the  defects  of 
construction,  and  all  the  obstruc- 
tions there  may  be  along  the  line  of 
the  railway,  nor  that  he  should  neg- 
lect the  performance  of  his  duties  as  a 
brakeman  to  be  on  the  constant  look- 
out for  such  obstructions  and  de- 
fects, which  may  be  dangerous  (Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  116  111. 
206;  4N.  E.  381). 

2  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hall,  87 
Ala.  708 ;  6  So.  277.  So  held,  Illi- 
nois Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Welch,  52  111. 
183  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gregory, 
58  111.  272  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Russell,  91  111.  298. 

'  X.  Y.  Susquehanna,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Marion,  57  N.  J.  Law,  94 ;  30  Atl. 
316. 


4  N.  Y.,  Stat.  1884,  ch.  439,  §  2. 
A  railroad  company  whose  tracks 
cross  those  of  another  company  by 
a  low  bridge  is  not  require')  I  to 
maintain  tell-tales  to  warn  trainmen 
on  the  under  road  of  the  danger 
(Neff  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  80 
Hun,  394  ;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  323). 

5  The  fact  that  a  tell-tale  is  so  near 
a  bridge  that  a  brakeman,  facing  the 
rear  of  the  train,  after  passing  under 
the  tell-tale  without  being  touched 
thereby,  could  not  see  it  in  time  to 
avoid  the  injury,  is  evidence  of  neg- 
ligence sufficient  to  go  to  the  jury, 
since  the  statute  recpaires  suitable 
warning  signals  (Wallace  v.  Central 
Vermont  R.  Co.,  138  N.  Y.  302  ;  33  N. 
E.  1060  ;  Maher  v.  Boston  &  A.  R. 
Co. ,  158  Mass.  36 ;  32  N.  E.  950  [tell- 
tales missing]  ;  Savannah,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Day,  91  Ga.  676  ;  17  S.  E.  959 
[tell-tale  out  of  order ;  broad  day- 
light]). 

6  Fitzgerald  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  59  Hun,  225  ;  12  N.  Y.  Supp. 
932.  The  principle  was,  however, 
wrongly  applied  in  that  case. 


329 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§201 


§  201.  Other  dangerous  projections. — The  projection  of 
buildings,1  posts,2  cattle-guards,3  tell-tales,4  and  the  like,  over  a 
railroad  track,  or  even  near  it,5  so  as  to  be  dangerous  to  serv- 
ants in  the  performance  of  their  duties,  is  usually  deemed 
negligence;  and  servants  are  not,  as  matter  of  law,  necessarily 
charged  with  the  assumption  of  all  risks  arising  therefrom, 
merely  because  they  have  notice  thereof.  The  question, 
within  the  usual   limits,  is   for  the  jury.     There   is   a  marked 


1  Flanders  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
51  Minn.  193  ;  53  N.  W.  544  [section 
house]. 

2  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hohn,  1  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  36 ;  21  S.  W.  942  [scaf- 
fold] ;  Nance  v.  Newport  News, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  [Ky.];  17  S.  W.  570 
[projecting  beam]  ;  Ft.  Worth,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Graves,        Tex.  Civ.  App. 

;  21  S.  W.  606  [supports  of  bridge]; 
Johnson  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  43 
Minn.  53  ;  44  N.  W.  884  [signal  post 
four  feet  from  cars].  Contra,  Love- 
joy  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  125  Mass. 
79  ;  wrongly  decided.  The  distance 
between  a  signal-post  and  the  ladder 
on  the  outside  of  a  car  was  but  one 
foot.  A  brakeman  on  his  first  trip, 
did  not  know  that  there  were  erec- 
tions so  near,  and  was  not  informed 
of  the  danger.  They  were,  in  fact, 
exceptional.  Held,  that  the  danger 
was  not  obviously  incident  to  the 
employment  (Scanlon  v.  Boston  & 
A.  R.  Co.,  147  Mass.  484  ;  18  N.  E. 
209).  In  Helfrich  v.  Ogden  R.  Co.  (7 
Utah,  186  ;  26  Pac.  295),  the  plain- 
tiff's intestate  was  clearly  negligent. 

3  Murphy  v.  Wabash  R.  Co  ,  115 
Mo.  Ill  ;  21  S.  W.  862  [danger  un- 
known]. The  fact  that  all  the  com- 
pany's cattle  guard  fences  are  con- 
structed in  the  same  way  will  not 
warrant  the  court  in  disturbing  the 
jury's  findings  (Id.)  Where  a 
brake  was  so  defective  as  to  require 
reaching  beyond  the  line  of  the  cars, 
and  a  brakeman  was  struck,  while 
so  doing,  by  a  cattle-guard  of  which 


he  had  no  notice,  he  may  recover, 
though  he  had  assumed  the  risk  as 
to  the  brakes  (Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.  Soniers,  78  Tex.  439  ;  14  S.  W. 
779). 

4A  "tell-tale,"  dangerous  for  brake- 
men  upon  cars  of  a  great  height, 
which  have  come  into  use  for  special 
purposes,  is  not  a  risk  incident  to  a 
brakeman's  employment  (Darling  v. 
N.  Y.,  Providence,  etc.  R.  Co.,  17  R. 
I.  708;  24Atl.  462). 

6  Where  it  is  customary  for  brake- 
men  in  the  performance  of  their 
duties  to  ascend  and  descend  cars  by 
side-ladders,  while  the  train  is  in 
motion,  the  company  is  bound  to 
maintain  its  road-way  free  from  pro- 
jections which  endanger  them  while 
so  doing  (Georgia  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Davis,  92  Ala.  300  ;  9  So.  252,^.  Where 
the  jury  found  that  "  the  shed  was 
so  close  to  the  track  as  to  render  the 
place  unnecessarily  dangerous  to 
employees  in  performing  their  duties 
at  that  place,"  company  held  liable 
(Kelleher  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
80  Wise.  584  ;  50  N.  W.  942).  Com- 
pany liable  for  a  switch-stand  so  near 
its  track  that  an  arm  projecting 
therefrom  was  only  seven  and  one- 
half  inches  from  the  gangway  step 
of  a  passing  engine  ;  it  being  shown 
that  it  stood  considerably  closer  to 
the  track  than  other  switch-stands 
in  the  same  yard,  and  was  never 
used  (Coif  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
87  Wise.  273  ;  58  N.  W.  408). 


§202] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


330 


difference  between  obstructions  not  removed  by  the  master  and 
those  made  by  him.6  And  a  clear  distinction  is  to  be  drawn 
between  bridges  and  similar  structures  over  the  main  track, 
placed  low  for  the  sake  of  mere  economy,  and  coverings  over 
side  tracks,  made  low  for  some  useful  purpose,  which  could  not 
be  answerd  by  any  less  dangerous  structure.  Thus  the  spout 
of  a  grain  elevator  or  a  covering  to  protect  grain  from  rain 
while  being  poured  into  the  cars,  would  stand  on  a  different 
footing,  if  on  a  side  track,  where  the  train  would  naturally  not 
move  at  full  speed,  and  where  the  exceptional  character  of  the 
work  would  notify  brakemen  of  peculiar  dangers.7  And  so 
does  every  structure,  necessarily  near  the  track  or  projecting 
over  it,  such  as  a  crane.8 

§  202.  Master's  duty  to  prescribe  and  enforce   rules. — 

A  master  who  employs  servants  in  a  dangerous  and  compli- 
cated business  is  personally  bound  to  prescribe  rules  sufficient 
for  its  orderly  and    safe  management,1  and   to  keep   his  serv- 

Besel  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  70  Id. 
171  ;  Sheehan  v.  Same,  91  Id.  332  ; 
Dana  v.  Same,  92  Id.  639  ;  Luebke 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  59  Wise. 
127  ;  Ford  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
124  N.  Y.  493  ;  26  N.  E.  1101  [no  rule 
requiring  lumber  loaded  on  flat-cars 
to  be  secured]  ;  Irvine  v.  Flint,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  89  Mich.  416  ;  50  N.  W.  1008 
[loading  cars]  ;  Byrnes  v.  N.  Y.  Lake 
Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71  Hun,  209  ;  24  N. 
Y.  Supp.  517  [loaded  cars]  ;  Lake 
Shore  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Murphy, 
50  Ohio  St.  135  ;  33  N.  E.  403  [signals 
for  approaching  trains] ;  Reagan  v. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93  Mo.  348;  6 
S.  W.  371  [signals  for  moving  cars]  ; 
Redington  v.  N.  Y.  Ontario  R.  Co., 
84  Hun,  231  ;  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  535 
[cars  standing  on  grade]  ;  Eastwood 
v.  Retsof  Min.  Co.,  86  Hun,  91  ;  34 
N.  Y.  Supp.  196  [dangerous  salt- bin]  ; 
Hartvig  v.  N.  P.  Lumber  Co.,  19 
Oreg.  522  ;  25  Pac.  358  [lumber- 
chute]  :  International,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hall,  78  Tex.  657  :  15  S.  W.  108  ; 
Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox,  31  Tex. 
586. 


8  Where  a  brakeman  knows  the 
danger  arising  from  a  tree  project- 
ing over  the  track,  which  though 
dangerous,  can  be  avoided  by  ordi- 
nary care,  if  he  continues  in  the  em- 
ployment without  protest  or  promise 
of  removal,  he  assumes  the  risk 
(Woodell  v.  West  Va.  Imp.  Co.,  38 
W.  Va.  23;  17  S.  E.  386). 

7  So  held,  as  to  a  brakeman  injured 
by  failing  to  "think"  of  an  awning 
used  to  protect  grain,  necessarily  low, 
and  projecting  from  the  side  of  an 
elevator,  over  a  side-track,  on  which 
he  was  engaged  (Clark  v.  St.  Paul, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  28  Minn.  128). 

8  Sisco  v.  Lehigh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  145 
N.  Y.  296;  39  N.  E.  958;  Wolf  v. 
East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  88  Ga. 
210;  14  S.  E.  199;  s.  P.,  Fisk  v. 
Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  158  Mass.  238 ;  33 
N.  E.  510  [awning].  InScidmore  v. 
Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.  (89  Wise. 
188  ;  61  N.  W  765),  a  brakeman  in- 
jured by  a  post  necessarily  near 
track  known  to  him,  was  not  allowed 
to  recover. 

1  Slater    v.    Jewett,   85   N.  Y.  61  ; 


33* 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  202 


ants  informed  of  these  rules,  so  far  as  may  be  needful  for 
their  guidance.2  Thus,  a  railroad  company  is  bound  to  regu- 
late, by  published  rules,  the  time  and  manner  of  running  its 
trains  so  as  to  avoid  collisions,  and  to  enable  all  its  servants  to 
know  when  a  train  may  be  expected,  and  thus  to  avoid  danger.3 
And  a  jury  may  find  that  it  ought  to  have  rules  to  protect 
men  working  underneath  cars  from  the  starting  of  such  cars 
without  due  warning.4  The  master  is  also  bound  to  use  ordi- 
nary care  and  diligence  to  enforce  the  rules  which  he  has 
made,  and  disregard  of  such  rules,  with  his  acquiescence  or 
neglect  to  enforce  them,  is  tantamount  to  a  suspension  of  the 
rules.5  A  jury  has  no  general  right  to  find  that  a  rule  should 
have  been  adopted,  without  sufficient  evidence  that  such  rule 
was  necessary  and  practicable;6  but  it  is  not  necessary  that 
other    masters  should  have  adopted  it  under  similar  circum- 


5  Abel  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
103  N.  Y.  581  ;  9  N.  E.  325  ;  La  Croy 
v.  N.  Y.  Lake  Erie,  etc  R.  Co.,  57 
Hun,  67  ;  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  382  ;  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Berkey,  136  Ind. 
181 ;  35  N.  E.  3.  If  a  rule  has  been 
prescribed,  and  a  foreman  omits  to 
warn  a  workman  under  him  of 
its  existence,  it  is  for  the  jury,  not 
the  court,  to  say  whether  the  master 
took  sufficient  precautions  (Avilla 
v.  Nash,  117  Mass.  318  [employee  in- 
jured while  on  goods  elevator]  ; 
distinguishing  Durgin  v.  Munson,  9 
Allen,  396). 

3  Lewis  v.  Seifert,  116  Pa.  St.  628 ; 
11  Atl.  514  ;  Bradley  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral, etc.  R.  Co.,  62  N.  Y.  99  [work- 
men removing  snow  from  tracks]  ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor,  69 
111.  461  [rules  for  making  "  flying 
switches "]  ;  Cooper  v.  Central  R. 
Co..  44  Iowa,  134  [rules  forbidding 
exi  •  ssive  speed  of  locomotive  run- 
ning backwards]  :  Haynes  v.  East 
Tennessee  R.  Co.,  3  Coldw.  222.  See 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.Whittington 
30  Gratt.  805. 


4  Abel  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
103  N.  Y.  581  ;  s.  c,  again,  128  N.  Y. 
662  ;  28  N.  E.  663  ;  Fordyce  v.  Briney, 
58  Ark.  206  ;  24  S.  W.  250.  What  is 
sufficient  in  such  cases  (Corcoran  v. 
Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  126  N.  Y.  673  ; 
27  N.  E.  1022) . 

5  Wabash  R.  Co.  v.  McDaniels,  107 
TJ.  S.  454 ;  2  S.  Ct.  932 ;  Whittaker 
v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co.,  126  N.  Y. 
544 ;  27  N.  E.  1042  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Triplett,  54  Ark.  289  ;  15  S.  W. 
831 ;  see  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Flynn, 
154  111.  448  ;  40  N.  E.  332  ;  Strong  v. 
Iowa  Cent.  R.  Co.,  94  Iowa,  380;  62 
N.  W.  799;  White  v.  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  72  Miss.  12;  16  So.  248. 

6  Morgan  v.  Hudson  Riv.  Ore  Co., 
133  N.  Y.  666  ;  31  N.  E.  234  [ore  kilns 
and  car  track]  :  Burke  v.  Syracuse, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  69  Hun,  21  ;  23  N.  Y. 
Supp.  458  [switch  opened].  Failure 
to  make  rules  is  not  negligence, 
where  the  practice  actually  in  force 
renders  a  rule  unnecessary  (Kudik 
v.  Lehigh  Yal.  R.  Co.,  78  Hun,  492; 
29  N.  Y.  Supp.  5:;:!). 


§  203] 


LIABILITY    OV   MASTERS  TO   SERVANTS. 


332 


stances.7  The  necessity,8  or  sufficiency9  of  a  particular  rule  is 
a  mixed  question  of  law  and  fact.  The  reasonableness  of  a 
particular  rule  is  a  question  of  law.10  To  enable  a  servant  to 
recover,  on  the  ground  of  the  absence  of  a  rule,  he  must  prove 
its  absence  "  and  necessity,1'  and  that  its  absence  was  proxi- 
mate cause  of  his  injury.13 


>j  203.  Master's  duty  to  guard  and  warn  against  unusual 
risks. — It  is  also  the  personal1  duty  of  the  master,  so  far  as  he 
can  by  the  use  of  ordinary  care,  to  avoid  exposing  his  servants 
to  extraordinary  risks  which  they  could  not  reasonably  antici- 
pate; 2  although  he  is  not  bound  to  guarantee   them  against 


I  Defendant  held  negligent  in  not 
making  a  rule  to  govern  the  shunt- 
ing of  cars,  although  there  was  no 
evidence  that  other  companies  had 
such  rules  (Doing  v.  N.  Y.,  Ontario, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  151  N.  Y.  579  ;  rev'g  s.  c, 
73  Hun,  270  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  405) ; 
s.  P.,  Abel  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  128  N.  Y.  662  ;  28  N.  E.  663. 

sAbel  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
103  N.  Y.  581  ;  s.  c,  again,  128  N.  Y. 
662  ;  28  N.  E.  663  [no  rule  protecting 
car  repairers  against  motion  of  car]. 
Under  guidance  from  the  court,  it  is 
for  the  jury  to  decide  which,  of  sev- 
eral reasonable  rules,  should  have 
been  adopted  (Id.). 

9  It  is  proper  to  leave  to  the  jury 
the  question  whether  a  rule  as  to 
loading  lumber  on  flat-cars  was  suffi- 
cient, when  faithfully  followed,  to 
give  reasonable  protection  to  em- 
ployees (Ford  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  124  N.  Y.  493  ;  26  N.  E.  1101). 

10  Kansas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hammond, 
58  Ark.  324  ;  24  S.  W.  723. 

II  Rose  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58 
N.  Y.  217. 

12  See  notes  6  and  7  ;  Rutledge  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  123  Mo.  121  ; 
24  S.  YV.  1053  ;  affi'd  in  27  S.  W.  327. 

i3Berrigan  v.  X.  Y.,  Lake  Erie, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  131  N.  Yr.  582  ;  30  N.  E. 
57;    Warn  v.   N.  Y.   Central   R.    R. 


Co.,  92  Hun,  91 ;  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  336 
[defect  in  rules] ;  Peaslee  v.  Fitch- 
burg  R.  Co.,  152  Mass.  155  ;  25  N.  E. 
71  ;  Rutledge  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
110  Mo.  312  ;  19  S.  W.  38 ;  Gibson  v. 
Oregon  Short  Line,  etc.  R.  Co.,  23 
Oreg.  493  ;  32  Pac.  295  ;  Texas,  etc., 
R.  Co.  v.  Cumpston,  4  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  25  ;  23  S.  W.  47. 

1  This  is  one  of  the  non-transferable 
duties.  See  §  204,  post,  and  many 
cases  cited  in  the  following  notes. 

QMcGovern  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co., 
123  N.  Y.  280  ;  25  N.  E.  373  [grain 
bin,  entered  from  bottom]  ;  Baxter 
v.  Roberts,  44  Cal.  187  ;  Fairbanks 
v.  Haentzche,  73  111.  236;  Deweese 
v.  Meramec  Mining  Co.,  128  Mo.  423; 
31  S.  W.  110  [mine  dangerous  from 
falling  stones]  ;  McGonigle  v.  Canty, 
80  Hun,  301  ;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  :):0 
[tree  about  to  fall]  ;  Palmer  v.  Michi- 
gan Central  R.  Co.,  87  Mich.  2S1  ;  49 
N.  W.  613  [dangerous  method  of 
loading].  A  master,  who  places  his 
servant  in  a  position  of  unusual  dan- 
ger, must  adopt  every  reasonable 
precaution  to  avoid  injury  to  him 
(Claybaugh  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  56  Mo.  App.  630  ;  Felice  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  14  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  345 
[men  working  in  railroad  tunnel]  ; 
Bernard]  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  78 
Hun,  454  ;  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  230  [trans- 


333 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  2°3 


such  risks,3  nor  to  guard  against  an  accident  which  is  not  at  all 
likely  to  happen.4  The  master  must,  therefore,  give  warning  to 
his  servants  of  all  perils  to  which  they  will  be  exposed,  of 
which  he  is  or  ought  to  be  aware,  other  than  such  as  they 
should,  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care,  hare  foreseen  as 
necessarily  incidental  to  the  business,  in  the  natural  and  ordi- 
nary course  of  affairs;5  though  more  than  this  is  not  required 

warning  of  dangerous  earth  bank]  ; 
Andreson  v.  Ogden  Union  R.  Co.,  8 
Utah,  128  ;  30  Pac.  305  [earth  banks 
falling]).  Where  there  are  hazards 
incident  to  an  occupation  which  the 
master  knows,  or  ought  to  know,  it 
is  his  duty  to  warn  the  servant  of 
them  fully,  and,  failing  to  do  so,  he 
is  liable  to  him  for  any  injury  that 
he  may  sustain  in  consequence  of 
such  neglect  (Missouri  Pac.  R.  v. 
Callbreath,  66  Tex.  526;  1  S.  W.  622 
[dangerous  car  coupling]).  It  is  the 
duty  of  a  manufacturer  of  Paris 
green  to  inform  laborers  of  its 
poisonous  character,  ami  the  precau- 
tions necessary  in  its  manufacture, 
not  of  its  particular  ingredients  (Fox 
v.  Peninsular  Lead  Works,  84  Mich. 
676 ;  48  N.  W.  203  ;  s.  p.,  Texas  Mex. 
R.  Co.  v.  Douglas,  73  Tex.  325  ;  US. 
W.  333  [plumber  should  be  informed 
of  dangerous  railroad  ties]).  Where 
the  service  involves  peculiar,  un- 
usual perils,  which  the  master  under- 
stands, but  the  servant,  from  youth, 
inexperience  or  ignorance,  may 
naturally  fail  to  appreciate,  the  mas- 
ter may  be  chargeable  with  breach 
of  duty  if  he  orders  or  urges  the 
servant  to  incur  such  dangers,  even 
though  the  latter,  from  ignorance, 
etc.,  assents.  The  question  is  for  the 
jury  (Atlas  Engine  Works  v.  Ran- 
dall, 100  Ind.  293  ;  Sullivan  v.  India 
Manufg.  Co..  113  Mass.  396  ;  Western 
Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  McMullen,  58  X.  J. 
Law,  155  ;  33  Atl.  384  ;  N.  Y.  Biscuit 
Co.  v.  Rouss,  20  C.  C.  A.  555  ;  74  Fed. 
608). 


portaiion  of  dynamite]).  Cases  of 
dynamite  left  in  drill  holes :  Neveu 
v.  Sears,  155  Mass.  303  ;  29  N.  E.  472 
[question  for  jury]  ;  Houston  v.  Cul- 
ver. 88  Ga.  34  ;  13  S.  E.  953  [nonsuit] ; 
Henderson  v.  Williams,  66  X.  H.  405  ; 
23  Atl.  365  [nonsuit  proper]. 

3  Riley  v.  Baxendale,  6  Hurlst.  & 
N:  446;  Kearney  Electric  Co.  v. 
Laughlin,  45  Neb.  390  ;  63  N.  W.  941. 

4  Keats  v.  National  Heeling  Mach. 
Co.,  65  Fed.  940;  13  C.  C.  A.  221; 
Sjogren  v.  Hall,  53  Mich.  274  [un- 
covered wheel  in  saw  mill]  ;  s.  p., 
McKee  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  83 
Iowa,  616  ;  50  N.  W.  209). 

5  If  laborers  engaged  in  hazardous 
occupations  are  not  informed  of 
the  accompanying  dangers  by  their 
employers,  and  they  remain  in 
ignorance  of  the  dangers,  and  suffer 
in  consequence,  the  employers  are 
chargeable  (Mather  v.  Rillston,  156 
U.  S.  391  ;  15  S.  Ct.  464  [dynamite 
liable  to  heat]).  An  employer  is 
bound  to  give  notice  of  latent  dan- 
gers among  which  the  employee  is 
required  to  work,  and  of  which  the 
employer  has  knowledge  (Salem 
Stone  Co.  v.  Griffin,  139  Ind.  141  ;  38 
N.  E.  411  ;  Smith  v.  Peninsular  Car 
Works,  60  Mich.  501 ;  27  N.  W.  662 ; 
Augusta  Factory  v.  Hill,  83  Ga.  709  ; 
10  S.  E.  450  ,  Northwestern  Fuel  Co. 
v.  Danielson,  6  C.  C.  A.  636 ;  57  Fed. 
915  [trestle  weakened,  without  warn- 
ing] ;  Stackman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co  ,  80  Wise.  428  ;  50  N.  W.  404 
[place  of  work  too  narrow  ;  no  warn- 
ing ;  master  liable]  ;  Lynch  v.  Allyn. 
100   Mass.    248;    35  N.    E.    550    [no 


§  203] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


334 


of  him.6  It  makes  no  difference  what  is  the  nature  of  the 
peculiar  peril,  or  whether  it  is  or  is  not  beyond  the  master's 
control.7  And  it  is  not  enough  for  the  master  to  use  care  and 
pains  to  give  such  notice.  He  must  see  that  it  is  actually 
given.8  If,  therefore,  he  fails  to  give  such  warning,  in  terms 
sufficiently  clear  to  call  the  attention  of  his  servants  to  a  peril 
of  which  he  is  or  ought  to  be  aware,  he  is  liable  to  them  for 
any  injury  which  they  suffer  thereby  without  contributory 
negligence.9  Such  notice  must  be  timely — that  is,  given  in 
sufficient  time  to  enable  the  servant  to  profit  by  it.10  It  is, 
therefore,  the  duty  of  the  master  to  give  adequate  and  timely 
warnings  of  changes  in  the  situation,  involving  new  dangers.11 
Signals  must  be  given  of  every  approaching  train  or  part  of  a 
train,  on  a  railroad ; vi  or  of  the  starting  of  a  train,  while  a 


6  Big  Creek  Stone  Co.  v.  Wolf,  138 
Ind.  496  ;  38  N.  E.  52  [servant  ought 
to  have  known  defects]  ;  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Neer,  26  111.  App.  356 
[no  liability  for  well-known  risk]  ; 
Muster  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61 
Wise.  325  ;  21  N.  W.  223  [mail-bag 
thrown  out]. 

1  Baxter  v.  Roberts,  44  Cal.  187 
[carpenter  employed  to  tear  down  a 
fence,  and  shot  by  squatters  while 
performing  his  duty].  But  not  so 
where  master  had  not  such  notice 
(Kelly  v.  Shelby  R.  Co.,  [Ky.]  ;  22 
S.  W.  445). 

8  Wheeler  v.  Wason  Mfg.  Co.,  135 
Mass  294  [plaintiff  injured  while 
operating  a  circular  saw). 

9  O'Connor  v.  Adams,  120  Mass. 
427  ;  Coombs  v.  New  Bedford  Cord- 
age Co.,  102  Id.  572  [minor's  arm  torn 
off  by  rapidly  revolving  cylinder]  ; 
Parkhurst  v.  Johnson,  50  Mich.  70 
[inexperienced  laborer  fell  into  a 
lime  kiln,  not  being  warned  of  danger 
from  removal  of  burned  stone  be- 
low] ;  Ryan  v.  Tarbox,  135  Mass.  207 
[laborer  tearing  down  an  old  build- 
ing, set  to  work  under  a  weak  chim- 
ney, which  fell  on  him]. 

,0  Thus,  timely  warning  must  be 
given  of   Btarting  machinery  at  an 


unusual  time  (Shumway  v.  Walworth 
Mfg.  Co.,  98  Mich.  411  ;  57  N.  W. 
251  ;  Huber  v.  Wilson,  58  Hun,  603  ; 
11  N.  Y.  Supp.  377 ;  see  Crispin  v.  Bab- 
bitt, 81  N.  Y.  516).  But  not  at  the 
usual  time  in  the  absence  of  special 
reasons  (Balle  v.  Detroit  Leather  Co., 
73  Mich.  158  ;  41  N.  W.  216). 

11  Muller  v.  McKesson,  73  N.  Y. 
195  [fierce  dog  let  loose  at  night]  ; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kerr,  148111. 
605;  35  N.  E.  1117  [track  out  of 
order]  ;  Cheeney  v.  Ocean  S.  S.  Co., 
92  Ga  726  ;  19  S.  E.  33  [throwing 
cotton  bales]  ;  Donahue  v.  Old  Colony 
R.  Co.,  153  Mass.  356  ;  26  N.  E.  868 ; 
[conductor's  omission  to  notify 
brakeman  that  draw-bar  is  broken  is 
negligence]  ;  Stevenson  v.  Raven- 
scroft,  25  Neb.  678 ;  41  N.  W.  652 
[breaking  off  earth  bank  without 
warning]  ;  Mollie  Gibson  Mining  Co. 
v.  Sharp,  5  Colo.  App.  321  ;  38  Pac. 
850  [removal  of  earth  support]. 

12  Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bar- 
ber, [Ky.]  ;  31  S.  W.  482  [signals  of 
late  train  omitted]  :  Dixon  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  109 Mo.  413;19S.  W. 
412  [engine  coming  around  curve]  ; 
Moran  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  48  Minn. 
46  ;  50  N.  W.  930 ;  Sobieski  v.  St. 
Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  41  Minn.   169 ;  42 


335 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§203 


servant  is  coupling  cars13  or  repairing  a  car,14  although,  as  the 
actual  movement  of  trains  is  rarely  within  the  possible  personal 
knowledge  of  the  master,  his  duty  in  that  and  similar  matters 
may  be  discharged  by  proper  rules  and  supervision.13  But  if 
a  servant  has  sufficient  actual  notice  of  the  peril  to  put  him 
upon  his  guard,  it  is  of  no  importance  that  such  notice  did  not 
proceed  from  the  master.16  And  the  master  is  not  required  to 
point  out  dangers  which  are  readily  discoverable  by  the  ser- 
vant himself  by  the  use  of  ordinary  care,  with  such  knowledge, 
experience  and  judgment  as  the  servant  actually  possesses,  or 
as  the  master  is  justified  in  believing  him  to  possess.17     No 


N  W.  863.  Defendant  owed  work- 
men duty  of  active  vigilance  in  giv- 
ing proper  signals  of  approach  of 
trains,  and  they  had  the  right  to  rely 
on  the  continued  performance  of 
this  duty  (Erickson  v.  St.  Paul,  etc. 
R.  Co..  41  Minn.  500  ;  43  N.  W.  332; 
Schulz  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  57 
Minn.  271  ;  59  N.  W.  192  ;  Promer  v. 
Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90  Wis.  215  ; 
63  N.  W.  90  [shunted  car]  ;  East 
Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bridges,  92 
Ga.  399  ;  17  S.  E.  645  ["  wild  "  engine, 
without  warning]  ;  Miss.  Cotton-Oil 
Mills  Co.  v.  Ellis,  72  Miss.  191 ;  17  So. 
214  ;  Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hol- 
comb,  9  Ind.  App.  198  ;  36  N.  E.  39  ; 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Gilbert,  51  111. 
App.  404  [insufficient  signal  of 
train]  ;  Wild  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co., 
21  Oreg.  159;  27  Pac.  054).  But  the 
U.  S.  Supreme  Court  has  recently 
held  (three  judges  dissenting)  that 
the  negligence  of  the  officer  in 
charge  of  a  train  in  failing  to  give 
warning  as  the  train  rapidly  ap- 
proached a  hand  car  on  the  track 
was  the  fault  of  a  fellow-servant 
and  not  imputable  to  the  master, 
where  a  section  hand  on  the  hand 
car  was  injured  (Northern  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Charless,  162  U.  S.  359  ;  rev'g 
S.  C  .  51  Fed.  562  ;  2  C.  C.  A.,  380  ;  7 
U.  S.  App.  359).  And  where  a 
switching  engine  is  constantly  mov- 
ji  g   to  and  fro  in  a  railroad  yard, 


there  is  no  obligation  to  ring  the 
bell  or  sound  the  whistle  for  the 
purpose  of  notifying  employees  who 
are  familiar  with  the  operation  of 
the  yard  (Aerkfetz  v.  Humphreys, 
HSU.  S.  418;  12  S.  Ct.  835). 

13  Barnett  v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.^ 
89  Ga.  399;  15  S.  E.  492. 

14  Abel  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
103  N.  Y.  5S1. 

15  See  §  202,  ante. 

16  Foley  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  48 
Mich.  622  [switchman  killed  while 
handling  nitro-glycerine,  he  having 
a  general  acquaintance  with  its 
qualities] ;  Rooney  v.  Sewall  Cordage 
Co.,  161  Mass.  153;  36  N.  E.  789; 
Downey  v.  Sawyer,  157  Mass.  418; 
32  N.  E.  654  ;  f  runtle  v.  North  Star 
Mills,  57  Minn.  52  ;  58  N.  W.  832. 

:'  It  is  not  necessary  that  a  servant 
should  be  warned  of  every  possible 
manner  in  which  injury  may  occur 
to  him,  nor  of  risks  that  are  as  obvi- 
ous to  him  as  to  the  master  ;  and 
where  a  mature  and  experienced 
man  engages  in  a  dangerous  occupa- 
tion, with  the  risks  of  which  he 
is  familiar,  and  is  injured,  not 
through  defect  in  the  appliances, 
but  through  the  manner  of  their 
operation,  i  cid  nt  to  the  business, 
he  cann  t  recover  against  the  master 
(Mississippi  Logging  Co.  v.  Schnei- 
der, 20  C.  C.  A.  390 ;  74  Fed.  195).  To 
same  effect,  Hazcn  v.  West  Superior 


203  a] 


LIABILITY   in-    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


136 


notice,   therefore,  is  usually  required   of  dangers   obvious  to 
everyone.18 

§  203a.  Duty  of  supervision.  —  It  is  a  universal  American 
rule  that  the  master  is  personally  bound  to  maintain  "  such  an 
oversight  and  supervision"  of  his  servants  and  business,1  as 
will  enable  him  to  discover,  within  a  reasonable  time,  the 
incompetency  or  habitual  negligence  of  any  servant,2  the 
defects  of  any  place  or  appliance  provided  for  work3  or  the 
failure  of  his  servants  to  conduct  the  business  in  pursuance  of 


Lumber  Co.,  91  Wis.  208;  64  N.  W. 
857  [projecting  circular  saws,  un- 
guarded :  floor  slippery  :  no  instruc- 
tion  :  dangers  obvious]  ;  Nugent  v. 
Kauffman  Milling  Co.,  131  Mo.  241  ; 
33  S.  W.  428  [revolving  cylinders  :  no 
instructions  :  age  20]  ;  Jones  v.  Rob- 
erts, 57  111.  App.  56  [steam  mangle  : 
girl  1G :  danger  obvious  :  no  warn- 
ing] ;  Jones  v.  Roberts,  57  111.  App. 
56  ;  Richstain  v.  Washington  Mills 
Co.,  157  Mass.  538;  32  N.  E.  908; 
Fones  v.  Phillips,  39  Ark.  17  [minor 
set  to  operate  dangerous  machinery] ; 
Arcade  File  Works  v.  Juteau,  15 
Ind.  App.  460 ;  40  N.  E.  818  [no 
notice  of  servant's  inexperience].  A 
railroad  company  is  not  negligent  in 
failing  to  inform  one  of  its  experi- 
enced engineers,  who  has  run  over 
its  road  for  many  years,  and  who 
was  appointed  to  instruct  an  en- 
gineer on  another  engine  in  all  the 
peculiarities  of  the  road,  that 
such  engine  is  several  inches  wider 
than  the  one  he  had  been  accustomed 
to  handle  (Bellows  v.  Pennsylvania, 
etc.  Canal  Co.,  157  Pa.  St.  51;  27 
Atl.  685;  s.  P.,  Thain  v.  Old  Colony 
R.  Co.,  161  Mass.  353;  37  N.  E.  309 
[post  four  feet  from  train]). 

18Bohn  v.  Havemeyer,  114  N.  Y. 
296  ;  21  N.  E.  402  [sugar  bin]  ;  Dela- 
ware Iron  Works  v.  Nuttall,  119  Pa. 
St.  149;  J.3  Atl.  65  [circular  saw]; 
Stuart  v.  West  End  St.  R.  Co.,  163 
Mass.  391  ;  40  N.  E.  180  [hay  cutter]  ; 


Foley  v.  Pettee  Machine  Works,  149 
Mass.  294 ;  21  N.  E.  304  [experienced 
servant  :  uncovered  gearing  :  no  re- 
covery] ;  East  Tennessee  R.  Co.  v. 
Turvaville,  97  Ala.  122 ;  12  So.  63 ;  [car 
couplings]  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Boland,  96  Ala.  626;  11  So.  667 
[same] ;  Watts  v.  Hart,  7  Wash .  St. 
178 ;  34  Pac.  423,  771.  Where  an 
unfenced  railroad  runs  through  pas- 
ture land,  it  is  not  the  duty  of  the 
company  to  warn  employees  of  the 
danger  of  encountering  cattle  (Pat- 
ton  v.  Central  Iowa  R.  Co.,  73  Iowa, 
306;  35  N.  W.149). 

1  Whittaker  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  126  N.  Y.  544;  27  N.  E.  1042. 
In  Cullen  v.  Norton  (126  N.  Y.  1; 
26  N.  E.  905),  this  point  was  over- 
looked, but  not  overruled.  The  de- 
cision was  made  by  a  divided  court, 
and  reversed  the  decision  of  a  large 
number  of  judges  below  (9  N.  Y. 
Supp.  174;  29  St.  Rep.  700;  S.  C, 
before,  52  Hun,  9  ;  reargued,  24  St. 
Rep.  103). 

2  Whittaker  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal 
Co. ,  126  N.  Y.  544 ;  Gilman  v.  East- 
ern R.  Co.,  10  Allen,  233. 

3  See  §§  194,  194a,  ante,  and  cases 
cited  ;  also  Durkin  v.  Sharp,  88  N. 
Y.  225;  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
M'Kee,  37  Kans.  592;  15  Pac.  484; 
Rogers  v.  Ludlow  Mfg.  Co.,  144  Mass. 
198  ;  11  N.  E.  77;  and  Mass.  cases 
there  cited. 


30/ 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§204 


his  rules.4  It  is  difficult  to  perceive  upon  what  principle  any 
distinction  can  be  made  between  supervision  for  these  purposes 
and  general  supervision  for  all  other  purposes  —  not  as  to 
minute  details,  but  over  the  general  work.  Indeed,  the 
requirement  of  rules  and  their  enforcement  (§  202)  has  no 
basis,  except  on  this  assumption.  Accordingly,  the  great 
weight  of  American  authority,  estimated  either  according  to 
the  number  of  judges  or  to  their  ability  and  freedom  from 
bias,  is  decidedly  in  favor  of  holding  masters,  whether  present 
or  absent,  to  personal  responsibility  for  such  general  super- 
vision as  a  prudent  master  would  give  if  personally  present.5 
If  the  master  chooses  to  delegate  this  supervision  to  an  agent, 
or  if  he  undertakes  work  on  so  large  a  scale  as  to  leave  him  no 
choice  but  to  so  delegate  it,  his  responsibility  stands  upon  the 
same  footing,  in  this  case,  as  in  the  other  duties  of  supervision, 
upon  which  all  authorities  agree. 

§  204.  Delegation  of  master's  personal  duties.— None  of 
the  duties  which  have  been  previously  stated  as  devolving 
upon  the  master  personally  can  be  by  him  delegated  to  any 
agent  so  as  to  relieve  him  from  personal  responsibility.1  He 
may  and  often  must  delegate  the  performance  of  such  duties 

4  Whittaker  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal    Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crockett, 
Co.,  126  N.  Y.  544;  Wabash  R.  Co.     19  Neb.   138;    26  N.    W.  921    [con- 


v.  McDaniels,  107  U.  S.  454 ;  2  S.  Ct. 
932. 

5  McElligott  v.  Randolph,  61  Conn. 
157  ;  22  Atl.  1094  ;  Criswell  v.  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.  R  Co.,  30  W.  Va.  798 ;  6 
S.  E.  31  ;  Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Keary,  3  Ohio  St.  201  ;  Taylor  v. 
Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  121  Ind.  124 ; 
22  N.  E.  876  ;  Engine  Works  v.  Rand- 
all, 100  Ind.  293  ;  Quincy  Mining  Co. 
t.  Kitts,  42  Mich.  34  ;  3  N.  W.  240  ; 
per  Cooley,  C.  J.;  Hunn  v.  Mich. 
Central  R.  Co.,  78  Mich.  513  ;  44  N. 
W.  502  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bay- 
field, 37  Mich.  205  ;  Carlson  v.  North 
West  Tel.Co.,  63  Minn.  428;  65N.W. 
914;  Miller  v.  Mo.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  109 
Mm  350  :  19  8.  W.  58,  and  cases  there 
cited  :  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lund- 
strum.  16  Neb.  254:  20  N.  W.  1  8 
[conductor's  orders]  :  re-affirmed, 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol   1  —  22] 


ductor's  omission  to  warn  of  danger]; 
Crystal  Ice  Co.  v.  Sherlock,  37  Neb. 
19  ;  55  N.  W.  294  ;  Hannibal,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Fox,  31  Kans.  586  ;  3  Pac.  320 
[foreman  failing  to  warn  of  danger] ; 
Bloyd  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58 
Ark.  66  ;  22  S.  W.  1089 ;  per  Field, 
J.,  Rogers  v.  Ludlow  Mfg.  Co.,  144 
Mass.  198  ;  11  N.  E.  77.  But  the 
principle  is  not  adhei-ed  to  in  Massa- 
chusetts, except  under  the  statute 
of  1887.  The  duty  does  not  extend 
so  far  as  to  require  the  master  to 
see  that  eveiy  servant  always  re- 
mains at  his  post  (Parker  v.  N.  Y. 
&  New  England  R.  Co.,  18  R.  I.  773  , 
30  Atl.  849). 

1  Booth  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73 
N.  Y.  38.  40.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
employer  t<>  select  and  retain  serv- 
ants who  are  fit  and  competent  for 


§  -04] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


333 


to  subordinates;  but  he  remains  responsible  to  all  his  servants 
for  the  acts  of  these  subordinates,  in  that  particular  capacity, 
to  the  same  extent  as  if  those  acts  were  literally  his  own.2 
This  has  been  repeatedly  adjudged,  as  to  his  duty  in  the  selec- 
tion and  dismissal  of  servants,3  in  providing,4  inspecting5  and 


the  service,  and  to  furnish  sufficient 
and  safe  materials,  machinery  or 
other  means  by  which  it  is  to  be  per- 
formed, and  to  keep  them  in  repair 
and  order.  This  duty  lie  cannot  dele- 
gate to  a  servant  so  as  to  exempt 
himself  from  liability  for  injuries 
caused  to  another  servant  by  this 
omission.  Indeed,  no  duty  required 
of  him  for  the  safety  and  protection 
of  his  servants  can  be  transferred,  so 
as  to  exempt  him  from  such  liability 
(Northern  Pacific  E.  Co.  v.  Herbert, 
116  U.  S.  642,  G47  ;  s.  P.,  Ford  v. 
Fitchburg  E.  Co.,  110  Mass.  240; 
Chicago,  etc.  E.  Co.  v.  Jackson,  55 
111.  492).  Almost  the  same  language 
was  used  by  Church,  C.  J.,  Flike  v. 
Boston,  etc.  E.  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  549. 
A  remarkable  distinction  was  made 
in  Malone  v.  Hatha%vay  (64  N.  Y. 
5,  12),  between  corporations  and  in- 
dividuals. It  was  held,  that,  where 
a  principal  was  an  individual,  "  and 
there  is  no  evidence  of  a  surrender 
of  power  and  control  to  any  subordi- 
nate, and  he  is  present  himself,  su- 
perintending the  establishment  in 
person,"  he  is  not  responsible  for  the 
negligence  of  a  competent  and  pro- 
per foreman  in  failing  to  maintain 
the  building  in  a  secure  and  safe 
condition.  Church,  C.  J.,  and  Ea- 
pallo,  J.,  dissented;  and  we  enter- 
tain no  doubt  that  their  dissent  was 
fully  justified. 

2  Cooper  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  E.  Co., 
24  West  Va.  37. 

Mann  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  91  N.  Y.  495  [incompetent  flag- 
man selected  by  conductor]  ;  Laning 
v  N.  Y.  Central  E  Co..  49  N.  Y. 
521  ;  Walker  v.  Boiling,  22  Ala.  294 


[ship-owner  responsible  for  captain's 
employment  of  incompetent  engi- 
neer]. To  the  contrary,  apparently, 
Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoover,  79 
Md.  253  ;  29  Atl.  994. 

4  The  obligation  of  the  master  "  to 
provide  and  maintain  in  suitable 
condition  the  machinery  and  appa- 
ratus to  be  used  by  its  employees  " 
cannot  be  so  delegated  to  an  agent  as 
to  relieve  the  master  from  responsi- 
bility therefor  to  his  servants  (Hough 
v.  Texas,  etc.  E.  Co.,  100  IT.  S.  213, 
220  ;  No.  Pac.  E.  Co.  v.  Poirier,  67 
Fed.  881  ;  15  C.  C.  A.  52 ;  Pullman 
Co.  v.  Laack,  143  111.  242  ;  32  N.  E. 
285  ;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Whitcomb, 
111  Ind.  212  ;  12  N.  E.  380  ;  Fuller  v. 
Jewett,  80  N.  Y*.  46  ;  Benzing  v. 
Steinway,  101  N.  Y.  547;  Collyer 
v.  Penna.  E.  Co.,  49  N.  J.  Law,  59  ; 
6  Atl.  437).  The  rule  is  the  same 
under  the  California  Code  (Sanborn 
v.  Madera,  etc.  E.  Co.,  70  Cal.  261  ; 
11  Pac.  710).  So  as  to  supplying 
sufficient  force  of  men  (Flike  v.  Bos- 
ton, etc.  E.  Co.,  53  N.  Y.  549). 
Agents  who  are  charged  with  the 
duty  of  supplying  safe  machinery 
are  not  to  be  regarded  as  fellow- 
servants  of  those  who  operate  it. 
They  are  charged  with  a  master's 
duties  to  his  servants.  They  are  em- 
ployed in  distinct  and  independent 
departments  of  service,  and  there  is 
no  difficulty  in  distinguishing  them 
(Ford  v.  Fitchburg  E.  Co.,  110  Mass. 
240;  S.  P.,  Kelly  v.  Erie  Tel.  Co.,  34 
Minn.  321  ;  Cincinnati,  etc.  E.  Co.  v. 
McMullen,  117  Ind.  439;  20  N.  E.287). 

5  The  operator  of  a  railroad,  to  ex- 
empt him  from  liability  to  a  servant 
for  injury  arising  from  a  defective 


339 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§204 


repairing G  materials  and  appliances,  in  warning  servants  of 
special  dangers,7  and  in  framing  rules.8  Thus  a  builder  has 
been  held  liable  to  a  hod-carrier  for  the  negligence  of  a  fore- 


condition  of  the  track,  must  show 
that  it  was,  at  proper  intervals,  care- 
fully inspected  by  a  competent  in- 
spector. Proof  of  the  competency 
of  the  inspector,  without  proof  of  due 
inspection,  is  insufficient  (Durkin  v. 
Sharp,  88  N.  Y.  225) .  s.  P. ,  as  to  plat- 
form containing  a  defective  plank 
(Benzing  v.  Steinway,  101  N.  Y.  547  ; 
5  N.  E.  449).  To  same  effect.  Little 
Rock,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moseley,  56  Fed. 
1009  ;  6  C.  C.  A.  225  [coupling  link]  ; 
Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McMullen, 
117  Ind.  439  ;  20  N.  E.  287  [car  brake]. 
The  same  rule  applies  to  the  inspec- 
tion of  foreign  cars  running  on  the 
road  (International,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kernan,  78  Tex.  294 ;  14  S.  W.  668). 
Very  strangely,  the  Ohio  courts, 
which  were  the  first  to  establish 
liberal  rules  in  favor  of  servants, 
have  greatly  erred  on  this  point, 
holding  that  a  railroad  company  is 
not  liable  to  a  train- hand  for  the 
failure  of  its  car  inspector  to  inspect 
(Little  Miami  R.  Co.  v.  Fitzpatrick, 
42  Ohio  St.  318  ;  citing  Columbus, 
etc.  R  Co.  v.  Webb,  12  Id.  475). 
This  ruling  is  clearly  wrong. 

6  The  neglect  of  a  servant  to  keep 
in  order  machinery,  etc.,  is  not  the 
neglect  of  a  fellow-servant  of  the  one 
employed  to  operate  such  machinery. 
In  the  repair  of  machinery,  the  serv- 
ant represents  the  master  in  the  per- 
formance of  his  part  of  the  contract, 
and  his  negligence  in  that  respect  is 
the  negligence  of  the  master  (Shanny 
v.Androscoggin  Mills,  66  Me.  420; 
cited  and  followed  in  Northern 
Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Herbert,  116  U.  S. 
642,  651).  To  the  same  effect.  Sa- 
dowski  v.  Mich.  Car.  Co..  84  Mich. 
100  ;  47  N.  W.  r.98  ;  Roux  v.  Blodgett 


Co.,  94  Mich.  607  ;  54  N.  W.  492  ; 
Bessex  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  45 
Wise.  477,  481 ;  Wedgwood  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  41  Wise.  478; 
Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Conroy,  68  111. 
560  ;  Drymala  v.  Thompson,  26  Minn. 
40  ;  Flynn  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  It. 
Co.,  78  Mo.  195;  Houston,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Marcelles,  59  Tex.  334.)  This 
duty  of  inspection  and  repair  cannot 
be  delegated  so  as  to  avoid  the  mas- 
ter's personal  liability  (Bailey  v. 
Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  139  N.  Y.  302; 
34  N.  E.  918  ;  Richmond,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Elliott,  149  U.  S.  266 ;  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward,  61  Fed. 
927  ;  18  U.  S.  App.  683 ;  Cooper  v. 
Pittsburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  24  West  Va. 
37;  Ford  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  110 
Mass.  249  ;  Moynihan  v.  Hills  Mfg. 
Co.,  146  Mass.  580;  16  N.  E.  574; 
Davis  v.  Central  Vt.  R.  Co.,  55  Vt. 
84  [fireman  killed  by  negligence  of 
road-master] ;  Cook  v.  St.  Paul,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  34  Minn.  45  [negligent  road- 
master]  ;  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Moore,  31  Kans.  197  [same]  ;  Lawless 
v.  Conn.  River  R.  Co.,  136  Mass.  1 
[draw-bar  on  switch  engine  too  low]  ; 
Mulvey  v.  R.  I.  Locomotive  Works, 
14  R.  I.  240  [breaking  of  elevator 
chain]  ;  Kirkpatrick  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral, etc.  R.  Co.,  79  N.  Y.  240  [ex- 
plosion of  weak  boiler]). 

'Smith  v.  Oxford  Iron  Co.,  43 
N.  J.  Law,  467  [verdict  sustained 
where  a  miner  was  injured  by  ex- 
plosion of  giant  powder  :  defendant 
having  failed  to  explain  its  danger- 
ous character].  Numerous  examples 
may  be  found  in  the  notes  to  §  203, 
ante. 

8  See  §  202,  ante. 


§  205]  LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  340 

man  employed  to  put  up  a  scaffold,9  or  entrusted  with  the 
construction  and  rigging  of  a  derrick,10  and  a  cotton  manufac- 
turing company  for  the  negligence  of  a  loom-repairer.11  So, 
as  to  a  mining  company,  in  respect  of  the  negligence  of  its 
superintendent,  who  failed  to  adopt  precautions  against  injury 
t>>  the  miners  by  falling  rock ; 12  and  a  factory-owner,  for  the 
act  of  his  foreman  in  supplying  a  defective  platform.13  Several 
English  and  American  decisions  are  inconsistent  with  these 
principles;  but  they  were  all,  or  nearly  all,  decided  without 
considering  the  distinction  between  the  responsibility  of  a 
master  for  materials,  and  his  responsibility  for  the  use  made  of 
materials  by  fellow-servants  of  the  injured  servant.  All  such 
decisions  are  of  no  authority,  outside  of  the  particular  courts 
making  them,  and  ought  to  be  overruled,  even  there.14  We 
hold,  further,  that  the  power  of  absolute  command  cannot  be 
delegated  so  as  to  relieve  the  master  from  liability  for  its 
misuse.15     But,  in  a  few  courts,  this  doctrine  is  not  accepted. 

§  205.  Illustrations  of  non-transferable  duties.—  Upon 
the  principle  just  stated,  many  cases  have  been  decided,  espe- 
cially with  reference  to  corporations.     Thus,  it  has  been  held 

9  Green  v.  Banta,  48  N.  Y.  Superior  Wonder  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co. , 
Ct..  156  (affi'd,  97  N.  Y.  627),  where  32  Md.  411  ;  Seaile  v.  Lindsay,  11 
Sedgwick,  C.  J.,  says  :  "The  master  C.  B.  N.  S.  429;  Little  Miami  R.  Co. 
would  be  liable  for  the  neglect  of  any  v.  Fitzpatrick,  42  Ohio  St.  318  ;  Gib- 
workman,  not  called  foreman,  who  son  v.  Northern  Central  R.  Co.,  22 
was  directed  by  the  master  to  make  Hun,  289  ;  Kidwell  v.  Houston,  etc. 
the  scaffold."  See  Fort  v.  Whipple,  R.  Co.,  3  Woods  C  C.  313  [all  cases 
11  Hun,  586  [workman  injured  by  of  negligent  inspection  of  ma- 
defects  in  scaffold  constructed  by  de-  chinery]  ;  Collier  v.  Steinhardt,  51 
fendant].  Cal.  116  [negligent  selection  of  serv- 

10  Courtney  v.  Cornell,  49  N.  Y.  ant  by  agent  delegated  thereto]  ; 
Superior,  286.  Mackin  v.  Boston  &  Alb.  R.  Co.,  135 

11  Gunter  v.  Graniteville  Mfg.  Co.,  Mass.  201  ;  Smith  v.  Potter,  46  Mich. 
18  S.  C.  262.  258  [neglect  of  car  inspector  to  in- 

12  Pantzar  v.  Tilly  Foster  Mining  spect  defective  cars  received  from 
Co  .  99  N.  Y.  368  ;    2  N.  E.  24.     To  other  companies]. 

the  contrary,    Hall    v.   Johnson,    9        15  See  ££  226,  227,  post.     In  Miller 

Hurlst.  &  C.  589,  of  no  authority  in  v.  Missouri  Pacific  R.  Co   (109  Mo. 

America.  350;  19  S.  W.  58),  this  section  was 

13  Benzing  v.  Steinway,  101  N.  Y.  cited  as  authoiuty  for  holding  that 
547  ;  ■")  N.  E.  449.  such  power  could  not  be  thus  dele- 

14  Among  the  cases  thus  errone-  gated, 
ously    decided    on    this    point    are 


341  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS.  [§  20$ 

that  a  corporation  is  responsible  to  its  servants  for  the  negli- 
gence of  other  servants,  entrusted  with  the  duty  of  providing 
a  safe  place  in  which  to  work,1  or  of  providing  suitable  tools, 
materials  or  other  appliances;  as  in  the  case  of  an  agent 
entrusted  with  the  selection  of  ropes,2  or  of  a  section  boss, 
who  knowingly  furnished  a  spike-driver  with  a  defective  maul;3 
of  the  foreman  of  a  gang  employed  in  constructing  a  road, 
who  was  entrusted  with  the  thawing  of  blasting  powder,  by 
whose  negligence  in  doing  which  one  of  the  men  was  injured  ;4 
of  a  car  inspector,  through  whose  neglect  to  cause  a  defective 
ladder  on  a  box  car  to  be  repaired,  a  brakeman  fell  from  the 
car;5  of  a  master  mechanic,  having  exclusive  management  of 
motive  power,  in  failing  to  make  secure  a  steam  whistle,6  and 
of  a  general  superintendent  and  an  overseer  of  repairs  in  a 
factory,  by  whose  joint  neglect  to  complete  certain  machinery 
before  starting  it,  an  employee  was  injured.7  So  railroad  com- 
panies have  been  held  responsible  to  their  servants  for  the 
negligence  of  other  servants  entrusted  with  the  duty  of 
inspecting  materials  and  supplies  or  making  repairs,  as  in  the 
case    of  a  division   superintendent   in   respect   of  defects  in  a 

1  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox,  31  4  Gilmore  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co., 
Kans.  586,  where  the  foreman  or  18  Fed.  860 ;  Bertha  Zinc  Co.  v. 
boss  repairer  ordered  the  plaintiff  to  Martin,  93  Va.  791;  22  S.  E.  869 
go    under  a  car  to   make    repairs,  [dynamite]. 

While  the  plaintiff  was  under  the  5  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Her- 
car  other  cars  were  pushed  along  the  bert,  116  TJ.  S.  643  ;  Cooper  v.  Pitts- 
track  and  injured  the  plaintiff.  Held,  burgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  24  W.  Va.  37; 
that  for  the  foreman's  neglect  to  see  Brann  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53 
that  reasonable  precautions  were  Iowa,  595  ;  Condon  v.  Mo.  Pacific  R. 
taken  to  protect  plaintiff,  the  com-  Co.,  78  Mo.  567. 

pany  was   responsible  (Quincy  Coal  6  Hough  v.  Railroad  Company,  100 

Co.  v.  Hood,  77  111.  68  [superintend-  TJ.  S.  213. 

ent     of    mining     company    having  '  Wilson  v.  Willimantic  Linen  Co., 

timely  notice  of    dangerous  condi-  50  Conn.  433.     The  negligence  of  de- 

tion  of  roof  of  mine]).  fendant's  foreman  in  failing  to  notice 

2  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Uela-  the  defect  in  machinery  when  it 
hunty,  53  Tex.  206  [roadmaster  who  came  from  the  manufacturer,  or  in 
f  urnished  a  worn  rope]  ;  Indiana  Car  failing  afterwards  to  discover  the  de- 
Co.  v.  Parker,  100  Ind.  181  [superin-  feet,  is  the  negligence  of  a  servant 
tendent  allowed  a  rope  used  in  oper-  in  the  discharge  of  a  duty  which  the 
ating  a  cut-off  saw  to  become  worn  master  owes  his  other  servants  and 
and  unsafe  from  age  and  use].  not,  the  negligence  of  a  fellow-serv- 

3  Guthrie  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  ant(Houston  v.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331;  29 
11  Lea  (Tenn.)  372.  Atl.  380). 


§205] 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS  TO   SERVANTS. 


34-2 


station  house  which  he  had  discretionary  power  to  repair;8  of 
a  superintendent  of  repairs  who  failed  to  make  proper  exami- 
n. it  ion  of  a  locomotive  boiler,  by  defects  in  which  a  fireman 
was  killed;9  of  its  inspectors  of  stakes  used  as  guards  on  plat- 
form cars,  by  the  breaking  of  one  of  which  a  brakeman  was 
injured;1"  of  a  car  inspector,  whose  duty  it  was  to  inspect  cars, 
failing  to  mark  them  for  repairs,  for  want  of  which  a  man 
engaged  in  coupling  cars  was  injured.11  So  as  to  a  road  master^ 
whose  duty  it  was  to  keep  the  road  in  good  repair,  and  through 
whose  neglect  a  train  was  precipitated  into  a  washout  and  a 
brakeman  injured;12  and  a  section  foreman,  who,  having  taken 
up  a  rail  in  repairing  the  track,  failed  to  put  out  any  signal  to 
warn  approaching  trains,  whereby  a  train  was  thrown  off  and  a 
brakeman's  leg  broken.15  So  as  to  servants  entrusted  with 
the  power  of  deciding  what  number  of  men  was  necessary  for 
a  particular  task.11  So  with  regard  to  servants  having  abso- 
lute  control   over   the   starting    or  delaying   of  trains.15     The 


8  Illinois  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Welch, 
52  111.  133  ;  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Oram,  40  Tex.  341  [brakeman  while 
ascending  a  side  ladder  on  a  car  in 
motion,  injured  by  projecting  frame- 
work of  a  water  tank]. 

9  Stevenson  v.  Jewett,  16  Hun, 
210. 

10  Bushby  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie  R. 
Co.,  37  Hun,  104;  affi'd,  107  N.  Y. 
374. 

11  Tierney  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  33  Minn.  311,  where  Vander- 
burgh, J.,  distinguishes  between 
servants  or  agents  whose  duties  re- 
late to  the  maintenance  of  safe  in- 
strumentalities and  those  who  super- 
intend the  use  of  them  (comparing 
Drymala  v.  Thompson,  26  Minn.  40, 
and  Brown  v.  Winona,  etc.  R.  Co.. 
27  Id.  162).  The  same  distinction  is 
taken  in  Marvin  v.  Miller  (23  Hun, 
10:5). 

'-'  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore, 
31  Kans.  197  ;  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Dunham,  49  Tex.  181  ;  s.  P.,  New 
Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hughes,  49 
Miss.  258  ;  and  see  Hall  v.  Pacific  R. 


Co.,  74  Mo.  293  ;  following  Lewis  v. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  59  Id.  495.  In 
Bessex  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  (45 
Wise.  477),  the  neglect  of  yardmaster 
to  keep  the  track  free  from  obstruc- 
tions, whereby  plaintiff  was  injured 
through  the  falling  of  a  pile  of 
boards,  was  held  to  be  the  negligence 
of  defendant.  Followed  in  Huleban 
v.  Green  Bay,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53  Wise. 
319  [loose  blocks  of  firewood  left 
scattered  along  track,  over  which 
brakeman  stumbled  while  coupling 
cars]. 

13  Drymala  v.  Thompson,  26  Minn. 
40.  Compare  Walsh  v.  St.  Paul,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  27  Minn.  367. 

14  Flike  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53 
N.  Y.  549  ;  Booth  v.  Boston,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  73  Id.  38  ;  in  which  cases  de- 
fendant's agent  sent  out  a  freight 
train  with  only  two  brakeman  aboard 
when  there  should  have  been  tbree, 
which  was  the  usual  number. 

15  Darrigan  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  Eng- 
land R.  Co.,  52  Conn.  285  [train  dis- 
patcher, through  whose  negligence 
in  sending  out  two  irregular  trains 


34: 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS 


[§  2o6 


decisions  as  to  the  liability  of  railroad  companies  to  their 
servants  for  the  neglect  of  engineers  to  give  the  ordinary 
signals  of  approaching  trains,  are  simply  irreconcilable.16 

§206.  What  is  sufficient  notice  to  master. —  Masters  are 
charged  with  notice,  not  only  of  what  they  know,  but  also  of 
what  they  ought  to  know,1  that  is,  of  every  fact  which  they 
would  have  known  had  they  used  ordinary  care  and  diligence 
in  performing  their  duties.2  And  while  the  general  rule  which, 
in  favor  of  a  stranger,  holds  the  principal  to  be  affected  with 
notice  of  any  fact  coming  to  the  knowledge  of  any  of  his 
agents,  under  such  circumstances  as  to  make  it  the  duty  of  that 
agent  to  communicate  the  fact  to  his  principal,  does  not  apply 
to  its  full  extent  in  favor  of  a  servant,3  yet,  where  a  master  has 


in  opposite  directions  a  collision  oc- 
curred, which  injured  an  engineer]  ; 
Hankins  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  142  N.  Y.  516;  37  N.  E.  466 
[samej ;  Dana  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
92  N.  Y.  639  ;  rev'g  23  Hun,  473  [rele- 
graph  operator,  through  whom  the 
movements  of  trains  were  regulated, 
by  whose  omission  to  send  proper 
dispatches,  a  collision  occurred,  in 
which  an  engineer  was  killed]. 

16  In  Georgia,  Kentucky,  Mississ- 
ippi, Indiana,  Illinois,  Missouri, 
Minnesota.  Oregon,  the  railroad  com- 
pany is  held  responsible.  (See  cases 
cited  under  §  203.)  In  the  U.  S.  Su- 
preme Court,  the  contrary  rule  was 
recently  established  (Northern  Pac. 
R.  Co.  v.  Charless,  162  U.  S.  359). 

1  Ocean  S  S.  Co.  v.  Matthews,  86 
Ga.  418  ;  12S  E.  632  [defect  in  ap- 
pliances] ;  Standard  Mfg.  Co.'s  ap- 
peal. 130  Pa.  St.  446  ;  18  Atl.  637. 

2  LTnion  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Daniels, 
152  U.  S.  684;  14  S.  Ct.  756;  John- 
son v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  79  Wise. 
414  ;  48  N.  W.  712  ;  St.  Louis,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v  Davis,  54  Ark.  389  ;  15  S 
W.  895  [latent  defect,  which  should 
have  been  discovered]  ;  Moon  v. 
Northern  Pac.  R  Co.,  46  Minn.  106  ; 
48  N.  W.  679  [same].     The  facts  that 


a  defective  car  was  attached  to  a 
train,  with  nothing  to  show  that  it 
differed  from  the  other  cars,  and 
that  it  became  necessary  to  use  it  in 
such  a  manner  as  resulted  in  injury, 
are  prima  facie  evidence  of  negli- 
gence of  the  railroad  company, 
without  proof  that  it  had  notice  of 
the  defect  (Guthrie  v.  Maine  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  81  Me.  572  ;  18  Atl.  295).  See 
Griffin  v.  Boston  &  Alb.  R.  Co  ,  148 
Mass.  143  ;  19  N.  E.  166  [defective 
coupling  link],  and  §§191,  194,  194  a, 
ante,  and  many  cases  there  cited. 

3  Knowledge  of  a  defect,  in  ma- 
terials, etc.,  on  the  part  of  a  fellow- 
servant,  of  precisely  the  same  grade 
as  the  one  who  is  injured  by  such 
defect  (e.  a.,  a  brakeman),  is  not  im- 
putable to  the  master  (Smoot  v,  Mo- 
bile, etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Ala.  13  ;  Union 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Springsteen,  41  Kans. 
724 ;  21  Pac.  774 ;  Indiana,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Snyder  (Ind.),  32  N.  E.  1129 
[latent  defect  in  handle,  known  only 
to  carpenter  making  it,  not  notice]). 
But  notice  to  a  telegraph  operator 
of  a  railroad,  of  defect  in  a  bridge  is 
sufficient  notice  to  the  company 
(Hall  v.  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  39 
Fed.  18). 


§  206] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


">     1     i 


delegated  to  any  of  his  servants  the  duty  of  receiving  notice 
of  certain  facts,4  or  has  placed  in  their  hands  the  power  of  tak- 
ing action  with  respect  to  such  notice,  or  has  left  such  matters 
under  their  charge  or  control,5  notice  of  such  facts  to  such  serv- 
ants is  equivalent  to  notice  to  the  master.  Thus,  a  master  is 
charged  with  notice  of  the  incompetency  of  a  servant,  when 
received  by  any  agent  who  has  the  power  of  dismissing  that 
servant,6  or  even  of  suspending  him;7  and  with  notice  of 
defects  in  instrumentalies,  received  by  any  agent  charged  with 
the  supply,  inspection  or  repair  of  such  instrumentalities.8 
Notice  to  any  one  who  is  a  vice-principal  (within  the  definition 
hereafter  given)  is  sufficient  notice  to  the  master.9     If  a  master 


4  A  railroad  company  is  bound,  by 
notice  of  the  defective  condition  of 
a  Bwitch  engine,  given  to  a  foreman 
in  its  repair  shop,  to  whom,  by  the 
company's  rules,  the  same  should 
have  been  reported  (Brabbits  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  38  Wise.  287). 
Where  a  railroad  company  makes  no 
provision  for  inspection  of  locomo- 
tives except  by  engineers,  it  is  a 
question  for  the  jury  whether  the 
engineer  does  not  occupy  such  rela- 
tion to  the  company  that  notice  to 
him  is  notice  to  the  company  (Mc- 
Donald v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 
108  Mich.  7  ;  65  N.  W.  597). 

5  Notice  to  head  engineer,  who  has 
charge  of  all  the  machinery  and 
elevators  in  a  building,  that  an  ele- 
vator chain  was  too  light  for  its 
work,  is  notice  to  the  owner  (De- 
laney  v.  Hilton,  50  N.  Y.  Super.  341). 
Notice  to  foreman  of  railroad  round- 
bouse  of  the  dangerous  condition  of 
an  engine  belonging  to  that  house, 
held  notice  to  the  company  (Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rung,  104  111.  641).  So, 
as  to  notice  given  to  a  railroad  super- 
intendent of  a  defect  in  its  track 
(Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R. 
Co. ,  7<5  Pa.  St.  389  ) ;  or  in  a  car-coup- 
ler (Bowers  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  4 
Utah,  215;  7  Pac  251). 
*  Notice  to    the   master-mechanic 


whose  province  it  was  to  employ  and 
discharge  engineers  and  firemen,  of 
the  practice  of  engineers  to  violate 
an  order  of  the  company,  by  placing 
their  engines  in  the  hands  of  fire- 
men, is  notice  to  the  company  (Ohio, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Collarn,  73  Ind.  261) 

7  It  is  sufficient  that  notice  of  in- 
competency should  be  given  to  offi- 
cers who  supervise  such  employee's 
work,  and  are  given  authority  to 
suspend  him  temporarily  from  his 
position,  for  incompetency  of  the 
kind  in  question  (Baltimore,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Henthorne,  19  C.  C.  A.  623 ;  73 
Fed.  634). 

b  Worden  v.  Humeston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
76  Iowa,  310 ;  41  N.  W.  26  ;  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Blevins,  46  Kans.  370; 
26  Pac.  687  [foreman  providing  de- 
fective tool]  ;  Sangamon  Coal  Co., 
v.  Wiggerhaus,  122  111.  279;  13  N.  E. 
648.  Notice  of  defects  in  appliances, 
to  one  whose  duty  it  is  to  have  re- 
pairs made,  whatever  the  grade  of 
his  employment,  is  notice  to  the 
company  (Chapman  v.  Southern 
Pac.  Co.',  12  Utah,  30  ;   41  Pac  551). 

*  Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R. 
R.  Co.,  76  Pa.  St.  389  ;  Johnson  v. 
First  Nat  Bank,  79  Wise.  414 ;  48 
N.  W.  712  [superintendent  of  build- 
ing walk]  ;  Lyttle  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  84  Mich.  289;   47  N.  W.  571 


345 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§207 


does  not  provide  any  convenient  means  of  receiving  notice  per- 
sonally or  through  an  easily  accessible  vice-principal,  he  neg- 
lects his  personal  duty  of  supervision  and  inspection,  and 
notice  to  any  agent  who  ought  to  communicate  it,  may  be 
sufficient.10 

§  207.  Contributory  negligence.— All  the  rules  as  to  con- 
tributory negligence  are,  of  course,  applicable  to  the  claims  of 
servants  against  their  masters ;  and  many  cases  of  that  kind  have 
already  been  cited  in  Chapter  VI.  Some  further  illustrations  of 
the  application  of  these  rules  may  be  given  here,  as  contributory 
negligence  is  naturally  very  frequent  among  injured  servants. 
Constant  familiarity  with  danger  always  breeds  indifference  and 
often  produces  recklessness.  The  servant  cannot  recover  if  his 
injury  was  proximately  due  to  his  own  fault  in  taking  unneces- 
sary risks,1  as  by  needlessly  going  or  remaining  in  a  dangerous 


[notice  to  yardmaster  of  defects  in 
engine].  Those  in  charge  of  the  men 
who  were  using  a  hand  car  had 
actual  knowledge  of  defects.  Held, 
that  their  knowledge  was  notice  to 
the  company  (Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Napole,  55  Kans.  401  ;  40  Pac. 
6(59).     Where  notice  was  given  to  the 


Atl.  939  ;  Carroll  v.  East  Tennessee, 
V.  &  G.  Ry.  Co.,  82  Ga.  452 ;  10  S. 
E.  163  [fireman  traveling  with  sleep- 
ing engineer]  ;  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Patterson.  69111.  650  ;  s.  C,  again, 
93  111.  290  ;  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thomas,  51  Miss.  637  [driving  train 
too  fast  over  track  known  to  be  dan- 


superintendent   of    a  street  railway    gerous]  ;    Welch    v.    Brainard,     108 


company  of  a  defect,  but  the  com- 
pany neglected  to  remedy  the  defect, 
and  after  a  change  in  superintend- 
ents, a  servant  was  injured  thereby, 
the  company  could  not  plead  want 
of  notice  of  the  defect,  though  its 
then  superintendent  had  not  been 
notified  thereof  (Bland  v.  Shreve- 
port  R.  Co.,  48  La.  Ann.  1057  ;  20  So. 
284). 

10  Notice  to  a  conductor  of  a  de- 
fective "  hand-hold  "  or  "  foot-rest  " 
was  notice  to  defendant,  and  his 
promise  to  have  the  defect  repaired 
soon  was  sufficient,  though  not  him- 
self authorized  to  make  the  repairs 
(Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kenley, 
92  Tenn.  207  ;  21  S.  W.  326). 

1  Lothrop  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  150 
Mass  423:  23  N.  E.  227;  Piper  v. 
Cambria   Iron   Co.,    78  Md.  249;  27 


Mich.  38  ;  65  N.  W.  667  [doing  work 
in  a  needlessly  dangerous  manner]  ; 
Way  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  70  Iowa, 
393;  41  N.  W.  51  [dispensing  with 
needed  assistance]  ;  Govven  v.  Har- 
ley,  6  C.  C.  A.  190  ;  50  Fed.  973. 
While  the  cars  were  still  moving, 
decedent  began  to  climb  down  the 
side  of  the  car,  and  was  crushed  be- 
tween the  car  and  a  post  which 
stood  close  to  the  track.  Decedent 
was  an  experienced  railroad  man, 
and  was  familiar  with  the  surround- 
ings of  defendant's  tracks.  It  did 
not  appear  that  any  rule  of  defend- 
ant required  decedent  to  descend 
from  a  moving  train  at  that  place. 
Held,  that  decedent  assumed  the 
risk  in  descending  from  car,  and 
plaintiff  could  not  recover  (Penning- 
ton v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90  M'ch. 


§  -o;\ 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


546 


place,'-  needlessly  or  carelessly  using  dangerous  appliances,3  need- 
lessly using  materials,  implements  or  structures  for  purposes,  or 
in  a  manner  to  which  they  are  obviously  not  adapted,4  needlessly 


505;  51  N.  W.  634).  In  an  action 
against  a  railway  company  for  the 
death  of  an  employee,  evidence  that 
deceased  was  habitually  careless  and 
reckless  in  the  performance  of  his 
duty  is  admissible  (Peoria,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Puckett,  52  111.  App.  222). 
"Where  plaintiff  was  not  acting 
under  the  orders  of  his  employer, 
but  on  his  own  responsibility,  know- 
ing the  danger,  he  could  not  recover 
damages  for  his  injuries  (Taylor  v. 
Baldwin,  78  Cal.  517;  21  Pac.  124). 

2  Bunt  v.  Sierra  Min.  Co.,  138  U. 
S.  483 ;  11  S.  Ct.  464  [miner  remov- 
ing prop  and  sitting  under  danger- 
ous roof]  ;  Victor  Coal  Co.  v.  Muir, 
20  Colo.  320  ;  38  Pac.  378  [miner  con- 
tinuing work  without  propping 
mine]  ;  Coal  Co.  v.  Estievenard,  53 
Ohio  St.  43  ;  40  N.  E.  725  [same]  ; 
Lord  v.  Pueblo  Smelting  &  Refining 
Co.,  12  Colo.  390  ;  21  Pac.  148  [pass- 
ing between  cars  two  feet  apart]  ; 
Whitmore  v.  Boston  &  M.  R.  Co., 
150  Mass.  477  ;  23  N.  E.  220  [going 
between  cars] ;  Columbus,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bridges,  86  Ala.  448  ;  5  So. 
864  [crossing  dangerous  trestle]  ; 
Haggerty  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90 
Iowa,  405  ;  57  N.  W.  896  [climbing 
down  side  of  car]  ;  Southern  Pac. 
Co.  v.  Johnson,  12  C.  C.  A.  479  ;  64 
Fed.  951  [going  outside  of  locomotive 
while  running  fast].  A  conductor 
of  a  material  train  who,  unneces- 
sarily and  contrary  to  custom, 
climbed  on  top  of  a  shanty  car  form- 
ing part  of  the  train,  to  signal  the 
engineer,  and  was  thrown  there- 
from on  account  of  the  car  being  de- 
railed through  the  falling  of  the 
coupling  apparatus,  was  guilty  of 
contributory  negligence  (Georgia, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hallman,  97  Ga.  317;  23 


S.  E.  73  [conductor  climbing  on  top 
of  car,  without  necessity  or  cus- 
tom] ;  Werk  v.  Illinois  Steel  Co.,  154 
111.  427  ;  40  N.  E.  442  [standing  on 
rail,  close  to  wheel  of  car]  ;  Coops 
v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  33  N.  W. 
541  [creeping  under  train]  ;  Kinney 
v.  Corbin,  132  Pa.  St.  341  ;  19  Atl. 
141  [going  under  hanging  stone]  ; 
Kilroy  v.  Foss,  161  Mass.  138  ;  36  N. 
E.  746  [going  under  hanging  stone  ; 
Goff  v.  Chippewa  River,  etc.  R.  Co., 
86  Wise.  237 ;  56  N.  W.  465  ;  Years- 
ley  v.  Sunset  Telephone  Co.,  110  Cal. 
236 ;  42  Pac.  638  [climbing  tree  to 
string  wires]).  To  stand  in  close  prox- 
imity to  a  railroad  train  passing  at 
the  rate  of  thirty  or  forty  miles  an 
hour  is  contributory  negligence 
(Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Stassen,  56 
111.  App.  221). 

8  Cunningham  v.  Merrimac  Paper 
Co.,  163  Mass.  89  ;  39  N.  E.  774  [lift- 
ing heavy  door]  ;  Diehl  v.  Lehigh 
Iron  Co.  (Pa.),  21  Atl.  430  [dyna- 
mite] ;  Acme  Coal  Min.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Iver,  5  Colo.  App.  267  ;  38  Pac.  596 
[elevator  liable  to  start] ;  Massie  v. 
Peel  Coal  Co.,  41  W.  Va.  629 ;  24  S. 
E.  644  [coal  miner,  who  tested  slate 
roof  of  mine  by  tapping  it  with  his 
pick  near  place  known  to  him  to  be 
dangerous]. 

4  An  employee  cannot  recover  for 
injuries  from  defective  appliances 
while  using  them,  without  necessity, 
in  a  manner  and  for  a  purpose  not 
intended,  where  the  defects  would 
not  render  such  appliances  unfit  to 
be  used  as  intended  (Jayne  v.  Sebe- 
waing  Coal  Co.,  108  Mich.  242  ;  65  N- 
W.  971)  ;  Galvin  v.  Old  Colony  R. 
Co..  162  Mass  533  ;  39  N.  E.  186 
[narrow  passage,  not  meant  for 
travel] ;  Jennings  v.  Tacoma  R.  Co., 


347 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS     TO     SERVANTS. 


[§207 


-coupling  cars  in  motion,5  or  needlessly  trying  to  step  on  a 
moving  railroad  train.6  He  cannot  recover  for  injuries  caused 
by  his  own  negligence,  in  using  without  order  to  do  so,  appli- 
ances which  he  knows  to  be  dangerously  defective  or  out  of 
repair,7  or  using  dangerous  machinery  in  a  perilous  manner,8  or 


7  Wash.  St.  275  ;  34  Pac.  937  [same]  ; 
Cluny  v.  Cornell  Mills,  160  Mass. 
218  ;  35  N.  E.  772  [guard  to  saw]  ; 
Felch  v.  Allen,  98  Mass.  572  ;  Hous- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Meyers,  55  Tex. 
110  [brakeman  using  end  of  switch- 
chain  in  place  of  coupling-link]  ; 
Groff  v.  Duluth  Imperial  Mill  Co., 
58  Minn.  333  ;  59  N.  W.  1049  [setting 
ladder  on  lose  barrels]  ;  Richardson 
v.  Carbon  Hill  Coal  Co.,  6  Wash.  St. 
52  ;  32  Pac.  1012  [walking  in  railroad 
tunnel] ;  Kauffman  v.  Maier,  94  Cal. 
269  ;  29  Pac.  481.  But  where  an  ap- 
pliance suitable  for  the  purpose  for 
which  it  is  designed,  is  used  for  an- 
other for  which  it  is  unfitted,  the 
master  may  become  liable  for  in- 
juries caused  by  such  diversion, 
where  that  practice  has  grown  into  a 
custom  (Miller  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co., 
17  Fed.  67 ;  Crebarry  v.  National 
Transit  Co.,  28  X.  Y.  Supp.  291  ;  77 
Hun,  74  [leaning  against  lath]). 

5  Finnell  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 
129  N.  Y.  669  ;  29  X.  E.  825  ;  Ken- 
nedy v.  Lake  Superior,  etc.  R.  Co., 
87  Wise.  28  ;  57  N.  W.  976  ;  Long  v. 
Coronado  R.  Co.,  96  Cal.  269  ;  31  Pac. 
170 ;  Muldowney  v.  Illinois  Central 
R.  Co.,  39  Iowa,  615  [brakeman 
warned] ;  Williams  v.  Central  R.  Co., 
43  Id.  396 ;  Peoria,  D.  &  E.  R.  Co.  v. 
Puckett,  52  111  App.  222  ;  Towner  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  52  Mo.  App. 
648  [needlessly  coupling  cars  going 
6  miles  an  hour]. 

6  Wilson  v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co., 
94  Mich.  20  ;  53  N.  W.  797  ;  Xovock 
v.  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co..  63  Mich. 
121  ;  29  N.  W.  525  ;  Louisville,  etc  N 
R.  Co  v.  Wallace,  90  Tenn.  531  ;  15  S. 
W.  921  [speed  ten  miles  an  hour  ;  in- 


excusable] ;  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Bivins,  103  Ala.  142;  15  So.  515  ; 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bloyd,  60 
Ark.  637  ;  31  S.  W.  457  ;  Union  Pac. 
R.  Co.  v.  Estes,  37  Kans.  715  ;  16  Pac. 
131. 

7  Schulz  v.  Robe,  149  N.  Y.  132  ;  43 
X.  E.  420 ;  rev'g  S  Misc.  683  ;  28  X. 
Y.  Supp.  1147;  McQuigan  v.  Dela- 
ware, etc.  R.  Co..  122  X.  Y.  618  ;  26 
X.  E.  13.  Where  deceased  was  in 
charge  of  defendant's  coal  cars,  and 
in  the  use  of  a  car,  the  trap  of  which 
had,  to  his  knowledge,  been  broken 
two  weeks  before  he  was  killed  by 
falling  through  the  trap,  while  cars 
in  proper  condition  were  available  to 
him  for  use,  and  he  had  been  directed 
to  send  cars  with  broken  traps  to  the 
shop  for  repair,  held,  that  it  was 
error  to  submit  the  case  to  the  jury 
(Shields  v.  X.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  133 
X.  Y   557;  30  X.  E.  596). 

*Odell  v.  X.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  120 
X.  Y.  323  ;  24  X.  E.  478  [placing 
hand  on  dangerous  saw]  ;  Gaff ney  v. 
Inman  Mfg.  Co.,  18  R.  I.  781  ;  31  Atl. 
6  [putting  hand  in  machine  while  in 
motion]  ;  Hartwig  v.  Bay  State  Shoe 
Co.,  118  X.  Y.  664  ;  23  X.  E.  24  [ad- 
justing machinery  in  motion]  ;  Lar- 
son v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  43  Minn. 
488;  45  X.  W.  1096  [turning  cog- 
wheels by  hand] ;  Salem  Stone  Co. 
v.  O'Brien,  12  Ind.  App.  217;  40  X. 
E.  430  [resting  foot  on  cogwheels]  ; 
Wilson  v  Steel-Edge  Stamping  Co., 
163  Mass.  315;  39  X.  E.  1039  [bad 
method  using  machinery]  ;  Mc- 
Callum  v.  McCallum,  58  Minn.  288; 
59  N.  W.  1019  ;  Jones  v.  Sutherland, 
91  Wise.  587  ;  <;."")  >T.  W.  496. 


§207] 


LIABILITY    OF    jMASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


)43 


in  failing  to  heed  warnings  or  signals;9  in  failing  to  give  such 
warning  to  others  as  is  necessary  for  his  own  protection;10  in 
failing  to  use  the  safeguards  which  the  master  has  provided,11 
or  to  take  proper  precautions  against  known  danger,1-  or  in 
omitting  to  look  and  listen  for  approaching  trains  on  a  railroad,13 


9  St,  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co  v.  Schu- 
macher, 153  U.  S.  77  ;  14  S.  Ct.  479 
[several  warnings]  ;  Southern  Pac. 
Co.  v.  Seley,  153  U.  S.  145;  14  S.  Ct.  530 
[warned,  yet  persisted]  ;  Moeller  v. 
Brewster,  131  N.  Y.  GOG  ;  30  N.  E.  124 
[warning  against  hammering  radia- 
tor] ;  Ward  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co  , 
39  W.  Va.  46  ;  19  S.  E.  3S9  [failure  to 
see  signal]  Vreeland  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.  (Iowa),  GO  N.  W.  543  [heard 
warning,  but  thought  no  danger]  ; 
Degnan  v.  Jordan,  1G4  Mass.  84  ;  41  N. 
E.  117  ;  Lendberg  v.  Brotherton  Iron 
Min.  Co.,  97  Mich.  443;  56  N.  W. 
846 ;  Devine  v.  Savannah,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  89  Ga.  541  ;  15  S.  E.  781 ;  Camp- 
bell, v.  Lunsford,  83  Ala.  512  ;  3  So. 
522  ;  Noll  v.  Phil.  &  Reading  R.  Co,, 
163  Pa.  St.  504  ;  30  Atl  .157  |  mistaken 
belief  that  danger  had  passed]. 

10  Hoover  v.  Beech  Creek  R.  Co., 
154  Pa.  St.  362  ;  26  Atl.  315  ;  Thonian 
v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co.,    Iowa, 

;  60  N.  W.  612  ;  Richmond,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  De  Butts,  90  Va.  405  ;  18  S. 
E.  837  ;  St.  Louis  Brick  Co.  v.  Ken- 
yon,  57  111.  App.  640 ;  Stevens  v. 
San  Francisco,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100  Cal. 
554 ;  35  Pac.  165  [near  machinery, 
without  notifying  engineer] ;  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co  v.  Mothershed,  97 
Ala.  261 ;  12  So.  714  [conductor  fail- 
ing to  signal];  Crane  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  93  Wise.  487;  67  N.  W.  1132 
[going  under  engine,  without  notify- 
ing engineer];  Lumpkin  v.  Southern 
R.  Co.,  99  Ga.  Ill ;  24  S.  E.  963  [watch- 
man climbing  on  car  without  giving 
notice].  A  car  repairer,  who  had 
been  engaged  for  three  years  in  that 
work,  went  under  the  List  car  of  a 
train,  with  the  knowledge  that  a  ca- 


boose was  to  be  attached  to  the  rear 
of  the  car,  without  putting  out  a 
flag  or  other  signal  to  give  warning 
of  his  being  under  the  car,  is  guilty 
of  negligence  (Southern  Pac.  Co.  v. 
Pool,  160  U.  S.  438  ;  16  S.  Ct.  338 ; 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Winslow,  56- 
111.  App.  462). 

11  Junior  v.  Missouri  Electric  Co., 
127  Mo.  79  ;  29  S.  W.  988  [handling 
wires  without  gloves]  ;  Kaare  v.  Troy 
Steel  Co.,  139  N.  Y.  369 ;  34  N.  E.  901 
[not  using  lights]. 

12  McQuigan  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  122  N.  Y.  618  ;  26  N.  E.  13,  759 
[stepping  on  man-hole  cover  known 
to  be  loose]  ;  Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Krapf,  143  Ind.  647  ;  36  N.  E.  901  ; 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowles,  71 
Miss.  1003  ;  15  So.  138  [going  between 
disabled  cars]  ;  Bedford  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown,  142  Ind.  659  ;  42  N.  E.  359  [not 
looking  to  see  if  timbers  were  in 
place.] 

13  Aerkfetz  v.  Humphreys,  145  TJ. 
S.  418  ;  12  S.  Ct.  835  ;  Elliott  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  150  TJ.  S.  245  ;  14 
S.  Ct.  85  [no  excuse  that  attention 
was  suddenly  called  away]  ;  Lynch 
v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  159  Mass 
536  ;  34  N.  E.  1072  :  Clark  v.  N.  Y., 
Lake  Erie.  etc.  R.  Co.,  80  Hun,  320  : 

30  N.  Y.  Supp.  126  ;  Loring  v.  Kan- 
sas City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  128   Mo.    349  ; 

31  S.  W.  6  ;  Church  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  119  Mo.  203  ;  23  S.  W.  105G  ; 
Rawlston  v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  94  Ga.  536  ;  20  S.  E.  123  ;  Keefe 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92Iowa,182; 
60  N.  W.  503  ;  Schaible  v.  Lake 
Shore,  etc.  R.  Co..  97  Mich.  318  ;  56 
N  W.  565  [shunted  train] ;  Wilber  v. 
Wisconsin   Cent.  Co. ,  86   Wis.    535  : 


A9 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§2°7 


or  to  notice  which  way  a  train  was  moving,1'  or  to  get  out 
of  the  way  of  a  train,15  or  to  look  for  defects  or  dangers  in 
the  place  of  work  or  appliances,  which  were  obvious  or  which 
he  ought  to  have  foreseen  were  probable.16  A  servant  cannot 
recover  for  an  injury  caused  by  his  own  needless  haste ; 17  but 
his  error  of  judgment,  caused  by  necessary  haste,  is  not  neces- 
sarily a  bar.18  So  the  servant  cannot  recover  for  an  injury 
which  he  would  not  have  suffered,  if  he  had  not  voluntarily 
left  his  post  of  duty  to  take  a  position  of  greater  danger,19 
even  though  his  act  may  be  well-meant  and  his  object  to  con- 
tinue serving  his  master.*  We  have  no  doubt,  however,  that 
this  doctrine  should  not  be  extended  so  far  as  to  cover  the 
case  of  a  servant  who,  in  good  faith  and  in  the  exercise  of 
a  reasonable  discretion,  leaves  his  regular  work  to  protect  the 
interest  of  his   master  in   another  place,  under  circumstances 

57  N  W.  356  [shunted  car]  ;  Nelling  top  of  car  :  low  bridge]  ;  S.  P., 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  95  Iowa,  ;  Rains  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71 
63  N.   W.  568  [extra   train]  ;  Kenna     Mo.  164 ;  Wilson  v.    Louisville,   etc. 


v.  Central  Pac.  R  Co.,  101  Cal.  26  ; 
35  Pac.  332. 

14  Magee  v.  Chicago,    etc.    R.    Co. 
89  Iowa,  752 ;  56  N.  W.  681. 

15  Cooney   v.   Great     Northern  R. 
Co. .  9  Wash.  St.  292  ;  37  Pac.  438. 

16  Conway  v.  Furst  [Ct.  Errors]  57 


R.  Co.,  85  Ala.  269  :  4  So.  701  ;  Sam- 
naon  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
38  N.  Y.  Superior,  414  [barrier-rnan 
at  a  crossing  injured  by  going  upon 
a  track,  where  he  had  no  business  to 
go]  ;  affi'd  on  another  ground,  62  N. 
Y.  251  ;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Chapman, 


N.  J.  Law,  645;  32  Atl.  3S0  [unfinished    96  Ga.  769;  22  S.  E.  273  [dangerous 


building] ;  East  St.  Louis  Storage  Co. 
v.  Crow,  155  111.  74;  39  N.  E.  589 
[hole  :  no  excuse  given  for  not  seeing 
it]:  Dieboldt  v.  U.  S.  Baking  Co., 
81  Hun,  195  ;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  745 
[elevator]  ;  Johnson  v.  Hovey,  98 
Mich.  343;  57  N.  W.  172  [saw]; 
Moore  v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  87  Va. 
4.^9  :  12  S.  E.  9CS  [lounging  too  near 
track]  :  Sexton  v.  Turner,  89  Va. 
341  ;  15  S.  E.  862  [failure  :o examine 
hole  loaded  with  dynamite]  ;  Day  v. 
Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.,  137  Ind.  206  ; 
36  N.  E.  854. 

11  Home  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  161 
Mass.  180  ;  36  N.  E.  792. 

'■  Reynolds  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
64  Vt    66  ;  24  Atl.  134. 

"Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sent- 
ii.' mi-,    92    Pa.   St.    276   [riding    on 


machine]  ;  Colorado  Coal  Co.  v. 
Carpita,  6  Colo.  App.  248 ;  40  Pac. 
248  ;  Chicago,  etc.  Smelting  Co.  v. 
Collins,  43  111.  App.  478  ;  Mandel  v . 
Wheeler,  59  111.  App.  459  [going  to 
look  at  escaping  steam].  We  doubt 
the  soundness  of  this  last  decision. 

20  Sears  v.  Central  R.  Co.,  53  Ga., 
630  [conductor  coupling  cars]  ; 
Brown  v.  Byroads,  47  Ind.  435 
[catcher  exchanging  place  with 
sawyer]  ;  Freeberg  v.  St.  Paul  Plow 
Works,  48  Minn.  99  ;  5.)  X.  W.  1026 
[meddling  with  licit]  ;  Knox  v. 
Pioneer  Coal  Co.,  90  Tenn.  546;  18 
S.  W.  255 [propping  mine  at  request 
of  servant  not  in  authority]  ;  Mellor 
v.  Merchants'  Mfg.  Co.,  150  Mass. 
362  ;  23  N.  E.  100  [making  danger- 
ous repairs]. 


§  20;a]  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  350 

which  justify  him  in  believing  that  his  master  would  direct 
him  to  do  so  if  personally  present.  Obviously,  he  cannot 
recover  for  an  injury  caused  by  his  own  negligent  workman- 
ship,21 or  bad  judgment,22  especially  where  he  chooses  to  follow 
his  own  judgment,  in  opposition  to  that  of  the  master.23 
Untrue  statements,  whether  willful  or  not,  are  a  bar  to  recov- 
ery upon  any  act  properly  done  in  reliance  thereon.24  Evi- 
dence of  a  general  habit  of  recklessness  among  servants  of  the 
same  master,  even  when  known  to  him  and  unchecked,  is 
inadmissible  for  the  purpose  of  relieving  any  of  them  from  the 
imputation  of  contributory  negligence.25 

§  207a.  What  is  not  contributory  negligence. —  Negli- 
gence, which  is  not  a  proximate  cause  of  the  injury,  is  not 
contributory  negligence.1  Not  every  risky  act  is  necessarily 
negligent ;  nor  does  the  servant's  assumption  of  a  particular 
risk,  as  part  of  his  duty,  make  him  assume,  also,  all  increased 
risks  due  to  negligence,  for  which  his  master  would  otherwise 
be  responsible.  A  servant,  whose  duty  requires  him  to  do 
something  which  necessarily  involves  some  danger,  is  not 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence  in  simply  performing  such 
duty,  and  assumes  only  such  risks  as  are  inherent  to  his  own 

21  Coal  Co.  v.  Estievenard,  53  Ohio  [having      good      ladder,      accepted 

St.  43  ;  40  N.  E.  725  [propping  mine  another  from  co-servant], 

badly]  ;  Pfeffer  v.  Cutler,   83  Wise.  24  Morgan    v.    Carbon  Hill  Co.,   & 

281  ;  53  N.    W.    508    [scaffold].     It  Wash.    St.    577  ;    34    Pac.    152,    772 

makes  no  difference   that  the  mas-  [decedent  induced  opening  of  lamp, 

ter    assisted    or    superintended   the  causing  explosion]  ;  Stanley  v.  Chi- 

work,  if  the  servant  participated  in  cago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  101  Mich.,  202  ;  591 

doing   it   badly  (Lucey  v.  Hannibal  N.  W.  393  [pretending  experience  to 

Oil  Co.,  129  Mo.,  32  ;  31  S.  W.  340).  get    employment]  ;    McDermott     v. 

"Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bur-  Iowa  Falls,  etc.   R.  Co.   (Iowa),   47 

ton,  97  Ala.  240  ;  12  So.  88.  N.  W.  1037  [same]. 

23  Jolly  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93  "Thompson    v.  Boston   &   M.    R. 

Mich.  370  ;  53  X.  W.   520  ;  Davies  v.  Co.,  153  Mass.  391  :  26  N.  E.  1070. 

Pelham  Hod  Elevating  Co.,  7G  Hun,  'Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bur 

289 ;  27  N.  Y.  Supp.    709  ;  Roblin   v.  ton,  97  Ala.  240  ;  12  So.  88  ;  Phillips 

Kansas   City.  etc.    R.    Co.,    119  Mo.  v.  Railway  Co.,  64  Wise.  475  ;  25  N. 

476;    24    S.  W.    1011;    Judkins    v.  W.  544 ;  Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 

Maine  Cent.   R.  Co.r80   Me.    417:14  Mansberger,  65  Fed.  196  ;  12 C.  C.  A. 

Atl.   735;    Bolton   v.    Georgia     Pac.  574  ;  Murray  v.  Gulf ,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  73 

R.    Co.,   83  Ga.    659  ;  10    S.    E.  352  Tex.  2  ;  11  s"  W.  125  ;  Magee  v.  North 

Pac.  R.Co.,  78  Cal.  430  ;  21  Pac.  114. 


35i 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  [§  207a 


act.2  The  principle  has  been  applied  in  favor  of  servants 
required  to  work  in  a  dangerous  place,3  to  jump  on  or  off 
moving  cars,4  to  walk  on  top  of  cars  in  a  moving  train,5  to 
occupy  a  perilous  position  on  a  moving  train,6  to  stand  very 
near  a  rapidly  moving  train,7  to  walk  or  stand  upon  a  rail- 
road track  where  trains  are  constantly  running,8  to  walk 
behind9  or  between10  cars  in  a  train  liable  to  move  at  any 
moment  upon  notice  to  make  a  "  flying  switch,"  u  to  cou- 
ple cars  by  going  between  them,  even  while  they  are  mov- 


a  Mather  v.  Rillston,  156  U.  S.  391  ; 
15  S.  Ct.  464  [dynamite]  ;  Galvin  v. 
New  York,  112  N.  Y.  223  ;  19  N.  E. 
675 ;  Stackman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  80  Wise.  428;  50  N.  W.  404 
[ground  slippery ;  place  narrow]. 
The  fact  that  an  employee  has  per- 
formed work,  knowing  it  to  be  dan- 
gerous, does  not  of  itself  make  him 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence, 
but  it  must  appear  that  he  per- 
formed that  which  was  dangerous  in 
a  negligent  manner  (Mobile  &  B.  R. 
Co.  v.  Holborn,  84  Ala.  133  ;  4  So. 
146). 

3  Mather  v.  Rillston,  supra  ;  Lyttle 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84  Mich.  289  ; 
47  N.  W.  571  [standing  on  engine- 
step]  ;  Michael  v.  Roanoke  Mach. 
Works,  90  Va.  492  ;  19  S.  E.  261  ; 
see  Cahill  v.  Hilton,  106  N.  Y.  512; 
13  N.  E.  339  ;  Pantzarv.  Mining  Co., 
99  N.  Y.  368  ;  Doyle  v.  Baird,  15  Daly, 
287  ;  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  517. 

4 Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Reed,  88 
Tex.  439  ;  3t  S.  W.  1058  [duty  to  get 
on  moving  cars]  ;  Lawson  v.  Trues- 
dale,  60  Minn.  410  ;  62  N.  W.  546  ; 
Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Tracy.  66  Fed. 
931  ;  14  C.  C.  A.  199  ;  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Earl,  94  Ky.  368  ;  22  S.  W. 
607  [jumping  on  car  ;  caught  by  other 
car  left  on  track]  ;  O'Mellia  v.  Kansas 
City,  etc.  R.  Co  ,115  Mo.  205  :  21  S. 
W.  503  [no  rule  forbidding  it].  Where 
common  laborer  returning  from  w*  >rk 
on  a  train  was  ordered  by  conductor 
to  jump  off  at  station  when   train 


was  moving  about  four  miles  an 
hour,  held  that  this  negligence  was 
a  question  for  the  jury,  and  verdict 
being  found  in  its  favor,  it  was  af- 
firmed (Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v. 
Egeland,  163  U.  S.  93;  affi'g  12  U. 
S.  App.  271). 

6  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Utz,  133 
Ind.  265  ;  32  N.  E.  881 ;  Baltimore, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Leathers,  12  Ind.  App. 
544  ;  40  N.  E.  1094  [for  jury]. 

6  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Zink,  126 
Pa.  St.  288 ;  17  Atl.  614  ;  Martin  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  95  Ky.  612; 
26  S.W.  801  ;  Lockhart  v.  Little  Rock, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  40  Fed.  631  [riding  on 
footboard  of  engine]. 

7  Swadley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
118  Mo.  268  ;  24  S.  W.  140  ;  Card  v. 
Eddy,  129  Mo.  510  ;  28  S.  W.  753. 

s  Taylor  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
93  Tenn.  305  ;  27  S.  W.  663  ;  O'Lough- 
lin  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  87  Hun, 
538  ;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  297  ;  Kroener, 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  88  Iowa,  16  ; 
55  N.  W.  28  [foot  caught  in  rails]  ; 
Craft  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  62 
Fed.  735. 

9Mears  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  163 
Mass.  150  ;  39  N.  E.  997. 

10  Lowe  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 
Iowa,  420;  56  N.  W.  519  [uncoup- 
ling]; Rahman  v.  Minnesota,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  43  Minn.  42  ;  44  N.  W.  522. 

11  Dooner  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  164  Pa.  St,  17  ;  30  Atl.  269  ;  St- 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  French,  56 
Kans.  5S1  ;  44  Pac.  12. 


§  207a]  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


352 


ing,ia  or  to  use  dangerous  appliances."  The  mere  fact  that  a 
servant  was  injured  because  of  the  way  of  performing  a  duty 
which  he  selected,  when,  if  he  had  selected  another  way, 
injury  would  have  been  avoided,  does  not  conclusively  show 
contributory  negligence.11  It  is  not  merely  no  negligence  in  a 
servant  to  take  the  most  obvious  risks,  in  order  to  save  human 
life;  it  is  positively  commendable  for  him  to  do  so;  and  it 
will  in  no  degree  prejudice  his  right  of  recovery.15  It  is  not 
negligence  to  take  some  risks,  in  the  proper  course  of  busi- 
ness, upon  the  assumption  that  both  the  master16  and  his 
servants 1T  will  do  their  duty.  Statutes,  positively  requiring 
masters  to  take  certain  precautions  against  dangers  to  servants, 
justify  a  servant  in  assuming,  without  special  inquiry,  that 
such  precautions  have  been  taken,18  but  not  so  when  it  is  obvi- 
ous that  they  have  not  been  taken  ; 19  nor  do  they  at  all  excuse 
the  servant's  want  of  due  care  in  other  respects.20  Where  a 
servant  is  suddenly  subjected  to  imminent  peril,  he  cannot  be 


12Horan  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.. 
89  Iowa,  328  ;  56  N.  W.  507  ;  Ben- 
nett v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  3  N. 
Dak.  91  ;  54  N.  W.  314.  Though 
plaintiff  was  directed  by  the  yard- 
master  not  to  go  between  the  cars, 


to  select  any  reasonable  method  of 
having  his  work  done. 

15  Omaha,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Krayen- 
buhl,  48  Neb.  553  ;  67  N.  W.  447,  see 
also  Fordyce  v.  Edwards,  60  Ark. 
438 ;  30  S.  W.  758  [defective  engine 


yet  his  going  between  them  to  un-  may  be  operated  to  end  of  journey], 

couple  them  would  not  make  him  16  Helton ville      Manuf'g     Co.     v. 

guilty  of  negligence,    where    there  Fields,  138  Ind.  58  ;  36  N.  E.  529. 

was  no  rule  forbidding  it,   and  he  "  Baltzer  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.    Co., 

was  acting  under  the  directions  of  89  Wise.  257 ;  60  N.  W.  716  ;  Cleve- 

the  conductor  (Hannah  v.  Connecti-  land,  etc.  R.  Co.  v    Brown,  18  U.  S. 


cut  River  R.  Co.,  154  Mass.  529  ;  28 
N.  E.  682). 

13  Martin  v.  California  Cent.  R.  Co. , 
94  Cal.  320  ;  29  Pac.  645  ;  Donahue 
v.  Drown,  154  Mass.  21  ;  27  N.  E.  675. 

14  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Herndon, 
100  Ala.  451  ;  14  So.  287  ;  McEUigott 
v.  Randolph,  61  Conn.  157  ;  22  Atl. 
1094:  Chase  v.  Burlington  &  N.  R 
Co.,  76  Iowa,  675  ;  39  N.  W.  196.  See 
Murphy  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  118 
N.  Y.  527  ;  2:!  N.  E.  812  ;  McPhee  v. 
Scully,  163  Mass.  216  ;  39  N.  E.  1007. 
Tli  is  is  only  a  fair  application  of  the 


App.  10;  6  C.  C.  A.  142;  56  Fed. 
804  ;  "West  Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Dwyer, 
57  111.  App.  440. 

18  Wallace  v.  Central  Vt  R.  Co., 
138  N.  Y.  302  ;  33  N.  E.  1069  ;  Davis 
v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co., 
159  Mass.  532  ;  34  N.  E.  1070. 

19  See  Thompson  v.  Allis  Co.,  89 
Wise.  523  ;  62  N.  W.  527. 

20  Davis  v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  159  Mass.  532  ;  34  N.  E.  1070 
[must  look  and  listen  for  train]  ; 
Krause  v.  Morgan.  52  Ohio  St.  662  ; 
40  N.    E.    886  ;  Linton   Coal   Co.  v. 


doctrine  which  holds  a  master  free    Persons,  11  lnd.  App.  264;  39  N.  E. 

214. 


553 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS.  [g  2/ob 


held  guilty  of  contributory  negligence,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
merely  because  he  does  not  choose  the  best  means  of  escape.21 
Where  he  is  in  doubt  about  the  safety  of  a  place  where  he  has 
to  work,  he  will  not  be  prejudiced  by  deferring  to  the  opinions 
and  assurances  of  those  who  are,  from  their  position,  bound  to 
have  special  knowledge  as  to  whether  it  is  safe  or  not.22 
Obedience  to  the  master's  rules  cannot  be  charged  as  contribu- 
tory negligence.  A  servant  cannot  be  required  to  keep  watch 
for  dangers,  when  his  duty  requires  him  to  do  something  incon- 
sistent therewith.23  The  negligence  of  one  servant  is  not 
imputed  to  another  co-operating  with  him.24 

§  207b.  Disobedience  of  rules  and  orders. —  The  disobe- 
dience of  a  servant  to  reasonable x  rules  or  orders  of  his  master, 
of  which  the  servant  has  notice  and  which  are  then  in  force,  is, 
if  it  proximately  contributes  to   his  injury,2   evidence  of  his 


21  Neilson  v.  Hillside  Coal  Co.,  168 
Pa.  St.  256  ;  31  Atl.  1091  ;  Schultz  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  44  Wise.  638  ; 
EastTenn..  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gurley,  12 
Lea,  46  ;  Greenleaf  v.  111.  Central  R. 
Co.,  29  Iowa,  47  ;  and  see  Union 
Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Fort,  17  Wall.  553 ; 
affrg  s.  c. ,  2  Dill.  259. 

22  Lake  Superior  Iron  Co.  v.  Erick- 
son,  39  Mich.  492. 

23  Cordon  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
74  Hun,  1 15  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  659. 

24  Abbitt  v.  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
150  Ind.  498  ;  40  N.  E.  40. 

1  The  rule  must  be  reasonable  (Re- 
ceivers v.  Moore,  3  Tex  Civ,  App.  416; 
22  S.  W.  272  ;  see  Overby  v.  Chesa- 
peake, etc.  R.  Co.,  37  W.  Ya.  524; 
16  S.  E.  813  ;  Francis  v.  Kansas  City 
R.  Co.,  110  Mo.  387;  19  S.  W.  935 
[rule  held  reasonable]).  A  rule  re- 
quiring brakemen  to  examine  appli- 
ances before  using  them,  does  not 
relieve  from  liability  for  injuries 
caused  by  defective  appliances,  un- 
less the  injured  brakeman  hail  time 
and  opportunity  to  make  such  an 
examination  as  would  have  re- 
[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  I  —  23] 


vealed  the  defect  (O'Malley  v.  N. 
Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Hun, 
130;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  48).  It  is  not 
negligence  for  a  servant  to  go  be- 
tween cars,  contrary  to  rules,  when 
the  duty  required  cannot  otherwise 
be  performed  (Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Graham,  94  Ala.  545  ;  10  So.  283 ; 
Eastman  v.  Lake  Shore  R.  Co., 
101  Mich.  597 ;  60  N.  W.  309 ;  but 
compare  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hissong,  97  Ala.  187;  13  So.  209). 
To  the  contrary  is  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bryant  (Ky).  22  S.  W.  606,  a 
very  bad  decision,  which  the  court 
itself  ordered  not  to  be  reported. 

2  Had  he  observed  the  rule  the 
result  would  have  been  the  same  ; 
violation  of  the  rule  will  not  pre- 
clude recovery  (White  v.  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  72  Miss.  12  ;  16  So.  248  : 
Helfenstein  v.  Medart,  136  Mc.  595; 
36  S.  W.  833  ;  Horan  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  89  Iowa,  328  ;  56  N.  W.  507. 
See,  also,  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v- 
Brown,  89  Va.  749  ;  17  S.  E.  132  ; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearson,  97 
Ala.  211  ;  12  So.  176). 


§  207b]  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


354 


contributory  negligence.3  Thus,  a  servant  has  been  denied  the 
right  to  recover  when  injured  while  violating  a  known  rule 
forbidding  him  to  ride  on  an  elevator4  or  tender,5  or  to  ride  on 
the  top  of  a  car,6  or  not  to  keep  on  the  top,7  or  to  jump  on  a 
moving  train,8  or  to  use  defective  cars,9  or  forbidding  him  to 


8  A  servant  cannot  recover  for  an 
injury  which  was  the  direct  result 
of  his  own  disobedience  of  specific 
orders  (Knight  v.  Cooper,  36  W.  Va. 
232  ;  14  S.  E.  999  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.   v.  Woods,  105  Ala.  561 ;  17  So. 
41  ;  Cullen  v.  National  Roofing  Co., 
114  N.  Y.  45  ;  20  N.  E.  831),  or  gen- 
eral  rules   (Overby   v.   Chesapeake, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  37  W.  Va.  524  ;  16  S.  E. 
813 ;    Shenandoah    Val.    R.    Co.    v. 
Lucado,  86  Va.   390  ;  10  S.   E.  422  ; 
Drake  v.  N.  Y.   Central  R.  Co.,  80 
Hun,  490  ;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  671  ;  Deeds 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  74  Iowa,  154  ; 
37  N.  W.  124  ;  Savannah,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Folks,  76  Ga.  527  ;  Memphis,  etc. 
R.  Co.   v.  Graham,  94  Ala.  545  ;  10 
So.  283  ;  Murray  v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co., 
73   Tex.   2  ;  11   S.   W.   125  ;  Fritz  v. 
Missouri,  etc.  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
30  S.  W.  85  ;  Patnode  v.  Harter,  20 
Nev.  303 ;  21  Pac.  679 ;  Kansas,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Dye,  16  C.   C    A.   604 ;  70 
Fed.  24  [signals]).     Even  a  reason- 
able belief  in   his  mind  that  obedi- 
ence to  such  rule  was  unnecessary  is 
no  excuse  (Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Mothershed,  110  Ala.  143  ;  20  So.  67). 
In  a  suit  to  recover  for  the  death  of 
an  employee  of  a  company  operating 
a  leased  track,  on  account  of  negli- 
gence in  the  construction  of  bridges 
over  the   track,   the  fact    that    his 
death  was  caused  by  his  violation  of 
a  rule  of  his  employer  will  operate 
as  a  defense  in  favor  of  the  owner  of 
the    track     (Texas,    etc.    R.    Co.  v. 
Moore,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App.  289  ;  27  S. 
"W.  962).     An  employee  of  a  railroad 
company,    who   has    himself    disre- 


garded its  rules,  cannot  recover  dam- 
ages for  an  injury  resulting  from  a 
disregard  of  the  company's  rules  by 
another  employee,  to  which  injury 
his  own  disregard  of  the  rules  con- 
tributed (Simpson  v.  Central  Vt.  R. 
Co.,  5  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  614  ;  39  N.  Y. 
Supp.  464).  Except  in  rare  cases, 
unless  the  act  is  contrary  to  a  statute, 
a  servant's  violation  of  a  rule  of  the 
master  is  not  negligence  per  se 
(Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sweeney, 
14  Tex.  Civ.  App.  216  ;  36  S.  W.  800  ; 
Dunlap  v.  Northeastern  R.  Co.,  130 
U.  S.  649  ;  9  S.  Ct.  647  [question  for 
jury]). 

4  Railroad  Co.  v.  Jones,  95  U.  S. 
439;  O'Neill  v.  Keokuk,  etc.  R.  Co., 
45  Iowa,  546  ;  Abend  v.  Terre  Haute 
etc.  R.  Co.,  Ill  111.  202;  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wilson,  88  Tenn.  316  ; 
12  S.  W.  720. 

B  Benage  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
102  Mich.  72,  79  ;  60  N.  W.  286. 

6  San  Antonio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wal- 
lace, 76  Tex.  636  ;  13  S.  W.  565. 

7  An  employee  injured  by  being 
brought  in  contact  with  a  coal  chute 
placed  too  near  the  track,  while 
standing  on  the  ladder  at  the  side  of 
the  car,  instead  of  on  top  thereof, 
as  the  rules  and  custom  require, 
cannot  recover  damages  for  injuries 
(Central  Trust  Co.  v.  East  Tennes- 
see, etc.  R.  Co.  [C.  C.].  69  Fed.  353). 

8  Francis  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  110  Mo.  387;  19  S.  W.  935; 
Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  69  Tex. 
665  ;  7  S.  W.  83. 

9  Shields  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
133  N.  Y.  557;  30  N.  E.  596. 


355 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  [§  20;b 


couple  cars  in  motion,10  or  to  couple  them  without  a  coupling 
stick,11  or  to  go  between  cars  to  couple  them,12  or  even  to 
couple  them  at  all,13  or  forbidding  high  speed,14  or  forbidding 
"  flying  switches."  15  Nor  can  he  recover  for  injuries  caused  by 
his  omitting  to  give  notices,16  warnings  or  signals17  required  by 
such  rules,  or  to  examine  and  inspect  cars  or  other  instrumen- 
talities of  work,18  or  to  clean  his  tools.19  A  servant  cannot  be 
charged  with  negligence  in  disobeying  orders  of  which  he  had 
no  notice,20  but  he  is  chargeable  with  notice  of  any  rules  and 


10  Johnson  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  38  W.  Va.  206;  18  S.  E.  573; 
Sedgwick  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  76 
Iowa,  340  ;  41  N.  W.  35 ;  Darracott 
v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.,  8S  Va.  288;  2 
S.  E.  511. 

11  Wolsey  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R. 
Co. ,  33  Ohio  St.  227  ;  Pennsylvania 
Co.  v.  Whitcomb,  111  lnd.  212;  12 
N.  E.  380  ;  Brennan  v.  Michigan  Cent. 
R.  Co..  93  Mich.  156;  53  N.  W. 
358  ;  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Briggs, 
[Va.]  ;  16  S.  E.  748  ;  affi'g  14  Id. 
753;  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Pan- 
nill,  89  Va.  552  ;  16  S.  E.  748  ;  Rich- 
mond, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Free,  97  Ala. 
231  ;  12  So.  294 ;  Rome,  etc.  Const.  Co. 
v.  Dempsey,  86  Ga.  499  ;  12  S.  E.  882  ; 
Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomason, 
99  Ala.  471  ;  12  So.  273  ;  Pryor  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90  Ala.  32  ;  8 
So.  55 ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ward.  10  C.  C.  A.  166  ;  61  Fed.  927  ; 
Russell  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  (C. 
C.)  47  Fed.  204. 

14  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice,  51 
Ark.  467  ;  11  S.  W.  699. 

:3  Kane  v.  Savannah,  etc.  R.  Co., 
85  Ga.  858  ;  1 1  S.  E.  493  [there  be- 
ing no  pressing  emergency]. 

14  Williams  v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co., 
89  Va.  165  ;  15  S.  E.  522 ;  Robinson 
v.  West  Virginia,  etc.  R.  Co.,  40 
W.  Va.  583  ;  21  S.  E.  727  :  Sutherland 
v.  Troy,  etc.  R.  Co.,  74  Hun,  162 ;  26 
N.  Y.  Supp.  237;  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co.  v.  Neer.  46  111.  App.  276.     Com- 


pare Texas,  etc.,  R.  Co.  v.  Lester,  75 
Tex.  56  ;  12  S.  W.  955. 

15  Pilkinton  v.  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  70 
Tex.  226  ;  7  S.  W.  805  ;  Sheets  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  139  lnd.  682; 
39  N.  E.  154. 

16  Davis  v.  Nuttallsburg  Coal  Co., 
34  W.  Va.  500  ;  12  S.  E.  539. 

17  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ban- 
ning, 131  lnd.  528  ;  31  N.  E.  187  ;  Mc- 
Grath  v.  N.  Y.  &  New  England  R. 
Co.,  15  R.  I.  95;  22  Atl.  927;  Le 
Bahn  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  80 
Hun,  116;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  7;  Louis- 
ville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Markee,  103  Ala. 
160;  15  So.  511. 

18  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Pear, 
son,  97  Ala.  211  ;  12  So.  176  ;  Brooks 
v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co. ,  47  Fed.  687. 
See  Beall  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co., 
38  W.  Va.  525  ;  18  S.  E.  729. 

19  Johnson  v.  Hovey,  98  Mich.  343  ; 
57  N.  W.  172  [saw  and  frame]. 

50  An  employee  is  not  guilty  of 
contributory  negligence  merely  be- 
cause an  act  of  his  violates  a  rule  of 
his  employer,  he  not  having  notice 
of  the  rule  (Brown  v.  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  Ill  Ala.  275;  19  So.  1001; 
Mackey  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
157  U.  S.  72;  Alabama  Midland  R. 
Co.  v.  McDonald,  Ala.  ;  20 
So.  472  ;  International,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hinzie,  82  Tex.  623 ;  18  S.  W.  681. 
But  if  he  knows  the  terms  of  a  rule 
promulgated  by  the  company  to  gov- 
ern his  conduct  he  is  bound  by  the 


§  207b]  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


356 


orders  which  he  ought  to  have  known.21  It  is  for  the  master 
to  prove  the  existence  of  rules,  and  either  actual  notice  or 
publication  in  such  manner  that  the  servant  ought  to  have 
known  of  them;'"  after  which  it  is  for  the  servant  to  prove 
that  he  did  not  know  of  them  and  was  not  in  fault  for  not 
knowing.23  A  rule  which  is  constantly  disobeyed,  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  master,  and  without  remonstrance  on  his 
part,  may  be  regarded   by  a  jury  as   not   in  force  ;24  but  mere 


rule,  though  the  company  failed  to 
give  him  notice  of  its  existence,  or 
to  afford  him  a  reasonable  opportu- 
nity to  ascertain  its  terms  (Port 
Royal,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  9.3  Ga. 
292  ;  22  S.  E.  833). 

81  Seese  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co., 
39  Fed.  487. 

23  Notice  of  the  rule  must  be 
proved  by  defendant  (Mackey  v. 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  19  D.  C.  282; 
affi'd,  157  IT.  S.  72  ;  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Utz,  133  Ind.  265  ;  32  N.  E. 
881  ;  Brunswick,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Clem, 
80  Ga.  534  ;  7  S.  E.  84  ;  Georgia  Pac. 
R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  92  Ala.  300  ;  9  So. 
252  :  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mother- 
shed,  110  Ala.  143;  20  So.  67).  A 
written  contract,  embodying  a  rule, 
signed  by  the  servant,  is  best  evidence 
of  notice  (Sedgwick  v.  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  73  Iowa.  158  ;  34  N.  W.  790.) 

23  Where  a  brakeman  had  seen  a 
book  of  rules,  read  some,  and  could 
have  read  all ;  held,  bound  by  rules 
which  he  did  not  read,  though  the 
railroad  company  had  not  furnished 
him  with  a  book  of  rules,  nor  re- 
quired him  to  read  it  (Lacroy  v. 
N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  132  N. 
Y  570  ;  30  N.  E.  391).  Rule  exten- 
sively distributed  and  posted  in  con- 
spicuous places,  is  admissible  in  evi- 
dence, though  it  is  not  shown  that 
plaintiff  actually  knew  of  its  exist- 
ence (Alcorn  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
108  Mo.  81  ;  16  S.  W.  229).  s  P. ,  Wil- 
liams v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co..  89  Va. 
165  ;  15  S.  E.  522  :  Alexander  v.  Louis- 


ville etc  R.  Co.,  83  Ky.  589  ;  For- 
dyce  v.  Briney,  58  Ark.  206  ;  24  S. 
W.  250). 

24  As  to  when  rules  are  considered 
not  in  force,  see  Newport  News,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Campbell  [Ky.],  25  S. 
W.  267;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Foley,  94  Ky.  220;  21  S.  W.  866 
["mere  form,"  and  impracticable]; 
East  Line,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Scott,  71 
Tex.  703  ;  10  S.  W.  298  ;  Chicago  & 
W.  I.  I?.  Co.  v.  Flynn,  154  111.  448; 
40  N.  E.  332  ;  Barry  v.  Hannibal,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  98  Mo.  62;  11  S.  W.  S08  ; 
Francis  v.  Kansas  City.  etc.  R.  Co., 
127  Mo.  658  ;  28  S.  W.  842  ;  Id.  30  S. 
W.  129;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Richardson,  100  Ala.  232  ;  14  So.  209  ; 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Nickels,  50 
Fed.  718  ;  1  C.  C.  A.  625  ;  Hayes  v. 
Bush  &  Denslow  Mfg.  Co.,  41  Hun, 
407.  A  rule,  directing  brakeman  to 
not  uncouple  cars  while  in  motion, 
may  be  waived  by  disregard  thereof 
on  the  part  of  brakernen,  for  such  a 
time  that  the  officers  were  charge- 
able witli  notice  (Fish  v.  Illinois  Cent. 
R.  Co.,  96  Iowa,  702;  65  N.  W.  995; 
Strong  v.  Iowa  Cent.  R.  Co..  94  Iowa, 

;  62  N.  W.  799  ;  Lowe  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co. ,  89  Iowa,  420  ;  56  N.  W. 
519 ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rea- 
gan, 96  Tenn.  128  ;  33  S.  W.  1050). 
But  it  must  be  shown  that  notice 
of  such  disregard  had  been  brought 
home  to  the  master  (Alabama,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Roach,  110  Ala.  266  ;  20  So. 
132). 


357 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§208 


disobedience,  however  frequent,  is  of  no  effect,  if  the  master 
was  not  chargeable  with  constructive  notice  or  had  no  oppor- 
tunity to  remonstrate.25  A  servant  is  justified  in  disobeying 
general  rules,  when  positively  ordered  to  do  so  by  the  master 
in  person  or  by  a  vice-principal,26  but  not  so  as  to  the  orders  of 
any  other  fellow-servant.27  And  a  mere  suggestion  or  assent 
from  a  vice-principal  is  not  equivalent  to  a  positive  ordcr?% 
A  servant  may  be  barred  from  recovering,  by  acquiescence  in 
the  violation  of  a  rule  by  another  servant,29  but  such  acquies- 
cence cannot  be  inferred  from  the  mere  silence  of  a  servant 
inferior  in  grade  to  the  one  in  fault.30 


§  208.  Basis  of  imputed  assumption  of  risks  from 
master's  negligence.  —  The  exemption  of  masters  from 
liability  to  servants  for  the  master's  negligence  is  founded,  in 
most  cases,  upon  the  general  doctrine  as  to  contributory 
negligence.1     But  it  has  been  held,  on  due  consideration,  that 

15  So.  133  [con- 


25  Benage  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  102  Mich.  72;  60  N.  W.  2S6 ; 
Francis  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 
110  Mo.  387;  19  S.  W.  935;  Rich- 
mond, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hissong,  97 
Ala.  187  ;  13  So.  209  ;  modifying  s.  c., 

91  Ala.  514  ;  8  So.  776. 

26  Smith  v.  Wabash,   etc.  R.   Co., 

92  Mo.  359;  4  S.  W.  129  [train  dis- 
patcher! ;  Mason  v.  Richmond,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  C.  482;  16  S.  E.  698 
[conductor]  :  see,  also,  Fulton  Bag 
&  Cotton  Mills  v.  Wilson,  89  Ga. 
318  ;  Hurlbut  v.  Wabash  R.  Co.,  130 
Mo.  657  ;  31  S.  W.  1051  [conductor]  ; 
especially  in  cases  of  emergency, 
where  reasonable  doubt  might  exist 
as  to  the  binding  force  of  the  rule  (Fox 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  86  Iowa,  368  ; 
East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bridges, 
92  Ga.  399).  But  compare  Wescott  v. 
N.  Y.  &  New  England  R.  Co.,  153 
Mass.  460  ;  27  N.  E.  10  [obedience  to 
vice-principal,  without  protest] ; 
Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Finley,  63 
Fed.  228  ;  12  C.  C.  A.  595  ;  25  U.  S. 
App.  16  [order  of  conductor  not  suffi- 
cient];   Richmond  &   D.    R.    Co.  v. 


Rush,  71  Miss.  987 
ductor]. 

21  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  89  Tenn.  114  ;  14  S.  W.  1077 
[engineer  and  brakeman]. 

28  Keenan  v.  N.  Y. ,  Lake  Erie,  etc. 
Co.,  145  N.  Y.  190;  39  X.  E.  711 
[boss  not  authorized  to  change  regu- 
lar rules  ;  nopositive  orders]  ;  Mason 
v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  114  N.  C. 
718  ;  19  S.  E.  362  ;  Atchison,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Reesman,  60  Fed.  370  ;  9  C.  C. 
A.  20  [mere  assent  of  conductor]. 

29  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co  v.  Dudley, 
90  Va.  304  ;  18  S.  E.  274  [conductor  ; 
brakeman]  ;  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Knittal,  33  Ohio  St.  468. 

30  New  Jersey,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Young,  1  U.  S.  App.  96  ;  1  C.  C.  A. 
428;  49  Fed.  723  [fireman;  en- 
gineer] ;  Haas  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  90  Iowa,  259;  57  N.  W.  894 
[fireman  ;  conductor]. 

See  Laning  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  49  N.  Y.  521  ;  Allerton.  etc. 
Co.  v.  Egan,  86  111.  253;  Devitl 
v.  Pacific  R.  Co.,  50  Mo.  302  [low 
bridge]  :   Crutchfield   v.   Richmond, 


§2(X)]  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  358 

such  a  risk  may  be  deliberately  assumed  without  any  want  of 
care,  and  that  the  maxim  volenti  non  fit  injuria  governs  such 
cases,  irrespective  of  any  negligence.2  To  bring  a  case  within 
this  maxim,  the  assumption  of  risk  must   be    really  voluntary, 

as  will  hereafter  be  shown. 

§  209.  Servant  accepting  employment  with  notice  of 
defects.  —  A  marked  distinction  is  to  be  made  between  risks, 
of  which  the  servant  had  notice  when  he  entered  into  service, 
and  risks  which  arose  or  were  first  brought  to  his  notice,  at 
some  subsequent  period.1  It  is  well  settled  that  a  servant 
assumes  the  risk  of  every  defect  of  which  he  had  actual  or 
constructive  notice  when  he  accepted  the  employment,2  so  far 
as  he  comprehends,  or  ought  to  comprehend,  the  peril 
involved,3  even  though  such  defect  was  due  to  the  master's 
personal  negligence,  provided  there  was  no  express  promise 
to  remove  the   defect,4  nor  any  new  obligation  subsequently 

etc.  R    Co.,  78  N.  C.  300  [coupling  162  Mass.  287;  38  N.  E.  500  [switch 

cars] ;    Mad    River,  etc.    R.    Co.    v.  too  near  main  track]  ;  Marean  v.  N. 

Barber,   5  Ohio  St.   541    [conductor  Y.,    Susquehanna,   etc.   R.   Co.,  167 

injured  through  a  defect  which  he  Pa.    St.  220 ;  31  Atl.  562  [no  proper 

should    have    discovered]  ;    Manu-  signals  furnished]  ;  St.    Louis,   etc. 

facturing  Co.  v.  Morrissey,  40  Ohio  R.   Co.   v.   Davis,  54  Ark.    389;    15 

St.  148  [operator  of  a  lathe,  injured  S.   W.  895  [unblocked   frogs]  ;  Nor- 

by  defects  of  which  he  had  knowl-  folk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonald.  88  Va. 

edge].      For  general   discussions  of  352;  13  S.  E.  706  [bad  couplings  ;  no 

the  subject,  see  Greene  v.    Minne-  promise  to  change]  ;  "Williamson  v. 

apolis,   etc.    R.    Co.,  31   Minn.    248;  Newport  News,  etc.  Co.,  34  W.  Va. 

O'Rorke  v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.,  22  657  ;    12    S.    E.    824    [low    bridge]  ; 

Fed.  189  ;  Hough  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Sheets  v.  Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co.,  139 

Co.,  100  U.  S.  213.  Ind.  682  ;  39  N.  E.  154  [same] ;  Lake 

2  Miner  v.  Conn.  R.  Co.,  153  Mass.  Shore,   etc.    R.  Co.   v.   Stupak,    108 

398 ;  26  N.  E.  994  ;  Mundle  v.  Hill  Ind.  1  ;  8  N.  E.  630  ;  Gleeson  v.  Ex- 

Mfg.  Co.,  86  Me.  400  ;  30  Atl.   16  ;  celsior  Mfg.  Co.,  94  Mo.  201 ;  7  S.  W. 

Rogers  v.  Leyden,  127  Ind.  50  ;  26  188  [unguarded   hatchway]  ;     Man- 

N.  E.  210.  ning  v.   Chicago,    etc.    R.  Co..  105 

1  See  §§  185,  185a,  ante;  Mahoney  Mich.  260  :  63  N.  W.  312  [tree  close  to 
v.  Dore,  155  Mass.  513;  30  N.  E.  366.  track];   Texas,  etc.  R.   Co.    v.  Min- 

2  Gibson  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  63  N.  Y.  nick,  57  Fed.  362  ;  6  C.   C.  A.   387 
449    [low     bridge] ;     De    Forest    v.  [defective  locomotive]. 

Jewett,   88    N.   YT.   264   [ditches    in  3This  limitation  is  recognized  in 

yard]  ;  Shaw  v.  Sheldon,  103  N.  Y.  Shaw  v.   Sheldon,  103  N.  Y.  667  ;  9 

667  :  9  N.  E.  183  [uncovered  rollers]  ;  N.  E.  183. 

Bancroft  v.  Boston  &  M.  R. .      N.  H.  4  See  Sweeney  v.  Berlin  Envelope 

:  30  Atl.  409  [no  gates  at  cross-  Co.,  101  N.  Y.  520  ;  5  N.  E.  358. 
ing]  ;  Goodes  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co., 


359 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  209a 


imposed  upon  the  master  with  respect  thereto.  In  such  a 
case  the  master  may  insist  that  the  servant  go  on  with  the 
work,  under  existing  conditions;  and  a  threat  to  dismiss  him, 
if  he  will  not  go  on,  is  not  coercion.5  This  doctrine,  however, 
has  only  been  applied  to  risks  inherent  in  a  place,  tool  or  other 
instrumentality,  or  in  the  nature  of  the  work,  or  in  the  character 
of  a  fellow  servant.  It  is  wholly  inapplicable  to  the  faults  of 
the  master  or  vice-principal,  even  though  such  faults  should 
be  so  habitual  as  to  form  a  part  of  his  very  nature.  The  care- 
lessness, violent  temper  or  incapacity  of  the  master  or  vice- 
principal  are  not  risks  assumed  by  the  servant,  even  if  he 
knows  of  them  from  the  beginning. 

§  209a.  Servant   continuing,   with  notice  of  defects.— A 

servant  who,  with  actual  or  constructive  notice  *  of  a  defect, 
due  to  the  master's  fault,   and  of  the  danger  to  which  he  is 


5  Sweeney  v.  Berlin  Envelope  Co., 
101  N.  Y.  520  ;  5  N.  E.  358. 

1  The  servant  must  have  notice  of 
some  kind  in  order  to  relieve  the 
master  (Scanlan  v.  Boston  &  A.  R. 
Co.,  147  Mass.  484;  18  N.  E.  209; 
Breen  v.  Field,  157  Mass.  277  ;  31  N. 
E.  1075  ;  Slater  v.  Chapman,  67  Mich. 
523  ;  35  N.  E.  106  ;  Alabama  G.  S.  R. 
Co.  v.  Richie,  99  Ala.  346  ;  12  So.  612 
[danger  not  obvious]  ;  Lebanon  v. 
McCoy,  12  Ind.  App.  500 ;  40  N.  E. 
700).  For  instances  of  actual  knowl- 
edge see  Appel  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co., 
Ill  N.  Y.  550;  19  N.  E.  93  [knew 
frog  unblocked] ;  Horrigan  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R  Co.,  7  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
377  ;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  938  [defective 
derrick]  ;  Schwartz  v.  Cornell,  59 
Hun  623 ;  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  355  [hole 
in  floor] ;  Wannamaker  v.  Burke,  111 
Pa.  St.  423  ;  2  Atl.  500  [same]  ;  Mun- 
dle  v.  Hill  Mfg  Co.,  86  Me.  400;  30 
Atl.  16;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
State.  75  Md.  152  :  23  Atl.  310  [tunnel 
not  ventilated]  ;  Nelson  v.  Central 
R.  Co.,  88  Ga.  225  :  14  S.  E.  210  [de- 
fective brake]  ;  East  Tennessee,  etc. 
R.  I  ».  v.  Head,  92  Ga.  723;  18  S.  E. 
976  [post  near  track]  :  O'Neal  v.  Chi- 
cago,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  132  Ind.  110;  31 


N.  E.  669  [track]  ;  Pitrowsky  v. 
Reedy  Mfg.  Co.,  54  111.  App.  253  [un- 
protected gearing]  ;  Steinhauser  v 
Spraul,  127  Mo.  541 ;  28  S.  W.  620 
Id.  30  S.  W.  102  [ladder  in  house] 
Lucey  v.  Hannibal  Oil  Co.,  129  Mo 
32  ;  31  S.  W.  340 ;  McLaren  v.  Wil 
liston,  48  Minn.  299  ;  51  N.  W.  373 ; 
Olson  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  38 
Minn.  117  ;  35  N.  W.  866  ;  Norton  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Ky.  ; 
30  S.  W.  599  [lever  on  hand  car]  ; 
Emma  Oil  Co.  v.  Hale,  56  Ark.  232  ; 
19  S.  W.  600  ;  Crilly  v.  Texas,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  44  La.  Ann.  95;  10  So.  400; 
Brown  v.  Brown,  71  Tex.  355  ;  9  S. 
W.  261  ;  Texas  &  Pacific  R.  Co.  v. 
Minnick,  6  C.  C.  A.  387  ;  57  Fed.  362 
[no  watchman  on  track]).  Plaintiff 
continued  in  service  some  months 
witli  knowledge  of  the  general  con- 
dition of  the  track.  Held,  that  he 
had  assumed  the  risk,  though  he  may 
not  have  known  of  the  particular 
defects  which  caused  the  injury 
(Green  v.  Cross,  79  Tex.  130  ;  15  S. 
W.  220).  To  similar  effect  Allen  v. 
Logan  City,  10  Utah.  279;  37  Pac. 
496  [earth  bank].  As  to  what  is 
sufficient  constructive  notice  or  when 
notice  is  presumed,  see  §  216,  jiost. 


§  209a]  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


360 


exposed  thereby,8  and  either  fully  comprehending  the  risk,3  or 
by  his  own  fault  failing  to  do  so4"  voluntarily  takes  his  chance  "  5 
and    continues  in  work  which  exposes   him  to  such   danger,6' 


As  to  the  servant's  duty  to  investi- 
gate, see  §  217a,  post.  Where  it  ap- 
pears that  a  brakeman,  injured 
through  a  defect  in  the  coupling 
machinery  of  a  car,  only  discovered 
his  danger  at  the  moment  of  the  acci- 
dent, the  question  of  contributory 
negligence  is  for  the  jury  (Goodrich 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  116  N.  Y. 
398  ;  22  N.  E.  397). 

2  That  servant  must  be  aware  of 
the  danger  to  charge  him  with  neg- 
ligence, see  §  214,  post;  Mullin  v. 
Cal.  Horseshoe  Co.,  105  Cal.  77  ;  38 
Pac.  535  ;  Wagner  v.  Jayne  Co.,  147 
Pa.  St.  475  ;  23  Atl.  772  ;  Huhn  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  92  Mo.  440;  4 
S.  W.  937.  If  plaintiff  "  without 
any  negligence  on  his  part,"  by 
reason  of  his  youth  or  inexperience, 
or  reliance  on  the  directions  given 
him,  failed  to  appreciate  the  danger, 
the  defendants  will  be  responsible  for 
their  negligence  in  not  properly 
guarding  the  shaft  (Dowling  v.  Allen, 
102  Mo.  213  ;  14  S.  W.  751  j.  Both 
master  and  servant  knowing  of  the 
defect,  and  neither  regarding  it  as 
dangerous,  servant  cannot  recover  on 
account  of  that  defect  (Jenney  Elec- 
tric Co.  v.  Murphy,  115  Ind.  566 ;  18 
N.  E.  30).  Otherwise,  however, 
where  the  defect  causing  the  injury, 
though  in  the  same  appliance,  was 
not  the  same  defect  thus  agreed  upon 
(Dumas  v.  Stone,  65  Vt.  442  ;  25  Atl. 
1097). 

3  Fitzgerald  v.  Conn.  Paper  Co., 
155  Mass.  155  ;  29  N.  E.  464  ;  see 
£  214,  post.  The  workman's  knowl- 
edge of  the  defects  should  amount 
to  thorough  comprehension  of  the 
risk  incurred  to  justify  the  with- 
drawal of  the  case  from  the  jury 
(Brooke  v.  Ramsden,  63  Law  T.  287"). 

4  Suter  v.   Park   Lumber  Co.,   90 


Wise.  118  ;  62  N.  W.  927  ;  Luebke  v. 
Berlin  Works,  88  Wise.  442  ;  60  N. 
W.  711. 

5  Quoted  from  Fitzgerald  v.  Conn. 
Paper  Co.  (155  Mass.  155;  29  N.  E. 
464),  where  plaintff  had  no  way  of 
leaving  the  mill,  except  by  going 
down  icy  steps.  Held,  a  question  for 
the  jury.  s.  P.,  Osborne  v.  London, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  21  Q.  B.  Div.  220  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McGraw,  22  Colo. 
363  ;  45  Pac.  383.  The  assumption 
of  risk  must  be  really  voluntary, 
not  "under  extraneous  pressure, 
which  amounts  almost  to  compul- 
sion "  (Mahoney  v.  Dore,  155  Mass. 
513  ;  30  N.  E.  366  ;  Smith  v.  Baker 
(Ho.  Lords),  1891,  App.  Cas.  325). 

6  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stupak, 
108  Ind.  1  ;  8  N.  E.  630  ;  Spencer  v. 
Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  130  Ind.  181  ;  29  N- 
E.  915 ;  Bradshaw  v.  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  [Ky.];  21  S.  W.  346; 
Bogenschutz  v.  Smith,  84  Ky.  330  ; 
3  S.  W.  800.  Injured  servants  were 
debarred  from  recovery,  on  this 
ground,  in  Clark  v.  Barnes,  37  Hun, 
389  [floor  slippery  from  drips  of 
water  and  oilj  ;  Pingree  v.  Leyland, 
135  Mass.  398  [machinist  used  a 
"  jack-winch,"  knowing  it  to  be  "  an 
old  rattle-trap,"  destitute  of  a  guard]; 
Russell  v.  Tillotson,  140  Mass.  201 
[revolving  shaft,  plainly  visible]  ; 
Assop  v.  Yates,  2  Hurlst.  &  N.  768 
[machine  in  dangerous  position]  ; 
Senior  v.  Ward,  1  El.  &  El.  385 
[miner  warned  to  test  rope,  but  did 
not]  :  Simmons  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co ,  110  111.  340,  and  Rasmussen  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  65  Iowa,  236 
[employee  killed  by  falling  of  a  bank 
which  he  was  undermining]  :  Sulli- 
van v.  Louisville  Bridge  Co.,  9  Bush. 
81  [use  of  narrow  plank  over  swift 
water,  as  standing  place]. 


361 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  209a 


without  reasonable  excuse7  and  without  complaint  or  objection,3 
where  ordinary  prudence  would  require  him  to  refuse  the  risk,9 
is  held  to  assume  the  risk.  This  rule  has  been  applied  to  cases 
in  which  a  servant  has  suffered  injuries  from  the  employment 
of  an  incompetent  or  habitually  negligent  fellow-servant,10  or 


1  As  to  what  is  sufficient  excuse, 
see  §§  211,  213,  215,  post.  The  mas- 
ter is  responsible  for  an  injury 
caused  by  obvious  defects  in  the  in- 
strumentalities furnished  only  where 
the  danger  was  not  fully  appreciated 
owing  to  the  want  of  time  for  con- 
sideration, or  the  increased  danger, 
by  reason  of  the  defective  agencies, 
was  not  so  imminent  and  threaten- 
ing as  to  require  the  servant  to  aban- 
don the  service  (Reichla  v.  Gruens- 
felder,  52  Mo.  App.  43). 

8  Kaare  v.  Troy  Steel  Co.,  139  N. 
Y.  369  ;  34  N.  E.  901  [platform,  no 
objection]  ;  Powers  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake 
Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  98  N.  Y.  274;  Mun- 
dle  v.  Hill  Man uf'g  Co.,  86  Me.  400  ; 
30  Atl.  16  [splinter  in  floor]  ;  Latre- 
mouille  v.  Bennington,   etc.  R.  Co., 

63  Vt.  336  ;  22  Atl.  656  [incompetent 
co-servant]  ;  Feely  v.  Pearson  Cord- 
age Co.,  161  Mass'  426  ;  37  N.  E.  368 
[ungarded  well]  ;  Goldthwait  v. 
Haverhill  R.  Co.,  160  Mass.  554;  36 
N.  E.  486  ;  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Lyons,  119  Pa.  St.  324;  13 
Atl.  205  ;  Foster  v.  Pusey,  8  Del.  168  ; 
14  Atl.  545  ;  Graver  Tank  Works  v. 
McGee,  58  111.  App.  250;  Chicago 
Packing  Co.  v.  Rohan,  47  Id.  640 
[unguarded  vat]  ;  Shackelton  v. 
Manistee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  107  Mich  16; 

64  N.  W.  728  [conductor  using  de- 
fective car  without  objection]  ; 
Hewitt  v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Mich. 
61  ;  34  N.  W.  659  ;  Needham  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85  Ky.  423  ; 
3  S  W.  797  :  1 1  S.  W.  306  ;  Balle  v. 
Detroit  Leather  Co.,  73  Mich.  158  ; 
41  N.  W.  210  ;  Scott  v.  Darby  Coal 
Co..  90  Iowa,  689  ;  57  N.  W.  619  [de- 
fective engine,  well  known,  no  com- 


plaint] ;  Beckman  v.  Consolidation 
Coal  Co.,  90  Iowa,  252  ;  57  N.  W. 
889  [switch  often  left  open]  ;  Bogen- 
schutz  v.  Smith,  84  Ky.  330  ;  1  S.  W. 
578  [no  complaint]  ;  Greenleaf  v. 
Dubuque,  etc.  R.  Co.,  33  Iowa,  52  ; 
Hanrathy  v.  Northern  Central  R. 
Co.,  46  Md.  288  ;  Galveston,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Drew,  59  Tex.  10. 

9  See  §§211,  214,  post.  For  a  fire- 
man, knowing  of  a  defect  in  the  air- 
brake, to  remain  upon  a  locomotive 
is  not  conclusive  of  negligence  on 
his  part,  and  it  is  a  proper  question 
for  the  jury  whether  the  defect  is 
such  that  a  man  of  ordinary  pru- 
dence and  intelligence  would  not 
have  remained  (New  Jersey,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Y'oung,  1  U.  S.  App.  96  ;  1  C. 
C.  A.  428  ;  49  Fed.  723).  See  contra, 
Worden  v.  Humeston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  72 
Iowa,  201  ;  33  N.  W.  629.  Servant 
assumed  the  risk,  and  was  guilty  of 
contributory  negligence,  having  con- 
tinued the  work  after  the  danger 
became  so  plain  and  imminent  that 
a  man  of  ordinary  prudence  would 
not  have  taken  the  risk  (Pollich  v. 
Sellers,  42  La.  Ann.  623  ;  7  So.  786). 

10  Frazier  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co  , 
38  Pa.  St.  104  ;  Kroy  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  32  Iowa,  357  ;  St.  Louis,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Morgart,  45  Ark.  318  ;  Con- 
solidated Coal  Co.  v.  Clay,  51  Ohio 
St.  542  ;  38  N.  E.  010  ;  Smith  v.  Sib- 
hv  Manuf'g  Co.,  85  Ga.  333;  11  S. 
E.  616  ;  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Worley,  92  Ga.  84  ;  18  S.  E.  361  [no 
objection  made]  ;  Acme  Coal  Min. 
Co.  v.  Mr  her,  5  Colo.  App.  267  ;  38 
Pac.  596.  By  continuing  to  work 
with  an  incompetent  fellow-servant 
without    notifying   the   master,  one 


§  209a] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


362 


from  inadequacy  in  the  force  employed,11  from  defects  in  the 
place  of  work,  materials  or  appliances,12  from  the  dangerous 
nature  of  the  work,  from  unlawful  speed  of  trains,13  or  from 
failure  to  maintain  safeguards  required  by  law.14  But  those 
cases  in  which  it  has  been  held,  regardless  of  these  limitations, 
that  notice  of  defects  or  continuous  negligence  of  the  master 
was  a  bar  to  the  action,  as  matter  of  law,  are  overruled  and 
obsolete.15     The  latest  and  best  authorities  hold  that  the  lia- 


assumes  the  risk  of  injuries  result- 
ing from  the  incompetency  (St.  Louis 
Brick  Co.  v.  Kenyon,  57  111.  App.  640  ; 
McCharles  v.  Horn  Silver  Mining 
Co.,  10  Utah,  470;  37  Pac.  733). 

11  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  41 
Md.  268  [only  one  brakeman  to  entire 
train]  ;  Robinson  v.  Houston,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  46  Tex.  540  [deficiency  of  brake- 
men]  ;  Texas  &  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Rogers, 
6  C.  C  A.  403  ;  57  Fed.  378  ;  Long  v. 
Coronado  R.  Co., 96  Cal.  269  ;  31  Pac. 
170  ;  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Harriett,  80 
Tex.  73  :  15  S.  W.  556  [no  conductor 
on  train]  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lemon,  83  Tex.  143  ;  18  S.  W.  331 
[obvious  deficiency] ;  Richmond,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  92  Ga.  77 ;  18  S. 
E.  290  ;  Eddy  v.  Rogers,  [Tex.  Civ. 
App.]  ;  27  S.  W.  295  ;  Southern 
Kansas  R.  Co.  v.  Drake,  53  Kans.  1  ; 
35  Pac.  825 ;  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  67  Fed.  524;  14  C.  C.  A.  509. 

12  Deceased  was  a  car  cleaner  on 
defendant's  elevated  railroad  yards, 
and  was  killed  by  stepping  backwards 
from  a  car  at  night,  and  falling 
through  an  opening  in  the  structure 
on  which  the  tracks  were  laid.  It 
was  shown  that  the  structure  was 
now,  and  not  yet  finished  ;  that  de- 
ceased had  been  there  daily  for  three 
weeks  in  the  capacity  of  watchman 
and  car  cleaner,  saw  carpenters  at 
work  planking  the  structure,  and 
knew  its  condition.  Held,  that  de- 
fendant was  not  liable.  Andrews, 
C  -L,  and  O'Brien,  J.,  dissenting 
(Kennedy  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co  ,   145 


N.  Y.  288  ;  39  N.  E.  956).     For  other 
examples,  see  La  Pierre  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co. ,  99  Mich.  212  ;  58  N.  W .  60  ; 
McGlynn  v.  Brodie,  31  Cal.  376  ;  Grif- 
fiths v.  Gidlow,  3  Hurlst.  &  N.  648 
[servant  injured  by  a  defect  in  ma- 
chinery, which  he  had  used  volun- 
tarily, knowing  its  defects]  ;  Green, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bresmer,  97  Pa.  St.  103 
[groom   kicked  by  mare  which  he 
knew  to  be  vicious]).     An  employee 
calking  pipe  in  a  trench  for  water- 
works   who  is  of  mature  years  and 
of  ordinary   intelligence,  and    who 
knows  the  liability  of  such  trenches 
to  cave  in,  and  who,  a  few  minutes 
after   seeing    the    trench    in   which 
he    is    working   partially  cave   in  a 
few  feet   from   him,  again  goes  to 
work,  assumes  the  risk   (Showalter 
v.  Fairbanks,  88  Wise.  376  ;  60  N.  W. 
257  ;  Secord  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
107  Mich.  540 ;  65  N.  \V.  550  [defects  in 
coupling]  ;  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Kee,  9  Tex.  Civ.  App.  100  ;  29  S.  W. 
544).      The  rule  that   a  servant  is 
deemed  to  assume  the  risks  attend- 
ant on  the  use  of  defective  machin- 
ery on  his  work  does  not  extend  to 
a  careless  use  of  such  machinery  by 
other  servants  of  the  master  (Moran 
v.  Harris,  63  Iowa,  390). 

13  Bengtson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
47  Minn.  486  ;  50  N.  W.  531. 

14  Victor  Coal  Co.  v.  Muir,  20  Colo. 
320  ;  38  Pac.  378  [mine]. 

15  See  Hawley  v.  Northern  Central 
R.  Co.,  82  N.  Y.  370  ;  Kain  v.  Smith, 
89  Id.  375. 


363  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  2IO 

bility  of  the  master  for  risks,  caused  by  his  negligence,  which 
did  not  exist  when  the  servant  accepted  the  employment, 
depends  upon  the  "  question  of  fact  wrhether  a  servant  who 
works  on,  appreciating  the  risk,  assumes  it  voluntarily  or 
endures  it  because  he  feels  constrained  to."16  If  he  volun- 
tarily continues  work,  with  full  notice  of  the  risk,  he  assumes 
it,17  but  not  so  if  he  acts  under  coercion.18 

§210.  Effect  of  refusal  to  repair. —  It  has  been  distinctly 
held,  in  some  cases,  and  plainly  implied  in  others,  that,  no 
matter  how  serious  may  be  the  defects  in  a  master's  selection 
of  materials  or  of  fellow-servants,  a  servant  who  remains  in  his 
employment,  knowing  that  the  master  does  not  intend  to 
remedy  these  defects,  assumes  the  risk  and  waives  all  right  of 
action  against  the  master,  in  case  of  injury  arising  therefrom. 
Such  decisions  are  founded  upon  the  assumption  that  a  master 
can  change  the  whole  rule  of  law  governing  the  relation 
between  himself  and  his  servants,  by  a  mere  notice,  without 
their  assent.  It  must  be  conceded  that  this  cannot  be  done 
in  any  other  relation  of  life.  Whatever  contract  is  implied  by 
law  in  any  other  case,  can  only  be  modified  by  mutual  con- 
sent. A  notice,  if  assented  to,  may  suffice  for  this  purpose; 
but  a  bare  notice  has  no  such  effect.1  There  is  no  foundation 
for  a  different  rule  in  this  instance.  Where  either  party  to  the 
contract  of  service  desires  to  alter  the  contract  implied  by  law, 
it  is  not  enough  for  him  to  give  notice  of  that  desire  or  inten- 
tion to  the  other  party.  The  legal  rights  of  the  parties  can 
only   be  altered   by  mutual  assent.     There  can  be  no  doubt 

,6Mahoney  v.  Dore,  155  Mass.  513;  19  Wend.  251  ;  Camden  Co.  v.  Bel- 

80  N.  E.  366  ;  McCampbell  v.  Cunard  knap,  21  Id.  354  ;  Blossom  v.  Dodd, 

Steamship  Co.,  69  Hun,  131 ;  23  N.Y.  43  N.  Y.  264  ;  Rawson  v.  Penn.  R. 

Supp.  477.  Co.,  48  Id.  212)  ;  in  the  United  States 

17  Coal  Co.  v.  Estievenard,  53  Ohio  courts    (Railroad  Co.    v.    Mfg.    Co., 

St.  43 ;    40   N.  E.  725 ;    Coal  Co.  v.  16  Wall.  318  ;  N.  J.  Steam  Nav.  Co. 

Jones,  127  111.  379  ;  8  N.  E.  865  ;  Hoi-  v.    Merchants'  Bank,  6  How.    344  ; 

loran  v.  Union  Iron  Co. ,  133  Mo.  470  ;  Ayres  v.  Western  R.  Co.,  14  Blatehf. 

35  S.  W,  260.  9;  Bank  of  Ky.  v.  Adams  Exp.  Co., 

'-Wells  Co.   v.  Gortorski,  50  111.  93  U.  S.  174) ;  and  in  nearly  or  quite 

445.     See  §  211a,  post.  all  of  the  state  courts.     See  Lawson 

1  Carriers    of  goods  cannot  limit  Contr.    Carr.,  33-55  ,  1  Add.  Contr. 

their  common-law  liability  for  losses,  (Am.ed.)  1883,  pp.  706,  768.  541,  note, 

by  a  mere  notice  ;  this  is  established  citing  numerous  cases, 
law  in  New  York  (Cole  v.  Goodwin, 


§211]  1  [ABILITY   OF   MASTERS  TO   SERVANTS.  364 

that  the  courts  would  disregard  any  notice  served  by  an 
employee  upon  his  employer,  to  the  effect  that  he  should  look 
to  the  employer  for  compensation  for  all  injuries  suffered  in 
his  service,  unless  the  employer  acted  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
give  the  employee  a  right  to  believe  that  he  accepted  this 
modification  of  their  legal  relations.  But  on  what  principle 
can  a  different  rule  be  applied,  where  the  notice  proceeds  from 
the  employer?  We  know  of  none;  and  we  are,  therefore, 
satisfied  that  a  servant  is  not  bound  by  any  mere  notice  given 
by  his  master  of  an  intent  not  to  perform  his  ordinary  legal 
duties.  The  master  must  require  an  assent  or  must  dismiss 
the  servant,  if  he  expects  to  avoid  the  usual  responsibilities  of 
a  master.  In  view  of  the  obvious  superiority  of  the  master's 
position,  which,  in  the  United  States,  is  constantly  increasing, 
it  should  not  be  presumed  that  the  servant  assents  to  any  such 
notice,  by  acts  which,  in  more  equal  relations  of  life,  might 
fairly  be  deemed  to  amount  to  a  tacit  assent.  We  certainly 
think  that  all  reasonable  presumptions  should  be  against  con- 
struing the  servant's  silence  into  such  an  assent.  We  fully 
admit  that  many  decisions  or  dicta  are  adverse  to  these  views  ;- 
but  they  have  been  practically  overruled  in  Great  Britain,  in 
our  Federal  courts,  and  even  in  Massachusetts;3  much  more 
in  other  states.4 

§  211.    True  rule  as  to  effect  of  servant's  knowledge. — 

The  true  rule,  as  nearly  as  it  can  be  stated,  is  that  a  servant 
can  recover  for  an  injury  suffered  from  defects  due  to  the 
master's  fault,  of  which  he  had  notice,  if,  under  all  the  circum- 
stances, a  servant  of  ordinary  prudence,  acting  with  such  pru- 
dence, would,    under   similar   conditions,   have  continued    the 

2  See  Leavy  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  they  would  have  to  get  along  the 
139  Mass.  580  ;  East  Tennessee,  etc.  best  they  could  ;  "  and  see  Hough  v. 
R.  Co.  v.  Duffield.  12  Lea,  G3 ;  Gal-  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100  U.  S.  213,  225  ; 
veston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Drew,  59  Dale  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  63  Mo. 
Tex.  10.  455  ;  Hawley  v.  Northern  Central  R. 

3  See  cases  cited  under  §  209a  and  Co.,  82  N.  Y.  370  ;  affi'g  s.  c  ,  17 
§  215,  post.  Hun,  115;  McMahon  v.  Port  Henry 

4  Francis  v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  Ore  Co.,  24  Hun,  48  ;  Poirier  v.  Car- 
127  Mo.  658  ;  28  S.  W.  842  ;  affi'd,  roll,  35  La.  Ann.  699  ;  Kain  v.  Smith, 
30  S.  W.  129  ;  where  servants  com-  89  N.  Y.  375  ;  Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh, 
plained,  and  were  "  told  to  go  on;  etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Pa.  St.  389. 


365  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  2 1 1 

same  work  under  the  same  risk ; l  but  not  otherwise.  All  the 
circumstances  must  be  taken  into  account,  and  not  merely  the 
isolated  fact  of  risk.  Thus,  to  take  a  strong  case,  an  engineer, 
who  should  discover,  for  the  first  time,  while  midway  between 
two  stations,  that  his  engine  was  dangerously  defective,  would 
unquestionably  be  justified  in  continuing  to  run  it  to  the  next 
station,2  To  take  a  weaker  case,  he  would  still  be  justified  in 
running  it  beyond  that  station,  if  no  other  engine  could  be 
obtained  there,  unless  the  danger  of  explosion  were  imminent. 
But  can  we  stop  there  ?  Would  not  an  engineer,  having  a 
train  full  of  passengers,  bound  for  a  station  100  miles  distant, 
be  entitled  and  indeed  almost  bound  to  take  the  train  through 
with  an  engine  which,  though  defective,  is  probably  manage- 
able with  unusual  care,  and  which  is  the  only  engine  obtainable 
by  which  the  train  can  be  taken  through  on  schedule  time?3 
Is  there  any  doubt  that  the  most  prudent  engineer  would  do 
so?  But  that  which  is  true  of  an  engineer,  under  such  circum- 
stances, is  equally  true  of  all  classes  of  servants  under  other 
circumstances,  similar  in  principle.  If  every  man  should  cease 
from  work  upon  the  instant  of  discovering  that  his  safety  was 
imperiled  by  the  negligence  of  some  other  person,  the  business 
world  would  come  to  a  stand.  If  every  servant  on  a  railroad 
or  in  a  factory  should  refuse  to  work  by  the  side  of  a  negligent 
fellow-servant  or  with  defective  materials,  immediately  upon 
becoming  aware  of  the  fact,  such  enterprises  could  never  be 
carried  on.  Obviously,  a  reasonable  time  must  be  given  for 
removal  of  the  defect ;  and  meantime,  the  business  must  be 
carried  on  with  no  prejudice  to  the  servant's  rights,4  unless  the 

'Patterson   v.    Pittsburg,    etc.    R.  8  Ford  v.    Fitchburg  R.    Co.,   110 

Co.,  76  Pa.  St.  389  :  Clarke  v.  Holmes,  Mass.  240. 

7  Hurlst.  &  N.  937,  945  ;  Hough  v.  3  Fordyce  v.  Edwards,  60  Ark.  438  ; 

Texas,  etc.    R.    Co.,  100  U.  S.    213;  30  S.  W.  758. 

Greene  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4  The  entire  doctrine  of  this  section 

31   Minn.    248  ;  Dwyer  v.  St.  Louis,  was  adopted,  in  effect,   in  cases  of 

etc.  R.  Co.,  52  Fed.  87.     It  is  gener-  injury    from   the  known   incompe- 

ally  a  question  for  the  jury  whether  tency  of  a  co-servant  (Northern  Pac. 

the  snrrounding  circumstances  made  R.    Co.    v.    Mares,    123    U.    S.    710; 

it   contributory   negligence   for  the  Francis  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co., 

servant  to  continue  using  the  appli-  127  M<»    658;    28  S.  W.  842;    affi'd, 

ance   (Hamilton    v.    Rich   Hill   Coal  30  S.  W.  129):  or  known  defects  in 

Co..    108  Mo.    364;    18   S.    W.    977).  instrumentalities  of  work  (Hamilton 

S.  P.,  Murtaugh  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  v.  Rich  Hill  Coal  Co.,  108  Mo.  364; 

Co.,  49  Hun,  456;  3  N.  Y.  Supp.  483.  18   S.   W.   977;    O'Mellia  v.    Kansas 


§212]  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  366 

risk  is  so  great  that  no  one,  acting  with  ordinary  prudence, 
would  go  on  under  the  circumstances. 

§  211a.      Special    risks    incurred    under    coercion. —  As 

already  stated,  it  is  now  held  by  the  most  conservative  authori- 
ties, that  a  servant  is  not  deprived  of  his  right  to  recover  for 
defects  caused  by  his  master's  negligence,  arising  or  first  com- 
ing to  the  servant's  notice,  after  he  has  entered  into  service, 
unless  he  assumes  the  risk  of  his  own  free  and  unconstrained 
will.1  If,  therefore,  he  continues  to  incur  the  risk  of  such 
defects,  under  any  kind  of  necessity2  or  coercion,3  such  as  the 
threat  or  reasonable  fear  of  dismissal,3  he  does  not  voluntarily 
assume  the  risk,  and  is  not,  necessarily,  debarred  from  recovery 
thereby.4  It  is  true  that  many  decisions  can  be  found  to  the 
contrary,5  but  now  that  the  ultra-conservative  courts  of  Great 
Britain  and  Massachusetts  have  overruled  them,  we  may  be 
permitted  to  concur  with  the  Virginia  court  in  condemning 
such  decisions  as  founded  on  "a  cruel  and  inhuman  doctrine."6 

§  212.  Test  of  servant's  prudence. —  The  test  of  prudence, 
in  these  cases,  in  analogy  to  that  applied  in  ordinary  cases  of 
contributory  fault,  is  that  which  a  prudent  servant,  of  the  same 
class,1  using   such    prudence   and    judgment    as   such    persons 

City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  115  Mo.  205;  21  S.  Kansas  Ry.  Co.    v.  Moore,  49  Kans. 

W.  503).  616;  31  Pac.  138;  Leary  v.  Boston, 

J  §  209a,  ante.  &  A.  R.  Co.,  139  Mass.  587;     2  N. 

8  Such  as  there  being  no  safe  means  E.  115.  In  Anderson  v.  Akeley  Luna- 

of  access  to  the  place  of  work  (Fitz-  ber  Co.,  47  Minn.  128  ;  49  N.  W.  664, 

gerald  v.  Conn.  Paper  Co.,  155  Mass.  the  vice-principal  refusing  to  repair, 

155  ;  29  N.  E.  464).  the  defect  was  one  which  the  servant 

3  Jackson  v.  Georgia  R.  Co.,  77  Ga.  could  easily  have  repaired  himself. 
82.  6  Richmond,    etc.    R.    Co.   v.  Nor- 

4  Mahoney  v.  Dor6,  155  Mass.  513 ;  ment,  84  Va.  167  ;  4  S.  E.  211. 

30  N.  E.    366  ;    Thrussell  v.  Handy-  '  The  test  is  whether  an  ordinarily 

side.  20  Q.  B.  Div.   359 ;    Yarmouth  prudent  person   of  his  age  and  ex- 

v.  France,  19  Id.  647  ;    see  Smith  v.  perience,  under  like   circumstances, 

Baker  (Ho.  Lords).  1891,  App.  Cas.  would  have  appreciated  the  danger 

325;   Fitzgerald  v.  Conn   Paper  Co.,  (Craven  v.  Smith,   89  Wise.   119;  61 

155  Mass.  155;  29  N.  E.  464.  N.  W.  317  ;  Colorado  Midland  R.  Co. 

5  Dougherty  v  West  Superior  Iron  v.  O'Brien,  16  Colo.  219  ;  27  Pac.  701. 
Co.,  88  Wise.  343;  60  N.  W.  274  See  Fox  v.  Glastonbury,  29  Conn, 
[relying  on  cases  since  overruled]  ;  204  ;  Hassenyer  v.  Michigan  Central 
Atchison,  etc.  R.   Co.  v.   Schroeder,  R.  Co  ,  48  Mich.  205). 

47  Kans.  315  ;  27  Pac.  9ti5  ;  Southern 


3^7 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§213 


usually  possess,2  but  no  more,3  might  reasonably  be  expected 
to  apply  to  the  particular  case.4  A  conductor  should  be 
required  to  exercise  the  care  and  judgment  of  an  ordinarily 
prudent  conductor;  an  engineer,  that  of  an  ordinarily  prudent 
engineer;  a  skilled  mechanic,  that  of  an  ordinarily  prudent 
mechanic  of  the  same  class ;  but  from  a  brakeman  or  common 
laborer,  only  that  which  can  fairly  be  expected  from  a  brake- 
man  or  a  laborer.5  This  has  been  too  often  overlooked ;  but  it  is 
well  settled  in  other  branches  of  the  law  of  contributory  negli- 
gence ;  and  the  later  cases  apply  this  test  here. 

§  213.  Excusable  omissions  of  usual  care.—  A  servant  is 
not  debarred  from  recovery,  as  matter  of  law,  by  his  omission 
to  exercise,  under  peculiar  circumstances,  the  same  kind  or 
degree  of  care  which  he  should  exercise  under  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances.1 Thus,  in  an  emergency,  to  avoid  a  greater  peril, 
either  to  himself  or  to  others  to  whom  he  owes  any  duty,  he 
may,  with  full  knowledge  of  the  peril  incurred,  go  into  a 
dangerous  place,2    use    a    dangerous    appliance,3    undertake  a 


2  §  211,  ante  ;  National  Syrup  Co. 
t.  Carlson,  42  111.  App.  178. 

3  Brick  v.  Bosworth,  162  Mass.  334 ; 
39  N.  E.  36. 

4  Where  an  instruction  was  re- 
quested that  deceased  was  bound  to 
exercise  the  same  care  and  diligence 
as  would  have  been  used  by  men  of 
ordinary  care  and  prudence  under 
the  same  or  similar  circumstances, 
it  was  error  to  substitute  the  words 
"under  ordinary  circumstances" 
(Overman  Wheel  Co.  v.  Griffin,  67 
Fed.  659;  14  C.  C.  A.  609). 

5  McGovern  v.  Central  Vermont 
R.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.,  280  ;  25  N  E.  373  ; 
Gill  v.  Homrighausen,  79  Wise.  634  ; 
48  N.  W.  862. 

'Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Overheiser, 
76  Tex.  437  ;  13  S.  W.  468  [stepping 
between  moving  cars] . 

'Johnson  v.  Steam  Gauge  Co.,  72 
Hun,  535  ;  25  N.  Y.  Supp.  689  [escap- 


ing from  fire  by  defective  fire  es- 
cape]. Where  an  engineer  fails  to  go 
on  a  siding  in  order  to  permit  a  train 
about  due  to  pass,  and  a  brakeman, 
in  imminent  danger  of  a  collision, 
goes  forward  on  top  of  the  cars  to 
warn  him  to  stop,  and  is  injured,  the 
company  is  liable  (Simmons  v.  East 
Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92  Ga.  658  ;  18 
S.  E.  999).  So  where  he  takes  great 
risks  to  save  a  train  (Omaha,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Krayenbuhl,  48  Neb.  553;  67  N. 
W.  447). 

3  A  brakeman  acting  under  orders, 
who  attempted  to  couple  cars  with 
defective  tool,  knowing  that  a  pas- 
senger train  was  soon  due,  end  that 
unless  the  coupling  was  made 
there  would  be  danger  of  collision 
may  recover  for  injuries  caused 
thereby  (Strong  v.  Iowa  Cent.  R. 
Co.,  94  Iowa,  380  ;  62  N.  W.  799). 


§2I3] 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


368 


dangerc  us  task  4  or  make  a  dangerous  leap.5  The  mere  tech- 
nical fact  of  the  servant's  knowledge  of  a  defect  is  not  sufficient 
to  exonerate  the  master,  if,  for  any  reason,  the  servant  forgets 
it,  and  is  not  in  fault  in  forgetting  it,  at  the  precise  time  when 
he  suffers  thereby.  In  analogy  to  the  principles  already  stated 
under  the  head  of  contributory  negligence,6  the  servant's 
rights  are  not  prejudiced  by  his  excusable  forgetfulness  of  or 
failure  to  observe  a  defect  or  danger,  under  the  influence  of 
sudden  alarm7  or  of  an  urgent   necessity  for  speed,8  or  if  his 


4  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  McCaffrey, 
139  Ind.  430  ;  38  N.  E.  67  [trying  to 
leave  train]  ;  Schroeder  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  108  Mo.  322  ;  18  S.  W. 
1094  [getting  out  of  way  of  train  to 
protect  passengers] ;  Fox  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  86  Iowa,  368  ;  53  N. 
W.  259  [endeavoring  to  catch  a  fast 
moving  freight  car.  under  orders  of 
conductor,  and  in  an  emergency]. 

5  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rains, 
[Ky.]  ;  23  S.  W.  505  [jumping  from 
a  train  to  avoid  a  collision]  ;  s.  P., 
Haney  v.  Pittsburgh  R.  Co.,  38  W. 
Va.  570 ;  18  S.  E.  748. 

6  See  §  89,  ante. 

7  Rima  v.  Rossie  Iron  Works,  120 
N.  Y.  433  ;  24  N.  E.  940 ;  Haas  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90  Iowa, 
259;  57  N.  W.  894  [fireman  not 
jumping  off,  in  view  of  collision]  ; 
s.  p..  Spauldingv.  Flynt  Granite  Co., 
159  Mass.  587  ;  34  N.  E.  1134  ;  Hud- 
son v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93 
Ga.  816  ;  21  S.  E.  126  [attention  dis- 
tracted by  noise] :  San  Antonio,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]; 
31  S.  W.  72.  In  Columbus,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Bradford  (86  Ala.  574  ;  6 
So.  90) ,  the  excuse  for  forgetfulness 
was  held  insufficient. 

8  His  duty  having  compelled  serv- 
ant to  act  at  once  without  oppor- 
tunity for  inspection,  the  question  of 
contributory  negligence  is  for  the 
jury  (Doonerv.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  164  Pa.  St.  17;  30  Atl.  269); 
s.  p.,  Irvine  v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89 


Mich.  416  ;  50  N.  W.  1008).  Servant 
obliged  to  work  quickly,  excusable 
(Carter  v.  Oliver  Oil  Co.,  34  S.  C.  211; 
13  S.  E.  419).  Plaintiff,  a  brake- 
man,  while  making  a  trip  on  a  cold, 
stormy  night,  discovered  that  a  step 
was  missing  from  a  car,  between  his 
post  and  the  caboose,  and  notified 
the  conductor,  who  promised  to 
drop  the  car  at  a  certain  point. 
Before  reaching  that  point  the  train 
stopped  at  a  station,  and  plaintiff 
went  back  to  the  caboose,  as  was  the 
custom,  to  eat  and  warm  himself. 
The  train  suddenly  started,  and 
plaintiff  hastily  ran  out  over  the 
cars,  to  resume  his  post,  and,  for- 
getting about  the  missing  step,  fell 
and  was  injured.  Held,  that  the 
question  of  contributory  negligence 
should  have  been  submitted  to  the 
jury  (Kane  v.  Northern  Cent.  R.  Co., 
128  U.  S.  91  ;  9  S.  Ct.  16).  Where  a 
laborer  while  working  under  the  eye 
and  voice  of  his  employer,  who  was 
urging  speed,  and  saying  "  all  right," 
did  not  think  at  the  moment,  owing 
to  this  urgency,  of  a  danger  of  which 
he  had  some  previous  knowledge, 
and  in  consequence  was  injured,  held 
that  he  was  not  deprived  of  his  rem- 
edy (Lee  v.  Woolsey,  109  Pa.  St.  124  ; 
42  Leg.  Intel.  375).  Brennan  v.  Front 
St.  R.  Co.,  8  Wash.  St.  363  ;  36  Pac. 
272,  perhaps  contra,  is  a  very  harsh 
and  oppressive  decision.  A  com- 
mand given  by  the  master  in  a  loud 
and  harsh  voice  to  the  engineer  in 


3<>9 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§2I4 


duties  are  such  as  necessarily  to  absorb  his  whole  attention, 
leaving  him  no  reasonable  opportunity  to  look  for  defects,9  or 
if  the  light  is  imperfect.10  Oaths  and  violent  language  in 
giving  orders  have  been  held  insufficient  excuse  for  errors  of 
judgment  on  the  part  of  a  frightened  servant.11 

§  214.  Notice  of  defect,  without  notice  of  danger,  imma- 
terial.— The  right  of  a  servant  to  recover  on  account  of  the 
master's  negligence  is  not  affected  by  notice  of  any  defects 
other  than  such  as  the  servant  foresaw,  or,  in  the  exercise  of 
ordinary  prudence,  ought  to  have  foreseen,  might  endanger 
his  safety.1  If  a  servant  of  ordinary  prudence  would  have 
believed  that  he  could  not,  in  the  regular  discharge  of  his  duties, 
be  injured  by  the  defect,  the  servant  may  properly  disregard 
it,  without  losing  the  right  to  complain  if,  while  pursuing  his 


charge  of  a  derrick  to  ' '  Hoist  her ! 
There  is  a  team  waiting" — is  not 
negligence  entitling  an  employee  to 
recover  for  injuries  caused  by  the 
engineer  obeying  in  a  negligent  man- 
ner (Griffin  v.  Glen  Mfg.  Co.,  67  N. 
H.       ;  30  Atl.  344). 

9  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Everett, 
152  U.  S.  107  ;  14  S.  Ct.  474 ;  Wal- 
lace v.  Cent.  Vt.  R.  Co.,  138  N.  Y. 
302.  In  Plank  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc. 
R.  Co.  (60  N.  Y.  607),  where  a  brake- 
man  was  killed  while  attempting  to 
couple  cars,  in  the  night,  while  snow 
was  on  the  ground,  by  stepping  into 
a  sluice-way  which  had  existed  for 
years,  and  of  which  he  knew,  a  non- 
suit was  held  error,  because  the  act 
in  which  he  was  engaged  necessarily 
required  his  whole  attention  and 
thought.  To  similar  effect,  Green- 
leaf  v.  111.  Central  R.  Co.,  29  Iowa, 
47  ;  Snow  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  8 
Allen,  441  :  Hannah  v.  Connecticut 
River  R.  Co.,  154  Mass.  529;  28  N. 
E.  682  ;  Bluedorn  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  121  Mo.  258  ;  24  S.  W.  57  [switch- 
man, failing  to  see  coming  train]  ; 
Tobey  v.  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94 
Iowa.  256;  62  N.  W.  761  [similar 
Fiero  v.  N.Y.  Cent.,  etc.  R.Co., 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  24] 


71  Hun,  213 ;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  805  [con- 
ductor busy  collecting  tickets]. 

10  Bluedorn  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
121  Mo.  258 ;  24  S.  W.  57  [confused  by 
electric  lights] ;  McLarney  v.  Long 
Island  R.  Co.,  11  N.  Y.  Misc.  64 ;  31  N. 
Y.  Supp.  862  [lantern  just  gone  out]. 

11  Coyne  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  133 
U.  S.  370 ;  10  S.  Ct.  382. 

1  Dale  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  63 
Mo.  455,  approving  the  doctrine  of 
the  text ;  Mehan  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  73  N.  Y.  585;  Worden  v. 
Humeston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Iowa, 
310  ;  41  N.  W.  26  ;  Sullivan  v.  Han- 
nibal, etc.  R.  Co.,  107  Mo.  66  ;  17  S. 
W.  748  ;  Wuotilla  v.  Duluth  Lumber 
Co.,  37  Minn.  153;  33  N.  W.  551; 
Newhart  v.  St.  Paul  City  R.  Co.,  51 
Minn.  42 ;  52  N.  W.  983  ;  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Lehmberg,  75  Tex. 
61  ;  12  S.  W.  838 ;  Sanborn  v.  Ma- 
dera Flume  Co.,  70  Cal.  261 ;  11  Pac. 
710;  Lee  v.  Southern  Pac.  R.  Co., 
101  Cal.  118;  35  Pac.  572;  Bjorman 
v.  Ft.  Bragg  Redwood  Co.,  104  Cal. 
626;  38  Pac.  451.  The  test  is 
whether  the  servant  ought  to  have 
comprehended  the  danger  (Craven 
v.  Smith,  89  Wis.  119 ;  61  N.  W. 
317). 


§2I4j  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  37O 

ordinary  course,  under  such  belief,  he  suffers  from  such  defect.* 
And  so,  if  the  danger  is  one  which  a  servant  of  ordinary  pru- 
dence would  believe  could  be  entirely  avoided  by  the  use  of  cer- 
tain additional  precautions,  the  servant  would  not,  by  continuing 
his  service,  lose  his  right  to  recover  for  damages  suffered  by 
him,  while  using  such  precautions.3  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is 
clearly  the  duty  of  a  servant,  in  such  a  case,  to  use  all  those 
additional  precautions  which  ordinary  prudence,  in  view  of  the 
risk,  would  dictate;4  and   the  burden   of  proof  would  justly 


2  Russell  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  32  Minn.  230  ;  20  N.  W.  147 
[brakeuian  crushed  while  coupling]  ; 
Cook  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  34 
Minn.  45;  24  N.  W.  311  ;  Snow  v. 
Housatonic  R.  Co.,  8  Allen.  441; 
Britton  v.  Great  Western  Cotton 
Co.,  L.  R.  7  Ex.  130;  reaffirmed  in 
Ford  v.  Fitchburg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  110 
Mass.  240  ;  Lawless  v.  Conn.  River 
R.  Co.,  136  Mass.  1  [low  draw-bar  on 
locomotive  ;  Thorpe  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  89  Mo.  650 ;  2  S.  W.  3.  The 
fact  that  a  servant  knows  of  a  de- 
fect in  machinery,  likely  to  injure 
him,  is  not  necessarily  conclusive  of 
want  of  due  care  on  his  part.  It  is 
for  the  jury  to  say  whether  the  de- 
fect was  such  that  none  but  a  reck- 
less person,  utterly  careless  of  his 
safety,  would  have  used  the  machine 
(Hough  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100  U. 
S.  213,  225).  In  Kain  v.  Smith  (89 
N.  Y.  375),  a  carpenter  sued  to  re- 
cover for  injuries  received  while 
loading  car  wheels,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  a  foreman  by  means  of  a 
defective  "jigger."  A  nonsuit  was 
held  error;  Danforth,  J.,  saying: 
"It  is  said  that  the  plaintiff  might 
also  see  the  defects  ;  true,  but  he  did 
not  know  the  effect  of  such  defi- 
ciencies, and  was,  moreover,  directed 
by  his  superior  to  get  and  use  the 
instrument,  and  whether,  under 
these  circumstances,  be  should  be 
charged  with   knowledge   and   with 


negligence  by  reason  of  it,  was  also 
for  the  jury." 

3  This  was  vaguely  implied  in  the 
opinion  of  Bartley,  J.,  in  Mad  River, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Barber,  5  Ohio  St.  541, 
562,  565,  and  expressly  declared  in 
Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co. 
(76  Pa.  St.  389),  where  defendant 
was  held  liable  to  its  conductor  for 
injuries  sustained  through  defects  in 
a  switch,  of  which  he  had  notified 
the  superintendent,  who  had  pro- 
mised to  make  the  required  repairs, 
and  requested  plaintiff  to  continue 
his  work  meanwhile,  observing  due 
care;  Gordon,  J.,  saying:  "Where 
the  servant,  in  obedience  of  the  re- 
quirement of  the  master,  incurs  the 
risk  of  machinery  which,  though 
dangerous,  is  not  so  much  so  as  to 
threaten  immediate  injury,  or  where 
it  is  reasonably  probable  it  may  be 
safely  used  by  extraordinary  cau- 
tion or  skill  .  .  .  the  master  is 
liable  for  a  resulting  accident."  See 
Sioux  City,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Finlayson, 
16  Neb.  578  [locomotive  with  weak 
throat-sheet,  which  engineer  used 
with  great  caution]. 

4  Taylor  v.  Carew  Mfg.  Co.,  143 
Mass.  470:  10  N.  E.  308  [servant 
walked  quickly  in  a  dark  basement 
room,  where  he  should  have  groped 
carefully,  and  fell  into  an  unguarded 
hatchway  hole]  ;  Gates  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.,  154 Pa.  St.  566  ;  26  AtL 
598  [attempting  to  cross  at  night  un- 


37i 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§215 


be  laid  upon  him  to  prove  that  he  did  so.  The  servant  loses 
no  rights,  unless  he  comprehends  and  appreciates  the  danger,5 
or,  having  the  necessary  capacity  and  information,  fails  to  do 
so  by  his  own  fault/'  But  one  who  comprehends  the  danger 
is  not  excused  by  his  inability  to  realize  the  full  extent  of  the 
injuries  which  may  possibly  result  therefrom.7 

§215.  Effect  of  master's   promises  or  assurances. —  In 

some  old  cases,  the  mere  continuance  of  a  servant  in  his  work, 
with  knowledge  of  defects  in  his  associates  or  his  materials, 
was  treated  as  conclusive  evidence  of  his  having  waived  objec- 
tions thereto.1  Such  rulings  were  unjust;  because  a  servant 
has  the  same  right  that  any  one  else  has,  to  complete  his  con- 
tract in  reliance  upon  its  original  terms.  And  those  opinions 
have  now  been   distinctly  overruled.2     A  party  to  any  other 


lighted  bridge,  with  which  servant 
was  familiar  for  the  jury].  If  a 
servant,  killed  by  the  sudden  draw- 
ing of  a  coal-car  out  of  the  mine  in 
which  he  is  working,  knew  that  the 
car  would  probably  soon  be  drawn, 
it  is  immaterial  that  the  master 
took  no  steps  to  notify  the  servant 
of  that  fact  (Lehigh,  etc.  Coal  Co. 
v.  Hayes,  128  Pa.  St.  294 ;  18  Atl. 
387). 

6  Fitzgerald  v.  Conn.  Paper  Co., 
151  Mass.  155  ;  29  N.  E.  464  ;  Prendi- 
ble  v.    Connecticut   River  Mfg.  Co., 

160  Mass.  131  ;  35  N.  E.  675  ;  Thomas 
v.  Quartermaine,  18  Q.  B.  Div.  685  ; 
Yarmouth  v.  France,  19  Id.  647  ;  Os- 
borne v.  London,  etc.  R.  Co.,  21  Id. 
220 ;  approved,  Mundle  v.  Hill.  Mfg. 
Co.,  86  Me.  400;  30  Atl.  16.  s.  P., 
Davidson  v.  Cornell.  133  N.  Y.  228  ; 
30  N.  E.  573;  Smith  v  Peninsular 
Car  Works,  60  Mich.  501 ;  27  N.  W. 
662  ;  Wuotilla  v.  Duluth  Lumber  Co., 
37  Minn.  153;  33  N.  W.  551. 

6  Suter  v.   Park   Lumber  Co.,  90 
Wise.  118;  62  N.  W.  927. 
1  Feely  v.    Pearson   Cordage  Co., 

161  Mass.  426  ;  37  N.  E.  368  ;  Trun- 
tle  v  North  Star  Woolen-Mill  Co., 
57  Minn.  :>>  :  5-s  N.  \V.  S32 


1  See  Mad  River,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  But- 
ler, 5  Ohio  St.  541  ;  Wright  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  25  N.  Y.  562,  569. 

2  Hoey  v.  Dublin,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  Irish 
Rep.,  5  C.  L.  206  ;  Laning  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  49  N.  Y.  521  [over« 
ruling  the  dicta  in  Wright's  case]  ; 
Hawley  v.  Northern  Central  R.  Co., 
82  N.  Y.  370  ;  Flynn  v.  Kansas  City, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  78  Mo.  195  ;  Dale  v.  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  63  Mo.  455  [fire- 
man injured  by  defective  joint  in 
rails]  ,  Francis  v.  Kansas  City,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  127  Mo.  658  ;  28  S.  W.  842  ; 
30  S.  W.  129  :  Graham  v.  Newburg 
Coal  Co.,  38  W.  Va.  273;  18  S.  E. 
584.  Defendant  held  liable,  where 
superintendent  promised  to  repair, 
and  requested  plaintiff  to  continue 
work  until  the  repairs  could  be 
effected  (Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Pa.  St.  389).  "  It 
would  seem  to  be  unreasonable  that 
one  who  has  undertaken  a  service 
which,  in  itself,  has  some  elements 
of  danger,  whenever  he  shall  see 
that  the  danger  has  been  increased 
through  some  negligence  of  his  em- 
ployer, must  either  stop  his  employ- 
ment or  be  deemed  to  have  accepted 
the  increased  risk.    We  do  not  think 


§215] 


LIABILITV    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


172 


contract  having  mutual  obligations  is  allowed  to  perform  fully 
his  part,  notwithstanding  the  failure  of  the  other  party  to  ful- 
fill a  condition  precedent,  without  necessarily  waiving  his  right 
to  insist  upon  performance  of  such  condition  at  a  later  period. 
It  is  not  fair  to  require  from  servants  a  more  peremptory 
assertion  of  their  rights  against  masters  than  would  be 
required  between  parties  standing  upon  a  more  equal  footing. 
Indeed,  the  dependent  position  of  servants  generally  makes 
it  reasonable  to  hold  any  notice  on  their  part  sufficient,  how- 
ever timid  and  hesitating,  so  long  as  it  plainly  conveys  to  the 
master  the  idea  that  a  defect  exists,  and  that  they  desire  its 
removal.3  The  real  question  to  be  determined  in  each  case  is 
whether,  under  all  the  circumstances,  the  master  believed  and 
the  servant  intended  to  make  him  believe,  that  all  objections 
to  the  unfitness  of  a  fellow-servant,  or  to  the  defects  in  the 
materials  provided  for  the  work,  were  waived,4  and  that  an 
implied  contract  exempting  the  master  from  liability  was 
freely  accepted.  This  is  a  question  of  fact,  not  of  law ;  and  if 
not  free  from  doubt,  it  must  be  left  to  the  jury.5  There  is  no 
longer  any  doubt  that  where  a  master  has  expressly  promised 


that  this  is  the  rule ;  and  it  seems  to 
us  that  the  plaintiff  had  a  right  to 
go  to  the  jury,  on  the  question 
whether  he  was,  under  the  circum- 
stances, justified  in  going  on  with 
his  work  "  (McMahon  v.  Port  Henry 
Ore  Co.,  24  Hun,  48). 

3  This  language,  used  in  our  old 
section  96,  although  not  quoted,  is, 
in  spirit,  reproduced  in  Hawley  v. 
Northern  Central  R.  Co.,  82  N.  Y. 
370.  It  is  literally  quoted  and  adopted 
in  Thorpe  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  89 
Mo.  650;  2  S.  W.  3.  When  com- 
plaining of  defective  machinery,  it 
is  not  necessary  that  the  servant 
shall  state  in  exact  words  that  heap- 
prehends  danger  to  himself  from  the 
defects,  nor  need  there  be  a  formal 
notification  that  he  will  leave  the 
service  unless  the  defects  be  re- 
paired (Rothenberger  v.  North- 
western Milling  Co.,  57  Minn.  461  ; 
59  N.  W.  531). 


4  This  proposition  cited  from  old 
section  96,  with  approval,  and  fol- 
lowed in  Poirier  v.  Carroll,  35  La. 
Ann.  699  [distinction  taken  in  favor 
of  a  servant  hired  for  a  limited 
time]. 

6  It  has  been  expressly  held  that 
the  mere  continuance  of  a  servant 
in  his  work,  in  face  of  a  known 
danger,  only  raises  a  question  for 
the  jury  (McMahon  v.  Port  Henry 
Iron  Co.,  24  Hun,  48  ;  Hawley  v. 
Northern  Central  R.  Co.,  17  Id.  115, 
affi'd  82  N.  Y.  370  ;  see  Kain  v. 
Smith,  89  Id.  375) .  But  perhaps 
Shaw  v.  Sheldon,  103  Id.  667,  de- 
cided by  a  bare  majority  of  the 
court,  is  to  the  contrary,  where  the 
facts  are  undisputed  and  no  excuse 
for  continuance  appears.  The  text 
was  quoted  and  adopted  in  Stephen- 
son v.  Duncan,  73  Wise.  404  ;  41  N. 
W.  337. 


373 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§2>5 


to  repair  a  defect,6  the  servant  does  not  assume  the  risk  of  an 
injury  caused  thereby  within  such  a  period  of  time  after  the 
promise  as  would  be  reasonably  allowed  for  its  performance,7 
or  indeed,  within  any  period  which  would  not  preclude  all 
reasonable  expectation  that  the  promise  might  be  kept.3    And 


6  For  examples  of  evasive  answers 
held  not  to  amount  to  a  promise,  see 
Breig  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  98 
Mich.  222  ;  57  N.  W.  118  ;  Wilson  v. 
Winona,  etc  R.  Co.,  37  Minn.  326  ; 
33  N.  W.  908.  It  is  often  said  to  be 
essential  that  the  servant  should  be 
,!  induced  to  remain  "  by  the  promise 
(Lewis  v.  N.  Y.,  New  England,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  153  Mass.  73  ;  26  N.  E.  431  ; 
Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Liehe,  17 
Colo.  280  ;  29  Pac.  1 75).  It  is  of  no 
importance  that  the  promise  was  not 
made  to  the  injured  employee  indi- 
vidually (Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sadler,  38  Kans.  128;  16  Pac.  46; 
Interstate,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox,  41 
Kans.  715  ;  21  Pac.  797  [promise 
made  to  contractor  under  whom 
plaintiff  worked]). 

1  Hough  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100 
TJ  S.  213  ;  New  Jersey,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Young,  49  Fed.  723  ;  1  TJ.  S.  App. 
96  1  C.  C.  A.  428 ;  Wust  v.  Erie  Iron 
Works,  149  Pa.  St.  263  ;  24  Atl.  291 
[incompetent  helper]  :  Rogers  v. 
Leyden,  127  Ind.  50 ;  26  N.  E.  210  ; 
Chicago  Forge  Co.  v.  Van  Dam,  149 
111.  337  ;  36  N.  E.  1024  ;  St.  Clair 
Nail  Co.  v.  Smith,  43  III.  App.  105  ; 
Lyttle  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84 
Mich.  289  ;  47  N.  W.  571  ;  Brecken- 
ridge  Co.  v.  Hicks,  94  Ky.  362  ;  22 
S.  W.  554  ;  Weber  Wagon  Co.  v. 
Kehl,  139  111.  644  ;  29  N.  E.  714  ; 
Rothenberger  v.  Northwestern  Mill- 
ing Co.,  57  Minn.  461  ;  59  N.  W.  531 
[defective  machinery  not  immedi- 
ately dangerous].  An  employee  who 
is  told  to  work  with  a  defective  tool, 
of  which  he  had  complained,  until 
a  good  one,  promised,  should  arrive, 
and    relying   on   such  promise,  and 


there  being  no  immediate  danger, 
does  so,  and  is  injured  by  the  use  of 
the  defective  tool,  can  recover  for 
the  injury  (Southern  Kan.  R.  Co. 
v.  Croker,  41  Kans.  747  ;  21  Pac. 
785  ;  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mid- 
gett,  1  Kans.  App.  138  ;  40  Pac.  995  ; 
Morbach  v.  Home  Min.  Co.,  53  Kans. 
731  ;  37  Pac.  122  ;  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co 
v.  Donnelly,  70  Tex.  371  ;  8  S.  W. 
52  ;  Harvey  v.  Alturas  Gold  Min. 
Co.,         Idaho,  ;    31  Pac.    819  ; 

Anderson  v.  Northern  Pac.  Lumber 
Co.,  21  Oreg.  281  ;  28  Pac.  5;  see 
Counsell  v.  Hall,  145  Mass.  468  ;  14 
N.  E.  530).  In  determining  what  is 
a  reasonable  time,  the  jury  should 
consider  all  the  circumstances,  such 
as  the  opportunity  for  making  re- 
pairs, and  the  frequency  with  which 
the  engine  was  used  (Lyttle  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  84  Mich.  289  ;  47 
N.  W.  571).  When  plaintiff  has  duly 
reported  a  defect,  and  been  twice 
assured  that  it  will  be  repaired,  the 
fact  that  he  could  have  repaired  it 
himself,  or  dispensed  with  the  ap- 
pliance in  which  it  occurred,  does 
not  deprive  him  of  his  right  to  re- 
cover for  an  injury  caused  by  it  (Gib- 
son v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  55 
Minn.  177;  56  N.  W.  686;.  Much 
more  can  he  recover,  if  forbidden  to 
repair  himself  (Ferriss  v.  Berlin  Ma- 
chine Works,  90  Wise.  541  ;  63  N.  W. 
234  [several  weeks  allowed]).  The 
promise  must  come  from  the  master 
or  his  proper  representative  (Ehmcke 
v.  Porter,  45  Minn.  338;  47  N.  W. 
1066). 

b  The  whole  of  this  sentence  from 
our  old  section  96  (in  its  original 
form),   was  quoted  and   adopted  ia 


£  2l5 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


374 


the  same  principle  applies  to  a  case  where  the  master  promises 
to  a  servant  to  discharge  an  incompetent  fellow-servant,  but 
fails  to  do  so,  and  the  former  servant  is  thereby  injured,9  or 
where  a  servant,  apprehending  a  particular  danger,  makes  it 
known  to  the  master,  who  assures  him  that  he  will  provide 
against  it.10  Nor,  indeed,  is  any  express  promise  or  assurance 
from  the  master  necessary.  It  is  sufficient,  if  the  servant 
may  reasonably  infer  that  the  matter  will  be  attended  to.11 
So  a  servant  may  rely  upon  the  master's  assurance  that  there 


Hough  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100  U. 
S.  213,  225  [engineer  and  defective 
engine]  ;  and  also  in  Missouri  Fur- 
nace Co.  v.  Abend,  107  111.  44  [similar 
facts].  So  held  in  Conroy  v.  Vulcan 
Iron  Works,  62  Mo.  35  [boards  of 
platform  insecure]  ;  Greene  v.  Minne- 
apolis, etc.  R.  Co.,  31  Minn.  248  ;  17 
N.  W.  378  [broken  "chafing  irons"]  ; 
Manufacturing  Co.  v.  Morrissey,  40 
Ohio  St.  148  [defective  lathe]  ;  Belair 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  43  Iowa,  G62 
[defective  draw  bar]  ;  Parody  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  15  Fed.  205 
[defective  draw-bar]  ;  Roux  v.  Blod- 
gett  Lumber  Co.,  94  Mich.  007  ;  54 
N.  W.  492  [uncovered  gearing]  ; 
Sioux  City,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Finlayson, 
16  Neb.  578  ;  20  N.  W.  8G0  [engine]  ; 
Clarke  v.  Holmes,  7  Hurlst.  &  N. 
937;  affTgS.  C.,  6  Id.  849[unfenced 
machinery].  Where  plaintiff's  in- 
testate remonstrated  with  defend- 
ant's agent  in  charge  of  the  mine,  on 
account  of  the  dangerous  position  of 
a  large  stone,  and  the  agent  sent  per- 
sons to  remove  it,  but,  before  they 
began  work,  it  fell  upon  the  de- 
ceased, held,  that  plaintiff  could  re- 
cover (Paterson  v.  Wallace,  1  Macq. 
H.  L.  748  [unfenced  machinery]  ). 
Where  a  servant  was  injured  because 
of  defective  lights,  of  which  he  had 
frequently  complained,  and  the  mas- 
ter had  repeatedly  promised  that  the 
defect  should  be  remedied,  the  serv- 
ant did  not  assume  the  risk,  in  con- 
tinuing in   the   employment  in  ex- 


pectation that  the  lights  would  be 
properly  fixed  (Smith  v.  Backus 
Lumber  Co.,  64  Minn.  447 ;  67  N.  W. 
358). 

9  Laning  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
49  N.  Y.  521.  Where  plaintiff,  a 
blacksmith  was  assigned  an  incom- 
petent helper,  and  the  latter  was 
changed  on  plaintiff's  complaint,  but 
reassigned  May  4th,  and  plaintiff 
again  complained  on  the  6th,  and 
was  promised  another  helper,  and 
was  injured  on  the  10th,  a  verdict 
holding  plaintiff  free  from  negli- 
gence sustained  (Lyberg  v.  Northern 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  15  ;  38  N.  W. 
632). 

10  Hyatt  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co., 
19  Mo.  App.  287  [employee,  sent  out 
to  shovel  snow  drifts,  was  frozen  in 
consequence  of  non-fulfillment  of  a 
promise  to  provide  a  car  in  which  he 
could  warm  himself]. 

11  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Bab- 
cock,  151  U.  S.  190;  14  S  Ct.  978 
[justifiable  impression  that  repair 
would  be  made]  So,  where  by  the 
master's  conduct,  the  servant  is  lulled 
into  a  sense  of  security  (Graham  v 
Newburg  Coal  Co.,  38  W.  Va.  273  ; 
18  S.  E  5«4).  Where  a  driver  of  a 
wagon  notifies  his  employer  of  its 
dangerous  condition,  and  is  induced 
to  use  it  for  a  short  time,  the  servant 
does  not  assume  the  risk  (Schlitz  v. 
Pabst  Brewing  Co.,  57  Minn.  303  ;  59 
N.  W.  188;  S.  P.,  Eddy  v.  Bodkin, 
[Tex.  Civ.  App.]  ;  28  S,  W.  54). 


375 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§215 


is  no  real  danger,1'  or  that  he  will  explain  the  points  of  danger,15 
or  that  he  will  see  that  there  is  no  danger.14  Much  more  may- 
he  rely  without  inquiry  upon  an  assurance  that  repairs  have 
actually  been  made.15  If.  however,  he  knows  that  such  assur- 
ances are  false,16  or  if  the  danger  is  so  palpable,  immediate  and 
constant,  that  none  but  an  utterly  reckless  person  would 
expose  himself  to  it,  even  after  receiving  any  or  all  of  these 
assurances,17  the  servant  may  be  debarred  from  recovery,  not 


12  Where  a  master  directs  his  serv- 
ant to  work  in  a  certain  dangerous 
place,  and,  in  reply  to  the  servant's 
expressions  of  fear,  assures  him  that 
there  is  no  danger,  the  servant  is  not 
guilty  of  negligence,  in  going  to 
work  there,  unless  the  danger  is  so 
imminent  that  no  prudent  person 
would  undertake  to  perform  the  ser- 
vice (Chicago  Brick  Co.  v.  Sobko- 
wiak,  148  111  573  ;  36  N.  E.  572).  To 
6ame  effect,  Wagner  v.  Jayne  Chemi- 
cal Co.,  147  Pa.  St.  475;  23  Atl.  772 
[fumes  of  nitric  acid  assured  not  be 
injuriousj  ;  Hoffman  v.  Dickinson, 
31  W.  Va.  142  ;  6  S.  E.  53  [chain:  as- 
surance no  danger]  ;  Stephens  v. 
Hudson  Knitting  Co.,  69  Hun,  375  ; 
23  N.  Y.  Supp.  656 ;  Schlacker  v. 
Ashland  Min.  Co.,  89  Mich.  253;  50 
N.  W.  «39  ;  O'Driscoll  v.  Faxon,  156 
Mass.  527  ;  31  N.  E.  635  ;  Burgess  v. 
Davis  Sulphur  Co.,  165  Mass.  71  ;  42 
N.  E.  501.  If  the  master  has  superior 
knowledge,  or  means  of  knowledge, 
and  assures  a  servant  that  he  can 
safely  undertake  a  given  work,  such 
an  assurance  may  justify  the  serv- 
ant in  undertaking  the  work,  with- 
out being  liable  to  the  charge  of 
negligence,  unless  the  danger  is 
imminent  or  manifest  (Haas  v.  Balch, 
56  Fed.  984  ;  6  C.  C.  A.  201). 

13  The  rule  that  a  servant  assumes 
the  risks  of  the  business  does  not  ap- 
ply where  the  servant  is  required  by 
his  master  to  enter  upon  a  hazardous 
task  under  an  unfulfilled  promise  to 
point  out  its  hazards  to  him  (McCor- 


mick  Mach.  Co  v.   Burandt,  136  111. 
170;  26  N.  E.  588). 

14  Defendant  had  told  plaintiff  that 
he  would  see  that  no  cartridge  was 
left  in  any  revolver  returned  to  plain- 
tiff for  alteration.  Held,  that  it  was 
a  question  for  the  jury  whether,  by 
continuing  in  defendant's  employ 
after  he  had  once  discovered  a  cart- 
ridge in  a  revolver,  plaintiff  assumed 
the  risk  of  such  an  accident  (Ander- 
son v.  Duckworth,  162  Mass.  251  ;  38 
N.  E.  510). 

15  Lawrence  v.  Hagemeyer,  93  Ky. 
591 ;  20  S.  W.  704  ;  Atchison,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  McKee,  37  Kans.  592  ;  15  Pac. 
484. 

16  This  is  on  the  general  principle 
of  estoppel. 

11  Dist.  Columbia  v.  McElligott,  117 
U.  S.  632  ;  6  S.  Ct.  884  ;  McKelvey  v. 
Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  35  W.  Va. 
500  ;  14  S.  E.  261.  So  held,  as  to 
promises  to  supply  a  better  ladder 
(Marsh  v.  Chickering,  101  N.  Y.  396  ; 
5  N.  E.  56  ;  Corcoran  v.  Gas  Co.,  81 
Wise.  191  ;  51  N.  W.  328  ;  Meador 
v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  138  Ind. 
290  ;  37  N.  E.  721  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
•Co.  v.  Kelton,  55  Ark.  483  ;  18  S.  W. 
933;  Showalter  v.  Fairbanks, 88  Wise. 
376  ;  60  N.  W.  257  [assurances  of  no 
danger]  ;  Mc Andrews  v.  Montana 
Union  R.  Co.,  15  Mont.  290  ;  39  Pac.  85 
[orders  to  go  on  "  with  great  care  "  ] ). 
This  limitation  is  recognized  in  all 
the  cases  cited  in  the  last  note.  The 
servant  cannot  "  rely"  upon  an  as 
surance  which  he  does   not  believe. 


§215]  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  tf6 

because  he  "assumed  the  risk/'  but  on  the  ground  of  his  con- 
tributory negligence.  For  the  master's  duty  to  repair  is  a 
continuing  one,  and  servants  do  not  "  assume  the  risk1'  of  his 
faults. w  In  several  cases,  however,  that  phrase  is  used  by  the 
courts.  After  the  prescribed  period  has  elapsed  without 
change,  or  if  the  master  has  refused  to  remedy  the  defect,  the 
servant  cannot  rely  upon  his  expectation  of  a  remedy  as  an 
excuse  for  remaining,  whatever  rights  he  may  have  upon  other 
grounds;  and  in  many  cases  it  has  been  held  that  he  *'  assumed 
the  risk."19  It  may  seem  presumptuous  on  our  part  to  differ 
from  so  many  learned  judges;  but  we  think  that  all  these 
decisions  are  wrong.  They  entirely  ignore  the  master's  gross 
breach  of  his  express  contract  to  repair.  Why  is  not  the  serv- 
ant entitled  to  recover  upon  that  ground,  entirely  irrespective 
of  the  ordinary  issue  of  negligence?  To  an  action  upon  breach 
of  express  contract,  contributory  negligence  is  no  defense.  If 
the  master  expressly  promises  to  "  take  all  the  risks,"  the 
servant  may  recover  upon  this  promise,  no  matter  how  obvious 
the  risk  may  be.20 

These  decisions,  however,  need  to  be  Watson,  114  Ind.  20  ,  14  N.  E.  721  ; 
reviewed  in  the  light  of  the  more  Chicago  Forge  Co.  v.  Van  Dam,  149 
modern  and  humane  cases  cited  111.  337  ;  36  N.  E.  1024  ;  Rothenberger 
under  §  211a,  ante.  The  night-  v.  Northwestern  Milling  Co.,  57  Minn, 
watchman  of  a  freight-yard,  after  461  ;  59  N.  W.  531. 
twice  applying  for  a  lantern  as  neces-  1S  Settle  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
sary  to  his  safety,  and  receiving  prom-  127  Mo.  336  ;  30  S.  W.  125;  Huhn  v. 
ises  of  one,  was  told  that  he  would  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  92  Mo.  447  ;  4 
be  lucky  if  he  got  one  in  a  month.  S.  W.  937  ;  Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh, 
He  resumed  work  not  expecting  etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Pa.  St.  389. 
to  get  one  within  a  month.  Held,  li(  Stephenson  v.  Duncan,  73  Wise, 
that,  his  employment  being  immedi-  404  ;  41  N.  W.  337  ;  Counsell  v.  Hall, 
ately  and  constantly  dangerous,  he  145  Mass.  468;  14  N.  E.  530:  Mor- 
could  not  recover  (Indianapolis,  etc.  bach  v.  Home  Min.  Co.,  53Kans.  731  ; 
R.  Co.  v.  Watson,  114  Ind.  20  ;  14  N.  37  Pac.  122 ;  Eureka  Co.  v.  Bass,  81 
E.  721;  15  Id.  824).  "  Utterly  reck-  Ala.  200;  8  So.  216  [defective  fuse]  ; 
less"  is  the  phrase  used  in  Hough  v.  Davis  v.  Graham,  2  Colo.  App.  210  ; 
Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100  U.  S.  213  ;  29  Pac.  1007.  These  were  all  cases  in 
Chicago  Brick  Co.  v.  Sobkowiak,  which  so  long  a  time  had  elapsed 
148  111.  573  ;  36  N.  E.  572  ;  Indianap-  without  repair  that  the  servant 
olis  R.  Co.  v.  Ott,  11  Ind.  App.  564 ;  could  not  have  believed  that  it 
38  N.  E.  842  ;  Cincinnati  R.  Co.  v.  would  be  made. 
Grames,  136  Ind.  39;  34  N.  E.  714.  20  Phillips  v.  Michaels,  11  Ind.  App. 
"  No  prudent  person  "  is  the  Ian-  672  ;  39  N.  E.  669. 
guage  of  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 


377 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§2l6 


§  216.  Presumption  as  to  servant's  knowledge.  —  It  may 

fairly  be  presumed  that  a  servant  knows  the  condition  of 
materials,  machinery  or  appliances,  which  he  has  a  constant 
opportunity  to  inspect,  and  which  his  regular  duties  bring 
under  his  notice;1  but  no  such  presumption  arises  where  he 
has  no  such  opportunity.2  A  locomotive  engineer,  conductor 
or  train  servant  of  any  kind  is  not  presumed  to  be  familiar 
with  the  condition  of  the  track ;  and  therefore  he  does  not,  as 
matter  of  law,  assume  risks  arising  from  a  defective  or  negli- 
gent construction  of  the  track,3  or  of  ties  under  the  track,4  even 
though  such  defects  existed  when  he  entered  upon  his  employ- 
ment. And  no  servant  is  presumptively  chargeable  with 
notice  of  a  peculiar  and  unusual  state  of  things.5  Reasonable 
time  must  be  allowed  to  a  new  servant  to  become  acquainted 


1  The  servant  is  presumed  to  know 
of  the  ordinary  dangers  and  risks  of 
the  service,  and  cannot  recover  for 
an  injury  which  he  might  have 
avoided  by  using  such  knowledge 
(St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Marker,  41 
Ark.  542);  where  a  laborer  had  his 
leg  broken  in  consequence  of  need- 
lessly sitting  on  the  edge  of  a  flat  car, 
while  in  motion,  with  his  feet  dang- 
ling down.  s.  P.,  Shaw  v.  Sheldon, 
103  N.  Y  667  ;  9  N.  E.  183  ;  Bross- 
man  v.  Lehigh  Valley  R.  Co.,  113 
Pa.  St.  490  ;  6  Atl.  226.  Compare 
Hoffman  v.  Clough.  124  Pa.  St.  505  ; 
17  Atl.  19.  Four  years'  service,  never 
being  warned  of  a  constant  danger, 
implied  notice  of  master's  habitual 
failure  to  warn,  and  assumption  of 
risk  (Fiynn  v.  Campbell,  160  Mass. 
128;  35  N.  E.  453).  So  after  one 
year's  service  (Kennedy  v.  Pennsyl- 
vania Co.  [Pa.],  17  Atl.  7).  So  after 
servant  had  been  using  machine  for 
three  weeks,  where  neither  party 
knew  of  the  defect,  and  both  had  the 
same  opportunity  of  discovering  it 
(Rietman  v.  Stolte,  120  Ind.  314;  22 
N.  E.  304). 

9 Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Jackson,  55 
111.  492  ;  Mickee  v.  Wood  Mach.  Co., 


70  Hun,  456  ;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  501 ; 
Alexander  v.  Central  Lumber  Co., 
104  Cal.  532  ;  38  Pac.  410  [few  oppor- 
tunities]. 

3  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller, 
140  Ind.  685 ;  40  N.  E.  116  [conduc- 
tor] ;  Bean  v.  Western  N.  C.  R.  Co., 
107  N.  C.  731  ;  12  S.  E.  600 ;  Little 
Rock,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Duffey,  35  Ark. 
602  ;  Sweeney  v.  Central  Pacific  R. 
Co.,  57  Cal.  15  ;  Trask  v.  California, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  63  Cal.  96.  See  Lovell  v. 
Howell,  L.  R.  1  C.  P.  Div.  161  ; 
Lopez  v.  Central  Ariz.  Mine  Co.,  1 
Ariz.  464  ;  2  Pac.  748  ;  Mich.  Central 
R.  Co.  v.  Austin,  40  Mich.  247  [worn 
rail]. 

4  Houston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Namara,  59  Tex.  255. 

6  Whalen  v.  Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.,  16 
111.  App.  320  [switchman's  knowl- 
edge of  dangerous  proximity  of  a 
scale-shed  to  the  track,  question  for 
jury].  Where  a  brakeman  was  in- 
jured by  contact  with  a  post,  erected 
near  the  track,  by  a  station  agent, 
for  his  own  purposes,  held,  that 
plaintiff  was  authorized  to  presume 
that  no  such  obstruction  existed 
(Kearns  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  66 
Iowa,  599;  24  N.  W.  231). 


§2,6] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


3/8 


with  his  surroundings,6  and  to  an  old  servant  to  learn  of 
changes  in  the  situation.7  Servants  are  presumed  to  be  aware 
of  defects  which  are  perfectly  obvious  to  their  sight,8  and  the 
danger   of    which    is  obvious   to   any  person  of    their    mental 


6  Northern  Pac .  R.  Co.  v.  Mares, 
123  U.  S.  710  :  8  S.  Ct.  321  [one  week 
not  necessarily  enough]. 

1  Nelson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60 
Wise.  320 ;  19  N.  W.  52  [locomotive 
engineer  not  bound  to  understand, 
immediately,  changes  in  time- 
table]. A  baggage-master  is  not  pre- 
sumed to  be  aware  of  ambiguities  in 
the  rules  for  running  the  trains 
(Georgia,  R.  etc.  Co.  v.  Rhodes,  56 
Ga.  645). 

8  For  instances  of  denial  of  recov- 
ery, irrespective  of  actual  knowledge, 
where  defects  in  appliances  were 
obvious,  see  McCampbell  v.  Cunard 
Steamship  Co.,  144  N.  Y.  552  ;  39  N. 
E.  637  [truck  and  skid] ;  Crown  v. 
Orr,  140  N.  Y.  450 ;  35  N.  E.  648 
[planing  machine]  ;  O'Maley  v. 
South  Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  158  Mass. 
135  ;  32  N.  E.  1119  [long  experience  ; 
"  must  have  known  "]  ;  Cassady  v. 
Boston  &  Albany  R.  Co.,  164  Mass. 
168  ;  41  N.  E.  129  [door  of  grain  car]  ; 
Goodridge  v.  Washington  Mills  Co., 
160  Mass.  234  ;  35  N.  E.  484  [uncov- 
ered gearing]  ;  Connors  v.  Morton, 
160  Mass.  333  ;  35  N.  E.  860  [master 
failed  to  warn,  yet  not  liable] ;  Con- 
nelly v.  Hamilton  Woolen  Co.,  163 
Mass.  156  ;  39  N.  E.  787  ;  Appel  v. 
Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  Ill  N.  Y.  550  ;  19 
N.  E.  93  ;  McNeil  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie, 
etc.  R.  Co. ,  142  N.  Y.  631 ;  37  N.  E.  566 
[unblocked  guard  rails].  Where  a 
longshoreman  can  see  that  a  place  is 
dark,  the  foreman,  who  is  loading  a 
ship,  does  not  represent  the  master 
in  failing  to  direct  the  longshoreman 
to  go  ashore  and  get  a  lantern  (Tully 
v.  N.  Y.  &  Texas  S.  S.  Co.,  10  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  463  ;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  29  ; 
Foley  v.  Jersey  City  Electric  Co.,  54 


N.  J.  Law,  411  ;  24  Atl.  487;  Yates 
v.  McCullough  Iron  Co.,  69  Md.  370  ; 
16  Atl.  280  ;  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Risdon,  87  Va.  335  ;  12  S.  E.  786 
[unblocked  frog]  ;  Adkins  v.  Atlan- 
tic, etc.  R.  Co.,  27  S.  C.  71  ;  2  S.  E. 
849  ;  Hazlehurst  v.  Brunswick  Lum- 
ber Co.  94  Ga.  535  ;  19  S.  E.  756  [no 
necessity  for  exposure  to  danger]  ; 
Hoyle  v.  Excelsior  Steam  Laundry 
Co.,  95  Ga.  34  ;  21  S.  E.  1001  ;  Smart 
v.  Louisiana  Electric  Co.,  47  La. 
Ann.  869  ;  17  So.  346  [insulating 
gloves]  ;  Fordyce  v.  Edwards,  60 
Ark.  438  ;  30  S.  W.  758  [locomotive] . 
Lamotte  v.  Boyce,  105  Mich.  545  ;  63 
N.  W,  517  [ladder  and  post]  ;  Ste- 
phenson v.  Duncan,  73  Wise.  404  ;  41 
N.  W.  337  [projecting  saw]  ;  Peter- 
sen v.  Sherry  Lumber  Co.,  90  Wise. 
83 :  62  N.  W.  948  [saw  mill]  ;  Quick 
v.  Minnesota  Iron  Co.,  47  Minn.  361  ; 
50  N.  W.  244  [mining  elevator] ; 
Bennett  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  2 
N.  Dak.  112 ;  49  N.  W.  408  [insuffi- 
cient space  between  cars]  ;  Olson  v. 
McMurray  Cedar  Lumber  Co ,  9 
Wash.  St.  500 ;  37  Pac.  679  [saw  mill 
machinery] ;  Hogele  v.  Wilson,  5 
Wash.  St.  160  ;  31  Pac.  469  [same]  ; 
Week  v.  Fremont  Mill  Co.,  3  Wash. 
St.  629  ;  29  Pac.  215  [defective  wire]  ; 
Bonnet  v.  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co., 
[Tex.  Civ.  App.]  ;  31  S.  W.  525). 
So,  where  the  place  of  work  was 
obviously  dangerous  (McGrath  v. 
Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60  Fed.  555  ;  9  C. 
C.  A.  133  [bridge];  Texas,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  French,  86  Tex.  96  ;  23  S.  W. 
642  [earth  bank] ;  Larich  v.  Moies,  18 
R.  I.  513  ;  28  Atl.  661  [same]  ;  Bat- 
terson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co  53 
Mich.  125  [track]). 


379 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  2I7 


capacity.9  But  to  charge  them  with  notice  on  this  ground,  the 
defect  and  danger  must  be  unquestionably  plain  and  clear,  so 
that,  if  they  did  not  see  it,  they  must  necessarily  have  been  in 
fault.13 

§  217.  Means  of  knowledge  ;  duty  to  investigate. —  It  has 

been  often  said  that  the  master  is  not  liable  for  defects  in 
instrumentalities  to  a  servant  whose  means  of  knowledge  were 
equal  to  those  of  the  master.1  But  this  is  much  too  broad  a 
statement ;  and  in  later  and  better  considered  cases,  it  has 
been  very  properly  repudiated.2  It  is  not  the  law.  Such  a 
rule  certainly  has  no  application  to  latent  defects;  as  to  which, 
servants  are  not  bound  to  inquire  or  inspect.3     The  true  rule 


9  In  most  of  the  cases  cited,  it  will 
he  found  that  weight  was  laid  upon 
the  capacity  of  the  servant  to  appre- 
ciate the  danger,  and  the  rule  is  fully 
stated  in  §§  203,  214,  218,  219,  219a. 
post. 

10  A.  master  is  liable  for  defective 
appliances,  unless  the  defect  is  so 
glaringly  obvious  that  there  can  be 
no  doubt  as  to  whether  a  prudent 
man  would  have  assumed  the  risk 
(Jones  v.  St.  Louis  Packet  Co.,  43 
Mo.  App.  398).  So,  also,  as  to  the 
danger  of  particular  work  (Kerns  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  94  Iowa,  121 ;  62 
N.  W.  692) .  If  by  reason  of  darkness, 
the  defect  could  not  possibly  have 
been  seen,  the  servant  is  free  from 
fault  (Bright  v.  Barnett  Co.,  88  Wise. 
299  ;  60  N.  W.  418).  For  cases  in 
which  the  question  of  notice  was  for 
the  jury,  see  Walker  v.  Lake  Shore, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  104  Mich.  606:  62  N.  W. 
1032  [workman  inexperienced  ;  no 
warning]  ;  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Tracy,  66  Fed.  931  ;  14  C  C.  A.  199 
[view  obscured]  ;  Smith  v.  Occidental 
Steamship  Co..  99  Cal.  462  ;  34  Pac. 
84  ;  Gaul  v.  Rochester  Paper  Co.,  72 
Hun,  485  ;  25  N.  Y.  Supp  443  ;  Coif 
v.  Chicaeo.  etc.  R.  Co..  8?  Wise.  273  ; 
58  N.  W.  408  [work  done  at  night  |. 

1  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hand- 
man,   13  Lea,  423 ;   Lumley  v.  Cas- 


well, 47  Iowa,  159  ;  Moulton  v.  Gage, 
138  Mass.  390  ;  Malone  v.  Hawley,  46 
Cal.  409  ;  Salem  Stone  Co.  v.  Hobbs, 

II  Ind.  App.  27  ;  38  N.  E.  538  [no  la- 
tent  defects]  ;  Clark  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co..  48  Kans.  654;  29  Pac.  1138 
[equal  knowledge  a  bar].  Plaintiff, 
having  better  knowledge  of  the  dan- 
ger than  defendant,  not  entitled  to 
recover  (Fairmount  Cemetery  v. 
Davis,  4  Colo.  App.  570  ;  36  Pac.  911). 

2  Austin  v.  Appling,  88  Ga.  54  ;  13 
S.  E.  955  ;  Williams  v.  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  109  Mo.  475  ;  18  S.  W.  1098  ; 
Dickson  v.  Omaha,  etc.  R.  Co.,  124 
Mo.  140  ;  27  S.  W.  476  [fence] ;  Salem 
Stone  &  Lime  Co.  v.  Tepps,  10  Ind. 
App.  516  ;  38  N.  E.  229  [latent  defect 
in  machinery]  ;  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co. 
v.  Crenshaw,  71  Tex.  340 ;  9  S.  W. 
262. 

3  Servants  are  not,  as  a  rule,  bound 
to  inspect  instrumentalities  or  to 
look  for  latent  defects  (Snow  v. 
Housatonic  R.  Co.,  8  Allen,  441  ; 
Pennsylvania  Coal  Co.  v.  Kelly,  156 

III  9;  40  N.  E.  938  [machinery]; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hines,  132 
111.  161  :  23  N.  E.  1021  [approving  our 
text] ;  Porter  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co., 
71  Mo.  66  ;  Harr  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co..  114  X.  Y  623  ;  21  N.  E  425  [track 
in  large  yard]  ;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
McCormack,  131  Ind.  250 ;  30  N.  E. 


§217] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


3  So 


as  to  "  equal  knowledge  "  is  that,  when  the  means  of  knowl- 
edge and  the  duty  to  use  those  means  are  equal,  between  master 
and  servant,  and  neither  uses  those  means,  both  are  equally  at 
fault.  And  this  is  all  which  was  really  intended  by  the  courts 
in  the  loose  dicta  referred  to.4  As  the  master  is  always  bound 
to  use  due  care  in  the  selection  of  servants  and  instrumentali- 
ties,5 his  servants  may  rely  upon  his  having  done  so;  and  as, 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  affairs,  such  care  would  result  in  a 
proper  selection,  servants  have  a  right,  in  all  cases,  to  assume, 
without  inspection,  that  instrumentalities  are  safe,6  and,  with- 


27  [brakeman  :  roadway  and 
switches]  ;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
Brush,  130  Ind.  347  ;  28  N.  E.  615 
[switchman  ;  broken  tie  in  track]  ; 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  McCaffrey,  139 
Ind.  430;  38  N.  E.  67  [section-man:  ab- 
sence of  necessary  hands  from  train]; 
Morton  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co.,  81 
Mich.  423  ;  46  N.  W.  Ill  [brakeman  : 
brake  chain] ;  Nicholds  v.  Crystal 
Plate-Glass  Co.  126  Mo.  55  ;  27  S.  W. 
516  [chain] ;  Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Voss  (Ark.),  18  S.  W.  172  [road- 
bed] ;  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Cren- 
shaw, 71  Tex.  340;  9  S.  W.  262; 
Zintek  v.  Stimson  Mill  Co.,  9  Wash. 
St.  395  ;  37  Pac.  340  [lumber  pile]  ; 
Victor  Coal  Co.  v.  Muir,  20  Colo.  320  : 
38  Pac.  378  [mine  roof]  ;  Little  Rock, 
etc  R.  Co.  v.  Moseley,  56  Fed.  1009  ; 


213  ;  Baldwin  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  72  Iowa,  45  ;  33  N.  W.  356.  A 
servant  may  assume  that  his  master's 
premises  and  appliances  are  safe, 
and  need  not  actively  inspect  them 
(Rigdon  v.  Allegheny  Lumber  Co., 
59  Hun,  627;  13  N.  Y.  Supp.  871; 
Lebanon  v.  McCoy,  12  Ind.  App.  500  ; 
40  N.  E.  700 ;  Banks  v.  Wabash  W. 
R.  Co.,  40  Mo.  App.  458  ;  Dillingham 
v.  Harden,  6  Tex.  Civ.  App.  474  ; 
26  S.  W.  914  [tool] :  see  Powers  v.  N. 
Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co..  98  N.  Y. 
274,  280).  Brakeman  not  bound  to 
inspect  coupling  appliances  of  cars 
(Goodrich  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
116  N.  Y.  398  ;  22  N.  E.  397  ;  Louis- 
ville &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Foley,  94  Ky. 
220  ;  21  S.  W.  866  ;  Sabine,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ewing,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  531  ; 


6  C.  C.  A  225  [switchman  :  tracks  in    21  S.  W.  700),  or  brakes,  nor  to  exam- 


yard]  ;  Carpenter  v.  Mexican  Nat. 
R.  Co.,  39  Fed.  315  [brakes]). 

4  See  Wells  v.  Coe,  9  Colo.  159  ;  11 
Pac.  50,  in  which  the  facts  were  as 
above  stated,  but  the  usual  broad 
language  was  used.  So  in  Vincen- 
nes  Water  Supply  Co.  v.  White,  124 
Ind.  376  ;  24  N.  E    747. 

6  See  §  194  and  notes  ;  Marsh  v. 
Chickering,  101  N.  Y.  396  ;  5  N.  E. 
56. 

6  Ante.  §  18ob,  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Hines,  132  111   161  ;  23  N.  E.  1021 


ine  brakes  before  using  them  (Ohio, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearcy,  128  Ind.  197; 
27  N.  E.  479)  ;  much  less  is  a  yard 
workman  bound  to  do  so  (Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kneirim,  152  111.  458 ; 
39  N.  E.  324),  nor,  as  a  matter  of  law, 
the  track  (Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Sloan,  11  Ind.  App.  401  :  39  N.  E. 
174).  A  brakeman  cannot,  as  matter 
of  law,  be  held  negligent  in  failing 
to  discover  that  bumpers  on  cars  he 
is  about  to  couple  were  rotten,  and 
so  defective  as  to  permit  the  cars  to 


[machinery]  ;  Bannon  v  Lutz,  158  come  almost  together  (Chesapeake, 
Pa.  St.  166  ;  27  Atl.  803:  Evans  v.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lash,  [Va.];  24  S.  E. 
Chamberlain,  40  S.  C.  104  ;   18  S.  E.     385). 


38i 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[I  217 


out  inquiry,  that  their  fellow-servants  are  competent  and  care- 
ful.7 In  like  manner,  servants  may  assume  that  all  instrumen- 
talities are  fit  and  suitable  for  the  use  to  which  the  master 
applies  them,s  and  that  they  are  properly  adjusted  to  each 
other.9  It  is  only  when  special  circumstances  make  it  the 
duty  of  the  servant  to  inquire,  that  it  is  contributory  negli- 
gence on  his  part  not  to  inquire.  The  duty  of  inspection  and 
inquiry  may  be  cast  upon  the  servant  by  special  contract,10  or 
by  general  rules11  or  special  orders,12  brought  home  to  his 
notice  and  giving  him  reasonable  opportunity  for  compliance,13 
and  to  the  extent  to  which  such  investigation  is  within  his 
reasonable  capacity.14  And  it  is  cast  upon  him  by  actual  knowl- 
edge of  any  fact,  which  would  suffice  to  put  every  person,  in 
his  circumstances  and  of  his  capacity,  using  ordinary  prudence, 
upon  inquiry.15  Therefore,  if,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  his 
service,  exercising  ordinary  care,  he  would  necessarily 16  become 


"  Ante,  %  1856 ;  U.  S.  Rolling  Stock 
Co.  v.  Wilder,  116  111.  100  ;5N.E. 
92  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Beatty, 
13  Ind.  App.  604  ;  40  N.  E.  753. 

'  Tins  is  well  stated  in  Porter  v. 
Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  71  Mo.  66 
[brakeman  thrown  from  car  by  de- 
fect in  track].  See  Muldowney  v. 
Illinois,  etc.  R.  Co.,  36  Iowa,  462 
[brakeman,  coupling  cars,  injured 
through  difference  in  height  of 
buffers]. 

9  Tims,  it  may  be  assumed  that  a 
car  has  been  properly  loaded  (North- 
ern Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Everett,  152  U.  S. 
107  :  Haugh  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
73  Iowa,  66;  35  N.  W.  116). 

10  See  Pratt  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  63  Hun,  616  ;  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  682. 

11  La  Croy  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  132  N.  Y.  570;  30  N.  E. 
391  :  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Dud- 
ley. 90  Va.  304;  18  S.  E.  274;  Fort 
Wayne,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gruff,  132 
Ind.  13;  31  N.  E.  460  ;  Alexander  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  83  Ky.  589. 

'•  Thus,  one  employed  to  select 
materials  is  necessarily  bound  to 
inspect  them  (Boettger  v.  Scherpe 
Iron  Co.,  124  Mo.  87  ;   27  S.  W.  466). 


13  See  O'Malley  v.  N.  Y,  Lake 
Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Hun,  130  ;  22  N. 
Y.  Supp.  48  [insufficient  time]. 

14  Question  of  negligence  properly 
submitted  to  jury,  since  evidence 
tended  to  show  that  it  would  have 
required  an  expert  to  discover  the 
defects  in  the  brake  (Pratt  v.  Lake 
Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  63  Hun,  616;  18 
N.  Y.  Supp.  682  [express  contract]. 

15  Servant,  knowing  that  many 
cars  had  defective  brakes,  put  upon 
inquiry  as  to  brakes  on  his  car 
(Roddy  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  104 
Mo.  234;  15  S.  W.  1112).  He  must 
look  for  obvious  defects  (Guinard  v. 
Knapp  Co.,  90  Wise.  123  ;  62  N.  W. 
625).  "  He  must  use  his  eyes,  and 
make  such  inspection  as  ordinary 
care  would  require"  for  obvious  de- 
fects (Fordyce  v.  Edwards,  60  Ark. 
438  ;  30  S.  W.  753). 

16  It  cannot  be  held  that  deceased 
was  bound  to  know  the  unsafe  con- 
dition of  the  track,  the  defect  not 
being  so  palpable  that  he  must  neces- 
sarily have  known  of  it  (Pennsyl- 
vania R.  Co.  v.  Zink,  126  Pa.  St.  288  ; 
17  Atl.  614). 


§2I7] 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


382 


familiar  with  certain  defects,  he  is  charged,  not  only  with  notice 
of  them,17  but  with  the  duty  of  making  reasonable  investiga- 
tion into  such  further  dangers  as  they  would  reasonably  sug- 
gest to  him.18  A  servant  is  chargeable  with  actual  notice  of 
every  fact  which  he  would  have  known,  had  he  exercised 
ordinary  care  to  keep  himself  informed  as  to  matters  concern- 
ing which  it  was  his  duty  to  inquire;19  and  especially  should 
this  rule  be  applied,  where  the  servant's  action  is  founded 
upon  the  assumption  that  the  master  ought  to  have  known  of 


"Ryan  v.  Porter  Manuf.  Co.,  57 
Hun,  253 ;  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  774  [floor- 
ing, used  eight  months] ;  Goltz  v. 
Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Wise.  136  ; 
44  N.  W.  752  [cracked  track]  :  Schulz 
v.  Johnson,  7  Wash.  St.  4U3  ;  35  Pac. 

130  [rope] ;  Ragon  v.  Toledo,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  97  Mich.  265;  56  N.  W.  612 
[hole,  readily  visible], 

!8  Flood  v.  Western   TJ.   Tel.   Co., 

131  N.  Y.  603;  30  N.  E.  196  [cross 
bars,  notoriously  not  strong  enough 
to  bear  man's  weight]  ;  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.  v.  Somers,  71  Tex,  700  ;  9  S.  W. 
741.  A  brakeman  coupling  a  flat 
car  is  entitled  to  assume  that  it  is 
properly  loaded,  but  is  nevertheless 
bound  to  use  proper  diligence  to  dis- 
cover any  negligent  loading  which 
renders  the  coupling  dangerous,  and 
then  to  desist  from  the  effort,  or  em- 
ploy some  method  of  avoiding  the 
danger  (Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Everett,  152  U.  S.  107  :  14  S.  Ct.  474). 
The  omission  of  employer  to  supply 
proper  light  does  not  excuse  em- 
ployee for  exposing  himself  to  un- 
seen and  unknown  danger  in  the 
dark,  which  he  ought  to  have  dis- 
covered, had  he  made  proper  use  of 
daylight  (Stubbsv.  Atlanta  Oil  Mills, 
92  Ga.  495  ;  17  S.  E.  746  ;  Norfolk  & 
W.  R.  Co.  v.  Emmert,  83  Va.  640  ;  3 
S.  E.  145  [couplings] :  Gulf,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Kizziah.  s»i  Tex.  81  ;  23  S.  W. 
578  [cars  ami  brakes]). 


"Duffy  v.  Upton,  113  Mass.  544 
[breaking  of  derrick-spar].  See  De 
Graff  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
76  N,  Y.  125  [car-brakes  of  old  pat- 
tern, on  wrong  side  of  car] ;  Perigo 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  52  Iowa,  276  ; 
Mayes  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  *J3 
Iowa,  562  [obvious  defect].  In  many 
cases,  the  qualifying  clause  as  to 
duty  to  inquire  is  not  stated  (Nix  v. 
Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  82  Tex.  473  ;  18  S. 
W.  571  ["knew  or  might  have 
known"]  ;  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
liams, 72  Tex.  159;  12  S.  W.  172 
[should  have  known]  ;  South  Flor- 
ida R.  Co.  v.  Weese,  32  Fla.  212  ;  13 
So.  436  ["should  have  known"]: 
Nelling  v.  Industrial  Manuf 'g  Co., 
78  Ga.  260  ["might,  by  ordinary 
care"]  ;  Haley  v.  Jump  River  Lum- 
ber Co.,  81  Wise.  412  ;  51  N.  W.  321, 
956  [samej  ;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Monden,  50  Kans.  539  ;  31  Pac.  1002 
["  in  the  performance  of  his  duties, 
must  have  known  "]).  But  that  con- 
dition is  always  implied.  Under 
Code  Ala.  §  2590,  which  releases  the 
employer  from  liability  when  the 
employee  knew  of  the  defects  which 
caused  bis  injury,  a  plea  is  bad 
which  alleges  that  the  employee 
knew,  "  or  by  the  exercise  of  due 
care  might  have  known,"  of  the  de- 
fect (Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hawkins,  92  Ala.  241  ;  9  So.  271). 


383  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  [§  2l8 

something  which  he  did  not  actually  know.20  A  servant  is 
certainly  not  chargeable  with  notice  of  that  which  he  neither 
knew  nor  was  bound  to  know.21 

§  218.  Application  of  rule  to  minors. —  It  is  now  well  set- 
tled that  the  general  rule,  limiting  the  liability  of  a  master  to 
his  servant,  applies  to  minor  servants,  as  well  as  to  others;  no 
distinction  being  made  on  account  of  their  incapacity  to  con- 
tract for  the  assumption  of  such  perils.1  Thus,  where  a  serv- 
ant is  set  at  dangerous  work,  the  mere  fact  of  his  minority 
does  not  render  the  master  liable  for  the  risk,  if  the  servant 
has  sufficient  capacity  to  take  care  of  himself,  and  knows  and 
can  properly  appreciate  the  risk.2  Therefore,  if  the  risk  is 
obvious  to  him,  and  fully  appreciated  by  him,  and  he  has 
entire  liberty  of  action,   the   usual   rules  are  held  to  apply.3 

20  Luinley  v.  Caswell,  47  Iowa,  159  The  fact  that  an  employee,  in- 
[explosion  of  a  boiler]  ;  Cooper  v.  jured  by  the  alleged  negligence  of 
Butler,  103  Pa.  St.  412 ;  Malone  v.  his  employer,  is  a  minor,  does  not 
Hawley,  46  Cal.  409 ;  see  111.  Central  require  the  question  of  his  assump- 
E.  Co.  v.  Jewell,  46  111.  99.  tion  of  risk  to  be  submitted  to  the 

21  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ward,  jury,  where  it  plainly  appears  from 
10  C.  C.  A.  166 ;  61  Fed.  927  ;  Mc-  undisputed  evidence  (Herold  v. 
Namara  v.  Logan,  100  Ala.  187  ;  14  Pflster,  92  Wise.  417  ;  66  N.  W.  35'j). 
So.  175  ;  Wells,  etc.  Co.  v.  Miskowicz,  The  mother  of  an  infant  cannot  re- 
50  111.  App.  452  [no  reason  to  suspect] ;  cover  for  injuries  received  by  her 
Cielfield  v.  Browning,  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  child  by  running  a  machine  which 
710  ;  9  N.  Y.  Misc.  98.  was  safe  when  properly  operated,  in 

1  Buckley  v.    Gutta   Percha  Mfg.  the  absence   of    evidence   that    the 

Co.,   113  N.   Y.  540;  21  N.  E.   717;  employer  failed  to  give  warning  of 

Hickey  v.  Taaffe,  105  N.  Y.  26  ;  12  N.  the  dangers  of  operation  (Davis  v 

E.  286  ;  Crown  v.  Orr,  140  N.  Y.  450  ;  Augusta  Factory,  92  Ga.  712  ;  18  S. 

35  N.  E.  648  ;  Gartland   v.  Toledo,  E.  974). 

etc.  R.  Co.,  67  111.  498  ;  Houston,  etc.  3Ogley  v.  Miles,  139  N.  Y.  458  ;  Si 

R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  51  Tex.  270  ;  Pitts-  N.  E.  1059  [boy  16  :  buzz-saw  ;  experi- 

burgh,    etc.    R.    Co.    v.  Adams,  105  ence ;     no    instructions  ;   non-suit]  ; 

Ind.    151  ;    5  N.    E.    187  :    King    v.  Ekendahl  v.  Hayes,  10  N.  Y.  App. 

Boston,   etc.    R.    Co.,  9  Cush.    112;  Div.  487  :  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  226  [boy  of 

Zurn  v.  Tetlow,  134  Pa.  St.  213  ;  19  16  :    disobedience    of    instructions  ; 

Atl.  504.  cog  wheels]  ;     Oszkoscil     v.     Eagle 

2 Where  a  minor  is  of  sufficient  Pencil  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  Superior,  217: 

age  and   discretion   to  comprehend  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  501  ;  Williamson  v. 

the  dangers  of  an  employment,  the  Sheldon  Marble  Co.,  66  Vt.  427;  29 

fact    that    he    is    a    minor    cannot  Atl.  669  [boy  16  :  "  danger  perfectly 

exercise     a     controlling     influence  apparent "]  ;  Downey  v.  Sawyer,  157 

(Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hender-  Mass.   418;    32  N.   E.  654  [boy  16: 

son     134   Ind.  636:  33  N.   E.  1021).  dreaded     the    work;     nonsuit;    no 


§218] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


384 


But,  while  the  mere  fact  of  minority  is  deemed  immaterial,  it 
is  also  settled  that  any  actual  or  presumptive  incapacity  of  a 
minor  to  understand  and  appreciate  the  perils  to  which  he  is 
exposed  is  to  be  fully  considered,  and  that  he  can  recover 
from  his  master  for  injuries  suffered  from  any  perils,  the 
nature  of  which  he  did  not  know,  or  could  not  properly 
appreciate,  if  he  did  nominally  know,  and  to  which  a  prudent 
and  right-minded  master  would  not  have  allowed  him  to  be 
exposed.4  In  effect,  the  weight  of  authority  is  in  favor  of 
applying  the  same  principles  to  the  case  of  a  young  person  in 
service  as  to  that  of  a  child  charged  with  contributory  negli- 
gence.5    He  is  held  responsible  for  the  exercise  of  that  degree 


point  of  coercion  raised]  ;  Probert 
v.  Phipps,  149  Mass.  258  ;  21  N.  E. 
370  ;  Curranv.  Merchants'  Mfg.  Co., 
130  Mass.  374  [boy  over  14]  ;  Green- 
way  v.  Conroy,  160  Pa.  St.  185  ;  28 
Atl.  692  [boy  14 :  warned] ;  McMellen 
v.  Union  News  Co.,  144  Pa.  St.  332  ; 
22  Atl.  706  [intelligent  boy  :  jumping 
off  train ;  nonsuit]  ;  Pennsylvania 
Co.  t.  Congdon,  134  Ind.  226  ■  33  N. 
E.  795  [age  18  :  3  months'  experi- 
ence] ;  Phillips  v.  Michael,  11  Ind. 
App.  672  ;  39  N.  E.  669  [girl  nearly 
16  presumed  to  appreciate  extremely 
obvious  dangers]  ;  Casey  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  90  Wise.  113  ;  62  N.  W. 
624  [age  18 ;  assumed  risk]  ;  Hef- 
feren  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  45 
Minn.  471  ;  48  N.  W.  1,  526  [17  years  : 
obvious  danger  ;  nonsuit]  ;  Ander- 
son v.  Morrison,  22  Minn.  274.  A 
number  of  similar  Massachusetts  de- 
cisions are  well  stated  in  Patnode  v. 
Warren  Mills,  157  Mass.  283  ;  32  N. 
E.  161.  A  minor  servant,  old  enough 
and  sensible  enough  to  use  his  eyes, 
and  to  take  notice  of  the  ordinary 
operation  of  familiar  natural  laws, 
and  to  govern  himself  accordingly, 
acts  at  bis  own  peril  in  failing  so  to 
do  (Kelly  v.  Barber  Asphalt  Co., 
93  Ky.  363  :  20  S.  W.  271  [boy  17]). 

4  Union    Pacific   R.   Co.  v.  Fort.  17 
Wall.  553;   Coombs  v.  New  Bedford 


Cordage  Co.,  102  Mass.  572  ;  Sullivan 
v.  India  Man'f'g.  Co.,  113  Id.  396; 
Hayden  v.  Smithville  M'f'g.  Co.,  29 
Conn.  548 ;  Hickey  v.  Taaffe,  105  N. 
Y.  26,  36 ;  12  N.  E.  286  ;  Patnode  v. 
Warren  Mills,  157  Mass.  283  ;  32  N. 
E.  161  [boy  of  14  :  dull  of  intellect]  ; 
Bartonshill  Coal  Co.  v.  McGuire,  3 
Macq.  300  :  4  Jur.  (N.  S.)  772  ;  Turner 
v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R  Co.,  40  W.  Va. 
675  ;  22  S.  E.  83  [boy  16]  ;  Thompson 
v.  Johnston  Co.,  86  Wise.  576  ;  57 
N.  W.  298  [boy  16:  little  experi- 
ence ;  risk  not  assumed  as  matter  of 
law]  ;  Sprague  v.  Atlee,  81  Iowa,  1  ; 
46  N.  W.  756  [boy  13:  verdict 
stands] ;  Northern  Pac.  Coal  Co.  v. 
Richmond,  58  Fed.  756 ;  7  C.  C.  A. 
485  [for  jury].  The  language  of 
this  paragraph  was  quoted,  approved 
and  adopted  in  Hinckley  v.  Horaz- 
dowsky,  133  111.  359  ;  24  N.  E.  421. 

5  Compare  S§  70,  73.  ante.  Atlas 
Engine  Works  v.  Randall,  100  Ind. 
293.  The  negligence  of  the  parent 
or  guardian  in  permitting  the  em- 
ployment of  a  minor  in  the  use  of 
dangerous  machinery  cannot  be  im- 
puted to  the  latter  (Huff  v.  Ames,  16 
Neb.  139  [boy  of  11]).  But  a  father 
who  allows  his  boy  to  be  employed 
in  a  coal  mine  without  stipulating 
for  such  employment  as  will  not  ex- 
pose him  to  danger  disproportioned 


335 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§218 


of  care  and  discretion  which  is  usual  among  young  persons  of 
his  age  and  circumstances,  and  for  the  use  of  ruch  knowledge 
as  he  actually  has,6  but  for  nothing  more.7  And  great  allow- 
ance is  made  in  favor  of  a  minor  rendering  obedience  to  a 
superior  servant,  where  a  servant  of  full  age  might  have  been 
required  to  refuse  such  obedience8  on  account  of  obvious 
danger.  In  general,  these  questions  are  to  be  left  to  the  jury, 
especially  as  to  mere  children.9  The  rule  holding  masters 
responsible  for  risks  assumed  under  their  coercion  is  peculiarly 
applicable  in  favor  of  minors,  and  especially  young  children.10 
Moreover  (although  we  do  not  find  that  the  point  has  been 
judicially  determined),  we  entertain  no  doubt  that  the  coercion 


to  his  years  and  discretion  is  negli- 
gent, and  cannot  recover  for  injuries 
to  him  (Weaver  v.  Iselin,  161  Pa.  St. 
386  ;  29  Atl.  49). 

6  Sullivan  v.  India  Mfg.  Co.,  113 
Ma?s.  396  ;  Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
cox, 138  111.  370;  27  N.  E.  899; 
Eva.ns  v.  American  Iron  Co.,  42  Fed. 
519.  Minor  servants  are  held  to 
assume  those  ordinary  risks  of  their 
service  which  are  obvious  to  them, 
or  have  been  pointed  out  in  a  man- 
ner suited  to  their  youth  and  inex- 
perience (Smith  v.  Irwin,  51  N.  J. 
Law,  507;  18  Atl  852). 

1  Hay  den  v.  Smith  ville  Mfg.  Co., 
29  Conn.  548 ;  Hinckley  v.  Horaz- 
dowsky,  133  111.  359  ;  24  N.  E.  421  ; 
Brazil  Block  Coal  Co.  v.  Gaffney, 
119  Ind.  455  ;  21  N.  E.  1102  [boy  10. 
coupling  coal  cars]  ;  Luebke  v.  Ber- 
lin Mach.  Works,  88  Wise.  442  ;  60 
N.  W.  711  [age  16:  for  jury],  A 
boy  of  14,  presumed  to  be  capable  of 
appreciating  danger,  yet  he  is  not  to 
be  held  to  the  same  degree  of  pru- 
dence as  a  man  of  mature  years 
(Kehler  v.  Schwenk,  144  Pa.  St.  348  ; 
22  Atl.  910).  See  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Brick,  83  Tex.  598  ;  20  S.  W.  511 
[boy  19,  with  experience,  not  pre- 
sumed to  be  equally  responsible  with 
adult]  ;  Evans  v.  American  Iron  & 
Tube  Co.,  42  Fed.  519  ;  Norton  v. 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  —  25] 


Volzke,  54  111.  App.  545.     All  cases 
cited  in  note  4  are  to  the  same  effect. 

8  Turner  v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co., 
40  W.  Va.  675  ;  22  S.  E.  83  [wrong- 
ful orders  of  foreman  :  boy  16] ; 
Hinckley  v.  Horazdowsky,  133  111. 
359  ;  24  N.  E.  421  [boy  12  :  obvious 
danger,  ordered  outside  regular  em- 
ployment] ;  Neilon  v.  Marinette,  etc. 
Paper  Co.,  75  Wise.  579;  44  N.  W. 
772  [ditto  :  boy  14] ;  Jones  v.  Old 
Dominion  Cotton  Mills,  82  Va.  140 
[boy  13]  ;  Robertson  v.  Cornelson,  34 
Fed.  716.  See  Gartside  Coal  Co.  v. 
Turk,  147  111.  120 ;  35  N.  E.  467  [age 
18  :  only  three  days  at  work ;  ex- 
press orders]. 

9  McCarragher  v.  Rogers,  120  N.  Y. 
526 ;  24  N.  E.  812  [boy  13]  ;  Heavey 
v.  Hudson,  etc.  Paper  Co.,  57  Hun, 
339  ;  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  585  [boy  15]. 

10  Mullin  v.  California  Horseshoe 
Co.,  105  Cal.  77  ;  38  Pac.  535  [ditto  : 
boy  16,  obeying  unwillingly]  ;  Kehler 
v.  Schwenk,  151  Pa.  St.  505  ;  25  Atl. 
130  [boy  14  :  unwilling  ;  urged  ;  for 
jury].  Where  a  boy  of  10  is  under 
control  of  full  grown  men,  jury  may 
infer  compulsion  (Brazil  Coal  Co.  v. 
Gaffney,  119  Ind.  445  ;  21  N.  E.  1102). 
See,  also.  Ciriack  v.  Merchants' 
Woolen  Co.,  151  Mass.  152  ;  23  N.  E. 
829  [boy  12 :  dull  ;  ordered  to  be 
quick]. 


§219] 


LIABILITY    OF    -MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


386 


of  a  parent  or  guardian,  exercised  in  favor  of  the  master,  has 
the  same  effect,  in  the  case  of  a  minor,  as  the  coercion  of  the 
master  himself.  The  master  of  a  minor  servant  is  charged 
with  notice  of  such  lack  of  capacity  as  is  usual  among  minors  of 
the  same  age,11  so  far  as  his  age  is  or  ought  to  be  known  by 
the  master,12  and  the  burden  of  proving  that  the  minor  servant 
had  any  greater  capacity  than  this  rests  upon  the  master,18 
while  the  burden  of  proving  that  he  had  less,  and  that  the 
master  had  notice  of  the  fact,  rests  upon  the  servant. 

§  219.   Special   duties   of  masters    to   minors. —  It  is  the 

duty  of  one  who  employs  young  persons  in  his  service  to  take 
notice  of  their  apparent  age  and  ability,  and  to  use  ordinary 
care  to  protect  them  from  risks  which  they  cannot  properly 
appreciate,  and  to  which  they  ought  not  to  be  exposed.1  This 
is  a  duty  which  cannot  be  delegated  ;  and  any  failure  to  per- 
form it  leaves  the  master  subject  to  the  same  liability,  with 
respect  to  such  risks,  as  if  the  child  were  not  a  servant.2  For 
this  purpose,  the  master  must  instruct  such  young  servants  in 

11  In  an  action   by  an   infant   for     years  of  age  is  employed  to  do  work 
personal    injuries    received    in    the    requiring  the  exercise  of  great  care 

and  judgment,  the  employer  assumes 
the  burden  of  proving  that  the  child 
was  in  fact  competent,  if  sued  for 
injuries  alleged  to  have  resulted  from 
his  negligence  (Molaske  v.  Ohio  Coal 
Co.,  86  Wise.  220;  56  N.  W.  475. 
See  Wynne  v.  Conklin,  86  Ga.  40  ; 
12  S.  E.  183  [boy  13  :  nonsuit  error]). 

1  Dowling  v.  Allen,  74  Mo.  13  ; 
Coombs  v.  New  Bedford  Cordage 
Co.,  102  Mass.  572;  Sullivan  v.  India 
Mfg.  Co.,  113  Id.  396  ;  Nashville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Elliot,  1  Coldw.  612  ;  Lynch 
v.  Nurdin,  1  Q.  B.  29.  Where  the 
servant  is  a  child  of  tender  years, 
the  master  is  bound  to  a  high  degree 
of  care  (Augusta  Factory  v.  Barnes, 
72  Ga.  217). 

2  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bayfield, 
37  Mich.  205  [minor,  hired  as  com- 
mon laborer,  and  ordered  to  act  as 
brakeman]  ;  followed  in  Jones  v. 
Lake  Shore  R.  Co.,  49  Mich.  573. 


course  of  an  employment  necessarily 
attended  with  danger,  instructions 
should  be  given  to  find  in  his  favor, 
on  the  ground  that  he  had  not 
assumed  the  risks  so  as  to  require 
him  to  exercise  ordinary  care  and 
caution,  unless  his  age,  intelligence 
and  experience  were  such  as  to  in- 
duce a  man  of  ordinary  care  and 
prudence  to  believe  him  qualified 
for  the  employment  (De  Lozier  v. 
Kentucky  Lumber  Co.,  [Ky.]  ;  18 
S.  W.  451  ;  s.  P.,  Taylor  v.  Wootan, 
1  Ind.  App.  183 ;  27  N.  E.  502).  Sub- 
stantially the  same  rule  is  stated  or 
implied  in  all  the  cases  cited  under 
this  section. 

12  Leistritz  v.  American  Zylonite 
Co..  154  Mass.  382;  23  N.  E.  294; 
Goff  v.  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.,  36  Fed. 
299. 

13  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  76 
Tex.  350  ;  13  S.  W.  874  [boy  16  : 
brakeman].     Where  a  child  12  or  13 


387 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§219 


their  work 3  and  warn  them  against  the  dangers  to  which  it 
exposes   them,4  and  he  must  put  this  warning  in  such  plain 


3  Hill  v.  Gust,  55  Ind.  45 ;  Keller 
v.  Gaskill,  9  Ind.  App.  670  ;  36  N.  E. 
303  ;  Glover  v.  Dwight  Mfg.  Co.,  148 
Mass.  22  ;  18  N.  E.  597  [girl  13,  clean- 
ing wheel] ;  Sciolina  v.  Erie  Pre- 
serving Co. ,  7  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  417  ; 
39  N.  Y.  Supp.  916.  Plaintiff  having 
been  injured  in  cleaning  a  wheel,  to 
which,  in  order  to  clean  it,  it  was 
necessary  to  impart  a  peculiar  mo- 
tion, the  question  of  her  due  care  is 
for  the  jury,  she  having  testified  that 
she  attempted  to  clean  the  wheel, 
and  give  the  required  movement,  as 
she  had  seen  her  fellow-servants  do 
(Glover  v.  D wight  Mfg.  Co.,  148 
Mass.  22  ;  18  N.  E.  597).  The  obliga- 
tion to  instruct  does  not  necessarily 
follow,  as  matter  of  law,  from  his 
minority  inexperience  ;  it  is  for  the 
jury  (Atlanta,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith, 
94  Ga.  107;  20  S.  E.  763). 

4Tagg  v.  McGeorge,  155  Pa.  St. 
368 ;  26  Atl.  671  ;  Smith  v.  Irwin,  51 
N.  J.  Law,  507  ;  18  Atl.  852  ;  Buckley 
v.  Gutta  Percha  Mfg.  Co.  ,41  Hun, 
450 ;  Gamble  v.  Hine,  50  Hun,  604  ; 
2  N.  Y.  Supp  778  ;  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Frawley,  110  Ind.  18 ;  9 
N.  E.  594  ;  Hoffman  v.  Adams,  106 
Mich.  Ill  ;  64  N.  W.  7  [dangerous 
horse  ;  no  warning]  ;  May  v.  Smith, 
92  Ga.  95;  18  S.  E.  360  [boy  17: 
dangerous  machinery]  ;  Nadau  v. 
White  River  Lumber  Co.,  76  Wise. 
120  ;  43  N.  W.  1135  [cog-wheels  :  boy 
19]  ;  Kaillen  v.  Northwestern  Bed- 
ding Co.,  46  Minn.  187;  48  N.  W. 
779  [inexperienced  boy  14  :  rollers  ; 
spikes]  :  Wallace  v.  Standard  Oil 
Co.,  66  Fed.  260  [inflammable  oils: 
boy  17].  Persons  who  employ  chil- 
dren to  work  with  or  about  danger- 
ous machinery,  or  in  dangerous 
places,  should  anticipate  that  they 
will  exercise  only  such  judgment 
and    discretion    a-    is   usual    amon'_r 


children  of  the  same  age,  under 
similar  circumstances ;  and  are 
bound  to  use  due  care,  having  re- 
gard to  their  age  and  inexperience, 
to  protect  them  from  dangers  inci- 
dent to  the  situation  in  which  they 
are  placed  ;  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
employer  to  so  instruct  such  em- 
ployees concerning  the  dangers 
connected  with  their  employment, 
which,  from  their  youth  and  inex- 
perience, they  may  not  appreciate 
or  comprehend,  that  they  may,  by 
the  exercise  of  such  care  as  ought 
reasonably  to  be  expected  of  them, 
avoid  injuries  (Cleveland  Rolling- 
Mill  Co.  v.  Corrigan,  46  Ohio  St.  2S3 ; 
20  N.  E.  466).  It  is  proper  to  charge 
that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  employer  of 
an  ignorant  and  inexperienced  boy 
of  tender  years  to  warn  him  of  all 
dangers  incident  to  his  employment 
(Harris  v.  Shebek,  151  111.  287 ;  37 
N.  E.  1015).  The  master  is  not  bound 
to  instruct  what  to  do  in  case  fellow- 
servant  is  guilty  of  negligence  (Sid- 
dall  v.  Pacific  Mills,  162  Mass.  378 ; 
38  N.  E.  9G9).  Compare  Wilson  v. 
Steel-Edge  Co.  (163  Mass.  315  ;  39 
N.  E.  1039),  where  no  instructions 
were  asked  by  servant,  nearly  21. 
Master  held  not  in  fault.  In  Wolski 
v.  Knapp  Co.  (90  Wise.  178;  63 
N.  W.  87),  there  was  evidence  that 
the  employment  was  attended  by 
danger  not  obvious  to  one  unac- 
customed to  the  work,  and  that  de- 
ceased, a  minor,  had  no  experience, 
and  was  not  warned  of  the  danger, 
though  testimony  for  defendant 
tended  to  show  that  he  had  been 
cautioned.  Held,  that  the  question 
of  defendant's  liability  was  for  the 
jury.  s.  P.,  Armstrong  v.  Fort;.  162 
Mass.  544;  39  N.  E.  190.  In  an 
action  involving  the  question  of 
negli   "  -  •<•   in   setting  an    inexperi 


8   2I9] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


188 


language  as  to  be  sure  that  they  understand  it  and  appreciate 
the  danger.5  For  it  is  not  enough  that  he  should  do  his  best 
to  make  children  understand.  They  must  no.  be  exposed  to 
dangers  which  they  do  not  fully  understand  in  fact.6  Bearing 
in  mind  the  natural  forgetfulness  of  youth,  he  must  renew  this 
warning  from  time  to  time,  as  may  be  reasonably  necessary.7 
And  if  the  servant  has  not  capacity  enough  to  understand  the 
warning  and  appreciate  the  danger,8  or  for  any  other  reason 
does  not  in  fact  understand  it,9  the  master  will  be  liable  for 
any  injury  which  such  servant  may  suffer  in  consequence,  if 
continued  at  such  work.  But  the  master  is  not  required  to 
point  out  dangers  which  are  known  or  must  be  obvious  to  and 
fully  appreciated  by  the  servant,  after  making  due  allowance 
for  his  youth.10  Generally,  this  question  is  for  the  jury.11 
When,  by  statute,  the  employment  of  young  persons  in  certain 


enced  person  to  work  on  a  dangerous 
machine,  a  witness,  familiar  with 
the  working  of  the  machine,  may 
describe  what  dangers  there  were 
about  it,  and  what  precautions  were 
necessary  to  avoid  them  ;  may  testify 
that  the  men  usually  employed  upon 
it  were  of  mature  age,  the  plaintiff 
being  a  young  lad  ;  and  that,  before 
being  set  to  work,  such  men  were 
carefully  instructed  in  the  use  of  the 
machine  (N.  Y.  Biscuit  Co.  v.  Rouss, 
20  CCA.  555  ;  74  Fed.  608). 

5  Honlahan  v.  New  American  File 
Co.,  17  R.  I.  141  ;  20  Atl.  268  ;  Reisert 
v.  Williams,  51  Mo.  App  13 ;  see 
Coombs  v.  New  Bedford  Coi-dage 
Co.,  102  Mass.  572  [boy,  less  than  14, 
set  to  work  near  unguarded  cogs]. 
Sufficiency  of  warning;  held,  for 
the  jury  to  decide  (Rummell  v.  Dil- 
worth,  131  Pa.  St.  509  ;  19  Atl.  346). 
Warning  held  sufficient  (Pratt  v. 
Prouty,  15'  Mass.  333;  26  N.  E. 
1002). 

6  Instructions  alone  are  not  enough. 
The  child  "  must  understand,  in 
fact"  (Hickey  v.  Taaffe,  105  N.  Y. 
26,  36  ;  12  N.  E.  286). 


7  Repeated  warnings  held  sufficient 
(Tinkham  v.  Sawyer,  153  Mass.  485  ; 
27  N.  E.  6). 

8  Taylor  v.  Wootan,  1  Ind.  App. 
188  ;  27  N.  E.  502. 

9  Hickey  v.  Taaffe,  105  N.  Y.  26 ; 
12  N.  E.  286  ;  Chicago  Brick  Co.  v. 
Reinneiger,  140  111.  334;  29  N.  E. 
1106. 

10  Ogley  v.  Miles,  139  N.  Y.  458  ;  31 
N.  E.  1059  [buzz-saw  :  nonsuit]  ; 
Buckley  v.  Gutta-Percha  Mfg.  Co., 
113  N.  Y.  540  ;  21  N.  E.  717  [boy  of 
12]  ;  Gordon  v.  Reynolds'  Card  Co., 
47  Hun,  278  [boy  18 :  several  months' 
experience]  ;  Mackin  v.  Alaska  Re- 
frigerator Co.,  100  Mich.  276;  58 
N.  W.  999;  Prentiss  v.  Kent  Mfg. 
Co.,  63  Mich.  478;  30  N.  W.  109. 
Master  need  not  point  out  wholly 
improbable  dangers  (Briggs  v.  New- 
port News  &  M.  V.  Co.  [Ky.],  24 
S.  W.  1069). 

11  The  question  whether,  from  pre- 
vious experience,  he  should  have 
comprehended  the  danger,  so  that 
neither  warning  nor  instruction  was 
necessary,  is  for  the  jury  (Chopin  v. 
Badger  Paper  Co.,  83  Wise.  192;  53 
N.  W.  452). 


to 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [g  219a 


dangerous  work  is  prohibited,  a  person  under  the  prescribed 
age,  who  is  thus  employed,  and  suffers  injury  in  consequence 
thereof,  is  entitled  to  recover  damages  from  the  master.12 
A  minor  must  not  be  employed  in  dangerous  work  against  the 
will  of  his  parent  or  guardian.13 

§  219a.  Inexperienced  servants,  etc.  —  The  principles  gov- 
erning the  employment  of  minors  are,  to  a  large  degree,  also 
applicable  to  the  employment  of  inexperienced,  ignorant,  feeble 
or  incompetent  servants.1  A  master,  having  notice  of  any  such 
defect  in  a  servant,  no  matter  what  his  age  may  be,  is  bound 
to   use   ordinary  care  to  instruct   the  inexperienced 2  or  igno- 

12  Hickey  v.  Taaffe,  32  Hun,  7  ;  re- 
versed only  on  the  ground  that  the 
statute  did  not  apply  to  that  particu- 
lar business  (99  N.  Y.  204).  An  em- 
ployee in  a  factory  rnay  waive  the 
protection  afforded  by  L.  1892,  c.  673, 
§  8,  which  provides  that  "  no  wornan 
under  21  years  of  age  shall  be  allowed 
to  clean  machinery  while  in  motion  " 
(De  Young  v.  Irving,  5  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  499  ;  38  N.  Y.  Supp.  1089). 

13  Hamilton  v  Galveston,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  54  Tex.  556;  Goff  v.  Norfolk, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  36  Fed.  299.  Where  a 
party  knowingly  engages  a  minor  in 
a  dangerous  employment,  against 
the  known  will  of  the  father,  and 
the  minor  is  injured  in  such  employ- 
ment, such  party  is  responsible  to 
the  father  for  the  consequent  loss  of 
the  services  of  the  minor  (Taylor  v. 
Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  41  W.  Va. 
704 ;  24  S.  E.  631).  Where  a  minor 
is  killed  in  a  dangerous  employment, 
the  mere  fact  that  he  was  employed 
without  his  father's  consent  does  not 
render  the  master  liable  to  the  father 
for  the  loss  of  the  minor's  services, 
but  the  employment  must  have  been 
against  the  will  of  the  father  (Toledo, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Trimble,  8  Ind.  App. 
333;  35  N.  E.  716). 

1  Where  a  servant  is  warned  of  the 
dangerous  character  of  aachinery, 
and  understands  the  danger,  he  can- 
not recover  for  any  injury  ;  but.  in 


determining  his  understanding,  mat- 
ters of  youth,  intelligence,  inexperi- 
ence, and  the  like,  are  to  be  consid- 
ered (King  v.  Ford  River  Lumber  Co., 
93  Mich.  172  ;  53  N.  W.  10). 

2  Brennan  v.  Gordon,  118  N.  Y. 
489  ;  23  N.  E.  810  [use  of  elevator]  ; 
Campbell  v.  Eveleth,  83  Me.  50  ;  21 
Atl.  784  [lath  saw]  ;  Cartter  v.  Cotter, 
88  Ga.  286  ;  14  S.  E.  476  [unsafe 
machinery]  ;  Jones  v.  Florence  Min- 
ing Co.,  66  Wise.  268  ;  Greenberg  v. 
Whitcomb  Co.,  90  Wise.  225;  63  N. 
W.  93  ;  Reynolds  v.  Boston  &  M.  R. 
Co.,  64  Vt.  66  ;  24  Atl.  134 [brakeman: 
double  deadwoods]  ;  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Frawley,  110  Ind.  18 ;  9  N. 
E.  594  [same]  ;  Hungerford  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.,  41  Minn.  444  ;  43 
N.  W.  324  [brakeman  coupling  with 
improper  draft-iron]  :  Missouri  Pac. 
R.  Co.  v.  White,  76  Tex.  102  ;  13  S. 
W.  65  [peculiar  couplings]  ;  Texas 
Mex.  R.  Co.  v.  Douglas,  73  Tex.  325; 
11  S.  W.  333.  A  railroad  company 
is  bound  to  instruct  a  brakeman, 
whose  experience  in  the  business  has 
been  only  five  days,  as  to  the  proper 
mode  to  make  the  coupling  of  foreign 
cars  supplied  with  coupling  appa- 
ratus unlike  its  own,  in  using  which 
the  danger  is  greater  than  in  using 
its  own,  and  which  cannot  with 
safety  be  coupled  in  the  same  man- 
ner (Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Price, 
72  Miss.  862;  18  So.  415). 


§2iga]  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


3'jo 


rant,8  to  avoid  putting  the  feeble  to  work  too  heavy  for  their 
strength,'  and  generally  to  refrain  from  exposing  them  to  risks 
which  they  are  not  fit  to  encounter.  When  the  master  has 
notice  of  such  ignorance  or  inexperience  on  the  part  of  the 
servant  as  would  make  the  ordinary  risks  of  the  business 
especially  perilous  to  that  servant,  he  must  give  the  servant 
explicit  warning  of  the  danger,  and  not  allow  him  to  undertake 
the  work  without  a  full  explanation  of  its  perils.5  Especially 
is  this  duty  of  warning  incumbent  upon  the  master,  when  the 
risks  to  be  encountered  are  unusual  or  special."  These  obliga- 
tions are  personal  to  the  master.7  On  the  other  hand,  the 
master  is  not    charged  with    these    duties,   without    proof  of 


3  Kearney  Electric  Co.  v.  Laughlin, 
45  Neb.  390  ;  G3  N.  W.  941  [common 
laborer  at  excavation  not  instructed 
to  erect  supports  to  tunnel]  ;  Roth  v. 
Northern  Pac.  Lumber  Co.,  18  Oreg. 
205  ;  22  Pac.  842  [unskilled  servant]  ; 
Ingerman  v.  Moore,  93  Cal.  410  ;  27 
Pac.  306  [concealed  danger] ;  White- 
law  v.  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  16  Lea, 
391  ;  1  S.  W.  37  [young  man  19]. 

4  Defendant  guilty  of  negligence  in 
setting  plaintiff  to  work  at  the 
special  task,  knowing  that  he 
lacked  the  strength  and  skill  neces- 
sary to  do  it  safely  (Yoaman  v. 
Noblesville  Foundry  Co.,  3  lad.  App. 
521  ;  30  N.  E.  10). 

5 Mather  v.  Rillston,  156  U.  S.  391  ; 
15  S.  Ct.  464  [dynamite]  ;  Rummell 
v.  Dillworth,  111  Pa.  St.  313  ;  2  Atl. 
355  ;  Gates  v.  State,  128  N.  Y.  221  ; 
28  N.  E.  373  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Frawley,  110  Ind.  18  ;  9  N.  E.  594; 
Davies  v.  England,  10  Jur.  (N.  S.)  1235 
[cutting  diseased  flesh]  ;  Spelman  v. 
Fisher  Iron  Co.,  56  Barb.  151  [new 
explosive]  ;  Smith  v.  Oxford  Iron 
Works,  42  N.  J.  Law,  407  ;  Lofrano 
v.  X.  Y.  &  Mt.  Vernon  Water  Co., 
55  Hun,  452;  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  717 
[dynamite]  ;  Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.Maddux,  134  Ind.  571;  33  N.  E. 
345  ;  34  Id.  511  [unsafe  condition  of 
road]  ;    Pullman  Palace  Car  Co.   v. 


Harkins  5  C.  C.  A.  326  ;  55  Fed. 
932  ;  see  Gilbert  v.  Guild,  144  Mass. 
601  ;  12  N.  E.  368.  See  Ryan  v.  Los 
Angeles  Storage  Co.,  112 Cal.  244  ;  44 
Pac.  471,  for  example  of  sufficient 
evidence. 

6  A  railroad  company  which  con- 
tinues to  use  a  brake  which  is  dan- 
gerous because  it  is  liable  to  throw 
off  suddenly,  after  a  safer  one  is  dis- 
covered, is  bound  to  warn  an  inex- 
perienced brakeman  of  its  danger 
(Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Binion,  107 
Ala  645  ;  18  So.  75).  An  inexperi- 
enced brakeman  will  not  be  held 
guilty  of  contributory  negligence  in 
obeying  an  order  to  couple  cars  sup- 
plied with  coupling  appliances  dif- 
ferent from  those  he  had  been  in- 
structed in  regard  to,  on  the  theory 
that  he  must  have  seen  the  difference, 
and  that  their  difference  was  suffi- 
cient warning  of  the  increased  dan- 
ger (Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Price, 
72  Miss.  862  ;  18  So.  415).  And  see 
further,  §  203,  ante. 

1  Master  personally  bound  to  in- 
struct, in  use  of  dangerous  machin- 
ery, servant  known  to  him  to  be 
unskilled  ;  and  every  one  giving 
such  instruction  is  a  vice-principal 
(Brennan  v.  Gordon,  118  N.  Y.  489 
[elevator]). 


39i 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§220 


notice  of  the  facts;8  nor  if  the  risks  are  known  or  perfectly 
obvious  to  the  servant,9  and  he  is  capable  of  appreciating  them  ; 
nor  is  he  bound  to  give  a  detailed  description  of  the  risks  to 
be  encountered  or  to  anticipate  every  possible  risk.10  The 
master  is  not  liable  for  injuries  caused  solely  by  the  inexpe- 
rience or  ignorance  of  the  servant  since  it  is  not  culpable  to 
employ  such  a  servant.11 

§  220.  Servant's  knowledge  of  master's  personal  defects. — 

A  servant's  knowledge  of  his  master's  character  and  habits 
does  not  protect  the  master  from  liability  for  the  direct  conse- 
quences of  his  own  negligence.  For  these  he  is  liable,  no 
matter  how  well  he  is  known  by  his  servants  to  be  of  negli- 
gent habits.  Nor,  indeed,  does  any  knowledge  of  his  general 
negligence  deprive  his  servants  of  remedy  for  the  proximate, 
though  indirect,  results  of  his  negligence  in  particular  things. 
It  is  only  where  a  servant  knows  that  a  particular  duty  has 
not  been  performed,  has  no  reason  to  expect  that  it  will  be, 


8  Gorman  v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  78  Iowa,  509;  43  N.  W.  303. 
Whether  the  master,  at  the  time  of 
engaging  a  servant  to  work  on  dan- 
gerous machinery,  or  afterwards, 
ought  to  have  inquired  whether  he 
was  experienced  or  not,  or  should 
have  taken  notice,  under  all  the 
facts  of  the  probability  that  he  was 
not,  nothing  being  said  on  the  sub- 
ject by  either  party,  is  a  question  for 
the  jury  (May  v.  Smith,  92  Ga.  95  ; 
18  S.  E.  360).  Ignorance  by  a  serv- 
ant of  a  malady  which  he  had,  and 
which  rendered  certain  labor  dan- 
gerous, and  knowledge  of  it  by  his 
master,  is  not  sufficient  to  entitle 
the  servant  to  recover  where  the 
master  places  him  at  such  labor ;  it 
being  necessary  to  show  further  that 
the  master  did  not  know  that  the 
servant  was  ignorant  of  it  (Crowley 
v.  Appleton,  148  Mass.  98  ;  18  N.  E. 
675). 

9  So  held  where  servant  know 
(White  v.  Wittemann  Lithographic 
Co.,  131  N.   Y.  631  ;  30  N.  E.   236  ; 


Coullard  v.  Tecumseh  Mills,  151 
Mass.  85;  23  N.  E.  731  [servant 
familiar]  ;  Yeager  v.  Burlington,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  93  Iowa,  1  ;  61  N.  W.  215  ; 
McCue  v.  National  Starch  Co.,  142 
N.  Y.  106  ;  36  N.  E.  809  [undirected 
use  of  machinery  where  danger 
was  obvious]  ;  Melzer  v.  Peninsular 
Car  Co.,  76  Mich.  94  ;  42  N.  W.  1078; 
Crowley  v.  Pacific  Mills,  148  Mass. 
238:  19  N  E.  344;  Townsend  v. 
Langles,  41  Fed.  919  ;  International, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Arias,  10  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
190;    30  S.  W.  446). 

10  Thompson  v.  Allis  Co.,  89  Wise. 
523  ;  62  N.  W.  527  ;  Foster  v.  Pusey, 
8  Del.  168  ;  14  Atl.  545. 

11  Where  an  inexperienced  man 
enters  on  the  duties  of  a  conductor 
of  a  railroad  train,  he  cannot  recover 
for  damages  resulting  merely  from 
his  inexperience,  though  the  com- 
pany knew  of  his  want  of  skill  when 
it  employed  him  (Alexander  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  83  Ky.  589). 
See,  also,  §§  218,  219,  ante. 


§221] 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


392 


and  docs  not  insist  that  it  shall  be,  that  he  can  be  deprived  of 
the  right  to  complain  of  its  neglect;  and  even  this  is  usually  a 
question  of  fact,  not  of  law.1  Therefore  a  servant  is  not 
affected  in  his  rights  by  his  knowledge  that  his  master  is  in 
the  habit  of  employing  incompetent  servants,  or  of  furnishing 
dangerous  materials  to  his  workmen,  or  of  omitting  to  provide 
adequate  safeguards,  or  of  neglecting  that  part  of  the  work  to 
which  he  personally  attends.  He  has,  none  the  less,  a  right 
to  presume  that  the  master  will  act  prudently  in  his  own  case. 

§  221.    Servant's    duty    to    warn    and    complain. — As   a 

general  rule,  servants  owe  to  their  masters  the  duty  of  giving 
notice  of  circumstances  which  endanger  their  own  safety;  and 
they  ought  to  complain  of  defects  in  materials  and  instrumen- 
talities of  their  work,1  defects  in  their  fellow-servants2  or 
insufficiency  of  their  numbers.3  They  should  ask  that  these 
defects  be  remedied.  And  if  they  fail  to  do  so,  they  are 
usually  considered  to  be  guilty  of   contributory   negligence.* 


1  Lasure  v.  Graniteville  Mfg.  Co., 
18  S.  C.  275. 

'Watts  v.  Boston  Towboat  Co., 
161  Mass.  378  ;  37  N.  E.  197  [grating 
and  cover  badly  worn]  ;  Keenan  v. 
Edison  Electric  Co.,  159  Mass.  379  ; 
34  N.  E.  3G6  [no  guard,  as  required 
by  statute  :  no  complaint  for  two 
montbs] ;  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Lyons,  119  Pa.  St.  324;  13 
Atl.  205  ;  Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  7G  Pa.  St.  389  ;  Illinois 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Je%vell,  46  111.  99  ; 
Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Eddy,  72  Id.  138; 
Bogenschutz  v.  Smith,  84  Ky.  330  ;  1 
S.  W.  578  ;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v. 
Lynch,  90  111.  333  ;  Consol.  Mining 
Co.  v.  Clay,  51  Ohio  St.  542 ;  38  N. 
E.  610  ;  Chicago  Coal  Co.  v.  Norman, 
49  Ohio  St.  598  ;  32  N.  E.  857  ;  Hewitt 
v.  Flint,  etc.  R .  Co. ,  67  Mich.  61 ;  Kroy 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  32  Iowa,  357  ; 
Muldowney  v.  111.  Central  R.  Co.,  39 
Id.  615  ;  Youll  v.  Sioux,  etc.  R.  Co., 
66  Id.  346  ;  23  N.  W.  736. 

*  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Peavey,  29 
Kans.    1fi9  ;  Hatt  v.  Nay,  144   Mass 


186  ;  approving  Davis  v.  Detroit, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  20  Mich.  105  [conductor 
injured  through  carelessness  of  en- 
gineer, who  became  careless  and  in- 
competent, and  conductor  knowing 
it  did  not  report  him]  ;  and  see  other 
cases  to  same  effect,  §  209,  ante.  A 
servant  assumes  all  dangers  arising 
from  the  known  incompetency  or 
unskillfulness  of  a  fellow-servant, 
which  he  does  not  complain  of  or 
make  known  to  his  master  (Latre- 
mouille  v.  Bennington,  etc.  R.  Co., 
63  Vt.  336;  22  Atl.  656). 

3  A  railroad  employee  assumes  the 
risk  of  collisions  at  a  crossing  having 
no  watchman,  and  knowing  its  dan- 
gers, if  he  makes  no  complaint  in 
regard  to  its  dangei's  and  the  neces- 
sity of  keeping  a  watchman  there 
(Rumsey  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co., 
151  Pa.  St.  74  ;  25  Atl.  37). 

4  Williams  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
119  Mo.  316 ;  24  S.  W.  782  [spiral 
spring,  concealed  in  grass,  grown 
over  track  :  no  complaint]. 


393  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  221 

This  duty  of  warning,  however,  does  not  extend  to  defects  and 
dangers  of  which  the  master  is  already  well  aware,5  unless  they 
are  of  such  a  nature  that,  in  the  absence  of  complaint,  the 
master  may  reasonably  assume  that  the  servant  is  content  to 
take  the  risk  of  them.6  They  also  owe  a  duty  of  warning  their 
masters  of  defects  in  themselves,  which  make  the  work  danger- 
ous to  them.7  Thus,  a  servant  who  is  set  to  do  work  to  which 
he  is  unaccustomed,  and  which  he  does  not  understand,  ought 
to  inform  his  master  of  the  fact;8  and  if,  for  want  of  such 
warning,  he  is  kept  at  work  for  which  he  is  unfit,  and  suffers 
injury  thereby,  he  is  himself  in  fault,  and  cannot  generally 
recover  damages.  Still  more  is  this  proper,  where  the  servant 
assures  the  master  that  he  is  competent,  when  he  is  not.9 
But,  in  a  few  large  establishments  (it  is  commonly  reported)  it 
is  the  rule  to  discharge  forthwith  any  employee  who  makes  a 
complaint.  On  proof  of  such  a  practice,  we  cannot  doubt  that 
every  court  would  hold  an  injured  servant  relieved  from  the  duty 
of  complaint,  and,  furthermore,  that  such  employers  would  be 
charged  with  personal  notice  of  all  defects  which,  but  for  this 
tyrannous  rule,  would  probably  have  come  to  their  knowledge. 
Failure  to  give  warning  of  dangers  unknown  to  the  master, 
which  he  could  have  guarded  against,  if  warned,  is  contribu- 
tory negligence.10     Warnings  should  be  given  or  complaints 

5  Where  servants  of  railroad  com-  blasting,  and  was  employed  to  use 
pany  supei'ior  to  plaintiff  knew  of  the  same  in  his  work  at  an  increased 
defects  in  the  engine,  it  is  no  defense  price.  Held,  that  plaintiff  from  his 
that  plaintiff,  though  knowing  of  own  negligence  in  undertaking  to 
them,  failed  to  inform  the  company  stir  the  material  in  the  cap,  without 
(Seaboard  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Woodson,  98  first  informing  himself  if  it  could 
Ala.  378  ;  11  So.  733).  safely  be  done,  was  not  entitled  to  re- 

6  See  §  211,  ante.  cover  (Ray  v.  Jeffries,  86   Ky.    367; 

1 1t  is  one  of  the  general  implied  5  S.  W.  867).  An  untruthful  state- 
conditions  of  every  contract  for  ser-  ment,  made  by  a  servant  when  he 
vice  with  an  adult  person  that  the  enters  upon  employment,  that  he  is 
servant  is  competent  to  discharge  accustomed  to  such  work,  relieves 
the  duties  for  which  he  is  employed  the  master  from  the  duty  of  explain- 
(Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Estes,  37  ing  the  dangers  ordinarily  incident, 
Kans.  715;  16  Pac.  131).  but  docs   not  qualify  bis   obligation 

8  Wbittaker  v.  Coombs,  14  111.  App.  to  furnish  reasonably  safe  appliances 
498.  (Steen  v.  St.  Paul.  etc.    R.    Co.,   37 

9  Plaintiff  represented  to  defendant    Minn.  310  ,  34  X.  W.  113). 

that  be  was  acquainted  with  and  '"Harrison  v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co., 
skille  1  in  the  use  of    giant  powder  in    79  Mich.  409  ;  44  N.  W.  1034. 


§222] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


394 


made  to  some  superior  officer,  and  not  to  a  mere  fellow-servant 
on  an  equal  footing,  nor  to  one  known  not  to  have  charge  of 
such  matters.11  But  they  maybe  given  to  any  superior,  whose 
duty  it  is  to  receive  and  forward  such  warnings  to  the  master; 
although  he  is  not  empowered  to  repair.1-  In  cases  of  extreme 
danger,  when  the  complaining  servant  knows  that  his  com- 
plaint has  not  been  attended  to.  he  should  renew  it  to  the 
master  or  to  the  highest  agent  that  he  can  conveniently 
reach.13 

§  222.  Burden  of  proof. — The  servant  must  affirmatively 
prove  the  master's  negligence,  and  that  it  was  the  proximate 
cause  of  the  injury.1  The  burden  of  proving  that  the  master 
had  failed  to  establish  or  enforce  proper  rules,2  or  that  instru- 
mentalities were  defective  in  quality  or  quantity,3  or  that  a 
fellow-servant  was  incompetent,4  or  that  the  force  of  servants 
was  inadequate,5  and  that  the  master  is  chargeable  with  notice 
of  such  defects,6  rests  upon  the  servant.     In   most  American 


11  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Dowell, [Ky.J ;  24  S.  W.  607. 

,2Pieart  v.Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
82  Iowa,  148 ;  47  N.  W.  1017  [brake- 
man  to  yardmaster] ;  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Kenley,  (.)1  Term.  207;  21 
S.  W .  328  [brakeman  to  conductor]. 

13  Lineoski  v.  Susquehanna  Coal 
Co.,  157  Pa.  St.  153  ;  27  Atl.  577. 

1  A  master  is  liable  for  an  injury 
to  his  servant  caused  by  the  master's 
negligence  and  the  concurrent  neg- 
ligence of  a  fellow-servant,  but  the 
burden  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  show 
that  the  master's  negligence  is  the 
proximate  cause  of  the  injury  (Union 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Callaghan,  56  Fed. 
988  ;  6  C.  C.  A.  205). 

*  Potter  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  136  N.  Y.  77  ;  32  N.  E.  603. 

3  So  held  as  to  defects  in  materials 
(Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Howard,  45 
Neb.  570;  63  N.  W.  872;  Mulligan 
v.  Crimmins,  75  Hun,  578  ;  27  N.  Y. 
Supp.  819).  In  an  action  by  a  serv- 
ant for  injuries  caused  by  the  break- 
ing   of    a    defective    machine,    the 


refusal  of  the  court  to  instruct,  as 
requested  by  defendant,  that  he  was 
not  bound  to  explain  the  cause  of 
the  accident,  is  not  ground  for  com- 
plaint, when  it  does  instruct  that  the 
breaking  of  the  machine  was  no  evi- 
dence of  neglect  on  the  part  of  the 
defendant  (Ouillette  v.  Overman 
Wheel  Co.,  162  Mass.  305  ;  3b  N.  E. 
511).  So  as  to  insufficiency  of  sup- 
ply (Potter  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
136  N.  Y.  77;  32  N.  E.  603). 

4  §  192,  ante.  A  brakeman  injured 
in  coupling  cars  has  the  burden  of 
proving  that  the  person  in  charge  of 
the  switch-engine  was  incompetent 
as  an  engineer  (Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dunn,  138  Ind.  18 ;  36  N.  E.  702  ;  37 
Id.  546). 

5  Potter  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
136  N.  Y.  77;  32  N.  E  603. 

6  So  held  as  to  appliances  (Beau- 
lieu  v.  Portland,  etc.  Co. ,  48  Me.  291 ; 
Columbus,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Webb,  12 
Ohio  St.  475:  Mansfield  Coal.  etc. 
Co.  v.  McEnery,  91  Pa.  St.  185;  Allen 
v.  New  Gas  Co.,  L.   R.    1   Ex.    Div. 


395 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§  222 


courts  it  is  held  that,  the  plaintiff  having  proved  the  master 
to  be  in  fault,  the  burden  of  proving  that  the  plaintiff  also 
had  notice  of  such  defect,  and  commenced  o:  continued  his 
service  with  such  notice,  rests  upon  the  defendant.7  This 
fact  being  proved,  it  is  then  for  the  plaintiff  to  show,  if  he 
can,  that  the  defendant  induced  him  to  continue  his  work, 
by  promising  to  remedy  the  defect,8  or,  in  some  other  way,  to 
excuse  his  continuance  without  assuming  the  risk.  In  Eng- 
land,9 Indiana,  Ohio,  Maine  and  Texas,10  it  is  held  that  the 
servant  must  affirmatively  prove  that  he  did  not  himself  know 
of  the  defect,  or,  if  he  did,  that  some  fact  existed  which  would 
justify  him  in  going  on  with  the  work,  at  the  risk  of  the 
master.    In  courts  adhering  to  the  general  American  rule,  which 

251  ;  State  v.  Malster,  57  Md.    287  ;  fire  escapes  (Gorman  v.  McArdle,  67 

East  Tenn.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart,  13  Hun,  484;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  479). 

Lea,  432  ;  Nelson  v.  Du  Bois,  11  Daly,  8  This  (which  was  part  of  our  old 

127  ;  Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Duel,  section  99)  was  accepted  as  sound 

134  Ind.    156  ;  33   N.   E.  355  [defec-  law  in  Greenleaf  v.  111.  Central  R. 

tive  engine] ;  Deane  v.  Roaring  Fork  Co.,  29  Iowa,  14  ;  and  yet,  in  Belair 

Light  Co.,  5  Colo.  App.  521  ;  39  Pac.  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  43  Id.  662, 

346  [water  valve]).  But  in  Alabama,  the  court  seems  to  have  held  that  it 

the  burden   is   not    on    plaintiff    to  was   incumbent   on  the   plaintiff  to 

prove  that  defendant  had  knowledge  show  by  a  preponderance  of  testi- 

of  the  imperfection   of  brakes  on  a  mony,  his  want  of  knowledge  and 

train,    whose    defects,    he    alleges,  of    means    of    knowledge,   of    the 

caused  his  accident  (Louisville,  etc.  defect. 

R.  Co.  v.  Coulton,  86  Ala.  129  ;  5  So.  9  In  Griffiths  v.  London,  etc.  Docks 

458).     The  burden  is  on  plaintiff  of  Co.  (L.  R.  12  Q.  B.  Div.  493  ;  affi'd, 

showing  that  his  employer  was  neg-  13  Id.  259),  the  "  statement  of  claim" 

ligent    in    hiring    a    fellow-servant  was  held  insufficient  for  want  of  an 

whose    incompetency  caused   plain-  allegation     that     the    danger     was 

tiff's  injuries  (Roblin  v.  Kansas  City,  known  to  the  master  and  unknown 

etc.  R.  Co.,  119   Mo.  476;  24  S.  W.  to    the    servant.     On    this    ground, 

1011  ;  St.  Louis  Press  Brick  Co.    v.  Seymour  v.  Maddox  (16  Q.   B.  :!26) 

Kenvon,  57  111.  App    640  ;  Southern  may  be  sustained  in  England.     On 

Cotton-Oil   Co.    v.  De   Vond,  [Tex.  the  merits,  we  think  it  could  not  be. 

Civ.  App.]  ;  25  S.  W.  43  ;  McCharles  It  was  questioned  in  Ryan  v.  Fowler, 

v.  Home  Silver  Co.,  10  Utah,  470;  24  N.  Y.  410.     Neither  case  is  good 

37  Pac.  733).     See  more  fully  on  this  law  in  the  United  States,  except  in 

point  §  192,  ante.  Indiana. 

'  Cowles  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.,  ,0  Chicago,  etc.  Coal  Co.   v.  Nor- 

84  N.   C.    309   [brakeman].       So    in  man,  49  Ohio  St.  598;  32  N.  E.  857; 

Massachusetts,    under    "Employers'  Buzzell  v.  Laconia  Mfg.  Co.,  48  Me. 

Liability    Act"    (Connolly   v.    Walt-  113;  Louisville,  etc.   R.   Co.  v.  Orr, 

ham,   156  Mass.  368  ;  31  N.  E.  302).  84  Ind.   50  ;    Texas,  etc.    R.   Co.    v. 

So    under    N.    Y.    statute   requiring  Crowder,  63  Tex.  502. 


o   2  23 J 


1  [ABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


30 


puts  the  burden  ot  proving  contributory  fault  upon  the  defense, 
the  servant  is  not  required  to  prove  affirmatively  his  freedom 
from  fault  ;  but  the  master  must  prove  that  the  servant  was  in 
fault,  if  he  relies  upon  this  as  a  defense  ;  n  and  it  is  for  the  master 
to  prove,  if  he  can,  that  the  servant  understood  and  appreciated 
extraordinary  risks,  due  to  the  master's  negligence.12  In  the 
minority  of  states,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  servant.13 
But  everywhere  it  is  for  the  master  to  prove  that  he  gave 
such  warning  of  danger  as  the  law  requires  him  to  give.  It 
will  not  be  presumed  that  he  did  so.14 

§223.*  What  is  sufficient  proof. —  As  in  other  cases,  it  is 
not  enough  for  the  servant  to  prove  an  accident  causing  him 
injury,  while  in  service,1  unless  there  is  something  in  the  very 


11  Thus  it  is  held  in  a  majority  of 
the  states  that  in  an  action  by  a 
servant  against  his  master,  the  bur- 
den of  proving  contributory  negli- 
gence is  on  defendant  (Whaley  v. 
Bartlett,  42  S.  C.  454  ;  20  S.  E.  745  ; 
Johnston  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 
95  Ga.  685  ;  22  S  E.  694  ;  Jones  v. 
Malvern  Lumber  Co.,  58  Ark.  125; 
23  S.  W.  679  ;  Comer  v.  Consol.  Min- 
ing  Co.,  34  W.  Va.  533  ;  12  S.  E.  476  ; 
Buckner  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 
72  Miss.  873;  18  So.  449;  Missouri, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hogan,  88  Tex.  679  ;  32 
S.  W.  1035). 

12  When  the  servant  shows  that 
his  injury  was  in  consequence  of  an 
increased  risk,  not  incident  to  his 
ordinary  employment,  but  growing 
out  of  the  master's  negligence,  the 
burden  of  proof  is  on  the  master  to 
show  that  the  servant  understood 
the  increased  dangers  (Norfolk,  etc. 
R,  Co.  v.  Ward,  90  Va.  687 ;  19  S.  E. 
849). 

13  Gayette  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co..  162 
Mass.  549  ;  39  N.  E.  188  ;  Tyndale  v. 
Old  Colony  R.  Co..  156  Mass.  503;  31 
N.  E.  655:  Reardon  v.  N.  Y.  Card 
Co.,  51  N.  Y.  Superior.  134;  Keller 


v.  Gaskill,  9  Ind.  App.  670  ;  36  N.  E. 
303;  Baker  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
95  Iowa,  163  ;  63  N.  W.  667  ;  Musick 
v.  Dold  Packing  Co.,  58  Mo.  App. 
232. 

uGrinimelman  v.  Union  Pac.   R. 
Co.,  101  Iowa,  74  ;  70  N.   W.  90. 

1  Proof  that  machinery  fell  upon 
the  servant  and  broke  is  not  sufficient 
proof  of  negligence,  in  the  absence  of 
any  direct  evidence  that  the  ma- 
chinery was  insecure  or  unsafe  (Dob- 
bins v.  Brown.  119  N.  Y.  188  ;  23  N. 
E.  537).  To  the  same  effect.  ( iahill 
v.  Hilton,  106  N.  Y.  512  ;  13  N.  E. 
339  ;  Latremouille  v.  Bennington, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  63  Vt.  336;  22  Atl  656; 
Murphy  v.  Greeley,  146  Mass.  196  ; 
15  N.  E.  654  :  Bahr  v.  Lombard  [Ct. 
Errors],  53  N.  J  Law,  233  ;  21  Atl. 
190  ;  Fenderson  v.  Atlantic  City  R. 
Co.  [Ct.  Errors],  56  N.  J.  Law,  708  ; 
31  Atl.  767 ;  Stewart  v.  Ohio  River 
R.  Co..  38  W.  Va.  438  ;  18  S.  E.  604  ; 
20  S.  E.  922  ;  Huff  v.  Austin,  46  Ohio 
St.  386  ;  21  N.  E.  864  [explosion  of 
boiler,  not  enough] ;  Jones  v.  Ala- 
bama Mineral  R.  Co..  107  Ala.  400  ;  18 
So.  30  [servant  thrown  off  hand  car ; 
not  enough]  :  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 


*  This  section  is  substantially  new. 


397 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§223 


nature  of  the  accident  which  affords  evidence  of  the  master's 
fault.2  The  proper  evidence  of  a  fellow-servant's  incompetency 
and  notice  thereof  has  been  already  sufficiently  discussed.3 
Proof  of  an  error  of  judgment  on  the  part  of  a  competent  serv- 
ant will  not  sustain  a  verdict  for  a  fellow-servant.4  Proof  of 
defects,  without  proof  also  of  notice  to  the  master,  is,  of  course, 
insufficient.5  If  the  ground  of  complaint  is  the  failure  to  keep 
a  path  in  order,  it  must  be  shown  that  the  master  had  notice 
of  the  servant's  proper  use  of  that  path.6     Proof  that  the  place 


Godfrey  155  111.  78 ;  39  N.  E.  590 
[collision]  ;  Wintuska  v.  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  [Ky.]  ;  20  S.  W.  819 
[cause  in  doubt]  ;  Redmond  v.  Delta 
Lumber  Co.,  96  Mich.  545  ;  55  N.  W. 
1004  ;  Murray  v.  Denver,  etc.  R.  Co., 
11  Colo.  124;  17  Pac.  484;  Brymer  v. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.,  90  Cal.  496;  27 
Pac  371  ;  Madden  v.  Occidental  & 
Oriental  S.  S.  Co. ,  86  Cal.  445  ;  25 
Pac.  5  ;  Lindall  v.  Bode,  72  Cal.  245  ; 
13  Pac.  660.  The  mere  fact  of  a  col- 
lision does  not  establish  a  presump- 
tion of  negligence  on  the  part  of  a 
railway  company  in  favor  of  its  em- 
ployees, such  a  presumption  existing 
only  in  favor  of  passengers  (Smith  v. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  113  Mo.  70  ;  20 
S.  W.  896).  The  mere  fact  that  the 
body  of  a  track-walker  was  found 
near  his  employer's  track,  in  such  a 
position  as  to  indicate  that  he  was 
struck  by  one  of  its  trains,  (Toes  not 
impute  negligence  to  the  company 
(Johnston  v.  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  [Ky.]  30  S.  W.  415). 

2  Such  is  sometimes  the  case,  as  in 
Transportation  Co.  v.  Downer,  11 
Wall  129  ;  Washington  v.  Missouri, 
etc  II.  Co.,  90Tex.  314  ;  38  S.  W.  764. 
Where  a  servant  is  injured  by  the 
defective  manner  in  which  a  wheel 
in  the  tackle  block  of  a  derrick  was 
held  in  place,  and  it  appears  that 
the  pin  holding  the  wheel  in  place 
would  not  have  worked  out  if  it  had 
been  securely  fastened  into  the 
block  and  had  been  kept  in  that  con- 
dition, the  working  out  of  the  pin  is 


presumptive  evidence  that  the  mas- 
ter failed  to  exercise  ordinary  care 
(Houston  v.  Brush,  66  Vt.  331  ;  29 
Atl.  380) .  A  lineman  was  putting  up 
a  telegraph  wire,  when  both  the  wire 
and  the  cross-arm  broke,  and  the 
lineman  was  thrown  to  the  ground 
and  killed.  Held,  iu  the  absence  of 
positive  evidence  that  the  materials 
were  carefully  selected  by  the  com- 
pany, and  the  evidence  as  to  their 
actual  soundness  being  conflicting, 
that  their  breaking  showed  them 
inadequate,  and  a  judgment  against 
the  company  was  sustained  (Clairain 
v.  Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  40  La. 
Ann.  178  ;  3  So.  625). 

3  See  g  192,  ante. 

4  Keith  v.  Walker  Iron  Co.,  81  Ga. 
49  ;  7  S.  E.  106. 

5  Proof  that  the  brake  on  defend- 
ant's car  was  out  of  order  at  the  time 
of  the  accident,  and  that  plaintiff  was 
thereby  unable  to  control  the  car,  so 
that  it  ran  away  with  him,  is  not 
sufficient  to  establish  the  negligence 
for  which  a  master  is  responsible  to 
his  servant  (Mixter  v.  Imperial  Coal 
Co.,  152  Pa.  St.  8:>.->;  25  Atl.  5871 

6  There  were  three  other  routes 
from  deceased's  work  to  his  home. 
some  of  which  he  sometimes  took, 
There  was  no  evidence  of  defend- 
ant's knowledge  that  the  deceased 
ever  took  tins  route.  Held,  that 
plaintiff  could  not  recover  (O'Don- 
nell  v.  Duluth,  etc.  R.  Co.,  89  Mich. 
171;  50  N.  W.  801). 


§  223] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


39« 


or  materials  of  work  were  defective,  in  such  respect  that,  if  a 
proper  inspection  had  been  maintained,  the  defects  would 
probably  have  been  ascertained  in  time  to  prevent  the  injury 
complained  of,  is  sufficient.7  But  it  is  not  enough  to  prove  a 
defect  which  may  have  been  beyond  the  reach  of  inspection.8 
Evidence  of  long  neglect  to  repair,9  and  of  frequent  complaints,10 
is  entirely  proper.  Proof  of  defects  in  the  place  of  work,  though 
not  originally  due  to  negligence,  is  proper,  to  show  neglect  to 
put  it  in  order,  sufficient  time  having  elapsed.11  Proof  that  a 
machine  has  acted  badly  before  is  competent  to  prove  notice 
of  the  defect  and   negligence  in  failing  to  repair.12     The  serv- 


1  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Daniels,  152 
U.  S.  684  ;  14  S.  Ct.  756  ;  Bailey  v. 
Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  139  N.  Y.  302 ;  34 
N.  E.  918  ;  Babcock  v.  Old  Colony  R. 
Co.,  150  Mass.  467;  23  N.  E.  325; 
and  many  other  cases,  cited  under 
§  194a,  ante. 

8  Grant  v.  Pennsylvania,  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  133  N.  Y.  657 ;  31  N.  E.  220. 

9  Evidence  that  the  defective  con- 
ditions existed  more  than  a  year  be- 
fore the  accident,  is  relevant  (Nichols 
v.  Brush,  etc.  Mfg.  Co.,  53  Hun,  137  ; 
6  N.  Y.  Supp.  601).  Evidence  that  a 
brakeman,  while  about  to  make  a 
coupling  between  moving  cars, 
stepped  into  a  ditch,  and  was  in- 
jured ;  that  he  was  not  aware  of  the 
existence  of  said  ditch  ;  that  a  rule 
of  defendant  permitted  couplings  to 
be  made  when  the  cars  were  moving 
at  a  safe  rate  of  speed  ;  and  that  de- 
fendant's foreman,  who  had  charge 
of  the  roadbed,  knew  of  the  ditcli 
for  several  months  before  the  acci- 
dent.— established  a  prima  facie  case 
of  negligence  (Hollenbeck  v.  Missouri 
Pa.'.  R.^Co..  [Mo.]  ;    U  S.    W.  494). 

,0TosIio\v  that  the  defective  con- 
dition of  the  still  in  which  the  em- 
ployee  was  required  to  work  was 
known  to  the  employer,  evidence 
that  another  employee  had,  prior  to 
the  accident,  repeatedly  complained 
of  it  to  the  superintendent,   is  ad- 


missible (Nichols  v.  Brush,  etc.  Mfg. 
Co.,  53  Hun,  137 ;  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  601). 
11  Where  part  of  the  roof  of  a 
mine,  from  which  rock  fell  and  in- 
jured plaintiff,  was  known  to  the 
officers  to  consist  of  treacherous  rock, 
needing  constant  watching,  and  lia- 
ble to  be  loosened  if  wet ;  and  v.' here 
it  appears  that  it  had  not  been  prop- 
erly tested  for  weeks  ;  that  it  had 
long  been  wet ;  that  similar  rock 
near  by  had  been  supported  or  re- 
moved —  it  is  a  question  for  the  jury 
whether  the  failure  to  support  or 
remove  such  rock  was  a  lack  of  or- 
dinary care  in  providing  a  safe  place 
for  the  miners  to  work  in  (Union 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Jarvi,  53  Fed.  65  ;  3  C. 
C.  A.  433;  10  U.  S.  App.  439).  To 
same  effect,  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wilson,  48  Fed.  57  ;  4  U.  S.  App.  25 ; 
1  C.  C.  A.  25  [flooded  track]  ;  Davis 
v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  78 
Hun,  235  ;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  819  [walls 
weakened  by  dynamite  explosion]  ; 
Perry  v.  Rogers,  91  Hun,  243  :  36  N. 
Y.  Supp.  208  [rock  loosened  by 
blasting]. 

12  McCarragher  v.  Rogers,  1 20  N.  Y. 
526;  24  N.  E.  812  [machinery  not 
guarded  by  netting].  When  an 
elevator  fell  a  second  time  and  in- 
jured a  servant,  proof  of  the  former 
fall  was  admissible  to  show  notice 
to  the  master  (Malone  v.  Hawley,  46 


399 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§223 


ant  is  not  bound  to  show  the  precise  nature  of  a  defect  in 
appliances ; 13  but  he  must  so  far  prove  the  nature  of  the  defect 
as  not  to  leave  a  fair  mind  unable  to  decide  whether  the  injury 
was  caused  by  it  or  not.14  Proof  of  a  dangerous  variation  in 
appliances  from  what  is  usual  and  safe,  combined  with  due 
proof  of  notice,  is  sufficient  evidence  of  negligence.15  Proof  that 
a  machine  acted  in  an  unusual  and  dangerous  manner  calls  for 
explanation  from  the  master.16     When  the  absence  of  peculiar 


Cal.  409).  For  drawing  down  to  its 
proper  position  a  heavy  spring  in  a 
locomotive,  a  railroad  company  pro- 
vided a  jack-screw  and  chain.  The 
spring  was  unusually  strong,  and 
the  chain  broke  without  apparent 
cause,  and  an  employee  was  injured 
by  the  recoil  of  the  spring.  The 
chain  had  broken  before  when  used 
for  the  same  purpose.  Held,  suffi- 
cient evidence  of  negligence  (Krog- 
6tad  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  46 
Minn.  18  :  48  N.  W.  409).  But  com- 
pare Dingley  v.  Star  Knitting  Co., 
134  N.  Y.  552  ;  32  N.  E.  35,  where 
belt  shifting  itself  three  times,  held, 
by  a  divided  court,  no  evidence  of 
negligence. 

13  Where  an  employee  is  injured 
by  defective  machinery,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  his  recovery  therefor 
that  he  should  be  able  to  show  the 
precise  nature  of  the  defect  (Nelson 
v.  St.  Paul  Plow  Works,  57  Minn. 
43  ;  58  N.  W.  868).  While  plaintiff 
was  engaged  in  changing  a  saw  in 
defendant's  mill,  a  log  carriage, 
which  had  been  left  at  rest,  with  the 
steam  shut  off,  and  the  lever  locked, 
suddenly  started,  and  injured  plain- 
tiff. Held,  proper  to  refuse  instruc- 
tions that  plaintiff  cannot  recover  if 
if  lines  not  appear  what  was  the  real 
cause  of  the  starting  of  the  machine, 
since  he  was  only  required  to  furnish 
evidence  from  which  defendant's 
negligence  might  be  inferred,  and 
was  not  bound  to  point  out  the  par- 
ticular act  or  omission  which  caused 


the  accident  (Mooney  v.  Connecticut 
River  Lumber  Co.,  154  Mass.  407  ;  28 
N.  E.  352). 

24  Dingley  v.  Star  Knitting  Co., 
134  N.  Y  552 ;  32  N.  E.  35.  If  the 
injury  maybe  inferred  to  have  arisen 
from  either  of  two  causes,  equally 
probable,  one  of  which  is  attributable 
to  the  employee,  a  nonsuit  is  proper 
(Id). 

15  Bennett  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co., 
2  N.  D.  112  ;  49  N.  W.  408  [coupling  : 
drawbars]  ;  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
White,  82  Tex.  543  ;  18  S.  W.  478 
[brake].  A  brakeman,  while  coupling 
a  flat  car  and  coach,  where  it  ap- 
peared that  the  bumpers  were  broken 
from  the  flat  car  ;  that  the  draw- 
heads  on  the  cars  were  of  a  different 
make,  so  that  they  did  not  come  to- 
gether evenly  ;  that  a  spring  on  the 
coach  drawhead  used  to  keep  it  in 
position  had  been  removed  for  re- 
pairs ;  and  that  the  brakeman  knew 
of  the  condition  of  the  cars,  —  the 
question  of  whether  the  appliances 
furnished  by  the  company  were  suffi- 
cient was  for  the  jury  (White  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  72  Miss.  12 ; 
16  So.  248). 

16  While  plaintiff  failed  to  specifi- 
cally assign  a  cause  for  the  sudden 
movement  of  the  machinery,  yet, 
such  movement  being  entirely  out 
of  the  usual  manner  of  its  operation, 
it  afforded  prima  facie  evidence  of 
some  want  of  care  in  its  construction 
or  condition  (Blanton  v.  Dold,  109 
Mo.  64  ;  18  S.  W.  1149). 


§  223 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS 


40O 


precautions  is  complained  of,  it  must  be  shown  that  such  are  in 
use  elsewhere,  or  that  in  some  other  way  prudence  dictated 
them.17  Evidence  of  precautions  taken  in  other  establishments 
is  competent.18  Failure  to  supply  an  appliance,  asked  for  on 
the  mere  ground  of  convenience,  the  servant  himself  not  think- 
ing it  needed  for  safety,  is  no  evidence  of  negligence.19  Where 
negligent  omission  of  warning  against  danger  is  proved,  it  is 
not  necessary  to  prove  also  that  the  master  foresaw  the  conse- 
quences.20 Evidence  that  a  machine,  while  in  the  same  con- 
dition as  at  the  time  of  the  accident,  worked  well,  both  before 
and  after  that,  is  competent  in  disproof  of  negligence.21  Oaths 
and  violent  language,  in  giving  orders,  are  held  to  be  no  evi- 
dence of  negligence  by  themselves.22  Contributory  negligence, 
in  courts  where  it  is  held  a  matter  of  defense,  cannot  be  inferred 


11  A  declaration  alleging  that  de- 
fendants had  hired  plaintiff  to  run  a 
lath  machine,  but  failed  to  keep  it 
safe  by  providing  a  pit  and  carrier 
for  refuse,  is  fatally  defective,  as 
not  alleging  a  custom  to  provide 
such  pit  or  carrier,  what  means  were 
proper  to  guard  the  saw  while  re- 
moving debris,  that  the  plaintiff 
could  not  stop  the  saw,  or  that  it 
was  necessarily  unsafe  to  remove 
the  debris  while  it  was  moving,  or 
that  plaintiff  was  inexperienced, 
how  long  he  had  been  at  said  work, 
or  that  he  had  ever  told  defendants 
of  the  defect,  or  that  they  had  failed 
to  instruct  him  (Torongo  v.  Salliotte, 
99  Mich.  41  ;  57  N.  W.  1042).  Where 
one  oiling  a  machine  is  injured  by 
its  starting  up  by  a  belt  working 
from  the  loose  pulley  to  the  tight 
pulley,  the  employer  is  not  liable, 
though  the  accident  could  not  have 
happened  had  there  been  something 
with  winch  to  lock  the  lever  used  in 
shifting  the  belt  from  the  tight  pul- 
ley to  the  loose  pulley,  and  back 
again,  there  being  no  evidence  that 
the  machinery  was  defective,  or  dif- 
ferent from  that  in  use  elsewhere 
(Boss  v.  Pearson  Cordage  Co.,  164 
Mass.  257  ;  41  N.  E.  284). 


18  Bannon  v.  Lutz,  158  Pa.  St.  166  ; 
27  Atl.  890  [oil  refinery  :  precautions 
not  used] 

19  Plaintiff  had  asked  for  and  been 
promised  skids,  whereon  to  slide  the 
box  from  one  car  to  the  other,  but 
he  made  request  merely  from  con- 
siderations of  convenience,  and  not 
because  he  thought  any  other  method 
of  moving  the  box  dangerous. 
Held,  that  the  failure  of  the  master 
to  furnish  skids  was  not  negligence 
(Gowen  v.  Harley,  56  Fed.  973  ;  6  C. 
C.  A.  190). 

20  Where  defendant  employed  an 
inexperienced  man  to  do  work  which 
was  unsafe  unless  performed  by  a 
skilled  workman,  without  caution- 
ing him  expressly  as  to  the  danger,  it 
was  not  necessary  to  show  further 
that  defendant  should  have  fore- 
seen that  an  accident  would  probably 
occur,  in  order  to  hold  him  liable 
(Ryan  v.  Los  Angeles  Storage  Co., 
112  Cal.  244;  44  Pac.  471). 

21  Tremblay  v.  Harnden,  162  Mass. 
383  ;  38  N.  E.  972. 

52  Coyne  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  133 
U.  S.  370 ;  10  S.  Ct.  382 ;  see  also 
Williams  v.  Churchill,  137  Mass. 
243. 


40i 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  224 


from  the  mere  accident,  any  more  than  the  master's  negligence 
could  be.28 

§224.  Who  are  fellow-servants. —  We  now  approach  a 
line  of  questions,  which  have  given  rise  to  irreconcilable  dif- 
ferences of  opinion,  and  upon  which  the  cases  must  be  mar- 
shaled in  divergent  lines ;  although  much  progress  has  been 
made,  in  the  last  ten  years,  towards  a  solution  upon  principle. 
The  master's  exemption  from  his  ordinary  liability  for  the 
negligence  of  his  servants  only  applies,  where  the  servant  in 
fault  is  a  fellow-servant,  in  the  same  common  employment 
with  the  injured  servant.  Leaving  the  latter  point  for  future 
consideration,  it  is  needful  to  determine  first :  Who  are  fellow- 
servants  ?  To  a  certain  extent,  all  the  cases  agree,  and  all  rest 
upon  an  intelligible  principle.  Any  person  in  the  employ- 
ment of  the  same  master,  and  under  his  control,  whether  his 
position  is  equal,  inferior  or  superior  to  that  of  the  injured 
servant,1  so  long  as  he  is  not  entrusted  with  a  power  of  control 
over  that  servant,2  is  a  fellow-servant  with  him.  No  extent  of 
difference  in  their  wages,  social  position,  or  work,  affects  the 
question.3  Thus,  a  merchant's  clerk,  although  (as  is  frequently 
the  case)  the  equal  of  his  employer  in  social  position,  is,  in  the 
eye  of  the  law,  a  fellow-servant  with  the  boy  who  sweeps  out 
the  store  and  lights  the  fires.  And  a  servant  who  was  form- 
erly employed  by  the  same  master  is,  with  respect  to  his 
negligence  while  so  employed,  to  be  considered  the  fellow- 
servant  of  another,  who,  being  subsequently  engaged,  is 
injured  by  the  after-effects  of  such  negligence,  if  they  would 
have  been  considered  fellow-servants,  had  the  former  remained 
in  the  same  service.4 

23  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Middle-  112  U.  S.  377 ;  Little  Miami  R.  Co.  v. 

ton  [Ct.  Errors].  57  N.J.  Law,  154;  31  Stevens,  20  Ohio,   415;  Pittsburgh, 

Atl.  616.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Devinney,  17  Ohio  St. 

1  Kumler  v.   Junction   R.   Co.,  33  198). 

Ohio  St.  150  [engineer  and  laborer]  ;  3  See  cases  cited  under  §  241,  post, 

Randall   v.   Baltimore,   etc.   R.   Co.,  4  Wilson  v.  Merry,  L.  R.  1  Sc.  App. 

109  U.  S.  478    [engineer  and  brake-  326  [the  only  point  rightly  decided 

man    or    switchman];    Kimmer   v.  in   thai  case];  Butler   v.  Townsend, 

Weber,  151  N.  Y.  417  ;  45  N.  E.  860.  126  N.  Y.  105  ;  26  N.  E.  1017  ;  Haley 

For  illustrations,  see  §  241,  post.  v.  Keim.  151  Pa.  St.  117  ;  25  Atl  98  ; 

2  This  is  th.->  test  under  the  Ohio  Burns   v.   Sennett,  99   Cal.   363;    33 
rule  (Chion«o    etc.   R.   Co.  v.  Ross,  Pac.  916. 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  26] 


§225; 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


402 


§  225.  Who  are  not  fellow-servants.  —  Mere  co-operation, 
or  community  of  labor  and  ultimate  purpose,  is  not  enough  to 
make  men  fellow-servants.  They  are  not  fellow-servants 
unless  they  are  all  under  the  control  and  direction  of  a  com- 
mon master.1  Therefore,  where  a  servant  works  side  by  side 
with  one  employed  by  his  master  as  an  independent  contrac- 
tor,2 or  with  a  servant  of  such  contractor,3  or  the  servant  of  a 
contractor  works  with  the  servants  of  a  subcontractor 4  or 
with  the  servants  of  another  independent  contractor,5  they  are 
not  fellow-servants,  even  though  they  help  to  do  the  same 
work,  for  the  benefit  of  the  same  ultimate  employer;  and  the 
master  of  either  servant  is,  therefore,  responsible  for  an  injury 


1  Cited  and  approved  (Svenson  v. 
Atlantic,  etc.  S.  S.  Co.,  57  N.  Y.  108); 
where  a  servant  of  owners  of  a  barge, 
engaged  in  lightening  a  steamship, 
was  injured  by  negligence  of  steam- 
ship crew.  To  same  effect,  Johnson 
v.  Lindsay,  1891,  Eng.  App.  Cas.  371  ; 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Stoermer,  1  TJ.  S. 
App.  276  ;  51  Fed.  518  ;  Kilroy  v. 
Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co.  121  N.  Y. 
22  ;  24  N.  E.  192  [captain  and  serv- 
ants of  consignee]  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hawthorn,  147  111.  226 ;  35 
N.  E  534  ;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Billeter,  28  Neb.  422  ;  44  N.  W.  483 
[train,  engineer  and  loaders].  To  the 
contrary  was  Ewan  v.  Lippincott, 
47  N.  J.  Law,  192  ;  practically  over- 
ruled in  New  Jersey  (Hardy  v.  Dela- 
ware, etc.  R.  Co.,  57  N.  J.  Law,  505  ; 
31  Atl.  281)  and  certainly  not  law.  An 
engine  hostler,  employed  by  a  rail- 
road company,  taking  a  locomotive 
to  the  yards  of  a  terminal  company, 
and  a  car  accountant  employed  by 
the  terminal  company,  were  not 
fellow-servants  (Northern  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Craft,  16  C.  C.  A.  175  ;  69  Fed. 
124). 

2  Reagan  v.  Casey,  160  Mass.  374  ; 
:]fi  N.  E.  58.  Where  a  stevedore  en- 
gaged in  discharging  cargo  was  in- 
jured by  being  struck  by  a  sling 
which  the  winchman  employed   by 


the  vessel  started  too  rapidly,  the 
doctrine  of  fellow-servants  did  not 
apply,  and  the  ship  was  liable  (Davi 
v.  The  Victoria,  69  Fed.  160.  S.  P., 
Fletcher  v.  Peto,  3  Fost.  &  F.  368 , 
Wadsworth  v.  Duke,  50  Ga.  91). 

3Cunard  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Carey,119  U. 
S.  245  [longshoreman  and  boss  of 
coal-heavers]  ;  Goodfellow  v.  Bos- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.,  106  Mass.  461  ; 
Abraham  v.  Reynolds,  5  Hurlst.  & 
N.  143  [servant  of  cartman  injured 
by  servants  of  warehouseman]  ;  Sey- 
bolt  v.  N.  Y..  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co., 
95  N.  Y.  562  [mail  agent  and  railroad 
employee]  ;  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v. 
Price,  96  Pa.  St.  256  [same]  ;  Hous- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hampton,  64 
Texas,  427  [same] ;  Sanford  v. 
Standard  Oil  Co.,  118  N.  Y.  571  ;  24 
N.  E.  313  [stevedore  and  wharfinger's 
engineer]  ;  Kane  v.  Mitchell  Transp. 
Co.,  90  Hun,  65  ;  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  581 
[laborer  and  deck-hand]. 

4  Gerlach  v.  Edelmeyer,  88  N.  Y. 
645  ;  47  N.  Y.  Super.  292  ;  Curley  v. 
Harris,  11  Allen,  112:  Johnson  v. 
Lindsay,  1891,  Eng.  App.  Cas.  371 ; 
overruling  Wiggett  v.  Fox.  11 
Exch.  832.  See  Necker  v.  Harvey, 
49  Mich.  517. 

5  Morgan  v.  Smith,  159  Mass.  570  ; 
35  N.  E.  101  ;  Burrill  v.  Eddy,  160 
Mass.  198  ;    35  N.  E.  483. 


403 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


Eg  225 


caused  by  such  servant's  negligence  in  such  work  to  the  other 
servant.  Still  more  clear  is  it  that,  where  two  or  more 
employers  use  the  same  property  for  their  respective  pur- 
poses, the  servants  of  one  do  not  become  fellow-servants  with 
the  servants  of  the  other,  by  their  concurrent  use  of  the  same 
thing.  Therefore,  a  servant  of  a  railroad  company,  employed 
upon  a  section  of  road  used  by  it  in  common  with  another 
corporation,  may  recover  against  that  corporation,  for  the 
negligence  of  its  servant.6  And  where  one  corporation  hires 
from  another  the  use  of  its  track,  a  servant  of  the  former  can 
recover  from  the  latter  for  any  injury  caused  by  defects  in  the 
track,7  and  a  servant  of  the  latter  corporation  may  recover 
fiom  the  former  for  the  negligent  management  of  its  trains,8 
in  the  same  manner  as  a  stranger;  the  servants  of  neither  being 
fellow-servants  with  those  of  the  other.9  It  makes  no  differ- 
ence that,  for  limited  purposes,  the  two  servants  were  for  the 
time  under  the  direction  of  a  single  superintending  agent,10 
or   subject   to   the   rules   of   a  single    corporation."     Nor  can 


"Smith  v.  Harlem  R.  Co.,  19  N. 
Y.  127  ;  Sawyer  v.  Rutland,  etc.  R. 
Co. ,  27  Vt.  370  ;  Warburton  v.  Great 
Western  R.  Co..  L.  R  2  Ex.  30  ;  4 
Hurlst.  &  C.  695 ;  Graham  v.  North 
Eastern  R.  Co.,  18  C.  B.  N.  S.  229  ; 
Phillips  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co..  64 
Wise.  475;  25  N.  W.  544.  To  same 
effect,  Swainson  v.  North  Eastern  R. 
Co..  L.  R.  3  Ex.  Div.  341  ;  Zeigler  v. 
Danbury,  etc.  R.  Co..  52  Conn.  543  ; 
Omaha,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Morgan,  40 
Neb.  604 ;  59  N.  W.  81  [joint  use 
s.ation  grounds] ;  Central  R.  v. 
Stoermer,  51  Fed.  518  ;  2  C.  C.  A. 
360;  1  U.  S.  App.  276  [limiting 
Ewan  v.  Lippincott,  47  N.  J.  Law, 
192;  Johnson  v.  Boston,  118  Mass. 
114] 

1  Snow  v.  Housatonic  R.  Co.,  8 
Allen,  441  :  Graham  v.  Northeastern 
R.  Co.,  18  C.  B.  N.  S  229  ;  Philadel- 
phia, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  58  Md.  372  ; 
Augusta,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Killian,  79 
Ga.  234  ;  4  S.  E.  165. 


8  Catawissa  R.  Co.  v.  Armstrong, 
49  Pa.  St.  186  ;  Sullivan  v.  Tioga  R. 
Co.,  112  N.  Y.  643;  20  N.  E.  569; 
Texas,  etc  R.  Co.  v.  Easton,  2  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  378  ;  21  S.  W.  575  ;  Noo- 
nan  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  62 
Hun,  618  ;  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  678  ;  affi'd, 
131  N.  Y.  594. 

9  Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  State, 
58.  Md.  372. 

10  Johnson  v.  Netherlands  Nav 
Co.,  132  N.  Y.  576;  30  N.  E.  505 
[stevedore  and  winchman]  ;  Tierney 
v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85  Hun, 
146;  32  N  Y  Supp.  627  [common 
superintendent]  ;  Noll  v.  Philadel- 
phia, etc.  R.  Co.,  163  Pa.  St.  504  ;  30 
Atl.  157. 

11  Jones  v.  St.  Louis,  etc  R.  Co..  125 
Mo.  666  ;  28  S.W.  883  [parlor  car  por- 
ter] ;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Kelley, 
4  Colo.  App.  325  ;  35  Pac.  923  [express 
agent  subject  to  railroad  rules]. 


§  226]  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS.  404 

contracts  between    masters,  unknown  to   an   injured  servant, 
take  away  his  rights  in  this  respect.1- 

§  226.*  American  rule  :  vice-principals  not  fellow-serv- 
ants.— At  an  early  clay,  American  judges  divided  sharply  upon 
the  question  of  the  liability  of  a  master  to  his  servants,  for  the 
negligence  of  a  servant  of  superior  grade  and  in  control  of 
other  servants.  The  question  was  passed  upon,  almost  at  the 
same  time,  in  the  East  and  the  West:  the  Massachusetts  court 
holding  strongly  in  favor  of  masters,1  and  the  Ohio  court 
strongly  against  them.2  A  long  conflict  of  opinions  followed ; 
and  when  our  last  edition  was  prepared,  in  1887,  there  was  no 
general  settled  rule.  Although  entire  unanimity  has  not  yet 
been  reached  on  some  material  points,  several  fundamental 
principles  are  fully  agreed  upon.  It  is  now  universally  held, 
in  American  courts,  that  a  master  always  may  have,  and  some- 
times must  have,  a  servant,  who  acts  as  his  representative  or 
alter  ego  towards  other  servants ;  and  that  for  the  negligence 
of  such  representative,  while  acting  as  such,  the  master  is 
responsible  to  the  other  servants,  precisely  as  if  it  were  his 
own.3     By  general  consent  such  representative,  while  acting  as 

12  Robertson  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  against   two    strongly    inclined    to- 

160  Mass.  191  ;  35  N.  E.  775  ;  Strader  wards  the  English  rule  ;  yet,  in  much 

v.  N.  Y..  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  86  more  recent  cases,  it  has  been  firmly 

Hun.  613  ;  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  761.  established  in  Pennsylvania  that  the 

1  Albrov.  Agawam  Co.,  6  Cush.  75.  chief  manager  of  any  separate  de- 

-  Little  Miami  R.   Co.  v.  Stevens,  partment    of    a    business    is    not  a 

20  Ohio,  415.  fellow-servant     of    those    who    are 

3  So    held    in    Maine   (Shanny   v.  under  his  absolute  orders,  with  re- 

Androscoggin    Mills,    66    Me.    420);  spect  to  those  orders,  and  that,  for 

Rhode    Island    (Mann    v.    Oriental  his  negligence  in  giving  such  orders, 

PrintWorks,  11   R.  I.   152;  Mulvey  the  master  is  responsible  to  a  servant 

v.  Rhode  Island  Works,  14  Id.  204 ;  injured  in  consequence  of  his  obedi- 

Brodeur  v.  Valley  Falls  Co  ,  16  Id.  ence  (Frazier  v.  Penn.  R.  Co  ,  38  Pa. 

448);   New   Forfc  (Corcoran  v.   Hoi-  St.  104  ;  Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc. 

brook.  59  N.  Y.  517  ;  Pantzar  v.  Tilly  R.  Co.,  76  Id.  389  ;  Mullan  v.  Phila- 

Iron  Co.,  99   Id.    368;    2  N.    E.  24;  delphia  S.   S.  Co.,  78  Id.  25  [steve- 

compare   Malone   v.    Hathaway,    64  dore]).  It  is  unnecessary  to  cite  cases 

N.   Y.    5) ;    Michigan  (Shumway   v.  from  other  states ,  as  all  other  courts 

Walworth  Mfg.  Co.,  98  Mich.  411  ;  57  holding    the   American   doctrine  at 

N.  W.  251).     Although  in  Ryan  v.  all,  hold  this  and  much  more,  as  will 

Cumberland  V.  R.  Co.   (23   Pa.   St.  be    seen    further    on.      Even    Mas- 

384),   the   opinion    «f    three  judges  sachusetts     is    no    exception;     for 

*  This  section  is  entirely  recast. 


405 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§227 


such,  is  called  a  "vice-principal."     And  a  vice-principal  is  not 
a  "  fellow-servant." 


§227.  British  rule :  novice-principals. —  In  Great  Britain, 
where  the  name  of  "vice-principal"  was  invented,1  it  is  now 
settled  that,  as  the  result  of  the  obiter  dicta  of  two  superannu- 
ated judges,  in  the  famous  case  of  Wilson  v.  Merry,  the  whole 
idea  of  liability  for  vice-principals  "  is  exploded."  The  com- 
mon master  is  not  responsible  to  any  of  his  servants  for  the 
negligence  of  any  other,  even  though  the  negligent  servant  is 
in  supreme  and  exclusive  control  over  the  entire  business,  the 
master  being  always  absent  or  being  a  corporation.2  This 
monstrous  and  iniquitous  ruling  was  not  essential  to  the 
decision  of  that  case.  It  was  founded  upon  pretended  infer- 
ences from  decisions  of  inferior  tribunals,  in  none  of  which 
was  any  such  point  clearly  decided,  and  in  the  latest  of  which 
the  whole-  court  conceded  that  a  master  was  liable  for  the 
negligence  of  his  general  representative.3     As  to  the  reasoning 


although  its  courts  persist  in  saying 
that  all  servants  of  a  corporation  are 
fellow-servants  (Rogers  v.  Ludlow 
Mfg.  Co.,  144  Mass.  198  ;  11  N.  E.  77  ; 
Mackin  v.  Bqston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  135 
Mass.  201),  they  no  longer  mean 
anything  more  by  that  phrase  than 
is  implied  by  the  New  York  rule  or 
Webster's  Dictionary.  Mississippi 
decisions  to  the  contrary  (Lagrone  v. 
Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67  Miss.  592  ;  7  So. 
432;  New  Orleans,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hughes,  49  Miss.  258  ;  Howd  v.  Miss. 
Central  R.  Co.,  50  Id.  178)  have  been 
abrogated  by  the  new  Constitution 
and  statutes.     (  See  §  241a,  post.) 

1  Murphy  v.  Smith,  19  C.  B.  N.  S.  361. 

•'  Wils.m  v.  Merry,  L.  R.  1  Scotch 
App.  326;  thus  interpreted,  with 
hardly  a  struggle  by  counsel,  in 
Hon  ells  v.  Landore  Co.,  L.  R.  10 
Q.  B.  62.  Limited  to  this,  in  John- 
sun  v.  Lindsay  [  1891 1.  App.  ( 'as  371 , 
65  Law  Times.  (.i?  ;  but  followed  as 
to  this,  in  Hedley  v.  Pinkney  S.  S. 
Co.  [1894],  App.  Cas.  222  [shipmaster 
fellow-servant  with  seamen]. 


3  The  history  of  the  cases  upon 
which  the  House  of  Lords  rested 
their  dicta  is  briefly  as  follows:  In 
Wigmore  v.  Jay  (5  Exch.  354),  a 
master  builder  was  held  not  respon- 
sible for  original  defects  in  a  scaf- 
fold, which  were  known  to  his  fore- 
man in  charge,  but  not  known  to  a 
workman  directed  to  work  upon  it 
nor  to  the  master  personally.  It  was 
supported  by  no  argument,  but 
simply  referred  to  the  opinion  in 
another  case,  decided  at  the  same 
time,  which  had  no  bearing  on  this 
question.  But  it  was  followed,  with 
much  hesitation,  in  Gallagher  v. 
Piper  (16  C.  B.  N.  S.  669),  Byles,  J., 
dissenting,  and  Williams,  J.,  doubt- 
ing ;  while  the  other  two  judges 
simply  held  themselves  bound  by  the 
previous  case  In  Murphy  v.  Smith 
(19  C.  B.  N.  S.  361).  the  same  court 
agreed  that  the  rule  would  not  apply 
to  a  "vice-principal."  In  Feltham 
v.  England  (L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  33).  it  was 
held  that  a  "foreman  or  manager" 
was  not   such  a  vice-principal,    be- 


§  228]  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  406 

of  the  noble  lords  themselves,  it  is  entirely  beneath  criticism. 
Had  it  been  used  as  an  argument  at  the  bar,  any  court  would 
have  resented  it,  as  an  insult  to  the  human  understanding 

§228.  British  rule  criticised. —  The  British  rule  has  been 
justly  condemned  everywhere.  Its  only  excuse  is  founded 
upon  the  assumption  that  a  master  owes  to  his  servants  no 
duty  with  respect  to  their  management  and  control,  that  he  is 
not  bound  to  see  that  they  receive  reasonable  orders,  or  are 
put  at  proper  work,  or  not  sent  into  places  of  danger.  But 
this  assumption  is  unfounded  and  unjust.  No  court  has  ever 
doubted  that  a  master  was  liable  to  his  servants,  if  he  personally 
ordered  his  servants  to  encounter  needless  dangers,  of  which 
he  was  aware  and  they  were  not.  Indeed,  what  is  the  special 
attribute  of  the  master?  What  distinguishes  him  from  any 
one  else?  Is  it  the  mere  fact  that  he  provides  materials  for 
the  work,  or  that  he  selects  the  servants  ?  Is  it  not,  more  than 
anything  else,  that  in  him  is  vested  the  right  and  duty  of 
supervision,  of  giving  orders,  of  directing  what  work  shall  be 
done,  and  how  it  shall  be  done?1  If  the  master  chooses  to 
delegate  this  authority  to  some  one  else,  on  what  possible 
principle  can  he  be  allowed  to  relieve  himself  from  the  respon- 
sibility of  having  proper  orders  given?  We  cannot  find  that 
a  single  judge,  in  any  part  of  the  United  States,  has  really 
followed  either  the  decision  or  the  dicta  in  Wilson  v.  Merry. 
Yet  nothing  is  more  common  than  to  see  that  case  cited  in 
some  American  courts  as  an  authority ;  while  its  very  dicta 
are  occasionally  quoted,  as  at  least  worthy  of  great  considera- 

cause,  in  that  case  'the  master  still  decisions  were  so  technical  as  to  be 

retained    control    of    the    establish-  a  "  disgrace  to  jurisprudence."     The 

ment,"  and  the  foreman  "was  not  opinions   so   often    quoted  were  de- 

.     .     .      the    representative    of    the  livered    by   Lord   Cairns  and    Lord 

master."     The    court   again   simply  Chelmsford,  both  of  the  most  bigoted 

followed  Wigmore   v.  Jay,  without  and  narrow  type  of  politics  ;  and  the 

independent    reasoning.     These   are  latter,  always  a  poor  judge,  all  the 

all  the  cases  cited  by  the  House  of  more  because  he  was  an  able  advo- 

Lords,  as  conclusive  of  British  law  ;  cate. 

and  they  all  rest  upon  one  slipshod,  '  Quoted   and   followed,    Bloyd  v. 

unreasoned     decision     of     the     Ex-  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  58  Ark.  66;  22 

chequer,     in     the     time     of     Baron  S.    W.   1089 ;    also,    substantially,   in 

Parke:    a   court    of   which    English  Carlson  v.  Northwestern  Tel.  Co. ,  63 

critics  have  said  that  many  of  its  Minn.  428;  65  N.  W.  914. 


407  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  229 

tion.2  It  is  time  to  bring  this  mistaken  policy  to  an  end.  So 
far  as  it  is  possible  to  ascertain  the  point  actually  decided,  in 
Wilson  v.  Merry,  it  was  that  the  master  is  not  bound  to  use 
any  further  care  to  make  or  keep  the  place,  on  which  his  serv- 
ants are  required  to  do  their  work,  safe  for  their  use,  than  to 
select  a  competent  servant  to  attend  to  that  matter.  This  is 
exploded  in  every  American  court,  including  Massachusetts.3 
The  dicta  so  often  quoted  from  that  case,  as  interpreted  by 
the  English  courts,  are  to  the  effect  that  no  corporation,  not 
even  a  railway  company,  is  ever  responsible  to  its  servants  for 
the  negligence  of  its  highest  officers.  This  doctrine  also  is 
exploded  in  America.4  In  short,  the  case  of  Wilson  v.  Merry 
is  one  not  fit  to  be  cited  in  any  American  court,  on  any  point 
whatever. 

§  229.  British  rule  condemned  at  home. — The  decision  in 
Wilson  v.  Merry  was  received  with  a  storm  of  censure  in  Great 
Britain.  All  independent  legal  critics  condemned  it ;  and 
nobody  ever  defended  it.  It  is  well  known  that  the  British 
Parliament  has  always  been  composed  almost  exclusively  of 
wealthy  employers,  for  whose  benefit  the  decisions  of  the 
British  courts  on  this  point  were  made.  Yet  a  parliamentary 
committee  reported  in  1877  that  these  decisions  were  unjust 
and  ought  to  be  abrogated,  saying,  among  other  things: 
"  Where  the  actual  employers  cannot  personally  discharge  the 
duties  of  masters,  or  where  they  deliberately  abdicate  their 
functions  and  delegate  them  to  agents,  the  acts  or  defaults  of 
the  agents  who  thus  discharge  the  duties  and  fulfill  the  func- 
tions of  the  masters  should  be  considered  as  the  personal  acts 
or  defaults  of  the  principals  and  employers,  and  should  impose 
the  same  liability  on  such  principals  and  employers  as  they 
would  have  been  subject  to  had  they  been  acting  personally  in 
the  conduct  of  their  business,  notwithstanding  that  such  agents 
are  technically  in  the  employment  of  the  principals;  'M  and  in 
1880  these  principles  were  given  partial  effect  by  the  Employ- 
ers'  Liability  Act,  which   we   quote  elsewhere.     In    1893,  the 

2  This  is  especially  true  of  Massa-        4  See  §  230,  post. 

chusetts,  New  York  and  Maryland.         Ml    Irish    Law    Times,   354;  less 

3  Rogers  v.  Ludlow  Mfg.  Co.,  144    fully,  21  Solicitors'  Journal,  754. 
Mass.  198  ;  11  N.  E.  77  ;  where  Wil- 
son v.  Merry  is  expressly  overruled. 


§  23°J  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  408 

House  of  Commons  passed  a  much  broader  measure,  substan- 
tially abolishing  the  entire  judge-made  limitations  on  the  lia- 
bility of  masters  to  servants  for  the  negligence  of  fellow-serv- 
ants, and  forbidding  contracts  for  exemption  from  the  new 
law.  The  House  of  Lords  insisted  on  amendments  permitting 
such  contracts  for  exemption  ;  to  which  the  Commons  refused 
to  agree ;  and  thus  the  entire  bill  fell  through.  The  new 
government,  although  its  members  defeated  the  last  bill,  have 
pledged  themselves  to  carry  through  something  of  the  same 
general  nature,  which  will  at  the  very  least  consign  "  Wilson  v. 
Merry  "  to  that  oblivion  which  alone  it  can  adorn. 

§  230.*  Who  are  vice-principals  :    general   managers.— 

The  master  must  either  give  a  general  management  to  his 
work  or  be  responsible  for  the  negligence  of  those  to  whom  he 
delegates  that  management.  He  cannot  efface  himself,  trans- 
fer all  his  powers  to  a  substitute  and  relieve  himself  from  all 
responsibility  as  to  the  mode  in  which  those  powers  are  exer- 
cised, even  as  to  his  servants.  Where  the  master  is  a  corpora- 
tion, there  must  of  necessity  be  at  least  one  vice-principal ; 
because  the  corporation  itself  cannot  perform  any  of  the  per- 
sonal duties  of  a  master.1  And  where  an  individual  master 
abdicates  from  control  and  puts  the  whole  power  of  super- 
intendence into  other  hands,  he  necessarily  has  one  or  more 
vice-principals.2  It  is,  therefore,  universally  agreed  in  America, 
that  any  person  to  whom  is  committed,  under  such  circum- 
stances, the  entire  control  of  all  the  servants,   including  the 

1  Duval  v.  Hunt,  34  Fla.  85  ;  15  So.  other    employers    on    this     ground. 

876,  887 ;  Hunn  v.  Mich.  Central  R.  This    was    said   in   order  to  let  an 

Co.,   78  Mich.    513;  44  N.    W.   502.  individual    master    avoid    liability. 

Corporations  are  responsible  to  serv-  In  Evansville,   etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Baum 

ants  for  the  negligence  of  their  di-  (26  Ind.  74),  the  court  said  that  the 

rectors  (Warner  v.  Erie  R.  Co.,  49  mere  suggestion  of  a  distinction  be- 

Barb.     558 ;     reversed     on    another  tween  corporations  and  individuals 

ground.  39  N.  Y.  468  ;  Texas  Mexican  was  "not  fit  to  be  made."     But  this 

R.  Co.  v.  TVhitmore,  58  Tex.  276),  gen-  was  said  to  let  a  corporate  master 

eral  managers  and  managers  of  de-  avoid  liability. 

partments,  etc.  See  subsequent  notes;  2  Corcoran   v.   Holbrook,  59   N.  Y. 

also.  Malone  v.  Hathaway.  64  N.  Y.  517  ;  Ryan  v.  Bagaley,  50  Mich.  179; 

5,  distinguishing  corporations  from  15  N.  W.  172. 


*  This  section  is  entirely  recast. 


409 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§230 


power  to  hire  and  discharge,  is  a  vice-principal ; 3  for  whose 
negligence,  in  all  management  of  the  business,  the  master  is 
liable  to  his  servants.4  It  is  in  like  manner  agreed  that  the 
manager  of  any  distinct  department  of  a  varied  or  extended 
business,  having  such  power  in  his  department,  is  a  vice- 
principal  with  respect  thereto.5     In  some  states,  such  as  Ohio, 


3  "  When  the  general  management 
and  control  of  an  industrial  enter- 
prise is  delegated  to  a  superintend- 
ent, with  power  to  hire  and  dis- 
charge servants,  to  direct  their  labors 
and  obtain  and  employ  suitable 
means  and  appliances  for  the  con- 
duct of    the   business,    such  super- 


tion  ;  and  whether  they  fit  him,  and 
he  wears  them  with  propriety,  or 
not,  is  their  concern '"  (Atlantic  Cot- 
ton Co.  v.  Speer,  69  Ga.  137).  So 
held,  as  to  individual  employers : 
Corcoran  v.  Holbrook,  supra  ;  Mitch- 
ell v.  Robinson,  80  Ind.  281  ;  Fort  v. 
Whipple,    11     Hun,    586.      This    is 


intendent  stands  in  the  place  of  the    especially  the  rule  where  the  busi 


master  "  (Pantzar  v.  Tilly  Min.  Co.,  99 
N.  Y.  368  ;  2  N.  E.  24  ;  Hathaway  v. 
Des  Moines,  73  Iowa,  133  ;  66  N.  W. 
188).  So  held,  as  to  railroad  super- 
intendents (Patterson  v.  Pittsburgh, 
etc.  R.  Co..  76  Pa.  St.  38f> ;  Hunting- 
ton, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Decker,  84  Id.  419  ; 
Laning  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  49 
N.  Y.  521  ;  Cleghorn  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  56  Id.  44  ;  Mann  v.  Delaware, 
etc.  Canal  Co.,  91  Id.  495  ;  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Henderson,  37 
Ohio  St.  549  ;  Krogg  v.  Atlanta,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  77  Ga.  202 ;  Kansas  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Little,  19  Kans.  267) ;  mine 
superintendents  (Pantzar  v.  Tilly 
Min.  Co.,  supra  :  Chicago,  etc.  Brick 
Co.  v.  Sobkowiak,  148  111.  573 ;  36  N. 
E.  572  ;  Ryan  v.  Bagaley,  50  Mich. 
179;  15  N.  W.  72),  or  "foremen" 
of  mines,  having  entire  control 
(Reddon  v.  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.,  5 
Utah,  344  ;  15  Pac.  262  :  Trihay  v 
Brooklyn  Lead  Min.  Co.,  4  Utah, 
46«  :  11  Pac.  612).  The  principle  in- 
cludes any  person  to  whom  the  gen- 
eral superintendent,  with  the  assent 
of  the  master,  delegates  his  powers 
(Lasky  v.  Canadian  Pac.  R.  Co.,  83 
Me.  461  ;  22  Atl.  367).  •*  The  agent 
who  represents  the  corporation,  as 
master  over  other  employees  for  the 
time,  is  in  the  shoes  of  the  corpora- 


ness  managed  is  one  entirely  dis- 
tinct from  that  which  the  master 
personally  supervises  (Id.  ;  Cook  v. 
St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.  34  Minn.  45; 
24  N.  W.  311  ;  VYhaley  v.  Bartlett, 
42  S.  C.  454  ;  20  S.  E.  745  ;  conceded 
in  Malone  v.  Hathaway,  64  N.  Y.  5). 

4  Limited  to  this,  in  most  courts. 
See  §  231,  post. 

5  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Peterson, 
162  U.  S.  340  ;  16  S.  Ct.  843  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ross,  112  U.  S. 
377,  390  [approved  on  this  point,  in 
Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  149 
U.  S.  36S];  Mullan  v.  Phila.  S.  S. 
Co..  78  Pa.  St.  25  [stevedore]  ;  Mc- 
Govern  v.  Central  Yt.  R.  Co.,  123  N. 
Y.  281  ;  29  X.  E.  373  [entire  charge 
of  grain  bin]  ;  Kimmer  v.  Weber,  81 
Hun,  599  ;  30  X.  Y.  Supp.  1103  [fore- 
man in  full  charge  :  master  some- 
times visiting]  ;  Davis  v.  Central  R. 
Co.,  55  Yt.  84  ;  Harrison  v.  Detroit, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  79  Mich.  409 ;  44  N.  W. 
1034 ;  Ryan  v.  Bagaley,  50  Mich. 
179  ;  15  X.  W.  72  [mine  bossj  ;  Hunn 
v.  Mich.  Central R.  Co.,  78  Mich.  513  ; 
44  N.  W.  502  ;  Baldwin  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  75  Iowa,  297  ;  39  N.  W. 
507 ;  Dayharsh  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R. 
Co..  103  Mo.  570  ;  15  S.  W.  554  ;  Gal- 
veston, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Drew,  59  Tex. 
11.     So  held  as  to  foreman  in  charge 


§  230] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


4IO 


Kentucky,  Michigan,  Texas,  Montana,  Utah,  the  master  is 
responsible  for  the  negligence  of  such  a  vice-principal,  in  any 
matter  connected  with  the  service  of  the  master,  whether  in 
management  or  not."  But  this  is  not  the  general  rule.7  In 
most  states,  including  Ohio,  one  who  is  a  vice-principal  only 
by  virtue  of  his  power  of  superintendence  and  control  is  a  vice- 
principal  only  as  to  those  who  are  under  his  control.8  In  all 
but  a  very  few  states,  such  as  Texas,9  although  power  to  hire 
and  discharge  existed,  and  is  referred  to  in  most  cases,  yet  the 
lack  of  power  either  to  hire  or  discharge  is  not  material;10  and 


of  gang  :  Woods  v.  Lindvall,  48  Fed. 
63  ;  4  U.  S.  App.  49  ;  1  C.  C.  A.  37  ; 
Cleveland,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brown, 
56  Fed.  804;  6  C.  C.  A.  142;  but 
these  cases  are  limited,  if  not  over- 
ruled, in  the  Peterson  case,  below. 
The  boss  of  a  separate  "little  job"  is 
not  necessarily  a  vice-principal  (Mc- 
Donald v.  Eagle  Mfg.  Co.,  68  Ga. 
840 ;  What  Cheer  Coal  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 56  Fed.  810;  6  C.  C.  A.  148 
[foreman  in  part  of  mine,  under 
superintendent]  ;  see  Thorn  v.  Pit- 
tard,  62  Fed.  232 ;  10  C.  C.  A.  352 ;  8 
U.  S.  App.  597).  The  foreman  of  an 
extra  gang  of  track  repairers,  whose 
sole  duty  it  was  to  supervise  the 
work  of  track  repairing  over  some 
eighteen  or  twenty  miles  of  the  road- 
bed of  a  railroad  company,  to  hire 
the  men  necessary  to  do  that  work, 
and  to  direct  the  operations  of  the 
force  so  employed,  is  not  a  vice- 
principal,  and  a  workman  in  the 
gang,  injured  by  his  fault,  but  not 
as  a  result  of  his  orders,  cannot  re- 
cover against  the  company  (North- 
ern Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Peterson,  162  U. 
S.  346  ;  rev'g  s.  C.,  51  Fed.  182  ;  2  C. 
C.  A.  157  :  4  U.  S.  App.  574). 

6  This  certainly  seems  to  be  the 
rule  declared  in  several  Michigan 
decisions,  with  unanimous  concur- 
rence of  the  court  (Ryan  v.  Bagaley, 
50  Mich.  179  :  15  N.  W.  72  ;  Slater  v. 
Chapman,  67  Mich.  523;  35  N.  W. 
106 ;    Shumway   v.    Walworth,   etc. 


Mfg.  Co.,  98  Mich.  411  ;  57  N.  W. 
251  ;  Palmer  v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co., 
93  Mich.  363  ;  53  N.  W.  397  [assistant 
roadmaster]  ;  Schroeder  v.  Flint,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  103  Mich.  213;  per  Mont- 
gomery, J.,  61  N.  W.  663  ;  yet  there 
are  intimations  of  doubt  as  to  this 
rule  in  the  last  case  cited.  This  is 
the  undoubted  rule  in  Montana  (Berg 
v.  Boston,  etc.  Min.  Co.,  12  Mont. 
212  ;  29  Pac.  545  ;  Kelley  v.  Cable  Co., 
7  Mont.  70;  14  Pac.  633),  and  the 
other  states  mentioned  (see  §  233a, 
post). 

1  See  §  231.  post. 

8  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  De- 
vinney,  17  Ohio  St.  198.  Two  fore- 
men of  gangs  working  independently . 
but  under  the  same  roadmaster,  are 
fellow-servants  (Sherrin  v.  St.  Jo- 
seph, etc.  R.  Co.,  103  Mo.  378;  15 
S.  W.  442). 

'Campbell  v.  Cook,  86  Tex.  630; 
26  S.  W.  486.  Otherwise,  by  statute 
of  1891,  as  to  railroads. 

10  A  master  is  liable  for  the  negli- 
gence of  a  superintending  employee 
in  directing  his  subordinates,  though 
he  has  no  power  to  hire  and  dis- 
charge (Foster  x.  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  1'5  Mo.  165  ;  21  S.  W.  916  ;  Mil- 
ler v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  109  Mo.  350; 
19  S  W.  58  ;  Dayharsh  v.  Hannibal, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  103  Mo.  570;  15  S.  W. 
554  ;  Moore  v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85 
Mo.  588  ;  Dowling  v.  Allen,  74  Id.  13 
Madden  v.  Chesapeake  &  O.  R.  Co., 


4ir 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§231 


the  power  of  superintendence  and  control  is  the  test.11  Even 
that  is  not  necessary  to  prove  vice-principalship  in  other 
matters  than  giving  orders,  as,  for  example,  in  providing  or 
inspecting  places  or  appliances  for  work.12  Where  a  general 
manager  of  a  department  is  appointed  in  obedience  to  a 
statute,  making  such  appointment  compulsory,  and  making 
such  manager  personally  responsible  and  independent  of  his 
employer's  control,  such  employer  is  not  responsible  for  any- 
thing more  than  due  care  in  selecting  him.  He  is  not  a  vice- 
principal  ;  because  he  is  not  really  an  agent  of  the  principal.13 
The  rule  of  law  as  to  vice-principals  has  apparently  not  yet 
been  settled  in  Florida. 

§  231.*  Who  are  vice-principals;  New  York  rule.—  It  was 
finally  settled,  as  the  law  of  New  York,  by  the  famous  case  of 
Crispin  v.    Babbitt,1  that  "  the  liability  of  the  master  does  not 

28  W.  Va  610).  A  conductor  is,  in  re- 
lation to  those  subject  to  his  orders  on 
the  train,  a  vice-principal,  whether 
he  has  (Shadd  v.  Georgia,  etc.  R. 
Co. ,  1 16  N.  C.  968 ;  21  S.  E.  554),  or  has 
not  (Mason  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 
HI  N.  C.  718;  19  S.  E.  362.  S.  c, 
11  N.  C  482;  16  S.  E.  698)  power 
to  hire  and  discharge.  "  The  power 
to  hire  and  discharge  is  •  '  '  in 
many  cases,  of  little  moment" 
(Schroeder  v.  Flint,  etc.  R.  Co.,  103 
Mich.  213  ;  61  N.  W.  663). 

11  Miller  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R  Co.. 
109  Mo.  350  :  19  S.  W.  58  ;  Hamilton 
v  Walla  Walla,  40  Fed.  198  [second 
matf  :  not  having  superintendence]. 

1  Jaques  v.  Great  Falls  Mfg.  Co., 
66  N.  H.  482  ;  23  Atl.  552. 

13  The  mining  boss  required  by  the 
act  of  1885  to  be  employed  by  mine 
owners,  is  a  fellow-servant  with  the 
miners  at  work  in  the  mine  ;  and,  if 
the  owners  have  exercised  reason- 
able care  in  the  selection  of  a  mining 
Loss,  they  are  not  liable  for  injuries 
to  workmen  resulting  from  his  negli- 
gence (Lineoski  v.  Susquehanna  Coal 


Co.,  157  Pa.  St.  153;  27  Atl.  577; 
Coke  Co.  v.  Roby,  115  Pa.  St.  364;  6 
Atl.  593  ;  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co. 
v.  Carroll,  89  Pa.  St.  374).  S.  P., 
Colorado  Coal,  etc.  Co.  v.  Lamb,  6 
Colo  App.  255  ;  40  Pac  251. 

1  This  rule,  first  propounded  by 
Church,  C.  J.  (Flike  v.  Boston,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  53  N.  Y.,  549),  in  1873,  was 
declared  to  be  the  law  in  Crispin  v. 
Babbitt,  81  N.  Y.  516  [where  a  gene- 
ral manager  carelessly  let  steam  into 
an  engine  while  the  plaintiff  was 
engaged  in  working  upon  the  en- 
gine] ;  re-affirmed  in  McCosker  v. 
Long  Island,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84  N.  Y. 
77  [yard-master  at  the  wrong  mo- 
ment signaled  to  back  up]  ;  s.  P., 
Brick  v.  Rochester,  etc.  R.  Co.,  98 
N.  Y.  211  [general  superintendent 
aiding  in  repair  of  railroad]).  In  all 
these  cases  the  rule  seems  to  us  to 
have  been  erroneously  applied  to 
work  of  superintendence.  In  the 
Crispin  case  it  was  the  duty  of  the 
master  to  see  that  proper  warning 
was  given,  before  starting  dangerous 
machinery  (Shumway  v.  Walworth 


*  This  section  is  entirely  new. 


§23I] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


412 


depend  upon  the  grade  or  rank  of  die  employee  whose  negli- 
gence causes  the  injury.  *  *  '"'  However  low  the  grade  or 
rank  of  the  employee,  the  master  is  liable  for  injuries  caused 
by  him  to  another  servant,  if  they  result  from  the  omission  of 
some  duty  of  the  master,  which  he  had  confided  to  such 
inferior  employee.  *     *     If  the  act  is  one  which  pertains 

only  to  the  duty  of  an  operative,  the  employee  performing  it 
is  a  mere  servant  ;  and  the  master,  although  liable  to  strangers, 
is  not  liable  to  a  fellow-servant  for  its  improper  performance." 
This  decision  has  been  so  fully  accepted  in  later  cases  as  to  be 
the  unquestioned  law  of  New  York.2  Under  this  rule,  a  vice- 
principal  is  one  to  whom  is  deputed  the  discharge  of  some 
duty  or  the  exercise  of  some  power  which  belongs  to  the  master, 
as  such.  And  he  does  not  act  as  a  vice-principal,  when  engaged 
in  any  work  which  does  not  pertain  to  the  duty  or  peculiar 
powers  of  the  master,  just  as  an  agent  does  not  act  as  an  agent 
when  doing  some  act  entirely  outside  of  his  agency.3     But  he 

Mfg.  Co.,  98  Mich.  411  ;  57  N.  W.  others,  e.  g.,  Riley  v.  O'Brien,  53 
251;  s.  P.,  Gerrish  v.  New  Haven  Hun,  147;  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  129;  Cul- 
Ice  Co.,  G3  Conn.  9;  27  Atl.  235).  len  v.  Norton,  126  N.  Y.  1  ;  26  N.  E. 
Crispin  v.  Babbitt  was  tried  a  sec-  905;  Ruger,  C.  J.,  and  O'Brien,  J., 
ondtiine;  when  judgment  was  again  dissenting.  In  Pendergast  v.  Union 
given  for  the  plaintiff,  and  finally  R.  Co.  (10  N.Y.  App.  Div.  207  ;  41  N.  Y. 
affirmed  (109  N.  Y.  653;  16  N.  E.  Supp.  927),  it  was  the  duty  of  a  street 
683) .  The  rule  was  wrongly  ap-  car  conductor  to  fasten  the  car  plat- 
plied  in  Loughlin  v.  State  (105  N.  Y.  form  gate,  so  as  to  prevent  passengers 
159;  11  N.  E.  371),  citing  Slater  v.  from  falling  off.  Held,  that  the  con- 
Jewett  (85  N.  Y.  61),  which  bore  no  ductor  represented  the  master  and 
analogy;  Wilson  v.  Merry,  a  case  fellow-master  of  another  employee 
not  fit  to  be  cited  anywhere  ;  and  of  the  master,  on  the  car,  on  his  way 
the  opinion  of  Allen,  J.,  in  Wright  home  after  a  day's  work,  and  the 
v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.  (25  N.  Y.  master  was  liable  for  the  conductor's 
562),  which  was  afterwards  over-  neglect  of  such  duty, 
ruled  by  all  his  associates  in  the  new  *  Hankins  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc. 
court  of  appeals.  This  decision  is  R.  Co.,  142  N.  Y.  416;  37  N.  E.  466; 
inconsistent  even  with  the  opinion  Cullen  v.  Norton,  126  N.  Y.  1  ;  26  N. 
of  Allen,   J.,    in    Malone   v.   Hatha-  E.  905;  Hussey  v.  Coger,  112  N.Y. 


way,  64  N.  Y.  5.  The  captain  in 
Loughlin's  case  was  doing  every 
thing  which  any  master  could  do. 
There  was  no  other  master,  and 
could  lie  none,  in  bodilv  form.     And 


614  ;  20  N.  E.  556. 

:;  A  laborer,  acting  as  temporary 
foreman  of  a  bridge  gang,  but  at 
the  same  time  actually  assisting  in 
the  labor,  is  a  fellow-servant  of  the 


hi-  negligence   consisted  in  positive  other  members  of  the  gang  (Texas, 

direction  of  the  work  ;  emphatically  etc.  R.  Co.  v.   Rogers,  57   Fed.   378; 

a  master's  province.     These  errone-  6  C.  C.  A.  403). 
ous  decisions  have,  of  course,  led  to 


413 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


L§232 


may  be,  at  the  same  moment,  a  vice-principal  as  to  one  duty 
and  a  fellow-servant  as  to  another.  He  is  none  the  less  a  vice- 
principal,  as  to  the  master's  duties,  delegated  to  him,  because 
of  any  part  which  he  may  take  in  the  servant's  work.4 

§  232.*    Principle     of    New    York    decision     generally 

accepted. —  The  principle  stated  in  the  New  York  rule  has 
met  with  acceptance  in  much  the  greater  part  of  the  United 
States,  including  the  U.  S.  Supreme  Court; x  all  New  England. 
New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania  and  Delaware  in  the  Northeast;2  in 


4  Thus,   while   working    as  a   ser- 
vant, he  may  issue  orders  as  vice- 
principal  (Hardy  v.  Minneapolis,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  36  Fed.  657).     The  fact  that 
the  vice-principal,  after  having  neg- 
ligently directed  the  work,  assisted 
in  its  performance,  does  not  affect 
the  question  of  the  master's  liability 
(Malcolm  v.  Fuller,  152  Mass.  160  ;  25 
N.  E.  83  ;  Bergstrom  v.   Staples.   82 
Mich.  654;  46  N.  W.   1035  [engineer 
carelessly  starting  machinery  as  part 
of  daily  duty]).     In   an    action  by  a 
brakeman     for     personal      injuries, 
under  a  count  alleging  that  defend- 
ant failed  to  have  sufficient  compe- 
tent inspectors  of  cars  received  by  it 
from  other  roads,  by  reason  of  which 
he   was  injured,  he  cannot  recover 
on  account  of  the  neglect  of  an  in- 
spector,   he    being   a  fellow-servant 
(Bowers  v.  Connecticut  River  R.  Co., 
16-2  Mass.  312;  38  N.    E.  508);  s.  P., 
Mackin  v.  Boston  &  Alb.  R.  Co.,  135 
Mass.  201  ;  Keith  v.  New  Haven,  etc. 
Co.,  140  Mass.  175  ;  3  N.  E.  28  :  Coffee 
v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  155 
Mass.  21  ;  28  N.  E.  1128). 

1  In  determining  the  liability  of  a 
master  to  his  servant  for  injuries 
caused  by  the  negligence  of  another 
servant,  the  question  does  not  turn 
merely  on  the  matter  of  subordina- 
tion and  control,  but  rather  on  the 
character  of  the  alleged  negligent 
act.     If  that  act  is  done  in  the  dis- 


charge of  some  positive  duty  of  the 
master  to  the  servant,  then  negli- 
gence in  the  act  is  the  negligence  of 
the  master,  irrespective  of  the  grada- 
tions of  service  as  between  the  serv- 
ants themselves.  If  the  act  is  not 
one  in  the  discharge  of  such  positive 
duty,  then  there  should  be  some 
personal  wrong  on  the  part  of  the 
master  before  he  can  be  held  liable 
(Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh,  149 
U.  S.  368  ;  13  S.  Ct.  914).  To  same 
effect,  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Ham- 
bly,  154  U.  S.  349  ;  14  S.  Ct.  983. 

■Maine:  Dube  v.  Lewiston,  83 
Me.  211  ;  22  Atl.  112. 

New  Hampshire:  Jaques  v.  Gt. 
Falls  Mfg.  Co.,  66  N.  H.  482  ;  22  Atl. 
552  [servant  charged  with  inspection 
vice-principal]. 

Massachusetts:  See  Moynihan  v. 
Hills,  146  Mass.  586  ;  16  N.  E.  574 
[reconstructing  machinery] ;  Bab- 
cock  v.  Old  Colony  R  Co.  150  Mass. 
467  ;  23  N.  E.  325  [inspecting  tracks]. 

Rhode  Island:  Hanna  v.  Granger, 
18  R.  I.  507  ;  28  Atl.  659  [foreman, 
while  in  ordinary  work,  mere  fellow- 
servant]. 

Connecticut :  McElligott  v.  Ran- 
dolph, 61  Conn.  157  ;  22  Atl.  1094 
[but  supervision  held  master's  duty]  ; 
Sullivan  v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  62  Conn.  209  ;  25  Atl.  711 
[foreman  not  vice-principal]. 

New  Jersey  :  O'Brien  v.  Dredging 


*Tliis  section  is  entirely  new. 


§232] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


414 


Maryland, South  Carolina,  Florida,  Alabama  and  probably  North 
Carolina  in  the  Southeast ; 3  in  Indiana,  Illinois,  Michigan,  Wis- 
consin, Iowa,  Minnesota  and  North  Dakota  in  the  Northwest;4 


Co.,  53  N.  J.  Law,  291  ;  21  Atl.  324 
[captain  of  dredge]  ;  Gilmore  v.  Ox- 
ford Iron  Co.,  55  N.  J.  Law,  39 ;  25 
Atl.  707  [mining  foreman]. 

Pennsylvania:  Lewis  v.  Seifert, 
116  Pa.  St.  628  ;  11  Atl.  514  ;  Bridge 
Co.  v.  Newberry,  96  Pa.  St.  246.  It 
is  not  clear  that  the  whole  principle 
has  been  adopted  in  Pennsylvania. 
The  courts  refuse  to  treat  any  serv- 
ant as  a  vice-principal  who  is  not  in 
charge  of  an  entire  department 
(Faber  v.  Carlisle  Mfg.  Co.,  126  Pa. 
St.  387  ;  17  Atl.  621  ;  Kinney  v.  Cor- 
bin,  132  Pa.  St.  341  ;  19  Atl.  141  ;  N. 
Y.,  Lake  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bell, 
112  Pa.  St.  400  ;  4  Atl.  50  ;  McGinley 
v.  Levering,  1 52  Pa.  St.  366 ;  25  Atl. 
824).  This  amounts  to  a  rejection  of 
the  principle,  so  far  as  it  is  advan- 
tageous to  servants. 

Delaware :  Foster  v.  Pusey,  14 
Atl.  545. 

3  Maryland  adopts  the  New  York 
rule,  with  that  decided  leaning 
against  servants,  which  lias  always 
marked  the  Maryland  courts  (State 
v.  Malster,  57  Md.  2S7). 

South  Carolina  :  Gunter  v.  Gran- 
ite ville  Mfg.  C ..«.,  18  S.  C.  262. 

Florida  :  South  Florida  R.  Co.  v. 
Weese,  32  Fla.  212  ;  13  So.  436. 

Alabama  :  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  59  Ala.  245 ;  Tyson  v.  South 
&  N.  Ala.  R.  Co.,  61  Ala.  554. 

North  Carolina :  See  Patton  v. 
Western,  etc.  R.  Co.  (96  N.  C.  455  ; 
1  S.  E.  863),  applying  the  rule  in 
favor  of  a  servant. 

4  Indiana  ;  New  Pittsburgh  Coal 
Co.  v.  Peterson,  130  Ind.  398  ;  35  N. 
E.  7  ;  Indiana  Car  Co.  v.  Parker,  100 
Ind.  181  :  Justice  v.  Peiinsylvania 
Co.,  lOO  Ind.  321  ;  30  N.  E.  303  [sec- 
tion foreman  failing  to  apply  brake, 
master  not  liable]. 


Illinois  :  Fitzgerald  v.  Honkomp, 
44  111.  App.  365  ;  and  see  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  May,  108  111.  288 ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moranda,  108  Id. 
576. 

Michigan :  Beesley  v.  Wheeler 
Co.,  103  Mich.  196;  61  N.  W.  658; 
Find  lay  v.  Russell  Wheel  Co.,  108 
Mich.  286  ;  66  N.  W.  50. 

Wisconsin  :  Klochinski  v.  Shores 
Lumber  Co.,  93 Wise.  417;  67  N.  W. 
934  [superintendent  handling  logs  : 
master  not  liable]  ;  Hartford  v. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  91  Wise.  374  ; 
64  N.  W.  1033  [superintendent 
turning  wheels  :  master  not  liable]  ; 
Stutz  v.  Armour,  84  Wise.  623  ;  54 
N.  W.  1000  [foreman's  negligent  di- 
rections :  being  such  only  as  one 
workman  would  give  to  anothpr] ; 
Dwyer  v.  American  Exp.  Co.,  82 
Wise.  307 ;  52  N.  W.  304  [general 
manager  driving  wagon] ;  Toner  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  69  Wise  188; 
33  N.  W.  433  [station  agent  :  master 
not  liable  to  brakeman]. 

Iowa  :  A  mere  '  foreman  "  is  a  fel- 
low-servant with  his  subordinates, 
"  so  far  as  his  own  mere  labor  is 
concerned  "  (Baldwin  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co..  68  Iowa,  37  ;  25  N.  W. 
918 ;  explaining  Peterson  v.  Coal 
Co..  50  Iowa,  673).  But  any  one  in 
full  control  of  a  timber  yard,  hiring 
and  discharging  men,  is  a  vice- 
principal  (Baldwin  v.  St.  Louis,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  75  Iowa,  297  ;  39  N.  W.  507), 
and  so  is  his  substitute,  in  his  ab- 
sence (Id.)  ;  see  Houser  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  60  Iowa,  230  ;  14  N.  W. 
778  ;  Hathaway  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R. 
Co..  92  Iowa.  337  ;  60  N.  W.  651  ; 
Wilson  v.  Dunreath  Red  Stone  Co. 
77  Iowa,  429  ;  42  N.  W.  360  ;  Fos- 
burg  v.  Phillips  Fuel  Co.,  93  Iowa, 
54  ;  61  N.  \v  .  4uu. 


4i5 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§233 


in  Missouri,  Arkansas  and  Tennessee,  in  the  Southwest ;  and  in 
California,  Oregon  and  Washington.5 

§  233  *  In  what  duties  servants  act  as  vice-principals. — 

The  value  of  any  general  principle  of  law  depends  mainly  upon 
the  method  of  its  application.  And  while  the  principle  here- 
tofore stated  has  met  with  very  general  acceptance,  its  value 
has  been  greatly  reduced  in  Maine,  Massachusetts,  Rhode 
Island,  New  York  and  Maryland,  by  the  narrow  spirit  in 
which   the    personal   duties  of   masters    have    been   defined;1 


Minnesota :  Carlson  v.  N.  W.  Tel. 
Co.  ,63  Minn.  428  ;  65  N.  W.  914  [mas- 
ter liable  for  negligent  orders  of 
foreman  sending  workmen  into  dan- 
ger, without  warning]  ;  Lindvall  v. 
Woods,  41  Minn.  212  :  42  N.  W.  1020 
[foreman  negligent  in  joint  work  : 
master  not  liable].  The  earlier 
Minnesota  cases  are  conflicting  and 
not  to  be  regarded  as  of  weight.  By 
Stat.  1887,  ch.  13,  this  question 
ceases  to  arise  in  actions  against 
railroad  companies,  with  some  ex- 
ceptions (see  §  181,  ante,  and  the 
statute  at  the  end  of  this  chapter). 

North  Dakota :  Ell  v.  Northern 
Pacific  R.  Co.,  48  N.  W.  222. 

6 Missouri:  Miller  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  109  Mo.  350  ;  19  S.  W.  58. 

Arkansas:  St.  Louis,  etc.,  R.  Co. 
v.  Torrey,  58  Ark.  217  ;  24  S.  W. 
244  [foreman  handling  rope  :  master 
not  liable]. 

Tennessee  :  The  master  is  liable  for 
the  foreman's  negligence  only  in  re- 
gard to  some  duty  to  the  inferior 
imposed  by  law  upon  the  master, 
and  by  him  intrusted  to  the  superior 
servant  (Allen  v.  Goodwin,  92  Tenn. 
385:  21  S.  W.  760;  quoting  Nash- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Handman,  81 
Tenn  [10  Lea]  425;  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Lahr,  80  Tenn.  350 ;  0  S. 
W.  663). 

California :  Daves  v.  Southern 
Pac.  Co.,  98   Cal.    20;  32  Pac.    708: 


Burns  v.  Sennett,  99  Cal.  363;  33 
Pac.  910  ;  Nixon  v.  Selby  Lead  Co., 
102  Cal.  458  ;  36  Pac.  803. 

Oregon:  Miller  v.  So.  Pac.  Co., 
20  Oreg.  285;  26  Pac.  70  [switch- 
tender  not  vice-principal]  ;  compare 
Knahtla  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  21 
Oreg.  136  ;  27  Pac.  91  ;  Anderson  v. 
Bennett,  16  Oreg.  515  ;  19  Pac.  765. 

Washington :  Say  ward  v.  Carlson, 
1  Wash.  St.  29  ;  23  Pac.  830;  Zintek  v. 
Stimson  Mill  Co. ,  9  Wash.  St.  395; 
37  Pac .  340. 

'-  In  Maine,  the  master  was  held 
not  liable  for  the  negligent  orders  of 
a  conductor  (Lasky  v.  Canadian  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  83  Me.  461  ;  22  Atl.  367  [de- 
nying ' '  Ross  "  case]  ;  Cassidy  v. 
Maine  Central  R.  Co.,  76  Me.  488)  or 
foreman  (Doughty  v.  Penobscot,  etc. 
Co.,  Id.  143)  or  overseer  (Conley  v. 
Portland,  78  Id.  217  ;  3  Atl.  658).  So 
in  Maryland  (O'Connell  v.  Bait.  & 
Ohio  R.  Co.,  20  Md.  212).  In  Rhode 
Island  the  court  once  said  that 
if  a  foreman  were  negligent  in 
ordering  men  to  go  on  shoveling 
under  a  bank,  after  warning  that  it 
was  dangerous,  such  negligence  was 
that  of  a  fellow-servant,  not  of  a 
vice-principal  (Larich  v.  Moies,  18 
R.  I.  513;  23  Atl.  631).  But  this 
was  not  the  point  decided.  In  New 
York  so  many  decisions  have  been 
made  by  almost  equally  divided 
courts,  with  so  many  reversals,  that 


This  section  is  entirely  new. 


§ 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


416 


while  in  nearly  all  other  courts  its  value  has  been  greatly 
increased,  by  putting  in  the  forefront  of  those  duties  the  duty 
of  general  superintendence,  including  direction,  control,  watch- 
fulness, warning,  instruction  and  inspection.  The  test  to  be 
applied  in  each  case,  under  this  principle,  is  to  inquire:  What 
would  have  been  the  duty  of  the  master  had  he  been  person- 
ally present?  To  whom  did  he  delegate  that  duty,  he  being 
absent?  That  delegate,  whether  he  be  high  or  low,  should 
be  deemed,  with  respect  to  that  duty,  a  vice-principal  Fore- 
most among  the  powers  of  a  master,  as  already  pointed  out,  is 
the  power  of  giving  orders.  Foremost  among  his  duties  is 
that  of  general  superintendence.  He  is  equally  responsible, 
where  he  deputes  to  another  the  duty  of  giving  orders  which 


it  is  hardly  possible  to  say  what  is 
the  law  on  these  questions.  Masters 
were  held  liable  for  the  negligence 
of  superior  servants  in  general  sup- 
erintendence in  Hankins  v.  N.  Y., 
Lake  Erie,  etc.  K.  Co.,  142  N.  Y.  41G  ; 
37  X.  E.  4G3  [train  dispatcher]  ; 
Bailey  v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  139  N. 
Y.  302  ;  31  N.  E.  918  [inspection  of 
machinery]  ;  Fuller  v.  Jewett,  SO  X. 
Y.  46  [same]  ;  Kranz  v.  Long  Island 
R.  Co.,  123  N.  Y.  1  ;  23  N  E.  200  [in- 
spection of  place]  ;  Pantzar  v.  Tilly, 
etc.  Mining  Co.,  99  N.  Y.  388  ;  2 
N.  E.  21  [general  manager  failing 
to  protect  against  dangers]  ;  El- 
dridge  v.  Atlas  Steamship  Co., 
134  N.  Y.  187  ;  32  N.  E.  GG  [sea- 
man injured  by  obedience  to  or- 
ders of  superior  at  sea]  ;  Scarff  v. 
Metcalf,  107  N.  Y.  211  ;  13  N.  E.  796 
[seaman  neglected  in  sickness  by 
captain]  ;  Conlan  v.  N.  Y.  Central, 
R.  Co.,  74  Hun,  115;  26  N.  Y. 
Supp.  G59  [brakeman  acting  as  con- 
ductor] ;  Marks  v.  Rochester  R.  Co., 
77  Hun,  77  ;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  314  [car- 
driver  and  assistant]  ;  Rettig  v.  Fifth 
Av.  Tr.  Co ,  6  N.  Y.  Misc.  328 ;  26 
N.  Y.  Supp.  896  [superintendent  alter 
ego  of  master  in  setting  intestate  at 
dangerous  work  without  proper  in- 
structions] ;  McCampbell  v.  Cunard 


Steamship  Co.,  69  Hun,  131  ;  23  N. 
Y.  Supp.  477  [superintendent  giving 
orders,  not  fellow-servant]  ;  Brennan 
v.  Gordon,  118  N.  Y.  489  ;  23  N.  E. 
810  [instructions  as  to  use  of  ele- 
vator]. They  were  held  not  liable 
under  somewhat  similar  circum- 
stances in  Gabrielson  v.  Waydell, 
135  N.  Y.  1  ;  31  N.  E.  969  [sea  cap- 
tain beating  seaman]  a  very  bad  case; 
vote  4  to  3 ;  quite  inconsistent 
with  Scarff  v.  Metcalf,  107  N.  Y. 
211.  because  master  owes  duty  of 
keeping  order  on  board  ;  Hussey  v. 
Coger,  112  N.  Y.  614  ;  20  N.  E.  556 
[superintendent  assumed  to  be  care- 
less in  orders,  but  fault  really  in 
workmen] ;  Murphy  v.  Boston  &  Al- 
bany R.  Co.,  88  N.  Y.  146  [engineer 
and  mechanic  in  repair  shop  killed 
by  explosion  of  boiler,  negligently 
inspected]  ;  Beilfus  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake 
Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.,  29  Hun,  556  [sup- 
erintendent of  wrecking  train  and 
employee  under  him  killed  by  obey- 
ing his  order]  ;  Scott  v.  Sweeney, 
34  Hun,  292  [foreman  in  charge  of  a 
derrick  and  laborer  under  him]  ; 
Hart  v.  N.  Y.  etc.  Dock  Co.,  48 
N.  Y.  Superior,  460  [foreman  of  dry- 
dock  and  laborer]  ;  Kenny  v.  Cun- 
ard S.  S.  Co..  52  Id.  434. 


417 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO  SERVANTS. 


[§  233 


he  ought  to  give  himself,  if  present;  and  if  he  deputes  his 
power  and  duty  of  superintendence,  he  is  responsible  for  the 
failure  of  his  deputy  to  properly  superintend.  Under  any 
consistent  application  of  the  New  York  rule,  therefore,  the 
master  is  represented,  as  by  a  vice-principal,  by  any  one  to 
whom  he  deputes  the  power  of  giving  orders,  which  must  be 
obeyed  without  or  before  appeal ;  and  he  is  responsible  for 
those  orders  as  much  as  if  they  were  his  own.2  His  deputy, 
in   these   and  all  similar  respects,  is  his  vice-principal.3     The 


5  Carlson  v.  N.  Western  Tel.  Co., 
63  Minn.  428;  65  N.  W.  914  [an  ex- 
cellent case]  ;  Eldridge  v.  Atlas  S. 
S.  Co.,  134  N.  Y.  187  ;  32  N.  E.  66  ; 
Patton  v.  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.,  96  N. 
C.  455  ;  1  S.  E.  863  [briefly  but  well 
reasoned];  Logan  v.  N.  Carolina  R. 
Co  ,  116  N.  C.  940  ;  21  S.E.  959  ;  Taylor 
v.  Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  121  Ind.  124; 
22  N.  E.  876  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
May,  108  111.  288  ;  Smith  v.  Wabash, 
etc." R.  Co.,  92  Mo.  366  ;  4  S.  W.  129  ; 
Schroeder  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  108 
Mo.  332  ;  18  S.  W.  1094  [section  fore- 
man] ;  Orman  v.  Mannix,  17  Colo. 
564  ;  30  Pac.  1037  [gang  boss,  giving 
negligent  orders  to  boy,  vice-princi- 
pal]. A  superintendent  who  has  fore- 
men and  workmen  under  him,  whom 
he  employs  and  discharges  at  pleas- 
ure, and  who  has  entire  control  of  the 
machinery  and  men  employed  is  a 
vice-principal  (Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Driscoll,  12  Colo.  520  ;  21  Pac.  708,  fol- 
lowing "Ross"  case).  The  negli- 
gence was  in  directing  work.  Fol- 
lowed, holding,  in  the  absence  of  the 
superintendent,  general  foreman  a 
vice-principal  (Colorado  Midland  R. 
Co.  v.  O'Brien.  16  Colo.  219  ;  27  Pac. 
701).  s.  P.,  Colorado  Midland  R.  Co. 
v.  Naylon,  17  Colo.  501  ;  30  Pac.  249 
[deputy  superintendent  being  absent: 
deputy  vice-principal  ;  master  li- 
able for  his  negligent  direction  of 
work] ;  Ryan  v.  Los  Angeles  Storage 
Co..  112  Cal.  244  ;  44  Pac.  471  [master 
liable  for  negligent  orders  of  engi- 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1—27  ] 


neer  in  control  for  time  being]  ; 
Borgman  v.  Omaha,  etc.  R.  Co.,  41 
Fed.  667,  per  Shiras,  J.  [foreman 
intrusted  with  restoring  wrecked 
trains].  Many  decisions  are  cited 
in  a  later  note,  holding  all  this  and 
much  more.  The  famous  ' '  Ross 
case"  of  course  does  so.  But  the 
"Baugh  case"  inferentially  recog- 
nizes this  rule.  Otherwise  in  Massa- 
chusetts, at  common  law  (Moody  v. 
Hamilton  Manuf'g  Co.,  159  Mass.  70; 
34  N.  E.  185) ,  and  in  Maine,  and  per- 
haps in  Michigan,  where  it  was  lately 
held  that  even  in  giving  orders  to  go 
on,  after  warning  of  danger,  a  shift 
boss  of  miners  is  a  fellow-servant  of 
a  trammer  (Petaja  v.  Aurora  Iron 
Min.  Co.,  106  Mich.  463;  66  N.  W. 
951;  64  N.  W.  335).  This  point, 
however,  does  not  seem  to  have  been 
much  in  the  mind  of  the  court.  The 
decision  seems  to  us,  on  this  point, 
inconsistent  with  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bayfield.  37  Mich.  205. 

3  Suppose  the  owner  of  a  mill,  em- 
ploying a  thousand  men,  should  call 
them  together  and  say,  in  so  many 
words:  "I  have  deputed  the  man- 
agement of  this  mill  to  the  superin- 
tendent, who  will  appoint  twenty 
foremen  over  fifty  hands  each.  I 
give  notice  that  each  of  you  is  to 
obey,  absolutely  and  without  hesita- 
tion, every  order  which  is  given  to 
you  by  your  foreman,  whether  it 
seems  to  you  reasonable  or  not.  If 
yon  do  not,   you  will  be  instantly 


•60 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


418 


master's  responsibility  for  the  acts  of  his  vice-principal  is  to  be 
determined,  not  merely  by  the  character  of  the  act  which  the 
latter  performs,  but  also  by  the  character  of  that  which  he 
fails  to  perform.  If,  therefore,  a  vice-principal,  invested  with 
the  power  and  duty  of  superintendence,  negligently  permits 
any  act  to  be  done  which  it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  master, 
if  present,  to  prevent,  the  master  is  responsible  to  a  servant 
injured  thereby,  simply  because  of  the  failure  of  his  super- 
intending vice-principal  to  prevent  it  being  done.4  And  the 
master  is  none  the  less  liable,  if  the  negligent  act  is  done  by 
the  vice-principal  himself.5  So  the  master  is  responsible  for 
the  failure  of  a  superintending  servant  to  give  such  due  warn- 


discharged.  Do  not  appeal  to  me  or 
to  the  general  superintendent;  for  we 
will  listen  to  no  appeal,  until  after 
you  have  obeyed  the  foreman's 
orders."  Could  there  be  any  doubt 
that  such  an  employer  would  be  li- 
able for  the  consequences  of  obedi- 
ence to  such  orders,  negligently 
given  ?  Yet  such  notice  is  as  effect- 
ually given  by  the  notorious  invari- 
able usage  of  employers  to  act  in  this 
manner,  as  if  it  were  given  in  express 
words  to  each  employee.  Every 
master,  putting  any  of  his  servants 
under  the  orders  of  another  servant, 
by  that  very  act  leaves  to  him  dis- 
cretion to  judge  whether  his  orders 
are  wise  or  unwise,  and  denies  to  the 
subordinate  servants  all  right  to  dis- 
cuss that  question.  He  does  this 
knowingly  and  intentionally ;  and 
he  knows  that  the  superior  servant, 
thus  entrusted  with  absolute  control, 
will  sometimes  use  it  negligently  to 
the  injury  of  the  other  servants  ;  for 
universal  experience  proves  that 
such  will  be  the  result.  It  is,  of 
course,  extremely  convenient  for  em- 
ployers thus  to  relieve  themselves 
from  responsibility  :  but  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  understand  how  any  court 
could  allow  them  to  do  it.  The  true 
test  is,  whether  the  inferior  servant 
is  allowed  any  discretion  as  to  obey- 


ing the  orders  of  the  superior.  If  he 
is  not,  but  is  by  usage  of  the  master 
dismissed  or  suspended  for  disobedi- 
ence, the  master  should  in  law,  as 
well  as  in  common  sense,  be  held  to 
have  personally  authorized  in  ad- 
vance any  order  given  by  the  super- 
ior servant,  however  negligent  or 
reckless  ;  and  he  should  be  held  per- 
sonally responsible. 

4  Shumway  v.  Walworth  Mfg.  Co., 
98  Mich.  411  ;  57  N.  W.  251  ;  Gerrish 
v.  New  Haven  Ice  Co.,  63  Conn.  9  ; 
27  Atl.  235  [general  manager  omit- 
ting to  prevent  starting  machinery]. 
To  the  contrary,  Crispin  v.  Babbitt, 
81  N.  Y.  516,  but  without  notice  of 
this  distinction. 

5  Where  a  section  foreman,  under 
whom  plaintiff  was  employed,  di- 
rected a  keg  to  be  placed  on  a  hand 
car  for  his  seat,  and  allowed  the 
keg  to  fall  off,  thus  causing  the  car 
to  leave  the  track,  defendant  is 
liable  (Russ  v.  Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co., 
112  Mo.  45;  20  S.  W.  472).  "The 
principle  of  liability  is  not  confined 
to  negligent  orders"  (Id.).  So  the 
master  is  liable,  when  a  vice-princi- 
pal personally  does  that  which  as 
master  he  ought  to  forbid  (Dayharsh 
v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  103  Mo.  570; 
15  S.  W.  554). 


419 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§233 


ing  of  dangers  as  the  master  should  have  given,  if  present.6 
These  doctrines  are  fully  sustained  by  the  decisions  of  the 
U.  S.  Supreme  Court,7  and  by  those  of  the  highest  courts  in 
Vermont,  Connecticut,  Delaware,  Virginia,  West  Virginia, 
North  and  South  Carolina,  Georgia,  Alabama,  Louisiana, 
Texas,  Arkansas,  Tennessee,  Kentucky,  Ohio,  Indiana,  Illi- 
nois, Missouri,  Minnesota,  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Colorado, 
Montana,  Utah,  Oregon,  Washington  and  Wyoming.8     They 


6  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ross,  112 
U.  S.  377 ;  5  S.  Ct.  184  [conductor 
omitting  signal] ;  Gerrish  v.  New 
Haven  Ice  Co. ,  supra  ;  Dayharsh  v. 
Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  103 Mo.  570  ;  15 
S.  W.  554  ;  Smith  v.  Oxford  Iron  Co. , 
42  N.  J.  Law,  467.  Company  liable 
for  section  foreman's  failure  to  notify 
conductor  of  snow  slide  (Fisher  v. 
Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  22  Or.  533 ;  30 
Pac.  425). 

1  ' '  There  is,  in  applying  this  doc- 
trine, a  clear  distinction  to  be  made 

•  ■  •  between  servants  of  a  cor- 
poration exercising  no  supervision 
over  others  engaged  with  them  in 
the  same  employment,  and  agents  of 
the  corporation  clothed  with  the 
control  and  management  of  a  dis- 
tinct department,  in  which  their 
duty  is  entirely  that  of  direction  and 
superintendence "  (Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Ross,  112  U.  S.  377,  390).  "  In 
no  proper  sense  of  the  term  is  a  con- 
ductor a  fellow-servant  with  the 
foreman,  the  brakeman,  the  porters 
and  the  engineer.  The  latter  are 
fellow-servants  in  the  running  of  the 
train  under  his  direction.  As  to 
them  and  the  train  he  stands  in  the 
place  of  and  represents  the  corpora- 
tion" (Id.).  "If  such  a  conductor 
does  not  represent  the  company,  then 
the  train  is  operated  without  any 
representative  of  its  owner "  (Id. 
394).  The  conductor's  negligence, 
in  that  case,  consisted  in  omitting  to 
give  proper  orders.  Although  that 
decision  has  been  limited  in  Balti- 
more, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Baugh   (149  U. 


S.  368)  to  the  conductor  of  an  entire 
train,  as  distinguished  from  an  en- 
gineer running  an  engine  with  no 
train,  and  again,  in  the  Hambly, 
Peterson  and  Charless  cases,  so  as  not 
to  cover  foremen,  etc.,  managing 
small  pieces  of  work,  in  which  they 
take  part,  it  has  never  been  over- 
ruled. In  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.  v. 
Fort  (17  Wall.  553),  the  defendant 
was  held  liable  to  a  boy  for  the  loss 
of  an  arm  suffered  while  adjusting  a 
belt  on  rapidly  moving  machinery, 
by  direction  of  C,  whose  orders  the 
boy  was  bound  to  obey.  S.  p.  ,  Daub 
v.  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.,  18  Fed. 
625  [deck-hand  injured  through  neg- 
ligence of  mate,  while  obeying  his 
order].  See  Briggs  v.  Titan,  23  Fed. 
413  [pilot  and  deckhand]  ;  Gravelle 
v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  3  Mc- 
Crary,  352  [yardmaster  and  hand 
coupling  cars  under  his  order]  ;  Mil- 
ler v.  Union  Pacific  R.  Co.,  17  Fed. 
67  [employee  ordered  by  foreman 
into  perilous  position]  ;  The  Clatsop 
Chief,  7  Sawyer,  275  [master  and 
foreman  of  steam-tug] ;  Garrahy  v. 
Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  25  Fed.  258. 

*  Arkansas:  Bloyd  v.  St.  Louis, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  58  Ark.  66  ;  22  S.  \Y. 
1089  [foreman  and  laborer  injured 
through  obedience  to  his  orders], 
expressly  adopting  our  §  228  and  the 
Ross  case  :  s.  P.,  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Harper,  44  Ark.  524.  Earlier  cases 
were  doubtful  (see  Fones  v.  Phillips, 
39  Ark.  17  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Shackleford,  42  Ark.  417). 

Color-ado :   Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 


§i$5] 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


420 


are  also  maintained,  upon  the  whole,  though  with  some  vacil- 


Driscoll,   12  Colo.   520 ;  21  Pac.  708 
[adopting  Ross  case]. 

Connecticut :  Darrigan  v.  N.  Y.  & 
New  England  R.  Co.,  52  Conn.  285 
[rejecting  the  English  decisions  and 
accepting  the  Ross  case]. 

Delaware  :  Foster  v.  Pusey,  14  Atl. 
545. 

In  Georgia,  so  much  of  the  rule 
here  stated  as  makes  in  favor  of 
servants  is  adopted  (Cheeney  v. 
Ocean  S.  S.  Co.,  92  Ga.  726  ;  19  S.  E. 
33  [stevedore  vice-principal]  ;  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.  v.  De  Bray,  71  Ga.  406 
[brakeman  and  conductor  on  same 
train,  not  fellow-servants] ;  Augusta 
Factory  v.  Barnes,  72  Id.  217). 

Indiana  :  One  engaged  in  superin- 
tendence and  command  as  the  sole 
present  representative  of  the  master, 
and  not  manually  working  with  and 
as  the  other  servants,  is  not  a  "fel- 
low-servant ; "  and  for  his  negligence 
in  giving  orders,  or  in  making  the 
work  which  he  orders  unsafe,  the 
master  is  responsible  (Taylor  v. 
Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  121  Ind.  124; 
22  N.  E.  876  ;  Spencer  v.  Ohio,  etc.,  R. 
Co.,  130  Ind.  181  ;  29  N.  E.  915  [negli- 
gent orders]).  Where  a  foreman  acts 
as  a  vice-principal  in  calling  out  em- 
ployees, he  does  not  cease  to  be  such 
vice-principal  and  become  a  fellow- 
servant  as  soon  as  he  has  assigned 
to  the  other  employees  a  place  to 
work,  but  retains  his  original  char- 
acter while  directing  the  details  of 
the  work  (Nail  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  129  Ind.  260  ;  28  N.  E.  183,  611). 

The  court  expressly  overruled  Col- 
umbus, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnold,  31  Ind. 
174 ;  and  distinguished  many  cases, 
such  as  Brazil,  etc.  Coal  Co.  v.  Cain, 
98  Id.  282  ;  Indiana  Car  Co.  v.  Parker, 
100  Id.  181  ;  Capper  v.  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  103  Id.  305. 

Illinois :  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
May,  108  111.  288,  where  one  of  a 
gang  of   men  was   killed  in  conse- 


quence of  obedience  to  an  order  care- 
lessly given  by  the  foreman,  the 
court,  per  Mulkey,  J. ,  saying : 
"When  the  negligent  act  complained 
arises  out  of  and  is  the  direct 
result  of  the  exercise  of  the  authority 
conferred  upon  him  by  the  master 
over  his  co-laborers,  the  master  will 
be  liable.  .  .  .  When  he  gives 
an  order  within  the  scope  of  his 
authority,  if  not  manifestly  unrea- 
sonable, those  under  his  charge  are 
bound  to  obey,  at  the  peril  of  losing 
their  situations ;  and  such  com- 
mands are,  in  contemplation  of  law, 
the  commands  of  the  company  ;  and 
hence  it  is  held  responsible  for  the 
consequences. "  This  was  quoted  and 
followed  in  several  cases  of  foremen 
negligent  in  giving  orders  (Wabash, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hawk,  121  111.  259  ;  12 
N.  E.  253  ;  Stearns  v.  Reidy,  33  111. 
App.  246  ;  affi'd  in  25  N.  E.  762)  ;  or 
omitting  to  give  due  warning  (Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gross,  35  111. 
App.  178;  affi'd  in  24  N.  E.  563). 
Any  servant  authorized  to  superin- 
tend and  command  a  gang  of  men 
is  a  vice-principal  as  to  them,  in  such 
superintendence  (Libby  v.  Scher- 
man,  146  111.  540  ;  34  N.  E.  801).  The 
master  is  responsible  for  negligence 
"in  exercise  of  authority"  conferred 
by  him  (Consolidated  Coal  Co.  v. 
Wombacher,  134  111,  57;  24  N.  E. 
627  [night  foreman]).  Whether  a 
conductor  negligently  starting  a 
train  is  fellow-servaiit  with  a  laborer 
on  a  work  train,  is  for  the  jury  (Mo- 
bile, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Massey,  152  111. 
144  ;  38  N.  E.  787  ;  affi'g  52  111.  App. 
556). 

Kansas:  Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Fox,  31  Kans.  586 ;  3  Pac.  320  ; 
Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore,  29 
Kans.  632  ;  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Sal- 
mon, 14  Id.  512  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Weaver,  35  Kans.  412 ;  11  Pac. 
408. 


421  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§233 

lation,    in    Michigan,    Wisconsin,    Iowa    and    California.9      In 


Louisiana :  In  Van  Amburg  v. 
Vicksburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  (37  La.  Ann. 
650)  a  conductor  was  held  not  to  be 
a  fellow-servant  with  the  engineer 
of  his  train,  Manning,  J.,  saying: 
"  The  case  of  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Ross,  112  U.  S.  377,  has  made  an  in- 
road on  jurisprudence  in  the  right 
direction  ;  and  we  have  applied  the 
new  principle  there  established  at 
the  present  term,  in  Towns  v.  Vicks- 
burg,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  37  La.  Ann.  632,  re- 
affirmed, Faren  v.  Sellers,  39  La. 
Ann.  1011  ;  3  So.  363."  A  fireman  in 
a  factory  is  not  a  fellow-servant  of 
the  engineer  in  charge  of  the  ma- 
chinery (Mattise  v.  Consumers'  Ice 
Co.,  46  La.  Ann.  1535  ;  16  So.  400 
[adopting  Ross  case]). 

In  Minnesota,  after  much  fluctua- 


tion, the  correct  principle  has  been 
decisively  adopted :  Carlson  v.  N.  W. 
Tel.  Co.,  63  Minn.  428;  65  N.  W.  914 
[foreman,  negligent  in  superinten- 
dence] ;  Blomquist  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  60  Minn.  426;  62  N.  W.  818 
[foreman,  negligent  in  orders]  ;  dis- 
tinguishing Lindvall  v.  Woods,  41 
Minn.  212  [foreman's  negligence  in 
work,  not  in  directions]  ;  and  practi- 
cally overruling  several  eai'lier  deci- 
sions. 

Nebraska :  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lundstrom,  16  Neb.  254 ;  20  N.  W. 
198  [injuries  received  through  negli- 
gence of  the  conductor,  while  work- 
ing under  his  orders].  Cobb,  C.  J., 
says :  "  I  think  the  law  thus  estab- 
lished and  laid  down  in  Ohio  pre- 
vails substantially   throughout    the 


9  The  latest  California  decision 
holds  the  master  liable  for  orders 
negligently  given  by  a  subordinate 
of  the  superintendent,  while  in  con- 
trol of  the  injured  servant  (Ryan  v. 
Los  Angeles  Storage  Co.,  112  Cal. 
244;  44Pac.  471). 

In  Michigan,  most  recent  cases 
have  been  in  harmony  with  the  doc- 
trines here  stated  (Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Bayfield,  37  Mich.  205  [con- 
ductor not  fellow-servant  with 
laborer  on  gravel  train] ;  Rodman  v. 
Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  59  Mich.  395  ;  26 
N.  W.  651 ;  practically  overruling  s. 
C,  55  Mich.  57  ;  20  N.  W.  788  [con- 
ductor's negligence]).  An  assistant 
road  master  in  control  of  a  gang  of 
men  and  with  power  to  direct  their 
work  and  discharge  any  of  them,  is 
a  superior  servant  for  whose  negli- 
gent acts  the  master  is  liable  (Harri- 
son v.  Detroit,  etc.  R.  Co..  79  Mich. 
409  ;  44  N.  W.  1034  ;  Palmer  v. 
Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.,  93  Mich  363  ; 
53  N.  W.  397).     But  compare  Petaja 


v.  Aurora  Min.  Co.,  106  Mich.  463  ;  64 
N.  W.  3&5. 

In  Wisconsin,  these  matters  are 
largely  regulated  by  statute  (L.  1889, 
ch.  438  ;  L  1893,  ch.  220).  Prior  to 
these  statutes,  superior  servants  were 
held  not  to  be  vice-principals,  in 
Mathews  v.  Case,  61  Wise.  491  [mas- 
ter and  mate  of  vessel]  ;  Peschel  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62  Id.  338 [fore- 
man, having  no  power  to  discharge, 
and  workman  under  foreman's  di- 
rection] ;  Pease  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  61  Id.  163  [conductor  and  brake- 
man,  injured  by  former  negligently 
starting  train]  :  Toner  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  69  Wise.  188;  31  N.  W. 
104  [station  agent,  responsible  to 
"see  everything  right  at  station," 
fellow-servant  with  brakeman]:  Hoth 
v.  Peters,  55  Wise.  405  [foreman  of 
a  lumber  yard  and  laborer] ;  Heine 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co. ,  58  Wise.  525 
[laborer  unloading  gravel  train  and 
conductor].  In  none  of  these  cases 
was  the  injury  the  result  of  a  direct 
order  to  the  plaintiff. 


§233] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


422 


Massachusetts10  and  Mississippi  u  adverse  decisions  have  been 
overruled  by  statutes.  Any  person  employed  by  the  master 
to  do  work  which  the  master  is  personally  bound  to  see  done, 
for  the  protection  of  servants,  is  a  vice-principal,  alike  in  doing 
or  in  failing  to  do  such  work;12  and  it  makes  no  difference  how 
high  or  how  low  the  position  of  such  servant  may  be.     With 


Western  states,  and  will  ultimately 
prevail  everywhere."  Re-affirmed, 
Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crockett, 
19  Neb.  13S;  26  N.  W.  921;  and 
again,  Crystal  Ice  Co.  v.  Sherlock, 37 
Neb.  19;  55  N.  W.  294.  In  a  very 
recent  decision,  the  "  Ross  "  case  was 
adhered  to,  and  the  later  U.  S.  deci- 
sions (e.  g.  "  Peterson  ")  overruled  in 
Nebraska  (Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Doyle,  70  N  W.  43.) 

North  Carolina :  Dobbin  v.  Rich- 
mond, etc.  R.  Co.,  81  N.  C.  446  [en- 
gineer and  laborers  on  gravel  train]  , 
per  Ruffin,  J.,  Cowles  v.  Richmond, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  84  N.  C.  309;  Shadd  v. 
Geo.  etc.  R.  Co.,  116  N.  C.  968  ;  21  S. 
E.  554  [adopting  "Ross  "  decision]. 

South  Carolina  :  Boatwright  v. 
No.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  25  S.  C.  128  ; 
Couch  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  22 
S.  C.  557  [adopting  "  Ross"  case.] 

Ohio ;  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lavalley,  36  Ohio  St.  221  [foreman, 
who  negligently  omitted  to  give 
warning]. 

Oregon :  Anderson  v.  Bennett,  16 
Oreg.  515;   19  Pac.  765. 

Tennessee  :  The  conductor  of  a 
train  is  a  vice-principal  and  not  a 
fellow  servant  of  a  brakeman  who 
is  injured  in  a  collision  (Illinois Cent. 
R.  Co.  v.  Spence,  93  Tenn.  173  ;  23  S. 
W.  2M  [adopting  "  Ross"  case]  ;  s.  p., 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowler,  9 
Heisk.  866  Tapproving  Cleveland,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Keary,  3  Ohio  St.  201]  ;  East 
Tenn.  R.  Co.  v.  De  Armond,  2  Pickle, 
73  ;  5  S.  W.    600).  Otherwise,    how- 


ever, where  the  one  assuming  to 
give  the  order  had  no  authority 
(Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McDaniel, 
12  Lea,  386),  or  the  "  order "  is  a 
mere  request  (Bradley  v.  Nashville, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  14  Lea,  374). 

Vermont :  Davis  v.  Central  R.  Co. 
55  Vt.  85. 

Virginia :  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thomas,  90  Va.  205  ;  17  S.  E.  884  ; 
Moon  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  78 
Va.  745  ;  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Williams,  86  Va.  165  ;  9  S.  E.  990. 
The  foreman  of  a  quarry  owned  by 
a  corporation,  whose  duties  require 
him  to  exercise  a  genei'al  superin- 
tendence over  the  men,  and  to  make 
and  abrogate  rules  for  their  guid- 
ance, is  not  a  fellow-servant  of  one 
of  such  men  (Richmond  Granite  Co. 
v.  Bailey.  92  Va.  554  ;   24  S.  E.  232). 

West  Virginia :  Criswell  v.  Pitts- 
burgh, etc.  R.  Co.,  30  W.  Va.  798  ; 
6  S.  E.  31  [foreman  omitting  to  give 
warning]  ;  Madden  v.  Chesapeake  & 
O.  R.  Co.,  28  W.  Va.  610  [not  neces- 
sary that  vice-principal  should  be 
alter  ego  or  have  power  to  discharge]; 
Cooper  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  24 
W.  Va.  37  ;  a  well-reasoned  decision. 

Washington  :  Zintek  v.  Stimson 
Mill  Co.,  6  Wash.  178  ;  32  Pac.  997  ; 
33  Id.  1055,  and  again,  37  Id.  340  ;  9 
Wash.  395  [yardmaster,  superintend- 
ing, hiring,  etc.,  negligent  in  direc- 
tions]. 

Wyoming  :  McBride  v.  Union  Pac. 
R.  Co.,  3  Wy.  247  ;  21  Pac.  687. 


10  Stat.  1887,  ch.  270. 
"  Const.,  1890. 


12  See  §  204,  ante,  and  for  illustra- 
tions, see  g  233a,  post. 


423 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  233a 


respect  to  that  particular  work,  he  is  not  a  fellow-servant  with 
those  for  whose  protection  it  should  be  done. 

§  233a.  Examples  of  who  are  or  who  are  not  vice-prin- 
cipals.—  Under  the  principle  stated  in  §  232,  as  now  generally- 
accepted,  it  is  held  that  a  train  dispatcher,  in  making  up  trains, 
directing  their  movements,  or  failing  to  do  so,  is  a  vice-prin- 
pal,  as  to  conductors,  engineers  and  their  subordinates  ; *  a  train 
conductor,  in  starting,  stopping  and  managing  his  train,  is  a  vice- 
principal,  as  to  all  subordinates  on   his  train,2  though  not  (in 


1  It  is  settled  in  New  York,  Pennsyl- 
vania, Virginia,  Michigan,  Illinois, 
Missouri  and  Arkansas  that  a  train 
dispatcher,  who  orders  the  move- 
ment of  trains,  and  whose  orders 
conductors  and  engineers  are  bound 
to  obey,  is  the  "  alter  ego  "  of  a  rail- 
way company  in  giving  such  orders, 
notwithstanding  he  is  subordinate 
to  a  division  superintendent,  who  is 
under  a  general  superintendent,  who 
in  turn  is  under  the  president  (Lewis 
v.  Seifert,  116  Pa.  St.  628  ;  11  Atl. 
514  ;  Hankins  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  142  N.  Y.  416 ;  37  N.  E. 
466  ;  Slater  v.  Jewett,  85  N.  Y.  61, 
68,  69  ;  Sutherland  v.  Troy,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  125  N.  Y.  737  ;  26  N.  E.  609  ; 
McChesney  v.  Panama  R.  Co.,  66 
Hun,  627  ;  21  N.  Y^.  Supp.  207;  Flan- 
negan  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  40 
W.  Va.  436  ;  21  S.  E.  1028  ;  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Young,  26  111.  App. 
115  ;  Hunn  v.  Mich.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  78 
Mich.  513 ;  44  N.  W.  502  ;  Smith  v. 
Wabash,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92  Mo.  366  ;  4 
S.  W.  129  ;  Little  Rock,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Barry,  58  Ark.  198;  23  S.  W. 
1097 ;  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Camp,  65  Fed.  952 ;  13  C.  C  A.  233). 
2  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ross,  112 
U.  S.  377  ;  5  S.  Ct.  184.  The  "  Ross 
case "  has  been  expressly  approved 
and  adopted  in  Arkansas,  Colorado, 
Connecticut,  Georgia,  Kentucky, 
Louisiana,  Michigan,  Nebraska, 
North    Carolina,    South    Carolina 


Tennessee,  Virginia  and  West  Vir- 
ginia (Bloyd  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
58  Ark.  66  ;  22  S.  W.  1089 ;  Colorado, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Naylor,  17  Colo.  501  ; 
Denver,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Driscoll,  12 
Colo.  520 ;  21  Pac.  708  ;  Darrigan  v. 
N.  Yr.  &  New  England  R.  Co.,  52 
Conn.  285  ;  Newport,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Dentzel,  91  Ky.  42 ;  14  S.  W.  958  ; 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  De  Bray,  71  Ga. 
406  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moore, 
83  Ky.  675  ;  Van  Amburg  v.  Vicks- 
burgh,  etc.  R.  Co.,  37  La.  Ann.  650  ; 
Mattise  v.  Consumers'  Ice  Co. ,  46  La 
Ann.  1535  ;  16  So.  400  ;  Rodman  v. 
Mich.  Central  R.  Co.,  59  Mich.  395; 
26  N.  W.  651  ;  Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Doyle,  50  Neb.  555  :  70  N.  W.  43 
[repudiating  the  limitations  of  the 
"Peterson"  case ]  ;  Shadd  v.  Geor- 
gia, etc.  R.  Co.,  116  N.  C.  968;  21 
S.  E.  554  ;  Coleman  v.  Wilmington, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  25  S.  C.  446  [leaving 
switch  open]  ;  Boatwright  v.  North- 
eastern R.  Co.,  25  Id.  128  ;  Couch  v. 
Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  22  Id.  557; 
Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Spence,  93 
Tenn.  173  ;  23  S.  W.  211 ;  Richmond, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  86  Va.  165  ; 
9  S.  E.  990  [master  liable  for  con- 
ductor negligently  starting  train]; 
Moon  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.,  78 
Va.  745 ;  Daniel  v.  Chesapeake,  etc. 
R.  Co.  36  W.  Va.  397 ;  15  S.  E.  162 
[conductor  failing  to  notify].  It  has 
been  expressly  disapproved  in  Maine 
(Lasky  v.  Canadian  Pac.  R.  Co.,  83 


§  233a]  LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


424 


most  States)  as  to  servants  on  other  trains  or  on  the  track.3 
So  is  any  agent,  high  or  low,  in  selecting  instrumentalities,  such 
as  tools  and  machinery,4  or  in  inspecting  them,5  or  the  place  of 
work.6  So  is  a  servant  having  general  authority  to  make 
needed  repairs ; 7  and  so,  as  to  repairs  which  the  master  is 
bound  to  make,  is  any  one  employed  by  him   to  make  them.8 


Me.  461  :  22  Atl.  367),  and  New  York 
(Loughlin  v.  State,  105  N.  Y.  159;  11 
N.  E.  371).  It  has  been  reaffirmed 
in  the  lower  Federal  courts,  as  un- 
affected by  the  ' '  Baugh  "  case 
(Canadian  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnston, 
9  C.  C.  A.  587  ;  61  Fed.  738  ;  Union 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Callaghan,  56  Fed. 
988 ;  6  C.  C.  A.  205 ;  Northern  Pac. 
R.  Co.  v.  Cavanaugh,  51  Fed.  517  ;  2 
C.  C.  A.  358 ;  10  U.  S.  App.  197  [con- 
ductor  disobeying  train  dispatcher]). 
"When  an  officer  is  placed  in  charge 
of  the  train,  over  the  conductor,  the 
latter  ceases  to  be  a  vice-principal 
(Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  59 
Fed.  993  ;  8  C.  C.  A.  663). 

3  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rey- 
nolds, 50  Fed.  728 ;  1  C.  C.  A.  636  ; 
6  U.  S.  App.  75  [brakeman  fellow- 
servant  with  conductor  of  another 
train]  ;  s.  P.,  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Needham,  63  Fed.  107  ;  11  C.  C.  A. 
56  ;  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mase, 
63  Fed.  114 ;  11  C.  C.  A.  63  ;  North- 
ern Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  59  Fed. 
993  ;  8  C.  C.  A.  663  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Devinney,  17  Ohio  St.  198. 
The  law  is  otherwise  in  West  Vir- 
ginia (Daniels  v.  Chesapeake,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  397  ;  15  S.  E.  162), 
and  now,  by  statute,  in  Ohio  (Ohio 
Stat.  April  2,  1890 ;  Cincinnati,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Margrat,  51  Ohio  St.  130 ; 
37  N.  E.  11). 

4  Ford  v.  Fitchburgh  R.  Co.,  110 
Mass.  240. 

6  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kneirim, 
152  111.  458;  39  N.  E.  324;  Western 
Mining  Co.  v.  Ingraham,  17  C.  C.  A. 
71  :  70  Fed.  219  [timbering  of  mine] ; 
Chesson  v.  Roper  Lumber  Co.,  118 


N.  C.  59  ;  23  S.  E.  925  [platform]. 
Where  one  employed  to  inspect  or 
repair  machinery  is  not  engaged  in 
using  it  in  a  common  employment 
with  fellow-servants,  the  master  is 
liable  to  the  fellow-servants  for  the 
negligence  of  such  employee  (Inge- 
bregtsen  v.  Nord  Deutscher  Lloyd 
Steamship  Co.  [Ct.  Errors],  57  N.  J. 
Law,  400  ;  31  Atl.  619).  A  car  in- 
spector is  not  the  fellow-servant  of 
a  brakeman  (Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co,  v. 
Myers,  63  Fed.  793  ;  11  C.  C.  A.  439 ; 
Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co  v.  Mans- 
berger,  65  Fed.  196  ;  12  C.  C.  A.  574 ; 
Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Pearcy,  128  Ind. 
197;  27  N.  E.  479;  Morton  v.  Detroit, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  81  Mich.  423;  46  N.  W. 
111). 

fi  Durkin  v.  Sharp,  88  N.  Y.  225 
[track]  ;  s.  P.,  Dewey  v.  Detroit,  etc. 
R.  Co.  (Mich.),  52  N.  W.  942;  Bal- 
hoff  v.  Mich.  Central  R.  Co.,  106  Mich. 
606;  65  N.  W.  592  [track]. 

'Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Her- 
bert, 116  U.  S.  642  ;  6  S.  Ct.  590  ;  Van 
Dusen  v.  Letellier,  78  Mich.  492 ;  44 
N.  W.  572.  Foreman  of  machine 
shop,  who  neglects  to  repair  a  defect 
in  an  engine  of  which  he  has  notice, 
is  not,  as  respects  the  duty  to  repair, 
the  fellow-servant  of  a  brakeman  in- 
jured because  of  such  defect  (Ohio, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stein,  140  Ind,  61;  39 
N.  E.  246). 

8  Indiana,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Snyder, 
140  Ind.  647;  39  N.  E.  912  [carpenter]; 
Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McMullen, 

117  Ind.  439;  20  N.  E.  287;  Romona 
Stone  Co.  v.  Phillips,   11  Ind.  App. 

118  ;  39  N.  E.  96  ;  Atchison,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  McKee,  37  Kans.  592  ;  Jacques  v. 


425 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  [§  233D 


Any  agent,  empowered  to  select  and  employ  servants,  acts  as 
a  vice-principal  in  so  doing,9  and  so  does  anyone  employed  to 
instruct  new  or  inexperienced  servants.10  But  a  telegraph 
operator,  transmitting  orders  received  from  others,  is  a  mere 
fellow-servant  of  those  who  receive  orders  through  him,11  for, 
unlike  a  train  dispatcher,  no  discretionary  power  is  delegated 
to  him.  The  engineer  of  a  train,  as  such,  is  not  a  vice-princi- 
pal,12 nor  is  a  switch-tender,  either  as  to  his  management  of 
the  switches  or  his  inspection  of  them.13 


§  233b.  Peculiar  local  rules.  —  In  Ohio,  at  an  early  date,  it 
was  held,  and  is  still  settled  law,  that  any  servant  having  con- 
trol over  another  is  not  a  "  fellow-servant  "  of  the  latter,  and 
that   the   common   master  is  responsible  to  the  servant  con- 


Great  Falls  Mfg.  Co.,  66  N.  H.  482  ; 
22  Atl.  552  [loom-fixer]  ;  Scherer  v. 
Holly  Mfg.  Co.,  86  Hun,  37;  33  N.  Y. 
Supp.  205  [grade  of  no  importance]. 

9  Mann  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  91  N.  Y.  495.  There  is  a  curiously 
involved  decision,  perhaps  to  the 
contrary,  in  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hoover,  79  Md.  253;  29  Atl.  994. 
But  if  so,  it  is  contrary  to  all  author- 
ity, outside  of  Maryland.  See  Yates 
v.  McCullough  Iron  Co.,  69  Md.  370  ; 
16  Atl.  280. 

10  Brennan  v.  Gordon,  118  N.  Y. 
489;  23  N.  E.  810. 

11  A  telegraph  operator  and  the 
engineer  of  a  train  are  fellow-serv- 
ants (Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Camp, 
65  Fed.  952  ;  13  C.  C.  A.  233  ;  Mon- 
aghan  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  45 
Hun,  113).  s.  P.,  as  to  fireman  (Cincin- 
nati, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Clark,  57  Fed.  125  ; 
6  C.  C.  A.  281  ;  McKaig  v.  Northern 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  42  Fed.  288). 

12  In  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Baugh  (149  U.  S.  3G8  ;  13  S.  Ct.  914), 
held,  that  an  engineer,  running  an 
engine  by  itself,  was  not  a  vice- 
principal  as  to  his  management  of 
the  engine  toward  a  fireman  injured 


thereby,  but  not  as  result  of  engi- 
neer's orders.     An  engineer  is  a  fel- 
low-servant with  a  brakeman  on  the 
same  train,  the  conductor  being  in 
charge  (East  Tennessee,  etc.   R.  Co. 
v.    Smith,  89  Tenn.   114;    14  S.   W. 
1077 ;  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Whe- 
less,  68  Tenn.  [10  Lea],  741  [a  well- 
reasoned  opinion];  Hobbs  v.  Atlantic, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  107  N.  C.  1  ;  12  S.  E.  124 
Hagins  v.  Cape   Fear,  etc.  R.  Co. 
106  N.  C.  537  ;  11  S.   E.   590  ;  LOuis 
ville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Martin,  87  Tenn 
[3  Pickle]  398  ;  10  S.  W.  772  ;  New 
port  News,  etc.  Co.  v.  Howe,  52  Fed 
362;  3  C.  C.  A.  121  :  6  IT.  S.  App 
172).      Engineer's    signals    are    not 
"  orders,"  so  as  to  make  him  a  vice 
principal  as  to  brakemen  (Pittsburgh 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ranney,  37   Ohio  St 
665  ;  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Lewis 
33  Id.  196).     Therefore, an  engineer  is 
the  fellow-servant  of  all  others  on 
the  train  (Id). 

13  Randall  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  109  U.  S.  483  ;  Miller  v.  So.  Pac. 
Co.,  20  Oreg.  285  ;  26  Pac.  70  ;  Har- 
vey v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  88  N.  Y. 
481. 


§  233b]  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


426 


trolled  for  the  negligence  of  the  superior  servant.1  But  this 
rule  is  limited  to  the  case  of  servants  vested  with  actual  con- 
trol over  injured  servants.  In  any  other  case,  superiority  of 
position  makes  no  difference.2  No  distinction  is  made  between 
the  different  kinds  of  negligence,  of  which  such  superior  serv- 
ant may  be  guilty.  He  stands  in  the  place  of  the  master, 
alike  when  doing  the  work  of  a  servant,  or  when  doing  that  of 
a  master.3  The  Ohio  rule  was  at  one  time  adopted  in  the  courts 
of  several  states ;  but  they  have  nearly  all  modified  their  position, 
until  only  Virginia,  Nebraska  and  Utah  seem  to  be  left  in  line 
with  Ohio;4  and  the  decisions  even  there  might  be  sustained 
upon  a  somewhat  different  theory.  Nevertheless,  the  Ohio 
judges  are  entitled  to  the  honor  of  having  been  the  first  to 
strike  out  on  the  right  path ;  although  they  made  some  mis- 
takes in  details,  and  failed  to  state  their  ideas  with  accuracy. 
In  Kentucky,  a  master  is  not  liable  to  a  servant  for  the  negli- 
gence of  a  fellow-servant  in  the  same  or  an  inferior  rank,  no 
matter  how  gross  it  may  be;5  nor  for  anything  less  than  gross 

Co.    v.    Kraft,    31 


1  This  point  was  first  decided  where 
an  engineer  was  allowed  to  use  an 
old  time-table,  through  the  negli- 
gence of  the  conductor  of  his  train 
or  the  superintendent  of  the  road, 
and,  in  consequence,  a  collision  oc- 
curred by  which  he  was  injured 
(Little  Miami  R.  Co.  v.  Stevens,  20 
Ohio,  415).  Afterwards,  where  a 
brakeman  was  injured  by  a  collision, 
through  the  negligent  management 
of  a  conductor,  whose  orders  he  was 
bound  to  obey,  it  was  held  that  the 
company  was  liable  (Cleveland,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Keary,  3  Ohio  St.  201  ;  see 
Mad  River,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Barber,  5 
Ohio  St.  541,  563).  But  a  brakeman 
and  an  engineer  on  the  same  train 
are  fellow-servants,  though  the 
former  is  bound  to  observe  the  sig- 
nals of  the  latter  to  apply  or  loosen 
the  brakes  (Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Lewis,  33  Ohio  St.  196  ;  compare 
Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ranney, 
37  Ohio  St.  665). 

8  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Devin- 
ney,  17  Ohio  St.  198. 


3  Berea    Stone 
Ohio  St.  287. 

*  Virginia:  Moon  v.  Richmond, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  78  Va.  745  [conductor  of 
gravel  train  and  laborer]  ;  fully  sus- 
tained in  Ayers  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  84  Va.  679;  5  S.  E.  582;  Rich- 
mond, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  86 
Va.  165  ;  9  S.  E.  990.  All  these  were 
really  acts  of  superintendence. 

Nebraska :  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Lundstrom,  16  Neb.  254  ;  20  N.  W. 
198  ;  Burlington,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Crock- 
ett, 19  Neb.  138  ;  26  N.  W.  921.  The 
court  has  recently  adhered  to  this 
doctrine,  refusing  to  follow  the 
Peterson  case  (162  U.  S.  346) ;  Union 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Doyle,  Neb.  ; 

70  N.  W.  43. 

Utah  adopts  the  full  Ohio  rule 
(Armstrong  v.  Oregon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8 
Utah,  420;  32  Pac.  693). 

5  Volz  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co., 
95  Ky.  188  ;  24  S.  W.  119  [workmen 
driving  piles]  ;  Casey  v.  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  84  Ky.  79  [common 
laborers]. 


42/ 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  233b 


negligence  on  the  part  of  any  servant  whatever;"  but  he  is 
liable  for  the  gross  negligence  of  a  superior  servant  of  any- 
kind,  whether  in  control  or  not.7  In  an  action  for  causing 
death,  under  the  statute,  willful  negligence  must  be  proved.8 
The  rule  adopted  in  Texas  is  peculiar,  but  is  at  least  intelli- 
gible and  easily  applied.  Any  servant  in  Texas,  high  or  low, 
is  a  vice-principal  as  to  other  servants  whose  work  he  super- 
intends, and  whom  he  has  power  to  hire  and  discharge.9  All 
these  powers  must  co-exist  in  the  same  person ;  or  he  is  not  a 
vice-principal.10  Such  a  vice-principal  is  not  a  ''fellow-serv- 
ant "  with  the  others ;  and  for  his  negligence,  whether  in  man- 
agement or  in  any  other  respect,  the  master  is  responsible.11 


6  When  an  employee  of  a  railroad 
company  is  injured  by  the  negli- 
gence of  another  employee  in  a 
higher  grade  of  the  same  service,  in 
order  to  recover  he  must  show  that 
such  negligence  was  gross  ;  and  a 
verdict  in  his  favor,  stating  that  the 
negligence  was  "  ordinary,"  will  be 
set  aside  (Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brantley,  96  Ky.  297  ;  29  S.  W.  477 
[engineer  and  porter  "not  fellow- 
servants  "J).  A  railroad  porter  who 
is  engaged  with  the  engineer  in 
making  up  a  train  can  recover  for 
injury  received  through  the  fault  of 
such  engineer  only  on  proof  of  gross 
negligence  (Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Palmer  [Ky.],  33  S.  W.  199). 

1  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Collins, 
2  Duvall,  114  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Cavens,  9  Bush,  559  [train-dis- 
patcher, through  whose  negligence 
an  engineer  was  killed]  ;  Greer  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  94  Ky.  169  ; 
21  S.  W.  649  [engineer  superior  of 
brakeman]. 

8  Chesapeake,  etc  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Michael  [Ky.],  15  S.  W.  878  [not 
proved] ;  Newport  News,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Dentzel,  91  Ky.  42  ;  14  S.  W.  958 
[proved]. 

9 Nix  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  82  Tex. 
473  ;  18  S.  W.  571  ;  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Wells  [Tex.]    16  S.  W.  1025 ;  see 


S.  C,  81  Tex.  685;  17  S.  W.  511. 
s.  p.,  Ft.  Worth,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Peters, 
87  Tex.  222  ;  27  S.  W.  257  ;  Missouri 
Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Williams,  75  Tex.  4 ; 
12  S.  W.  835  [foreman  in  repair  de- 
partment] ;  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  76  Tex.  Oil ;  13  S.  W.  562 
[railroad  superintendent] . 

10  Thus  a  brakeman  and  the  con- 
ductor on  the  same  train  are  fellow- 
servants,  in  the  absence  of  authority 
by  the  conductor  to  employ  and  dis- 
charge brakemen  (Campbell  v.  Cook, 
86  Tex.  630  ;  26  S.  W.  486).  And  so 
as  to  conductor  and  laborer  (Corona 
v.  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.  [Tex.],  17 
S.  W.  384) ;  and  a  locomotive  engi- 
neer and  fireman  (Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Blohn,  73  Tex.  637  ;  11  S.  W.  867). 
To  justify  a  finding  for  plaintiff,  the 
evidence  must  show  that  the  tempo- 
rary foreman  had  full  control  of  the 
work,  with  power  to  employ  and 
discharge  the  men  (St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Lemon,  83  Tex.  143  ;  18  S.  W. 
331).  But  all  these  limitations,  so 
far  as  they  relate  to  railroad  serv- 
ants, have  been  substantially  abol- 
ished by  the  statutes  of  March  10, 
1891.  and  May  4,  1893. 

11  In  Texas  there  is  no  distinction, 
as  regards  the  master's  liability  for 
the  vice-principal's  negligence,  be- 
tween the  latter's  acts  in  performing 


§-34] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


428 


§  234.  Servants  must  be  in  same  common  employment. — 
In  order  to  constitute  an  exception  to  the  general  rule  of  the 
master's  liability  for  the  negligence  ot  his  servant,  it  is  neces- 
sary that  the  person  suffering  the  injury  should  be  not  only  a 
fellow-servant,  but  also  in  the  same  common  employment 
with  the  servant  whose  negligence  has  caused  the  injury.1 
And  the  injury  must  have  occurred  while  both  servants  were 
actually  serving  in  this  employment.2  The  opinions  of  the 
courts  have  generally  failed  to  distinguish  between  the  ques- 
tions of  what  constitutes  a  fellow-servant  and  what  constitutes 
a  common  employment  ;  and  in  many  cases  it  has  been  held 
that  two  servants  of  the  same  master  were  not  fellow-servants, 
when  all  that  was  really  meant  by  the  court  was  that  they 
were  not  in  the  same  common  employment.  We  shall  en- 
deavor to  classify  the  cases  according  to  their  real  meaning, 
but  may  not  be  always  able  to  succeed.  So  far  as  we  can  see, 
the  only  tests  as  to  fellow-service  are  the  common  service  of 
one  master  by  both  servants  and  the  absence  of  any  such 
difference  of  grade  between  them  as  would   put   one  in  the 


the  non-assignable  duties  intrusted 
to  him  specially  and  those  ordinary 
acts  which  he  and  the  servants  under 
him  are  in  the  habit  of  indiscrimin- 
ately performing  (Sweeney  v.  Gulf, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  84  Tex.  433;  19  S.  W. 
555  [foreman  throwing  switch]  ; 
Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Reed,  88  Tex. 
439  ;  31  S.  W.  1058  [assisting  in  the 
making  up  of  trains]). 

1  Warburton  v.  Great  Western  R. 
Co.,  L.  R.  2  Exch.  30  ;  Abraham  v. 
Reynolds,  5  Hurlst.  &  N.  143  ;  Gil- 
lenwater  v.  Madison,  etc.  R.  Co.,  5 
Ind.  339  ;  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ham- 
mersley,  2S  Ind.  371  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Moore,  77  111.  217;  McAn- 
drews  v.  Burns,  39  N.  J.  Law,  117; 
Rogers,  etc.  Works  v.  Hand,  50  Id. 
464  ;  14  Atl.  766  ;  Baird  v.  Pettit,  70 
Pa.  St.  477.  In  Mullan  v.  Phila.  etc. 
S.  S.  Co.  (78  Pa.  St.  25) ,  it  was  held  to 
be  a  question  for  the  jury,  whether  a 
stevedore,  employed  by  a  ship-owner 
to  unload  a  vessel,  was  a  fellow-ser- 


vant, in  a  common  employment, 
with  the  mate,  whose  negligence  in 
splicing  a  rope  occasioned  an  injury 
to  the  former.  If  the  stevedore  was 
a  "  contractor,"  it  is  clear  that  the 
two  men  would  not  be  fellow-ser- 
vants (see  Hass  v.  Philadelphia,  etc. 
S.  S.  Co.,  88  Pa.  St.  269  [question 
for  jury]). 

2  As  to  the  injured  servant,  all  the 
cases  agree.  But  it  is  equally  clear 
as  to  the  servant  in  fault.  Both 
must  have  actually  co-operated  in 
one  employment.  The  cases  upon 
the  first  question  are  reviewed 
in  State  v.  Western  Maryland  R. 
Co.  (63  Md.  433),  where  Stone,  J., 
points  out  that  they  all  agree  in 
this,  "  that  if  the  plaintiff  is  not,  at 
the  time  of  the  accident,  engaged  in 
the  actual  service  of  the  company,  or 
in  some  way  connected  with  such 
service,  the  company  is  liable  for  the 
negligence  of  its  employees." 


429 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


[§235 


position  of  a  master  over  the  other.  All  questions  as  to  the 
engagement  of  servants  of  the  same  master  in  such  spheres  of 
labor  as  to  bring  the  common  master  within  the  rule  of  ex- 
emption, or  to  exclude  him  therefrom,  belong  to  the  realm  of 
common  employment.  Thus,  sailors  employed  upon  different 
vessels  by  the  same  owner  may  be  fellow-servants ;  but  they 
are  not  in  the  same  common  employment. 

§235.  Common  employment :  general  rule.  —  Under  the 
rule  first  established  in  England  and  Massachusetts,1  but 
which,  upon  this  point,  is  accepted  by  the  U.  S.  Supreme 
Court,2  as  well  as  the  courts  in  all  New   England,  New  York, 


^artonshill  Coal  Co.  v.  Reid,  3 
Macq.  H.  L.  266  ;  Bartonshill  Coal 
Co.  v.  MeGuire,  Id.  300  ;  Charles  v. 
Taylor,  3  C.  P.  Div.  492.  "When  the 
object  to  be  accomplished  is  one  and 
the  same,  when  the  employers  are 
the  same,  and  the  several  persons 
employed  derive  their  authority  and 
their  compensation  from  the  same 
source,  it  would  be  extremely  diffi- 
cult to  distinguish  what  constitutes 
one  department,  and  what  a  dis- 
tinct department  of  duty  "  (Farwell 
v.  Boston  &  "Worcester  R.  Co.,  4 
Mete.  49). 

2  The  general  rule  is  that  those 
entering  the  service  of  a  common 
master  become  thereby  engaged  in  a 
common  service,  and  are  fellow- 
servants  ;  and,  prima  facie,  the  com- 
mon master  is  not  liable  for  the 
negligence  of  one  of  his  servants 
which  has  resulted  in  an  injury  to  a 
fellow-servant  (Northern  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Peterson,  162  U.  S.  346  ;  16 
S.  Ct.  843).  In  Northern  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Hambly  (154  U.  S.  349), 
Brown,  J.,  sums  up  the  cases  very 
fairly  thus  :  "It  may  be  said  in 
general  that,  as  between  laborers 
employed  upon  a  railroad  track  and 
the  conductor  or  other  employees  of 
a  moving  train,  the  courts  of  Massa- 
chusetts, Rhode  Island,  New  York, 
Indiana,     Iowa,      Michigan      North 


Carolina,  Minnesota,  Maine,  Texas, 
California,  Maryland,  Pennsylvania, 
Arkansas  and  Wisconsin  hold  the 
relation  of  fellow-servants  to  exist 
(Farwell  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.,  4  Mete. 
49  ;  Clifford  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  141 
Mass.  564  ;  6  N.  E.  751  ;  Brodeur  v. 
Valley  Falls  Co.,  17  Atl.  54  ;  16  R.  I. 
448  ;  Harvey  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.,  88 
N.  Y.  481  ;  Gormley  v.  Ohio,  etc.  R., 
72  Ind.  31  ;  Collins  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  30  Minn.  31  ;  Pennsylvania  R. 
R.  v.  Wachter,  60  Md.  395;  Houston, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rider,  62  Tex.  267  ;  St. 
Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Shackelford,  42 
Ark.  417  ;  Blake  v.  Maine  Central  R., 
70  Me.  60  ;  Ryan  v.  Cumberland 
Valley  R.,  23  Pa.  St.  384;  Sullivan 
v.  Miss.  &  Mo.  R.,  11  Iowa,  421  ; 
Fowler  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co., 
61  Wise.  159  ;  Kirk  v.  Atlantic,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  94  N.  C.  625  ;  Quincy  Mining 
Co.  v.  Kitts.  42  Mich.  34  ;  Keystone 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Newberry,  96  Pa.  St. 
246)  ;  while  in  Illinois,  Missouri, 
Virginia,  Ohio  and  Kentucky  the 
rule  is  apparently  the  other  way 
(Chicago,  etc.  R.  v.  Moranda,  93  111. 
302;  Sullivan  v.  Mo.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  97 
Mo.  113  ;  10  S.  W.  852  ;  Richmond, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Norment.  84  Va.  167  ; 
4  S.  E.  211  ;  Dick  v.  Railroad  Co.,  38 
Ohio  St.  389  ;  Louisville,  etc.  R.  v. 
Caven,  9  Bush,  559  ;  Madden  v. 
Chesapeake,   etc.  R.  Co.,  28  W.  Va. 


§  2&] 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


430 


New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  Maryland,  Virginia,  North  Caro- 
lina, South  Carolina,  Mississippi,  Texas,  Arkansas,  Ohio,  Indi- 
ana, Michigan,  Wisconsin,  Iowa,  Minnesota,  the  two  Dakotas, 
Idaho,  California  and  other  states,  it  is  not  necessary,  in  order 
to  establish  a  "  common  employment,"  that  the  two  servants 
should  be  engaged  in  the  same  kind  of  work,  or  even  in  the 
same  department.  It  is  held  to  be  enough  if  they  are  both 
engaged  in  serving  one  master  in  one  general  business,  aim- 
ing at  one  general  result,  with  such  notice  of  risk  as  is 
stated  in  the  next  section. 


§  236.  Who  are  in  common  employment. — Under  the 
generally  prevailing  rule,  fellow-servants  are  engaged  in  a  com- 
mon employment  when  each  of  them  is  occupied  in  service  of 
such  a  kind  that  all  the  others,  in  the  exercise  of  ordinary 
sagacity,  ought  to  be  able  to  foresee,  when  accepting  their 
employment,  that  his  negligence  would  probably  expose  them 
to  the  risk  of  injury.1     That  this  is  the  proper  test  is  evident, 


610).  The  cases  in  Tennessee  seem 
to  be  divided  (East  Tenn.  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rush,  15  Lea,  145  ;  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Robertson,  9  Heisk.  276  ; 
Haley  v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  7  Bax- 
ter, 239 ;  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Jones,  9  Heisk,  27  ;  East  Tenn.  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Gurley,  12  Lea,  46)."  The  list 
of  states  thus  given  by  Judge  Brown 
must  be  modified  by  excluding  from 
those  supposed  to  have  adopted  the 
Illinois  doctrine,  Ohio,  where  it 
never  was  really  adopted  (see  Con- 
solidated Coal  Co.  v.  Clay,  51  Ohio 
St.  542 ;  38  N.  E.  610  ;  Whaalan  v. 
Mad  River  R.  Co.,  8  Ohio  St.  249); 
and  Virginia,  where  it  has  since 
been  expressly  repudiated  (Norfolk, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Nuckols,  91  Va.  193 ;  21 
S.  E.  342  ;  overruling  earlier  cases) ; 
while  the  apparent  conflict  in  Ten- 
nessee is  settled  by  holding  that  the 
"Illinois  rule"  applies  to  railroad 
companies  and  to  no  other  employ- 
ers (Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Carroll, 
62  Tenn.  [6  Heisk  ]  347,  as  limited  in 
Coal  Creek    Min.    Co.    v.   Davis,    90 


Tenn.  711  ;  18  S.  W.  387)  which  is 
also  the  case  in  Georgia  (Ellington 
v.  Beaver  Dam  Co.,  93  Ga.  53;  19 
S.  E.  21).  The  general  rule  also  pre- 
vails in  New  Jersey  (Smith  v.  Ox- 
ford Iron  Co.,  42  N.J.  Law,  467); 
Idaho  (Snyder  v.  Viola  Mining  Co., 
2  Idaho,  771  ;  26  Pac.  127) ;  and  at 
common  law  in  Mississippi  (McMas- 
ter  v.  111.  Central  R.  Co.,  65  Miss. 
264  ;  4  So.  59) ;  but  changed  there  in 
part  by  statute. 

1  McAndrews  v.  Burns,  39  N.  J. 
Law,  117  ;  Baird  v.  Pettit,  70  Pa.  St. 
477  ;  Norfolk,  etc.  R.Co.  v.  Nuckols, 
91  Va.  193  ;  21  S.  E.  342.  See  Louis- 
ville, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  4 
Bush,  507  [brakeman  and  conductor 
on  different  trains]  ;  Baltimore  Ele- 
vator Co.  v.  Neal,  65  Md.  438  ;  5  Atl. 
338  ;  Barstow  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co., 
143  Mass.  535;  10  N.  E.  255.  In 
Bartonshill  Coal  Co.  v.  McGuire  (3 
Macq.  H.  L.  300),  Lord  Chelmsford 
said:  "There  may  be  some  nicety 
and  difficulty,  in  peculiar  cases,  in 
deciding  whether  a  common  employ- 


431  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  [§  238 

if  it  is  true,  as  stated  in  the  English  cases  and  those  follow- 
ing them,  that  the  reason  for  the  exemption  of  masters  from 
liability  to  their  servants  is  that  the  servant  takes  the  risk  into 
account  in  fixing  his  wages.  He  cannot  take  into  account  a 
risk  which  he  has  no  reason  to  anticipate  ;  and  he  should  take 
into  account  those  risks  which  the  average  experience  of  his 
fellows  has  led  them  as  a  class  to  anticipate. 

§237.  Who  are  not   in   common   employment.— On  the 

other  hand,  the  mere  fact  that  two  servants  of  the  same  man 
are  both  engaged  in  adding  to  his  wealth  or  ministering  to  his 
tastes  or  comforts,  does  not  necessarily  bring  them  within  the 
definition  of  a  common  employment.  Thus,  where  a  mer- 
chant carries  on  a  regular  trade  in  his  store,  and  at  the  same 
time  owns  a  ship,  the  clerks  in  his  store  and  the  sailors  in  his 
ship  are  clearly  not  in  a  common  employment.  Indeed,  if  he 
owns  two  ships,  a  sailor  in  one  is  not  in  a  common  employ- 
ment with  a  sailor  in  the  other.1  Workmen  in  a  quarry 
owned  by  a  railroad  company  are  not  in  common  employment 
with  the  railroad  hands.2  Still  less  are  domestic  servants, 
engaged  in  providing  for  the  wants  of  their  employer  at  home, 
in  a  common  employment  with  his  clerks,  operatives,  or  other 
servants  in  his  business.  So  a  draftsman  is  not  in  the  same 
common  employment  with  a  man  excavating  a  cellar  below 
the  same  office.3 

§238.  Common  employment;  "association"   rule. —  In 

Illinois,  Missouri,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Nebraska,  Utah  and  per- 
haps elsewhere,  what  may  be  called  the  "  association  "  rule  is 
established.1     Under  this  rule,  fellow-servants   are  not  in  the 

ment    exists  ;    but    in  general,    by  227  [track  repairer  and  stock  and  fuel 

keeping  in  view  what  the  servant  agent]. 

must  have  known  or  expected   to        '  Illinois :  Chicago,  etc.   R.  Co.  v. 

have  been  involved  in  the  service  Moranda,  93  111.  302 ;  Chicago,  etc. 

which  he  undertook,  a  satisfactory  R.  Co.   v.  Snyder,  117  111.  376  ;  7  N. 

conclusion  may  be  arrived  at."  E.  604.     It  is  proper  to  charge  that, 

1  The  Petrel  (1893),  Prob.  &  Adm.  to  constitute  fellow-servants,  the 
320  ;  Connolly  v.  Davidson,  15  Minn,  servants  should  be  actually  co-ope- 
519.  rating  at  the  time  of  the  injury  in 

2  Dixon  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  109  the  particular  business  in  hand,  or 
Mo.  413  ;  19  S.  W.  412.  their  usual  duties  should  bring  them 

8Baird  v.  Pettit,  70  Pa.  St.  477;  into  habitual  consociation  with  each 
Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Kirk,  62  Tex.     other,  so  that   they    might  exercise 


§238] 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


432 


"  same  common  employment,"  unless  they  are  so  engaged  that 
their  duties  bring  them  into  association  with  each  other,  either 
generally2  or  at  the  time  of  the  injury  in  question,3  to  such  a 
degree  that  they  can  exercise  some  influence  upon  each  other, 
in  favor  of  care  and  caution  for  their  mutual  safety.4  In  some 
cases  this  rule  is  stated  as  limiting  "  common  employment  " 
to  "  the  same  department ;  "5  but  the  definition  of  a  depart- 
ment seems  to  be  as  above  stated.  This  rule  is  adopted  in 
Tennessee,  with  respect  to  railroad  companies,  but  no  fur- 
ther.6 In  Georgia,  Mississippi  and  Texas,  by  statute,  a  simi- 
lar  rule   is  imposed    upon   all   owners   and   managers   of    rail- 


an  influence  upon  each  other  promo- 
tive of  proper  caution  for  their  per- 
sonal safety  (Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Brien,  155  111.  630  ;  40  N.  E.  1023). 
So  in  Missouri,  although  with  con- 
siderable dissent,  on  the  part  of  new 
judges  (Dixon  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  109  Mo.  413  ;  19  S.  W.  412  [track 
laborer  not  in  common  employment 
with  trainmen]  :  Sehlereth  v.  Mis- 
souri Pac.  R.  Co.,  115  Mo.  87;  21  S. 
W.  1110  [same];  Sullivan  v.  Mo. 
Pacific  R.  Co.,  97  Mo.  113  ;  10  S.  W. 
852  [same]  ;  but  compare  Parker  v. 
Hannibal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  109  Mo.  362; 
19  S.  W.  1119  [where  trainmen  were 
unloading  with  trackmen ;  and  the 
court  divided  equally]  ;  and  Relyea  v. 
Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  112  Mo.  86  ; 
19  S.  W.  1116  ;  again,  20  S.  W.  480 
[brakeman  on  one  train  in  common 
employment  with  fireman  on  an- 
other]). So  in  Kansas  (Atchison, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McKee,  37  Kans.  592 ; 
St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Weaver,  35 
Kans.  412  ;  11  Pac.  408  [section  fore- 
man and  engineer  of  train,  not  in 
common  employment])  ;  in  Kentucky 
(Kentucky,  etc  R  Co  v  Ackley,  87 
Ky.  278;"  8  S  W  691)  Nebraska 
(Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Erickson,  41 
Neb.  1  ;  59  X.  W.  347 ;  Omaha,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Krayenbuhl,  48  Neb.  553 ; 
67  N.  W.  447  [section  foreman  not  in 


common  employment  with  train  en- 
gineer]) ;  and  Utah  (Armstrong  v. 
Oregon,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  8  Utah,  420  ;  32 
Pac.  693  ;  Webb  v.  Denver,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  7  Utah,  363;  26  Pac.  981  [car- 
repairer  and  engineer]).  The  Illinois 
rule  was  once  approved  in  Virginia 
(Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Norment,  84 
Va.  167);  but  is  now  expressly  repu- 
diated (Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co  v.  Nuck- 
ols,  94  Va.  193 ;  21  S.  E.  342). 

2  This  is  declared  in  all  the  cases. 

3  If  they  are  thus  co-operating,  at 
the  time  of  the  injury,  it  makes  no 
difference  that  their  usual  duties  are 
iu  separate  departments  (Casey  v. 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  84  Ky.  79; 
Abend  v.  Terre  Haute,  etc.  R.  Co., 
Ill  111.  202). 

4  North  Chicago  Mill  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 114  111.  57  ;  29  N.  E.  186  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  155  111. 
630 ;  40  N.  E.  1023. 

5  St.  Louis,  etc,  R.  Co.  v.  Weaver, 
35  Kans.  412;  11  Pac.  408. 

6  The  doctrine  that  where  em- 
ployees are  in  different  departments 
of  service  the  fellow-servant  rule 
does  not  apply,  has  no  application  in 
this  state  except  as  to  railroad  com- 
panies (Coal  Creek  Min.  Co.  v.  Davis, 
90  Tenn.  711  ;  18  S.  W.  387  ;  limiting 
Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Carroll,  6 
Heisk.  347). 


433 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§238 


roads.7  In  courts  adhering  to  this  definition,  the  following 
servants  are  held  not  to  be  usually  in  common  employment 
with  each  other,  and  therefore  a  jury  may  allow  one  to 
recover  against  the  common  master  for  the  negligence  of  the 
other:  trainmen  for  the  fault  of  trackmen;8  trackmen  for 
fault  of  trainmen  ; 9  trainmen  for  fault  of  telegraph  operators,10 
or  of  foreman  sending  out  unsafe  engine  or  car;11  a  yard 
switchman  for  fault  of  an  engineer;12  a  car  inspector  for  fault 
of  engineer;13  car  loaders  for  fault  of  trainmen  within  the 
same  yard;14  a  brakeman  for  fault  of  officers  attending  to 
loading  of  trains.15  As  to  servants  on  separate  trains,  coming 
into   collision,  the  decisions  are  conflicting.16     On  the  other 


■>  Georgia  Code  [1882],  §  3036  ;  Mis- 
sissippi Code,  §  193  ;  Texas  Stat.  May 
4,  1893  ;  March  10, 1891.  But  it  is  not 
the  common-law  rule,  and  therefore 
has  no  further  application  (Ellington 
v.  Beaver  Dam  Lumber  Co.,  93  Ga  53 ; 
19  S.  E.  21 ;  International,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Ryan,  82  Tex.  565 ;  18  S.  W.  219). 

8  Toriansv.  Richmond,  etc.  R.  Co., 
84  Va.  192  ;  4  S.  E.  339  [track  re- 
pairers in  fault]. 

9  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Powers, 
74  111.  341  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Swett,  45  Id.  197  ;  Toledo,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  O'Connor,  77  Id.  391  ;  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Moranda,  93  Id. 
302 ;  Peoria,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Rice,  144 
111.  227  ;  33  N.  E.  951  [section  fore- 
man] ;  Sullivan  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  97  Mo.  113  ;  10  S.  W.  852  ;  Schle- 
reth  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.,  115 
Mo.  87  ;  21  S.  VY.  1110 ;  Northern 
Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  1  Wash. 
599 ;  21  Pac.  32.  In  Texas,  an  em- 
ployee of  a  railroad  who  travels  in  a 
train  to  reach  a  point  where  he  has 
been  assigned  to  work,  but  who  takes 
no  part  in  the  running  of  the  train, 
is  not  a  fellow-servant  of  the  engi- 
neer (Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Nor- 
ris,  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  ;  29  S.  W.  950). 
A  section  man  and  men  operating  a 
train  are  not  fellow-servants  (South- 
ern  Pac.    Co.    v.  Ryan,   [Tex.   Civ. 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  28.] 


App.] ;  29  S.  W.  527  ;  Union  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Erickson,  41  Neb.  1  ;  59  N. 
W.  347). 

10  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  De 
Armond,  2  Pickle,  73  ;  5  S.  W.  600. 

11  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Shannon, 
43  111.  338;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Moore,  77  Id.  217  [engineer  not  fel- 
low-servant with  those  whose  duty 
it  was  to  inspect  and  keep  engine  in 
order]  ;  S.  P.,  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Taylor,  69  Id.  461  ;  Norway  v.  Jen- 
sen, 52  Id.  373  [sailor  on  schooner]. 

12  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Sheets, 
(Ky.)  13  S.  W.  248. 

13  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoyt,  122 
111.  369;  12  N.  E.  225;  Richmond, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Norment,  84  Va.  167  ; 
4  S.  E.  211  ["different  depart- 
ments'*]; but  compare  Valtez  v. 
Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  85  111.  500  [car  re- 
pairer at  station  and  negligent  en- 
gineer in  charge  of  switch  engine  at 
same  station]. 

14  North  Chicago  Rolling  Mill  Co. 
v.  Johnson,  114  111.  57  ;  29  N.  E.  186. 

15Atchinson,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Seeley, 
54Kans.  21  ;  37  Pac.  104. 

16  Kentucky  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Ackley, 
87  Ky.  278;"  8  S.  W.  691  [freight 
train  and  passenger  train  not  in  com- 
mon employment].  But  see  contra, 
as  to  locomotive  engineers  on  the 
same  road,  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Robb, 


§^39] 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


434 


hand,  it  is  held  under  this  rule  that  servants  are  in  common 
employment,  and  therefore  cannot  recover  against  the  master, 
in  the  following  cases:  laborers,  carried  on  a  train,  for  the 
fault  of  the  train  engineer;17  a  trackman  for  the  omission  of 
an  engineer  to  notify  him  of  a  defect,  it  being  the  duty  and 
habit  of  the  engineer  to  do  so  ; 18  a  watchman  at  a  cable  road 
crossing,  for  the  fault  of  a  motorman  ; 19  a  laborer,  loading  a 
ship,  for  the  fault  of  laborer  above,  failing  to  give  due  warn- 
ing ; 20  and  a  track-layer  in  a  mine  for  the  fault  of  an  engineer 
operating  the  hoist.21 


§  239.  Illustrations  of  common  employment. — Except  in 
the  states  specified  in  section  238,  the  rule  of  common  employ- 
ment includes  all  employed  in  the  same  factory,  mill,  shop, 
warehouse  or  office,1  all  employed  in  operating  the  same  mine, 
whether  above  or  below,2  all  persons  employed  upon  the  trains, 
yards,  stations  and  depots  of  the  same  railroad,3  and  certainly 


36  111.  App.  627,  and  brakeman  and 
fireman  of  different  trains,  Relyea 
v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  112  Mo. 
86  ;  20  S.  W.  480. 

"Higgins  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
104  Mo.  413  ;  16  S.  W.  409 ;  Illinois 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Cox,  21  111.  23; 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Keefe,  47  Id. 
108 ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Britz, 
72  Id.  256;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Durkin,  76  111.  395  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Rush,  84  111.  571  [all  cases  of 
co-servants  on  same  train]. 

18  White  v.  Kennon,  83  Ga.  343  ;  9 
S.  E.  1082. 

"Murray  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
98  Mo.  573  ;  12  S.  W.  252. 

20  Ocean  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Cheeney,  86 
Ga.  278 ;  12  S.  E.  351. 

21  Niantic  Min.  Co.  v.  Leonard,  25 
111.  App.  95;  affi'd,  126  111.  216;  19 
N.  E.  294. 

1  Adams  v.  Iron  Cliffs  Co.,  78  Mich. 
271  ;  44  N.  W.  270  [furnace  with 
separate  departments]  ;  Say  ward  v. 
Carlson,  1  Wash.  St.  29;  23  Pac.  830 
[sawyer  and  carpenter]. 


8Bartonshill  Coal  Co.  v.  Reid,  3 
Macq.  II.  L.  266;  Bartonshill  Coal 
Co.  v.  McGuire,  Id.  300 ;  Coal  Creek 
Min.  Co.  v.  Davis,  90  Tenn.  711  ;  18 
S.  W.  387. 

3  The  employees  of  an  extra  freight 
train  are  the  fellow-servants  of  sec- 
tion hands  going  to  their  work  upon 
a  hand  car,  so  that  the  negligence  of 
the  former  in  failing  to  give  proper 
signals,  whereby  a  collision  results, 
does  not  render  the  company  liable 
for  injuries  to  one  of  the  section  men 
(Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Charless, 
162  U.  S.  359  ;  16  S.  Ct.  848).  Track- 
men and  trainmen  of  a  railroad  com- 
pany are  fellow-servants  (Schaible 
v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  97  Mich. 
318  ;  56  N.  W.  565  ;  St.  Louis,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Welch,  72  Tex.  298 ;  10  S. 
W.  529).  So  held,  under  a  code, 
using  the  words,  "  the  same  general 
business"  (Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
Hambly,  154  IT.  S.  349  ;  14  S.  Ct. 
983).  Employees  in  a  round-house 
in  whose  charge  plaintiff,  an  inex- 
perienced workman,  was  placed,  and 


435 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


H  239 


all  co-operating  in  a  single  piece  of  work4  or  the  construction 
of  a  single  thing,  such  as  a  building,5  no  matter  how  different 
their  special  lines  of  work  may  be.6  Workmen  employed  by 
a  railroad  company,  and  carried  free  to  and  from  their  work, 
as  part  of  their  contract  for  service,  upon  trains  in  the  manage- 
ment of  which  they  do  not  in  the  least  degree  participate,  are 
in  a  common  employment  with  the  engineer  and  other  serv- 
ants in  charge  of  the  train,7  and  with  switchmen  upon  the 
track,8  and,  therefore,  cannot  hold  the  company  liable  for  the 
negligence  of  the  latter.  But  if  servants  thus  traveling  were 
not  carried  in  pursuance  of  their  contract  for  service,  even 
though  they  traveled  under  a  free  pass  which  would  not  have 
been  given  to  them  but  for  their  service,  they  are  not  in  service 
during  their  journey,  and  therefore,  are  not  in  common  employ- 
ment with  anybody.9  And  in  Pennsylvania  it  is  held  that  a 
servant,  who  accepts  reduced  wages,  in  consideration  of  being 
allowed  to  travel  upon  the  road  to  and  from  his  work,  is  not 
in  service  while  thus  traveling.10 


who  ordered  plaintiff  to  clean  an 
engine,  are  fellow-servants  of  plain- 
tiff, as  is  also  the  engineer  in  charge 
of  such  engine  (Spencer  v.  Ohio,  etc. 
R  Co.,  130  Ind.  181  ;  29  N.  E.  915). 

4  Morgan  v.  Vale  of  Neath  R.  Co., 
5  Best  &  S.  570 ;  affi'd,  Id.  740  ; 
L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  149  ;  Butler  v.  Town- 
send,  126  N.  Y.  105  ;  26  N.  E.  1017  ; 
Fitzgerald  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  156 
Mass.  293 ;  31  N.  E.  7  [stowing  hay]; 
Bergquist  v.  Minneapolis,  42  Minn. 
471  ;  44  N.  W.  530  ;  see  Neal  v. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  57  Minn.  365  ; 
59  N.  W.  312  [men  blasting  for  track 
and  men  laying  telegraph  line]).  One 
unloading  coal  from  a  car  is  in  the 
same  common  employment  with  one 
employed  by  the  same  master  to 
place  cars  in  a  position  for  unload- 
ing (Rehm  v.  Pennsylvania  R.  Co., 
164  Pa.  St.  91  ;  30  Atl.  356). 

5  Armour  v.  Halm,  111  U.  S.  313; 
4  S  Ct.  433. 

6  Butler  v.  Townsend,  126  N.  Y. 
105;  26  N.  E    1017. 

7  Boldt  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  18 
N.  Y.  432  ;  Ryan  v.  Cumberland  Val- 


ley R.  Co.,  23  Pa.  St.  384  ;  Gillshan- 
non  v.  Stony  Brook  R.  Co.,  10  Cush. 
228 ;  Seaver  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R. 
Co.,  14  Gray,  466  ;  Whaalan  v.  Mad 
River,  etc.  R.  Co.,  8  Ohio  St.  249  ; 
McQueen  v.  Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  20 
Kans.  689  ;  Capper  v.  Louisville,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  103  Ind.  305. 

8  Gilman  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  10 
Allen,  233  ;  Tunney  v.  Midland  R. 
Co.,  L.  R.,  1  C.  P.  291  ;  Vick  v.  N.  Y. 
Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  95  N.  Y.  267. 

9  State  v.  Western  Md.  R.  Co.,  63 
Md.  433.  A  foreman  of  a  railroad's 
bridge  carpenters,  who  has,  by  the 
order  of  his  superior  (the  superin- 
tendent of  the  bridge- building  de- 
partment), gone  on  a  train,  to  be 
transported  to  his  place  of  work,  is 
not,  while  being  transported,  a  fel- 
low-servant of  the  conductor  (North- 
ern Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Beaton,  64  Fed. 
563;  12C.  C.  A.  301). 

10  O'Donnell  v.  Allegheny  Valley 
R.  Co.,  59  Pa.  St.  239,  which  case, 
however,  is  declared  to  be  "  not 
sound  law."  in  Vick  v.  N.  Y.  Central, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  95  N.  Y.  267. 


§241] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


436 


§  240.  [Omitted  as  superfluous]. 

§  241.  Illustrations  of  fellow-servants  in  common  employ- 
ment. —  Subject  to  the  exceptions  mentioned  in  section  238, 
it  is  everywhere  held  that  the  rule  of  "  fellow-servants  in  com- 
mon employment"  applies,  and  the  common  master  is  not 
liable,  in  the  following  instances  :  for  the  negligence  of  a  loco- 
motive engineer  or  electric  motorman,  causing  injury  to  a 
conductor,1  brakeman,2  fireman,3  or  other  servant,4  on  the  same 
train,  or  on  any  other  train  of  the  same  master  on  the  same  road,5 
or  on  a  hand  car,6  or  employed  in  any  capacity  upon  the  track,7 


1  Ragsdale  v.  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co., 
3  Baxter  (Tenn.),  426,  where  McFar- 
land,  J.,  points  out  that  it  was  a  case 
where  the  superior  servant  charged 
negligence  upon  the  inferior.  See  a 
similar  case,  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Morgart,  45  Ark.  318. 

2  Russell  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co., 
17  N.  Y.  134 ;  Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Brown,  91  Va.  6G8 ;  22  S.  E.  496. 

3 Bull  v.  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.,  67 
Ala.  206  ;  Nashville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Handman,  13  Lea,  423 ;  Nashville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wheless,  10  Id.  741  ; 
Summerhays  v.  Kansas  Pac.  R.  Co., 
2  Colo.  2S4  ;  Murray  v.  South  Caro- 
lina R.  Co.,  1  McMullan,  Law,  385; 
Henry  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  49 
Mich.  495  ;  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Britz,  72  111.  256. 

4  Abend  v.  Terre  Haute,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  111.  202  [blacksmith  going  to 
repair  wrecked  train]  ;  Dallas  v. 
Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61  Tex.  196  [person 
employed  to  watch  ties  along  road, 
riding  on  train  under  orders]  ;  Smith 
v.  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  18  Fed.  304 
[switchman  ordered  to  ride  on  en- 
gine] ;  Kumler  v.  Junction  R.  Co., 
33  Ohio  St.  150  [car-loader  on  gravel 
train]  ;  Ohio,  etc.  Co.  v.  Tindall,  13 
Ind.  366  [shoveler  on  gravel  train]  ; 
Houston  v.  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.,  62 
Tex.  267  [section  hand]  ;  Evansville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Henderson,  134  Ind. 
636  ;  33  N.  E.  1021. 


5  So  held  as  to  injured  engineer 
(Norfolk,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Donnelly,  88 
Va.  853  ;  14  S.  E.  692  ;  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Doyle,  60  Miss.  977 ;  Far- 
well  v.  Boston  &  Worcester  R.  Co., 
4  Mete.  49  [injured  conductor]  ;  En- 
right  v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  93  Mich. 
409  ;  53  N.  W.  536  [same] ;  Wright  v 
N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  25  N.  Y.  562 
[injured  brakeman]  ;  Randall  v.  Bal- 
timore, etc.  R.  Co.,  109  U.  S.  478 
[same]  ;  East  Tenn.  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Rush,  15  Lea  [Tenn.],  145  [same] ; 
Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  4 
Bush,  507  [same]). 

6  Van  Wickle  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co., 
32  Fed.  278.  So  held  where  no  head- 
light was  shown  (Penn.  R.  Co.  v. 
Wachter,  60  Md.  395  ;  s.  P.,  Collins 
v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  30  Minn.  31). 
Otherwise,  if  the  company  had  failed 
to  furnish  a  proper  headlight  (Id.). 

7Gormley  v.  Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.,  72 
Ind.  31  ;  Coon  v.  Syracuse,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  5  N.  Y.  492;  Blake  v.  Maine 
Cent.  R.  Co.,  70  Me.  60;  Watts  v 
Hart,  7  Wash.  St.  178;  34  Pac. 
423,  771  [all  cases  of  laborers]  ■ 
Lundquist  v.  Duluth  R.  Co.,  65 
Minn.  387 ;  67  N.  W.  1006  [track  re- 
pairer injured  by  fault  of  motor- 
man]  ;  Kennedy  v.  Manhattan  R. 
Co.,  33  Hun,  457  [signalman] ;  Con- 
nelly v.  Minneapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.,  38 
Minn.  80;  35  N.  W.  582  [section 
man].     Applied  even  to  the  case  of 


437 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


[§241 


or  to  a  switchtender,8  a  car-coupler,9  a  car-repairer,10  a  sec- 
tion-boss,11 a  yardmaster,12  a  station-agent,13  or  a  general 
superintendent.14  Nor  is  the  common  master  liable  for  the 
negligence  of  a  brakeman,  injuring  a  switchman,15  a  car 
inspector  or  car-repairer,16  a  station-master,17  a  train-loader18 
or  any  servant  on  his  train  ; 19  nor  for  the  negligence  of  a  man 
watching  the  track,  injuring  an  engineer,20  fireman  21  or  con- 
ductor22   of    a  train,    a    switchman 23   or  a    laborer    upon    the 


a  detective,  walking  on  the  track 
(Pyne  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  54 
Iowa,  223). 

8  Randall  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co. , 
109  U.  S.  478  ;  Satterly  v.  Morgan,  35 
La.  Ann.  1166  ;  Fowler  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  61  Wise.  159;  Farwell 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  4  Mete.  (Mass.) 
49  ;  Rutledge  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co., 
123  Mo.  121  ;  24  S.  W.  1053  ;  affi'd  in 
27  S.  W.  327. 

9  Fowler  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  61 
Wise.  159. 

10  Texas,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Harrington, 
62  Tex.  597  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Murphy,  53  111.  336.  s.  p.,  as  to  an 
engine-wiper,  employed  in  the  round- 
house of  the  defendant  in  cleaning 
engines  (Ewald  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  70  Wise.  420  ;  30  N.  W.  12). 

"Clifford  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co., 
141  Mass.  564  ;  6  N.  E.  751. 

12  Evans  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co., 
62  Mo.  49.  So  as  to  a  car-numberer 
stationed  in  the  yard  to  take  the 
number  of  each  car  as  it  arrives 
(Beuhring  v.  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co., 
37  W.  Va.  502 ;  16  S.  E.  435). 

1;  Evans  v.  Atlantic,  etc.  R.  Co., 
62  Mo  49. 

14  Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Smith,  59 
Ala.  245.  Here,  if  the  negligence 
had  been  on  the  side  of  the  superin- 
tendent, the  engineer  could  have  re- 
covered. 

15  Ponton  v.  Wilmington,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  6  Jones  Law  (N.  C),  245  ;   Slat- 


tery  v.  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co.,  23  Ind. 
81. 

16  Car-repairers  (Besel  v.  N.  Y.  Cen 
tral,  etc.  R.  Co.,  70  N.  Y.  171).  Car 
inspectors  (Potter  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  136  X.  Y~.  77  ;  33  N.  E.  603  ;  Col- 
umbus, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Webb,  12 
Ohio  St.  475  ;  see  Manville  v.  Cleve- 
land, etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Ohio  St.  417). 

"Hodgkins  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  119 
Mass.  419. 

18  Henry  v.  Staten  I.  R.  Co.,  81  N. 
Y.  373. 

19  The  other  members  of  a  train 
crew  engaged  with  a  brakeman  in 
making  a  "  running  switch,"  under 
orders  from  their  conductor  simply 
to  side  track  certain  cars,  are  his 
fellow-servants  (Sheets  v.  Chicago 
Coal  Ry.  Co.,  139  Ind.  682  ;  39  N.  E. 
154).  Under  the  Illinois  rule,  brake- 
men  engaged  in  running  the  same 
train  are  fellow-servants  (Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Howard,  45  Neb.  570  ; 
63  N.  W.  872). 

j0McEniry  v.  Waterford,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  8  Irish  C.  L.  312. 

51  Whaalan  v.  Mad  River,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  8  Ohio  St.  249. 

M  Waller  v.  Southeastern  R.  Co.,  2 
Hurlst.  &  C.  102  ;  see  also  Lovegrove 
v.  Brighton,  etc.  R.  Co.,  16  C.  B.  N. 
S.  669  ;  distinguished  in  Elmer  v. 
Locke,  139  Mass.  57.-,. 

23  Sammon  v.  N.  Y.  &  Harlem  R. 
Co.,  62  N.  Y.  251. 


§241] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


438 


track;24  nor  for  the  negligence  of  a  switchman,  injuring  an 
engineer,25  a  fireman,26  a  flagman,27  car-repairer 2S  or  train- 
loader;29  nor  for  the  negligence  of  a  fireman,  on  an  engine, 
injuring  a  brakeman  so  or  track  repairer;31  nor  for  the  negli- 
gence of  a  baggage-master,  injuring  a  conductor;32  nor  for  that 
of  a  car-repairer  (otherwise  than  in  omission  to  repair),  injuring 
a  yardmaster.33  Even  though  a  train  conductor  be  deemed  a 
vice-principal,  as  to  servants  on  the  same  train,  and  under  his 
command,  he  is  not  so  considered  as  to  servants  on  other 
trains  or  on  the  track  ;  and  the  common  master  is  not  liable  to 
the  latter  for  his  negligence.34  The  carpenter,  the  porter  and 
the  stewardess  of  a  steamship  are  fellow-servants,  in  common 
employment,  for  whose  negligence,  as  to  each  other,  the  mas- 


24  A  laborer  employed  by  a  railroad 
company  to  remove  snow  and  other 
obstructions  is  a  fellow-servant, 
within  the  law  of  negligence,  with 
the  track-walker,  whose  duty  it  is  to 
see  that  the  track  is  clear,  and  with 
a  conductor  of  a  train  (Fagundes  v. 
Central  Pac.  E.  Co.,  79  Cal.  97  ;  21 
Pac.  437). 

"Walker  v.  Boston  &  Maine  R. 
Co.,  128  Mass.  8  ;  Miller  v.  So. 
Pacific  R.  Co.,  20  Oreg.  285:  26 
Pac.  70 

26  Harvey  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  88  N.  Y.  481  ;  Galveston,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Faber,  63  Tex.  344  ;  Parker 
v.  N.  Y.  &  New  England  R.  Co.,  18 
R.  I.  773  ;  30  Atl.  849  ;  s.  p.,  Roberts 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  33  Minn.  218 
[baggage-master]. 

27  Sammon  v.  N.  Y.  Central,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  62  N.  Y.  251. 

28  Clark  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  28 
Minn.  128. 

29  Indianapolis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 102  Ind.  352. 

3ft  Kersey  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  79  Mo.  362;  Green wald  v.  Mar- 
quette, etc.  R.  Co.,  49  Mich.  197 
[fireman  only  16  years  old,  but  com- 
petent]. 


31  Foster  v.  Minn.  Central  R.  Co., 
14  Minn.  360. 

32  Colorado  Central  R.  Co.  v.  Mar- 
tin, 7  Colo.  592,  citing  our  old  §  11, 
now  §  52 ;  Manville  v.  Cleveland, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Ohio  St.  417  [con- 
ductor traveling  on  another  train  to 
place  of  service]. 

33  Corcoran  v.  Delaware,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  126  N.  Y  673 ;  27  N.  E.  1022. 

34  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Hambly, 
154  U.  S.  349 ;  14  S.  Ct.  983 ;  N.  Y. 
&  New  England  R.  Co.  v.  Hyde,  5 
C.  C.  A.  461;  56  Fed.  188.  So  in 
Indiana  (Becker  v.  Baltimore,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  57  Fed.  188) ;  and  South  Caro- 
lina (Jenkins  v.  Richmond,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  39  S.  C.  507;  18  S.  E.  182);  and, 
of  course,  in  Massachusetts  (Whit- 
more  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  150 
Mass.  477;  23  N.  E.  220  [car  inspector 
injured]).  But  in  West  Virginia, 
trainmen  can  recover  for  the  fault  of 
the  conductor  of  another  train,  as  a 
vice-principal  (Madden  v.  Chesa- 
peake, etc.  R.  Co.,  28  W.  Va.  610; 
Daniel  v  Chesapeake,  etc.  R.  Co.,  36 
W.  Va.  397;  15  S.  E.  162).  Conductors 
of  electric  railway  cars  on  the  same 
road  are  fellow-servants  (Baltimore 
Trust  Co.  v.  Atlanta  Traction  Co., 
69  Fed.  358). 


439 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


[§24I 


ter  is  not  liable.33  The  same  rule  applies  between  a  negligent 
engineer  of  a  hoisting  engine  at  a  mine  and  a  miner  excavating 
the  shaft  and  loading  rock;36  a  negligent  roadman  in  a  mine 
and  a  miner ;  3~  a  workman  hauling  rock  and  other  employees 
negligently  blasting  the  rock  ; w  a  negligent  engineer  in  charge 
of  a  steam  shovel  and  a  workman  engaged  with  the  machine;39 
and  between  carpenters  and  bricklayers,  working  together  in 
the  construction  of  a  wall.40  In  several  of  these  instances,  a 
superior  officer  cannot  recover  for  the  negligence  of  the 
inferior;41  although  the  inferior  could  recover  for  the  negli- 
gence of  the  superior.     For  some  other  cases,  see  the  notes.42 


35  Quebec  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Merchant, 
133  U.  S.  375;  10  S.  Ct.  397. 

36  Buckley  v.  Gould,  etc.  Mining 
Co.,  14  Fed.  833;  S.  P.,  Collier  v. 
Steinhart,  51  Cal.  116. 

37  Troughear  v.  Lower  Vein  Coal 


the  hour,  was  sent  by  his  master  to 
repair  def  endaiit's  elevator  under  the 
direction  of  defendant's  superin- 
tendent, and  while  executing  the 
repairs  was  injured  by  the  careless- 
ness of  the  elevator  boy.     Held,  that 


Co.,  62  Iowa,  576.     Contra,  as  to  a    plaintiff,  for  the  purpose  of  making 


laborer,  not  a  miner,  employed  in  a 
mine,  and  the  regular  miners, 
through  whose  negligence  in  re- 
moving a  supporting  pillar  a  por- 
tion of  the  mine  caved  in  and  in- 
jured the  former  (James  v.  Emmet 
Mining  Co.,  55  Mich.  335).  This  was 
on  the  ground  that  the  place  of  work 
was  thus  made  unsafe. 

38  Bogard  v.  Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co., 
100  Ind  491. 

39  Thompson  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  18  Fed.  239;  though  it  would 
not  be  so  as  to  a  general  superin- 
tendent, having  power  of  control  (Id.) 

40  Armour  v.  Hahn,  111  U.  S.  313; 
4  S.  Ct.  433;  Bier  v.  Jefferson ville, 
etc.  R.  Co ,  132  Ind.  78  ;  31  N.  E.  471. 

41  Ragsdale  v.  Memphis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  3  Baxter  [Tenn.],  426. 

4i  Negligence  of  a  competent  serv- 
ant, who,  in  the  course  of  his  daily 
duty  of  oiling  machinery,  fails  to  re- 
adjust the  cylinders  of  one  of  them, 
whereby  the  operator  thereof  is  in- 
jured, cannot  be  imputed  to  the 
master  (Bjbjian  v.  Woonsocket  Rub- 
ber Co..  164  Mass.  214:  41  N.  E.  265]. 
Plaintiff,   a  carpenter  employed  by 


the  repairs,  was  defendant's  serv- 
ant and  in  a  common  employment 
with  the  elevator  boy  (Ha6ty  v. 
Sears,  157  Mass.  123;  31  N.  E.  759). 
A  foreman,  who  unites  with  the 
workmen  in  determining  that  a  scaf- 
folding being  constructed  by  them  is 
safe,  is  a  co-servant,  and  his  deter- 
mination, if  erroneous,  does  not 
render  the  master  liable  (Kimmer 
v.  Weber,  151  N.  Y.  417;  45  N.  E. 
Rep.  860;  rev'g  81  Hun,  599;  30  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1103).  One  who  rents  a  room 
containing  machinery  operated  by 
men  employed  by  the  lessor,  is  the 
master  of  the  men  so  employed, 
where  they  are  engaged  wholly  with 
his  work,  and  subject  entirely  to  his 
control  ;  and  they  are  the  fellow- 
servants  of  a  person  employed  by 
the  lessee  to  work  under  the  direc- 
tion of  one  of  them  (Rozelle  v.  Rose, 
3  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  132;  39  N.  Y.  Supp. 
363).  The  slingman  of  a  stevedore's 
ci-ew  employed  to  load  a  vessel, 
whose  duty  it  is  to  stand  on  the 
wharf  and  attach  the  hoisting  tackle 
to  the  articles  to  be  loaded,  is  a  fel- 
low-servant of   the  riggers,    whose 


§  24 1  a]  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  44O 

§  241a.  Effect  of  statutes  and  codes.  —  Mere  general  lan- 
guage in  statutes,  especially  in  codes,  declaring  persons  or 
corporations  to  be  liable  for  the  negligence  of  themselves  or 
of  their  servants,  in  such  broad  terms  as,  if  there  were  no  rule 
of  common  law  exempting  masters  from  liability  to  their  serv- 
ants, would  undoubtedly  leave  no  room  to  imply  such  an 
exemption,  is  not  to  be  construed  as  abolishing  the  exemption 
of  the  common  law,  but  is  to  be  taken  as  simply  affirming  the 
general  liability  of  such  persons  or  corporations,  subject  to  all 
the  established  exceptions  of  the  common  law.  Therefore,  a 
statute  prescribing  certain  rules  and  declaring  that  a  corpora- 
tion neglecting  to  comply  therewith  "  shall  be  liable  to  any 
person  injured  for  all  damages  sustained  by  reason  of  such 
neslect,"  does  not  alter  the  common-law  rule  so  as  to  make  a 
corporation  liable  to  its  servants  for  the  consequences  of  such 
neglect  on  the  part  of  a  fellow-servant.1  Nor,  on  the  other  hand, 
will  general  language  in  a  statute,  especially  a  code,  be  con- 
strued so  as  to  restrict  the  liability  of  masters  to  something  less 
than  that  imposed  by  the  common-law,  where  the  intent  of  the 
legislature  to  produce  that  result  does  not  plainly  appear.2 
Nor  will  it  be  construed  as  abolishing  the  common-law  rule  as 
to  contributory  negligence.3  The  only  attempt  to  codify  the 
whole  law  on  this  subject  is  to  be  found  in  one  section  of  the 
Civil  Codes  of  Dakota  and  California.4     This  section  is  a  model 

duty  it  is  to  set  up  and  rig  the  hoist-  of  their  agents  (Carle  v.  Bangor,  etc. 

ing  apparatus  to  the  vessel  (Burns  v.  E.  Co.,  43  Me.  269  ;  Sullivan  v.  Mis- 

Sennett,  99  Cal.  363;  44  Pac.  1068).  sissippi,  etc.  R.  Co.,  11  Iowa,  421). 

A  complaint  which  alleges  that  de-  s.  p.,  Railroad  Co.  v.  Rush,  15  Lea 

fendant  allowed  a  car  to  stand  on  [Tenn.],  150.  But  where  the  statute, 

the  track  without  having  the  brake  taken    as   a   whole,    was    evidently 

set,  in  consequence  of  which  it  ran  framed  for  the  purpose  of  affording 

against  plaintiff,  who  was  working  increased  protection  to  servants,  the 

at  another  car,  shows  on  its  face  that  rule  is  otherwise  (Le  May  v.  Can. 

plaintiff's    injuries    were  caused  by  Pac.  R.  Co.,  18  Ontario,  314). 

the  negligence  of  a  fellow-servant  -  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Herbert, 

(Kudik   v.   Lehigh  Val.   R.    Co.,  78  116  TJ.  S.  642 ;  construing  Civil  Code 

Hun,  492;  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  533).  of  Dakota. 

1  Randall  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  3Lorimer  v.  St.    Paul  R.  Co.,   48 

109  TJ.  S.  478.     So,  also,  in  the  case  Minn.  391;  51  N.  W.  125. 

of  a  statute  declaring  that  railroad  4  Civil  Code,    Dakota,  §  1130;  do. 

companies    shall   be    liable    for    all  Cal.,    §    1970.      This    part  of    these 

damages    happening  to   "  any  per-  Codes  was    framed  by   the  writer, 

son,"  in  consequence  of  the  neglect  nearly  forty  years  ago,  just  after  his 


44i 


LIABILITY    OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  [§  241b 


of  inaccuracy  and  incompleteness;  which  has  confused  every- 
thing and  explained  nothing.  Literally  construed,  it  would 
legalize  the  dicta  in  Wilson  v.  Merry.  Fortunately,  it  is 
mostly  explained  away.5  While  it  is  construed  as  abolishing 
all  distinctions  between  servants  of  every  degree,6  the  courts 
of  California  and  the  Dakotas  hold  masters  responsible  under 
the  New  York  rule,  and  regard  as  a  vice-principal  every  servant 
charged  with  the  performance  of  the  master's  duty,  in  the 
discharge  of  that  duty.7 

§  241b.  Statutes  of  general  application. —  The  liability  of 
masters  to  their  servants  has  been  regulated  by  statute,  in  sev- 
eral states.  We  can  only  refer  to  these  statutes  and  the  decis- 
ions under  them,  in  a  very  general  way.  The  first  example  of 
careful  general  legislation  was  given  in  Great  Britain,  in  1880.1 
This  statute  was  sound  and  liberal  in  principle,  but,  as  usual 
in  such  cases,  was  spoiled  by  the  House  of  Lords  in  its  details. 
The  principles  of  the  British  statute  were  embodied  in  statutes 
of  Alabama,  in  1885,2  ar>d  °f  Massachusetts,  in  1887.3     Thegen- 


adtnission  to  the  bar,  when  he  knew 
no  better  than  to  quote  literally  from 
the  ponderous  obiter  dicta  of  learned 
judges.  The  section  contains  at  least 
two  errors  in  every  line. 

6  Northern  Pacific  R.  Co.  v.  Her- 
bert, 116  U.  S.  642 ;  6  S.  Ct.  590. 

6  Congrave  v.  Southern  Pacific  R. 
Co.,  88  Cal.  360  ;  reaffirmed,  Stevens 
v.  San  Francisco,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100 
Cal.  554 ;  overruling  Brown  v.  Sen- 
nett,  68  Cal.  225  ;  which  overruled 
McLean  v.  Blue  Point  Co.  51  Cal. 
255 ;  S.  P.,  Ell  v.  No.  Pacific  R.  Co., 
1  N.  Dak.  336;  Elliot  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  5  Dak.  523  ;  41  N.  W. 
T5S  :  Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Hogan, 
63  Fed.  102;  11  C.  C.  A.  51  [brake- 
man  and  conductor]. 

1  McNamara  v.  MacDonough,  103 
Cal.  575 ;  36  Pac.  941  ;  Elledge  v. 
National  City.  etc.  R.  Co.,   100  Cal. 


282 ;    34  Pac.    720.      See  Ell  v.  No. 
Pacific  R.  Co.,  1  N.  Dak.  336. 

1  Stat.  43  and  44  Vic.  c.  42.  See 
the  statute,  at  the  end  of  this  chap- 
ter. 

2  Alabama  Code,  §  2590.  Under 
Code  Ala.  §  2590,  an  employer, 
knowing  of  defect  or  negligence, 
cannot  set  up  that  the  employee,  by 
continuing  in  the  work,  has  thereby 
waived  his  right  to  sue  (Mobile,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Holborn,  84  Ala.  133  ;  4  So. 
146).  It  is  not  necessary  to  show  that 
the  superintendence  was  over  the 
person  who  complains  of  negligence 
(Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Burton, 
97  Ala.  240 ;  12  So.  88).  When  an 
engineer  is  not  a  person  "  who  has 
any  superintendence  intrusted  to 
him,"  under  Code  (Dantzler  v.  De 
Bardeleben  Coal  Co.,  101  Ala.  309 ; 
14  So.  10).     When  he  is  (Perdue  v. 


3  Mass.  Stat.  1887,  ch.  270;  amended  chinery  (Bowers  v.  Conn.  Riv.  R. 
1888,  1892,  1893  and  1894.  Loaded  Co.,  162  Mass.  312;  38  N.  E.  508). 
cars    are    part    of  works  and    ma-    So  by  stat.  1893,  ch.  359. 


§  24 lb]  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 


442 


eral  effect  of  these  statutes  (apart  from  special  rules  affecting 
railroad  companies)  is  to  make  clear  the  liability  of  masters  for 
the  negligence  of  any  servants  entrusted  with  powers  of 
superintendence  or  command,  in  the  execution  of  such  pow- 
ers.4 They  also  define  more  clearly  the  master's  liability  for 
defects  in  ways,  works  and  machinery.5     These  statutes  do  not 


Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100  Ala.  535; 
14  So.  366).  The  fact  that  foreman 
was  voluntarily  assisting  in  manual 
lahor  does  not  constitute  him  a  co- 
employee,  so  as  to  relieve  defendant 
from  liability  (Kansas  City,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Burton,  97  Ala.  240  ;  12  So. 
88).     Liability  of  municipal  corpora- 


tion (Sheffield  v.  Harris,  101  Ala. 
564 ;  14  So.  357  j  Lewis  v.  Mont- 
gomery, [Ala.]  ;  16  So.  34).  Rail- 
road company  liable  for  inj  uries  to  a 
switchman  caused  by  fireman's  fail- 
ure to  transmit  a  signal  (Richmond, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Jones,  92  Ala.  218;  9 
So.  276). 


4  Who  are  superintendents  within 
the  statute:  foreman  of  gang  (Pren- 
dible  v.  Connecticut  River  Mfg.  Co., 
160  Mass.  131 ;  35  N.  E.  675) ;  fore- 
man of  five  men  (Mahoney  v.  N.  Y. 
&  New  England  R.  Co.,  160  Mass. 
573;  36  N.  E.  588);  foreman  of  a  sec- 
tion gang  doing  no  work  (Davis  v. 
N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R.  Co.,  159 
Mass.  532;  34  N.  E.  1070);  foreman, 
doing  a  slight  amount  of  work 
(Crowley  v.  Cutting,  165  Mass.  4^6  ; 
43  N.  E.  197);  section  master  (Bab- 
cock  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  150  Mass. 
467;  23  N.  E.  325);  overseer  (Patnode 
v.  Warren  Cotton  Mills,  157  Mass. 
283;  32  N.  E.  161).  In  that  case  the 
factory  owner  was  represented  in 
the  carding  room  by  a  card  grinder, 
who  was  acting  as  second  hand,  and 
who  ordered  plaintiff  to  leave  his 
ordinary  work  and  assist  him  in  his 
work,  which  plaintiff  did.  Held, 
plaintiff  was  not  properly  employed 
in  rendering  such  assistance. 

What  is  negligence  in  superin- 
tendent :  MoPhee  v.  Scully,  163 
Mass.  216;  39  N.  E.  1007;  Malcolm  v. 
Fuller,  152  Mass.  160;  25  N.  E.  83. 

Who  is  not  a  superintendent :  one 
doing  the  same  work  and  receiving 
the  same  pay  as  those  to  whom  he 
gives  directions  (Dowd  v.  Boston  & 


A.  R.  Co.,  162  Mass.  185;  38  N.  E. 
440;  Adasken  v.  Gilbert,  165  Mass. 
443;  43  N.  E.  199) ;  or  who  is  at  work 
"  pretty  much  all  the  time  "  with  the 
others  (O'Brien  v.  Rideout,  161  Mass. 
170;  36  N.  E.  792  ;  and  see  O'Neil  v. 
O'Leary,  164  Mass.  387;  41  N.  E.  662); 
weaver  operating  a  loom  (Roseback 
v.  ^Etna  Mills,  158  Mass.  379;  33  N.  E. 
577). 

Who  is  "  in  charge  of  a  train:" 
Devine  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co.,  159 
Mass.  348;  34  N.  E.  539  [conductor] ; 
Davis  v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  159  Mass.  532;  34  N.  E.  1070 
[engineer]. 

Who  is  not  in  charge  :  Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  100  Ala. 
232;  14  So.  209  [hostler]. 

5  What  are  such  defects  :  Toomey 
v.  Donovan,  158  Mass.  232  ;  33  N.  E. 
396 ;  Gustafsen  v.  Washburn,  etc. 
Mfg.  Co.,  153  Mass.  468 ;  27  N.  E. 
179 ;  Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Webb,  97  Ala.  157;  11  So.  888  [de- 
fects in  track]. 

What  are  not  "  defects  in  the  ways, 
works,  or  machinery  connected  with 
or  used  in  the  business  of  the  em- 
ployer," within  the  meaning  of  St. 
1887,  ch.  270,  §  1,  cl.  1 :  Lynch  v.  Al- 
lyn.  160  Mass.  248  ;  35  N.  E.  550  [earth 
bank]  :  Burns  v. Washburn,  160  Mass. 


443 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS.  [§  24 1 C 


abolish  the  rule  as  to  the  effect  of  a  perfectly  voluntary 
assumption  of  risks  by  a  servant.6  They  do  not  supersede 
the  common  law  upon  the  same  subject ;  and  a  servant  may, 
if  he  desires  to  do  so,  maintain  his  action  at  common  law, 
instead  of  relying  upon  the  statute.7  In  1893,  a  statute  was 
enacted  in  Indiana,  enlarging  the  liability  of  all  corporations  to 
their  servants. 


§  241c.  Statutes  applying  to  railroad  companies. — Georgia 
was  the  first  state  to  legislate  on  this  subject.  In  1855,  the 
entire  exemption  of  railroad  companies  from  liability  for  neg- 
ligence of  fellow-servants  was  abolished  by  a  statute x  which 
was  literally  copied  in  Florida,  in    1887,2  substantially  enacted 


457;  36  N.  E.  199  [temporary  stag- 
ing] ;  Carroll  v.  Willcutt,  163  Mass. 
221;  39  N.  E.  1016  [stone  on  a  scaf- 
fold]; Shear.  Wellington,  163  Mass. 
364  ;  40  N.  E.  173  [exploder];  May  v. 
Whittier  Mach.  Co.,  154  Mass.  29  ;  27 
N.  E.  768  [pile  of  wood  on  way]; 
Fisk  v.  Fitchburg  R.  Co.,  158  Mass. 
238;  33  N.  E.  510  [awning];  see 
O'Maley  v.  South  Boston  Gaslight 
(  o.,  158  Mass.  135;  32  N.  E.  1119. 
Company  not  liable  for  car  (Coffee 
v.  N.  Y.,  New  Haven,  etc.   R.   Co., 

155  Mass.  21;  28  N.  E.  1128)  on  track 
not  owned  by  it,  though  temporarily 
used   (Trask  v.  Old   Colony  R.    Co., 

156  Mass.  298;  31  N.  E.  6). 

6  Cassady  v.  Boston  &  A.  R.  Co., 
164  Mass.  168  ;  41  N.  E.  129.  The 
statute  does  not  change  the  doctrine 
of  volenti  non  Jit  injuria  (Birming- 
ham R.  Co.  v.  Allen,  99  Ala.  359;  13 
So.  8  [voluntary  use  for  year,  with- 
out objection]  ;  overruling  Mobile, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Holborn,  84  Ala.  133; 
4  So.  146 ;  Highland  Ave.  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Walters,  91  Ala.  435;  8  So. 
357;  and  approving  Thomas  v.  Quar- 
termain,  18  Q.  B.  Div.  685;  Mellor 
v.  Merchants"  Mfg.  Co.,  150  Mass. 
302;  23  N.  E.  100). 

'  Ryalls  v.  Mechanics'  Mills,  150 
Mass.    190;    22  N.  E.   766;   Clark  v. 


Merchants',  etc.  Trans.  Co.,  151  Mass. 
352;  24  N.  E.  49. 

1  Georgia  Code,  §  3033.  In  Geor- 
gia, a  railroad  company  is  liable  for 
injuries  to  an  employee  wholly 
caused  by  the  negligence  of  a  fellow- 
servar.t,  whether  or  not  such  injuries 
are  connected  with  the  running  of 
trains  (Georgia  R.  Co.  v.  Brown,  86 
Ga.  320;  12  S.  E.  812);  s.  p.,  Geor- 
gia R.  Co.  v.  Miller.  9  1  Ga.  571  ;  16 
S.  E.  939.  Under  the  same  statute, 
a  railroad  employee  may  recover  for 
injuries  resulting  from  the  negli- 
gence of  a  co-employee  where  he 
himself  was  free  from  fault  (Maloy 
v.  Port  Royal,  etc.  R.  Co.,  97  Ga. 
295;  22  S.  E.  58S).  For  cases  of 
non  liability,  see  McGovern  v.  Col- 
umbus Manuf'g  Co.,  80  Ga.  227;  5 
S.  E.  492  ;  Georgia  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Nelms,  83  Ga.  70  ;  9  S.  E.  1049  [ham- 
mer is  not  machinery]. 

2  Florida  Stat.  June  7,  1887  (Gen. 
Laws,  ch.  3741)  ;  and  by  statute  May 
4,  1891,  any  person  or  property  is  in- 
jured by  the  operation  of  railroad 
(rains,  cars,  locomotives,  or  machin- 
ery, or  by  any  person  in  the  employ 
of  the  company,  the  burden  shall  be 
on  the  company  to  show  ordinary 
and  reasonable  care  and  diligence 
(Laws  1890-91,  ch.  4071). 


§24IC]  LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 


444 


in  Kansas,  in  1874,3  and  followed  in  Iowa,  also  in  1874,  so  far  as 
relates  to  wrongs  "  connected  with  the  use  and  operation  of  any 
railroad,"4  leaving  negligence  in  the  construction  of  a  railroad 
subject  to  common-law  rules.5  A  similar  statute  was  enacted 
in  Minnesota,  in  1 SS/.6  But  it  is  held  that,  under  a  constitu- 
tion prohibiting  class  legislation,  such  a  special  burden  could 
not  be  imposed  upon  any  one  class  of  masters  in  that  state,  if 
applicable  to  all  the  corporate  business ;  and  therefore  the  effect 
of  the  statute  is  restricted  to  those  hazards  which  are  peculiar 
to  the  operation  of  railroads.7  Therefore  it  does  not  apply  at 
all  to  street  railroads  in  a  city  or  town  operated  by  cable8  or 
horse  power.   In  Mississippi,  by  the  constitution  of  1890,9  and  in 


3  Kansas  Stat.  1874,  ch.  93  :  Com- 
piled Laws,  §  5204.  The  Kansas 
statute  is  constitutional  (Atchison, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Koehler,  37  Kans.  463  ; 
15  Pac.  567) .  For  cases  of  liability 
under  the  Kansas  statute,  see  Chi- 
cago, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Pontius,  157  U. 
S.  209;  15  S.  Ct.  585;  affi'g  S.  C.,  52 
Kans.  264 ;  34  Pac.  739  ;  Atchison, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Brassfield,  51  Kans. 
167  ;  32  Pac.  814  ;  Missouri  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  McCally,  41  Kans.  039;  21 
Pac.  574  ;  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Stahley,  62  Fed.  363  ;  11  C.  C.  A.  88. 

4  Iowa  Stat.  1874,  ch.  65,  Code,  § 
1307.  For  examples  of  liability 
under  the  Iowa  statute,  see  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  McLaughlin,  119  U.  S. 
566  ;  7  S.  Ct.  1366 ;  Keatley  v.  Illi- 
nois Cent.  R.  Co.,  94  Iowa,  685;  63 N. 
W.  560;  Butler  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  87  Iowa,  206;  54  N.  W.  208; 
Larson  v.  Illinois  Cent.  R.  Co.,  91 
Iowa,  81  ;  58  N.  W.  1076  ;  Haden  v. 
Sioux  City,  etc.  R.  Co.,  92  Iowa,  226  ; 
60  N.  W.  537  ;  Smith  v.  Humeston, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  78  Iowa,  583  ;  43  N.  W. 
545  ;  Neville  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co., 
79  Iowa,  232  ;  44  N.  W.  367  ;  Nelson 
v.  Chicago,  M.,  etc.  R.  Co.,  73  Iowa, 
576  ;  35  N.  W.  611  ;  Pierce  v.  Central 
Iowa  R.  Co.,  73  Iowa,  140  ;  34  N.  W. 
783. 

5  This  is  expressly  provided  by  the 
Minnesota  statute  (Laws  1887,  ch.  13). 


6  Id. 

7  Lavallee  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co., 
40  Minn.  249  ;  41  N.  W.  974  ;  John- 
son v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  43  Minn. 
222  ;  45  N.  W.  156.  For  cases  of  lia- 
bility, see  Nichols  v.  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  60  Minn.  319  ;  62  N.  W.  386  ; 
Smith  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  44 
Minn.  17  ;  46  N.  W.  149  ;  Schneider 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  42  Minn.  68 ; 
43  N.  W.  783  ;  Steffenson  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  45  Minn.  355  ;  47  N.  W. 
1068. 

8  Funk  v.  St.  Paul  R.  Co.,  61  Minn. 
435;  63  N.  W.  1099.  s.  P.,  Riley  v. 
Galveston  R.  Co.  (Tex.  Civ.  App.), 
35  S.  W.  826. 

a  Const.  1890,  §  193,  provides  that 
employees  of  any  railroad  corpora- 
tion shall  have  the  same  rights  and 
remedies  as  are  allowed  to  persons 
not  employees,  for  injuries  caused 
by  the  negligence  of  a  superior  agent 
or  officer,  or  of  a  person  having  the 
right  to  control  or  direct  the  services 
of  the  party  injured,  or  of  a  fellow- 
servant  engaged  in  another  depart- 
ment of  labor,  etc.  Held,  that 
negligence  will  not  be  inferred  from 
the  fact  of  injury  to  an  employee, 
but  it  must  be  shown,  since  the  rule 
applicable  in  case  of  injury  to  pas- 
sengers does  not  apply  to  an  em- 
ployee (Short  v.  New  Orleans,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  69  Miss.  848  ;  13  So.  826). 


445 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS.  [$  24 1 C 


Texas,  by  statutes  of  1891  and  1892, 10  railroad  companies  are 
made  liable  to  servants  for  any  negligence  of  a  superior  agent  or 
of  any  person  having  the  right  to  control  or  direct  the  injured 
servant,11  or  where  servants  are  engaged  in  different  departments 
of  labor.12  In  Montana,  since  1887,  railroad  companies  have 
been  liable  to  servants  for  the  fault  of  any  superior.13  In 
Ohio,  by  act  of  April  2,  1890,  "  every  person  in  the  employ  of 
such  company  having  charge  or  control  of  employees  in  any 
separate  branch  or  department,  shall  be  held  to  be  the  superior 
and  not  fellow-servant  of  employees  in  any  other  branch  or 
department,  who  have  no  power  to  direct  or  control  in  the 
branch  or  department  in  which  they  are  employed."  14  In  Wis- 
consin, since  1893,  railroad  companies  have  been  liable  to  serv- 
ants for  the  negligence  of  engineers  and  officers  superior  to 
them,  and  also  for  that  of  telegraphers,  signalmen  and  switch- 


10  Texas  Stat.  March  10,  1891,  ch. 
24.  This  statute  held  not  to  apply 
to  the  employees  of  a  receiver  of  a 
railway  corporation  (Campbell  v. 
Cook,  86  Tex.  630;  26  S.  W.  486; 
Turner  v.  Cross,  83  Tex.  218 ;  18  S. 
W.  578 ;  San  Antonio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Reynolds,  [Tex.  Civ.  App.];  30  S. 
W.  846).  It  was  therefore  amended 
in  1892  so  as  to  include  receivers. 
These  statutes  apply  to  street  rail- 
way corporations  (Austin  R.  Co.  v. 
Groethe,  [Tex.  Civ.  App.] ;  31  S.  W. 
197). 

11  Engineer  and  brakeman,  held, 
fellow-servants  :  Evans  v.  Louisvdle, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  70  Miss.  527  ;  12  So.  581. 
To  the  contrary  :  San  Antonio,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Bowles,  Tex.  Civ.  App.  ; 
30  S.  W.  89 ;  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Waldo,  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  ;  26  S. 
W.  1004. 

13  A  fireman  on  an  engine  and  a 
telegraph  operator  are  engaged  in 
different  departments  (Illinois  Cent. 
R.  Co.  v.  Hunter,  70  Miss.  471  ;  12 
So.  482) .  Under  Gen.  Laws  1891,  ch. 
24,  conductors  of  switch  engines  in 
the   same  yard,  engaged  in  moving 


cars,  etc.,  under  a  common  superior, 
but  whose  duties  are  separate  and 
distinct,  are  fellow-servants  (Texas, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Tatman,  10  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  434  ;  31  S.  W.  333). 

13  Under  Comp.  St.  Mont.  1887,  ch. 
25,  §  697.  Under  this  statute,  a  rail- 
road company  is  liable  for  an  injury 
to  a  fireman  on  one  train,  caused  by 
the  negligence  of  a  conductor  on 
another  train  in  leaving  a  switch 
open  (Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Mase, 
63  Fed.  114  ;  11  C.  C.  A.  63  ;  approv- 
ing Ragsdale  v.  Northern  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  42  Fed.  383). 

14  An  engineer  in  charge  of  a  loco- 
motive, who  has  authority  to  direct 
or  control  a  fireman  serving  on  the 
same  locomotive,  is  a  "superior," 
within  the  meaning  of  Act,  April  2, 
1890,  and  therefore  not  fellow-serv- 
ant with  a  brakeman  on  another 
train  (Cincinnati,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Margrat,  51  Ohio  St.  130 ;  37  N.  E. 
11).  A  chief  inspector  of  cars,  hav- 
ing other  inspectors  under  him,  is 
not  a  fellow-servant  of  a  brakeman 
(Columbus,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Erick,  51 
Ohio  St.  146  ;  37  N.  E.  128). 


24  id] 


LIABILITY    OF    MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS. 


446 


men.15  Notwithstanding  decisions  to  the  contrary  in  Geor- 
gia16 and  Texas,17  it  is  the  settled  general  rule  that  these  stat- 
utes apply  to  receivers  or  trustees  operating  railroads  18  belong- 
ing to  corporations.  They  do  not  apply  to  individuals  or 
private  firms  owning  railroads,  but  not  acting  as  common 
carriers.19 


§  24id.  Exemption  from  liability  by  special  contract. —  In 
Great  Britain,  and  in  some  American  courts,  it  is  held  that  a 
servant  can,  by  express  contract,  release  his  master  from  all 
liability  for  the  ordinary  negligence  of  the  master,  and  for 
any  negligence  of  the  master's  agents,  either  at  common  law 
or  under  a  statute.1  But  there  must  be  some  good  considera- 
tion for  such  a  contract,  and  if  made  while  the  servant  is  in 
employment,  without  some  new  consideration,  it  is  void.a 
Some  courts  hold  such  contracts  void,  as  against  public 
policy.3     Several  statutes  expressly  prohibit  such  contracts.4 


15  Stat.  1893,  ch.  220  ;  Sanb.  &  B. 
Ann.  St.  §  1816a.  See  Promer  v. 
Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  90  "Wis.  215  ; 

63  N.  W.  90  ;  Albrecht  v.  Milwaukee, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  87  Wise.  105  ;  58  N.  W. 
72.  Under  the  previous  statute  of 
1889,  a  foreman  of  a  shop  was  not 
a  "superintendent"  (Hartford  v. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  Co.,  91  Wise.  374  ; 

64  N.  W.  1033). 

16  Thurman  v.  Cherokee  R.  Co.,  56 
Ga.  376;  Henderson  v.  Walker,  55 
Id.  481. 

17  See  note  10,  supra. 

18  Sloan  v.  Central  Iowa  R.  Co. ,  62 
Iowa,  728 ;  16  N.  W.  331  ;  Rouse  v. 
Harry,  55  Kans.  589  ;  40  Pac.  1007 ; 
Hornsby  v.  Eddy,  56  Fed.  461  ;  5  C. 
C.  A.  560 ;  12  U.  S.  App.  404  ;  Rouse 
v.  Hornsby,  67  Fed.  219;  14  C.  C.  A. 
377. 

19  Beeson  v.  Busenbark,  44  Kans, 
669  ;  25  Pac,  48. 

1  As  between  master  and  servant, 


the  latter  in  the  contract  of  hiring 
may  assume  all  risks  appertaining 
to  the  service,  save  such  as  arise 
from  criminal  negligence  (Western, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bishop,  50  Ga.  465; 
Western,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Strong,  52 
Id.  461  ;  Fulton  Bag  Mills  v.  Wilson, 
89  Ga.  318;  15  S.  E.  322).  A  mere 
notice  will  not  have  this  effect, 
especially  if  not  brought  clearly  to 
the  servant's  mind  (Georgia  Pac.  R. 
Co.  v.  Dooley,  86  Ga.  294  ;  12  S.  E. 
923). 

2Purdy  v.  Rome,  etc.  R.  Co.,  125 
N.  Y.  209;  26  N.  E.  255. 

3  An  employer  cannot  provide  that 
his  employees  shall  look  after  and 
be  responsible  for  their  own  safety 
(Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Orr,  91 
Ala.  548  ;  8  So.  360  ;  Hissong  v.  Rich- 
mond, etc.  R.  Co.,  91  Ala.  514 ;  8  So. 
776).  An  employee  in  a  factory  can- 
not waive  the  protection  afforded  by 
Laws  1892,  ch.  673,  requiring  machin- 


4  So  in  Texas  (Gen.  Laws  1891,  ch.     statutory  liability  of  railroad   com- 
24,  §  3),  and  Wyoming  (Laws  1890-91 ,     panies  (Code,  §  1307) . 
ch.  2S),  and  in  Iowa,  as  to  the  special 


447  liability  of  masters  to  servants. 

English  Employers'  Liability  Act  of  1880. 


43  &  44  Vict.  c.  42. 
An  Act  to  extend  and  regulate  the  Liability  of  Employers  to  make  Compen- 
sation for  Personal  Injuries  suffered  by  Workmen  in  their  Service. 

[7th  September.  1880.] 
Be  it  enacted  by,  &c,  &c,  as  follows  : — 

1.  Where  after  the  commencement  of  this  act  personal  injury  is  caused 
to  a  workman — 

(1.)  By  reason  of  any  defect  in  the  condition  of  the  ways,  works,  machin- 
ery, or  plant  connected  with  or  used  in  the  business  of  the 
employer;  or 

(2.)  By  reason  of  the  negligence  of  any  person  in  the  service  of  the 
employer  who  has  any  superintendence  entrusted  to  him  whilst  in 
the  exercise  of  such  superintendence  ;  or 

(3.)  By  reason  of  the  negligence  of  any  person  in  the  service  of  the 
employer  to  whose  orders  or  directions  the  workman  at  the  time 
of  the  injury  was  bound  to  conform,  and  did  conform,  where  such 
injury  resulted  from  his  having  so  conformed;  or 

(4.)  By  reason  of  the  act  or  omission  of  any  person  in  the  service  of  the 
employer  done  or  made  in  obedience  to  the  rules  or  by-laws  of 
the  employer,  or  in  obedience  to  particular  instructions  given  by 
any  person  delegated  with  the  authority  of  the  employer  in  that 
behalf;  or 

(5.)  By  reason  of  the  negligence  of  any  person  in  the  service  of  the 
employer  who  has  the  charge  or  control  of  any  signal,  points,  loco- 
motive engine  or  train  upon  a  railway,  the  workman,  or  in  the  case 
the  injury  results  in  death,  the  legal  personal  representatives  of  the 
workman,  and  any  persons  entitled  in  case  of  death,  shall  have 
the  same  right  of  compensation  and  remedies  against  the  employer 
as  if  the  workman  had  not  been  a  workman  of  nor  in  the  service 
of  the  employer,  nor  engaged  in  his  work. 

2.  A  workman  shall  not  be  entitled  under  this  act  to  any  right  of  com- 
pensation or  remedy  against  the  employer  in  any  of  the  following  cases; 
that  is  to  say, 

(1.)  Under  sub-section  one  of  section  one,  unless  the  defect  therein  men- 
tioned arose  from,  or  had  not  been  discovered  or  remedied  owing 
to  the  negligence  of  the  employer,  or  of  some  person  in  the  serv- 

ery  to  be  properly  guarded   (Simp-  Laws  1887,  p.  235,  in  relation  to  the 

eon  v.  N.  Y.  Rubber  Co.,  80  Hun,  care  that  the  mine  owner  must  exer- 

415  ;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  339).     A  parent  cise  with  regard  to  the  protection  of 

cannot  exempt  the  employer  from  his    employees    from    personal    in- 

responsibility  to  a  minor  (Interna-  juries,  cannot  be  dispensed  with  by 

tional,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Hinzie.  82  Tex.  contract  (Chicago,  etc.  Coal  Co.  v. 

623;  18   S.  W.  681  ;  see  Shepard  v.  Peterson.  39  111.  App.  114).    See  also 

N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co.,  18  N.  Y.  Supp.  Louisville,   etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Davis,  91 

665).      The    provisions    of    Illinois  Ala.  487. 


LIABILITY   OF    MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS.  448 

ice  of  the  employer  |  and  entrusted  by  him  with  the  duty  of  see- 
ing that  the  ways,  works,  machinery,  or  plant   were  in    proper 
condition. 
(2.)  Under  sub-section  four  of  section   one,  unless   the   injury   resulted 
from  some  impropriety  or  defect  in  the  rules,  by-laws,  or  instruc- 
tions therein  mentioned  ;  provided  that  where  a  rule  or  by-law  has 
been  approved  or  has  been  accepted  as  a  proper  rule  or  by-law  by 
one  of  her  Majesty's  Principal  Secretaries  of  State,  or  by  the  Board 
of  Trade  or  any  other  department  of  the  Government,  under  or 
by  virtue  of  any  act  of  parliament,    it  shall  not  be  deemed  for 
the  purposes  of  this  act  to  be  an   improper  or  defective  rule  or 
by-law. 
(3.)  In  any  case  where  the  workman  knew  of  the  defect  or  negligence 
which  caused   his  injury,  and  failed  within  a  reasonable  time  to 
give,  or  cause  to  be  given,  information   thereof  to  the  employer  or 
some  person  superior  to  himself  in  the  service  of  the  employer, 
unless  he  was  aware  that  the  employer  of  such  superior  already 
knew  of  the  said  defect  or  negligence. 
3.  The  amount  of  compensation  recoverable  under  this  act  shall  not 
exceed  such  sum  as  may  be  found  to  be  equivalent  to  the  estimated  earn- 
ings, during  the  three  years  preceding  the  injury,  of  a  person  in  the  same 
grade  employed  during  those  years  in  the  like  employment  and  in  the  dis- 
trict in  which  the  workman  is  employed  at  the  time  of  the  injury. 
[Limitation  of  time  for  bringing  suit,  etc.] 


Alabama  —  Code  [1886],  §§  2590,  2591,  2592. 


§  2590.  When  a  personal  injury  is  received  by  a  servant  or  employee 
in  the  service  or  business  of  the  master  or  employer,  the  master  or 
employer  is  liable  to  answer  in  damages  to  such  servant  or  employee,  as  if 
he  were  a  stranger,  and  not  engaged  in  such  service  or  employment,  in  the 
cases  following : 

1.  When  the  injury  is  caused  by  reason  of  any  defect  in  the  condition  of 
the  ways,  works,  machinery,  or  plant  connected  with,  or  used  in  the  busi- 
ness of  the  master  or  employer. 

2.  When  the  injury  is  caused  by  reason  of  the  negligence  of  any 
person  in  the  service  or  employment  of  the  master  or  employer,  who 
has  any  superintendence  intrusted  to  him  whilst  in  the  exercise  of  such 
superintendence. 

3.  When  such  injury  is  caused  by  reason  of  the  negligence  of  any 
person  in  the  service  or  employment  of  the  master  or  employer,  to  whose 
orders  or  directions  the  servant  or  employee,  at  the  time  of  the  injury, 
was  bound  to  conform,  and  did  conform,  if  such  injuries  resulted  from 
his  having  so  conformed. 

4.  When  such  injury  is  caused  by  reason  of  the  act  or  omission  of  any 
person  in  the  service  or  employment  of  the  master  or  employer,  done  or 
made  in  obedience  to  the  rules  and  regulations  or  by-laws  of  the  master 


449  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 

or  employer,  or  in  obedience  to  particular  instructions  given  by  any  person 
delegated  witb  the  authority  of  the  master  or  employer  in  that  behalf. 

5.  When  such  injury  is  caused  by  reason  of  the  negligence  of  any  person 
in  the  service  or  employment  of  the  master  or  employer,  who  has  the 
charge  or  control  of  any  signal,  points,  locomotive,  engine,  switch,  car  or 
train  upon  a  railway,  or  of  any  part  of  the  track  of  a  railway. 

But  the  master  or  employer  is  not  liable  under  this  section,  if  the  servant 
or  employee  knew  of  the  defect  or  negligence  causing  the  injury,  and 
failed  in  a  reasonable  time  to  give  information  thereof  to  the  master  or 
employer,  or  to  some  person  superior  to  himself  engaged  in  the  service 
or  employment  of  the  master  or  employer,  unless  he  was  aware  that  the 
master  or  employer,  or  such  superior  already  knew  of  such  defect  or 
negligence;  nor  is  the  master  or  employer  liable,  under  sub-division  one, 
unless  the  defect  therein  mentioned  arose  from,  or  had  not  been  discovered 
or  remedied  owing  to  the  negligence  of  the  master  or  employer,  or  of  some 
person  in  the  service  of  the  master  or  employer,  and  intrusted  by  him  with 
the  duty  of  seeing  that  the  ways,  works,  machinery,  or  plant,  were  in 
proper  condition. 

§  2591.  If  such  injury  results  in  the  death  of  the  servant  or  employee, 
his  personal  representative  is  entitled  to  maintain  an  action  therefor,  and 
the  damages  recovered  are  not  subject  to  the  payment  of  debts  or  lia- 
bilities, but  shall  be  distributed  according  to  the  statute  of  distributions. 

§  2592.  Damages  recovered  by  the  servant  or  employee,  of  and  from 
the  master  or  employer,  are  not  subject  to  the  payment  of  debts  or  any 
legal  liabilities  incurred  by  him. 


Arkansas  —  Statutes  —  §§6248,  6249,  6250. 
[Act  February  28,  1893.] 

§  6248.  All  persons  engaged  in  the  service  of  any  railway  corporations, 
foreign  or  domestic,  doing  business  in  this  state,  who  are  entrusted  by 
such  corporation  with  the  authority  of  superintendence,  control  or  com- 
mand of  other  persons  in  the  employ  or  service  of  such  corporation,  or  with 
the  authority  to  direct  any  other  employee,  in  the  performance  of  any  duty 
of  such  employee,  or  vice-principals  of  such  corporation,  and  are  not  fellow- 
servants  with  such  employee. 

§  6249.  All  persons  who  are  engaged  in  the  common  service  of  such  rail- 
way corporations,  and  who,  while  ?o  engaged,  are  working  together  to  a 
common  purpose,  of  same  grade,  neither  of  such  persons  being  entrusted 
by  such  corporations  with  any  superintendence  or  control  over  their  fellow- 
employees,  are  fellow-servants  with  each  other  ;  provided,  nothing  herein 
contained  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  make  employees  of  such  corporation 
in  the  service  of  such  corporation  fellow-servants  with  other  employees  of 
such  corporation  engaged  in  any  other  department  or  service  of  such  cor- 
poration. Employees  who  do  not  come  within  the  provisions  of  this  sec- 
tion, shall  not  be  considered  fellow-servants. 

§  6250.  No  contract  made  between  the  employer  and  employee  based 
upon  the  contingency  of  the  injury  or  death  of  the  employee  limiting  the 
[Law  of  Neq.  Vol.  1  —  29.] 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS.  45O 

liability  of  the  employer  under  this  act,  or  fixing  damages  to  be  recovered, 
shall  be  valid  and  binding. 


Colorado  —  Laws  of  1893,  Ch.  yy. 


An  Act  Concerning  Damages  Sustained  by  Agents,  Servants  or  Employees. 

Section  1.  Where,  after  the  passage  of  this  act,  personal  injury  is  caused 
to  an  employee,  who  is  himself  in  the  exercise  of  due  care  and  diligence  at 
the  time  : 

(1.)  By  reason  of  any  defect  in  the  condition  of  the  ways,  works  or 
machinery  connected  with  or  used  in  the  business  of  the  employer,  which 
arose  from  or  had  not  been  discovered  or  remedied  owing  to  the  negli- 
gence of  the  employer,  or  of  any  person  in  the  service  of  the  employer, 
and  entrusted  by  him  with  the  duty  of  seeing  that  the  ways,  works  and 
machinery  were  in  proper  condition  ;  or 

(2.)  By  reason  of  the  negligence  of  any  person  in  the  service  of  the 
employer,  entrusted  with  exercising  superintendence,  whose  sole  or  princi- 
pal duty  is  that  of  superintendence. 

(3. )  By  reason  of  the  negligence  of  any  person  in  the  service  of  the 
employer,  who  has  the  charge  or  control  of  any  switch,  signal,  locomo- 
tive, engine  or  train  upon  a  railroad,  the  employee,  or  in  case  the  injury 
results  in  death,  the  parties  entitled  by  law  to  sue  and  recover  for  such 
damages,  shall  have  the  same  right  of  compensation  and  remedy  against 
the  employer,  as  if  the  employee  had  not  been  an  employee  of  or  in  the 
service  of  the  employer  or  engaged  in  his  or  its  works. 


Florida— Laws  of  1891,  Ch.  4071. 


An  Act  Defining  the  Idabilities  of  Railroad  Companies  in  certain  cases. 
§  3.  If  any  person  is  injured  by  a  railroad  company  by  the  running  of 
the  locomotives,  or  cars,  or  other  machinery  of  such  company,  he  being  at 
the  time  of  such  injury  an  employee  of  the  company,  and  the  damage  was 
caused  by  negligence  of  another  employee,  and  without  fault  or  negligence 
on  the  part  of  the  person  injured,  his  employment  by  the  company  shall 
be  no  bar  to  a  recovery.  No  contract  which  restricts  such  liability  shall  be 
legal  or  binding. 


Georgia  — Code,  §  3036. 


[Act  of  1855,  relating  to  injuries  by  Railroad  Companies.] 

If  the  person  injured  is  himself  an  employee  of  the  company,  and  the 
damage  was  caused  by  another  employee,  and  without  fault  or  negligence 
on  the  part  of  the  person  injured,  his  employment  by  the  company  shall 
be  no  bar  to  the  recoverv. 


451  liability  of  masters  to  servants. 

Indiana — Statute,  1896  —  §  5206^. 


[Laws  of  1893,  Ch.  130.] 

Every  railroad  or  other  corporation,  except  municipal,  operating  in  this 
State,  shall  be  liable  in  damages  for  personal  injury  suffered  by  any 
employee  while  in  its  service,  the  employee  so  injured  being  in  the  exer- 
cise of  due  care  and  diligence,  in  the  following  cases  : 

First.  When  such  injury  is  suffered  by  reason  of  any  defect  in  the  con- 
dition of  ways,  works,  plant,  tools  and  machinery  connected  with  or  in 
use  in  the  business  of  such  corporation,  when  such  defect  was  the  result 
of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  corporation,  or  some  person  entrusted  by 
it  with  the  duty  of  keeping  such  way,  works,  plant,  tools  or  machinery  in 
proper  condition. 

Second.  Where  such  injury  resulted  from  the  negligence  of  any  person 
in  the  service  of  such  corporation  to  whose  order  or  direction  the  injured 
employee  at  the  time  of  the  injury  was  bound  to  conform,  and  did 
conform. 

Third.  Where  such  injury  resulted  from  the  act  or  omission  of  any 
person  done  or  made  in  obedience  to  any  rule,  regulation  or  by-law  of  such 
corporation,  or  in  obedience  to  the  particular  instructions  given  by  any 
person  delegated  with  the  authority  of  the  corporation  in  that  behalf. 

Fourth.  Where  such  injury  was  caused  by  the  negligence  of  any  person 
in  the  service  of  such  corporation  who  has  charge  of  any  signal,  telegraph 
office,  switch-yard,  shop,  round-house,  locomotive  engine  or  train  upon  a 
railway,  or  where  such  injury  was  caused  by  the  negligence  of  any  person, 
co-employee,  or  fellow-servant  engaged  in  the  same  common  service  in 
any  of  the  several  departments  of  the  service  of  any  such  corporation, 
the  said  person,  co- employee,  or  fellow-servant,  at  the  time  acting  in 
the  place  and  performing  the  duty  of  the  corporation  in  that  behalf, 
and  the  person  so  injured,  obeying  or  conforming  to  the  order  of  some 
superior  at  the  time  of  such  injury,  having  authority  to  direct  ;  but 
nothing  herein  shall  be  construed  to  abridge  the  liability  of  the  corpora- 
tion under  existing  laws. 


Iowa  —  Code  —  §  1307. 


Every  corporation  operating  a  railway  shall  be  liable  for  all  damages 
sustained  by  any  person,  including  employes  of  such  corporation,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  neglect  of  agents,  or  by  any  mismanagement  of  the 
engineers  or  other  employees  of  the  corporation,  and  in  consequence  of 
the  wUful  wrongs,  whether  of  commission  or  omission  of  such  agents, 
engineers  or  other  employees  when  such  wrongs  are  in  any  manner  con- 
nected with  the  use  and  operation  of  any  railway,  on  or  about  which  they 
shall  be  employed,  and  no  contract  which  restricts  such  liability  shall  be 
legal  or  binding. 


liability  of  masters  to  servants.  452 

Kansas — Laws  of  1874,  Ch.  93. 


§  1.  Every  railroad  company  organized  or  doing  business  in  this  State 
shall  be  liable  for  all  damages  done  to  any  employee  of  such  company  in 
consequence  of  any  negligence  of  its  agents  or  by  any  mismanagement  of 
its  engineers  or  other  employees  to  any  person  sustaining  such  damage. 


Massachusetts  —  Acts,  1894,  Ch.  499. 


An  Act  Relating  to  the  Liability  of  Employers  to  make  compensation  for 
Personal  Injuries  Suffered  by  Employees  in  their  Service. 
Section  1.  Where,  after  the  passage  of  this  act,  personal  injury  is  caused 
to  an  employee,  who  is  himself  in  the  exercise  of  due  care  and  diligence  at 
the  time  :  (1)  By  reason  of  any  defect  in  the  condition  of  the  ways,  works 
or  machinery  connected  with  or  used  in  the  business  of  the  employer, 
which  arose  from,  or  had  not  been  discovered  or  remedied  owing  to  the 
negligence  of  the  employer,  or  of  any  person  in  the  service  of  the  employer, 
and  entrusted  by  him  with  the  duty  of  seeing  that  the  ways,  works  or 
machinery  were  in  proper  condition  ;  or  (2),  By  reason  of  the  negligence  of 
any  person  in  the  service  of  the  employer,  entrusted  with  and  exercising 
superintendence,  whose  sole  or  principal  duty  is  that  of  superintendence, 
or,  in  the  absence  of  such  superintendent,  of  any  person  acting  as  super- 
intendent with  the  authority  or  consent  of  such  employer ;  or  (3) ,  By 
reason  of  the  negligence  of  any  person  in  the  service  of  the  employer  who 
has  the  charge  or  control  of  any  signal,  switch,  locomotive  engine  or  train 
upon  a  railroad,  the  employee,  or  in  case  the  injury  results  in  death,  the 
legal  representatives  of  such  employee,  shall  have  the  same  right  of  com- 
pensation and  remedies  against  the  employer  as  if  the  employee  had  not 
been  an  employee  of,  nor  in  the  service  of  the  employer,  nor  engaged  in 
its  work. 


Mississippi  —  Constitution  (1890),  §  193. 


Every  employee  of  any  railroad  corporation  shall  have  the  same  right 
and  remedies  for  any  injury  suffered  by  him  from  the  act  or  omission  of 
said  corporation  or  its  employees,  as  are  allowed  by  law  to  other  persons 
not  employees,  where  the  injury  results  from  the  negligence  of  a  superior 
agent  or  officer,  or  of  a  person  having  the  right  to  control  or  direct  the 
services  of  the  party  injured,  and  also  where  the  injury  results  from  the 
negligence  of  a  fellow-servant  engaged  in  another  department  of  labor 
from  that  of  the  party  injured,  or  of  a  fellow-servant  on  another  train  of 
cars,  or  one  engaged  about  a  different  piece  of  work.  Knowledge  by  any 
employee  injured,  of  the  defective  or  unsafe  character  or  condition  of  any 
machinery,  ways,  or  appliances,  shall  be  no  defense  to  an  action  for 
injury  caused  thereby,  except  as  to  conductors  or  engineers  in  charge  of 


453  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO   SERVANTS. 

dangerous  or  unsafe  cars,  or  engines  voluntarily  operated  by  them.  *  *  * 
Any  contract  or  agreement,  express  or  implied,  made  by  any  employee  to 
waive  the  benefit  of  this  section,  shall  be  null  and  void  ;  and  this  section 
shall  not  be  construed  to  deprive  any  employee  of  a  corporation,  or  his 
legal  or  personal  representative,  of  any  right  or  remedy  that  he  now  has 
by  the  law  of  the  land.  The  legislature  may  extend  the  remedies  herein 
provided  for  to  any  other  class  of  employees. 

§  3559  of  the  Annotated  Code  of  Mississippi  is  substantially  identical  with 
§  193  of  the  Constitution  above  quoted. 


Montana  —  Constitution  [1889],  Art.  XV.,  Sec  16. 


It  shall  be  unlawful  for  any  person,  company  or  corporation  to  require 
of  its  servants  or  employees,  as  a  condition  of  their  employment  or  other- 
wise, any  contract  or  agreement,  whereby  such  person,  company  or  cor- 
poration, shall  be  released  or  discharged  from  liability  or  responsibility  on 
account  of  personal  injuries  received  by  such  servants  or  employees  while 
in  the  service  of  such  person,  company  or  corporation,  by  reason  of  the 
negligence  of  such  person,  company  or  corporation,  or  the  agents  or  em- 
ployees thereof;  and  such  contracts  shall  be  absolutely  null  and  void. 

Section  2242  of  the  Civil  Code  of  Montana  is  substantially  identical  with 
section  16  of  article  15  of  the  Constitution  above  quoted. 


New  Mexico — Laws  of  1893,  Chap.  28. 


An  Act  for  the  Protection  and  Relief  of  Railroad  Employees,  and  for 
Other  Purposes. 

Sec.  1 .  Every  corporation  operating  a  railway  in  this  territory  shall  be  lia- 
ble in  a  sum  sufficient  to  compensate  such  employee  for  all  damages  sus- 
tained by  any  employee  of  such  corporation,  the  person  injured  or  damaged 
being  without  fault  on  his  or  her  part,  occurring  or  sustained  in  conse- 
quence of  any  mismanagement,  carelessness,  neglect,  default  or  wrongful 
act  of  any  agent  or  employee  of  such  corporation,  while  in  the  exercise  of 
their  several  duties,  when  such  mismanagement,  carelessness,  neglect,  de- 
fault or  wrongful  act  of  such  employee  or  agent,  could  have  been  avoided 
by  such  corporation  through  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care  or  diligence  in 
the  selection  of  competent  employees  or  agents,  or  by  not  overworking 
said  employees  or  requiring  or  allowing  them  to  work  an  unusual  or  un- 
reasonable number  of  hours;  and  any  contract  restricting  such  liability, 
shall  be  deemed  to  be  contrary  to  the  public  policy  of  this  territory,  and 
therefore  void. 


LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS    TO    SERVANTS.  454 

Ohio  —  Laws  of  1890 — P.  149. 


An  Act  for  the  Protection  and  Relief  of  Railroad  Employees,  etc. 
Sec.  3.  That  in  all  actions  against  a  railroad  company  for  personal  injury 
to,  or  death  resulting  from  personal  injury  of  any  person  while  in  the 
employ  of  such  company,  arising  from  the  negligence  of  such  company  or 
any  of  its  officers  or  employees,  it  shall  he  held,  in  addition  to  the  liability 
now  existing  by  law,  that  every  person  in  the  employ  of  such  company, 
actually  having  power  or  authority  to  direct  or  control  any  other  employee 
of  such  company,  is  not  the  fellow-servant,  but  superior  of  such  other 
employee;  also,  that  every  person  in  the  employ  of  such  company  having 
charge  or  control  of  employees  in  any  separate  bi-anch  or  department,  shall 
be  held  to  be  the  superior  and  not  fellow-servant  of  employees  in  any  other 
branch  or  department  who  have  no  power  to  direct  or  control  in  the  branch 
or  department  in  which  they  are  employed. 


Utah  — Laws  of  1896,  Chap.  24. 


An  Act  to  Define  Wlio  are  and  Wlio  are  not  Fellow-servants. 

Sec  1.  That  all  persons  engaged  in  the  service  of  any  person,  firm  or 
corporation,  foreign  or  domestic,  doing  business  in  this  State,  who  are  en- 
trusted by  such  person,  firm  or  corporation  as  employer  with  the  authority 
of  superintendence,  control  or  command  of  other  persons  in  the  employ  or 
service  of  such  employer,  or  with  the  authority  to  direct  any  other  em- 
ployee in  the  performance  of  any  duties  of  such  employee  are  vice  princi- 
pals of  such  employer  and  are  not  fellow-servants. 

§  2.  That  all  persons  who  are  engaged  in  the  service  of  such  employer, 
and  who,  while  so  engaged,  are  working  together  at  the  same  time  and 
place  to  a  common  purpose,  of  the  same  grade  of  service,  neither  of  such 
persons  being  entrusted  by  such  employer  with  any  superintendence  or 
control  over  his  fellow-employees,  are  fellow-servants  with  each  other ; 
Provided,  that  nothing  herein  contained  shall  be  so  construed  as  to  make 
employees  of  such  employer  in  the  service  of  such  employer  fellow -ser- 
vants with  other  employees  engaged  in  any  other  department  of  service 
of  such  employer.  Employees  who  do  not  come  within  the  provisions  of 
this  section,  shall  not  be  considered  fellow-servants. 


Wisconsin  —  Laws  of  1893  — Chap.  220. 


An  Act  to  Define  the  Liability  of  Railroad  Companies  in  Relation  to  Dam- 
ages Sustained  by  Their  Employees. 
Sec.  1.  Every  railroad  or  railway   company  operating  any  railroad  or 
railway,  the  line  of  which  shall  be  in  whole  or  in  part  within  this  state, 
shall  be  liable  for  all  damages  sustained  within  this  state  by  any  employee 


455  LIABILITY   OF   MASTERS   TO    SERVANTS. 

of  such  company,  without  contributory  negligence  on  his  part;  first,  when 
such  injury  is  caused  by  any  defect  in  any  locomotive,  engine,  car,  rail, 
track,  machinery  or  appliance  required  by  said  company  to  be  used  by  its 
employees  in  and  about  the  business  of  such  employment,  when  such  de- 
fect could  have  been  discovered  by  such  company  by  reasonable  and  proper 
care,  tests  or  inspection,  and  proof  of  such  defect  shall  be  presumptive 
evidence  of  knowledge  thereof  on  the  part  of  such  company;  second,  or 
while  any  such  employee  is  so  engaged  in  operating,  running,  riding  upon 
or  switching,  passenger  or  freight  or  other  trains,  engines  or  cars,  and 
while  engaged  in  the  performance  of  his  duty  as  such  employee,  and  which 
such  injury  shall  have  been  caused  by  the  carelessness  or  negligence  of  any 
other  employee,  officer  or  agent  of  such  company  in  the  discharge  of,  or 
for  failure  to  discharge  his  duties  as  such. 

§  4.  No  contract,  receipt,  rule  or  regulation  between  any  employee  and  a 
railroad  company  shall  exempt  such  corporation  from  the  full  liability 
imposed  by  this  act. 


CHAPTER    XI. 


LIABILITY  OF  SERVANTS. 


§  242.  Servant's  liability  to  master. 

243.  Servant  not   liable    to    third 

person  for  nonfeasance. 

244.  Servant  liable  to  third  person 

for  misfeasance. 

245.  Servant's  liability   to  fellow- 

servants. 


g  246.  Liability  of  shipmasters. 

247.  Servant  not  liable  for  negli- 

gence of  a  fellow-servant. 

248.  Joint  liability  of  master  and 

servant. 


§  242.  Servant's  liability  to  master. — A  servant  is  liable 
to  his  master  for  any  damage,  of  which  the  servant's  want  of 
ordinary  care  and  diligence  in  his  work,  or  want  of  such  skill 
as  he  had  induced  the  master  to  believe  that  he  possessed,  is 
the  proximate  cause.1  And  if  the  master  is  obliged  to  pay 
damages  to  a  stranger  for  negligence  of  the  servant,  in  which 
the  master  had  no  personal  share,  he  is  entitled  to  recover  over 
against  the  servant, 

§  243.  Servant  not  liable  to  third  person  for  nonfeasance. — 

No  agent  of  a  private  individual  or  corporation  is  ever  liable 
to  third  persons  for  his  failure  to  perform  obligations  of  his 
principal,  and  which  the  principal  has  employed  him  to  per- 
form, but  which  he  has  not  contracted  with  them  to  perform 
in  their  favor.1     In   other  words,   he  is    not  liable  to  them  for 


1  Willard  v.  Pinard,  44  Vt.  34 ; 
Mobile,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Clanton,  59 
Ala.  392  [railroad  company  could 
recover  from  employee  for  damage 
to  its  property  resulting  from  his 
negligence].  The  fact  that  a  train 
was  imperfectly  equipped  did  not 
relieve  the  conductor  from  the  exer- 
cise of  due  care  in  its  management 
Id.)  The  damage  suffered  by  the 
master  need  not  be  directly  or  im- 


mediately caused  by  the  servant's 
act ;  it  is  sufficient  that  it  is  fairly 
attributable  to  an  act  done  or  omitted 
by  the  latter,  as  a  natural  or  a  just 
consequence  (Gilson  v.  Collins,  66 
111.  136  [tug-boat  damaged  by  fire 
while  in  charge  of  an  engineer]). 

1  Shipmasters  and  factors  are  no 
exception,  because  they  personally 
contract  with  third  persons. 


[456] 


457 


LIABILITY   OF   SERVANTS. 


[§243 


his  mere  nonfeasance.2  He  is,  consequently,  not  responsible  to 
them  for  any  negligence  in  the  performance  of  duties  devolv- 
ing upon  him  purely  from  his  agency,  since  he  cannot,  as 
agent,  be  subject  to  any  obligations  toward  third  persons, 
other  than  those  of  his  principal.  And  these  duties  are  not 
imposed  upon  him  by  law,  nor  has  he  agreed  with  any  one, 
except  his  principal,  that  he  will  perform  them.  In  failing  to 
do  so,  he  wrongs  no  one  except  his  principal,  who  alone, 
therefore,  can  hold  him  responsible  for  his  negligence.3  For 
the  failure  of  the  agent  to  perform  any  duty  which  the  prin- 
cipal owes  to  a  third  person,  the  remedy  of  such  person  is 
only  against  the  principal,  even  though  the  fault,  as  a  matter 
of  fact,  is  entirely  with  the  agent.  Thus,  where  a  banker  is 
employed  to  collect  a  note,  which  he  puts  into  the  hands  of 
another  banker,  through  whose  negligence  the  debt  is  lost, 
the  creditor  cannot  sue  the  latter  banker,  though  he  was  the 
one  actually  in  fault.4  So  the  transfer  agent  of  a  corporation 
is  not  liable  to  a  purchaser  of  stock  for  his  improper  refusal  to 
transfer  such  stock  upon  the  books.5     So  a  sheriff's  deputy  is 


J  The  question  of  the  liability  of 
the  negligent  servant  depends  upon 
whether  his  act  was  one  of  misfeas- 
ance or  nonfeasance.  For  the  for- 
mer the  former  the  servant  is,  in 
general,  liable ;  for  the  latter,  not. 
The  servant,  as  between  himself  and 
his  master,  is  bound  to  serve  him 
with  fidelity  and  to  perform  the  du- 
ties committed  to  him.  An  omission 
to  perform  them  may  subject  third 
persons  to  harm,  and  the  master  to 
damages.  But  the  breach  of  the 
contract  of  service  is  a  matter  be- 
tween the  master  and  servant  alone, 
and  the  nonfeasance  of  the  servant 
causing  injury  to  third  persons  is 
not,  in  general,  at  least,  a  ground 
for  a  civil  action  against  the  servant 
in  their  favor  (Murray  v.  Usher,  117 
N.  Y.,542;  23  N.  E.  564).  The  agents 
of  a  corporation  charged  with  the 
duty  of  erecting  on  its  grounds 
structures  for  the  accommodation  of 
the  public,  negligently  permitted  a 
defective    structure    to   be  erected. 


Held  guilty  merely  of  nonfeasance, 
and  therefore  were  not  liable  to  per- 
sons injured  by  reason  of  such  de- 
fects (Van  Antwerp  v.  Linton,  89 
Hun,  417;  35  N.  Y.  Supp.  318). 
S.  p.  ,  Jessup  v.  Sloneker,  142  Pa.  St. 
527  ;  21  Atl.  988. 

3  Montgomery  Bank  v.  Albany 
Bank,  7  N.  Y.  459;  Colvin  v.  Hol- 
brook,  2  Id.  126  :  Denny  v.  Manhat- 
tan Co.,  2  Denio,  115 ;  afn'd,  5 
Id.  639  ;  Bristol,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Col- 
lins, 7  H.  L.  Cas.  194 ;  5  Hurlst.  & 
N.  [Amer.  ed.]  969;  Coxon  v.  Gt- 
Western  R.  Co.,  5  Hurlst.  &  N.  274  ; 
Mytton  v.  Midland  R.  Co.,  4  Id.  615  ; 
see  Anderson  v.  Brownlee,  1  S.  474  ; 
Hay,  28  ;  Blackstock  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie 
R.  Co.,  20  N.  Y.  48,  50  ;  Henshaw  v. 
Noble,  7  Ohio  St.  226;  Osborne  v. 
Morgan,  137  Mass.  1. 

4  Montgomery  Bank  v.  Albany 
Bank,  7  N.  Y.  459;  see  Commercial 
Bank  v.  Union  Bank,  11  Id.  203. 

5  Denny  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  2 
Denio,  115  ;  affi'd,  5  Id.  639. 


§  244]  LIABILITY   OF   SERVANTS.  458 

not  liable  to  a  judgment-creditor  for  money  collected  by  him 
under  an  execution  in  favor  of  the  creditor.6  So  the  agent  of 
an  executor  is  not  liable  to  the  legatees  for  his  mismanage- 
ment of  the  estate.7  So  the  agent  of  a  landlord  is  not  liable  to 
the  tenant  for  his  neglect  to  make  repairs,  which  the  landlord 
was  bound  to  make  and  had  deputed  to  the  agent.8  The 
directors  or  other  officers  of  a  corporation  cannot  be  held 
liable  to  a  stranger  for  any  omission  on  the  part  of  the  cor- 
poration to  perform  a  duty  to  him,  even  though  such  omis- 
sion is  the  direct  result  of  the  vote  of  such  directors,  who  have 
exclusive  control  of  the  corporate  business.9 

§  244.  Servant  liable  to  third  person  for  misfeasance. — 

But  every  one,  whether  he  is  principal  or  agent,  is  responsible 
directly  to  persons  injured  by  his  own  negligence  in  fulfilling 
obligations  resting  upon  him  in  his  individual  character. 
These  obligations  are  those  which  the  law  imposes  upon 
all  persons,  independent  of  contract.  No  man  increases  or 
diminishes  his  obligations  to  strangers  by  becoming  an  agent ; 
but  if,  in  the  course  of  his  agency,  he  comes  in  contact  with 
the  person  or  property  of  a  stranger,  he  is  liable  for  any  injury 
he  may  do  to  either,  by  his  negligence  in  the  performance  of 
duties  imposed  by  law  upon  him,  in  common  with  all  other 
men.1    Thus,  a  servant  is  personally  liable  to  a  third  person  for 

6  Colvin  v.  Holbrook,  2  N.  Y.  126  ;  without  passing  on    this  (sub  nom. 

Tuttle  v.  Love,  7  Johns.  470.  Rogers  v.  N.  Y.  &  Texas  Land  Co.), 

1  Phinney  v.    Phinney,    17    How.  134  N.  Y.  197  ;  32  N.  E.  27. 

Pr.  197.  '  Where  the    agent's    act,    which 

8  Dean  v.  Brock,  11  Ind.  App.  507;  causes  the  injury,  is  a  misfeasance, 
38  N.  E.  829.  But  where  premises  as  distinguished  from  a  mere  omis- 
owned  by  a  non-resident  are  placed  sion  of  duty,  the  agent  is  liable,  as 
in  the  hands  of  a  resident  real  estate  well  as  the  principal  (Harriman  v. 
agent,  with  authority  to  make  re-  Stowe,  57  Mo.  93  [carpenter,  em- 
pairs,  lease,  etc.,  and  the  agent  per-  ployed  to  build  a  trapdoor,  did  the 
mits  such  premises  to  become  danger-  work  so  negligently  that  another 
ous  for  want  of  repairs,  he  will  be  person  fell  down  the  hatchway]; 
liable  to  any  person  who  is  injured  Blue  v.  Briggs,  12  Ind.  App.  105 ; 
by  such  dangerous  condition  of  the  39  N.  E.  885 ).  An  agent  is  liable  for 
premises  (Baird  v.  Shipman,  33  111.  misfeasance  to  the  owner  of  the  prop- 
App.  503 ;  affi'd,  132  111.  16;  23  N.  E.  erty  injured,  whether  he  acted  by 
384,.  the  direction  of  his  principal  or  not 

9  Rogers  v.  Phelps,  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  (Richardson  v.  Kimball,  28  Me.  463). 
886 ;    reversed    on    other    grounds,  If    one    commits    an  unlawful    act 


459 


LIABILITY    OF    SERVANTS. 


[§244 


negligently  driving  the  master's  horse  or  carriage  over  him, 
even  though  the  master  also  be  liable.2  So  the  driver  of  a 
railroad  engine,  or  the  conductor  of  a  train,  is  personally 
responsible  for  cattle  killed  on  the  track  through  his  negli- 
gence,3 or  for  bodily  injuries  suffered  by  a  passenger  from  the 
same  cause;4  and  a  servant  in  a  stone  quarry,  adjacent  to  a 
highway,  negligently  setting  off  a  blast,  is  liable  to  a  traveler 


under  the  direction  of  another,  that 
fact  will  not  shield  him  from  respon- 
sibility, but  both  are  equally  liable 
to  the  injured  party  (Johnson  v.  Bar- 
ber, 5  Gilm.  425).  An  agent,  com- 
mitting a  positive  and  obvious 
wrong,  cannot  relieve  himself  from 
liability  by  showing  that  he  was  act- 
ing under  the  orders  of  another  (see 
Bennett  v.  Ives,  30  Conn.  329; 
Mitchell  v.  Harmony,  13  How. 
[TJ.  S.]  115).  Defendants,  who  had 
been  repairing  a  house,  left  a  box  on 
the  premises,  in  a  pathway.  Held, 
that  they  were  responsible  to  a  ten- 
ant living  in  the  house,  who,  in  go- 
ing along  the  pathway,  after  dark, 
fell  over  the  box,  and  was  injured 
(Donnelly  v.  Hufschmidt,  79  Cal.  74; 
21  Pac.  546).  See  a  dictum,  in  affir- 
mation of  the  doctrine  of  the  text,  in 
Kirby  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.  (76  Pa.  St. 
506),  where  Agnew,  C.  J.,  says  that 
the  law  leaves  "each  one  to  assert 
his  proper  remedy  against  the  per- 
son whose  act  or  negligence  does 
him  an  injury."  In  applying  this 
principle,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind 
that  a  rule  of  law  is  merged  in  a 
contract,  express  or  implied,  cover- 
ing the  same  point.  Therefore,  one 
who  commits  his  property  to  the 
care  of  another,  for  any  purpose, 
enters  into  an  applied  contract  with 
the  latter  for  the  exercise  of  care, 
which  supersedes  the  requirement  of 
the  law.  And  the  agents  of  the  per- 
son thus  intrusted,  in  dealing  with 
the  property  as  such  agents,  and 
within  the  scope  of  their  agency,  are 


not  subject  to  the  general  rule  of  law 
requiring  care,  for  that  has  been 
merged  in  the  contract  ;  nor  are  they 
subject  to  the  contract,  for  they  were 
not  parties  to  it.  In  an  action  of 
trover,  it  is  no  defense  that  the  de- 
fendant acted  as  the  agent  or  ser- 
vant of  another,  who  was  himself 
a  wrong- doer  (McPheters  v.  Page,  83 
Me.  234 ;  22  Atl.  101). 

2  Phelps  v.  Wait,  30  N.  Y.  7  8; 
Montfort  v.  Hughes,  3  E.  D.  Smith, 
591  :  Wright  v.  AYilcox,  19  Wend. 
343  ;  Hewett  v.  Swift,  3  Allen,  420  ; 
but  compare  Parsons  v.  Winchell,  5 
Cush.  592.  Where  the  owner  of  a 
scow  employed  a  tug  to  tow  the 
scow  across  a  river,  the  tug-owner 
was  held  liable  to  a  third  person, 
having  freight  on  the  scow,  for  neg- 
ligence, injuring  the  freight  (Baird 
v.  Daly.  57  N.  Y.  237). 

3  Suydam  v.  Moore,  8  Barb.  358. 

4  Where  an  engineer  is  employed 
to  erect  a  steam  boiler  and  other 
apparatus,  and,  in  consequence  of 
the  explosion  of  the  boiler,  while 
under  the  personal  supervision  of  the 
engineer,  although,  from  the  insuffi- 
ciency of  the  materials  of  which  it 
was  composed,  the  plaintiff  is  in- 
jured, the  engineer  is  answerable. 
But  it  seems  that  if  the  jury  had 
negatived  the  fact  of  the  defend- 
ant's management  of  the  apparatus, 
he  would  not  have  been  liable  (Witte 
v.  Hague,  2  Dowl.  &  R.  33).  Cited 
in  Necker  v.  Harvey,  49  Mich.  517 
[fall  of  elevator,  while  in  custody  of 
manufacturer's  servant]. 


§245] 


LIABILITY    OF   SERVANTS. 


460 


injured  thereby.5  So  a  servant  is  liable  for  his  negligence  in 
so  constructing  a  building  as  to  cause  a  wall  to  fall  upon  a 
stranger.6 

§  245.  Servant's  liability  to  fellow-servants. — The  authori- 
ties are  now  unanimous  in  favor  of  holding  a  servant  liable  to 
his  fellow-servants  for  injuries  suffered  by  them  through  his 
personal  negligence  in  the  performance  of  those  duties  which 
each  man  owes  to  his  fellow-men.1  Servants  do  not  neces- 
sarily or  commonly  make  any  bargain  with  each  other,  express 
or  implied,  for  exemption  from  such  liability  ;  and,  if  it  is  true 
that  they  consider  the  risk  in  fixing  their  wages,  the  implied 
contract  thus  entered  into  is  not  made  for  the  benefit  of  the 
other  servants,  nor  have  the  latter  any  interest  in  it.  The  test 
of  liability  is  the  same  as  in  the  case  of  strangers.     A  servant 

corporation,  negligently  caused  a 
tackle  block  and  chains  to  be  placed 
upon  an  iron  rail  suspended  from  the 
ceiling,  and  suffered  them  to  remain 
in   such   a  condition   that  they  fell 


6  Wright  v.  Compton,  53  Ind.  337. 
6  Mayer  v.  Hutchinson  B'd'g  Co., 
104  Ala.  611  ;  16  So.  620. 

1  Woodhead  v.  Gartness  Mineral 
Co.,  4  Rettie,  469  ;  Griffiths  v.  Wol- 
fram, 22  Minn.  185  [servants  negli- 
gently constructing  a  center  piece 
for  the  support  of  a  brick  arch,  liable 
to  a  bricklayer,  being  a  fellow- 
servant],  Gilfillan,  J.,  says  :  "  This 
liability  does  not  rest  upon  any  duty 
imposed  by  privity  of  contract,  for  in 
such  cases  there  may  not  be,  and 
frequently  is  not,  any  such  privity. 
But  the  duty  of  each  to  do  the  work 
with  proper  care  grew  out  of  the  re- 
lation which  existed  between  them  as 
persons  engaged  in  the  same  work." 
In  former  editions  of  this  work,  we 
referred  to  the  fact  that  the  contrary 
doctrine  was  established  in  Massa- 
chusetts, in  Albro  v.  Jaquith,  4  Gray, 
99,  which  decision  we  then  em- 
phatically condemned.  It  has  since 
been  expressly  overruled  by  the  same 
court  (differently  constituted)  in  Os- 
borne v.  Morgan,  130  Mass,  102.  In 
that  case,  while  plaintiff  was  at 
work,  in  the  establishment  of  a 
manufacturing  corporation,  as  a  car- 
penter, the  defendants,  the  superin- 
tendent,  and  other  servants  of  the 


upon  the  plaintiff.  It  was  held  that 
the  action  was  maintainable.  Gray, 
C.  J.,  says  :  "Upon  consideration, we 
are  all  of  the  opinion  that  [Albro  v. 
Jaquith]  is  supported  by  no  satisfac- 
tory reasons,  and  must  be  over- 
ruled. .  .  .  The  plaintiff's  action 
is  not  founded  on  any  contract,  but 
is  an  action  of  tort  for  injuries 
which,  according  to  the  common  ex- 
perience of  mankind,  were  a  natural 
consequence  of  the  defendant's  neg- 
ligence. .  .  .  Even  the  master  is 
not  exempt  from  liability  to  his  ser- 
vants for  his  own  negligence  ;  and 
the  servants  make  no  contract  with, 
and  receive  no  compensation  from, 
each  other."  Fellow-servants  mutu- 
ally owe  to  each  other  the  duty  of 
exercising  ordinary  care  in  the  per- 
formance of  their  service,  and  one 
who  fails  in  that  respect  is  liable  at 
common  law  for  any  personal  injury 
resulting  therefrom  to  his  fellow- 
servant  (Hare  v.  Mclntire,  82  Me. 
240  ;  19  Atl.  453). 


461 


LIABILITY   OF   SERVANTS. 


[§246 


is  liable  to  his  fellows  for  misfeasance,2  but  not  for  mere  non- 
feasance of  a  duty  belonging  to  the  master,  though  delegated 
to  him.3 

§  246.  Liability  of  shipmasters. — By  a  rule  peculiar  to  the 
mercantile  law,  the  master  of  a  private  vessel,  no  matter  of 
what  kind,1  is  responsible  to  third  persons  for  his  own  negli- 
gence to  the  fullest  extent,2  and  for  the  negligence  of  all 
employed  on  board,  to  the  same  extent  as  if  he  were  the  ulti- 
mate principal.3  His  liability  in  this  last  respect  is  defined  in 
the  chapter  on  the  liability  of  masters  for  the  acts  of  their 
servants.  But  while  the  master  is  on  shore,  and  the  vessel  is 
under  the  charge  of  a  licensed  pilot,  the  latter  is  master  for 
the  time  being,  and  the  former  is  not  liable  for  the  pilot's 
negligence.4 


5  Thus  an  agent,  to  whom  the  duty 
of  providing  safe  machinery  is  dele- 
gated, is  liable  to  a  fellow-servant 
for  directing  him  to  use  defective 
machinery,  which  he  knew  to  be 
dangerous  (Greenberg  v.  Whitcomb 
Lumber  Co.,  90  Wise.  225;  63  N.  W. 
93).  Where  the  section  crew  of  a 
railroad  company  side  track  a  hand 
car  with  which  they  are  working  to 
clear  the  main  track  for  an  approach- 
ing train,  and  the  foreman,  who  has 
unlocked  the  switch,  negligently 
fails  to  close  it,  and  tbe  train  enters 
on  the  side  track,  and  kills  a  section 
hand,  the  foreman  is  personally  liable 
in  damages  for  his  death  (Daves  v. 
Southern  Pac.  Co.,  98  Cal.  19;  32  Pac. 
708). 

3  A  servant  in  charge  of  work, 
who  neglects  to  take  proper  precau- 
tions for  the  safety  of  the  workmen, 
as  by  failing  to  direct  them  not  to 
work,  is  not  liable  to  a  workman  in- 
jured thereby,  as  a  servant  is  not  lia- 
ble for  injuries  caused  by  nonfeas- 
ance, but  only  for  such  as  are  caused 
by  misfeasance  (Burns  v.  Pethcal,  75 
Hun.  437:  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  499;  see, 
also,  Steinhauser  v.    Spraul,  114  Mo. 


551  ;  127  Mo.  541;  28  S.  W.  620  [wife 
not  liable  to  servant]). 

1  Not  only  does  this  rule  apply  to 
master  of  a  merchant  ship,  but  also 
to  the  master  of  a  steamer  carrying 
passengers  on  inland  water  (Denison 
v.  Seymour,  9  Wend.  9).  The  rela- 
tion of  master  and  servant  does  not 
subsist  between  the  captain  of  a  ship 
of  war  and  his  officers  or  seamen 
(Nicholson  v.  Mounsey,  15  East,  384); 
nor  between  the  master  or  owner  of 
a  merchant  vessel  and  a  pilot  received 
on  board  under  a  statute  giving  the 
former  no  choice  to  accept  or  refuse, 
nor  control  over  his  services  (see 
Bowcher  v.  Noidstrom,  1  Taunt.  568). 

2  Denison  v.  Seymour,  9  Wend.  9; 
see  Foot  v.  Wiswall,  14  Johns.  304  ; 
Snell  v.  Rich,  1  Id.  305  ;  Rosiere  v. 
Sawkins,  12  Mod.  434. 

3  Id.  The  text  is  cited  and  applied 
in  Kennedy  v.  Ryall  (67  N.  Y.  379), 
where  the  master  of  a  steamship 
was  held  liable  for  the  negligence  of 
the  chief  steward  in  leaving  poison 
exposed  in  a  pan,  used  in  fumigating 
the  vessel  under  direction  of  the 
health  officer  while  in  port,  whereby 
plaintiff's  intestate  was  killed. 

4  Snell  v.  Rich,  1  Johns.  305. 


§  248] 


LIABILITY   OF   SERVANTS. 


462 


§  247.  Servant  not  liable  for  negligence  of  a  fellow-serv- 
ant.— Except  in  the  peculiar  case  mentioned  in  the  last  sec- 
tion, a  servant  is  never  responsible  to  a  third  person  for  the 
negligence  or  other  fault  of  a  fellow-servant,  even  though  the 
latter  is  under  the  control  and  direction  of  the  former,  as 
the  sole  representative  of  the  master,  having  the  power  to 
select  and  dismiss  his  subordinate  fellow-servants.1  It  is  only 
for  his  own  personal  negligence  that  a  servant  is  liable. 

§  248.  Joint  liability  of  master  and  servant. — Wherever  a 
master  can  be  held  responsible  for  the  tortious  negligence  of 
his  servant,  the  two  are  generally  held  jointly  as  well  as  sever- 
ally liable  ; 1  and  if  a  servant  employs  a  sub-agent,  under  such 
circumstances  that  both  the  original  master  and  the  intermedi- 
ate employer  are  liable  for  the  negligence  of  the  sub-agent, 
they  are  all  jointly  and  severally  liable.2  A  different  rule  pre- 
vails in  Massachusetts,3  and  probably  in  Maine  ; 4  a  master, 
who  is  not  present  when  his  servant  commits  a  wrongful  act, 
being  held  not  subject  to  a  joint  liability,  even  when  both  are 
severally  liable. 

1  In  Brown  v.  Lent  (20  Vt.  529),  3  A  master  and  servant  are  not  lia- 
defendant  was  employed  as  the  gen-  ble  jointly,  in  an  action  on  the  case, 
eral  superintendent  over  a  job  of  for  an  injury  occasioned  by  the  neg- 
quarrying  and  mason  work,  and  as  ligence  of  the  servant  while  driving 
such  directed  another  servant  of  the  the  carriage  of  the  master  in  his  ab- 
same  master  to  take  charge  of  the 
blasting  of  certain  rocks.  The  latter 
servant,  in  the  absence  of  the  de- 
fendant, and  by  his  own  negligence 
alone,  caused  an  injury  to  a  third 
person  in  the  process  of  blasting. 
Held,  that  the  defendant  was  not  li- 
able for  the  injury.  Davis,  J.,  said: 
"Neither  principle  nor  authority 
will  warrant  the  holding  a  mere 
middleman,  an  intermediate  agent 
between  the  master  and  the  direct 
agent,  constructively  responsible  for 
the  acts  of  the  latter." 

1  Phelps  v.  Wait,  30 N.  Y.  78  :  Suy- 
dam  v.  Moore,  8  Barb.  358  ;  Mont- 
fort  v.  Hughes,  3  E.  D.  Smith,  591; 
Wright  v.  Wilcox,  19  Wend.  343; 
Fortv.  Whipple.  11  Hun,  589  [where 
the  injury  was  to  a  servant] ;  Wright 
v.  Compton.  53  Ind.  337. 

5  Suvdam  »   Moore.  8  Barb.  358. 


sence  (Parsons  v.  Winchell,  5  Cush. 
592  ;  and  see  Campbell  v.  Phelps,  1 
Pick.  62  ;  Mulchey  v.  Methodist,  etc. 
So.,  125  Mass.  487.  But  compare 
Hewett  v.  Swift,  3  Allen,  420).  One 
who  gratuitously  superintends  work 
done  on  the  land  of  another, 
and  through  whose  negligence,  as- 
well  as  that  of  such  other,  damage 
is  done  to  a  third  person  by  the 
work,  is  liable  jointly  with  the  other 
person  therefor  (Hawkesworth  v. 
Thompson,  98  Mass.  77). 

4  In  Campbell  v.  Portland  Sugar 
Co.  (62  Me.  552),  a  wharf  company 
and  its  agent  were  held  to  be  sever- 
ally liable  for  a  defect  in  the  wharf, 
Barrows,  J.,  saying:  "We  think 
there  are  substantial  reasons  assigned 
in  Parsons  v.  Winchell  {supra),  why 
the  principal  and  agent  should  not 
be  charged  jointly  in  such  a  case." 


PART  III. 

PUBLIC  CORPORATIONS  AND  OFFICERS. 


Chapter    XII.  Municipal  Corporations. 

XIII.  Public  Officers. 

XIV.  Incorporated  Public  Trustees. 


CHAPTER    XII. 
MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


|  249.  The  state  cannot  be  coerced    §  263. 
by  suit. 

250.  Extent  of  state's  immunity.  264. 

251.  Liability  of  state  by  its  own       265. 

consent. 

252.  [Consolidated  with  §  253]. 

253.  Municipal     corporations      as        266. 

state-agencies.  267. 

254.  Statutory  test    of    corporate       268. 

liability.  269. 

255.  Public  and  private  functions       270. 

of  corporations.  271. 

256.  Liability  of  counties,  towns, 

etc.,  generally.  272. 

257.  Liability  of  counties  in  Penn- 

sylvania, Maryland,  Indiana       273. 
and  Iowa.  274. 

258.  Liability    of    New    England 

towns.  275. 

259.  Common  law  liability  of  New 

England  towns.  276. 

260.  [Consolidated  with  §  291]. 

260a.  Maintenance  of  jails,  etc.  277. 

261.  Statutory    liability    for    mob       278. 

violence. 

262.  Adoption    and    execution    of       279. 

laws  and  ordinances.  280. 

[463] 


Discretionary  powers — grant- 
ing licenses. 

[Omitted]. 

Supplying  water  and  appa- 
ratus  for  extinguishing 
fires. 

Providing  for  public  health. 

Providing  public  schools. 

[Consolidated  with  §  258]. 

[Consolidated  with  §  262]. 

[Consolidated  with  §  262]. 

Devising  plan  of  public  im- 
provement . 

Error  of  judgment  distin- 
guished from  negligence. 

[Consolidated  with  §  272]. 

Planning  inefficient  or  injuri- 
ous drainage. 

Duty  to  remedy  defects  in 
plan. 

Discretion  in  the  application 
of  limited  funds. 

[Consolidated  with  §  374]. 

How  far  professional  advice 
will  excuse  defect  in  plan. 

Statutory  directions  as  to  plan. 

[Consolidated  with  §  281]. 


§2491 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


464 


§  281.  Liability  for  breach  of  minis- 
terial duties. 

282.  [Consolidated  with  §  281]. 

283.  Damage    consequent    on  au- 

thorized act. 

284.  [Consolidated  with  §  334]. 

285.  Municipal    lands    and    struc- 

tures. 

286.  Management    of    water    and 

gas  service. 

287.  Maintenance    and    repair     of 

sewers. 

288.  [Consolidated  with  §  258]. 

289.  Implied    liability    for  non  re- 

pair of  streets. 

290.  [Consolidated  with  §  367]. 


§  291.    Implied    liability    for    negli- 
gence of  agents. 

292.  [Consolidated  with  $  291]. 

293.  [Consolidated  with  §  291]. 

294.  [Consolidated  with  §  291]. 

295.  Departments  of  government, 

not  agents  of  city. 

296.  When  departments  are  city's 

agents. 

297.  [Omitted]. 

298.  Independent  contractors  not 

agents. 

299.  Liability  limited    to  matters 

within  jurisdiction. 

300.  [Consolidated  with  §  299]. 

30 1 .  Recovery  over  by  corporation. 


§249.  State  cannot  be  coerced  by  suit. —  The  state  is  a 
corporation,1  and  as  such  may  make  contracts  and  may  suffer 
and  commit  wrongs,  and  may  enforce  its  rights  and  redress  its 
injuries  by  civil  action.2  But  as  a  sovereign  power,  it  cannot 
be  compelled  by  the  process  of  courts  of  its  own  creation, 
much  less  by  that  of  other  courts,  to  defend  itself  from  pros- 
ecution.3 Such  immunity  is  placed  upon  the  ground  that  the 
general  welfare  requires  that  the  state  should  not  be  deprived 
or  dispossessed  of  its  property  without  its  consent;  not  on  the 
maxim  of  the   English  law  that  the  king  can  do  no  wrong,  a 


1  Even  the  United  States  may  be 
said  to  be  a  corporation  (United 
States  v.  Hillegas,  3  Wash.  C.  C.  73), 
as  the  king  of  England  and  Parlia- 
ment are  (10  Co.  29b;  Shep.  Abr. 
431).  The  governor  of  a  state,  as 
the  head  of  the  executive  depart- 
ment, is  a  corporation  sole,  and 
bonds  given  to  him  may  be  enforced 
for  the  benefit  of  those  interested 
(Governor  v.  Allen,  8  Humph.  176; 
Polk  v.  Plummer,  2  Id.  500).  The 
District  of  Columbia  is  a  municipal 
corporation,  created  by  act  of  Con- 
gress (see  Barnes  v.  Dist.  of  Colum- 
bia, 91  U.  S.  540  ;  Dist.  of  Columbia 
v.  Woodbury,  136  Id.  450;  10  S.  Ct. 
990). 

'Indiana  v.  Woram,  6  Hill,  33; 
Delafield   v.  Illinois,   2  Id.   159;  26 


Wend.  192  ;  affi'g  8  Paige,  531  ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Watertown,  1  Hill,  620  ;  State 
v.  Delesdenier,  7  Tex.  76. 

3  Cohens  v.  Virginia,  6  Wheat.  264, 
411  ;  United  States  v.  Clarke,  8  Pet. 
436  ;  Briscoe  v.  Bank,  11  Id.  257 ; 
Cary  v.  Curtis,  3  How.  [U.  S.]  236; 
United  States  v.  McLemore,  4  Id. 
286  ;  Hill  v.  United  States,  9  Id.  386  ; 
Reeside  v.  Walker,  11  Id.  272;  Beers 
v.  Arkansas,  20  Id.  527  ;  Nations  v. 
Johnson,  24  Id.  195  ;  DeGroot  v. 
United  States,  5  Wall.  419 ;  United 
States  v.  Eckford,  6  Id.  484 ;  The 
Siren,  7  Id.  152,  154;  The  Davis,  10 
Id.  15,  20  ;  Nichols  v.  United  States, 
7  Id.  122  ;  United  States  v.  O'Keefe, 
11  Id.  178  ;  Case  v.  Terrell,  11  Id. 
199,  201;  Carr  v.  United  States,  98 
U.    S.    433,    437;    United    States   v. 


465 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§249 


maxim  which  has  no  existence  in  American  law.4  Any  liability 
therefore,  on  the  part  of  the  state  for  the  negligent  acts  or 
omissions  of  its  officers  or  agents,  must  be  one  voluntarily 
assumed  by  constitutional  legislative  enactment,5  or  it  does  not 
exist.6  In  a  word,  the  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior  does  not 
apply  to  the  state.7 


Thompson,  98  Id.  486,  489  ;  Railroad 
Co.  v.  Tennessee,  101  Id.  337  ;  Rail- 
road Co.  v.  Alabama,  Id.  832  ;  United 
States  v.  Lee,  106  Id.  196  ;  1  S.  Ct. 
340 ;  Hans  v.  Louisiana,  24  Fed.  55 ; 
Harvey  v.  Virginia,  20  Id.  411  ; 
Lewis  v.  State,  96  N.  Y.  71 ;  Sipple 
v.  State,  99  Id.  284  ;  People  v.  Miles, 
56  Cal.  401;  Chapman  v.  State,  104 
Id.  690  ;  38  Pac.  457  ;  Chicago,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  State,  53  Wise.  509;  10 
N.  W.  560;  Raymond  v.  State,  54 
Miss.  562;  Chevallier  v.  State,  10 
Tex.  315 ;  Tracy  v.  Hornbuckle,  8 
Bush,  336;  Tate  v.  Salmon,  79  Ky. 
540  ;  Ex  parte  State,  52  Ala.  231 ; 
Owen  v.  State,  7  Neb.  108  ;  Rollo  v. 
Andes  Ins.  Co.,  23  Gratt.  515  ;  Clod- 
felter  v.  State,  86  N.  C.  51  ;  Lowry 
v.  Thompson,  25  S.  C.  416  ;  State  v. 
Lanier,  47  La.  Ann.  110  ;  16  So.  647  ; 
Bloxham  v.  Florida  Central  R.  Co., 
35  Fla.  625  ;  17  So.  902  ;  Matter  of 
Substitute,  etc.,  21  Colo.  69;  39  Pac. 
1088.  Though  the  action  is  in  form 
against  an  officer  of  the  state,  if  it  is 
in  fact  against  the  state  itself,  it  can- 
not be  maintained.  The  fact  that 
the  state  is  not  a  party  of  record  is 
immaterial  (Louisiana  v.  Jumel,  107 
U.  S.  711  ;  2  S.  Ct.  128  ;  Cunning- 
ham v.  Macon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  109  Id. 
446;  3  S.  Ct.  292;  Hagood  v. 
Southern,  117  Id.  52  ;  6  S.  Ct.  608). 
s.  P.,  Paine  v.  Boston,  124  Mass.  486; 
Weaver  v.  Devendorf,  3  Denio,  117  ; 
Freeport  v.  Marks,  59  Pa.  St.  257 ; 
Jones  v.  Loving,  55  Miss.  109  ;  Pike 
v.  Megam,  44  Mo.  491;  Attorney- 
General  v.  Brown,  1  Wise.  522  ; 
Wright  v.  Defrees,  8  Ind.  302  ;  Baker 
v.  State,  27  Id.  485. 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  -  30] 


4  "We  do  not  understand  that 
either  in  reference  to  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States,  or  of  the 
several  states,  or  of  any  of  their 
officers,  the  English  maxim  [that 
the  king  can  do  no  wrong]  has  an 
existence  in  this  country  "  (per  Mil- 
ler, J.;  Langford  v.  United  States, 
101  U.  S.  341). 

5  No  officer  or  body  of  authority, 
except  the  legislature,  can  consent 
that  the  state  be  sued  (The  Davis,  10 
Wall.  15;  United  States  v.  Lee,  106 
U.  S.  196  ;  1  S.  Ct.  240 ;  Transporta- 
tion Co.  v.  Chicago,  99  Id.  635).  The 
state  may  withdraw  its  consent  to 
be  sued  whenever  the  public  interest 
requires  (Beers  v.  Arkansas,  20  How. 
[U.  S.]  527  ;  Ex  parte  State,  52  Ala. 
235). 

6  The  ordinary  courts  have  no 
jurisdiction  to  render  an  affirmative 
judgment  against  the  state,  even  by 
way  of  a  set-off  in  a  suit  instituted 
by  the  state,  unless  authorized  by 
statute  (People  v.  Dennison,  84  N.  Y. 
272  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Matlack,  4 
Dall.  303 ;  White  v.  The  Governor, 
18  Ala.  767  ;  State  v.  Hill,  54  Id.  67  ; 
State  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.,  34 
Md.  344;  Commonwealth  v.  Rodes, 
5  T.  Mon.  318,  and  cases  cited, 
supra).  See,  also,  Coster  v.  Albany, 
43  N.  Y.  399  ;  Branch  v.  Macon,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  2  Woods  C.  C.  385 ;  Metz  v. 
Soule,  40  Iowa,  236  ;  People  v.  Tal- 
madge,  6  Cal  256). 

7  The  government  is  not  liable  on 
an  implied  assumpsit  for  the  torts  of 
its  officer  committed  while  in  its 
service  and  apparently  for  its  benefit 
(Gibbons  v.  United  States,  8  Wall.  269). 


§251]  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  466 

§  250.  Extent  of  state's  immunity. — The  fact  that  the 
state  derives  a  profit  by  way  of  statutory  tolls  or  otherwise, 
from  the  maintenance  and  operation  of  a  public  work,  does 
not  deprive  it  of  its  immunity  or  impose  a  duty  as  to  which 
negligence  is  predicable  in  a  private  action.1  On  the  other 
hand,  the  fact  that  the  state  shares  the  profits  of  a  private 
enterprise,  e.  g.,  as  a  stockholder  of  a  private  corporation,  does 
not  exempt  the  latter  from  coercion  by  suit.  By  becoming  a 
partner  in  such  a  company,  the  state  divests  itself  of  its  sover- 
eign character,  so  far  as  concerns  the  transactions  of  that  com- 
pany, and  takes  that  of  a  private  citizen  ;  the  fact  of  the  state's 
ownership  of  a  part,  or  even  of  the  whole,  of  the  capital  of  such 
a  corporation  does  not  affect  the  rights  of  those  dealing  with  it.2 
Hence  the  state's  ownership  of  all  the  shares  of  the  capital  stock 
of  a  railroad  company  will  not  exempt  the  corporation  from 
liability  for  the  negligence  of  its  servants.3 

§  251.  Liability  of  state  by  its  own  consent. — The  Federal 
government,  and  some  of  the  states,  have  provided  for  the 
adjudication  of  many  classes  of  private  claims  against  them, 
in  their  ordinary  courts  or  in  courts  especially  erected  for  that 
purpose.1     The    rule    is    inflexible    that,    whenever   the    state 

1  The  fact  that  the  state  derives  a  of  its  sovereignty,  takes  possession 

profit  from  the  enforced  labor  of  its  of,  and  operates  a  railroad,    it    is, 

prison  convicts  will  not  make  it  lia-  by   virtue    of   its    sovereignty,   ex- 

ble  for  the  negligence  of  its  prison  empt  from  liability  for  its  servants' 

officers  to  the  injury  of    a  convict  acts    in    operating    the  line.      The 

(Lewis  v.  State,  96  N.   Y.  71;  Ala-  crown  is  not  liable  as  a    common 

mango  v.  Albany  County,  25  Hun,  carrier  (Regina  v.  McLeod,  8  Duval 

511;  and  cases  cited  under  §  260a,  [Canada],  1;    Regina  v.  McFarlane, 

post).  7  1(1.216). 

5  Bank  of  United  States  v.  Plant-  '  Notwithstanding  that  in  thirteen 
ers'  Bank,  9  Wheat.  904;  Pennsyl-  states,  the  legislature  is  authorized 
vania  v.  Wheeling,  etc.,  Bridge,  13  by  constitutional  provision  to  pro- 
How.  [U.  S.]  518;  Curran  v.  Arkan-  vide  a  method  for  establishing  claims 
sas,  15  Id.  304;  Darrington  v.  State  against  the  stato  by  suit,  this  per- 
Bank,  13  Id.  12;  Bank  of  Kentucky  mission  has  been  availed  of  in  only 
v.  Wister,  2  Peters,  318;  Tinsman  v.  a  few  of  them.  The  New  York 
Belvidere,  etc.  R.  Co.  26  N.  J.  Law,  scheme  of  a  Court  of  Claims,  as 
148.  originally  adopted,  was  a  statutory 

3  Hutchinson  v.  Western,  etc.  R.  tribunal  without  constitutional  sane- 
Co.  6  Heisk.  634.  On  the  other  tion.  In  five  states  the  legislature 
hand,  it  is  held  in  Canada,  that  is  forbidden  to  make  any  such  pro- 
where  the    crown,  in  the  exercise  vision. 


467 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§253 


designates  a  particular  tribunal  in  which  it  consents  to  be 
prosecuted,  and  the  class  of  claims  which  such  tribunal  may- 
entertain,  and  prescribes  a  particular  form  of  procedure,  the 
statutory  directions  must  be  strictly  followed.  Actions  can- 
not be  brought  for  any  other  cause2  or  in  any  other  court3 
than  that  thus  specified.  But  Federal  statutes,  allowing  the 
United  States  to  be  sued  for  certain  causes,  without  specifying 
any  particular  court,  are  held  to  authorize  actions  to  be  brought 
in  state  courts.4 

§  252.   [consolidated  with  §  253]. 

§  253.    Municipal   corporations   as   state-agencies 


confine    ourselves    here    to    the 

2  Lewis  v.  State,  96  N.  Y.  71.  Or- 
dinary legal  remedies,  as  in  ques- 
tions of  contract  between  individuals 
are  not  contemplated  by  these  per- 
missive statutes.  In  those  cases,  re- 
liance must  be  had,  it  is  said,  upon 
the  good  faith  of  the  state  (see  Han- 
cock v.  Walsh,  3  Woods  C.  C.  363; 
Dabney  v.  State  Bank,  3  S.  C.  167; 
Clark  v.  State,  7  Coldw.  317;  Dan- 
olds  v.  State,  89  N.  Y.  36).  The  jur- 
isdiction of  the  Federal  Court  of 
Claims  is  restricted  to  contracts,  ex- 
press or  implied.  Hence  the  gov- 
ern ment  is  not  liable  to  suit  for  the 
wrongful  and  unauthorized  acts 
committed  by  its  officers,  under  a 
mistaken  zeal  for  the  public  good 
(Longford  v.  United  States,  101  U.  S. 
341).  In  New  York  (L.  1883,  ch. 
205;  L.  1870,  ch.  321),  the  state  is 
liable  to  all  persons  for  damages  sus- 
tained from  the  canals  of  the  state, 
or  from  their  use  or  management,  or 
from  the  negligence  of  the  state  offi- 
cers in  charge  thereof,  resulting  or 
arising  from  any  accident  or  other 
matter  connected  with  the  canals,  if 
the  facts  proved  shall  make  out  a 
case  which  would  create  a  legal  lia- 
bility against  the  state,  were  they 
established  in  a  court  of  justice 
against  an  inrlivirlual  or  corporation. 
It  is  not  necessary  that  the  damages 


consideration    of 


We 

the   extent 


should  be  caused  by  some  person 
described  by  law  as  "an  officer  "  of 
the  state  (Sipple  v.  State,  99  N.  Y. 
284;  Rexford  v.  State,  105  Id.  229; 
UN.  E.  514).  For  other  cases  under 
this  statute,  see  Bowen  v.  State,  108 
N.  Y.  166  [action  for  death  caused 
by  negligent  act  will  lie]  ;  Splittorf 
v.  State,  Id.  205;  15  N.  E.  322  [open 
swing  bridge].  Ballou  v.  State,  111 
N.  Y.  496  ;  18  N.  E.  627  [failure  to 
remove  obstruction  in  drainage 
sewer]  ;  Bidelman  v.  State,  110  N. 
Y.  232;  18  N.  E.  115.)  By  California 
statute  of  March  12,  1885,  authoriz- 
ing recovery  of  damages  by  reason 
of  certain  canal  improvements  made 
by  the  state,  provided  they  were 
occasioned  "by  any  act  for  which 
the  state  is  legally  liable,"  it  is  held 
that  no  liability  was  admitted  or  de- 
fense waived,  except  immunity  from 
suit;  the  state  may  still  interpose  the 
defense  that  it  was  engaged  in  a  pub- 
lic work  for  the  common  good  (Green 
v.  State,  73  Cal.  29 ;  14  Pac.  610). 

3  See  United  States  v.  Clark,  8 
Peters,  444. 

4  United  States  v  Clark,  8  Peters, 
444;  Jones  v.  United  States,  48  Wise. 
385  ;  4  N.  W.  519  ;  Zemlock  v.  Uni- 
ted States,  73  Wise.  363;  41  N.  W. 
445  ;  Velte  v.  United  States,  76  Wise. 
278  ;  45  N.  W.  119. 


§253] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


468 


of  the  liability  to  private  actions  of  that  largo  class  of  local 
corporations,  generically  denominated  municipal  corporations, 
such  as  cities,  towns,  counties,  school  districts,  etc.,  to  which, 
for  administrative  purposes,  the  state  delegates  portions  of  its 
sovereign  powers,  to  be  exercised  within  particular  sections  of 
its  territory,  for  certain  public  purposes.1  To  the  extent 
that  such  local  or  special  organizations  possess  and  exer- 
cise governmental  powers,  they  are,  as  it  were,  departments 
of  state ; 2  and  as  such,  in  the  absence  of  any  statute  to  the 
contrary,  they  have  the  privilege  and  immunity  of  the  state; 
they  partake  of  the  state's  prerogative  of  sovereignty,  in  that 
they  are  exempt  from  private  prosecution  for  the  conse- 
quences of  their  exercising  or  neglecting  to  exercise  the 
governmental   powers  they  possess.3     Their  delegated  duties 


1  The  term  ' '  municipal  corpora- 
tion" is  sometimes  denned,  as  in 
New  York  (Gen.  Corp-  L-  of  1891,  § 
2)  so  as  to  include  "a  county,  town, 
school  district,  village,  city,  and  any 
other  territorial  division  of  the  state 
established  by  law,  with  powers  of 
local  government."  In  Missouri,  the 
term  as  used  in  a  statute  does  not 
include  an  incorporated  board  of 
public  schools,  but  only  organized 
cities  and  towns  and  other  like 
organizations  with  political  and 
legislative  powers  for  local  civil 
government  and  police  regulation 
of  the  inhabitants  of  particular  dis- 
tricts included  in  the  boundaries  of 
the  corporation  (Heller  v.  Strem- 
mel,  52  Mo.  309  ;  State  v.  Leffing- 
well,  54  Id.  458).  In  Wisconsin,  the 
term  as  used  in  the  constitution  is 
held  not  to  include  towns,  school 
districts  and  such  like  unincorpora- 
ted quasi  corporations  (Eaton  v. 
Manitowoc  Co.,  44  Wise.  489). 

2"  A  municipal  corporation  in  the 
exercise  of  all  of  its  duties,  includ- 
ing those  most  strictly  local  or  inter- 
nal, is  but  a  department  of  the  state. 
The  legislature  may  give  it  all  the 
powers   such  a  being  is   capable   of 


receiving,  making  it  a  miniature 
state  within  its  locality.  Again  :  it 
may  strip  it  of  every  power,  leaving 
it  a  corporation  in  name  only"  (per 
Hunt,  J.,  Barnes  v.  Dist.  of  Colum- 
bia, 91  U.  S.  540). 

3  In  Edgerly  v.  Concord  (62  N.  H. 
8),  the  court  said  :  "As  a  part  of 
the  governmental  machinery  of  the 
state,  municipal  corporations  legis- 
late and  provide  for  the  customary 
local  convenience  of  the  people,  and 
in  exercising  these  discretionary 
functions  the  corporations  are  not 
called  upon  to  respond  in  damages 
to  individuals,  either  for  omissions 
to  act  or  in  the  mode  of  exercising 
the  powers  conferred  on  them  for 
public  purposes  and  to  be  exercised 
at  discretion  for  the  public  good. 
For  injuries  arising  from  the  cor- 
poration's failure  to  exercise  its  pub- 
lic, legislative  and  police  powers, 
and  for  the  manner  of  executing 
those  powers  there  is  no  remedy 
against  the  municipality,  nor  can  an 
action  be  maintained  for  damages 
resulting  from  the  failure  of  its  offi- 
cers to  discharge  properly  and 
efficiently  their  official  duties."  To 
the  same  effect,    Tainter  v.  Worces- 


469  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [§  254 

are  regarded  as  due  to  the  public,  not  to  individuals;  their 
officers  are  not  agents  of  the  corporation,  but  of  "  the 
greater  public,"4  the  state.  No  relation  of  agency  existing 
between  the  corporation  and  its  officers,  with  respect  to  the 
discharge  of  these  public,  governmental  duties,  the  corpora- 
tion is  not  responsible  for  the  acts  or  omissions  of  its  officers 
therein.  This  is  nothing  more  than  an  application  and  proper 
extension  of  the  rule  that  the  state  is  not  liable  for  the  mis- 
feasance of  its  officers.  On  the  other  hand,  to  the  extent  that 
these  local  organizations  are  invested  with  a  corporate  indi- 
viduality, and  so  are  to  be  regarded  as  juristic  persons,  they 
are,  like  private  corporations  or  individuals,  subject  to  the 
rule  of  private  law  that  a  principal  is  liable  for  the  acts  or 
omissions  of  his  agent.5 

§  254.  Statutory  test  of  corporate  liability.  —  It  is  impos- 
sible to  state  a  general  rule  by  which  the  liability  of  every 
municipal  corporation  of  every  class,  for  either  the  non- 
feasance or  misfeasance  of  its  officers,  may  be  determined. 
The  only  test  of  liability  of  a  particular  corporation  is  the 
statute  under  which  it  exists,  and  which  confers  its  powers 
and  prescribes  its  duties.  Subject  to  constitutional  limita- 
tions, the  state  may,  either  in  the  charter,  as  a  condition  of  a 
grant  of  powers,  or  subsequently  by  an  independent  act, 
impose  upon  such  bodies  such  burdens  and  charges  as  are 
thought  most  likely  to  accomplish  the  object  of  their  creation  ;x 

ter,    123   Mass.    311  ;  Maximilian   v.  isiana  v.  New  Orleans,  109  U.  S.  285  ; 

New  York,  62  N.  Y.  160,    per  Folger,  3  S.  Ct.  211).   The  several  "  riot  acts" 

J.  ;  Springfield  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Keese-  of  England,  and  of  various  American 

ville,   148  Id.  46  ;  42   X.  E.    405,    per  states,  giving  a  right  of  action  against 

Gray,  J.     And  see  cases  cited  under  a  city  or  county  for  damages  done  by 

SS  260-276,  post.  a  mob  or  riot,  and  statutes  giving  a 

4 Per  Folger  J.,  Maximilian  v.  New  remedy  against  a  town  or  county  or 

York,  62  N.  Y.   160  ;  see  §  266,  post,  municipal  corporation  at  the  suit  of 

5  See  6  201,  post.  a  citizen  sustaining  injuries  by  rea- 

1  Laramie  county  v.  Albany  county,  son  of  the  defective  condition  of  a 

92  U.  S.  307  ;  Darlington  v.  New  York,  street  or  bridge  within  their  limits 

31  N.  Y.  164;    People  v.  Morrell,  21  are  examples  of  the  exercise  of  such 

Wend.  563;  Stone  v.  New  York,  25  Id.  power.      It    was    once    contended 

181  ;  Booth  v.  Woodbury,  32  Conn.  (Green  v.  New  York,  5  Abb.  Pr.  503; 

118.     A  statutory  right  of  action  for  People  v.  Haws,  37  Barb.  440),  that 

damages  caused  by  a  mob  may  be  while  such  an  exercise  of  legislative 

given  or  taken  away  at  pleasure  (Lou-  power  over  counties  and  other  quasi 


§  254] 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


47O 


or  it  may  exempt  them  altogether  from  certain  kinds  of 
liability.-  It  is  a  universally  recognized  principle  that  they 
have  no  powers,  except  those  given  by  statute,  either  expressly 
or  as  necessarily  incident  to  their  express  powers;3  and  that 
their  liabilities  are  to  be  determined  upon  a  true  interpretation 
of  the  statutes  creating  or  governing  them.4     Where  the  stat- 


corporations  may  not  be  open  to 
question,  a  different  question  arises 
as  to  municipal  corporations  holding 
property  derived  from  other  sources 
than  the  legislature.  But  this  dis- 
tinction  was  long  ago  overruled 
(Darlington  v.  New  York,  31  N.  Y. 
163).     See  §§261,  281. 

2  See  Gray  v.  Brooklyn,  2  Abb.  Ct. 
App.  267  ;  Fitzpatrick  v .  Slocum,  89 
N.  Y.  358  ;  Hardy  v.  Brooklyn,  90 
Id.  435  ;  Bieling  v.  Brooklyn,  120  Id. 
98  ;  24  N.  E.  389,  on  the  construction 
of  L.  1873,  ch.  863,  tit.  19,  §  27,  re- 
lieving the  city  of  Brooklyn  from 
liability  for  any  misfeasance  or  mal- 
feasance of  its  common  council  or  any 
officer  of  the  city  or  appointee  of  the 
common  council.  The  result  of  the 
cases  under  this  statute  is  that  if  the 
duty  that  was  neglected,  e.  g.,  the 
guarding  of  a  draw-bridge,  did  not 
rest  upon  any  particular  officer  of  the 
corporation,  the  corporation  will  be 
liable  for  the  consequences  of  its 
neglect  of  the  duty,  under  its  pri- 
mary obligation  to  keep  its  streets 
and  bridges  in  a  safe  condition.  See 
Vincent  v.  Brooklyn,  31  Hun,  122  ; 
Fitzgerald  v.  Binghamton,  40  Hun, 
332  ;  Parsons  v.  San  Francisco,  23 
Cal.  462;  O'Harra  v.  Portland,  3 
Oreg.  525.  It  is  competent  to  at- 
tach any  condition  precedent  or  sub- 
sequent to  a  right  of  action  against 
a  municipal  corporation,  whether  a 
common-law  action  or  one  given  by 
the  statute  (Reining  v.  Buffalo,  102 
N.  Y.  308;  6  N.  E.  792;  Merz  v. 
Brooklyn,  128  N.  Y.  617,  mem.  ;  28 
N.  E.  253 ;  Curry  v.  Buffalo,  135  N. 
Y.  366  ;    32  N.  E.  80  ;    Simmons  v. 


Brooklyn,  1  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  630  ; 
36  N.  Y.  Supp.  1133  ;  Patterson  v. 
Brooklyn,  6  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  127; 
40  N.  Y.  Supp.  581). 

3  Frost  v.  Belmont,  6  Allen,  152 ; 
Stetson  v.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272  ; 
Abendroth  v.  Greenwich,  29  Conn. 
363  ;  Willard  v.  Killingworth,  8  Id. 
254 ;  Booth  v.  Woodbury,  32  Id. 
118  ;  Morey  v.  Newfane,  8  Barb.  645  ; 
Wright  v.  Briggs,  2  Hill,  77 ;  Macon 
v.  Macon,  etc.  R.  Co.,  7  Ga.  221; 
Askew  v.  Hall,  54  Ala.  639 ;  Young- 
blood  v.  Sexton,  32  Mich.  406  ;  Ould 
v.  Richmond,  23  Gratt.  464  ;  Hess  v. 
Pegg,  7  Nev.  23  ;  Douglass  v.  Placer- 
ville,  18  Cal.  643.  Corporate  powers 
cannot  be  created  by  implication, 
nor  extended  by  construction  (Penn- 
sylvania R.  Co.  v.  Canal  Commis- 
sioners, 21  Pa.  St.  9  ;  and  see  Blair  v. 
Perpetual  Ins.  Co.,  10  Mo.  559  ;  Hos- 
ack  v.  College  of  Physicians,  5  Wend. 
547  ;  Brady  v.  New  York,  20  N.  Y. 
312). 

4  Mersey  Docks  v.  Gibbs,  L.  R.  1 
H.  L.  93.  ' '  AH  that  can  be  done  with 
safety  is  to  determine  each  case  as  it 
arises  "  (per  Foote,  J. ,  Lloyd  v.  New 
York,  5  N.  Y.  369,  375).  "The  lia- 
bility of  a  body  created  by  statute 
must  be  determined  upon  a  true  in- 
terpretation of  the  statute  under 
which  it  is  created"  (Southampton, 
etc.  Bridge  Co.  v.  Southampton 
Board,  8  El.  &  B.  801,  812).  "The 
liability  of  a  statutory  body  depends 
wholly  upon  the  construction  of  the 
various  acts  of  parliament  under 
which  they  exercise  their  powers. 
If  certain  duties  are  imposed  upon 
the  defendants,  the  circumstance  of 


A7l  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [§  255 

ute  is  silent  on  the  subject  of  their  liabilities  to  private  actions 
for  a  failure  to  exercise  delegated  powers,  or  to  perform  an 
imposed  duty,  the  courts  have  confessedly  found  it  difficult  to 
state  a  rule  of  general  application  by  which  such  a  liability, 
one  way  or  the  other,  may  be  determined.  The  question  has 
sometimes  been  determined  on  a  consideration  of  the  nature  of 
a  particular  power  or  duty  expressed  in  the  statute;  in  other 
cases,  it  has  been  made  to  depend  upon  a  distinction  between 
corporations  having  special  charters,  with  specific  duties  vol- 
untarily assumed  by  the  grantee,  and  involuntary  or  quasi  cor- 
porations, organized  under  general  statutes,  upon  which  duties 
are  arbitrarily  imposed. 

§  255.  Public   and   private    functions   of  corporations.— 

There  is  a  well-recognized  distinction  between  powers  and 
duties  which  are  granted  to,  or  imposed  upon,  a  public  body 
as  an  agency  of  government,  to  be  exercised  and  performed 
exclusively  for  public,  governmental  purposes,  and  that  other 
class  of  powers  and  privileges  which  are  exercised  by  the 
grantee  for  its  own  private  advantage,  and  are  for  public  pur- 
poses  in  no  other  sense  than  that  the  public  derives  a  com- 
mon benefit  from  a  proper  discharge  of  duties  arising  from  the 
grant.1     In  respect  to  special  powers  and  privileges  granted  to 

their  being  a  public  body,  receiving  tary  Commissioners  v.  Orfila,  L.  R. 
their  powers  for  public  purposes  15  App.  Cas.  400.)  In  that  case,  it 
only,  does  not  protect  them  from  the  was  held  that  a  board  of  officers  un- 
consequences  of  neglect  of  their  der  a  statutory  duty  merely  to  main- 
duties,  if  danger  arises  by  the  neg-  tain  roads,  was  not  liable  for  the  fall 
lect "  (per  Cleasby,  B  ,  Winch  v.  of  a  retaining  wall  of  an  overhang- 
Conservators  of  the  Thames,  L.  R.  ing  road,  due  to  an  original  defect 
9  C.  P.  378  ;  affi'g  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  458).  existing  before  the  board  was  cre- 
If  the  court  can  see  that,  by  the  ated,  of  which  the  board  was  not 
terms  of  the  statute  creating  a  negligently  ignorant.  "  Without  a 
subordinate  board  or  corporation  duty  to  repair  [a  highway],  no  duty 
with  a  duty  to  perform  a  particular  rests  on  the  municipality.  In  this 
public  service,  the  body  thus  created  state,  the  duty  is  statutory,  and 
was  intended  to  be  a  mere  agent  for  therefore  we  must  look  to  the  stat- 
executing  the  state's  administrative  ute  for  its  nature  and  extent "  (per 
functions  in  that  particular,  subject  Agnew,  J.,  Rapho  v.  Moore,  68  Pa, 
to  tbe  control  of  the  state,  it  will  not  St.  404).  See  §  281,  post. 
infer  an  intention  to  impose  upon  it  '  Fowle  v.  Alexandria,  3  Pet.  398, 
any  liability  to  a  private  action  for  per  Marshall,  C.  J.;  Maximilian  v. 
the  consequences  of  its  failure  to  New  York,  62  N.  Y.  160  ;  Folger,  J., 
perform  such  duties  (Gibraltar  Sani-  there  Baid  :  "  There  are  two  kinds  of 


§256] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


472 


it,  and  the  duty  to  the  public  which  acceptance  and  use  of 
such  a  grant  involve,  a  municipality  is  on  the  same  footing 
with  a  private  grantee  of  a  power,  and  is,  like  an  individual, 
liable  for  a  negligent  exercise  of  it.2 

§256.  Liability    of   counties,    towns,    etc.,    generally. — 

Speaking,  in  the  first  place,  of  that  class  of  quasi  municipal 
corporations,  such  as  counties,  towns,  parishes,  road  and  school 
districts  and  the  like,  which  are  mere  political  divisions  of  the 
territory  of  the  state,  like  assembly  and  senatorial  districts, 
organized  for  the  convenient  exercise  of  portions  of  the  politi- 
cal power  of  the  state,  they  are  regarded  as  mere  agencies  of 
government ;  they  have  certain  limited  powers  and  duties 
which    may   be   enforced,   and   privileges  which  may  be  main- 


duties  which  are  imposed  upon  a 
municipal  corporation :  One  is  of 
that  kind  which  arises  from  the 
grant  of  a  special  power,  in  the  ex- 
ercise of  which  the  municipality  is 
as  a  legal  individual ;  the  other  is  of 
that  kind  which  arises  or  is  implied 
from  the  use  of  political  rights  under 
the  general  law,  in  the  exercise  of 
which  it  is  as  a  sovereign.  .  .  . 
In  the  exercise  of  the  former  power, 
and  under  the  duty  to  the  public 
which  the  acceptance  and  use  of  the 
power  involves,  a  municipality  is 
like  a  private  corporation,  and  is 
liable  for  a  failure  to  use  its  power 
well  or  for  an  injury  caused  by 
using  it  badly.  But  where  the 
power  is  conferred  not  for  the  im- 
mediate benefit  of  the  municipality, 
but  as  a  means  to  the  exercise  of  the 
sovereign  power  for  the  benefit  of 
all  citizens,  the  corporation  is  not 
liable  for  non-user,  nor  for  mis-user, 
by  the  public  agents. 
When  the  powers  created  and  duly 
enjoined  are  given  and  laid  upon 
officers  to  be  named  by  the  corpora- 
tion, but  for  the  public  benefit  and 
as  a  convenient  method  of  exercising 
a  function  of  general  government, 
and  the  corporation  has  no  immedi- 


ate control  nor  immediate  power  of 
removal  of  those  officers,  nor  of 
their  subordinates  and  servants, 
then  it  is  not  liable  for  their  negli- 
gent omission  or  action."  This 
distinction  determined  the  decision 
of  the  following,  among  a  multitude 
of  other  cases  :  Ham  v.  New  York, 
70  N.  Y.  459  ;  N.  Y.  &  Brooklyn 
Sawmill,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brooklyn,  71  Id. 
580  ;  Swift  v.  New  York,  83  Id.  528  ; 
Ehrgott  v.  New  York,  96  Id.  264; 
Seifert  v.  Brooklyn,  101  Id.  137;  4 
N.  E.  321  ;  Hunt  v.  New  York,  109 
N.  Y.  134 ;  16  N.  E.  320  ;  Chapman 
v.  Rochester,  110  N.  Y.  273;  18  N. 
E.  88;  Danaher  v.  Brooklyn,  119  N. 
Y.  241  ;  23  N.  E.  745  [quality  of 
water-supply  of  public  well]  ;  Mead 
v.  New  Haven,  40  Conn.  72  ;  Boyd  v. 
Insurance  Patrol,  113  Pa.  St.  269 ;  6 
Atl.  536  ;  Richmond  v.  Long,  17 
Gratt.  378 ;  Hollenbeck  v.  Winne- 
bago county,  95  111.  148  ;  Brinkmeyer 
v.  Evansville  29  Ind.  187  (per  Elliott 
J.);  Evansville  v.  Decker,  84  Id.  325; 
Gould  v.  Topeka,  32  Kans.  485;  Kin- 
caid  v.  Hardin  county,  53  Iowa,  430; 
Ogg  v.  Lansing,  35  Id.  495. 

2  For  illustrations  of  the  two  kinds 
of  duties,  see  §§261-275,  281-289, 
post. 


473 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§256 


tained  ;  but  they  are  invested  with  corporate  powers  sub  modo, 
and  for  a  few  specified  purposes  only.1  This  class  of  involun- 
tary organizations  have  no  duties,  and  are  under  no  liabilities, 
except  such  as  are  imposed  by  statute  expressly.  Hence  it 
is  very  generally,  though  not  uniformly,  held  that  where  a 
statute  imposes  a  duty  upon  public  corporations  of  this  sort, 
but  is  silent  on  the  subject  of  their  liability  to  a  private  action 
for  injuries  sustained  because  of  a  breach  of  that  duty,  no 
liability  therefor  will  be  implied,2  while  in  the  case  of  a  muni- 


1  Comraonwealth  v.  Green,  4 
Whart.  [Penn.j  531 ;  Jackson  v. 
Hartwell,  8  Johns.  330  ;  Hornbeck 
v.  Westbrook,  9  Id.  73,  and  cases 
infra. 

2  Russell  v.  Men  of  Devon  (2  Term 
R.  667)  is  the  leading  case  which  has 
been  frequently  referred  to  and  fol- 
lowed by  the  American  courts. 
Tbere,  the  duty  of  the  county  to  re- 
pair a  bridge  was  admitted  ;  but  in- 
asmuch as  the  county  had  no  corpo- 
rate fund,  nor  the  means  of  obtaining 
such  a  fund,  out  of  which  a  judg- 
ment could  be  satisfied,  and  because 
each  inhabitant  would  be  liable  to 
satisfy  any  judgment,  which  might 
be  levied  upon  one  or  two  inhabit- 
ants, who  would  have  no  means  of 
reimbursing  themselves,  the  action 
was  held  not  to  lie.  The  reasons 
given  for  the  judgment  in  this  case 
are  not  altogether  applicable  to  the 
case  of  counties  or  of  towns  which 
have  a  corporate  fund,  or  the  means 
of  obtaining  one,  out  of  which  a 
judgment  might  be  satisfied,  but  the 
reasoning  of  the  case  has  been  re- 
peatedly approved.  See  "VVeightman 
v.  Washington,  1  Black,  39  ;  Riddle 
v.  Proprietors  of  Locks,  etc.,  7  Mass. 
169 ;  Mower  v.  Leicester,  9  Id.  247  ; 
Beardsley  v.  Smith,  16  Conn.  375  ; 
Jones  v.  New  Haven,  34  Id.  1  ;  Bax- 
ter v.  Winooski  Tump.  Co.,  22  Vt. 
123  ;  Ball  v.  Winchester,  32  N.  H. 
443,  as  explained  and  limited  by  Gil- 
raan  v.  Laconia,  55  Id.  130 ;  Eastman 


v.  Meredith,  36  Id.  284  ;  Hill  v.  Bos- 
ton, 122  Mass.  344  ;  King  v.  St.  Lan- 
dry, 12  La.  Ann.  858. 

As  to  counties,  the  rule  of  non- 
liability, at  common  law,  has  been 
applied  in  the  following  states  : 

Alabama :  Askew  v.  Hale  county, 
54  Ala.  639;  Barbour  county  v.  Horn, 
48  Id.  566 ;  Covington  county  v. 
Kinney,  45  Id.  1 76  ;  Sims  v.  Butler 
county, 49  Id. 110;  Barbour  county 
v.  Brunson,  36  Id.  362  ;  Van  Epps  v. 
Commissioners,  25  Id.  460  ;  Selma  v. 
Perkins,  68  Id.  145  ;  Green  county  v. 
Eubanks,  80  Id.  204  ;  Dunn  v.  Wil- 
cox county,  85  Id.  144;  4  So.  661 
Under  Ala.  Code,  §  1456,  a  county 
which  has  neglected  to  take  from  a 
road-contractor  the  guaranty  it  is 
authorized  to  exact  for  the  safe  con- 
dition of  a  road,  is  liable  for  injuries 
from  the  unsafe  condition  of  the 
road  contracted  for  (Lee  county  v. 
Yarbrough,  85  Ala.  590  ;  5  So.  341 ; 
see  Williams  v.  Still  well,  88  Ala.  332  ; 
6  So.  914). 

Arkansas :  Granger  v.  Pulaski 
county,  26  Ark.  37. 

In  California,  "a  county  is  not  a 
person  in  any  sense  ;  it  is  not  a  cor- 
poration," and  there  is  no  more 
remedy,  therefore,  against  it  than 
there  is  against  the  state  (Hunsaker 
v.  Borden,  5  Cal.  288  ;  Price  v.  Sac- 
ramento, 6  Id.  254).  s.  P.,  Huffman 
v.  San  Joaquin  county,  21  Id.  426 ; 
Burnett  v.  Contra  Costa  county,  67 
Id.  78  [defective  bridge]  ;  Crowell  v. 


§256] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


474 


cipal  corporation  proper,  under 
cation   will   be  made.     The  di 

Sonoma  county,  25  Id.  313  [building 
a  bridge  so  that  it  obstructed  water- 
course] ;  Sherbourne  v.Yuba  county, 
21  Id.  113  [county  physician's  un- 
skilled treatment  of  an  indigent  sick 
person  in  county  hospital]. 

Colorado :  El  Paso  county  v.  Bish, 
18  Colo.  474  ;  33  Pac.  184  [bridge]. 

Connecticut :  Counties  having  no 
organization,  and  no  officer  on  whom 
process  can  be  served,  and  cannot 
be  sued  at  all  (Ward  v.  Hartford 
county,  12  Conn.  404). 

Florida :  Forbes  v.  Escambia 
county,  28  Fla.  26  ;  9  So.  862. 

Georgia :  Scales  v.  Chattahoochee 
county,  41  Ga.  225 ;  Haygood  v. 
Justices,  etc.,  20  Id.  845  [county  not 
liable  to  sheriff  for  escape  of  prisoner 
on  account  of  insufficiency  of  jail]. 
S.  P.,  Governor  v.  Justices,  etc.,  19 
Id.  97.  As  to  liability  of  counties, 
under  Code,  §  690,  see  Arnold  v. 
Henry  county,  81  Ga.  730  ;  8  S.  E. 
606  ;  Smith  v.  Floyd  county,  85  Ga. 
420  ;  11  S.  E.  850 ;  Monroe  county 
v.  Flynt,  80  Ga.  489  ;  6  S.  E.  173. 

Illinois:  Hollenbeck  v.  Winneba- 
go county,  95  111.  148  [defective  con- 
struction of  public  building]  ;  White 
v.  Bond  county,  58  Id.  297  [defective 
bridge]  ;  Browning  v.  Springfield, 
17  111.  143  ;  Symonds  v.  Clay  county, 
71  Id.  355  [county  employee  negli- 
gently setting  fire  to  brush  on  county 
poor  house  farm]. 

Indiana  :  Cones  v.  Benton  county, 
137  Ind.  404  ;  37  N.  E.  272  [highway]; 
Vigo  county  v.  Daily,  132  Ind.  73; 
31  N.  E.  531  [court-house]  ;  Morris 
v.  Switzerland  county,  131  Ind.  285; 
31  N.  E.  77  [county  jail]  ;  Abbett  v. 
Johnson  county,  114  Ind.  61  ;  16  N. 
E.  127.  s.  P.,  Smith  v.  Allen  county, 
131  Ind.  116 ;  30  N.  E.  949  ;  Spicer  v. 
Elkhart  county,  126  Ind.  369  ;  26  N. 
E.  58.     See  next  section. 


a  similar  statute,  such  an  impli- 
fficulty  sometimes  met   with,  in 

loira  :  Kincaid  v.  Hardin  county, 
53  Iowa,  430  ;  5  N.  W.  589  [court- 
house] ;  Green  v.  Harrison  county, 
61  Iowa,  311  ;  16  N.  E.  136  [ditch]  ; 
Lindley  v.  Polk  county,  84  Iowa, 
308 ;  50  N.  W.  975  [county  jail]  ; 
Packard  v.  Voltz,  94  Iowa,  277  ;  62 
N.W.  757  ;  Dashner  v.  Mills  county, 
88  Iowa.  401  ;  55  N.  W.  468  [ditch]. 
See  §  257,  note  4. 

Kansas :  Marion  county  v.  Riggs, 
24  Kans.  255  [defective  highway  and 
bridge]  ;  Eikenberry  v.  Bazaar,  22 
Id.  556  [highway]. 

Kentucky :  Wheatly  v.  Mercer,  9 
Bush,  704  [bridge]  :  Hite  v.  Whitley 
county,  91  Ky.  168;  15  S.  W.  57 
[jail] ;  Shepard  v.  Pulaski  county, 
18  S.  W.  15  [court-house];  Hender- 
son v.  Covington,  14  Bush,  312. 

Maine :  Mitchell  v .  Rockland,  52 
Me.  118. 

Michigan :  Larkin  v.  Saginaw 
county,  11  Mich.  88  [bridge]  ;  Web- 
ster v.  Hillsdale  county,  99  Id.  259  ; 
58  N.  W.  317  [county  jail]. 

Minnesota  :  Dosdall  v.  Olmsted 
county,  30  Minn.  96  ;  14  N.  W.  458 
[county  court  house  and  appurten- 
ant sidewalk]. 

Mississippi :  Sutton  v.  Police 
Board,  41  Miss.  236  [defective  con- 
struction of  bridge]  ;  Brabham  v. 
Hinds  county,  54  Id.  363  [non-repair 
of  bridge]. 

Missouri :  Miller  v.  Iron  county, 
29  Mo.  122  :  State  v.  St.  Louis  county, 
34  Id.  546  ;  State  v.  Leffingwell,  54 
Id.  458  ;  Clark  v.  Adair  county,  79 
Id.  536;  Reardon  v.  St.  Louis  comity, 
36  Id.  555  ;  Reed  v.  Howell  county, 
125  Id.  58  ;  28  S.  W.  177  ;  Jefferson 
county  v.  St.  Louis  county,  113  Mo. 
619:21  S.  W.  217 

Nebraska  :  Wehn  v.  Gage  county, 
5  Neb.  494  [county  jail]  :  Woods  v- 
Colfax  county,  10  Id.  552  ;   7  N.  W. 


475 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§256 


maintaining  this  difference,  has 
authority  to  reject  it  altogether, 

269  [bridge] ;  A  statute  (L.  18S9,  ch. 
7,  §  4)  now  declares  the  liability  of 
counties  for  injuries  to  a  traveler 
caused  by  insufficient  or  unsafe 
highways  and  bridges.  See  Hollings- 
worth  v.  Saunders  county,  36  Neb. 
141. 

Ne  w  Jersey  :  Sussex  v.  Strader,  18 
N.  J.  Law,  108  ;  Cooley  v.  Freehold- 
ers, etc.,  27  Id.  415.  In  1860,  the 
statute  made  the  freeholders  of  each 
county  a  corporation,  and  gave  an 
action  against  them  for  injuries 
from  defective  condition  of  bridges 
(Ripley  v.  Freeholders,  etc.,  40  N. 
J.  Law,  45  ;  Pray  v.  Jersey  City,  32 
Id.  394  ;  Livermore  v.  Freeholders, 
etc.,  29  Id  245).  See  State  v.  Hud- 
son county,  30  N.  J.  Law,  137  [in- 
dictment]. 

New  York :  Under  a  statute  de- 
claring that  a  certain  bridge  "  shall 
become  a  public  bridge  and  may  be 
maintained  by  the  county,"  an  ac- 
tion will  not  lie  against  the  county 
for  damages  from  want  of  repair. 
"We  have  not  been  referred  to  a  case, 
an«l  we  are  not  aware  of  one,  in 
which  an  action  for  injury  for  neg- 
lect to  properly  maintain  a  bridge 
has  been  maintained  against  a  county 
or  town,  unless  the  right  of  action 
was  expressly  given  by  statute  "  (En- 
sign v.  Livingston  county.  25  Hun, 
20).  S.  P.,  Hughes  v.  Monroe  county, 
147  N.  Y.  49  ;  41  N.  E  407  [defective 
machine  in  insane  asylum]  :  Ala- 
mango  v.  Albany  county,  25  Hun, 
551  [same,  in  penitentiary].  See 
Lorillard  v.  Monroe  county,  UN. 
Y.  393  [mistake  in  tax  assessment]. 
The  statute  (L.  1893,  ch.  686,  §§  2,  3) 
declaring  counties  to  be  municipal 
corporations,  does  not  change  the 
rule  that  a  county  is  not  liable  for 
negligence  in  failing  to  maintain 
bridges  in  a  reasonably  safe  condition 


led  some  courts  of  established 
as  being  without   foundation 

for  public  travel  (Albrecht  v.  Queens 
county,  84  Hun,  399  ;  32  N.  Y.  Supp. 
473;  Ahern  v.  Kings  county,  89  Hun, 
148  ;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  1023) :  nor  for  the 
negligence  of  a  drawbridge  tender 
(Godfrey  v.  Kings  county,  89  Hun, 
18  ;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  1052). 

North  Carolina  :  White  v.  Cho- 
wan county,  90  N.  C.  437  [defective 
bridge]  ;  Jackson  v.  Greene  county, 
76  Id.  282  [fallen  bridge]  ;  S.  P.,  An- 
derson v.  Steamboat  Co.,  64  Id.  399  ; 
Willey  v.  Gatling,  70  Id.  410. 

Ohio :  Hamilton  county  v. 
Mighels,  7  Ohio  St.  109  [court-house]. 
See  Dunn  v.  Brown  county,  46  Id. 
93  ;  18  N.  E.  496). 

Oregon  :  Templeton  v.  Linn  coun- 
ty, 22  Oreg.  313;  29Pac.  795;  Walker 
v.  Wasco  county,  19  Pac.  81  ;  East- 
man v.  Clackamas  county,  32  Fed. 
24.  Compare  McCalla  v.  Multno- 
mah county,  3  Oreg.  424  [action 
under  statute]  ;  Rankin  v.  Buckman, 
9  Id.  253. 

South  Carolina :  Young  v.  Road 
Commis.,  2  Nott  &  McC.  537  ;  White 
v.  Charleston,  2  Hill.  571. 

South  Dakota :  Bailey  v.  Law- 
rence county,  5  S.  D.  393 ;  59  N.  W. 
219  [bridge]. 

Washington:  Clark  v.  Lincoln 
county,  1  Wash.  St.,  518;  20  Pac. 
576  [highway]. 

Towns  and  townships  are  likewise 
exempt  at  common  law  (Morey  v. 
Newfane,  8  Barb.  645;  Fishkiii  v. 
Fishkill  Plank  Road  Co.,  22  Id.  631  : 
Galen  v.  Clyde  Plank  Road  Co.,  27 
Id.  543  :  Gailor  v.  Herrick,  42  Id.  79  ; 
North  Lebanon  v.  Arnold,  47  Pa.  St. 
488;  Miller  v.  McWilliams,  50  Ala. 
427  ;  Waltham  v.  Kemper,  55  111.  346 
[overruling  South  Ottawa  v.  Foster, 
20  Id.  296]  ;  Bussell  v.  Steuben,  57 
Id.  35  :  Flori  v.  St.  Louis.  69  Mo.  341 ; 
Yeager  v.  Tippecanoe.  81  Ind.   46  ; 


§  256]  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  476 

in  sound  reason.  The  difficulty  of  finding  any  legal  basis  for 
exempting  a  county  from  liability  for  a  breach  of  its  duty  to 
maintain  its  highways  in  a  reasonable  state  of  repair,  where  it 
has  the  same  power  that  a  city-corporation  has  of  raising 
funds  to  perform  its  duty  in  that  regard,  is  not  to  be  denied. 
It  would  seem  that  where  a  county  or  other  such  public  cor- 
poration is  provided  with  a  corporate  fund,  or  the  means  of 
raising  it,  one  reason  at  least  for  the  rule  of  exemption  ceases. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  the  reason  may  be  found  in  the 
difference  of  character  between  urban  and  suburban  servitudes, 
and  the  consequent  limited  ownership  and  control  of  their 
roads  by  counties,  as  compared  with  a  city's  mere  absolute 
rights  of  ownership  and  control  of  its  streets.  Other  plausible 
reasons  might  be  urged,  but  the  fact  remains  that  counties, 
townships,  and  the  like,  are  governmental  agencies  not  less 
than  cities,  and  for  that  reason,  where  a  statutory  duty 
imposed  on  one  class  —  e.  g.  to  maintain  highways  and  bridges, 
is  essentially  identical  with  that  imposed  on  the  other,  within 
their  respective  territories,  and  each  is  provided  with  the 
means  of  performing  it,  it  is  plainly  more  consistent,  on  prin- 
ciple, to  hold  both  classes  to  the  same  extent  of  liability  for 
a  breach  of  the  duty,  either  by  denying  that  either  class  is 
liable,  as  is  done  in  some  states,  or  else  holding  both  liable,  as 
in   others.     But   with  the    exceptions  mentioned   in   the  next 

Altnow  v.  Sibley,  30  Minn.  186;  14  grounds]).    See Bigelowv.  Randolph, 

N.  W.  877  ;    Vail  v.  Anienia,  4  N.  14  Gray,  541.     Union  school  districts 

Dak.  239 ;    59  N.  W.   1092  ;  Niles  v.  in  New  York  are,   by  statute,   full 

Martin,  4  Mich.  557  ;  Leoni  v.  Tay-  corporations,  and  responsible  out  of 

lor,   20  Id.    148  ;  Bristol  v.  Johnson,  their  corporate  funds,  for  the  negli- 

34  Id.  123).     As  to  Michigan,  under  gence  of  their  trustees  (L.  1864,  ch. 

present  statutes,  see  Frary  v.  Allen,  555 ;  Bassett  v.  Fish,  75  N.  Y.  303  ; 

91  Mich.  666  ;  52  N.  W.  78.  rev'g  12  Hun,  209  [defects  in  floor  of 

So  are  school  districts  (Harris  v.  school-house   injuring  pupil]).     See 

School  District,  8  Foster  [N.  H.],  58;  §  329,  post. 

Giles  v.  School  District,  11  Id.  304  ;  So  are  Road   Districts  (White  v. 

Scales    v.  Chattahoochee   county,  4  Road  District,  9  Iowa,  202  ;  McCon- 

Ga.  225 ;   Rogers  v.    People,   68  111.  nell  v.  Dewey,  5  Neb.  385  ;  Court  v. 

154  :    Lane  v.  Woodbury,  58  Iowa,  Coroner,  2  Wall.  501  ;  Trustees,  etc., 

462    [school-house];    12  N.  W.  478;  v.  Tatman,  13  111.  27). 

Beach  v.  Leahy,  11  Kans.  23  ;  Conk-  DrainciQe    Districts:     Elmore     v. 

lin  v.    School   District,   22  Id.   521  ;  Drainage  Corn'rs,  135  111.  269  ;  25  N. 

Bank  v.  Brainerd  School  District,  49  E.  1010. 
Minn.   106  ;    51    N.    W.    814   [school 


477 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§  257 


two  sections,  all  the  states,  while  holding  their  cities  and  in- 
corporated villages  and  towns  liable  for  breaches  of  such  a 
duty,  declare  their  counties,  townships,  etc.,  to  be  exempt, 
although  the  language  of  the  statute  imposing  the  duty  is,  in 
words,  as  mandatory  on  the  one  as  on  the  other.3 

§257.  Liability  of  counties,  towns,  etc.,  in  Pennsylvania, 
Maryland,  Indiana  and  Iowa. — In  Pennsylvania1  and   Mary- 


3  Referring  to  this  distinction, 
Judge  Dillon  (Municip.  Corp.  § 
1023a)  says  :  "  It  may  be  after  all 
that  there  is  a  substantial  difference 
not  readily  perceived  in  the  greater 
efficiency  with  which  the  latter  class 
of  corporations,  as  actually  consti- 
tuted, is  able  to  perform  the  duty  in 
question.  And  it  may  be  that  this 
is  only  another  of  the  many  ex- 
amples with  which  our  jurispru- 
dence abounds  —  which  abhors  gen- 
eralizations, disregards  mere  sym- 
metry, and  unconsciously  and 
silently  embodies  the  underlying 
notions  of  the  local  communities  — 
this  may  be,  we  suggest,  after  all 
only  another  example  of  the  fact 
that  logic  and  law  are  not  always 
precisely  coincident  or  coterminous  ; 
that  law  is  frequently  logic  limited 
and  circumscribed  by  a  sense  of  ex- 
pediency ;  and  that  accordingly  leg- 
islators and  courts  declare  and  apply 
distinctions  that  are  oftentimes 
easier  to  feel  than  to  unfold  and 
define,  and  which  do  not  obviously 
consist  with  an  indefinite  extension 
and  inexorable  application  of  those 
principles  of  logic  that  are  appar- 
ently applicable  to  and  seemingly 
control  the  subject.  The  foregoing 
considerations  are  applicable  to  all 
kinds  of  quasi  corporations.  These 
are  primarily  and  distinctively  state 
instrumentalities,  and  the  preroga- 
tive of  partaking  of  the  state's  ex- 
emption from  liability  in  respect  to 
the  exercise  of  all  their  public  func- 
tions and  duties  without  exception, 


is  one  which  naturally  grows  out  of 
the  manner  and  objects  of  the  crea- 
tion." The  reason,  or  want  of  reason, 
for  the  distinction  is  discussed  in 
Elliott,  Roads  and  Streets,  39-42,  322, 
and  1  Thompson,  Negligence,  618. 
The  subject  need  not  be  further 
pursued  here.  As  to  highways,  see 
§  289,  post. 

1  Under  the  Pennsylvania  Consti- 
tution of  1873,  counties  are  recog- 
nized as  municipal  corporations 
(Lamoreux  v.  Luzerne  county,  116 
Pa.  St.  195;  9  Atl.  274).  The 
Pennsylvania  statute  provides  that 
"  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  county 
commissioners  "  to  repair  all  bridges, 
etc.,  and  pay  the  expenses  out  of  the 
county  treasury  (Act  1843,  §  1,  P.  L. 
221).  "  All  roads  shall  be  kept  in  re- 
pair at  the  expense  of  the  respective 
townships  "  (Act  of  1836,  §  6,  P.  L. 
556).  It  is  held  that,  under  these 
statutes,  the  liabilities  of  the  counties 
for  the  non-repair  of  bridges,  and  of 
townships  for  the  non-repair  of  roads, 
is  ' '  legally  consequent  upon  a 
neglected  duty  to  repair"  (Dean  v. 
New  Milford  [1843]  5  Watts  &  S. 
545  [township]  ;  Humphreys  v.  Arm- 
strong county,  56  Pa.  St.  204  [coun- 
ty] ;  Rapho  v.  Moore,  68  Id.  404 
[township]  ;  Newlin  v.  Davis,  77  Id. 
319  [township]  ;  Mahanoy  v.  Scholly, 
84  Id.  136  [township] ;  Rigony  v. 
Schuylkill  county,  103  Id.  382  [coun- 
ty not  liable  for  bridge  built  by  it, 
and  subsequently  turned  over  to 
township  by  act  of  legislature]  ; 
Shadier  v.  Blair  county,  136  Id.  488 : 


§257] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


478 


land2  it  has  long  been  firmly  held  that  the  imposition  of  an 
imperative  duty  by  general  statute,  upon  counties  and  towns, 
or  similar  quasi  municipal  corporations,  such  as  to  maintain 
highways,  bridges,  public  buildings  and  the  like,  or  to  abate 
nuisances,  especially  when  coupled  with  a  power  through 
administrative  boards,  to  raise  money  for  the  purpose  of  per- 
forming the  duty,  by  taxation  or  otherwise,  implies  an  inten- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  legislature  to  make  them  liable  to  a 
private  action  for  the  consequences  of  a  breach  of  such  duties. 
In  Indiana3  and   Iowa,4  early  decisions,  under  their  respective 


20  Atl.  539.  To  the  same  effect, 
Pennsylvania,  etc.  Canal  Co.  v. 
Graham,  63  Pa.  St.  290  ;  Meadville  v. 
Erie  Canal  Co.,  18  Id.  66. 

2  In  Maryland,  the  statute  makes 
the  county  commissioners  a  corpora- 
tion, and  they  have  "  power  and 
authority  "  to  build  and  maintain  in 
repair  all  roads  and  bridges,  with  am- 
ple powers  to  raise  funds  for  that 
purpose  ;  though  no  liability  is  ex- 
pressly imposed  or  action  given  for 
a  breach   of   duty.     It   is   held   that 


Co.  v.  Cassell,  60  Md.  419  ;  7  Atl. 
805 ;  Hartford  county  v.  Wise,  71 
Md.  43  ;  18  Atl.  31. 

3  In  Indiana,  the  county  commis- 
sioners "shall  cause"  all  bridges  in 
the  county  to  be  kept  in  repair. 
Held  that  this  raises  an  imperative 
duty,  and  an  implied  liability  on  the 
part  of  the  county  for  injuries  oc- 
casioned by  the  non-repair  of  a 
bridge  (Vaught  v.  Johnson  county, 
101  Ind.  123  ;  Fulton  county  v. 
Rickel,  106  Id.  501  ;  Knox  county  v. 


under  this  statute,  a  county  is  liable  Montgomery,    109  Id.  69  ;  Patton  v. 

for  injuries  sustained  from  the  non-  Montgomery    county,   96     Id.    131  ; 

repair  of  a  road  or  bridge  ;  that  the  Gibson    v.    Emmerson,   95   Id.  579  ; 

exercise    of     a      statutory      power,  Howard  county  v.  Legg,  93  Id.  523  ; 

granted  for  the  public  good,  is  not  Madison  county  v.  Brown,  89  Id.  48  • 

merely  discretionary,  but  imperative,  Morgan  county  v.  Pritchett,  85   Id. 


and  the  words,  "power  and  authori- 
ty "  in  such  case  may  be  construed 
"duty  and  obligation"  (Baltimore 
v.  Marriott,  9  Md.  178  ;  Anne  Arun- 
del county  v.  Duckett,  20  Id.  468 ; 
Calvert  county  v.  Gibson,  36  Id. 
229  ;  Prince  George's  county  v.  Bur- 
gess, 61  Id.  29  ;  Baltimore  v.  Pen- 
nington, 15  Id.  173 ;  Baltimore  v. 
Baker,  44  Id.  1  [county  liable  for  de- 


68  ;  Pritchett  v.  Morgan  county  62 
Id.  210  ;  Shelby  county  v.  Duprez, 
87  Id.  509  ;  House  v.  Montgomery 
county,  60  Id.  580  [negligent  con- 
struction of  bridge]  ;  Sullivan  v.  Ar- 
nett,  116  Id.  438  ;  19  N.  E.  299  ;  Har- 
ris v.  Vigo  county,  121  Ind.  299  ;  23 
N.  E.  92). 

4  In  Iowa,  the  county  officers  have 
power  "  to  provide  for    the  erection 


feet  of  county  bridges  occasioned  by    of  all  bridges  which   may  be  neces. 


omission  to  appoint  officers  to  make 
repairs] ;  Flynn  v.  Canton  Co. ,  40 
Id.  322 ;  Baltimore,  etc.  Turnpike 
Co.  v.  Crowther,  63  Id.  566  ;  Hart- 
ford county  v.  Hamilton,  60  Id.  340  ; 
Prince  George's  county  v.  Burgess, 
61  Id.  29  ;  Baltimore,  etc.    Turnpike 


sary  and  which  the  public  con- 
venience may  require  within  their 
respective  counties  and  to  keep  the 
same  in  repair  "  (Code,  §  303,  subd. 
18) ;  and  the  same  officers  are  also 
empowered  "  to  build  and  keep  in 
repair"   necessary  buildings  for   tho 


479 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§258 


statutes,  which  held  counties  impliedly  liable  for  non-repair  of 
bridges,  continue  to  be  followed,  though  confessedly  without 
any  legal  reason,  and  contrary  to  all  the  authorities  in  other 
states  having  similar  statutes  ;  but  in  both  these  states  the 
courts  have  refused  to  extend  the  rule  of  liability  any  further 
than  the  matter  of  bridges,  though  the  cases  so  decided  are 
fully  within  the  principle  of  the  bridge  cases.5 

§  258.  Liability  of  New  England  towns.  —  The  term 
"  town  "  in  New  England  is  generic,  and  will  embrace  cities, 
unless  the  contrary  appears  to  have  been  the  intent  of  the 
legislature.1     The  individual   inhabitants   of  towns  and  cities 


use  of  the  county  and  the  courts. 
Under  the  first  named  statute  coun- 
ties are  held  impliedly  liable  for  in- 
juries resulting  from  defective 
bridges  (Wilson  v.  Jefferson  county, 
13  Iowa,  181  ;  Brown  v.  Jefferson 
county,  16  Id.  339;  McCullom  v. 
Blackhawk  county,  21  Id.  409  ;  Bar- 
rett v.  Brooks,  Id.  144 ;  Soper  v. 
Henry  county,  26  Id.  264  ;  Kendall 
v.  Council  Bluffs,  32  Id.  324  ;  Chand- 
ler v.  Fremont  county,  42  Id.  58  ; 
Huston  v.  Iowa  county,  43  Id.  456  ; 
Moreland  v.  Mitchell  county,  40  Id. 
394  ;  Krause  v.  Davis  county,  44  Id. 
141  ;  Huff  v.  Poweshiek  county,  60 
Id.  529  15  N.  W.  418;  Casey  v. 
Tama  county,  75  Iowa,  655  ;  37  N. 
W.  138  ;  Morgan  v.  Fremont  county, 
92  Iowa,  644;  61  N.  W.  231).  It 
must  be  shown  that  the  county  had 
assumed  control  of  the  bridge  or 
made  appropriations  for  building  or 
keeping  it  in  repair  (Titter  v.  Iowa 
county,  48  Iowa,  90  ;  s.  P. ,  Taylor  v. 
Davis  county,  40  Id.  295.  It  is, 
nevertheless,  held  that  from  the  lan- 
guage of  the  statute  as  to  court- 
houses, no  such  liability  as  to  tbem 
will  be  implied  (Kincaid  v.  Hardin 
county,  53  Iowa,  430  ;  see  next  note). 
6  Cones  v.  Benton  county,  137  Ind. 
404  ;  37  N.  E.  272  ;  where  the  county 
was  held  not  liable  for  non-repair  of 


a  highway ;  the  court  saying 
"  While  we  regard  the  liability  of 
counties  for  negligence  in  failing  to 
keep  bridges  in  repair  as  well  settled, 
we  recognize  the  fact  that  the  weight 
of  authority  is  all  the  other  way, 
and  are  not  disposed  to  extend  the 
rule  so  as  to  embrace  other  cases." 
So  a  county  has  been  held  not  liable 
for  non-repair  of  its  court-house 
(Vigo  county  v.  Daily,  132  Ind.  73  ; 
31  N.  E.  531)  ;  or  of  its  jail  (Morris  v. 
Switzerland  county,  131  Ind.  285 ; 
31  N.  E.  77).  It  is  also  held  that  a 
county  is  not  liable  for  injuries  to 
a  traveler  on  a  highway  by  the  negli- 
gent conduct  of  its  officers  in  piling 
lumber  therein  while  repairing  a 
bridge  (Abbett  v.  Johnson  county, 
114  Ind.  61  ;  16  N.  E.  127).  The 
same  restricted  interpretation  of  the 
statute  has  been  made  in  Iowa. 
Thus  in  Kincaid  v.  Hardin  county 
(53  Iowa,  430),  where  it  was  sought 
to  hold  a  county  liable  for  structural 
defects  in  a  county  court-house  caus- 
ing injury  to  plaintiff,  it  was  held 
the  county  was  not  liable.  "We 
have  no  disposition  to  carry  the  doc- 
trine [of  the  bridge  cases]  further 
than  is  necessary  to  sustain  the  de- 
cisions of  the  court"  (per  Roth- 
rock,  J.). 
1  State  v.  Gennon,  2  R.  I.  278  ;  Hill 


§25S] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


480 


and  other  municipal  communities  are  liable,  in  their  persons 
and  property,  for  the  debts  of  the  towns  or  corporations  (in- 
cluding judgments  against  towns  for  negligence),  by  execu- 
tion or  taxation.2  These  town  organizations  have  many,  if 
not  all,  the  usual  powers  of  municipal  corporations,  besides 
the  characteristics  of  the  county  organizations  of  other  states. 
They  are  charged,  among  other  things,  with  the  duty  of  build- 
ing and  maintaining  highways,  bridges,  town  buildings  and  the 
like  —  a  duty  which,  in  other  states,  is  generally  imposed  upon 
independent  public  officers,  or  is  voluntarily  assumed  by  incor- 
porated villages  and  cities.  Nevertheless  they  are  universally 
declared  to  be  quasi  corporations  merely,  and,  with  perhaps  a 
single  qualification,  to  be  wholly  exempt  from  civil  liability 
for  neglect  of  duty,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute  imposing  such 
liability.3     This  doctrine  has  been  applied  by   the  courts   of 


v.  Boston,  122  Mass.  344;  Mead  v. 
Derby,  40  Conn.  205.  In  Connecti- 
cut, however,  this  notion  of  identi- 
fying incorporated  cities  and  bor- 
oughs with  rural  towns,  in  respect 
to  their  corporate  liabilities,  seems 
to  be  now  repudiated  (Hall  v.  Nor- 
walk,  65  Conn.  310;  32  Atl.  400). 
There  held  that  a  borough,  whose 
charter  provided  that  it  shall  have 
exclusive  authority  to  repair  high- 
ways, "  any  general  statute  to  the 
contrary  notwithstanding,"  was  im- 
pliedly liable  for  defective  highways 
within  its  limits.  See  cases  cited  in 
notel,  §259. 

2  In  Beardsley  v.  Smith  (16  Conn. 
368)  it  was  declared  to  be  the  imme- 
morial usage,  and  uniformly  sup- 
ported by  judicial  decisions  through- 
out New  England,  that  the  inhabit- 
ants of  towns  and  other  municipal 
communities  or  corporations  and 
quasi  corporations,  were  liable  in 
their  persons  and  property  for  the 
debts  of  the  towns  or  corporations 
by  taxation  or  execution.  And  see 
Bray  v.  Wallingford,  20  Conn.  416  ; 
compare  Horner  v.  Coffey,  25  Miss. 
434;  Miller  v.  Mc Williams,  50  Ala.  427. 


3  Hill  v.  Boston,  122  Mass.  344 ; 
Oliver  v.  Worcester,  102  Id.  489; 
Sullivan  v.  Boston,  126  Id.  540 ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Springfield,  7  Id.  9  ; 
Mower  v.  Leicester,  9  Id.  247  ;  Hixon 
v.  Lowell,  13  Gray,  59  ;  Bigelow  v. 
Randolph,  14  Id.  541  ;  Brady  v.  Low- 
ell, 3  Cush.  121  ;  Bacon  v.  Boston,  3 
Id.  174  ;  Brailey  v.  Southborough,  6 
Id.  141  ;  Smith  v.  Dedham,  8  Id.  522; 
Gregory  v.  Adams,  14  Id.  242  ;  Blod- 
gett  v.  Boston,  8  Allen,  237 ;  Stick- 
ney  v.  Salem,  3  Id.  374  ;  Pettingell 
v.  Chelsea,  161  Mass.  368  ;  37  N.  E. 
380  [breaking  of  pole  connected  with 
fire-signal  service,  injuring  em- 
ployee]; Chedsey  v.  Canton,  17  Conn. 
475;  Reed  v.  Belfast,  20  Me.  248; 
Frazer  v.  Lewiston,  76  Id.  531  ;  San- 
ford  v.  Augusta,  32  Id.  536  ;  Peck  v. 
Ellsworth,  36  Id.  393 ;  McCarthy  v. 
Portland,  67  Id.  167  ;  Eastman  v. 
Meredith,  36  N.  H.  284  [defective 
construction  of  town  house] ;  Wake- 
field v.  Newport,  62  Id.  624  [negli- 
gence in  taking  down  a  flag-staff  so 
that  it  fell  on  a  traveler  on  the  high- 
way] ;  Hyde  v.  Jamaica,  27  Vt.  443  ; 
Baxter  v.  Winooski  Turnp.  Co.  22  Id. 
114 ;  Davis  v.   Lamoile  Turnp.  Co. 


48 1 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


[§258 


Massachusetts  and  Rhode  Island  to  the  performance  of  any 
and  all  duties  imposed  by  general  statute  upon  all  the  towns 
of  the  state,  and  not  upon  any  particular  town  or  city,  by  the 
terms  of  its  charter  for  its  individual  benefit,  pecuniary  or 
otherwise.4  Duties  thus  generally  imposed  are  held,  in  those 
states,  to  be  owing  to  the  public  alone,  and  not  to  any  indi- 
vidual, and  hence  an  injury  sustained  by  a  breach  thereof  will 
not  sustain  a  private  action.  From  a  duty  thus  generally  im- 
posed, e.  g.,  to  build  and  maintain  school-houses,  a  liability  for 
a  negligent  performance  of  it  will  not  be  implied,  in  favor  of 
one  specially  damaged  thereby.5  It  does  not  matter  that  such 
service  is  not  one  imperatively  imposed  upon  the  corporation; 
it  is  sufficient  if  the  statute  permits  it,  and  the  city  voluntarily 
undertook  the  work.6     This  rule  has  been  accepted  and  applied 


27  Id.  602  ;  State  v.   Burlington,    36 
Id.  521  ;  Drew  v.  Sutton,  55  Id.  586 
Wixon   v.   Newport.   13  R.    I.    453 
Taylor    v.     Peckham,    8     Id.    849 
Providence  v.  Clapp,  17  How.  TJ.  S. 
167. 

4  Hill  v.  Boston,  supra. 

6  Hill  v.  Boston,  supra.  No  doubt 
this  case  was  rightly  decided  ;  but 
we  cannot  think  the  ground  on 
which  the  decision  was  put  can  be 
Bustained,  except,  perhaps,  under 
the  somewhat  peculiar  jurisprudence 
governing  the  liabilities  of  towns  in 
the  New  England  states.  We  can 
see  no  reason  why  a  duty  imposed 
by  a  general  law  upon  the  1,000 
towns  of  a  state  should  have  any 
less  force  to  raise  an  implied  liability 
for  a  breach  of  it  than  1,000  special 
statutes  imposing  the  same  duty  on 
1,000  different  towns.  The  doctrine 
was  approved  in  Wixon  v.  Newport, 
13  R.  I.  454,  where  it  was  sought  to 
make  a  city  corporation  liable  for 
defects  in  the  steam  heating  appa- 
ratus of  a  public  school  building,  re- 
sulting in  a  pupil  being  scalded. 
The  non-liability  of  the  city,  how- 
ever, was  more  distinctly  put  upon 
the  ground  that  the  maintenance  of 
[Law  op  Neg.  Vol.  1—31.] 


school  buildings  was  a  public,  as 
distinguished  from  a  private  cor- 
porate, duty. 

6  Under  a  general  statute,  provid- 
ing that  cities  might  appropriate 
money  for  the  celebration  of  holi- 
days, a  city  undertook  the  celebra- 
tion of  a  holiday  exclusively  for  the 
gratuitous  amusement,  entertain- 
ment and  instruction  of  the  public. 
Held,  the  city  was  not  liable  to  one 
injured  through  the  negligence  of 
the  city's  servants  in  discharging 
fireworks  for  the  purpose  of  the 
celebration.  The  doctrine  was  there 
stated  to  be  that  "  cities  or  towns  are 
not  liable  for  negligence  when,  act- 
ing under  general  laws  applicable  to 
all  cities  and  towns  alike,  they  have 
undertaken  a  particular  service  or 
work  which  has  no  direct  or  natural 
tendency  to  injure  any  individual  in 
reason  or  property,  and  no  element 
of  special  corporate  advantage  or  of 
a  consideration  for  undertaking  it, 
or  of  pecuniary  profit  or  contribution 
from  individuals  especially  bene- 
fited, either  by  way  of  aid  in  the 
performance  of  the  work,  or  of  com- 
pensation for  its  use,  or  benefit  after 
its  completion  ;  and  where  no  pecu- 


§  258]  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  4S2 

in  California,7  Michigan,8  New  Jersey,9  South  Carolina10  and 


niary  penalty  or  liability  is  imposed 
by  statute  in  case  of  defective  or 
negligent  performance  of  the  under- 
taking ;  but  where  their  action  is 
exclusively  and  purely  as  a  matter  of 
public  service  for  the  general  and 
common  good  "  (Tindley  v.  Salem, 
137  Mass.  171).  "The  agents  se- 
lected by  them  to  execute  the  duty 
[of  keeping  public  ways  in  repair], 
in  obedience  to  the  law  of  the  state, 
are  to  be  regarded  as  public  officers 
rather  than  the  servants  or  agents 
of  the  municipal  corporation  by 
which  they  are  employed.  The  re- 
lation of  master  and  servant  does 
not  exist  and  the  maxim  of  respond- 
eat superior  does  not  apply"  (Bar- 
ney v.  Lowell,  98  Mass.  570) . 

1  "  In  California,  the  doctrine  [that 
municipal  corporations  are  not  liable 
for  personal  injuries  to  individuals] 
has  been  clearly  and  continuously 
adopted  "  (Chope  v.  Eureka,  78  Cal. 
588;  21  Pac.  364  [excavation  for 
sewer  left  without  guard  or  light  at 
night]  ;  Arnold  v.  San  Jose,  81  Cal. 
618  ;  22  Pac.  877  [same]).  The  muni- 
cipal officers  are  aloue  liable  (Butler 
v.  Ash  worth,  102  Cal.  663  ;  36  Pac. 
922  [unskillful  repair  of  sewer  caus- 
ing sewage  to  set  back]).  A  general 
statute  of  California  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  cities  provides  that  "  the  city 
council  shall  have  power  to  cause 
the  streets  to  be  cleansed  and  re- 
paired." Held,  that  this  power  was 
not  given  to  the  corporation,  as  such, 
and  that  there  was  no  consequent 
liability  on  the  part  of  the  corpora- 
tion for  the  non-performance  of  the 
correlative  duty  (Winbigler  v.  Los 
Angeles  [1872],  45  Cal.  36).  There  is 
also  a  dictum  that  incorporated  cities 
are,  like  counties,  mere  govern- 
mental instruments,  formed  for  the 
purpose  of  internal  administration, 
and  are  not  liable  for  the  negligence 


of  their  officers,  unless  made  so  by 
statute.  See  James  v.  San  Fran- 
cisco, 6  Cal.  528  ;  O'Hale  v.  Sacra- 
mento, 48  Id.  212. 

8  Detroit  v.  Blackeby,  21  Mich.  84 
[decided  in   1870].      Cooley,  J.,    de- 
livered    a     convincing     dissenting 
opinion,  frequently   referred  to  by 
writers  on  this  subject.     The  case  is 
ably  reviewed  and  dissented  from  in 
Waltham  v.  Kemper,  55  111.  347.     In 
1879,    the    legislature    declared   the 
liability   of   municipal   corporations 
for  negligence  in  the  maintenance  of 
their  streets,  the  purpose  of  the  stat- 
ute being  to  limit  the  responsibility 
to  want  of  reasonable  care  (McAr- 
thur  v.  Saginaw,  58  Mich.  357).    See 
Burnham  v.  Byron,  46  Id.  555  ;  Grand 
Rapids  v.  Wyman,  Id.  516  ;  Lansing 
v.  Toolan,  37  Id.  152  ;  Niles  v.  Mar- 
tin, 4  Id.  557  [decided  before  1879]. 
9  Pray  v.  Jersey  City,  32  N.  J.  Law, 
394.     This  case  wTas  decided  appar- 
ently out  of  deference  to  the  eminent 
judges  who  decided  [1840]  Sussex  v. 
Strader    (3    Harr.    108),    the    court 
remarking,    that   "the  legal    mind 
of  the  country  upon  this  topic,  is  in 
a   state  of   dubiety ;    if  the  matter 
were  one  primce  impressionis  in  this 
court,  a  broad  field  for  investigation 
would  be  thrown  open."     See   also 
Callahan  v.   Morris,  30  N.  J.  Law, 
161  ;  Union   v.    Durkes,   38  Id.    21  ; 
Condict  v.  Jersey  City,  46  Id.   157. 
In  the  last  case,  it  was  held  that  the 
removal  of  ashes  and  garbage  from 
the    streets    was    a    public    duty  ; 
and  the  corporation  was  not  liable 
for  the  negligence  of  its  servant,  the 
driver  of  an  ash  cart  owned  by  it, 
while  dumping  ashes.     See  also  Mar- 
vin Safe  Co.  v.  Ward,  46  N.  J.  Law, 
19  ;  Jersey  City  v.  Kiernan,  50  Id. 
246  ;  note  5,  §  287,  post. 

10  Young  v.   Charleston,   20  S.  C. 
116. 


483 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§259 


Wisconsin.11  It  was  at  one  time  accepted,12  but  soon  rejected,13 
in  Texas.  But  in  none  of  these  states  does  the  rule  extend 
to  cases  of  a  positive  wrong  committed  by  the  corporation  to 
the  personal  damage  of  another,  though  done  in  the  discharge 
of  a  public  duty,  such  as  a  trespass  or  the  creation  or  main- 
tenance of  a  nuisance.14 


§  259.  Common-law  liability  of   New   England  towns. — 

The  qualification  of  the  general  rule  mentioned  in  the  preced- 
ing section  is,  with  respect  to  liability  for  the  neglect  of  obli- 
gations which  a  town  incurs  when  a  special  duty  is  imposed 
upon  it,  with  its  consent,  express  or  implied,  or  a  special 
authority  is  conferred  on  it,  at  its  request.     In  such  cases  the 


11  Ward  v.  Jefferson,  24  Wise.  342  ; 
Cook  v.  Milwaukee,  Id.  270  ;  Houfe 
v.  Fulton,  29  Id.  296  ;  Wheeler  v. 
Westport,  30  Id.  392  ;  Burns  v.  Elba, 
32  Id.  605  ;  Perkins  v.  Fond  du  Lac, 
34  Id.  435  ;  Kittredge  v.  Milwaukee, 
26  Id.  46  ;  Harper  v.  Milwaukee,  30 
Id.  365. 

12  Navastota  v.  Pearce,  46  Tex.  525. 

13  In  Galveston  v.  Posnainsky  (62 
Id.  118),  the  question  was  examined 
with  care,  in  the  case  of  a  city  whose 
charter  merely  gave  it  the  control  of 
its  streets.  It  was  held  that  a  lia- 
bility for  the  defective  condition  of 
a  street  was  necessarily  implied  from 
such  a  grant  of  power  ;  Stayton,  J., 
saying:  "The  weight  of  authority 
holding  that  such  a  corporation, 
created  by  special  charter,  is  liable 
for  an  injury  resulting  from  its  neg- 
lect to  keep  its  streets  in  repair,  is  so 
overwhelming  that  we  feel  con- 
strained to  hold  the  law  so  to  be,  and 
that  an  action  lies  for  such  an  injury 
without  its  being  expressly  given  by 
statute."  Followed:  Galveston  v. 
Barbour,  62  Id.  172  ;  Klein  v.  Dallas, 
71  Id.  284  ;  Baugus  v.  Atlanta,  74  Id. 
629  ;  12  S.  W.  750  ;  Sherman  v.  Wil- 
liams. 77  Tex.  310  ;  14  S.  W.  130. 

14  "If  by  an  excess  of  the  powers 
granted  or  negligence  in  the  mode 


of  carrying  out  the  system  legally 
adopted,  or  omitting  to  take  due 
precautions  to  guard  against  the  con- 
sequences of  its  operation,  a  nuisance 
is  created,  the  city  may  be  liable  to 
indictment  in  behalf  of  the  public, 
or  to  suit  by  individuals  suffering 
special  damages"  (Washburn,  etc., 
Mfg.  Co.  v.  Worcester,  116  Mass. 
458  ;  Haskell  v.  New  Bedford,  108  Id- 
208  ;  Merrifield  v.  Worcester,  110  Id. 
216).  Maintaining  a  sewer  in  such  a 
manner  that  it  carries  the  wash  and 
dirt  from  the  streets  into  a  tide- 
water dock,  is  to  create  a  private 
nuisance,  and  the  dock  owner  may 
recover  for  the  consequent  obstruc- 
tion of  the  water  near  the  wharf 
preventing  vessels  from  lying  at  it 
(Brayton  v.  Fall  River,  113  Mass. 
218)/  So  in  California,  it  is  held,  fol- 
lowing the  common-law  rule,  that  a 
city  is  liable,  as  for  maintaining  a 
nuisance,  where  it  knowingly  per- 
mits a  sewer  to  become  obstructed 
or  out  of  repair,  so  that  sewage  over- 
flows upon  adjacent  land.  It  is  no 
defense  that  the  flow  was  unusual, 
provided  the  sewer  would  have  car- 
ried off  all  the  water  if  it  had  been 
kept  in  repair  (Spangler  v.  San 
Francisco,  84  Cal.  12  ;  23  Pac.  1091) ; 
see  §  287,  post. 


§  260a]  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  484 

town  is  subject  to  the  same  liabilities,  for  the  neglect  of  those 
special  duties  to  which  a  corporation  proper,  or  a  private 
company,  would  be  if  the  same  duties  were  imposed  or  the 
same  authority  conferred  on  it,  including  a  liability  for  the 
wrongful  omission  of  its  officers  and  agents  to  act,  as  well  as 
for  their  wrongful  acts.1  In  like  manner,  the  common-law 
immunity  of  towns  does  not  extend  to  the  case  of  a  town 
which  assumes  an  obligation  for  its  own  advantage,  as  where 
a  town  lets  a  public  building  and  receives  rent  for  its  use.  In 
such  a  case,  the  town  is  liable  in  the  same  manner  and  to  the 
same  extent  as  a  private  owner  for  injuries  caused  by  defects 
in  the  building.2  So  if  a  town,  instead  of  leaving  the  duty  of 
keeping  its  highways  in  repair  to  be  performed  by  its  officers 
and  in  the  methods  provided  by  general  laws,  assumes  to  per- 
form it  by  means  of  agents,  whom  it  may  direct  and  control,  it 
is,  like  any  other  employer,  responsible  for  the  acts  of  those 
agents.3 

§  260  [consolidated  with  §  291]. 

§  260a.   Maintenance   of  jails  and  care  of  prisoners. — 

As  a  state-agency,  a  municipal  corporation  is  exempt  from 
liability  for  the  negligence  of  its  officers  in  maintaining  and 
administering   its  jails,  workhouses,  and  the  like,  for  the  con- 

1  Bigelow  v.  Randolph,  14  Gray,  alike  to  all  cities  ;  but  it  is  a  special 
541,  per  Metcalf,  J.  In  Jones  v.  New  power  or  privilege  conferred  upon 
Haven  (34  Conn.  1),  defendant's  the  city  at  its  request."  So,  in  ex- 
charter  gave  its  common  council  ercising  a  privilege  specially  granted 
power  to  make  by-laws  for  the  regu-  to  a  borough,  e.  g.,  the  right  to 
lation  and  protection  of  trees  in  the  remove  encroachments  upon  its 
public  squares  and  streets.  A  dead  highways,  it  acts  for  its  ownadvant- 
limb,  which  the  city  officers  had  age,  and  not  for  the  benefit  of  the 
negligently  allowed  to  remain  upon  public  at  large,  and  hence  is  liable 
a  tree  in  a  public  square,  fell  upon  for  the  trespass  of  its  officer  within 
and  in jured  the  plaintiff.  Held,  city  the  scope  of  such  power  (Weed  v. 
was  liable.  Carpenter,  J.,  said:  Greenwich,  45  Conn.  170;  Hall  v. 
"  This  duty  [of  caring  for  trees]  is  Norwalk,  65  Id.  310  ;  32  Atl  400). 
not,  strictly  speaking,  a  public  one.  2  Worden  v.  New  Bedford,  131 
It  is  not  a  matter  in  which  the  pub-  Mass.  23  :  Oliver  v.  Worcester,  102 
lie  .-'t  large  outside  the  immediate  Id  489;  Thayer  v.  Boston,  19  Pick, 
vicinity   of   New   Haven,    have  any  511. 

particular  interest.  It  is  not  a  power  3  Waldron  v.  Haverhill,  143  Mass. 

or   duty   imposed   upon  the  city  by  582  ;  10  N.  E.  481. 
general  law ;   nor  is    it    applicable 


4«5 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§26l 


finement  of  offenders.1  The  fact  that  revenue  is  derived  from 
the  labor  of  prisoners  confined  in  a  jail,  or  that  inmates  of  a 
workhouse  or  poor-farm  are  called  upon  to  assist  in  the  work 
of  conducting  it,2  does  not  change  the  nature  of  the  city's 
obligation  from  a  public  to  a  private  one,  so  as  to  make  the 
jail  officers  its  servants,  for  whose  negligence,  in  the  line  of 
their  duty,  it  is  liable. 


§  261.  Statutory  liability  for  mob  violence.  —  The  protec- 
tion of  persons  and  property  from  the  violence  of  mobs  and 
riotous  assemblages  is  essentially  a  governmental  function,  and 


1  Hence  a  municipal  corporation 
is  not  liable  for  the  death  of  a  pris- 
oner in  the  burning  of  its  jail, 
through  the  negligence  of  the  officer 
in  charge  (Brown  v.  Guyandotte,  34 
W.  Va.  299;  12  S.  E.  707).  S.  P., 
Symonds  v.  Clay  county,  71  111.  355. 
An  action  will  not  lie  by  a  prisoner 
for  injuries  resulting  from  his  being 
confined  in  a  filthy  and  unhealthy 
jail,  without  bedding,  to  the  injury 
of  his  health  (New  Kiowa  v.  Craven, 
46  Kans.  114  ;  26  Pac.  426  ;  Blake  v. 
Pontiac,  49  111.  App.  543  ;  La  Clef 
v.  Concordia,  41  Kans.  323 ;  21  Pac. 
272  ;  Moffitt  v.  Asheville,  103  N.  C. 
237;  9  S.  E.  695;  Davis  v.  Knox- 
ville,  90  Tenn.  599;  18  S.  W.  254); 
or  being  detained  in  a  lock-up  all 
night  in  winter  without  a  fire  (Gul- 
likson  v.  McDonald.  62  Minn.  278  ; 
64  N.  W.  812).  In  Shields  v.  Dur- 
ham (118  N.  C.  450  ;  24  S.  E.  794) 
the  authorities  had  known  the  bad 
condition  of  the  jail  for  some  time 
prior  to  plaintiff's  arrest.  Held,  a 
nonsuit  was  error.  See  Lewis  v. 
Raleigh,  77  N.  C.  229.  In  Ulrich  v. 
St.  Louis  (112  Mo.  138  ;  20  S.  W.  466). 
the  plaintiff,  committed  to  tne  work- 
house, was  kicked  by  a  mule  which 
the  superintendent  of  the  workhouse 
had  ordered  him  to  harness,  know- 
ing it  to  be  vicious  :  city  not  lia- 
ble.   Compare  Neff  v.  Wellesley,  148 


Mass.  487;  20  N.  E.  Ill  [poorhouse 
farm  ;  town  liable].  In  Edwards  v. 
Pocahontas  (47  Fed.  268  [W.  Dist. 
Va.]),  a  distinction  was  made  be- 
tween a  public  county-jail  (which 
the  city  had  a  statutory  right  to  use 
for  confining  persons  arrested  for 
breaches  of  its  ordinances),  and  a 
lock-up,  which  it  set  up  instead  ;  it 
being  held  that  for  the  defective 
condition  of  the  latter,  causing  in- 
juries to  a  prisoner  therein  confined, 
the  defendant  was  liable,  it  appear- 
ing that  the  officers  whose  duty  it 
was  to  inspect  it,  from  time  to  time, 
had  neglected  to  do  so. 

2  In  Curran  v.  Boston  (151  Mass. 
505  ;  24  N.  E.  781),  an  inmate  of  a 
workhouse  was  injured  while  en- 
gaged in  unloading  coal,  by  the  neg- 
ligence of  the  officers  and  servants 
employed  in  the  institution.  The 
city  derived  some  revenue  from  the 
labor  of  the  inmates.  Held,  that  the 
profit  thus  derived  was  purely  inci- 
dental to  the  object  and  purpose  of 
the  workhouse,  which  was  not  the 
nature  of  a  business,  and  the  city 
was  not  liable.  To  same  effect, 
Alamango  v.  Albany  county.  ','5 
Hun.  551  fa  penitentiary  inmate  in- 
jured by  defective  machinery  at 
which  he  was  put  to  work].  See 
Lewis  v.  State,  96  N.  Y.  71  ;  §  250, 
n.  1,  ante. 


§26l] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


486 


when  delegated  by  the  state  to  a  local  governing  body,  the 
latter  partakes  of  the  state's  prerogative  of  exemption  from 
private  action  for  the  consequences  of  its  failure  to  exercise  its 
powers  to  that  end.  Although  it  may  have  anticipated  a 
breach  of  the  peace  and  possessed  means  to  prevent  the  injury 
inflicted  by  the  wrong-doers,  it  is  not  liable  at  common  law  for 
the  consequences  of  its  neglect  of  duty  in  that  regard.1  It  is 
entirely  competent,  however,  for  the  legislature  to  furnish  such 
a  remedy,  and  regulate  the  mode  of  assessing  the  damages 
suffered  ; 2  and  this  has  been  done  in  England,  and  in  several 
of  our  own   states,  as   in   Alabama,   California,    Kansas,  Ken- 


1  Hart  v.  Bridgeport,  13  Blatchf. 
289  ;  Louisiana  v.  New  Orleans,  109 
U.  S.  285.  The  charter  of  a  city 
provided  that  it  should  be  its  duty 
"  to  regulate  the  police,  preserve  the 
peace,  prevent  disturbance  and  dis- 
orderly assemblages."  Held,  that 
the  duty  intended  properly  apper- 
tained to  an  administrative  and  legis- 
lative body,  acting  in  the  govern- 
ment of  a  city;  hence  the  corpora- 
tion was  not  responsible  for  the 
destruction  of  property  by  a  riotous 
assemblage  of  persons,  or  for  the 
neglect  of  the  officers  in  not  prevent- 
ing such  destruction  (Western  Col- 
lege v.  Cleveland,  12  Ohio  St.  375). 
In  that  case  Gholson,  J.,  said  :  "It 
is  not  the  policy  of  governments  to 
indemnify  individuals  for  losses  sus- 
tained, either  from  the  want  of 
proper  laws,  or  from  the  indequate 
enforcement  of  laws,  made  to  secure 
the  property  of  individuals."  To 
same  effect,  Darlington  v.  New  York, 
31  N.  Y.  164;  Solomon  v.  Kingston, 
24  Hun,  562;  Luke  v.  Brooklyn :  43 
Barb.  54;  Re  Pennsylvania  Hall,  5 
Pa.  St.  205 ;  Allegheny  county  v. 
Gibson.  90  Id.  397  :  Baltimore  v. 
Poultney,  25  Md.  107  ;  Brightman  v. 
Bristol.  65  Me.  428 ;  Underbill  v. 
Manchester,  45  N  H.  214  :  Chad- 
bourne  v.  New  Castle,  48  Id.  196; 
Campbell  v.    Montgomery,  53  Ala. 


527 ;  Clear  Lake,  etc.  Co.  v.  Lake 
County,  45  Cal.  90 ;  Atchison  v. 
Twine,  9  Kans.  350  ;  Prather  v.  Lex. 
ington,  52  Ky.  559  ;  Fauvia  v.  New 
Orleans,  20  La.  Ann.  410  ;  Gianfor- 
tone  v.  New  Orleans,  61  Fed.  64; 
New  Orleans  v.  Abbagnato,  10  C.  C. 
A.  361  ;  62  Fed.  240  ;  Respublica  v. 
Sparhawk,  1  Dallas,  357  [government 
not  liable  for  loss  of  goods  stored  in 
a  public  storehouse  during  a  time  of 
war,  by  order  of  Congress,  and  sub- 
sequently seized  by  the  public 
enemy].  In  Kentucky  (Gen.  Stat. 
c.  1,  §  5),  cities  are  declared  liable 
for  damages  done  to  property  by 
riotous  and  tumultuous  assem- 
blages of  people.  In  Jolley  v. 
Hawesville  (89  Ky.  279  ;  12  S.  W. 
313),  the  city  was  sought  to  be  held 
liable  for  the  negligence  of  the  city 
marshal  in  permitting  persons  to 
congregate  on  the  streets  with  guns 
and  pistols,  and  engage  in  a  sham 
battle,  resulting  in  the  death  of  a 
non-participant.  Held,  city  not  lia- 
ble. The  liability  cannot  be  founded 
on  the  existence  of  both  power  and 
means  to  prevent  and  suppress  mobs, 
and  the  neglect  of  the  officers  to 
exercise  them  (Prather  v.  Lexing- 
ton, 52  Ky.  559;  Ward  v.  Louisville, 
16  Id.  184). 

2  Darlington  v.  New  York,  31  N. 
Y.  164,  and  cases  supra. 


487 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§262 


tucky,  Louisiana,  Maryland,  New  Hampshire,  New  York, 
Pennsylvania,  and  perhaps  others.  Like  every  purely  statu- 
tory remedy,  it  must  be  strictly  pursued.3 

§  262.  Adoption  and  execution  of  laws  and  ordinances. — 

The  common-law  immunity  of  a  municipal  corporation,  of 
whatever  grade,  from  liability  to  a  private  action  for  a  neglect 
of  its  imposed  public  duties  has  been  extended  to  cases  of 
failure  either  to  adopt  suitable  ordinances  for  the  public 
welfare,  as  authorized  by  its  charter,  or  by  general  statute, 
and  to  cases  of  neglect  or  refusal  to  enforce  its  ordinances 
to   that   end.     Except    in    Maryland,1   and    perhaps    Pennsyl- 


3  For  various  defenses  in  actions 
under  a  statute  giving  a  remedy,  see 
Underhill  v.  Manchester,  45  N.  H. 
214  ;  Chadbourne  v.  New  Castle,  48 
Id.  196;  Brightman  v.  Bristol,  65 
Me.  428 ;  Duffy  v.  Baltimore,  Taney 
C.  C.  200  ;  Ely  v.  Niagara  county,  36 
N.  Y.  297  [that  plaintiff  kept  a  dis- 
orderly house  is  no  defense];  Hill  v. 
Rensselaer  county,  53  Hun,  194 ;  6 
N.  Y.  Supp.  716  [contributory  negli- 
gence]. 

1  It  is  well  settled  in  Maryland  that 
when  a  statute  confers  a  power  upon 
a  corporation  to  be  exercised  for 
the  public  good  ("general  welfare 
clause")  its  exercise  is  not  merely 
discretionary,  but  imperative ;  the 
words  "power  and  authority  "  may 
be  construed  "duty  and  obligation." 
(See  §  254,  ante.)  In  Cochrane  v. 
Frostburg(81  Md.  54;  31  Atl.  703), 
a  petition  was  sustained,  on  demur- 
rer, which  alleged  that  large  num- 
bers of  domestic  animals  were  al- 
lowed to  run  at  large  within  the 
streets  ;  that  the  authorities,  having 
knowledge  of  such  fact,  had  ne- 
glected and  refused  to  pass  an  ordi- 
nance abating  such  nuisance,  al- 
though having  power  under  the 
charter  to  pass  and  enforce  ordi- 
nances for  the  "  comfort,  good  order, 
health  and  safety  of  the  inhabitants." 
and    to  prevent    and    remove  nui- 


sances ;  and  that  plaintiff,  while 
walking  on  one  of  the  streets  was 
attacked  and  seriously  injured  by 
one  of  such  animals.  The  ground 
of  the  decision  was  that  "  the  de- 
fendant could  have  prevented  the 
cow  from  running  at  large  by  the 
use  of  ordinary  care  and  diligence." 
The  court  said,  however,  that  if  the 
cow  was  on  the  street  without  any 
fault  of  the  owner,  then  no  blame 
could  attach  to  the  defendant,  and  it 
would  not  be  liable  ;  to  hold  other- 
wise would  impose  a  stricter  liability 
on  the  corporation  than  the  owner 
of  the  animal  would  be  held  to  ;  and 
that  it  would  be  competent,  on  a 
trial,  to  charge  "that defendant  was 
not  liable  if  it  had  made  a  vigorous 
effort  to  enforce  the  ordinance,  and 
notwithstanding  such  effort,  was 
unable  to  prevent  the  nuisance  in 
question."  In  Taylor  v.  Cumber- 
land (64  Md.  68),  a  corporation 
which  was  required  by  its  charter  to 
pass  ordinances  to  remove  all  nui- 
sances from  the  streets  and  to 
protect  persons,  property,  etc., 
was  held  bound  to  prevent  per- 
sons from  coasting  on  the  streets, 
if  it  could  do  so  by  ordinary  and 
reasonable  care  and  diligence.  The 
city  of  Baltimore's  charter  con- 
ferred power  to  prevent  and  remove 
nuisances.    Held,  that  the  mere  pas- 


§262] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


488 


vania,2  it  is  everywhere  held  that  a  public  duty  to  make  and 
enforce  adequate  laws,  for  the  prevention  or  abatement  of 
nuisances  injurious  to  the  health,  property  or  person  of  the 
citizen  is  an  imperfect  obligation,  and  cannot  be  enforced  against 
the  will  of  the  state.3  The  mere  fact  that  a  nuisance  exists  and 
has  occasioned  an  injury  to  a  third  person  does  not  render  the 
corporation  liable  therefor,4  provided  the  nuisance  was  not 
created  or  maintained  by  the  corporation  itself.5     Such  failure 


sage  of  an  ordinance  requiring  abut- 
ters to  remove  ice  and  snow  from  the 
sidewalk  was  not  enough.  It  must 
use  reasonable  care  and  diligence  to 
enforce  it,  and  not  doing  so,  was  lia- 
ble (Marriott  v.  Baltimore  ,  9  Md. 
160). 

'2  "  Whether  a  charter- duty  to  re- 
move nuisances  remains  unper- 
formed, because  the  city  had  no 
ordinance  on  the  subject,  or  because, 
having  ordinances,  it  neglected  to 
enforce  them,  is  no  matter.  In 
either  case,  the  liability  of  the  city 
remains  the  same "  (Pittsburgh  v. 
Grier,  22  Pa.  St.  54  [wharf]  ;  Mc- 
Dade  v.  Chester,  117  Pa.  St.  414  :  12 
Atl.  421  [neglect  to  prohibit  manu- 
facture of  fireworks]). 

3  See  Winpenny  v.  Philadelphia, 
65  Pa.  St.  135,  per  Agnew,  J. 

4  The  duty  to  prevent  by  adequate 
laws  nuisances,  injurious  to  health, 
property  or  rights  of  the  citizen,  is 
an  imperfect  obligation,  and  for  its 
non-performance  it  is  not  liable,  un- 
til after  notice  (Griffin  v.  New  York, 
9  N.  Y.  456)  The  fact  that  a  cor- 
poration has  adopted  an  ordinance 
providing  a  method  for  the  removal 
of  vessels  sunken  at  any  of  the 
docks  on  its  water-front  does  not 
charge  it  with  the  duty  of  enforcing 
the  ordinance,  nor  make  it  liable  for 
its  non-enforcement  (Coonley  v.  Al- 
bany, 132  N.  Y.  145  ;  30  N.  E.  382  ; 
affi'g  57  Hun,  327  ;  10  N.  Y.  Supp. 
512).  In  Davis  v.  Montgomery  (51 
Ala.    139)  plaintiff's  house   was   de- 


stroyed by  fire  communicated  from 
a  steam  engine  on  an  adjoining  lot, 
the  danger  of  which  was  known  to 
the  corporation's  officers  ;  city  not 
liable,  though  the  engine  might 
have  been  abated  as  a  nuisance.  In 
Stackhouse  v.  Lafayette  (26  Ind.17),  a 
railroad  company  having  a  right  of 
way  through  a  city  street,  granted  by 
the  city,  built  a  culvert  on  the  street 
solely  for  its  own  use,  but  of  insuffi- 
cient capacity  to  carry  off  water, 
so  that  plaintiff's  land  was  over- 
flowed. Held,  city  not  liable  for 
not  compelling  the  company  to  re- 
construct the  culvert.  A  city  is  not 
liable  as  for  misfeasance  in  extend- 
ing the  bounds  of  a  sti'eet  so  as  to 
bring  an  existing  nuisance  within 
limits  of  such  street  (McCutcheon  v. 
Homer,  43  Mich.  483).  S.  P.,  James 
v.  Harrodsburg,  85  Ky.  191  ;  3  S.  W. 
135  [neglect  to  stop  negligent  blast- 
ing on  lot  abutting  on  highway]. 

5  A  city,  sheltering  itself  under 
authority  of  law  from  liability  for 
acts  which  between  individuals 
would  be  a  nuisance,  must  show  an 
express  or  clearly  implied  authority 
from  the  powers  conferred  (Hill  v. 
New  York,  139  N.  Y.  495  ;  34  N.  E. 
1090  ;  Stoddard  v.  Saratoga  Springs, 
127  N.  Y.  261  ;  27  N.  E.  1030  ;  Seif- 
ert  v.  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y.  136  :  4 
N.  E.  321  ;  Noonan  v.  Albany,  79  N 
Y.  470  ;  Bolton  v.  New  Rochelle,  84 
Hun,  281  ;  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  442 ; 
Fort  Worth  v.  Crawford,  74  Tex. 
404  ;  12  S.  W.   52  [dump  yard  for 


489 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§262 


to  execute  the  law  is  neglect  of  a  duty  owing  to  the  public,  not 
to  individuals.  A  neglect  or  refusal  to  execute  a  power  "  to 
construct  and  repair  sidewalks  " 6  or  "  to  remove  all  obstruc- 
tions in  a  harbor,"7  or  to  organize  a  fire  department  and  fire 
extinguishing  apparatus,8  or  to  provide  a  pest-house,9  or  to 
plat  and  establish  the  grade  of  its  streets,10  or  to  provide  for 


city  refuse]).  It  will  not  be  as- 
sumed that  the  legislature  in- 
tended to  authorize  a  nuisance, 
unless  this  is  the  necessary  result 
of  the  powers  granted  (Bacon  v. 
Boston,  154  Mass.  100;  28  N.  E.  9, 
and  cases  cited). 

6  Whether  the  corporation  will 
build  or  permit  to  be  built,  a  side- 
walk, is  a  matter  of  discretion.  It  is 
only  when  the  sidewalk  is  built,  with 
or  without  its  authority,  that  any 
responsibility  with  reference  thereto 
begins  (Saulsbury  v.  Ithaca,  94  N. 
Y.  27  ;  Urquhart  v.  Ogdensburg,  91 
Id.  67 ;  Atwater  v.  Canandaigua, 
124  Id.  602 ;  27  N.  E.  385  ;  Lehigh 
county  v.  Hoffort,  116  Pa.  St.  119  ;  9 
Atl.  177  ;  Joliet  v.  Verley,  35  111.  58). 
s.  P..  Hines  v.  Lockport,  50  N.  Y. 
239  ;  Hyatt  v.  Rondout,  44  Barb.  391  ; 
41  N.  Y.  619  ;  Vogel  v.  New  York, 
92  N.  Y.  10  ;  Requa  v.  Rochester,  45 
Id.  129 ;  Cole  v.  Medina,  27  Barb. 
218  ;  Peck  v.  Batavia,  32  Id.  634  ; 
Herrington  v.  Corning,  51  Id.  396  ; 
Carroll  v.  St.  Louis,  4  Mo.  App.  191 
[failure  to  condemn  land  for  street 
purposes] ;  Easton  v.  Neff,  102  Pa. 
St.  474  [refusal  to  build  crosswalk  at 
a  particular  place]  ;  see  cases  cited 
in  note  10,  infra. 

1  Goodrich  v.  Chicago,  20  111.  445. 
In  Forbes  v,  Lee  Conservancy  Board 
(L.  R.  4  Excli.  Div.  116),  a  statute 
under  which  incorporated  trustees 
were  "  authorized  and  empowered, 
from  time  to  time,  to  remove  ob- 
structions and  impediments  to  the 
navigation "  of  a  canal,  was  con- 
strued  as  making  the  duty  of  re- 


moving obstructions  discretionary 
and  not  compulsory. 

8  Cases  cited  under  §  265,  ante. 

9  Aaron  v.  Broiles,  64  Tex.  316. 

10  Transportation  Co.  v.  Chicago, 
99  U.  S.  035  ;  Smith  v.  Washington, 
20  How.  [TJ.  S.]  135  ;  Mills  v.  Brook- 
lyn,  32  N.  Y.  489  ;  Pontiac  v.  Carter, 
32  Mich.  164  ;  Wicks  v.  De  Witt,  54 
Iowa,  130  ;  6  N.  W.  176  ;  White  v. 
Yazoo  City,  27  Miss.  357,  and  cases 
cited  under  §  271,  post.  Whether  a 
municipal  corpoi-ation  will  or  will 
not  open  and  improve  a  street  in  its 
remote  suburbs,  is  a  question  of  leg- 
islative discretion,  a  decision  of 
which  in  the  negative  cannot  be 
made  the  basis  of  a  civil  action 
(Hughes  v.  Baltimore,  Taney's  Dec. 
243 ;  McDonough   v.  Virginia  City, 

6  Nev.  90:  Aurora  v.  Pulfer,  56  111. 
270  ;  Lindholm  v.  St.  Paul,  19  Minn. 
245  ;  Henderson  v.  Sandefur,  11 
Bush,  550).  s.  P.,  Smith  v.  Gould, 
61  Wise.  31  ;  20  N.  W.  369 ;  Keating 
v.  Kansas  City,  84  Mo.  415 ;  Wil- 
liams v.  Grand  Rapids,  59  Mich.  51  ; 
26  N.  W.  279.  As  to  discretion  in 
vacating  or  discontinuing  a  street,  so 
as  to  terminate  all  obligation  to  re- 
pair it.  see  Tinker  v.  Russell,  14  Pick. 
279  ;  Warner  v.  Holyoke,  112  Mass. 
362  ;  State  v.  Cumberland,  6  R.  1.  496; 

7  Id.  75 ;  State  v.  Hampton,  2  N.  H. 
22;  Page  v.  Weather sfi eld,  13  Vt.  424  ; 
Bauman  v.  Campau.  58  Mich.  444; 
Brewster  v.  Davenport,  51  Iowa, 
427  ;  see  Horton  v.  Nashville,  4  Lea 
[Tenn.]  47.  Where  the  charter  re- 
quired the  city  council,  "as  soon  as 
practicable,"  to  establish  the  grade 


§262] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


49O 


lighting  them,11  or  to  devise  and  adopt  a  drainage  and  sewerage 
system,12  will  not  sustain  a  private  action  for  neglect  of  duty. 
In  all  such  matters,  the  corporate  authorities  have  a  discretion 
to  exercise;  and,  however  unwise  their  judgment  may  turn 
out  to  have  been,  the  corporation  will  not  be  liable  in  damages 
for  the  consequence  of  their  unwisdom.13  It  is  not  action- 
able for  municipal  officers  to  neglect  to  enforce  an  ordinance 
or  to  tolerate  its  violation,14  unless  there  is  a  clear  abuse  of 
discretion.15     It  is,  therefore,  very  generally  held  that  the  cor- 


of  the  streets,  the  corporation  is  not 
liable  for  delaying  the  undertaking  ; 
the  council  is  the  judge  of  when  it  is 
practicable  (Schattner  v.  Kansas 
City,  53  Mo.  162).  S.  P.,  Evansville 
v.  Decker,  84  Ind.  325  ;  Wilson  v. 
New  York,  1  Denio,  595  ;  Milwaukee 
v.  Davis,  6  Wise.  377. 

11  Freeport  v.  Isbell,  83  111.  400  ; 
Randall  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  106  Mass. 
276. 

11  Carr  v.  Northern  Liberties,  35 
Pa.  St.  324  ;  Grant  v.  Erie,  69  Pa.  St. 
420  ;  Woods  v.  Kansas  City,  58  Mo. 
App.  272  ;  Hoyt  v.  Hudson,  27  Wise. 
656  ;  Alton  v.  Hope.  68  111.  167.  To 
allow  an  owner  of  property  to  prose- 
cute the  corporation,  on  the  ground 
that  sufficient  sewerage  had  not  been 
provided  for  his  premises,  "  would 
be  to  submit  these  questions  to  the 
determination  of  a  jury  ;  and  thus, 
in  effect,  a  judicial  tribunal  would 
be  exercising  the  functions  of  a  com- 
mon council  "  (Anne  Arundel  coun- 
ty v.  Duckett,  20  Md.  468 ;  Bennett 
v.  New  Orleans,  14  La.  Ann.  120 
[failure  to  repair  a  draining  machine, 
whereby  plaintiff's  cellar  was 
flooded]  ;  Steinmeyer  v.  St.  Louis,  3 
Mo.  App.  256  [sewer  formerly  suffi- 
cient to  carry  off  water,  now  failed 
to  do  so  ;  city  not  liable])  s.  p.,  Ban- 
nagan  v.  Dist.  of  Col.,  2  Mackey  [D. 
C.].  285;  see  Alton  v.  Hope,  68  111. 
167  ;  Atchison  v.  Challiss,  9  Kans 
603  •  McGregor  v.  Boyle,  34  Iowa, 
26«  ;  Van  Pelt  v.  Davenport,  42  Id. 


308 ;  Judge  v.  Meriden,  38  Conn.  90. 
See  §  287,  post. 

13  In  determining  the  place  in  a 
public  street  where  a  railroad  com- 
pany may  place  a  turntable,  which 
the  company  is  entitled  to  have  in 
the  locality,  the  city  exercises  a  dis- 
cretion which  is  not  reviewable  by 
the  courts  (Fitch  v.  New  York,  55 
N.  Y.  Superior,  494  ;  2  N.  Y.  Supp. 
700).  "It  may  be  laid  down  as  a 
very  clear  proposition,  that  if  no 
sewer  had  been  constructed  at  the 
locality  referred  to,  an  action  would 
not  lie  against  the  corporation, 
though  the  jury  should  find  that  one 
was  necessary,  and  that  the  defend- 
ants were  guilty  of  a  dereliction  of 
duty  in  not  having  constructed  one  " 
(Mills  v.  Brooklyn,  32  N.  Y.  489). 
s.  p.,  Lynch  v.  New  York,  76  N.  Y. 
60 ;  Hardy  v.  Brooklyn,  90  Id.  435 ; 
Roeck  v.  Newark,  33  N.  J.  Law,  129  ; 
Cummins  v.  Seymour,  79  Ind.  491  ; 
Chase  v.  Oshkosh,  81  Wise.  313 ;  51 
N.  W.  560  [destruction  of  shade  trees 
in  street,  ordered  removed]. 

14  See  cases  in  note  16  et  seq. 

15  This  qualification  appears  in 
many  of  the  decisions  above  cited, 
but  in  Rosenbaum  v.  Newbern  (118 
N.  C.  83  ;  24  S.  E.  1),  it  was  held  that 
a  city  was  not  liable  for  damages 
caused  by  the  enactment  and  en- 
forcement of  a  valid  ordinance, 
though  the  ordinance  showed  an 
abuse  of  its  discretionary  power. 


491 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§262 


poration  is  not  responsible  for  the  acts  of  persons  engaged  in 
the  violation  of  a  law  or  ordinance,  resulting  in  an  injury  to  a 
third  person,  though  such  illegal  acts  might  and  ought  to  have 
been  prevented  by  its  officers,  and  although  the  officers  them- 
selves, and  even  a  majority  of  the  citizens,  actively  participated 
in  the  illegal  proceeding.16  Thus  a  municipal  corporation  is 
not  liable  for  injuries  caused  by  persons  unlawfully  coasting 
upon  its  streets,17  even  when  the  authorities  had  tolerated  the 
sport,18  or  had  publicly  set  apart  a  particular  street  for  that 
purpose.19  So  where  the  injury  was  caused  by  a  builder 
encumbering  the  street  with  materials  in  violation  of  the 
building  laws,20  or  by  the  fall  of  a  partially  ruined  wall  which 
the  city  had  neglected  to  compel  the  owner  to  remove,  as 
required   by  an  ordinance,21  or   by  swine   being   permitted  to 

16  Ball  v.  Woodbine,  61  Iowa,  83;  Cohoes,  56  Hun,  36;  9  N.  Y.  Supp. 
15  N.  W.  846:  Boyland  v.  New  160;  Toomey  v.  Albany,  60  Hun, 
York,  1  Sandf.  27.  The  non-action  580,  mem.;  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  572,  where 
of  the  officers  must  be  deemed  to  the  propriety  of  such  authorization 
have  been  contrary  to  the  will  of  the  and  use  were  held  questions  for  the 
corporation  as  expressed  in  its  ordi-  jury.  See  cases  cited  under  next  sec- 
nances  (Peck  v.  Austin,  22  Tex.  261).  tion. 

S.  P.,  Lorillard  v.  Monroe,  11  N.  Y.  20 Griffin   v.  New  York,  9   N.   Y. 

392  ;  Cole  v.  Nashville,  4  Sneed,  162  456  [notice  of  obstruction  not  shown, 

[not  arresting  and  confining  a  luna-  city  not  liable].   As  to  kind  of  notice 


tic]  ;  Miller  v.  Iron  county,  29  Mo. 
122  [same]. 

11  Schultz  v.  Milwaukee,  49  Wise. 
254;  5  N.  W.  342;  Faulkner  v. 
Aurora,  85  Ind.  130 ;  Lafayette  v. 
Timberlake,  88  Id.  330  ;  Burford  v. 
Grand  Rapids,  53  Mich .  98  ;  Steele  v. 
Boston,  128  Mass.  583  ;  Pierce  v.  New 
Bedford,  129  Mass.  534  ;  Wilmington 
v.  Vandegrift,  29  Atl.  1047. 

18  Faulkner  v.  Aurora,  85  Ind.  130  ; 
Weller  v.  Burlington,  60  Vt.  28  ;  12 
Atl.  215. 

,!' Burford  v.  Grand  Rapids.  53 
Mich.  98.  "If  it  were  unquestion- 
able that  coasting  upon  a  public 
highway  was  always  a  nuisance, 
there  would  be  much  plausibility  in 
■  •< intention  [that  it  was  a  nui- 
sance per  se],  and  perhaps  it  should 
be  accepted  as  sound."  (Id.  per 
Cooley,    J.)      Compare    Arthur    v. 


necessary  to  warrant  recovery,  see 
§  367,  x>ost.  A  corporation  which 
permits  a  wooden  building  to  be 
erected  in  violation  of  its  ordinance, 
is  not  liable  to  the  owner  of  an  ad- 
joining house  taking  fire  from  the 
wooden  house  (Forsyth  v.  Atlanta, 
45  Ga.  152  ;  Hines  v.  Charlotte,  72 
Mich.  278  ;  40  N.  W.  333). 

"Cain  v.  Syracuse,  95  N.  Y.  83; 
s.  p.,  Connors  v.  New  York,  11  Hun, 
439 ;  Hewison  v.  New  Haven,  37 
Conn.  475  ;  Parker  v.  Macon,  39  Ga. 
729  ;  Howe  v.  New  Orleans,  12  La. 
Ann.  481  ;  Kistner  v.  Indianapolis, 
100  Ind.  210  [failure  to  pass  ordi- 
nance requiring  railroad  company  to 
erect  guards  at  grade  crossing  ;  city 
not  liable]  ;  Anderson  v.  East,  117 
Id.  126;  19  N.  E.  726.  But  see 
Kiley  v.  Kansas  City,  69  Mo.  102. 


§  263]  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  492 

run  at  large  in  violation  of  an  ordinance.22  The  non-enforce- 
ment of  an  ordinance  forbidding  the  firing  of  cannon  or  the 
display  of  fireworks  in  public  streets  and  places23  will  not 
render  the  city  liable  to  a  bystander  injured  thereby  ;  nor  to 
one  who  fell  into  an  open  excavation  adjacent  to  a  highway, 
which  the  abutting  owner  had  not  been  compelled  to  fill  up, 
as  required  by  ordinance.24  Having  a  discretion  as  to  what 
ordinances  it  will  adopt,  the  corporation  has  a  like  discretion 
and  power  to  suspend  the  operation  of  its  ordinances  tempo- 
rarily or  indefinitely.25 

§263.   Discretionary    powers  —  granting    licenses. — A 

municipal  corporation  has  been  held  exempt  from  liability 
for  the  negligent  or  fraudulent  conduct  of  a  person  formally 
licensed  by  it  to  pursue  a  particular  calling,  without  exacting 
(by  misconstruing  the  extent  of  its  powers)  certain  legal 
formalities  on  the  part  of  the  licensee,  as  where  a  license  was 
issued  to  an  auctioneer  without  taking  the  bond  required  by 
law.1  But  the  rule  has  never  been  so  far  applied  as  to  protect 
a  corporation  from  liability  for  the  consequences  of  the  unlaw- 
ful acts  of  third  persons,  authorized  by  it  to  be  done,  under 

52  Levy  v.  New  York,  1  Sandf.  465  ;  [ordinance     forbidding    fireworks]  ; 

Kelley  v.  Milwaukee,  18  Wise.  83.  Rivers  v.  Augusta.  67  Ga.  376  [for- 

23  Boyland  v.  New  York,  1  Sandf.  bidding    cattle    running    at  large]  ; 

27  [firing  cannon  in  public  park,  at  Fifield  v.  Phoenix,          Ariz.          ;  36 

public  meeting  called  together  by  the  Pac.  916. 

mayor]  :    Morrison  v.  Lawrence,    98  '  Fowle  v.  Alexandria,  3  Pet.  398  ; 

Mass.  219  [city  officers   took  part]  ;  affi'g  3  Cranch  C.  C.  70.    But  in  Cole 

Lincoln  v.  Boston,  148  Mass.  579  ;  20  v.  Nashville  (4  Sneed,    162)   it   was 

N.  E.  329  ;  McDade  v.  Chester,    117  held   that  granting  a  license  to  a 

Pa.  St.  414  ;  12  Atl.  421  [same]  ;  Nor-  known  lunatic  to  carry  on  the  busi- 

ristownv.  Fitzpatrick,  94  Pa.  St.  121  ;  ness  of  a  druggist,  was  a  ministerial 

Robinson  v.  Greenville,  42  Ohio  St.  act  for  which  the  city  was  liable  to 

625  ;  Ball  v.  Woodbine,  61  Iowa,  83  ;  one  injured   by  the  lunatic's  negli- 

15  N.  W.  840  [fireworks] :  O'Rourke  gence  in  his  business  as  a  druggist. 

v.  Sioux  Falls,  4    So.    Dak.  47  ;    54  See  Hubbel  v.  Virogua,  67  Wise.  343  ; 

N.  W.  1044.     As  to  whether  the  act  30  N.  W.  847  [licensing  shooting  gal- 

of  discharging  fireworks  in  a  high-  lery].     In  Anderson  v.  Wilmington 

way  is  a  nuisance  per  se,  see  Jenne  ( [Del  ],  19  Atl.  509),  a  city  was  held 

v.  Sutton,  43  N.  J.  Law,  257  ;  Conklin  liable  for  the  negligent  work  of  a 

v.  Thompson,  29  Barb.  218.  plumber  acting  under  its  license  in 

24Moran  v.  Pullman  Car  Co.,  134  laying  a  private  drain  to  the  public 

Mo.  641  ;  36  S.  W.  659.  main,  causing  flooding  of  plaintiff's 

"Hill  v.  Charlotte,    72   N.    C.   55  premises. 


493 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§'263 


a  mistaken  notion  of  its  corporate  powers.  Whatever  may  be 
the  extent  of  the  right  of  a  particular  corporation  to  grant  to 
private  persons  exceptional  uses  of  its  streets,  it  is  settled  that 
it  cannot  escape  liability  for  the  consequences  of  an  unlawful 
use  of  its  streets  by  a  third  person,  under  its  authority.  A  per- 
mission, for  example,  given  to  a  railroad  company,  contrary  to 
law,  to  use  steam-motors  in  the  streets  of  a  city,2  or  to  a  third 
person  to  store  his  property  in  a  street,3  is  to  authorize  a 
nuisance,  and  the  city  is  liable  for  an  injury  caused  to  one  on 
the  highway  by  such  unlawful  user.  So  the  licensing  of  a  dis- 
play of  fireworks  and  dangerous  explosives  in  a  compact 
portion  of  a  city,  at  the  junction  of  two  narrow  streets,  being 
reasonably  likely  to  result  in  injury  to  persons  and  property, 
is  such  an  unwarranted  use  of  the  streets  as  will  render  the 
licensor  liable  for  the  consequences.4  But,  it  not  being  unlaw- 
ful to  permit  an  abutting  owner  to  interfere  with  a  highway 
so  as  to  connect  his  premises  with  the  public  sewer  therein, 
the  mere   fact   of  granting  such  a  permit  does  not  render  the 


5  Stanley  v.  Davenport,  54  Iowa, 
463  :  and  other  cases  cited  under 
§  358.  post. 

3  Cohen  v.  New  York,  113  N.  Y. 
532  ;  21  N.  E.  700  ;  rev'g  43  Hun. 
345.  In  that  case,  the  city,  without 
authority,  granted  a  license  to  a 
grocer,  on  payment  of  a  fee,  per- 
mitting him  to  keep  his  delivery 
wagon  standing  in  the  street  in  front 
of  his  store  night  and  day.  Held, 
the  wagon  constituted  a  public  nui- 
sance, and  that  the  city  was  liable 
for  plaintiff's  injury  from  collision 
therewith.  s.  P.,  Farley  v.  New 
York,  152  N.  Y.  222  ;   46  N.  E.  506. 

4  Spier  v.  Brooklyn,  139  N.  Y.  6 ; 
34  N.  E.  727.  In  that  case,  the  de- 
fendant's contention  that  the  lan- 
guage of  the  ordinance  under  which 
the  permit  was  given  implied  a  lim- 
itation that  the  permit  should  extend 
only  to  proper  and  suitable  places 
other  than  public  streets,  and,  there- 
fore, the  permit  was  ultra  vires,  and 
the  city  not  liable,   was  overruled. 


In  Little  v.  Madison  (42  Wise.  643), 
the  authorities  granted  a  license  to 
exhibit  a  bear  within  the  city.  Held, 
on  demurrer,  that  it  was  implied 
that  the  exhibition  should  be  in  a 
suitable  place  and  not  in  the  street ; 
it  was  not  the  duty  of  the  city  to  see 
that  the  licensee  chose  a  suitable 
place,  and  it  was  not  liable  for  the 
fright  of  plaintiff's  horse  by  the 
bear's  exhibition  in  the  street.  It 
appeared,  on  the  trial,  that  the 
license  did  not  specify  the  streets  as 
the  place  for  the  exhibition.  Held, 
it  was  the  licensee's  duty  to  select  a 
safe  place,  and  city  not  liable  for 
not  preventing  his  use  of  the  street 
(49  Wise.  605).  In  Wheeler  v.  Ply- 
mouth (116  Ind.  158  ;  18  N.  E.  532), 
an  ordinance  prohibited  the  firing  of 
gunpowder,  except  on  license  of  the 
mayor,  on  certain  occasions.  Held, 
city  not  liable  for  the  negligence  of 
the  licensee,  the  authorized  act  not 
being  necessarily  dangerous. 


§265] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


494 


corporation  responsible  for  the  negligent  conduct  of  the 
licensee  in  leaving  his  excavation  open  and  unguarded.5  It  can 
only  be  held  liable  under  its  general  duty  of  keeping  its 
highways  in  a  reasonably  safe   condition.6 

§264.   [Omitted]. 

§  265.  Supplying  water  and  apparatus  for  extinguishing 
fires. — A  power  conferred  upon  a  municipal  corporation  to 
provide  a  system  of  water-supply,  fire-engines  and  other 
apparatus  for  extinguishing  fires,  being  for  the  common  pro- 
tection, as  distinguished  from  any  corporate  benefit  of  its  own, 
the  corporation's  neglect  or  refusal  to  exercise  it  is  not  action- 
able.1 Nor  do  the  facts  that  it  has  accepted  such  power,  and 
has  built  water-works  and  levied  taxes  or  rates  for  their  main- 
tenance, change  the  nature  of  its  duty  to  one  of  contract 
between  it  and  the  owners  of  property  to  supply  sufficient 
water,2  or   adequate  means  for  using  it,  to  extinguish  fires, 


5  Masterton  v.  Mount  Vernon,  58 
N.  Y.  391  ;  distinguishing  Wendell 
v.  Troy,  4  Abb.  Ct.  App.  563.  The 
negligence  of  a  lot-owner  while 
making  a  sidewalk  is  imputable  to 
the  city,  if  the  proprietor  made  the 
sidewalk  in  obedience  to  an  order 
from  the  city  authorities,  and  rea- 
sonable supervision  of  the  work  by 
these  authorities  would  have  dis- 
covered the  defect  in  season  to  have 
prevented  the  injury  (Boucher  v. 
New  Haven,  40  Conn.  457  ;  Master- 
ton  v.  Mount  Vernon,  supra ;  Mc- 
Coull  v.  Manchester,  85  Va.  579  ;  8 
S.  E.  379).  It  is  proper  to  instruct 
that  the  granting  of  a  permit  to 
make  an  excavation  in  a  street  is 
notice  to  the  corporation  that  the 
work  is  in  progress,  and  that  there- 
after it  would  be  liable  for  injuries 
arising  from  the  negligence  of  the 
person  doing  the  work,  which  is 
dangerous  in  itself  (District  of  Co- 
lumbia v.  Woodbury,  136  U.  S.  450  : 
10  S.  Ct.  990). 

6  See  Fitch  v.  New  York,  55  N.  Y. 


Superior,  494;  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  700 
[lawfully  permitting  a  railroad  turn- 
table to  be  placed  in  street ;  city  not 
liable  for  negligence  of  company  in 
operating  it]. 

1  Grant  v.  Erie,  69  Pa.  St.  420 ; 
and  cases  cited,  infra.  As  there  is 
no  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  city 
to  supply  water  to  extinguish  fires, 
a  contractor  with  it  to  furnish  water 
for  that  purpose  cannot  be  charged 
with  a  liability  which  the  law  did 
not  impose  on  it  (House  v.  Hous- 
ton Water-works  Co. ,  88  Tex.  233  : 
31  S.  W.  179  [well-considered  opin- 
ion by  Brown,  J.]). 

2  "  The  protection  of  all  buildings 
in  a  city  or  town  from  destruction 
or  injury  by  fire  is  for  the  benefit  of 
all  the  inhabitants  and  for  their 
relief  from  a  common  danger ;  and 
cities  and  towns  are,  therefore, 
authorized  by  general  laws  to  pro- 
vide and  maintain  fire-engines,  etc., 
to  supply  water  for  the  extinguish- 
ment of  fires.  The  city  did  not,  by 
accepting  the   statute  and  building 


495 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§265 


upon  which  a  private  action  can  be  maintained.  The  corpora- 
tion is,  therefore,  not  liable  for  the  want  of  repair  or  other 
defects    of    its   fire-engines,3  or   their  appliances,4   or   its   fire- 


its  water-works  under  it,  enter  into 
any  contract  with,    or  assume  any 
liability  to,  the  owners  of  property 
to   furnish   means   or  water  for  the 
extinguishment  of  fires  upon  which 
an  action  can  be  maintained  "  (Tain- 
ter  v.  Worcester,  123  Mass.  311  [cut- 
ting olf   water,    but   for  which  fire 
might   have     been     extinguished]). 
There  is  no  contract,  express  or  im- 
plied, on  the  part  of  a  city  to  indem- 
nify the    citizen   for  losses   by   the 
burning  down    of  their  houses  ex- 
cept in  cases  specially  provided  by 
law  "    (Yule  v.  New  Orleans,  25  La. 
Ann.  394).     A  municipal  corporation 
is  not  liable  for  the  destruction  of 
property  by  fire  because   of  the  in- 
sufficiency    of     the    water    supply 
(Springfield  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Keese 
ville,    148   N.    Y.    46 ;   42  N.  E.  405 
rev'g  80  Hun,  162  ;   29  N.  Y.  Supp 
1130:  and  affi'g  6  N.  Y.  Misc.    233 
20    N.    Y.    Supp.   1094  ;   Mendell    v 
Wheeling,    28  W.   Va.    233   [supply 
pipe  filled  with  mud,  stopping  flow 
of  water]  ;  Wheeler  v.  Cincinnati.  19 
Ohio  St.  19  [insufficient  cisterns,  and 
unsuitable   engines  ;  Brinkmeyer  v. 
Evansville,  29  Ind.  187  [same] ;  Black 
v.    Columbia,    19  S.  C.  412  [lack  of 
water]  ;   Foster  v.    Chattanooga,    3 
Lea  [Tenn.]  42  [same]  ;  Vanhorn  v. 
Des   Moines,  63   Iowa    447    [same]); 
Becker  v.  Water-works.  79  Iowa.  419  ; 
44  N.  W.  694  ;  compare,  contra,  Len- 
zen  v.  New  Braufels.  13  Tex.  Civ- 
App.  335;  35  S.  W.  341.     Frequent 
attempts   have  been  made  to  hold 
water   companies    contracting   with 
municipal    corporations    to    supply 
them    water,    liable    for    breach   of 
contract,  or  in  tort,  at  the  suit  of  a 
third    person    whose    property    was 
destroyed   by  fire  by  reason  of  its 


failure  to  supply  sufficient  water. 
But  with  apparently  a  single  excep- 
tion (Paducah  Lumber  Co.  v.  Padu- 
cah  Water  Co.,  89  Ky.  340:  12  S. 
W.  554 ;  13  Id.  249),  all  courts  hold 
that  the  contracting  company  can- 
not be  charged  with  a  greater  lia- 
bility than  the  city  itself  was  legally 
subject  to,  and  that  there  is  no  pri- 
vity of  contract  between  the  water 
company  and  a  citizen  which  will 
support  an  action  (Nickerson  v. 
Bridgeport  Hydraulic  Co.,  46  Conn. 
24 ;  Stone  v.  Uniontown  Water  Co., 
4  Pa.  Dist.  R.  431 ;  Beck  v.  Kitanning 
Water  Co.  [Penn.]  ;  11  Atl.  300; 
Becker  v.  Keokuk  Water-works,  79 
Iowa  419  ;  44  N.  W.  694 ;  Davis  v. 
Clinton  Water- works  Co.,  54  Iowa, 
59  ;  6  N.  W.  126  ;  Becker  v.  Keokuk 
Water-works,  79  Iowa,  419  ;  44  N.  W. 
694 ;  Britton  v.  Greenbay  Water- 
works Co.,  81  Wise.  48  ;  51  N.  W.  84; 
Eaton  v.  Fairbury  Water-works  Co., 
37  Neb.  546  ;  56  N.  W.  201  ;  Mott  v. 
Cherry  vale  Water,  etc.  Co.,  48  Kans. 
12  ;  28  Pac.  989  ;  Howsmon  v.  Tren- 
ton Water  Co.,  119  Mo.  304;  24  S. 
W.  784  ;  Fowler  v.  Athens  Water- 
works Co.,  83  Ga.  219  ;  9  S  E.  G73  ; 
House  v.  Houston  Water-works  Co., 
88  Tex.  233  ;  31  S.  W.  179  ;  Ferris  v. 
Carson  Water  Co.,  16  Nev.  44. 

3  McKenna  v.  St.  Louis,  6  Mo. 
App.  320. 

4  Fisher  v.  Boston,  104  Mass.  87 
[bursting  of  hose]  ;  Robinson  v. 
Evansville,  87  Ind.  334  [insufficient 
length  of  hose]  :  Brinkmeyer  v. 
Evansville,  29  Ind.  187  ;  Edgerly  v. 
Concord,  59  N.  H.  79  [fire-hydrant]  ; 
Welsh  v.  Rutland,  56  Vt.  228:  see 
Jenney  v.  Brooklyn,  120  N.  Y.  164  ; 
24  N.  E.  274. 


§265] 


MT  MCI  PAL    CORPORATIONS. 


496 


hydrants,  rendering  them  ineffectual,  or  for  the  delay  of  its 
firemen  in  reaching  the  fire,5  or  their  negligent  management  of 
these  instrumentalities,  though  in  the  line  of  duty,  to  the  per- 
sonal injury  of  third  persons.6  It  is  immaterial  whether  the 
firemen  were  employed  and  paid  by  the  city,  or  whether  they 
constituted  themselves  a  voluntary  association,  acting  gratu- 
itously.7 In  neither  case  are  they  agents  or  servants  of  the 
corporation  for  whose  fault  the  latter  is  liable.8 


5  Robinson  v.  Evansville,  87  Ind. 
334. 

6  Smith  v.  Rochester,  76  N.  Y.  506  ; 
O'Meara  v.  New  York,  1  Daly,  425  ; 
Clarissy  v.  Fire  Department,  7  Abb. 
N.  S.  852  ;  New  York  v.  Workman, 
14  C.  C.  A.  530 ;  67  Fed.  347  ;  Haf- 
ford  v.  New  Eedford,  82  Mass.  297  ; 
Burrill  v.  Augusta,  78  Me.  118 ;  3  Atl. 
177  [drawing  fires  of  a  steam  fire- 
engine  while  standing  in  the  street 
and  permitting  escape  of  steam  with 
great  noise,  frightening  horse] ; 
Dodge  v.  Granger,  17  R.  I.  664  ;  24 
Atl.  100;  Thomas  v.  Findlay,  6 
OhioCir.  Ct.  241  ;  Wilcox  v.  Chicago, 
107  111.  334  ;  Hayes  v.  Oshkosh,  33 
Wise.  314  [sparks  emitted  from  en- 
gine] ;  Grube  v.  St  Paul,  34  Minn. 
402  ;  26  N.  W.  228  ;  Greenwood  v. 
Louisville,  13  Bush.  226  ;  Patch 
v.  Covington,  17  B.  Monr.  722  ; 
Alexander  v.  Vicksburg,  68  Miss. 
564  ;  10  So.  62  ;  Heller  v.  Sedalia,  53 
Mo.  159 ;  Gillespie  v.  Lincoln,  35 
Neb.  34 ;  52  N.  W.  811  ;  Howard  v. 
San  Francisco,  51  Cal.  52  ;  Lawson 
v.  Seattle,  6  Wash.  St.  184 ;  33  Pac. 
347.  The  foregoing  were  mostly 
cases  for  negligent  driving  in  going 
to  a  fire,  resulting  in  collisions  with 
persons  on  the  street.  In  some  of 
them,  the  decision  was  put  on  the 
ground  that  the  negligent  officers 
were  members  of  the  city's  fire  de- 
partment, but  the  doctrine  of  the 
text  was  asserted.  As  to  the  liability 
of  a  fire  department  for  the  negli- 
gence of  its  employees,  see  Newcomb 


v.  Boston  Protective  Dept.  146  Mass. 
596  ;  16  N.  E.  555  ;  Clarissy  v.  Fire 
Dept.  7  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  S.)  352;  and 
cases  under  §§  295,  296,  post.  In 
Smith  v.  Rochester,  supra,  fireman 
going  to  a  rendezvous  to  participate 
in  a  public  celebration,  ordered  by 
the  common  council,  ran  down 
plaintiff.  Held,  that  the  calling  out 
of  firemen  for  such  purpose  was 
ultra  vires,  and  the  city  was  not  lia- 
ble. The  city's  ownership  of  the 
horses  and  hose  cart  did  not  make  it 
responsible  for  the  negligent  acts  of 
its  servants  in  a  service  not  of  a  pub- 
lic nature  and  not  authorized  by 
law. 

7  Jewett  v.  New  Haven,  38  Conn. 
368  ;  Lawson  v.  Seattle,  6  Wash.  St. 
184  ;  33  Pac.  347. 

8Kies  v.  Erie,  135  Pa.  St.  144  ;  19 
Atl.  942  [fireman  opening  door  of 
engine-house  striking  passer-by  ; 
city  not  liable]  ;  Torbush  v.  Nor- 
wich, 38  Conn.  225.  It  follows  that 
the  rule  of  non-liability  of  a  master 
to  a  servant  for  the  negligence  of  a 
fellow -servant  is  not  applicable  to 
the  case  of  a  fire  officer,  who,  while 
driving  rapidly  to  a  fire,  came  in 
contact  with  an  obstruction  in  the 
street  and  was  thrown  out  and  in- 
jured. He  can  maintain  an  action 
against  the  city  (Turner  v.  Indian- 
apolis, 96  Ind.  51  ;  Lafayette  v.  Al- 
len, 81  Ind.  166  [defective  fire-en- 
gine injured  operator  ;  city  liable]  ; 
Edgerly  v.  Concord,  59  N.  H.  79  [fire- 
man injured  by  defective  hydrant]). 


497 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§266 


§  266.  Providing  for  public  health. —  Making  provision  for 
the  poor,  the  sick  and  the  injured  is  essentially  a  public  duty 
with  which  the  state  is  primarily  charged.  When  such  duty 
is  imposed  upon,  or  is  voluntarily  assumed  by,  a  local  govern- 
ing body,  the  latter  is  exempt  at  common  law  from  private 
prosecution,  whether  for  an  entire  failure  to  perform  it,1  or  for 
the  negligent  manner  in  which  it  is  attempted  to  be  performed, 
to  the  injury  of  another.2  Like  police  or  fire  officers,  health 
officers  do  not  sustain  the  relation  of  servants  or  agents  to  the 
corporation    appointing    them,    so    as    to    make    the    latter 


Compare  Wild  v.  Paterson,  47  N.  J. 
Law,  406  [defective  brake  on  engine  : 
fireman  injured  ;  city  not  liable]. 
"  If  there  are  any  reasons  for  modi- 
fying the  general  rule  of  exemption 
with  respect  to  employees,  they  can- 
not be  considered  by  the  courts"  (Id. 
by  Magie,  J.).  See  Coots  v.  Detroit, 
75  Mich.  628 ;  43  N.  W.  17. 

'  Danaher  v.  Brooklyn,  119  N.  Y. 
241  ;  23  N.  E.  745  ;  affi'g  51  Hun,  563. 
In  that  case,  city  held  not  liable  for 
injuries  attributable  to  the  failure  of 
its  health  department  to  watch  over 
the  natural  influences  which  might 
render  unhealthful  the  water  of  a 
public  well  unconnected  with  the 
city's  water  system.  In  Bryant  v. 
St.  Paul  (33  Minn.  289;  23  N.  W. 
220).  a  privy  vault  was  negligently 
allowed  to  remain  open,  to  plaintiff's 
injury  ;  city  not  liable,  s.  P.  Love 
v.  Atlanta,  95  Ga.  129  ;  22  S.  E.  29 
[health  officers  neglect  to  remove 
accumulations  of  filth  from  streets]. 
2  Maximilian  v.  New  York,  62  N.  Y. 
160  ;  Haight  v.  New  York,  24  Fed. 
93 ;  Brennan  v.  Limerick  Union,  L. 
R.  Ir  .  2  C.  L.  42  ;  Benton  v.  Boston 
Hospital,  140  Mass.  13  ;  1  N.  E.  836  ; 
see  McDonald  v.  Mass.  Gen.  Hospital, 
120  M.iss.  432;  Palmer  v.  St.  Al- 
bans, GOVt.  427  ;  13  Atl.  569  ;  Brown 
v.  Vinal  Haven,  65  Me.  402  [suffer- 
ing a  hospital  nurse  to  depart  with- 
out being  disinfected,  whereby  plain- 
[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  I  —  32] 


tiff  caught  small-pox]  ;  Barbour  v. 
Ellsworth,    67    Id.    294   [carrying  a 
well  person  to  small-pox  hospital]  ; 
Mitchell    v.    Rockland,    52    Id.    118 
[health  officer  appropriated    plain- 
tiff's vessel,  by  consent,  for  a  hos- 
pital, and  so  negligently  cared  for  it 
that  it  caught  fire  and  was  injured]; 
Rudolphe    v.    New   Orleans,   11   La. 
Ann.  242  [illegally  ordering  a  ship  to 
leave  port]  ;  Harrison  v.  Baltimore, 
1     Gill    (Md.),    264;     Summers    v. 
Daviess  county,  103  Ind.  262  ;  2  N. 
E.  725  [unskillful  treatment  of  sick 
poor  person  by  county  physician] ; 
Shelbourne  v.  Yuba  county,  21  Cal. 
113  [unskilled  treatment  by  hospital 
physician]  ;      Forbes    v.     Escambia 
county,  28  Fla.  26  ;    9  So.  862  [vessel 
wrongfully    ordered    into    quaran- 
tine] ;   Richmond  v.  Long,  17  Gratt. 
375  [patient  admitted  to  a  small-pox 
hospital  negligently  suffered,  when 
delirious,  to  escape,  wander  off  and 
die] ;  Murtaugh  v.  St.  Louis,  44  Mo. 
480  [hospital    officers]  ;    Hughes   v. 
Monroe  county,    79  Hun,    120;     29 
N.  Y.  Supp.  495.     In  Ogg  v.   Lan- 
sing (35  Iowa,  495),  plaintiff  sought 
to  recover  for  the  city's  neglect  to 
take  proper  precautions  to  prevent 
the   spread    of    small  pox    and    for 
failing  to  notify  him,  when  requested 
by  its  officers  to  help  them  remove 
the  corpse  of  a  person  who  had  died 
of  that  disease,  of  the  dangerous  na- 


267] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


498 


liable  for  their  misfeasances  or  malfeasances,  in  the  line  of 
their  public  duties.3 

£267.  Providing  and    maintaining  public   schools. — The 

duty  of  providing  means  of  education,  at  the  public  expense, 
by  building  and  maintaining  schools-houses,  employing  teach- 
ers, etc.,  is  a  purely  public  duty,  in  the  discharge  of  which 
the  local  body,  as  the  state's  representative,  is  exempt  from 
corporate  liability,  for  the  faulty  construction  or  want  of  repair 
of  its  school  buildings,1  or  the  torts  of  its  servants2  employed 
therein.  In  states  where  the  liablity  of  towns,  etc.,  to  private 
actions  for  negligence  is  denied,  unless  imposed  by  statute,  this 
ground  of  exemption  is  not  specially  relied  on,  though  it  is 
stated.  But  in  other  states,  the  exemption  is  distinctly  based 
upon  the  public  nature  of  the  duty  imposed.  Where,  as  in 
some  states,  school-districts  or  unions  are  incorporated  under 
statutory  authority,  and  are  provided  with  the  means  of  raising 
funds  for  the  repair  of  school  buildings,  a  liability  for  negligent 
failure  to  repair  will  be  implied.3 


ture  of  the  service  required  of  hirn. 
Held,  the  city  not  liable.  And  see 
cases  cited  under  §  331,  post. 

3  Maximilian  v.  New  York,  62  N. 
Y.  160,  and  cases  cited  in  note  2. 

1  Hill  v.  Boston,  122  Mass.  344  [pu- 
pil fell  over  dangerously  low  railing 
on  winding  stair,  in  school-house]  ; 
Sullivan  v.  Boston,  126  Id.  540  [de- 
fective approach  to  school-house]  ; 
Bigelow  v.  Randolph,  14  Gray,  541 
[dangerous  excavation  in  school- 
house  yard]  ;  Wixon  v.  Newport,  13 
R.  1.454  [defective  heating  apparatus, 
injuring  pupil].  See  Howard  v.  Wor- 
cester, 153  Mass.  426,  27  N.  E.  11 
[negligent  blasting  for  erection  of 
school-house],  where  ground  of  deci- 
sion was  that  the  school-house  con- 
struction was  for  public  use. 

2  Donovan  v.  Board  of  Education, 
85  N.  Y.  117  [excavation  in  school- 
yard left  uncovered  by  workmen  em- 
ployed by  trustees;  a  pupil  fell  into 
it].  In  Donovan  v.  McAlpin  (85  Id. 
185),    the  same  plaintiff  as  in    the 


above  case  sued  the  trustees  person- 
ally for  the  negligence  of  their  em- 
ployee. Held  that,  acting  gratuit- 
ously for  the  public,  they  were  not 
responsible  for  the  negligence  of 
persons  employed  to  do  what  they 
were  not  personally  bound  to  do.  In 
the  first  case,  the  decision  went  on 
the  ground  that  the  school-board  was 
organized  to  exercise  purely  public 
functions;  that  it  had  no  treasury  t 
and  received  no  private  corporate 
benefit  from  the  powers  conferred. 
To  the  same  effect,  see  Ham  v.  New 
York,  70  N.  Y.  460  ;  Terry  v.  New 
York,  8  Bosw.  504  ;  Diehm  v.  Cin. 
cinnati,  25  Ohio  St.  305  ;  Finch  v. 
Board,  etc.,  30  Id.  37;  Lane  v.  Wood- 
bury, 58  Iowa,  462 ;  12  N.  W 
478  [lightning  rod  on  school-house 
broken];  Beach  v.  Leahy,  11  Kans. 
23. 

3  Ford  v.  Kendall  School  District, 
121  Pa.  St.  543:  15  Atl.  812  [janitor 
of  school  threw  petroleum  in  the 
stove,  injuring  pupil].     But  it  is  no 


499 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§271 


§  268.   [consolidated  with  §  258.J 

§  269.  [consolidated  with  §  262.] 

§  270.  [consolidated  with  §  262.] 

§271.  Devising  plan  of  public  improvement. —  After  de- 
ciding to  undertake  the  construction  of  a  public  work,  and 
when  and  where  to  begin,  the  corporation  is  called  upon  to 
determine  the  plan  of  the  structure,  e.g.,  the  route  and  grade 
of  a  street,1  the  level  and  size  of  a  sewer,2  and  like  details ;  and 


defense  to  an  action  for  trespass  that 
a  wall  which  encroached  on  plaintiff's 
land  was  a  school-house  wall  (Miles 
v.  "Worcester,  154  Mass.  511  ;  28  N. 
E.  676),  or  that  it  was  the  negligent 
plumbing  and  drainage  of  a  school 
building  that  caused  the  flooding  of 
plaintiff's  premises  (Briegel  v.  Phila- 
delphia. 135  Pa.  St.  451  ;  19  Atl. 
1038).     See  §  329,  post. 

1  In  constructing  a  plan  for  a  high- 
way, the  officers  are  called  upon  to 
decide  upon  the  safety  of  the  route 
adopted,  and  the  dangers  thereby  to 
be  encountered.  If  guards  are  neces- 
sary to  protect  travelers  in  passing 
dangerous  places,  failure  to  provide 
them  is  simply  a  defect  in  the  plan 
of  the  work,  arising  from  an  error 
of  judgment  as  to  its  necessities,  for 
which  there  is  no  liability  (Monk  v. 
New  Utrecht,  104  N.  Y.  552  ;  11  N. 
E.  268).  In  Urquhart  v.  Ogdens- 
burg(91  N.  Y.  67),  the  defect  com- 
plained of  and  which  caused  the  in- 
jury was  that  the  slope  of  the  side- 
walk was  too  steep,  so  that  ice  form- 
ing on  it  made  it  dangerous  for 
travel.  Held,  the  corporation  was 
not  liable  for  error  in  the  plan  of  the 
sidewalk,  s.  p.,  Watson  v.  Kingston, 
114  N.  Y.  88  ;  21  N.  E.  102  [grade 
adopted  diverted  surface  water  on 
abutting  lot]  :  Champion  v.  Crandon, 
84  Wise.  405  ;  54  N.  W.  775  [same] ; 
Roach  v.  Ogdensburg,  80  Hun,  467  ; 
30  N.  Y.  Supp.  450  [sidewalk].     See 


Rehrey  v.  Newburgh,78Hun,  611  ;  28 
N.  Y.  Supp.  916  ;  Smith  v.  Pella,  86 
Iowa,  2o6  ;  53  N.  W.  226  ;  Shippy  v. 
Au  Sable,  65  Mich.  494;  32  N.  W. 
741. 

2  In  Johnson  v.  District  of  Colum- 
bia (118  U.  S.  19;  6  S.  Ct.  923),  Justice 
Gray  stated  the  rule  thus:  "The 
duties  of  the  municipal  authorities, 
in  adopting  a  general  plan  of  drain- 
age, and  determining  when  and 
where  sewers  shall  be  built,  of  what 
size  and  at  what  level,  are  of  a  quasi- 
judicial  nature,  involving  the  exer- 
cise of  deliberate  judgment  and  large 
discretion,  and  depending  upon  con- 
siderations affecting  the  public 
health  and  general  convenience 
throughout  an  extensive  territory; 
and  the  exercise  of  such  judgment 
and  discretion,  in  the  selection  and 
adoption  of  the  general  plan  or  sys- 
tem of  drainage,  is  not  subject  to  re- 
vision by  a  court  or  jury  in  a  private 
action  for  not  sufficiently  draining 
a  particular  lot  of  land."  Cooley,  C. 
J.,  in  reversing  the  judgment  in 
Lansing  v.  Toolan  (37  Mich.  152), 
says:  "In  planning  public  works  a 
municipal  corporation  must  deter- 
mine for  itself  to  what  extent  it  will 
guard  against  possible  accidents, 
courts  and  juries  are  not  to  say  it 
shall  be  punished  in  damages  for  not 
giving  the  public  more  complete  pro- 
tection :  for  that  would  be  to  take 
the  administration  of  municipal  af- 


§  272]  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  500 

also,  what  precautions  are  reasonably  required  to  prevent 
accidents  while  the  work  is  in  progress.  All  these  matters 
must  be  determined  by  the  corporation  for  itself;  courts 
and  juries  cannot  decide  that  the  plan  adopted  was  ill-judged, 
and  that  the  corporation  should  be  punished  in  damages  for 
its  error  in  judgment  and  for  not  giving  the  public  more  com- 
plete protection.3  All  that  can  be  required,  where  the  statute 
does  not  specify  the  plan  or  other  particulars  of  construction, 
is  that  such  course  should  be  adopted  as  is  reasonably  calcu- 
lated to  subserve  the  object  of  the  work,4  according  to  the  needs 
of  the  present,  and  those  of  the  future  so  far  as  they  can  be 
reasonably  anticipated. 

§  272.  Error  of  judgment  distinguished  from  negligence. — 

The  foregoing  principle  has  been  accepted  with  entire  approval 
by  all  the  courts,  though  the  cases  disclose  some  divergence  of 
opinion  among  them  as  to  its  proper  application.  Some  dis- 
tinctions are  made,  which  it  is  important  to  note.  Thus,  a 
distinction  is  made  (justly,  we  think)  between  a  mere  "  error  of 
judgment  "  in  devising  a  plan  of  construction,  for  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  corporation  is  not  liable,  and  such  a  palpable 
lack  of  skill  and  care  as  amounts  to  negligence,  in  devising  and 
adopting  the  plan  of  a  public  work.1     It  is  a  lack  of  ordinary 

fairs  out  of  the  hands  to  which  it  liable  for  consequent  insufficiency], 

has  been   intrusted   by   law."     See  But  see  Seifert  v.  Brooklyn,  101  N. 

Garratt  v.  Canandaigua,  135  N.  Y.  Y.  136;  4  N.  E.  321  ;  and  cases  cited 

436  ;  32  N.  E.  142  [drainage  sewer]  ;  under  §  275,  post.     In  constructing 

and  cases  cited  under  §  274,  post.  a  market- house,  the   corporation  is 

3  Johnson  v.  District  of  Columbia,  not  bound  to  anticipate  the  occur- 

supra.  rence  of  extraordinary  forces  of  na- 

4 "  The  degree  of  care  and  fore-  ture,  and,  therefore,  is  not  liable  to 
sight  which  it  is  necessary  to  use  in  one  injured  by  the  fall  of  the  house, 
cases  of  this  description,  must  always  occasioned  by  an  unusual  and  extra- 
be  in  proportion  to  the  nature  and  ordinary  wind  storm  (Flori  v.  St. 
magnitude  of  the  injury  that  will  be  Louis,  69  Mo.  341);  nor  from  the 
likely  to  result  from  the  occurrence  flooding  of  a  water-way,  caused  by  an 
which  is  to  be  anticipated  and  extraordinary  rainfall  (German 
guarded  against"  (New  York  v.  Theo.  School  v.  Dubuque,  64  Iowa, 
Bailey,  2  Den.  433).  See  §  45,  ante.  736 ;  Allen  v.  Chippewa  Falls,  52 
Fair  v.  Philadelphia,  88  Pa.  St.  309  Wise.  430  ;  Evansville  v.  Decker,  84 
[sewer,  when  built,  was  large  enough  Ind.  325  ;  Wright  v.  Wilmington,  92 
to  carry  off  all  the  water,  but  the  N.  C.  156). 

system  of  sewerage  being  extended,        '  This  distinction  is  clearly  made 

an  increased  flow  resulted  ;  city  not  in    several     cases    in    Indiana.     In 


5oi 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§  272 


prudence,  for  example,  amounting  to  culpable  negligence,  to 
stop  the  course  of  a  natural  water-way,  without  providing  an 
artificial  substitute  to  discharge  the  water  accustomed  to  flow 
through  it  ;2  or  to  plan  a  bridge  to  be  built  of  timbers  so  slight 
that  they  would  give  way  beneath  the  tread  of  a  child  or  horse,3 
or  with  a  span  so  narrow  as  not  to  allow  the  free  flow  of 
water  in  times  of  ordinary  freshets;4  or  to  build  a  road  on  a 
high  embankment  without  guard  or  barrier5  or  a  sidewalk  of  a 


North  Vernon  v.  Voegler  (103  Ind. 
314  ;  2  N.  E.  821),by  an  improvement 
in  a  city  street,  surface  water  was 
set  back  and  overflowed  plaintiff's 
lots.  The  improvements  were  made 
under  an  ordinance  and  a  plan  of 
the  common  council.  Held,  that 
the  corporation  was  liable.  Elliott, 
J.,  said:  "The  only  rule  that  has 
any  solid  support  in  principle  is,  that 
for  errors  of  judgment  in  devising  a 
plan,  there  is  no  liability  ;  but  there 
is  liability  where  the  lack  of  care 
and  skill  in  devising  the  plan  is  so 
great  as  to  constitute  negligence." 
.See  to  same  effect,  Rice  v.  Evans- 
ville,  108  Ind.  7  ;  9  N.  E.  139  ;  Evans- 
ville  v.  Decker,  84  Ind.  325  ;  Cum- 
mins v.  Seymour,  79  Ind.  491  ;  Sey- 
mour v.  Cummins,  119  Id.  148  ;  21  N. 
E.  549.  Substantially  the  same  dis- 
tinction was  made  in  Gould  v.  To- 
peka,  32  Kans.  485;  4  Pac.  822; 
Wilson  v.  Atlanta,  60  Ga.  473  ;  Chi- 
cago v.  Gallagher,  44  111.  295  [bridge 
across  a  canal  of  less  width  than  the 
street  leading  to  it,  and  without  rail- 
ings].    See  §  274,  jjost,  as  to  sewers. 

2  Indianapolis  v.  Huffer,  30  Ind. 
235  ;  Helena  v.  Thompson,  29  Ark. 
569.     See  cases  under  §  274. 

3  It  is  negligence  to  construct  a 
road  or  bridge  of  a  poor  kind  of  ma- 
terial, not  likely  to  endure  the 
weather  (Townsend  v.  Susquehanna 
Turnp.  Co. ,  6  Johns.  90  ;  People  v. 
Waterford,  etc.,  Turnp.  Co.,  2Keyes, 
327 ;  Howard  county  v.  Legg,  93 
Ind.  523  ;  11  N.  E.  612),  or  of  a  width 


unsafe  or  inconvenient  for  travel 
(Wilson  v.  Susquehanna  Turnp.  Co., 
21  Barb.  68  ;  Aldrich  v.  Pelham,  1 
Gray,  510);  depending  upon  its  loca- 
tion, and  the  business  to  which  it  will 
be  principally  appropriated  (Fowler 
v.  Mott,  19  Barb.  204). 

4  Riddle  v.  Delaware  county,  156 
Pa.  St.  6t:J  ;  27  Atl.  569.  In  that 
case,  a  mill  owner  had  raised  his  dam 
and  erected  a  stone  wall  in  the 
stream.  Held,  the  county,  in  erect- 
ing a  bridge  across  the  stream,  was 
bound  to  provide  for  the  then  exist- 
ing conditions  ;  and  if  a  larger  span 
in  the  bridge  would  have  obviated 
the  flooding  of  plaintiff's  property, 
he  was  entitled  to  recover  for  the 
injury,  though  such  flooding  would 
not  have  occurred  if  he  had  not 
raised  the  dam  or  built  the  wall. 

5  Maxim  v.  Champion,  50  Hun,  88  ; 
4  N.  Y.  Supp.  515  ;  Wood  v.  Gilboa,  76 
Hun,  175  ;  27  N.  Y.  Supp.  586) ;  dis- 
tinguishing cases  cited  in  note  1, 
§  271,  ante.  See  §  275,  post.  On 
one  side  of  a  city  street  was  a  high 
embankment,  without  rails,  guards  or 
lights  ;  plaintiff's  carriage  overturn- 
ing he  was  precipitated  down  the 
embankment  and  injured.  Held, 
that  where  a  street  as  planned  was 
so  manifestly  dangerous  that  a  court, 
upon  the  facts,  could  say,  as  matter 
of  law,  it  was  dangerous  and  unsafe, 
the  city  was  liable ;  but  where  it 
would  be  so  doubtful  whether  the 
street  as  planned  was  dangerous  or 
unsafe  or  not,  that  different   minds 


§27^] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


502 


dangerously  steep  grade,  not  required  by  the  natural  lay  of  the 
land.0  If  the  work,  as  planned  and  ordered,  is  so  manifestly 
dangerous  that  a  court  can  say,  upon  the  facts,  as  matter  of 
law,  that  it  was  dangerous  and  unsafe  for  travel  or  otherwise  a 
cause  of  injury,  the  city  will  be  liable  for  the  consequence  of 
executing  it.7  This  would  be  not  an  "  error  of  judgment,"  but 
neglect  to  use  ordinary  care  and  prudence,  and  the  corporation 
should  not  be  allowed  to  excuse  itself  for  the  consequences  o'f 
its  fault,  on  the  pretense  of  a  judicial  discretion  in  the  adoption 
of  the  plan  and  the  selection  of  materials.  We  quite  agree  that 
such  cases  do  not  come  within  the  rule  stated.  There  is  in  such 
cases  no  question  of  the  breach  of  a  purely  discretionary  duty ; 
the  duty  neglected  was  executive  and  ministerial,  and  the  lia- 
bility of  the  corporation  for  the  consequences  of  such  neglect 
rests  upon  the  same  principle  as  that  under  which  individuals 
are  made  liable  for  the  acts  of  themselves  and  their  servants  in 
the  performance  of  a  similar  duty. 


might  entertain  different  opinions 
with  respect  thereto,  the  benefit  of 
the  doubt  might  properly  be  given 
to  the  city,  and  it  should  not  be  held 
liable  (Gould  v.  Topeka,  32  Kans. 
485  ;  4  Pac.  822  ;  Blyhl  v.  Waterville, 
57  Minn.  115  ;  58  N.  W.  817  [side- 
walk] ;  Sawyer  v.  Newburyport,  157 
Mass.  430  ;  32  N.  E.  653  [defect  in 
original  construction,  question  for 
the  jury].  A  charge  that,  if  the 
jury  found  that  the  sidewalk,  as 
originally  constructed,  was  danger- 
ous to  persons  who  used  it,  that  a 
person  of  ordinary  care  and  pru- 
dence would  not  have  so  construc- 
ted it,  they  would  be  justified  in 
finding  the  walk  originally  negli- 
gently constructed.  Held,  correct 
(Kendall  v.  Albia,  73  Iowa,  241  ;  34 
N.  W.  883).  The  real  ground  of  re- 
covery in  these  cases  was  not  so  much 
the  defects  in  the  original  plan,  as 
failure  to  correct  them  after  they 
were  discovered. 

6Clemence  v.  Auburn,  66  N.  Y. 
334  ;  Granger  v.  Seneca  Falls,  45 
Hun,  60. 


1  In  Weightman  v.  Washington  (1 
Black,  39)  the  plan  for  a  bridge  was 
essentially  and  radically  defective, 
and  at  the  time  of  the  falling  of  the 
bridge  its  braces  were  broken  and 
some  of  the  wedges  had  fallen  out, 
and  the  bridge  was  loose  and  shook 
greatly  when  carriages  passed  over 
it.  Held,  the  corporation  was  liable 
for  injuries  sustained  by  the  falling 
of  the  bridge.  A  city  which  so  con- 
structs the  doors  of  an  engine  house 
that  they  open  outward  with  springs, 
is  liable  for  injuries  resulting,  if  the 
necessary  operation  of  the  doors  was 
dangerous  to  persons  passing  on  the 
sidewalk,  though  ordinary  care  was 
used  by  the  employees  (Kies  v.  Erie, 
169  Pa.  St.  598;  32  Atl.  621).  It  is 
negligence  to  grade  two  streets  which 
run  at  right  angles  with  each  other 
without  providing  for  the  comple- 
tion of  one  before  the  other,  if  the 
result  of  so  doing  is  necessarily  to 
cause  the  excavation  in  one  of  them 
to  be  filled  with  water  during  the 
prosecution  of  the  work,  without 
possibility  of  escape,  and  thereby  in- 


503 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§  274 


§  273.  [consolidated  with  §  272J. 

§274.  Planning  inefficient    or    injurious    drainage.  —  In 

applying  the  rule  of  corporate  non-liability  for  injuries  caused 
by  drains  or  sewers,  constructed  on  a  faulty  plan  as  to  size, 
level,  location  or  other  detail,  a  distinction  is  made  between 
sewers  designed  merely  to  collect  and  carry  off  surface  water 
from  streets  and  public  places,  and  artificial  channels  planned 
as  substitutes  for  natural  water-courses.  No  duty  rests  upon 
the  corporation,  at  common  law,  to  drain  surface  water  from 
its  streets  and  public  places,1  much  less  from  abutting  private 
lands;2  but  when  such  a  duty  is  assumed,  or  is  imposed,  with- 
out the  plans  or  details  of  the  work  being  prescribed,  all  courts 
agree  that,  in  deciding  upon  the  size  and  other  details  of  a 
sewer,  the  corporation  acts  ^watf^-judicially,  and  hence  is  not 
liable,  in  the  absence  of  bad  faith,  for  an  error  of  judgment, 
though  the  work,  as  planned,  turns  out  to  be  inefficient,  under 


jure  adjacent  property  (Lacour  v. 
New  York,  3  Duer,  406).  S.  P.,  Ken- 
sington v.  Wood,  10  Pa.  St.  93; 
Flagg  v.  Worcester,  13  Gray,  601  ; 
Welsh  v.  Rutland,  56  Vt.  228; 
Hitchins  v.  Frostburg,  63  Md.  100  ; 
11  Atl.  826  ;  Nevins  v.  Peoria,  41  111. 
502  ;  Beatrice  v.  Leary,  45  Neb.  149  ; 
63  N.  W.  370  ;  De  Baker  v.  Southern 
Cal.  R.  Co.,  106  Cal.  257  ;  39  Pac.  610  ; 
Stanford  v.  San  Francisco,  111  Cal. 
198 ;  43  Pac.  605. 

1  Lynch  v.  New  York,  76  N.  Y.  60  ; 
Gould  v.  Booth.  66  Id.  62  ;  Acker  v. 
New  Castle,  48  Hun,  312.  The  grad- 
ing and  paving  of  streets  prevented 
the  absorption  of  rain,  which  was 
consequently  discharged  on  adjoin- 
ing land  in  greater  quantities  than 
it  would  otherwise  have  been.  Held, 
that  as  the  municipality  could  not 
be  compelled  to  construct  drains  to 
dispose  of  surface  water,  it  was  not 
liable  (Anchor  Brewing  Co.  v.  Dobbs 
Ferry,  84  Hun.  274  ;  32  N.  Y.  Supp. 
371).  See  St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Duluth,  56  Minn.  494.  S.  P.,  Byrne 
v.   Farmington,    64    Conn.   367;    30 


Atl.  138  ;  Waters  v.  Bay  View,  61 
Wise.  642  ;  Hoyt  v.  Hudson,  27  Id. 
656 ;  Champion  v.  Crandon,  84  Id. 
405 ;  Monticello  v.  Fox,  3  Ind. 
App.  481  ;  28  N.  E.  1025  ;  Kearney  v. 
Themanson,  48  Neb.  74  ;  66  N.  W. 
996  ;  Bush  v.  Portland,  19  Oreg. 
45  ;  23  Pac.  667.  "  The  construction 
of  -ewers  and  drains  to  carry  off 
merely  surface  water  is  purely  dis- 
cretionary with  a  city.  It  may  con- 
struct them  or  not  at  its  option" 
(per  Valentine,  J.,  Atchison  v.  Chal- 
liss,  9  Kans.  603),  or  discontinue  and 
abandon  them,  at  discretion,  pro- 
vided individuals  are  left  thereby  in 
no  worse  condition  than  if  they  had 
never  been  built  (lb ;  see  Simpson 
v.  Keokuk,  34  Iowa,  568).  Compare 
Sample  v.  Vicksburg,  62  Miss.  63 
[city  liable  for  disconnecting  plain- 
tiff's  drain  with  public  sewer]. 

-  Mills  v.  Brooklyn,  32  N.  Y.  489  ; 
St.  Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Duluth,  56 
Minn.  494  ;  58  N.  W.  159  ;  Henderson 
v.  Minneapolis,  32  Minn.  319  ;  Evans- 
ville  v.  Decker,  84  Ind.  S25,  and  cases 
cited. 


§274] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


504 


circumstances  which  could  not  reasonably  be  anticipated.3 
The  adoption,  however,  of  a  plan  which  does  not  provide 
proper  means  of  escape  for  the  water,  so  that  it  sets  back 
upon,  or  overflows,  adjacent  lands,  under  ordinary  conditions, 
or  one  which  provides  for  the  discharge  of  the  water  directly 
upon  another's  premises,4  is   a  clear  abuse  of  discretion,  and, 


3  Johnson  v.  District  of  Columbia, 
118  U.  S.  19  ;  6  S.  Ct.  923  [overflow 
of  sewer  of  inadequate  size] ;  Wilson 
v.  New  York,  1  Denio,  595,  598; 
Mills  v.  Brooklyn,  32  N.  Y.  489 
[water  set  back  in  sewer]  ;  Watson 
v.  Kingston,  114  N.  Y.  88  ;  21  N.  E. 
102 ;  Garratt  v.  Canandaigua,  135 
N.  Y.  436  ;  32  N.  E.  142  ;  Merrifield 
v.  Worcester,  110  Mass.  216 ;  Buck- 
ley v.  New  Bedford,  155  Id.  64  ;  29 
N.  E.  201  ;  Darling  v.  Bangor,  68  Me. 
108;  Attwood  v.  Bangor,  83  Id. 
582 ;  22  Atl.  466  [locating  sewer] ; 
Diamond  Match  Co.  v.  New  Haven, 
55  Conn.  510;  13  Atl.  409  [mistake 
of  engineer]  ;  Collins  v.  Philadelphia, 
93  Pa.  St.  272  ;  Fair  v.  Philadelphia, 
88  Id.  309 ;  Carr  v.  Northern  Lib- 
erties, 35  Id.  324  ;  Bear  v.  Allentown, 
148  Pa.  St.  80  ;  23  Atl.  1062  ;  Har 
rigan  v.  Wilmington  [Del.],  12  Atl. 
779  [sewer  not  grossly  inadequate]  ; 
Weis  v.  Madison,  75  Ind.  241  ;  Rice 
v.  Evansville,  108  Id.  7  :  9  N.  E.  139  ; 
Peru  v.  Brown,  10  Ind.  App.  597  ; 
38  N.  E.  223 ;  Dermont  v.  Detroit,  4 
Mich.  435  ;  Allen  v.  Chippewa  Falls, 
52  Wise.  430  ;  9  N.  W.  284  ;  Damour 
v.  Lyons,  44  Iowa,  276 ;  German 
Theo.  School  v.  Dubuque,  64  Id.  736  ; 
17  N.  W.  153  [location  of  sewer 
draining  a  ravine] ;  Wicks  v.  De- 
Witt,  54  Iowa,  130;  6  N.  W.  176 
[location  of  ditch]  ;  Thompson  v. 
Polk  county,  38  Minn.  130  ;  36  N.  W. 
267 ;  Little  Rock  v.  Willis,  27  Ark. 
572  ;  Atchison  v.  Challiss,  9  Kans. 
603 ;  Kearney  v.  Thoemanson,  25 
Neb.  147  ;  41  N.  W.  115  ;  Denver  v. 
Capelli,    4  Colo.    25;     Los   Angeles 


Cemetery  Ass'n  v.  Los  Angeles,  10& 
Cal.  461  •  37  Pac.  375. 

4  "A  municipal  corporation  has  no 
greater  right  than  an  individual  to 
collect  the  surface  water  of  its  lands 
or  streets  into  an  artificial  channel 
and  discharge  it  upon  the  lands  of 
another"  (per  Andrews,  J.,  Noonan 
v.  Albany,  79  N.  Y.  470).  "  The  cases 
to  the  effect  that  a  municipal  corpo- 
ration is  not  liable  for  an  omission 
to  supply  drainage  or  sewerage  do 
not  apply  to  a  case  where  the  neces- 
sity for  the  drainage  or  outlet  is 
caused  by  the  act  of  the  corporation 
itself "  (Byrnes  v.  Cohoes,  67  N.  Y. 
204).  To  the  same  effect,  Baltimore, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Fifth  Baptist  Ch., 
108  U.  S.  317  ;  2  S.  Ct.  719  ;  Stoddard 
v.  Saratoga  Springs,  127  N.  Y.  261  ; 
27  N.  E.  1030  ;  Chapman  v.  Roches- 
ter, 110  N.  Y.  273  ;  18  N.  E.  88  [dis- 
charging water  and  sewage  into 
stream] ;  Clark  v.  Rochester,  43  Hun, 
271  [diverting  surface  water  from 
natural  channel]  ;  Beach  v.  Elmira, 
22  Id.  158 ;  Bastable  v.  Syracuse, 
8  Hun,  587 ;  appeal  dismissed,  72 
N.  Y.  64  ;  Gillett  v.  Kinderhook,  77 
Hun,  604;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  1044; 
Daggett  v.  Cohoes,  54  Hun,  639. 
■mem.;  7  N.  Y.  Supp.  882  ;  Hooker  v. 
Rochester,  37  Hun,  181  ;  Donohue 
v.  New  York,  3  Daly,  65  ;  Lewen- 
thal  v.  New  York,  61  Barb.  511 
Kavanagh  v.  Brooklyn,  38  Id.  234 
Haskell  v.  New  Bedford,  108  Mass 
208 ;  Manning  v.  Lowell,  130  Id.  21 
Collins  v.  Waltham,  151  Id.  196 
24  N.  E.  327;  Bohan  v.  Avoca, 
154  Pa.  St.  404  ;  26  Atl.  604  ;  West 


505 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§  274 


under  the  rule  already  stated,  the  corporation  is  liable  for 
damages  caused  by  a  work  built  upon  such  a  necessarily 
defective  plan.     In   diverting  a  natural  water-course,  or  con- 


Orange  v.  Field,  37  N.  J.  Eq.  600  ; 
Elliott  v.  Oil  City,  129  Pa.  St. 
570  ;  18  Atl.  553.  See  Frostburg  v. 
Dufty,  70  Md.  47  ;  16  Atl.  642  ;  Smith 
v.  Alexandria,  33  Gratt.  208  ;  Bur- 
ton v.  Chattanooga,  17  Lea,  739 ; 
Eufaula  v.  Simmons,  86  Ala.  515  ; 
6  So.  47  ;  Jacksonville  v.  Lambert,  62 
III.  519  ;  Aurora  v.  Reed,  57  Id.  29  ; 
Elgin  v.  Kimball,  90  Id.  356 ;  Craw- 
fordsville  v.  Bond,  96  Ind.  236 
Evansville  v.  Decker,  84  Id.  325 
Templeton  v.  Voshloe,  72  Id.  134 
Schlichter  v.  Phillipy,  67  Id.  201 
Buford  v.  Grand  Rapids,  53  Mich. 
98;  Ashley  v.  Port  Huron,  35  Id. 
296  ;  Defer  v.  Detroit,  67  Id.  346 ;  34 
N.  W.  680  ;  Rice  v.  Flint,  67  Mich. 
401  ;  34  N.  W.  719 ;  Schroeder  v. 
Baraboo,  93  Wise.  95 ;  67  N.  W.  27  ; 
Follmann  v.  Mankato,  45  Minn.  457  ; 
48  N.  W.  192  ;  Stoehr  v.  St.  Paul,  54 
Minn.  549  ;  56  N.  W.  250  ;  Da- 
mour  v.  Lyons,  44  Iowa,  276  ; 
Foster  v.  St.  Louis,  71  Mo.  157 ;  Im- 
ler  v.  Springfield.  55  Id.  119  ;  Schatt- 
ner  v.  Kansas  City,  53  Id.  162  ;  Sax- 
ton  v.  St.  Joseph,  60  Id.  153  ;  Weg- 
mann  v.  Jefferson  City,  61  Id.  55  ; 
Rychlicki  v.  St.  Louis,  98  Mo.  497  ; 
11  S.  W.  1001  ;  Edmondson  v.  Mo- 
berly,  98  Mo.  523;  11  S.  W.  990; 
Am  v.  Kansas  City,  14  Fed.  236. 
Where  owing  to  the  natural  confor- 
mation of  the  country,  surface  water 
has  formed  for  itself  a  definite  chan- 
nel, in  which  it  is  accustomed  to 
flow,  a  city  is  bound  to  build  cul- 
verts, sufficient  to  discharge  the  or- 
dinary flow  of  water,  in  grading 
streets  (Los  Angeles  Cemetery  Ass'n 
v.  Los  Angeles,  103  Cal.  461  ;  37  Pac. 
375  ;  Lehn  v.  San  Francisco,  66  Cal. 
76).  Compare  Rice  v.  Evansville  (108 
Ind.  7 ;  9  N.  E.  139),  where  it  was 


held  that  the  court  would  not  say, 
as  matter  of  law,  that  a  sewer  was 
inadequate  in  size  to  carry  off  sur- 
face    water,    occasionally    running 
through  a  ravine,  not  a  natural  water, 
course.    Thus,  where  a  culvert,  con- 
structed for  the  purpose  of  carrying 
off  the  water  of  a  natural  stream 
which   had   been   the  outlet  of  the 
surface   water  of   a   portion  of   the 
city,  was  of  such  insufficient  capac- 
ity and  so  otherwise  negligently  con- 
structed that,  on  the  occurrence  of 
a  freshet,  it  failed  to  discharge  the 
waters,  so  that  they  ai-e  set  back  up- 
on adjacent  premises,  held  that  the 
city  was  liable  for  the  injuries  there- 
by caused   (Rochester  White  Lead 
Co.  v.  Rochester,  3  N.  Y.  463).    S.  P., 
Boston   Belting  Co.   v.   Boston,   149 
Mass.  44  ;  20  N.  E.  320  ;  Manning  v. 
Lowell,  130  Id.  21  ;   Morse  v.  Wor- 
cester,  139  Id.   389  ;    Stanchfield    v. 
Newton,  142  Id.  110  ;  Crawfordsville 
v.   Bond.   96  Ind.   236;   McClure  v 
Red  Wing,  28  Minn.  186  ;  Blakely  v 
Devine,  36  Id.   53;    29  N.  W.  342 
Pye  v.  Mankato,  30  Id.  373  ;  31  N 
W.  863  ;  Barnes  v.  Hannibal,  71  Mo 
449;  Weis  v.  Madison,  75  Ind.  241 
Gillison  v.  Charleston,  16  W.  Va.  282 
Helena  v.  Thompson,  2J  Ark.  569 
Spelman  v.  Portage,  41  Wise.   114 
Van  Pelt  v.  Davenport,  42  Iowa,  303 
Damourv.  Lyons,  44  Id.  276  ;  Powers 
v.  Council  Bluffs,  50  Id.  20!  ;  Bea- 
trice v.  Leary,  45  Neb.  149  ;  63  N.  W. 
370 ;   Spangler  v.  San  Francisco,  84 
Cal.  12,  17 ;  23  Pac.  1091  [temporary 
dam  to  divert  water  course,  while 
building  sewer,   caused  flooding  of 
adjoining     lands     during     unusual 
storm].     It  has  been  held  in  Penn- 
sylvania, however,  that  a   munici- 
pality's failure  to  construct  a  sewer 


§274] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


506 


fining  and  carrying  off  its  waters  in  an  artificial  channel,  as  a 
substitute  therefor,  the  corporation  cannot  escape  liability  for 
the  consequences  of  the  work  as  planned  on  the  plea  that  the 


along  the  bed  of  a  creek  (under 
statutory  authority)  of  sufficient 
capacity  to  carry  off  all  its  waters, 
was  a  mere  want  of  judgment,  and 
hence  the  city  was  not  liable  for  an 
overflow  of  the  creek,  after  a  heavy 
rain  (Collins  v.  Philadelphia,  93  Pa.  St. 
272).  There  is  some  diversity  of  opin- 
ion as  to  whether  it  is  a  justification 
for  causing  surface  water  to  be  cast 
upon  an  adjacent  owner's  land,  that 
such  was  the  effect  of  an  authorized 
raising  of  the  grade  of  a  street,  and 
as  to  whether  the  city  in  such  a  case 
was  bound  to  make  some  provision 
for  carrying  off  the  surface  water,  so 
as  to  prevent  the  flooding  of  abutting 
land,  and  whether,  failing  to  do  so, 
it  is  liable  for  injuries  so  caused. 
It  was  held  so  bound  in  Dixon  v. 
Baker,  65  111.  518  ;  Nevins  v.  Peoria, 
41  Id.  502  ;  Elgin  v.  Kimball,  90  Id. 
356  ;  Crawfordsville  v.  Bond,  96  Ind. 
236  ;  North  Vernon  v.  Voegler,  89  Id. 
77  ;  La  Fayette  v.  Nagle,  113  Id.  425  ; 
15  N.  E.  1 ;  Quincey  v.  Jones,  76  111. 
231;  O'Brien  v.  St.  Paul,  25  Minn. 
331 ;  Imlerv.  Springfield,  55  Mo.  119  ; 
Sheehy  v.  Kansas  City  R.  Co.,  94  Id. 
574  ;  7  S.  W.  579  ;  Schattner  v.  Kan- 
sas City,  53  Id.  162  ;  Burton  v.  Chat- 
tanooga, 7  Lea  [Tenn.],  739 ;  Mont- 
gomery v.  Townsend,  84  Ala.  478  ;  4 
So.  780.  For  the  Ohio  rule,  see  Cin- 
cinnati v.  Penny,  21  Ohio  St.  499  ; 
Youngstown  v.  Moore,  30  Id.  133  ; 
McCombs  v.  Akron,  15  Ohio,  471  ; 
18  Id.  229  ;  Rhodes  v.  Cleveland,  10 
Ohio,  159 ;  approved,  Keating  v. 
Cincinnati,  38  Ohio  St.  141.  But  the 
great  body  of  authority  is  in  accord- 
ance with  the  rule  that  the  flooding 
of  the  abutting  land  in  such  cases  is 
proximately  owing  to  the  owner's 
failure  to  raise  his  land  to  the  grade 


of  the  street,  and  that,  providing  the 
work  of  grading  is  doue  witli  reason- 
able care  and  skill,  the  owner  is 
without  remedy.  The  city  has  the 
right  to  presume  that  the  abutting 
owner  will  bi  ing  his  premises  to 
grade,  and  thus  protect  himself  from 
overflow  (West  Orange  v.  Field,  37 
N.  J.  Eq.  600  ;  Miller  v.  Morris  town, 
47  Id.  62  ;  20  Atl.  61  ;  Gardiner  v. 
Johnston,  16  R.  I.  94;  12  Atl.  888; 
Gilpatrick  v.  Biddeford,  86  Me.  534 ; 
30  Atl.  99  ;  Allentown  v.  Kramer, 
73  Pa.  St.  405  ;  Magarity  v.  Wilming- 
ton, 5  Del.  530  ;  Cumberland  v.  Wil- 
lison,  50  Md.  138 ;  Alden  v.  Minne- 
apolis, 24  Minn.  254 ;  Henderson  v. 
Minneapolis,  32  Id.  319  ;  Freburg  v. 
Davenport,  63  Iowa,  119;  Morris  v. 
Council  Bluffs,  67  Id.  343  :  Stewart 
v.  Clinton,  79  Mo.  603  ;  Patoka  v. 
Hopkins,  131  Ind.  142  ;  30  N.  E.  896  ; 
Kokomo  v.  Mahan,  100  Id.  242  ;  Weis 
v.  Madison,  75  Id.  241  ;  Princeton  v. 
Gieske,  93  Id.  102  ;  Fuller  v.  Atlanta, 
66  Ga.  80 ;  White  v.  Yazoo  City,  27 
Miss.  357 ;  Herring  v.  District  of 
Columbia,  3  Mackey  [D  C],  572; 
Champion  v.  Crandon,  84  Wise.  405; 
54  N.  W.  775  ;  Beatrice  v.  Knight 
45  Neb.  546 ;  63  N.  W.  838  ;  Thibo- 
daux  v.  Thibodaux,  46  La.  Ann. 
1528  ;  16  So.  450.)  See  cases  cited  in 
note  3,  §  283  post.  The  rule  of  non- 
liability is  well  settled  in  New  York 
(Watson  v.  Kingston,  114  N.  Y.  88 ; 
afiTg  43  Hun,  367,  and  cases  cited.) 
See  Betts  v.  Gloversville,  56  Hun, 
639,  mem.;  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  795.  The 
ordinance  authorizing  the  grading 
must  conform  to  the  requirements 
of  the  charter  to  make  such  grading 
legal ;  otherwise  the  city  is  liable  for 
damages  caused  (Meinzer  v.  Racine, 
70  Wise.  561  ;  36  N.  W.  260.) 


507 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATION'S. 


[§  -75 


plan  was  faulty  through  an  error  of  judgment.  It  is  bound  to 
use  reasonable  care  and  skill  in  planning  as  well  as  construct- 
ing such  new  channel.  If  it  is  insufficient  in  size  or  otherwise 
faulty,  so  that  the  water  is  set  back,  or  is  otherwise  made  a 
cause  of  injury  to  another,  the  corporation  is  liable,  not  for 
diverting  the  course  of  the  stream  (if  authorized  to  do  so),  but 
for  a  failure  to  use  ordinary  care  and  skill  in  the  construction 
of  the  sewer.5 

§  275.  Duty  to  remedy  defects  in  plan.— It  is  well  settled 
that  when  a  public  work,  as  planned,  is  found  to  result  in 
direct  and  physical  injury  to  the  property  of  another,  which, 
from  its  nature,  is  liable  to  be  repeated  and  continuous,  but  is 
remediable  by  the  adoption  of  prudential  measures,  the  cor- 
poration is  liable  for  such  damages  as  occur  in  consequence  of 
the  continuance  of  the  original  cause,  after  notice,  and  an 
•omission  to   remedy  the   evil.1     The  immunity   from  liability 


5  Alexander  v.  Milwaukee,  16  Wise. 
264 ;  Atwater  v.  Canandaigua,  124 
N.  Y.  602  ;  27  N.  E.  385  [dam  across 
outlet  of  lake]  ;  see  Pettigrew  v. 
Evansville,  25  Wise.  223  ,  Purnpelly 
v.  Green  Bay  Co.,  13  Wall.  166  ; 
Barton  v.  Syracuse,  37  Barb.  292; 
Dayton  v.  Pease,  4  Ohio  St.  80 ;  Del- 
monico  v.  New  York,  1  Sandf.  222  ; 
Smith  v.  Milwaukee,  18  Wise.  69, 
and  cases  cited  under  §  272,  ante. 

1  Seifert  v.  Brooklyn,  101  N.  Y. 
136;  4  N.  E.  321  (distinguishing 
Mills  v.  Brooklyn,  32  N.  Y.  489;  Smith 
v.  New  York,  66  Id.  295  ;  Lynch  v. 
New  York.  76  Id.  60  ;  Wilson  v.  New 
York,  1  Den.  595).  In  that  case,  the 
sewage  commissioners  adopted  a  sys- 
tem of  drainage  over  and  through 
plaintiff's  land.  A  main  sewer  was 
built  and  lateral  sewers  were  con- 
nected with  it  from  time  to  time. 
Soon  after  the  main  sewer  was  com- 
pleted, it  was  demonstrated  that  it 
was  insufficient  to  carry  off  all  the 
sewage  flowing  into  it,  and  at  times 
plaintiff's  premises  were  inundated 
witli  noxious  matter  driven  through 


the  manholes.  As  other  lateral  sew- 
ers were  added,  these  overflows  in- 
creased, and  were  known  to  the  mu- 
nicipal officers.  Notwithstanding 
which,  lateral  sewers  were  continu- 
ally added,  and  the  nuisance  pro- 
duced by  the  defect  in  the  original 
plan  as  steadily  increased.  Held, 
the  city  was  liable  for  not  adopting 
measures  to  abate  the  nuisance. 
Followed,  Munk  v.  Watertown,  67 
Hun,  261  :  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  227.  In  Le- 
high county  v.  Hoffort  (116  Pa.  St. 
119  ;  9  Atl.  177),  it  was  held  that  in 
planning  a  bridge,  a  city  is  not  bound 
to  anticipate  its  own  future  growth, 
and  the  consequent  increase  of  travel 
on  the  bridge,  fifty  years  thereafter, 
or  to  anticipate  that  horses  would  be- 
come unmanageable  while  crossing 
it,  and  that  being  properly  planned 
when  built  and  large  enough  for  its 
then  uses,  the  failure  to  erect  a  guard 
was  not  actionable  negligence.  The 
last  conclusion  seems  to  us  erroneous. 
A  more  reasonable  conclusion  was 
reached  in  Fleming  v.  Manchester 
(44  Law  Times  [N.  S.]  517),  where  a 


§276] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


508 


for  the  consequences  following  the  exercise  of  judicial  or  dis- 
cretionary power  by  a  municipal  corporation  presupposes  that 
the  act  performed  may,  in  some  manner,  be  lawfully  exercised; 
but  the  legislature  cannot  sanction,  and  the  statute  is  no  pro- 
tection for,  an  invasion  of  individual  rights.2 

§  276.    Discretion   in  the  application  of  limited  funds. — 

A  municipal  corporation  or  highway  officer,  charged  with  the 
general  duty  of  repairing  the  highways  within  the  corporation 
limits,  has  a  discretion  as  to  the  application  of  the  means  in 
hand  devoted  to  that  purpose.  If  the  funds  are  limited  in 
amount,  and  there  is  no  way  of  obtaining  more,  there  is  no 
duty  to  undertake  more  than  they  will  complete  and  pay  for. 
If  the  means  in  hand  or  obtainable  are  insufficient  to  repair 
all *  the  highways  of  the  town  or  all  parts  of  that  particular 
highway,2  the  questions  whether  this  or  that  street  or  bridge,  or 
this  or  that  portion  of  a  particular  street,  requires  repair ;  or 
whether  the  funds  ought  to  be  used  in  the  repair  of  one  street 
or  bridge  more  than  another,  call  for  deliberation,  judgment 
and  discretion,  in  the  exercise  of  which  good  faith  will  be  pre- 
sumed. In  the  absence  of  a  statute  imposing  an  absolute  lia- 
bility, the  town  or  officer,  as  the  case  may  be,  is  responsible 
for  the  condition  of  the  highway,  only  to  the  extent  of  the 
means  possessed,  or  obtainable,  to  accomplish  the  task  ;  and 
there  is  no  liability  for  the  consequences  of  an  error  of  judg- 
ment in  the  application  of  such  means.3 


sewer  40  years  after  it  had  been  con- 
structed, during  a  violent  storm, 
burst  under  plaintiff's  cellar.  The 
jury  found  that  the  bursting  of  the 
sewer  was  caused  by  defects  in  its 
original  construction,  and  by  the 
omission  of  defendants  to  take  rea- 
sonable means  to  discover  the  de- 
fects. Held,  that  the  corporation 
was  liable.     And  see  §  287,  post. 

2  Seifert  v.  Brooklyn,  supra,  per 
Euger,  C.  J.  See  Childs  v.  Boston, 
80  Mass.  41. 

1  Garlinghouse  v.  Jacobs,  29  N.  Y. 
297. 

2  Monk  v.  New  Utrecht,  104  N.  Y. 
552 ;  11  N.  E.  268,  per  Ruger,  C.  J. 


3  Where  the  statute  does  not  im- 
pose an  absolute  liability  upon  high- 
way officers,  or  upon  a  town  having 
the  care  and  superintendence  of  its 
highways,  the  duty  to  maintain  every 
part  of  a  particular  highway  in  a 
safe  condition  for  travel  is  only  com- 
mensurate with  the  means  provided 
for  that  purpose.  Hence,  where 
highway  commissioners  received  a 
specific  sum  of  money  to  spend  in 
repairing  seventy-five  miles  of  roads 
and  bridges,  and  this  sum  was  all 
spent  thereon,  and  they  had  no 
means  of  obtaining  more,  held,  that 
the  town  (made  liable  by  statute  for 
such  injuries  as  the   commissioners 


509  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [§  278 

§  277.  [consolidated  with  §  374.] 

§  278.  How  far  professional  advice  will  excuse  defective 
plan. —  It  may  become  the  duty  of  the  municipal  officers,  in 
adopting  apian  of  construction,  depending,  of  course,  upon  the 
character  of  the  work,  to  consult  an  architect,  surveyor,  or 
other  person  skilled  in  such  matters.1  As  a  general  rule,  the 
corporation  will  be  protected  by  the  advice  of  persons  pro- 
fessionally familiar  with  the  subject,  notwithstanding  the 
structure  turns  out  to  be  radically  defective.2     But  if  an  incom- 


were  liable  for) ,  was  not  liable  for 
the  want  of  a  railing  along  a  par- 
ticular part  of  the  road  running  on 
an  embankment,  the  commissioners 
not  having  sufficient  funds  to  build 
it.  In  such  a  case,  held  error  to  charge 
that  if  the  jury  found  "  that  the  great 
necessity  was  to  keep  the  actual  bed 
of  the  roadway  safe,  they  were 
right  in  spending  the  money  in  that 
way;  but  if  you  say  that  it  was  of 
more  importance  to  guard  this  high- 
way, then  they  were  wrong."  This 
would  be  leaving  to  the  jury  to  find 
defendants  liable  for  an  error  of 
judgment,  where  they  were  un- 
able from  want  of  means  to  re- 
pair all  the  defective  places  in  the 
highway  (Monk  v.  New  Utrecht, 
supra). 

1  See  Rochester  White  Lead  Co.  v. 
Rochester,  3  N.  Y.  463.  In  Terre 
Haute  v.  Hudnut  (112  Ind.  542  ;  13 
N.  E.  086)  it  was  held  that  where  the 
character  of  a  sewer  required  the 
preparation  of  a  plan  by  a  skilled 
person,  it  was  negligence  for  coun- 
cilmen  to  act  on  their  own  judg- 
ment :  they  were  bound  to  exercise 
reasonable  care  in  securing  the  prep- 
aration of  plans  by  a  skilled  person, 
and  to  use  ordinary  care  in  seeing 
that  such  person  used  his  skill. 
Having  done  so,  the  city  was  not 
liable  for  a  defect  in  the  plan. 

2  Thus,  where  road  trustees  ordered 
a  drain  to  be  cut,  and  informed  them- 


selves how  it  could  best  be  done,  and 
took  the  opinion  of  a  competent 
surveyor  upon  the  subject,  who  said 
that  it  was  not  likely  to  produce  in- 
jury to  any  one,  it  was  held,  in  an 
early  English  case,  that  no  negli- 
gence could  be  imputed  to  them,  as 
they  did  all  that  the  statute  required 
them  to  do  in  the  best  manner  they 
were  able,  and  according  to  the  best 
information,  though  it  turned  out 
that  they  were  mistaken  in  their 
judgment  (Sutton  v.  Clarke,  1  Marsh. 
429  :  6  Taunt.  29).  See  also  Sherman 
v.  Kortright,  52  Barb.  267.  If  a  city 
chooses  a  competent  engineer,  and 
he,  by  error  of  judgment,  makes  a 
culvert  too  small,  no  negligence  on 
the  part  of  the  city  is  shown  (Van 
Pelt  v.  Davenport,  42  Iowa,  308).  It 
is  quite  otherwise  in  the  case  of  an 
individual  who  undertakes  to  build 
a  road  or  bridge  for  his  own  profit. 
He  cannot,  of  course,  relieve  him- 
self from  responsibility  for  defects 
therein  on  the  ground  that  he  em- 
ployed a  competent  engineer  to  build 
it  (Grote  v.  Chester,  etc.  R.  Co  2 
Exch.  251  ;  Allen  v.  Hay  ward,  7  Q. 
B.  960).  In  Rhinelander  v.  Lock- 
port  (60  Hun,  582,  mem.;  14  N.  Y. 
Supp.  850)  a  city's  street  gutters  were 
all  built  on  the  same  plan  by  advice 
of  its  surveyor.  Held,  there  being 
no  defect  in  the  maintenance  of  the 
gutter,  city  was  not  liable  for  a 
structural  defect  therein.     Compare 


-79] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


5IO 


petent  person  is  intrusted  with  the  work,  his  advice  is  no  justifi- 
cation ;  and  although  a  competent  person  is  selected,  and  a 
plan  is  adopted  on  his  advice,  yet  if  it  becomes  apparent,  dur- 
ing the  progress  of  the  work,  that  the  plan  adopted  is  defec- 
tive, the  corporation  is  guilty  of  negligence  if  it  allows  the 
work  to  progress  to  completion  on  that  plan.3 

§  279.  Statutory  directions  as  to  plan.  —  Where  the  plan 
of  construction,  the  materials  to  be  used,  or  other  particulars, 
are  expressly  prescribed  by  statute,  such  directions  must  be 
strictly  complied  with.  Non-compliance  with  the  statutory 
requirement  or  departure  from  the  plan  adopted,  is  enough  to 
sustain  an  action  for  injuries  suffered  in  consequence  thereof, 
without  proof  of  actual  negligence.1  It  is  no  defense  that  the 
deviation  better  subserves  the  convenience  of  the  public  than 
the  plan  prescribed,  or  that  the  substituted  plan  has  been  skill- 
fully carried  out.2 


Dayton  v.  Pease,  4  Ohio  St.  80  [city 
liable  for  fall  of  bridge  through  want 
of  skill  of  city  engineer],  and  Harris- 
burg  v.  Saylor,  87  Pa.  St.  216. 

3  Weightman     v.    Washington,    1 
Black,  39.     See  §  272,  ante. 

1  Wilson  v.  Susquehanna  Turnp. 
Co.,  21  Barb.  68.  There,  the  defend- 
ant had  failed  to  construct  its  road, 
at  the  place  of  the  accident,  as  wide 
as  the  statute  required.  Held,  that 
"if  there  was  a  failure  on  the  part 
of  defendant  to  comply  with  an  ex- 
press requirement  of  the  statute, 
either  as  to  the  width  of  the  road  or 
as  to  the  mode  of  its  construction, 
and  a  person  traveling  over  it  sus- 
tained an  injury  in  consequence  of 
such  omission,  defendant  is  respon- 
sible. In  such  case,  there  is  no  ques- 
tion involve.!  of  want  of  skill  or  care 
on  the  part  of  the  defendant.''  S.  P  , 
Harlow  v.  Humiston,  6  Covven,  189  ; 
Dygert  v.  Schenck,  23  Wend.  446  ; 
Baltimore,  etc.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Bate- 
man,  68  Md  3S9  ;  13  Atl.  54.  In 
Clemence  v.  Auburn  (66  N.  Y.  334), 
the  common  council  had  directed  the 
building  of  the  siaewalk,  and  one  of 


its  members,  in  constructing  it,  made 
an  alteration  from  the  original  plan 
which  was  entirely  unauthorized. 
The  slanting  stone  which  caused  the 
injury,  instead  of  being  laid  as 
directed  by  the  common  council, 
was  laid  contrary  to  its  directions  by 
an  alderman.  Held,  city  was  liable. 
Followed,  Munk  v.  Watertown,  67 
Hun,  261  ;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  227.  In 
Hardy  v.  Brooklyn  (90  N.  Y.  435), 
there  was  a  departure  from  the  plan 
adopted  for  a  sewer  system,  in  con- 
sequence of  which  plaintiff's  prop- 
erty was  injured.  Held,  city  was 
liable.  "  We  do  not  think  that,  un- 
der such  circumstances,  where  there 
was  a  failure  to  carry  out  the  plan 
adopted,  it  can  be  held  that  it  was  a 
mere  exercise  of  discretion,  which 
exempted  the  defendant  from  lia- 
bility" (per  Miller,  J.),  s.  P.,  Pekin, 
v.  Newell,  26  111.  320. 

2  Hughes  v.  Providence,  etc. ,  R. 
Co  ,  2  R.  I.  493.  Compare  Smith  v. 
Pella,  86  Iowa,  236  ;  53  N.  W.  226 
[sidewalk  laid  on  two  stringers  in- 
stead of  three,  as  required  by  ordi- 
nance]. 


511  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  [§  28l 

§  280.  [consolidated  with  §  281. J 

§281.  Liability  for  breach  of  ministerial  duties.  —  Thus 
far  we  have  dealt  with  cases  arising  out  of  the  execution  of 
powers  granted  to  the  municipality  for  public  governmental 
purposes,  and  with  the  performance  of  discretionary  guasi- 
judicial  duties  incident  to  such  powers.  We  come  now  to 
treat  of  that  large  class  of  absolute  ministerial  duties  which  a 
public  corporation  owes  primarily  to  the  state,  but,  at  the 
same  time,  to  every  individual  who  is  interested  in  their  per- 
formance. As  already  stated,1  the  statute  is  the  sole  criterion 
and  measure  of  duty  owing  by  a  municipal  corporation,  regard 
being  had  not  so  much  to  the  nature  and  character  of  the 
various  powers  conferred  as  to  the  object  and  purpose  of  the 
legislature  in  conferring  them.  It  is  not  necessary,  in  order  to 
raise  a  liability  for  breach  of  duty,  that  the  statute  should 
expressly,  and  in  set  terms,  impose  a  liability  to  respond  in 
damages  to  any  one  who  may  suffer  a  special  injury  from  it. 
If  the  duty  clearly  appears,  the  liability  for  a  breach  of  it  will 
be  implied.  The  acceptance,  from  the  sovereignty,  of  a  valu- 
able grant  of  power,  implies  an  agreement,  on  the  part  of  the 
grantee,  to  execute  the  power  granted,  and  to  assume  the 
liability  which   such  an  agreement  legally  implies.2     Where  a 

1  See  §  254,  ante.  charges  should  repair,  maintain  and 

2  The  leading  case  is  Henley  v.  support."  All  the  courts  held  that 
Lyme  Regis,  which  went  from  the  the  defendants,  having  accepted  the 
Common  Pleas,  through  the  Kings  charter,  became  legally  bound  to  re- 
Bench,  to  the  House  of  Lords  (5  pair  the  buildings,  banks,  etc.,  and 
Bing.  91  ;  3  Barn.  &  Ad.  77  ;  1  Bing.  that,  as  this  obligation  was  one  which 
N.  C.  222) .  The  king,  by  letters-  concerned  the  public,  an  action  on 
patent,  granted  "  to .  the  mayor  and  the  case  would  lie  against  them  for  a 
burgesses  of  Lyme  Regis,  the  bor-  direct  and  particular  damage  sus- 
ough  or  town  of  that  name,  also  the  tained  by  an  individual,  in  conse- 
pier,  quay,  or  cob,  with  all  liberties,  quence  of  a  neglect  to  perforin  it. 
profits,  etc. ,  belonging  to  the  same,  The  reasoning  was  that  the  tilings 
and  remitted  a  part  of  their  ancient  granted  by  the  charter  were  the  con- 
rent,  expressing  his  will  therein  that  sideration  for  the  repairs  to  be  made  ; 
the  said  mayor  and  burgesses  and  and  that  the  corporation,  by  accept- 
their  successors,  all  and  singular,  ing  the  letters-patent,  bound  them- 
the  buildings,  banks,  sea-shore,  etc.,  selves  to  do  these  repairs.  This  is 
within  the  said  borough,  or  there-  the  unquestioned  law  of  England  to 
unto  belonging,  or  situate  between  the  present  time,  and  has  never  been 
the  same  and  the  sea,  and  also  the  questioned  in  the  United  States.  It 
said  pier,  etc.,  at  their  own  costs  and  has  been  claimed,  however,  that  this 


§  281] 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


512 


duty  imposed  is,  in  no  proper  sense,  for  "public  purposes," 
except  as  the  public  derives  a  common  benefit  from  its  proper 
discharge,   and    there   is   nothing   in   the   statute    imposing    it 


principle  of  a  contractual  relation 
between  the  donee  of  beneficial 
powers  and  privileges,  and  the  sov- 
ereign granting  them,  has  no  applica- 
tion to  municipal  corporations  in 
this  country,  where  the  legislature 
(which  has  exclusive  power  to  create 
municipal  or  other  corporations) 
may,  and  almost  always  does,  im- 
pose duties  and  powers  upon  muni- 
cipal corporations,  without  asking 
the  consent  of  the  inhabitants  (see 
Berlin  v.  Gorham,  34  N.  H.  266; 
Gorham  v.  Springfield,  21  Me.  58). 
Indeed,  it  is  held  in  some  states  that 
the  legislature  cannot  leave  it  to  the 
people  of  a  city  to  decide  whether 
they  will  accept  a  charter  (Paterson 
v.  Society,  etc.,  24  N.  J.  Law,  385). 
The  subject  was  elaborately  dis- 
cussed by  Gray,  C.  J.,  in  Hill  v. 
Boston  (122  Mass.  344)  on  a  review 
of  the  English  and  many  of  the 
American  cases  ;  and  although  the 
particular  case  before  the  court  was 
decided  upon  quite  another  principle, 
the  learned  judge  took  occasion  to 
remark  that,  in  the  absence  of  such 
binding  decisions,  "we  find  it  diffi- 
cult to  reconcile  the  view,  that  the 
mere  acceptance  of  a  municipal 
charter  is  to  be  considered  as  con- 
ferring such  a  benefit  upon  the  cor- 
poration as  will  render  it  liable  to 
private  action  for  neglect  of  the 
duties  therebv  imposed  upon  it,  with 
the  doctrine  that  the  purpose  of  the 
creation  of  municipal  corporations 
by  the  state  is  to  exercise  a  part  of 
its  powers  of  government."  The  no- 
tion of  "a  contract"  between  the 
state  and  the  municipality  is  de- 
clared by  Judge  Dillon  (Municipal 
Corp.,  3d  ed.  §  1023),  to  be  "  ideal." 
The    "notion    of    a    contract"   has 


never  been  questioned  in  the  courts 
of  New  York.  It  was  first  clearly 
stated  by  Selden,  J.,  in  Weet  v. 
Brockport  (16  N.  Y.  161,  note),  and 
has  been  steadily  approved  and  fol- 
lowed ever  since.  He  said  :  "  When- 
ever an  individual  or  a  corporation, 
for  a  consideration  received  from 
the  sovereign  power,  has  become 
bound  by  covenant  or  agreement, 
either  express  or  implied,  to  do  cer- 
tain things,  such  individual  or  cor- 
poration is  liable,  in  case  of  neglect 
to  perform  such  covenant,  not  only 
to  a  public  prosecution  by  indict- 
ment, but  to  a  private  action  at  the 
suit  of  any  person  injured  by  such 
neglect.  The  contract  made  with 
the  sovereign  power  is  deemed  to 
inure  to  the  benefit  of  every  indi- 
vidual interested  in  its  performance." 
In  Cain  v.  Syracuse  (95  N.  Y.  83), 
Finch,  J.,  said:  "Municipal  cor- 
porations accepting  chartered  powers 
from  the  state,  and  so  by  their  own 
consent  assuming  duties  not  previ- 
ously imposed,  become  liable,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  grant,  for  the  due 
exercise  of  the  powers,  and  the 
proper  performance  of  the  duties 
thus  conferred  and  imposed ;  and 
where  a  public  body  is  clothed  by 
statute  with  power  to  do  an  act 
which  the  public  interest  requires  to 
be  done,  and  the  means  of  perform- 
ance are  placed  at  its  disposal,  the 
execution  of  the  power  may  become 
a  duty,  although  the  statute  con- 
ferring it  be  only  permissive  in  its 
terms."  In  Kunz  v.  Troy  (104  N.  Y. 
344  ;  10  N.  E.  442),  Andrews,  J., 
stated  the  rule  thus  :  "  The  duty  to 
keep  the  streets  of  a  city  in  repair 
and  free  from  obstructions  is  a  cor- 
porate duty  resting  upon  the  muni- 


5i3 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§  281 


which  indicates  a  contrary  intention,  the  true  rule  of  con- 
struction is,  that  the  legislature  intended  that  the  corporation's 
liability  should  be  co-extensive  with  that  imposed,  by  the 
general  law,  on  individuals  negligently  performing,  or  omitting 
to  perform,  a  duty  owing  by  them.3 


cipality,  springing  from  the  accept- 
ance by  the  city  of  its  charter,  and 
the  power  of  the  municipal  legisla- 
tive body  to  protect  the  streets 
against  nuisances  to  the  injury  of 
the  public  or  of  individuals  lawfully 
using  them."  The  doctrine  is  vari- 
ously stated  and  applied  in  the  fol- 
lowing, among  other  cases :  New 
York  v.  Furze,  3  Hill,  612  ;  Hutson 
v.  New  York,  9  N.  Y.  163  ;  Conrad  v. 
Ithaca,  16  Id.  158  ;  Hiekok  v.  Pitts- 
burgh, Id.  161,  note  ;  Davenport  v. 
Ruckman,  37  Id.  568  ;  Robinson  v. 
Chamberlain,  34  Id.  389;  Requa 
v.  Rochester,  45  Id.  129  ;  Barton  v. 
Syracuse,  36  Id.  54 ;  Hume  v.  New 
York,  74  Id.  264 ;  Maximilian  v. 
New  York,  62  Id.  160  ;  Ehrgott  v. 
New  York,  96  Id.  264;  Nelson  v. 
Canisteo,  100  Id.  89  ;  2  N.  E.  473  ; 
Peck  v.  Batavia,  32  Barb.  642,  per 
Marvin,  J.  ;  Champlin  v.  Penn  Yan, 
34  Hun,  33.  In  Winn  v.  Rutland 
(52  Vt.  481),  which  was  an  action  for 
failure  to  repair  a  sewer,  in  which 
the  city  was  held  liable,  Powers,  J., 
said  :  ' '  The  charter  was  sought  and 
accepted  in  order  to  realize  expected 
benefits  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  vil- 
lage, and  not  to  discharge  a  public 
governmental  duty.  The  charter- 
power  to  act  is  thus  proprietary  in 
its  character,  conferring  upon  the 
village  a  valuable  privilege  and  fran- 
chise. Tli  is  privilege,  however,  is 
not  granted  without  consideration  ; 
it  carries  with  it  an  implied  obliga- 
tion to  use  the  power  granted  in 
such  a  way  as  to  work  no  unneces- 
sary injury  to  persons  or  property 
affected  by  its  exercise."  s.  p.,  Den- 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1—33 .] 


ver  v .    Dunsmore,    7  Colo.   328 ;    3 
Pac.  705. 

3  Mersey  Docks  v.  Gibbs,  L.  R.  1 
H.  L.  93  ;  H.  L.  Cas.  686.  The  ac- 
tion was  brought  against  the  Mersey 
Docks  board  of  trustees,  a  corpora- 
tion created  by  act  of  parliament, 
with  power  to  build  docks  at  Liver- 
pool and  receive  dock  rates,  to  apply 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  docks,  etc. 
The  plaintiff's  vessel,  while  entering 
one  of  the  docks,  ran  foul  of  a  sand 
bank,  which  had  been  suffered  to  ac- 
cumulate. It  was  contended  that 
such  a  corporation  was  a  public  serv- 
ant or  trustee,  not  civilly  liable  for 
injuries  arising  to  private  individu- 
als from  acts  done  by  persons  acting 
under  them.  But  this  was  overruled. 
Blackburn,  J.,  said  :  "  In  the  absence 
of  anything  in  the  statutes  which  cre- 
ate such  corporations,  showing  a 
contrary  intention  in  the  legislature, 
the  true  rule  of  construction  is  that 
the  legislature  intended  that  the  lia- 
bility of  corporations  thus  consti- 
tuted for  individuals  should,  to  the 
extent  of  their  corporate  funds,  be 
co-extensive  with  that  imposed  by 
general  law  on  owners  of  similar 
works."  See  Cooley's  Const.  Limita- 
tions (4th  ed.)  304.  "  When  a  duty  is 
imposed  by  statute,  and  no  remedy 
prescribed,  the  right  of  action  accrues 
at  common  law  ;  otherwise  there 
would  be  a  right  without  a  remedy  '' 
(Anne  Arundel  county  v.  Duckett,  20 
Md.  468).  In  Dayton  v.  Pease  (4  Ohio 
St.  80),  Ranney,  J. ,  said  :  ' '  When  a 
municipal  corporation  undertakes  to 
execute  its  own  prescribed  regula- 
tions, by  constructing  improvements 


§  283]  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 

§  282.   [consolidated  with  §  281.] 


5'4 


§  283.  Damage   consequent   on  authorized  act. —  An  act 

which  the  legislature  has  authorized,  if  done  without  negli- 
gence, although  it  occasions  consequential  damage  to  an  indi- 
vidual, is  not  actionable.  The  remedy  of  the  person  who  suf- 
fers loss  is  confined  to  recovering  such  compensation,  if  any,  as 
the  legislature  has  thought  fit  to  give  him.1  Municipal  cor- 
porations exercising  a  power,  under  a  valid  authority  of  the 
state,  to  open,  grade  and  close  streets,  public  parks  and  other 
public  works,  are  not  liable,  at  common  law,  for  the  consequen- 
tial damages  which  almost  inevitably  ensue,  to  the  owners  of 
adjacent  property,  from  such  undertakings ;  they  are  only 
responsible  for  a  failure  to  exercise  reasonable  care  and  skill  in 
the  execution  of  the  powers  granted.2     On  this  principle,  if  the 


for  the  especial  interest  or  advantage 
of  its  own  inhabitants,  the  authorities 
are  all  agreed  that  it  is  to  be  treated 
merely  as  a  legal  individual,  and,  as 
such,  owing  all  the  duties  to  private 
persons,  and  subject  to  all  the  lia- 
bilities, that  pertain  to  private  cor- 
porations or  individual  citizens.  To 
this  class  most  clearly  belongs  the 
construction,  repair,  and  mainte- 
nance of  its  streets." 

'Per  Lord  Blackburn,  Geddis  v. 
Bann  Reservoir,  L.  R.  3  App.  Cas. 
455.  "The  act  done,  being  itself 
lawful,  can  only  become  unlawful  in 
consequence  of  the  mode  in  which  it 
is  carried  into  execution  "  (per  Hol- 
royd,  J.,  Boulton  v.  Crowther,  2 
Barn  &  Cr.  703).  "A  public  body 
acting  in  the  discharge  of  a  public 
duty  is  not  answerable  for  an  injury 
caused  by  their  obeying  an  act  of 
parliament"  (Dixon  v.  Board  of 
Works,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  Div.  418).  The 
burden  lies  on  those  who  seek  to  es- 
tablish that  the  legislature  intended 
to  take  away  the  private  rights  of 
individuals,  to  show  that,  by  express 
words  or  by  necessary  implication, 
such  an  intention  appears"  (per 
Blackburn,  J.,    Metropolitan    Asyl. 


Dist.  v.  Hill,  L.R.  6  App.  Cas.  193.)  In 
that  case,  it  was  held  that  to  justify 
the  creation  of  a  nuisance  under  the 
authority  of  a  statute,  it  must  be 
clear  that  the  legislature  intended  to 
give  that  power,  s.  P.,  Woodruff  v. 
North  Bloomfield  Gravel  Co.,  16  Fed. 
25  ;  Jennison  v.  Kirk,  98  U.  S.  461  ; 
Richardson  v.  Kier,  34  Cal.  74 ;  Hill 
v.  Smith,  27  Id.  482. 

2  In  Transportation  Co.  v.  Chicago 
(99  U.  S.  635),  Strong,  J.,  reviewing 
many  cases,  said  :  "  It  is  undeniable 
that  in  making  the  improvement 
[tunneling  the  Chicago  river]  of 
which  the  plaintiffs  complain,  the 
city  was  the  agent  of  the  state,  and 
performing  a  public  duty  imposed 
upon  it  by  the  legislature  ;  and  that 
persons  appointed  or  authorized  by 
law  to  make  or  improve  a  highway 
are  not  answerable  for  consequential 
damages,  if  they  act  within  their 
jurisdiction,  and  with  care  and  skill, 
is  a  doctrine  almost  universally  ac- 
cepted alike  in  England  and  in  this 
country."  The  rule  of  law  here 
stated  was  first  defined  under  cir- 
cumstances which  may  be  interest- 
ing, as  illustrating,  in  a  striking- 
manner,  the  essential  harshness,  if 


5i5 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§283 


grade  of  a  street  is  so  raised  as  to  cut  off,  or  render  difficult, 
the  access  to  the  adjacent  property,  upon  which  the  owner  had 
erected   buildings   with   reference  to   the   grade  before   estab- 


not  injustice,  of  the  rule  itself. 
The  city  of  New  York,  having  just 
laid  out  a  street  on  the  river  bank, 
which  had  proved  very  useful  in 
every  way,  the  village  of  Brook- 
lyn, on  the  opposite  shore,  was 
seized  with  the  idea  that  it  could  do 
the  same  thing  with  equal  success. 
The  only  difficulty  in  the  way  was 
the  existence  of  a  magnificent  bank 
on  the  shore,  known  as  the  Heights, 
one  of  the  finest  ornaments  of  the 
harbor,  and  a  natural  site  for  a  park. 
Instead  of  preserving  these  heights 
for  a  park,  the  authorities  projected 
a  street  to  run  through  them,  cut- 
ting through  sixty  feet  of  solid  earth. 
Of  course,  the  whole  adjacent 
heights,  then  cultivated  as  a  garden, 
fell  down  in  a  shapeless  mass.  The 
assessors  gravely  decided  that  Judge 
Radcliff,  who  owned  one  of  the  lots, 
would  be  so  much  benefited  by  the 
opening  of  the  street  and  the  privil- 
ege of  erecting  a  warehouse  on  his 
side  of  it,  against  the  solid  mass  of 
earth  behind,  that  he  ought  to  re- 
ceive nothing  for  the  total  destruc- 
tion of  his  property  as  it  stood,  and 
ought  to  pay  $300  for  the  privilege  of 
fronting  on  Furman  street.  As  a 
matter  of  fact,  Furman  street  has  al- 
ways been  a  useless  nuisance  ;  it 
was  a  nest  of  cholera  in  1849  ;  and 
each  owner  of  the  lots  thus  destroyed 
had  to  spend  at  least  $10,000  in  erect- 
ing a  support  for  his  lot.  from  which 
not  enough  rent  was  ever  derived  to 
pay  the  annual  taxes.  Furman 
street  did  not  front  upon  the  river, 
as  it  should  have  done  to  be  of  any 
use  ;  but  the  shore  was  left  in  the 
hands  of  private  owners.  Its  con- 
struction, therefore,  never  did  the 
least  good  to  the  city  of  Brooklyn  ; 


and  it  cost  the  adjacent  land  owners 
far  more  than  their  whole  land  was 
worth  in  the  market  in  its  original 
form.  After  the  lapse  of  sixty  years, 
during  which  the  population  has 
multiplied  more  than  thirty  fold, 
none  of  these  lots  could  be  sold  for 
half  as  much  as  it  cost  to  erect  their 
artificial  supports.  Judge  Radcliff 
struggled  to  prevent  this  absurd  pro- 
ject from  being  carried  out,  but  was 
defeated  (Matter  of  Furman  St.,  17 
Wend.  667).  After  the  work  of  ruin 
had  been  completed,  he  sued  the  city 
for  damages,  but  was  again  defeated 
(Radcliff  v.  Brooklyn,  4  N.  Y.  195). 
Judge  Radcliff 's  house  is  still  standing 
at  176  Columbia  Heights,  Brooklyn. 
"  Re  Furman  Street''  is  the  leading 
case  on  this  subject,  and  its  doctrine 
has  been  generally  followed  (Smith 
v.  Washington,  20  How.  U.  S.  135  ; 
Pennsylvania  v.  Wheeling  Bridge,  13 
Id.  518  ;  Willson  v.  Blackbird  Creek 
M.  Co.,  2  Pet.  245  ;  Gozler  v.  George- 
town, 6  Wheat.  593  ;  Lebanon  v.  01- 
cott,  1  N.  H.  339 ;  Flagg  v.  Worces- 
ter, 13  Gray,  601  ;  Hatch  v.  Vermont 
Central  R.  Co.,  25  Vt.  49  ;  Rounds  v. 
Mumford,  2  R.  I.  154  ;  Tinsman  v„ 
Belvidere,  etc.  R.  Co.,  26  N.  J.  Law, 
164  ;  O'Connor  v.  Pittsburg,  18  Pa. 
St.  187  :  Monongahela  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Kirk,  46  Pa.  St.  112 ;  Clark  v.  Bing- 
hamton,  etc.  Bridge  Co.,  41  Id.  147  ; 
Clark  v.  Wilmington,  5  Harringt. 
243  ;  Slate  v.  Grover,  19  Md.  351  ; 
Horn  v.  Baltimore,  30  Id.  218  ;  Sim- 
mons v.  Camden,  26  Ark.  276 ; 
Humes  v.  Knoxville,  1  Humph.  403  ; 
Shaw  v.  Crocker,  42  Cal.  435  :  Cole 
v.  Muscatine,  14  Iowa,  296  ;  Delphi 
v.  Evans,  36  Ind.  90 ;  Murphy  v. 
Chicago,  29  111.  279 ;  Dore  v.  Mil- 
waukee, 42  Wise.  108  ;  St.    Louis  v. 


§285]  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  516 

lished,3  or  if  raising  the  grade  enlarges  the  area  of  surface  water 
drainage  cast  on  adjoining  land,4  the  injury  is  damnum  absque 
injuria.  So,  where  the  effect  of  a  harbor  improvement,  made 
under  special  legislative  authority,  was  to  allow  the  waters  of 
the  lake  to  be  driven  by  the  wind  through  the  canal  or  chan- 
nel, which  was  a  part  of  the  improvement,  into  and  upon  the 
plaintiff's  adjacent  lands,  washing  them  away  and  rendering 
them  insecure  and  unfit  for  use,  the  plaintiff  was  held  to  be 
without  remedy,  there  being  no  claim  of  negligence  or  want  of 
care  and  skill  in  constructing  the  work.5  But  however  lawful 
the  work  itself,  or  under  whatever  authority  it  may  be  per- 
formed, the  party  undertaking  it  will  not  be  protected  from 
the  consequences  of  his  own  unskillfulness  or  malice.6 

§284.  [consolidated  with  §  334.] 

§  285.  Municipal  lands  and  structures. — The  rule  which 
exempts  municipal  corporations  for  negligence  in  the  con- 
struction and  maintenance  of  school  buildings,  jails,  hospitals 
and  the  like  on  the  ground  that  these  structures,  though  cor- 
porate property,  are  for  public  use,  and  that  the  corporation, 
as  such,  has  no  interest  in  them,  has  in  some  states  been 
extended  to  court-houses,  town  and  city  halls,  and  similar 
public  buildings  maintained  and  primarily  designed  for  the  use 
of  the  corporation-government.1  It  will  be  found  on  examin- 
ation that  most  of  these  cases  were  against  towns  or  counties, 
and  either  were,  or  might  well  have  been,  decided  on  the 
ground  that  such  ^/^/-corporations  were  under  no   obligation 

Gurno,  12  Mo.  414).    The  subject  is  4  Watson  v.   Kingston,   114  N.  Y. 

not  strictly  one  of  negligence,    and  88  ;  21  N.  E.  102. 

we  do  not  pursue  it  further.     Many  5  Alexander  v.  Milwaukee,  16  Wise, 

cases  are  collected  by  Judge   Dillon  264. 

(Municipal  Corp.  §  987).  6  Barton  v.  Syracuse,  3?  Barb.  292, 

3  Wright  v.  Woodcock,  86  Me.  113  ;  and  cases  cited    in  note    5,   §  274, 

29  Atl.  953  ;  Provost  v.  New  Chester  ante. 

Water  Co.,  162  Pa.  St.  275  ;  29  Atl.  "  So  held  in  Snider  v.  St.  Paul, 
914  ;  and  cases  cited  in  note  4,  §  274,  51  Minn.  466  ;  53  N.  W.  763  [negli- 
ante.  So  a  party  who,  in  conse-  gence  of  operator  of  elevator  in  city 
quence  of  a  highway  being  laid  upon  hall],  where  the  court  declared  there 
the  line  of  his  land,  becomes  was  no  more  reason  for  holding  a 
obliged  to  maintain  the  whole  fence,  city  liable  for  defects  in  its  city  hall 
cannot  recover  his  damages  (Ken-  than  a  county  for  defects  in  its  court- 
net's  Petition,  24  K  H.  139).  house. 


5i7 


MUNICIPAL    COR  ['ORATIONS. 


[§285 


whatever  in  respect  to  such  structures  unless  so  declared  by 
statute.2  Even  ^^-corporations,  such  as  counties  and 
towns,  are  responsible  for  the  negligent  management  of 
property  either  owned  or  controlled  by  them,  if  they  derive 
therefrom  any  profit  by  way  of  rent  or  otherwise.3  But  accord- 
ing to  a  great  weight  of  authority,  a  municipal  corporation 
proper,  as  an  owner  of  lands  and  structures,  holding  by  the 
same  right  and  title,  is  subject  to  the  same  liabilities,  as  a 
private    owner;4   providing    it   has   absolute    control    of    their 


2  Eastman  v.  Meredith,  36  N.  H. 
284  [town  hall]  ;  Sussex  v.  Strader, 
3  Harr.  [N.  J.],  108,  121  [court-house 
and  jail]  ;  Hamilton  v.  Mighels,  7 
Ohio  St.  109  [court-house]  ;  Hollen- 
beck  v.  Winnebago  County,  95  111. 
148  [court-house  in  course  of  erec- 
tion] ;  and  other  cases  cited  in  note 
2,  §  256,  ante.  In  Massachusetts,  it 
has  been  held  that  a  town  to  which 
land  is  conveyed  on  condition  that 
it  shall  "  forever  after  be  kept  open 
as  a  public  common  for  the  use  of 
the  inhabitants  of  the  town "  is  not 
liable  for  its  negligent  management 
(Clark  v.  Waltham,  128  Mass.  567  ; 
compare  Steele  v.  Boston,  Id.  582). 
In  Iowa,  the  city's  acceptance  of  a 
toll-bridge  ' '  to  be  held  in  trust  for 
the  use  of  the  public,"  does  impose 
on  it  the  duty  of  keeping  the  bridge 
in  repair  as  a  free  bridge  (Scott  v. 
Des  Moines,  34  Iowa,  552) .  In  Bos- 
ton v.  Crowley  (38  Fed.  202  [Mass. 
Cir.],  an  admiralty  court  refused  to 
agree  that  quas j-corporations,  like 
towns  and  cities,  in  Massachusetts, 
were  not  liable  for  the  negligence 
in  maintenance  of  corporate  pro- 
perty, e.  g.,  a  draw-bridge,  and  de- 
clared that  the  question  of  liability 
in  such  a  case  was  not  one  of  statu- 
tory construction  in  which  the 
Federal  courts  were  bound  to  follow 
the  decisions  of  the  state  courts,  but 
was  a  question  of  general  municipal 
or  commercial  law  which  had  been 
settled    by    the     Federal     Supreme 


Court  —  referring  to  Weightman  v. 
Washington,  1  Black,  39  ;  Chicago 
v.  Robbins,  2  Id.  418  ;  Nebraska  City 
v.  Campbell,  Id.  590  ;  Barnes  v. 
Dist.  of  Columbia,  91  U.  S.  540; 
Evanston  v.  Gunn,  99  Id.  660.  A 
town,  having  assumed  the  obliga- 
tions of  a  private  corporation  to  con- 
struct and  maintain  a  draw-bridge, 
which  neither  it  nor  the  town  was 
required  to  operate,  Held,  liable 
for  negligence  of  town's  servant  in 
operating  the  draw  (Greenwood  v. 
Westport,  60  Fed.  560).  See  case  of 
same  title  in  the  state  court,  62  Conn. 
575. 

3  See  cases  cited  in  note  2,  §  259, 
ante. 

4  '•  Municipal  corporations  in  their 
private  character  as  owners  and  oc- 
cupiers of  lands  and  houses,  are 
regarded  in  the  same  light  as  indi- 
vidual owners  and  occupiers,  and 
dealt  with  accordingly"  (per  Nelson, 
C.  J.,  Bailey  v.  New  York,  3  Hill, 
531).  In  that  case,  decided  in  1842, 
and  frequently  referred  to,  the  city 
was  sued  for  an  injury  to  the  plain- 
tiff's land  by  the  breaking  away  of 
a  dam,  the  property  of  the  corpora- 
tion, which  it  had  built  across  Cro- 
ton  river  as  a  part  of  its  enterprise 
of  introducing  water  into  the  city. 
The  dam  wras  negligently  and  un- 
skillfully  built  by  commissioners 
appointed  by  the  state,  not  under 
the  control  of  the  city,  though  at  its 
instance    and    expense.      The    trial 


§285] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


5I8 


use.5  As  a  land-owner,  it  is  liable  to  an  adjoining  owner  for  inter- 
fering with  his  lateral  support,6  and,  as  a  riparian  proprietor, 
for  interfering  with  the  flow  of  water  to  the  damage  of  an 
adjacent  owner.7  The  same  duty  to  exercise  care  for  the 
safety  of  the  public  rests  upon  those  in  control  of  public  piers 
as  in   the  case  of   public   streets,8  and  when  receiving  tolls  or 

neither  is  a  privileged  owner,  and 
each  must  fulfill  the  same  duties  in 
respect  to  the  other"  (Brower  v. 
New  York,  3  Barb.  254  ;  Barron  v. 
Detroit,  94  Mich.  601  ;  54  N.  W.  273 


court  granted  a  nonsuit,  but,  on  ap- 
peal, a  new  trial  was  ordered,  the 
court  holding  that,  with  respect  to 
the  work,  the  city  was  to  be  re- 
garded as  a  private  proprietor,  and 
as  such,  responsible  for  the  unskill- 
ful construction  of  the  dam.  On  the 
second  trial,  a  verdict  was  had  for 
the  plaintiff,  which  was  afterwards 
sustained  by  the  Court  of  Errors 
(New  York  v.  Bailey,  2  Den.  433), 
not  upon  the  ground  of  the  distinc- 
tion between  public  and  private 
functions  of  the  city,  but  of  the 
agency  of  the  officers  having  charge 
of  the  building  of  the  dam  (see  the 
comments  of  Denio,  C.  J.,  on  this 
distinction,  Darlington  v.  New  York, 
31  N.  Y.  200).  The  doctrine  of  the 
decision  of  the  Supreme  Court  (3 
Hill,  531),  has,  however,  been  re- 
peatedly approved  by  courts  of  the 
highest  authority,  and  must  be  con- 
sidered to  be  firmly  established.  The 
case  has  been  commented  on  by 
Hunt,  J.,  in  Barnes  v.  District  of 
Columbia  (91  U.  S.  540) ;  by  Sargent, 
J.,  in  Wright  v.  Holbrook  (52  N.  H. 
120);  by  Gray,  C.  J.,  in  Hill  v.  Bos- 
ton (122  Mass.  344);  and  by  Strong, 
J.,  in  Western  Savings  Fund  v. 
Philadelphia  (3l  Pa.  St.  185).  Fol- 
lowed, Galvin  v.  New  York,  112 
N.  Y.  223  ;  19  N.  E.  675  [unfastened 
grating  over  hatchway  in  court- 
house] ;  Barthold  v.  Philadelphia, 
154  Pa  St.  109  ;  26  Atl.  304  [slipping 
of  stone  from  wall  of  public 
grounds].  "  The  citizens  and  the 
municipal  body,  in  respect  to  their 
several  possessions  of  real  estate, 
stand  upon  a   footing  of  equality  ; 


[market  place]  ;  Savannah  v.  Cul- 
lens,  38  Ga.  334  [same]  ;  Fort  Worth 
v.  Crawford,  74  Tex.  404 ;  12  S.  W. 
52  [garbage  dump  on  city  property]; 
Lowe  v.  Salt  Lake  City,  Utah 
44  Pac.  1050  [open  hatchway  in  un- 
lighted  city  hall  yard]  ;  Carrington 
v.  St.  Louis,  S9  Mo.  208  [corporation 
liable  for  the  condition  of  a  building 
occupied  by  its  board  of  police] ; 
Whitfield  v.  Carrollton,  50  Mo.  App. 
98  [city  liable  for  lessee's  negligent 
use  of  its  land];  Pekin  v.  McMahon, 
154  111.  141  ;  39  N.  E.  484).  In  con- 
tracting for  laying  a  water  pipe  to  a 
county  building,  under  the  super- 
vision of  its  own  officer,  a  county  is, 
quod  hoc,  a  private  corporation,  and 
liable  to  contractor's  servant  for  cave- 
in  of  ditch  (Hannon  v.  St.  Louis 
county,  62  Mo.  313). 

5  Ham  v.  New  York,  70  N.  Y.  459 
[public  school  building  under  exclu- 
sive control  of  independent  depart- 
ment]). See  §  295,  post.  Compare 
Buchanan  v.  Barre,  66  Vt.  129;  28 
Atl.  878.  A  city's  ownership  of  the 
upper  story  of  a  building  does  not 
render  it  responsible  for  a  defect 
in  the  basement  steps  (El  Paso  v. 
Causey,  1  111.  App.  531). 

6 Stearns  v.  Richmond,  88  Va.  992; 
14  S.  E.  847. 

1  Ordway  v.  Canisteo,  66  Hun,  569  ; 
21  N.  Y.  Supp.  8.35. 

8  Kennedy  v.  New  York,  73  N.  Y. 
365    [string-piece     wanting ;     horse 


5i9 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§285 


dockage  from  a  vessel  moored  at  its  public  piers,  the  corpora- 
tion is  liable,  like  a  private  wharfinger,  for  injuries  to  the  vessel 
by  reason  of  any  defect  in  the  pier,9  except  that,  unlike  a 
private  wharfinger,  it  is  only  liable  for  negligence.10  With 
respect  to  the  waters  adjacent  to  the  pier,  no  duty  arises,  in 
the  absence  of  a  statutory  obligation.11  The  rule  of  corporate 
liability  applies  to  every  kind  of  property,  e.  g.,  a  toll-bridge  ia 
or  canal,13  from  which  a  profit  is  derived ;  and  to  every  kind  of 
business  for  profit  in  which  the  corporation  engages.14 


backed  off  ;  city  liable]  ;  Heissen- 
buttel  v.  New  York,  30  Fed.  456; 
McGuiness  v.  New  York,  52  How. 
Pr.  450.  s.  P.,  Swords  v.  Edgar,  59 
N.  Y.  28  ;  Oceanic  Steam  Nav.  Co.  v. 
Compania  Tr.  Espanola,  29  Abb.  N. 
Cas.  238  ;  Elting  v.  East  Chester,  50 
Fed.  112. 

9  Garrison  v.  New  York,  5  Bosw. 
497  ;  Moody  v.  New  York,  43  Barb. 
282 ;  Allegheny  City  v.  Campbell, 
107  Pa.  St.  530 ;  Pittsburgh  v.  Grier, 
22  Id.  54  ;  Erie  City  v.  Schwingle, 
Id.  3S8  ;  Jeffersonville  v.  Louisville, 
etc.  Ferry  Co.,  27  Ind.  100  ;  Fenni- 
more  v.  New  Orleans,  20  La.  Ann. 
124 ;  Memphis  v.  Kimbrough,  12 
Heisk.  133  [steamer  wrecked  by 
striking  on  end  of  iron  cylinder  neg- 
ligently left  on  wharf]  ;  Shinkle  v. 
Covington,  1  Bush,  617  [not  provid- 
ing proper  fastenings,  so  that  plain- 
tiff's  boat  broke  away  during  a 
flood  :  city  liable], 

10  Jackson  v.  Allegheny  City,  41 
Fed.  886.  There  held  that  the  ves- 
sel was    not    entitled  to  the  same 

degree  of  care  as  tbat  due  from  a 
private  wharfinger,  and  it  not  ap- 
pearing that  the  owner  complained 
of  the  defect  or  notified  the  city  to 
cure  it,  he  could  not  recover. 

11  Spiles  fastened  to  the  pier  by 
bolts  and  chains,  becoming  loose, 
fell  away  and  were  wholly  sub- 
merged, except  at  low  tide.  Held, 
that  the  corporation  was  not  liable 
for  damages  sustained  by  a  steam- 


tug  striking  the  submerged  spiles,  in 
passing  the  pier,  the  river  in  front  of 
the  pier  not  being  a  highway  which 
the  city  was  bound  to  keep  clear  of 
obstructions  (Seaman  v.  New  York, 
80  N.  Y.  239;.  s.  P.,  Winpenny  v. 
Philadelphia,  65  Pa.  St.  135;  com- 
pare Petersburg  v.  Applegarth,  28 
Gratt.  321  [sunken  pile  negligently 
allowed  to  obstruct  a  safe  use  of 
wharf  ;  city  liable]. 

12  Augusta  v.  Hudson,  88  Ga.  599; 
15  S.  E.  678  ;  Fox  v.  New  York,  5 
App.  Div.  349 ;  39  N.  Y.  Supp.  309 
[N.  Y.  and  Brooklyn  bridge]. 

13  As  the  proprietor  of  a  canal,  a 
public  body  has,  at  common  law,  a 
duty,  "  not  perhaps  to  repair  the 
canal,  or  absolutely  to  free  it  from 
obstructions,  but  to  take  reasonable 
care,  so  long  as  they  keep  it  open  for 
the  public  use  of  all  who  may  choose 
to  navigate  it,  that  they  may  navi- 
gate it  without  danger  to  their  lives 
or  property  "  (Lancaster  Canal  Co.  v. 
Parnaby,  11  Ad.  &  El.  223).  It  must 
appear  that  the  city  was  the  owner 
of,  or  had  an  interest  in,  the  canal  ; 
or  that  it  was  a  public  highway 
(N.  Y.  &  Brooklyn  Saw  Mill  Co.  v. 
Brooklyn,  71  N.  Y.  580).  See  §§  401- 
403,  post. 

14  A  city  which  engages  in  the 
business  of  towing  vessels  for  profit 
is  Hal  ile  for  a  collision  caused  by  the 
fault  of  the  tug  (Philadelphia  v. 
Gavagnin,  62  Fed.  617  ;  10  C.  C.  A. 
552;  Bodge  v.  Philadelphia,  167  Pa. 


§  286] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


520 


§  286.  Management  of  water  and  gas  service,  etc. — In  its 
proprietary  or  private  character  a  municipal  corporation  may 
engage  in  enterprises  for  its  own  immediate  profit  or  advantage 
as  a  corporation,  although  enuring  ultimately,  of  course,  to  the 
benefit  of  the  public.  Of  this  character  are  water-works,1  to 
supply  water  to  consumers ;  or  gas-works,2  to  supply  gas,  on 
payment  of  rates  or  tolls,  and  other  similar  enterprises.3  In 
respect  of  its  liability  for  negligence  in  the  construction  and 
maintenance  01  such  works,  the  corporation  is  on  the  same 
footing  with  private  proprietors,  and  is  liable  for  the  negli- 
gence of  its  agents  in  the  management  of  its  business.4     It  is 


St.  492;  31  Atl.  728  [electrical 
bureau]).  A  municipal  corporation 
erected  wash-houses  for  public  use 
on  payment  of  a  small  sum.  Held, 
the  corporation  was  bound  to  exer- 
cise ordinary  care  and  diligence  in 
providing  machines  reasonably  safe 
for  use  (Cowley  v.  Sunderland,  6 
Hurlst.  &  N.  565  ;  Waldron  v.  Haver- 
hill, 143  Mass.  582  ;  10  N.  E.  481). 

1  Bailey  v.  New  York,  3  Hill,  533 
(see  note  4,  last  section) ;  Fleming  v. 
Suspension  Bridge,  92  N.  Y.  368. 

2  A  city  which  engages  in  the  busi- 
ness of  manufacturing  and  supplying 
gas  to  its  inhabitants  acts  as  a  private 
corporation  and  is  subject  to  the  same 
duties,  liabilities  and  disabilities 
(Western  Savings  Society  v.  Phila- 
delphia, 31  Pa.  St.  175;  Scott  v. 
Manchester,  1  Hurlst.  &  N.  59;  affi'd, 
2  Id.  204).  In  Kibele  v.  Philadelphia 
(105  Pa.  St.  41),  gas  had  escaped  from 
the  city's  gas  main  into  plaintiff's 
sewer,  and  thence  into  his  house, 
where  it  exploded.  Held,  the  city,  as 
a  manufacturer  and  vender  of  gas, 
was  bound  to  know  the  dangerous 
character  of  illuminating  gas  and 
take  care  that  through  the  negli- 
gence of  its  officers  it  did  harm  to  no 
one,  and  whether  if,  by  exercising 
reasonable  diligence,  they  could  have 
discovered  the  defect  in  the  gas 
main,  in   time   to  have  repaired  it 


before  the  explosion,    was  for  the 

jury- 

3  See  cases  cited  under  last  section. 

4  Bailey  v.  New  York,  supra  ;  Hand 
v.  Brookline,  126  Mass.  324  [water 
escaping  from  pipes]  ;  Wilson  v. 
New  Bedford,  108  Id.  261  [water  per- 
colating through  soil  from  reservoir]; 
Perkins  v.  Lawrence,  136  Id.  305 
[negligently  laying  water-pipes]  ; 
Aldrich  v.  Tripp,  11  R.  I.  141  ;  Grimes 
v.  Keene,  52  N.  H.  335  ;  Wilkins  v. 
Rutland,  61  Vt.  336  ;  17  Atl.  735  ;  Pet- 
tengill  v.  Yonkers,  116  N.  Y.  558  :  22 
N.  E.  1095  ;  affi'g,  1  N.  Y.  Supp.  805 
[laying  pipes:  trench  left  unguarded]; 
Wilson  v.  Troy,  60  Hun,  183  ;  14  N.  Y. 
Supp.  721  [same]  ;  Winters  v.  New 
York,  15  Daly,  102  ;  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  695; 
Hazzard  v.  Council  Bluffs,  79  Iowa, 
106  ;  44  N.  W.  219  ;  Sebert  v.  Alpena, 
78  Mich.  165;  43  N.  W.  1098;  Mc- 
Coull  v.  Manchester,  85  Va.  579  ;  8 
S.  E.  379  ;  Mendel  v.  Wheeling,  23 
W.  Va.  233  ;  Vicksburg  v.  McLain, 
67  Miss.  4  ;  6  So.  774  ;  Hannon  v .  St. 
Louis,  62  Mo.  313  ;  Mulcairns  v. 
Janesville,  67  Wise.  24  ;  29  N.W.  565 
[fall  of  reservoir  in  course  of  con- 
struction, injuring  workman]  ; 
Boulder  v.  Fowler,  11  Colo.  396  ;  18 
Pac.  337  [city  undertook  to  supply 
residents  with  water  for  inigation]  ; 
Ysleta  v.  Babbitt,  8  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
432 ;  28  S.  W.  702  [same]  ;  Levy  v. 


521 


MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS. 


[§28/ 


not  liable,  of  course,  for  defects  in  the  lateral  service  pipes, 
connected  with  its  mains  by  users  of  the  water.5  By  permit- 
ting a  lot-owner  to  connect  his  premises  with  the  main  service 
pipe,  the  city  does  not  guarantee  to  supply  sufficient  water  for 
lot-owner's  use.6 

§287.  Maintenance  and  repair  of  sewers. —  A  municipal 
corporation  is  the  owner  of  its  sewers,  and,  as  such,  is  respon- 
sible for  the  manner  in  which  the  work  of  construction  is  done, 
and  for  its  subsequent  maintenance  in  a  reasonably  safe  and 
efficient    condition.1      It    is   bound    to    anticipate    and    guard 


Salt  Lake  City,  5  Utah,  302 ;  affi'g, 
3  Id.  63  [same]  ;  16  Pac.  598. 

5  Terry  v.  New  York,  8  Bosw.  504  ; 
Treadwell  v.  New  York,  1  Daly,  123  ; 
Bigelow  v.  Eandolph,  14  Gray,  541. 
In  Stock  v.  Boston  (149  Mass.  410;  21 
N.  E.  871),  where  workmen  em- 
ployed by  a  city,  while  digging  a 
sewer,  uncovered  a  water-pipe  run- 
ning to  a  greenhouse,  and  negligently 
left  the  pipe  exposed,  so  that  the 
water  froze  and  deprived  the  owner 
of  the  greenhouse  of  his  supply,  the 
city  was  held  liable. 

6  Smith  v.  Philadelphia  (81  Pa.  St. 
38)  was  an  action  by  a  lot-owner  for 
damages  for  a  non-supply  of  water, 
the  water-main  being  frozen  in  con- 
sequence of  being  laid  too  near  the 
surface.  Held,  plaintiff  might  re- 
cover back  water-rents  paid,  but  not 
his  damages.  As  to  non-liability  of 
city  for  failure  to  supply  water  suf- 
ficient to  extinguish  fires,  see  §  264, 
ante. 

'"Statutory  power  to  construct 
sewers  under  public  streets  is  not  a 
power  given  to  the  city  for  govern- 
ment purposes,  or  a  public  municipal 
duty  imposed  on  the  city,  like  that 
to  keep  its  streets  in  repair,  or  the 
like,  but  a  special  legislative  grant  to 
the  city  for  private  purposes.  The 
sewers  of  the  city,  like  its  works  for 
supplying   the  city  with  water,  are 


the  private  property  of  the  city  ;  the 
corporation  and  its  corporators  —  its 
citizens  —  are  alone  interested  in 
them  ;  the  outside  public  or  people 
of  the  state  at  large  have  no  interest 
in  them,  as  they  have  in  the  streets 
of  the  city,  which  are  public  high- 
ways.  The  donee  of  such  a  power 
takes  with  it  the  understanding  that 
it  shall  be  so  executed  as  not  un- 
necessarily to  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  the  public,  and  that  all 
needful  and  proper  measures  will  be 
taken,  in  the  execution  of  it,  to  guard 
against  accidents  to  persons  lawfully 
using  the  highway  at  the  time"  (per 
Manning,  J.,  Detroit  v.  Corey,  9 
Mich.  165).  "  As  the  city  assumes  to 
regulate  the  whole  subject,  and  com- 
pels all  inhabitants  to  conform  to  and 
comply  with  their  ordinances,  it  re- 
sults, by  necessary  implication,  that 
they  make  themselves  liable  for 
whatever  mischief  or  injury  neces- 
sarily results  from  any  negligence 
or  omission  of  duty  on  their  part " 
(Child  v.  Boston,  4  Allen,  41).  "  Es- 
tablishing rules  and  regulations  in 
respect  to  cleaning  sewers  is  one 
thing,  and  the  act  of  cleaning  them 
is  another.  The  power  and  duty  to 
perform  the  latter  is  clearly  ministe- 
rial, and  falls  under  the  class  of  pri- 
vate powers.  The  principle  of  re- 
spondeat   superior  consequently  ap- 


§  28;] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


522 


against  such  obstructions  and  dilapidations  in  the  structure,  as 
naturally  result  from  use,  by  occasional  examinations  and 
cleansings.  This  duty  is  purely  ministerial  ;  and  the  corpora- 
tion is  liable  for  a  failure  to  perform  it,  without  regard  to 
whether  it  had  notice  of  the  defect  or  not.2  Constructive 
notice  of  a  defect  in  a  sewer,  which  might  have  been  dis- 
covered by  the  exercise  of  ordinary  and  reasonable  diligence, 
is  implied.3  Manholes  and  other  parts  of  the  structure  on  the 
street  surface  are  to  be  looked  after  as  parts  of  the  highway.4 
But  a  city  does  not  insure  against  damage  from  defects  in  its 
sewers,  any  more  than  from  defects  in  its  highways  and  other 
public  works.  Its  duty  extends  only  to  the  exercise  of  reason, 
able  care  and  vigilance.  It  is  necessary,  for  a  recovery,  there- 
fore, to  show  that  the  city  neglected  to  remove  the  obstruction 
after  notice,  or  else  culpably  neglected  to  discover  it  before 
the  damage  was  done.5     The  city  is,  of  course,  liable,  without 


plies"  (Lloyd  v.  New  York,  5  N.  Y. 
375  [sewer  trench  left  open,  un- 
guarded and  unlighted)]. 

9  The  neglect  of  duty  consists  in 
not  having  ascertained  the  fact  of 
obstruction  (Barton  v.  Syracuse,  37 
Barb.  292;  affi'd  36  Id.  54;  New  York 
v.  Furze,  3  Hill,  612  [obstruction  ; 
leading  case]  ;  and  cases,  infra). 

3  Kibelev.  Philadelphia,  105  Pa.  St. 
41  ;  Koelsch  v.  Philadelphia  Co.,  152 
Pa.  St.  355.  See  also  Briegel  v. 
Philadelphia,  135  Pa.  St.  451  ; 
19  Atl.  1038;  Hazzard  v.  Coun- 
cil Bluffs,  79  Iowa,  106;  44  N. 
W.  219. 

4  Cassidy  v.  Poughkeepsie,  71  Hun, 
144  ;  24  N.  Y.  Supp.  523  [sewer-basin 
cover  in  sidewalk  out  of  order  from 
long  use].  It  is  no  defense  that  the 
overflow  of  a  sewer  was  unusual,  if 
the  sewer's  incapacity  to  carry  off 
all  the  water  was  due  to  its  want  of 
repair  (Spangler  v.  San  Francisco,  84 
Cal.  12  ;  23  Pac.  1091  ;  Hunt  v.  New 
YTork,  109  N.  Y.  134;  16  N.  E.  320). 
Plaintiff's  horse  was  injured  by  step- 
ping on  a  brick  washed  into  the  street 
by  the  overflow  from  a  culvert.  Held, 


error  to  instruct  that  defendant  was 
not  liable,  for  the  reason  that  such  an 
injury  could  not  have  been  foreseen 
and  apprehended  as  a  result  of  the 
insufficient  capacity  or  lack  of  re- 
pair of  the  culvert  (Hazzard  v. 
Council  Bluffs,  79  Iowa,  106  ;  44  N. 
W.  219;  Barr  v.  Kansas,  121  Mo. 
22 ;  25  S.  W.  562 ;  Lincoln  v.  De- 
troit, 101  Mich.  245 ;  59  N.  W.  617). 
5  Smith  v.  New  York,  66  N.  Y. 
295.  In  that  case  the  overflow  of 
sewer  was  caused  by  its  stoppage 
with  sand,  etc.,  washed  in  from  the 
streets,  during  or  just  after  an  un- 
usually heavy  shower.  No  defect 
in  the  sewer's  construction,  or  any 
prior  obstructions  were  shown.  In 
Seifert  v.  Brooklyn  (101  N.  Y.  136; 
4  N.  E.  321),  the  injury  to  abutting 
property  was  directly  caused  by  an 
original  defect  in  the  sewer,  which 
was  continued  in  use  after  knowl- 
edge, and  was  remediable  by  adopt- 
ing a  change  of  plan.  Held,  the  city 
was  liable  for  neglect  to  take  meas- 
ures to  remedy  the  defect  s.  P.  (Jer- 
sey City  v.  Kiernan,  50  N.  J.  Law, 
246  ;  Paine  v.  Delhi,  116  N.  Y.  224; 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§28/ 


proof  of  negligence,  for  having  directly  caused  or  authorized 
any  change  in  its  sewers,6  or  their  use  for  other  purposes  than 
that  for  which  they  were  designed,7  so  that  their  capacity  is 
diminished,  and  the  sewage,  in  consequence,  is  thrown  back 
on  abutting  land,  or  other  damage  is  done.  Where  it  has  con- 
verted, under  its  statutory  powers,  a  natural  watercourse8  or  a 


22  N.  E.  405  ;  Ballou  v  State,  111  N.  Y. 
496;  18  N.  E.  627  ;  Jenney  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 120  N.  Y.  164  ;  24  N.  E.  274  [hy- 
drant] ;  Rowe  v.  Portsmouth,  56  N. 
H.  291 ;  Hession  v.  Wilmington 
[Del.]  27  Atl.  830  ;  Harrigan  v.  Wil- 
mington [Del.]  12  Atl.  779 ;  Fair 
v.  Philadelphia,  88  Pa.  St.  309; 
Collins  v.  Philadelphia,  y3  Id. 
272  ;  Fairlawn  Coal  Co  v.  Scran- 
ton.  148  Id.  231;  23  Atl.  1069; 
Baltimore  v.  Schnitker,  84  Md.  34  ; 
34  Atl.  1132  ;  Bannagan  v.  District 
of  Columbia,  2  Mackey,  285  ;  Wright 
v.  Wilmington,  92  N.  C.  156;  Peru 
t.  Brown,  10  Ind.  App.  597  ;  38  N.  E. 
223  ;  Harper  v.  Milwaukee,  30  Wise. 
365  [overflow  of  water  by  obstruc- 
tion of  street  gutter,  knowingly  per- 
mitted] ;  Taylor  v.  Austin,  32  Minn. 
247  ;  Cook  v.  Milwaukee,  24  Wise. 
270  ;  Netzer  v.  Crookston,  59  Minn. 
244 ;  61  N.  W.  21  ;  Imler  v.  Spring- 
field. 55  Mo.  119  ;  Woods  v.  Kansas 
City.  58  Mo.  App.  272  ;  Valparaiso  v. 
Cartwright,  8  Ind.  App.  429  ;  35  N.  E. 
1051  ;  Nashville  v.  Sutherland,  94 
Tenn.  356;  29  S.  W.  228;  Tate 
v.  St.  Paul,  56  Minn.  527  ;  58  N. 
W.  158  ;  Parker  v.  Laredo,  9  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  221;  28  S.  W.  1048.  See 
Downs  v.  High  Point,  115  N.  C. 
182;  20  S.  E.  385;  Fort  Wayne  v. 
Coombs,  107  Ind.  75 ;  Spring- 
field v.  Le  Claire,  49  111.  476;  O'Brien 
v.  St.  Paul,  25  Minn.  333  ;  Wallace 
v.  Muscatine,  4  Greene  [Iowa], 
373. 

6  Nims  v.  Troy,  59  N.  Y.  500; 
Evers  v.  Long  Island  City,  78  Hun 
243;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  825  ;  McCarthy 


v.  Far  Rockaway,  3  App.  Div.  379 ; 
38  N.  Y.  Supp.  989  ;  Bates  v.  West- 
borough,  151  Mass.  174;  23  N.  E. 
1070  ;  Frederick  v.  Lansdale,  156  Pa. 
St.  613 ;  27  Atl.  563  ;  Chalkley  v. 
Richmond,  88  Va.  402  ;  14  S.  E.  339. 
Where  the  necessary  result  of  cut- 
ting a  sewer  is  to  flood  adjacent 
land,  the  city  is  liable  (Ashley  v. 
Port  Huron,  35  Mich.  206). 

1  Buchanan  v.  Duluth,  40  Minn. 
402;  42  N.  W.  204  [gas  pipe  in  sew-er]. 
Where  a  city  permits  the  use  of  a 
sewer  in  violation  of  an  ordinance, 
it  is  liable  for  injuries  thereby  caused 
(Champaign  v.  Forrester,  29  111.  App. 
117).  In  Fuchs  v.  St.  Louis  (133 
Mo.  168  ;  34  S.  W.  508),  petroleum 
which  had  been  allowed  to  run  into 
the  sewer  under  the  direction  of  the 
city's  fire  deparment  could  not  flow 
out  by  reason  of  the  high  water  in 
the  river  at  the  outlet  of  the  sewer; 
after  being  in  the  sewer  for  four 
days,  it  generated  gases  which  could 
not  escape  because  the  manholes 
were  closed;  the  gases  were  acci- 
dentally ignited,  causing  the  explo- 
sion. Held,  question  of  city's  negli- 
gence was  for  the  jury. 

8  Krans  v.  Baltimore,  64  Md.  491  ; 
2  Atl.  908  ;  Morse  v.  Worcester,  139 
Mass.  389;  2  N.  E.  694  ;  Parker  v. 
Lowell,  11  Gray,  353  ;  Yates  v.  Judd. 
18  Wise.  118;  Houfe  v.  Fallon,  34 
Id.  608:  Gillerly  v.  Madison,  63 
Id.  510;  Dallas  v.  Schultz,  [Tex. 
Civ.  App.]  :  27  S.  W.  292.  A  munici- 
pality which  adopts  and  uses  a 
stream  as  an  open  sewer,  and  fails 
to  keep  its  channel  open  and  to  re- 


28;] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


524 


canal9  into  a  public  sewer,  its  duty  in  respect  thereto  is  the 
same  as  if  the  sewer  were  originally  artificial.  As  sewers  are 
constructed  to  effect  the  drainage,  not  only  of  the  streets,  but 
of  lands  adjacent,  and  generally  at  the  expense  of  their  owners, 
such  owners  have  a  legal  right  to  connect  their  premises  by 
particular  drains  with  the  main  or  common  sewer;10  and  a  par- 
ticular duty  is  owing  to  them  by  the  corporation  to  use  ordi- 
nary care  to  prevent  injury  to  their  property  by  reason  of  the 
structure  becoming  dilapidated,  obstructed  or  otherwise  a 
cause  of  damage.11     It  is,  however,  no  part  of  a  city's  duty  to 


move  accumulations  which  obstruct 
the  flow  of  water  and  throw  it  out 
of  its  banks  upon  the  adjoining  land, 
is  liable  though  the  stream  had  been 
used  as  a  sewer  for  thirty  years  (Bliz- 
zard v.  Danville,  175  Pa.  St.  479  ;  31 
Atl.  846). 

9  Savannah  v.  Spears  66  Ga.  304. 

10  In  Barton  v.  Syracuse  (36  N.  Y. 
54;  affi'g  37  Barb.  292).  it  was 
claimed  that  plaintiff  was  a  wrong- 
doer in  connecting  his  cellar  and 
premises  with  the  sewer  by  a  drain, 
and  that  he  was  not,  therefore,  en- 
titled to  recover  in  the  action. 
"  But,"  said  the  court  below,  "  if  the 
public  cannot  use  them  for  the  pur- 
pose of  drainage,  they  will  not  ac- 
complish the  end  for  which  they 
were  designed.  There  is  something 
very  like  a  contract  to  be  implied 
from  the  construction  of  a  sewer,  at 
the  expense  of  the  adjacent  prop- 
erty, that  it  may  be  used  to  drain 
the  property  thus  charged  with  its 
construction."  The  rule  is  very 
clearly  applicable  to  the  case  of  one 
who  complies  with  an  ordinance 
which  requires  all  the  particular 
drains  from  private  premises  to  pass 
into  the  main  sewer  of  the  city 
(Child  v.  Boston,  4  Allen,  41  ;  Bolton 
v.  New  Rochelle,  84  Hun,  281  ;  32 
N.  Y.  Supp.  442).  The  fact,  how- 
ever, that  the  connection  with  the 
bewer  was  voluntary  does  not  pre- 


vent recovery  for  injuries  from  the 
sewer's  overflow  (Daggett  v.  Cohoes, 
54  Hun,  639,  mem.;  7  N.  Y.  Supp. 
882).  But  where  adjacent  owners 
are  not  required  to  conform  their 
drainage  to  that  which  the  city  has 
provided  for  public  imrposes,  and 
have  not,  in  fact,  made  use  of  the 
common  sewer  in  that  way,  and 
have  taken  no  means  to  prevent  the 
overflow  of  water  from  it  on  their 
open  land,  they  cannot  complain  of 
the  failure  of  the  city  to  keep  its 
own  wrorks  in  repair  (Barry  v.  Low- 
ell, 8  Allen,  127  ;  Flagg  v.  Worces- 
ter, 13  Gray,  601).  See  Judge  v. 
Meriden,  38  Conn.  90.  So  where  the 
connecting  drain  was  built  on  plain- 
tiff's land  by  the  corporation  with 
his  knowledge  and  consent,  and 
through  a  defect  in  it,  sewage  mat- 
ter came  from  the  main  sewer  and 
was  thrown  on  plaintiff's  land,  the 
corporation  was  held  not  liable.  ' '  If 
he  did  not  like  the  sewer  on  his  land, 
he  could  take  it  up."  Searing  v. 
Saratoga,  39  Hun,  307). 

11  Barton  v.  Syracuse,  supra.  "  Be 
cause  sewers  are  built  and  main- 
tained partly  for  the  private  benefit 
and  advantage  of  the  abutters,  who 
pay  in  part  for  such  advantages,  and 
because  the  charge  of  sewers  is  not 
an  obligation  imposed  by  law  with- 
out the  assent  of  the  municipality, 
but  voluntarily  assumed,  a  munici- 


5^5 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§289 


connect  private  drains  with  its  main  sewer,  and  the  city  is  not 
liable  for  the  negligent  manner  in  which  its  agents  undertook 
to  do  so.12  The  corporation  is  not  responsible  for  defects  in  a 
private  sewer,  though  on  land  purchased  by  it,  unless  it  has 
adopted  it  as  a  public  sewer.13 

§  288.  [consolidated  with  §  258.] 

§  289.  Implied  liability  for  non-repair  of  streets.—  With 
few  exceptions,  the  courts  of  all  the  states  agree  that,  as  at 
common  law,  no  civil  liability  rests  upon  counties  and  other 
^^/-corporations,  for  neglect  to  keep  their  highways  in  a 
reasonable  state  of  repair,  unless  such  liability  is  expressly 
imposed  by  statute.1  But  in  respect  of  cities,  towns  and 
villages,  incorporated  either  by  special  charter,  or  under  a 
general  statute,2  the  principle  is  firmly  established,  by  the 
decisions  of  the  Federal  courts,3  and  by  those  of  all  the  state 


pality  is  liable  in  a  private  action  for 
negligence  in  building  and  main- 
taining them"  (per  Barker,  J.,  Coan 
v.  Marlborough,  164  Mass.  206  ;  41 
N.  E.  238).  s.  P.,  Pettingell  v.  City 
of  Chelsea,  161  Mass.  368  ;  37  N.  E. 
380 ;  Kansas  City  v.  Slangstrom,  53 
Kans.  431  ;  36  Pac.  706.  The  fact  that 
the  premises  were  not  directly  con- 
nected with  the  sewer  would  not 
prevent  recovery  (Allen  v.  Boston, 
159  Mass.  324;  34  N.  E  519). 

12  Streiff  v.  Milwaukee,  89  Wise. 
218;  61  N.  W.  770.  Compare  Ander- 
son v.  Wilmington  [Del.]  19Atl.  509; 
Bethlehem  v.  Haus  [Pa.]  19  Atl. 
437. 

13  The  acquisition  of  the  property 
on  which  the  private  drain  was  lo- 
cated by  the  corporation  does  not 
constitute  an  adoption  of  the  drain 
as  a  public  sewer,  nor  impose  the 
duty  of  keeping  it  open  (Kosmak  v. 
New  York,  53  Hun,  329:  6  N.  Y. 
Supp.  453). 

1  See  cases  cited  tnder  §  256,  ante. 

2  Ludlow  v.  Fargo,  3  N.  Dak.  485  ; 
57  N.  W.  506. 


3  In  District  of  Columbia  v.  Wood- 
bury (136  U.  S.  450  ;  10  S.  Ct.  990  ; 
Barries  v.  District  of  Columbia,  91 
U.  S.  540),  congress  created  a  board 
of  public  works,  in  the  District  of 
Columbia,  "  who  shall  have  entire 
control  of,  and  make  all  regu- 
lations which  they  shall  deem  neces- 
sary for  keeping  in  repair,  the 
streets,  etc.,  of  the  city."  Held,  that 
the  District  was  liable  for  injuries 
caused  by  the  defective  condition  of 
one  of  its  streets.  "  The  authorities 
establishing  the  doctrine  that  a  city 
is  responsible  for  its  mere  negligence , 
are  so  numerous  and  so  well  con- 
sidered that  the  law  must  be  deemed 
to  be  settled  in  accordance  with 
them"  (Id.  per  Hunt,  J.),  s.  P., 
Weightman  v.  Washington,  1  Black, 
39  ;  Nebraska  City  v.  Campbell,  2 
Id.  590  ;  Robbins  v.  Chicago,  4  Wall. 
658;  Mayor  v.  Sheffield,  Id.  189; 
Delger  v.  St.  Paul,  14  Fed.  567  ; 
Brown  v.  District  of  Columbia,  127 
U.  S.  586  ;  8  S.  Ct.  1314;  District  of 
Columbia  v.  McElligott,  117  U.  S. 
621  ;  6  S.  Ct  884. 


289] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


526 


courts,4  where  the  question  has  been  properly  open  for  discus- 


4  So  held  in  Alabama  :  Srnoot  v. 
Wetumpka,  24  Ala.  112  ;  Albritton 
v.  Huntsville,  CO  Id.  486  ;  Campbell 
v.  Montgomeiy,  53  Id.  527  ;  Selrria  v. 
Perkins,  68  Id.  145 ;  Montgomery 
v.  Wright,  72  Id.  411. 

Colorado :  Daniels  v.  Denver,  2 
Colo.  G69  ;  Denver  v.  Dunsmore,  7 
Id.  328 ;  3  Pac.  705  ;  Boulder  v. 
Niles,  9  Colo.  415  ;  12  Pac.  632. 

Dakota :  Larson  v.  Grand  Forks, 
3  Dak.  307  ;  19  N.  W.  414. 

Delaware  :  Magarity  v.  "Wilming- 
ton, 5  Hous.  530 ;  Anderson  v.  Wil- 
mington, 19  Atl.  509. 

Florida :  Tallahassee  v.  Fortune, 
3  Fla.  19. 

Georgia :  Western,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Atlanta,  74  Ga.  774  ;  Rome  v.  Dodd, 
58  Id.  239 ;  Millidgeville  v.  Cooley, 
55  Id.  17  ;  Wilson  v.  Atlanta,  60  Id. 
473  ;  Parker  v.  Macon,  39  Id.  725  ; 
Brunswick  v.  Braxton,  70  Id.  193  ; 
Greensboro  v.  McGibbony,  93  Ga. 
672  ;  20  S.  E.  37. 

Illinois :  Rockford  v.  Hildebrand, 
61  111.  155  ;  Browning  v.  Spring- 
field, 17  Id.  143  ;  Springfield  v.  La 
Claire,  49  Id.  476  ;  Chicago  v.  Mar- 
tin, Id.  241.  See  Nevins  v.  Peoria, 
41  Id,  513. 

Indiana  :  Centerville  v.  Woods, 
57  Ind.  192;  Grove  v.  Fort  Wayne, 
45  Id.  429  ;  Kistner  v.  Indianapolis; 
100  Id.  210;  Knightstown  v.  Mus-. 
grove,  116  Id.  121;  18  N.  E.  452; 
Goshen  v.  Myers,  119  Ind.  196 ;  21 
N.  E.  657. 

Ioiva  :  Manderschid  v.  Dubuque, 
29  Iowa,  73  ;  Koester  v.  Ottumwa, 
34  Id.  41  ;  Clark  v.  Epworth,  56  Id. 
462:  Hendershott  v.  Ottumwa,  46  Id. 
658;  Case  v.  Waverlj,  36  Id.  545; 
Beazan  v.  Mason  City,  58  Id,  233  ;  12 
N.  W.  279. 

Kansas  :  Topeka  v.  Tuttle,  5  Kans. 
311  ;  Atchison  v.  Kin<r.  9  Id.  550  ; 
Ottawa  v.  Washabaugh,  11  Id.  124  ; 


Wyandotte  v.  White,  13  Id.  191  ; 
Smith  v.  Leavenworth,  15  Id.  81; 
Jansen  v.  Atchison,  16  Id.  358  ; 
Kansas  City  v.  Bermingham,  45  Id. 
212  ;  25  Pac.  569. 

Kentucky:  Patch  v.  Covington, 
17  B.  Mon.  722;  Greenwood  v.  Louis- 
ville, 13  Bush,  226. 

Louisiana :  O'Neil  v.  New  Or- 
leans, 30  La.  Ann,  220  ;  Cline  v. 
Crescent  City  R.  Co.,  41  Id.  1031  ;  6 
So.  851. 

Maryland  :  Baltimore  v.  Pendle- 
ton, 15  Md.  12  ;  Hartford  county  v. 
Wise,  71  Id.  43  ;  18  Atl.  31  ;  Frost- 
bury  v.  Hitchins,  16  Atl.  380.  See 
§  257,  ante. 

Minnesota :  Furnell  v.  St,  Paul, 
20  Minn  117;  Shartle  v.  Minneapo- 
lis, 17  Id.  308  ;  Bohen  v.  Waseca,  32- 
Id.  170  ;  Kellogg  v.  Janesville,  34  Id. 
132  ;  24  N.  W.  359 ;  Welter  v.  St. 
Paul,  40  Minn.  460  ;  42  N.  W.  392 ; 
Young  v.  Waterville,  39  Minn.  196  ; 
39  N.  W.  97  ;  Nichols  v.  St.  Paul,  44 
Minn.  494  ;  47  N.  W.  168. 

Mississippi:  Bell  v.  West  Point, 
51  Miss.  262 ;  Vicksburg  v.  Hen- 
nessy,  54  Id.  392  ;  Whitfield  v.  Meri- 
dian, 66  Id.  570  ;  6  So.  244. 

Missouri :  Bassett  v.  St.  Joseph, 
53  Mo.  290  ;  Craig  v.  Sedalia,  63  Id. 
417  ;  Blake  v.  St.  Louis,  40  Id.  569  ; 
Halpin  v.  Kansas  City,  76  Id.  335. 

Montana:  Sullivan  v.  Helena,  10 
Mont.  134;  25  Pac.  94. 

Nebraska:  Omaha  v.  Olmstead.  5 
Neb.  446  ;  Lincoln  v.  Walker,  18  Id. 
244  ;  20  N.  W.  113  ;  Ponca  v.  Craw- 
ford, 23  Id.  662  ;  37  N.  W.  609. 

Nevada  :  McDonough  v.  Virginia 
City,  5  Nev.  90. 

New  York  :  Elrrgott  v.  New  York, 
96  N.  Y.  264  ;  Nelson  v.  Canisteo,  100 
N.  Y.  89  ;  Saulsbury  v.  Ithaca,  94  Id. 
27;  Conrad  v.  Ithaca,  16  Id.  158; 
Hickok  v.  Plattsburgh,  Id.  161,  note; 
Weet  v.    Brockport,    Id.  161,  note  ; 


527 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§2S9 


sion,  except  these  mentioned  below,3  that  such  corporations, 
where  the   statute  grants  them  the   control   of    their  streets, 

ing,  19  W.  Va.  324 ;  Curry  v.  Man- 
nington,  23  Id.  14  ;  Moore  v.  Hunt- 
ington, 31  W.  Va.  842  ;  8  S.  E.  512 ; 
Biggs  v.  Huntington,  32  W.  Va.  55  ; 
9  S.  E.  51. 

5  In  all  the  Neiv  England  states 
(see  §  258,  ante)  and  in  Arkansas 
(Arkadelphia  v.  Windham,  49  Ark. 
139;  4  S.  W.  450;  Fort  Smith  v. 
York,  52  Ark.  84;  12  S.  W.  157), 
California  (Winbigler  v.  Los  An- 
geles, 45  Cal.  36  ;  Tranter  v.  Sacra- 
mento, Gl  Id.  271  ;  Chope  v.  Eureka, 
78  Id.  588  ;  21  Pac.  304  ;  Arnold  v. 
San  Jose,  81  Cal.  018  ;  22  Pac.  877  [two 
of  three  judges  sitting,  while  agree- 
ing to  apply  the  rule,  disapproved 
it]),  Michigan  (Detroit  v.  Blacke- 
by,  21  Mich.  84  [dissenting  opinion 
by  Cooley,  J.]  ;  Detroit  v.  Putnam, 
45  Id.  203  ;  7  N.  W.  815  ;  McKeUar 
v.  Detroit,  57  Mich.  158 ;  23  N.  W. 
621  ;  McArthur  v.  Saginaw,  58  Mich. 
357;  25  N.  W.  313;  Williams  v. 
Grand  Rapids,  59  Mich.  51  ;  26  N. 
W.  279  ;  McCutcheon  v.  Homer,  4a 
Mich.  483  ;  5  N.  W.  008  ;  Roberts  v. 
Detroit,  102  Mich.  04  ;  00  N.  W.  450) : 
liability  for  non-repair  is  (since  1887) 
imposed  by  statute  (Howell  Stats., 
g§  1442-45;  see  Southwell  v.  De- 
troit, 74  Mich.  438;  42  N.  W.  118; 
Joslyn  v.  Detroit,  74  Mich.  458  ;  42 
N.  W.  50 :  Campbell  v.  Kalamazoo, 
80  Mich.  655;  45  N.  W.  052),  New 
Jersey  (Sussex  county  v.  Sti'ader,  18 
N.  J.  Law,  108  ;  Pray  v.  Jersey  City, 
32  Id.  394;  Livermore  v.  Camden 
county,  29  Id.  245  ;  Condict  v.  Jersey 
City,  40  Id.  157 ;  Carter  v.  Rahway, 
57  Id.  190  ;  30  Atl.  863) ,  South  Caro- 
lina (Young  v.  Charleston,  20  S.  C. 
116;  Black  v.  Columbia.  19  Id.  412; 
Coleman  v.  Chester,  14  Id.  291),  and 
Wisconsin  (Burns  v.  Elba.  32  Wise. 
605  ;  Stilling  v.  Thorp,  54  Wise.  528 ; 
11  N.W.  906  ;  Spearbracker  v.  Larra- 


Maximilian  v.  New  York,  62  Id.  160; 
Hyatt  v.  Rondout,  44  Barb.  385 ; 
Wendell  v.  Troy,  39  Id.  329  ;  affi'd,  4 
Abb.  Ct.  App.  503  ;  Peck  v.  Batavia, 
32  Barb.  634  ;  Cole  v.  Medina,  27  Id. 
218  ;  Clark  v.  Lockport,  49  Barb.  580, 
and  many  other  cases. 

North  Carolina:  Meares  v.  Wil- 
mington, 9  Ired.  Law,  73  ;  Bunch  v. 
Edenton,  90  N.  C.  431. 

North  Dakota :  Ludlow  v.  Fargo, 
3  N.  Dak.  485. 

Ohio :  Dayton  v.  Pease,  4  Ohio  St. 
80  ;  Clark  v.  Fry,  8  Id.  358 ;  Toledo 
v.  Cone,  41  Id.  149 ;  Shelby  v.  Cla- 
gett,  46  Id.  549  ;  22  N.  E.  407. 

Oregon :  Sheridan  v.  Salem,  14 
Oreg.  328  ;  12  Pac.  925  ;  Farquar  v. 
Roseberg,  18  Oreg.  271  ;  22  Pac.  1103. 

Pennsylvania  :  Erie  v.  Schwingle, 
22  Pa.  St.  388  ;  Fritsch  V.Allegheny, 
91  Id.  226  ;  Rigony  v.  Schuylkill,  103 
Pa.  St.  382  ;  Brookville  v.  Arthurs, 
130  Id.  501  ;  18  Atl.  107G  ;  Ethridge 
v.  Philadelphia,  20  Fed.  43. 

Tennessee :  Nashville  v.  Brown,  9 
Heisk.  1  ;  Niblett  v.  Nashville,  12  Id. 
084;  Knoxville  v.  Bell,  12  Lea,  157. 

Texas:  Galveston  v.  Posnainsky, 
62  Tex.  118  ;  Klein  v.  Dallas,  71  Id. 
280 ;  8  S.  W.  90 ;  Austin  v.  Ritz,  72 
Tex.  3P1  ;  9  S.  W.  884. 

Utah  :  Levy  v.  Salt  Lake  City,  3 
Utah,  03  ;  1  Pac.  100. 

Virginia :  Sawyer  v.  Corse,  17 
Gratt.  230  ;  Noble  v.  Richmond,  31 
Id.  271  ;  Clark  v.  Richmond,  83  Id. 
355 ;  5  S.  E.  369  ;  Moore  v.  Richmond, 
85  Va.  538;  8  S.  E.  387. 

Washington:  Morgan  v.  Morley, 
1  Wash.  St.  464  ;  25  Pac.  333  ;  Hutch- 
inson v.  Olympia,  2  Wash.  314 :  5 
Pac.  606  ;  Saylor  v.  Montesano,  11 
Wash.  St.  328;  39  Pac.  053  ;  Sutton, 
v.  Snohomish,  11  Wash.  St.  24  ;  39 
Pac.  273. 

West  Virginia  :  Wilson  v.  Wheel- 


§29ll  MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS.  528 

coupled  with  powers  to  raise  means  to  maintain  them,  are  bound 
to  exercise  ordinary  care  and  diligence  to  see  that  they  are 
reasonably  safe  for  travel ;  that  this  duty  is  not  a  public  duty 
owing  to  the  public  alone,  but  a  private,  corporate  duty,  which 
(when  not  expressly  imposed)  is  necessarily  implied  from  such  a 
grant  of  power;  and,  moreover,  that  the  legislature  is  deemed 
to  have  intended  by  the  grant  to  impose  a  liability,  co-exten- 
sive with  the  duty,  in  favor  of  any  person  specially  injured  by 
a  wrongful  omission  to  perform,  or  a  negligent  performance 
of,  such  duty.  We  reserve  for  a  separate  chapter  the  con- 
sideration of  a  multitude  of  decided  cases,  in  which  this 
principle  has  been  applied.6 

§  290.   [consolidated  with  §  367.] 

§291.  Implied    liability    for    negligence    of    agents. — A 

municipal  corporation  is  impliedly  liable,  on  the  maxim  of 
respondeat  superior,  for  the  negligence  of  its  servants  and 
agents  in  the  discharge  of  its  purely  corporate  powers,  as  dis- 
tinguished from  those  of  a  governmental  nature.1  The  fact  of 
agency  being  established,  the  liability  of  the  corporation  is 
determined  by  the  rules,  already  stated,  which  govern  the 
relation  of  master  and  servant  between  private  persons,  unless 
it  is  expressly  exempted  by  statute  from  the  application  of  the 
rule.2  It  is  well  settled  that  such  relation  does  not  exist 
between  a  municipal  corporation  and  the  agents  it  appoints  or 
employs  in  the  execution  of  its  governmental  powers  for 
the  enforcement  of  the  laws  and  its  own  ordinances,  such  as 
police  officers,3  firemen,4  health  officers,5  and  the  like,  who  are 

bee,    64  Wise    573  ;  25  N.  W.  555 ;  ]  Barnes  v.  District   of  Columbia, 

Wiltse  v.  Tilden,  77  Wise.  152  ;  46  N.  91  U.  S.  540  ;  Clark  v.   Washington, 

W.  234  ;  Goeltz  v.  Ashland,  75  Wise.  12  Wheat.  40  ;  McCaughey  v.  Provi- 

642  ;  44  N.  W.  770) :  the  statute  now  dence,  12  R.  I.  449,  and  cases  cited, 

imposes  a  liability  (L.  1889,  ch.  471) ;  infra. 

see  Kollock   v.  Madison,    84  Wise.  2  See  §  254,  ante. 

485  :  54  N.  W.  725).  3  "  Police  officers  can,  in  no  sense, 

For  the  rule  in  Pennsylvania,  be  regarded  as  servants  or  agents  of 
Maryland  and  Indiana  that  both  the  city.  Their  duties  are  of  a  pub- 
counties  and  cities  are  impliedly  lie  nature.  Their  appointment  is  de- 
liable,  see  §  257,  ante.  volved  upon  cities  and  towns  by  the 

6  Chapter  xv,  §§  332-384,  post.  legislature  as  a  convenient  mode  of 

4  See  §  265,  ante.  6  See  §  266,  ante. 


529 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


T§2gi 


agents  of  the  state  and  not  of  the  corporation.     The  corpora- 
tion  is   not   liable,    therefore,   for  the    torts  of   these  officers, 


exercising  a  function  of  government, 
but  this  does  not  render  the  cities 
and  towns  liable  for  their  unlawful 
or  negligents  acts.  The  powers  and 
duties  with  which  police  officers  and 
constables  are  intrusted  are  derived 
from  the  law,  and  not  from  the  city 
or  town  under  which  they  hold  their 
appointment  "  (per  Bigelow,  C.  J., 
82  Mass.  172  [policeman  made  an  as- 
sault while  attempting  to  enforce 
ordinance  against  street  obstruc- 
tions]). In  McKay  v.  Buffalo  (9 
Hun,  401  ;  affi'd  without  opinion,  74 
N.  Y.  619),  it  was  sought  to  hold  a 
city  liable  for  a  policeman's  negli- 
gently handling  his  pistol  while 
attempting  to  shoot  a  supposed  mad 
dog  in  the  street,  as  required  by 
ordinance,  so  that  he  wounded  plain- 
tiff Held,  on  demurrer,  no  cause 
uf  action.  In  Woodhull  v.  New 
York  (150  N.  Y.  450 ;  44  N.  E.  1038  ; 
rev'g  76  Hun,  300;  28  N.  Y.  Supp. 
120),  a  policeman,  detailed  to  the 
Brooklyn  Bridge,  also  acted  as  train- 
guard  of  the  railroad  operated 
thereon,  for  hire,  by  the  two  cities. 
Held,  that  the  latter  were  not  liable 
for  the  policeman's  forcible  deten- 
tion of  a  passenger  on  its  train,  no  re- 
lation of  master  and  servant  existing 
between  them  and  the  policeman. 
S.  P.,  Burch  v.  Hardwicke,  30  Gratt. 
24  ;  Altvater  v.  Baltimore,  31  Md. 
462  :  Elliott  v.  Philadelphia,  7  Phila. 
128  [policeman  not  caring  for  horse 
after  arresting  driver]  ;  Whitfield  v. 
Paris,  84  Tex.  431  ;  19  S.  W.  566  [un- 
skillful attempt  to  shoot  unmuzzled 
dog.  wounding  plaintiff]  ;  Culver  v. 
Streator,  130  111.  238;  22  N.  E.  810 
[same].  InGivensv.  Paris  (5  Tex. Civ. 
App.  705  ;  24  S.  W.  9741,  plaintiff  was 
gored  by  a  cow  which  was  being 
driven  to  pound,  instead  of  led  by  a 
rope,  through  a  populous  part  of 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  1  —  34] 


city,  by  a  policeman  specially  ap- 
pointed to  enforce  an  ordinance 
against  animals  running  at  large. 
Held,  city  not  liable.  A  city  is  not 
liable  for  arresting  a  person  without 
a  warrant,  or  for  using  unnecessary 
violence  in  making  an  arrest  (Pol- 
lock v.  Louisville,  13  Bush,  221  : 
Cook  v.  Macon,  54  Ga.  468 ;  Harris 
v.  Atlanta,  62  Id.  290 ;  Attaway  v. 
Cartersville,  68  Id.  740  ;  Richmond 
v.  Long,  17  Gratt.  376  ;  Dargan  v. 
Mobile,  31  Ala.  469;  Moss  v.  Augusta, 
93  Ga.  797  ;  20  S.  E.  653  [maliciously 
shooting  dog].  See  Brown  v.  Guy- 
andotte,  34  W.  Va.  299 ;  12  S.  E. 
707  ;  Odell  v.  Schroeder,  58  111.  353 
[arrest  on  verbal  order  of  magis- 
trate]; Peters  v.  Lindsborg,  40  Kans. 
654  ;  20  Pac.  490  ;  Gullikson  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 62  Minn.  278  ;  64  N.  W.  812 
[false  imprisonment].  But  see  Fox 
v.  Northern  Liberties,  3  Watts  &  S. 
103  ;  Rusher  v.  Dallas,  83  Tex.  151  ; 
Blake  v.  Pontiac,  49  111.  App.  543 
[same] ;  Kansas  City  v.  Lemen,  57 
Fed.  905 ;  6  C.  C.  A.  627  [illegally 
closing  circus  exhibition] ;  Cobb  v. 
Portland,  55  Me.  381  [third  person 
injured  while  assisting  police,  at 
their  request,  in  making  an  arrest]. 
Enforcing  ordinances  is  in  the  inter- 
est of  tbe  public,  not  of  the  corpor- 
ation as  such  (Elliott  v  Philadelphia, 
75  Pa.  St.  347;  Calwell  v.  Boone, 
51  Iowa,  687 ;  Ogg  v.  Lansing,  35  Id. 
495;  Prather  v.  Lexington,  13  B. 
Mon.  559  ;  Laurel  v.  Blue  [Ind.]  27 
N.  E.  301 ;  Vaughtman  v.  Waterloo, 
14  Ind.  App.  649  ;  43  N.  E.  476  ;  Mc- 
Elroy  v.  Albany,  65  Ga.  387  [night- 
watch  maliciously  assaulted  pris- 
oner] ;  Dargan  v.  Mobile,  31  Ala. 
469  ;  Stewart  v.  New  Orleans,  9  La. 
Ann.  461  [officer  killed  a  slave  in 
suppressing  an  unlawful  assembly 
of    slaves].      Compare    Johnson    v. 


§290 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


530 


though  committed  with  its  knowledge  or  by  its  order,  or 
though  the  wrong  was  subsequently  ratified  by  it.6  The  mere 
fact  that  an  officer  was  appointed,  and  is  removable,  by  the 
corporation,  does  not  establish  an  agency,  within  the  rule.  In 
appointing,  under  statutory  requirement,  a  person  to  perform 
specific  public  duties,  e.g.,  a  boiler-inspector,7  or  a  pilot,8  the 
city  discharges  a  political  duty  only,  and  is  not  liable  for  the 
appointee's  misfeasance  or  malfeasance  in  office.9  Its  officers 
directly  elected  by  the  people  are  not  its  agents,10  nor  are  per- 
sons designated  by  statute  to  construct  or  maintain  a  public 
work  for  its  use  and  benefit,11  unless  it  accepts  the  statute  and 

New  Orleans,  5  Id.    100 ;  Clague  v.     city  liable]  ;  Lewis  v    New  Orleans, 
New  Orleans,  13  Id.   275  [death  of    12  Id.  190). 
slave  put  to  work  in   chain-gang; 


6  Calwell  v.  Boone,  51  Iowa,  687  ; 
2  N.  W.  614  ;  Odell  v.  Schroeder,  58 
111.  353  ;  Grumbine  v.  Washington, 
2  McArthur,  578  ;  Parks  v.  Green- 
ville, 44  S.  C.  168;  21  S.  E.  540. 
Compare  Rosenbaum  v.  Newbern, 
118  N.  C.  83 ;  24  S.  E.  1  ;  McGraw  v. 
Marion,  98   Ky.  673  ;  34  S.  W.  18. 

7  Mead  v.  New  Haven,  40  Conn. 
72. 

8  Ogilvie  v.  Edinburgh,  Hay,  26  ; 
F.  C.  1821. 

9  Martin  v.  Brooklyn,  1  Hill,  545  ; 
Sullivan  v.  Holyoke,  135  Mass.  273 ; 
Prince  v.  Lynn,  149  Id.  193  ;  21  N. 
E.  296  [street  superintendent] ;  Jen- 
sen v.  Waltham,  166  Id.  344  ;  44  N.  E. 
339  [same]  ;  New  Bedford  v.  Taun- 
ton, 9  Allen,  207  [overseers  of  the 
poor]  ;  Hennessey  v.  New  Bedford, 
153  Mass.  260  ;  26  N.  E.  999  [survey- 
ors of  highways]  ;  Cochrane  v.  Mai- 
den, 152  Mass.  365;  25  N.  E.  620 
[drainage  commissioners]  ;  Bates  v. 
Rutland,  62  Vt.  178;  20  Atl.  278 
[trustees  of  highway  district]. 

10  Terry  v.  New  York,  8  Bosw.  504  ; 
Treadwell  v.  New- York,  1  Daly,  123  ; 
Denver  v.  Williams.  12  Colo  475  ;  21 
Pac.  617.  A  city  corporation  is  not  re- 
sponsible to  a  lot-owner  for  negli- 


gence of  a  district  surveyor  elected  by 
the  people,  under  authority  of  stat- 
ute, the  corporation  having  no  con- 
trol over  him,  in  locating  the  line  of 
his  lots,  so  that,  after  a  partial  con- 
struction of  a  house,  he  was  com- 
pelled to  rebuild  it  (Alcorn  v.  Phila- 
delphia, 44  Pa.  St.  348).  S.  P., 
Wood  v.  Watertown,  58  Hun,  298 ; 
11  N.  Y.  Supp.  864  [alderman]. 
Selectmen  of  a  town  (elected),  whom 
the  statute  authorized  to  establish 
and  maintain  public  drinking 
troughs,  held  not  agents  of  the  town 
in  erecting  a  trough  and  painting  it 
brilliant  red,  causing  plaintiff's  horse 
to  be  frightened  and  to  run  away 
(Cushing  v.  Bedford,  125  Mass.  526). 
11  In  N.  Y.  &  Brooklyn  Saw  Mill 
Co.  v.  Brooklyn  (71  N.  Y.  580),  the 
legislature  appointed  commissioners 
to  build  docks  along  a  canal  within 
the  city  limits,  but  not  owned  or  con- 
trolled by  the  city,  the  expense  to  be 
ultimately  paid  by  an  assessment 
upon  adjacent  land.  Held,  not  a 
corporate  work,  and  that  the  com- 
missioners were  not  agents  of  the 
corporation  for  whose  negligence  it 
was  liable.  And  see  cases  under  next 
note. 


53i 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§291 


adopts  the  appointment,  in  which  case  the  appointees  become 
its  agents,  the  same  as  if  they  were  appointed  by  its  own 
authority.12  An  officer  whose  duties  are  prescribed  by  statute, 
whose  authority  is  not  derived  from  the  corporation,  and  who 
is  not  subject  to  its  control,  is  not  its  agent  for  whose  negli- 
gence it  is  liable.13  Under  the  general  principle  which  makes 
a  master  liable  for  the  negligence  of  sub-agents  employed  by 
his  servant,  under  his  authority,14  municipal  corporations  are 


12  In  Bailey  v.  New  York  (3  Hill, 
531;  affi'd,  2  Denio,  443),  commis- 
sioners were  appointed  by  the  state 
to  draft  a  plan  for  conveying  water 
into  the  city  of  New  York,  such  plan 
to  be  submitted  to  the  common  coun- 
cil of  the  city  for  approval  and  adop- 
tion. The  plan  submitted  to  the 
commissioners  was  approved,  and 
the  commissioners  were  instructed 
by  the  common  council  to  proceed 
with  the  work,  which  was  accord- 
ingly done.  The  work  was  paid  for 
and  accepted  by  the  city.  In  the 
course  of  the  work,  a  dam  was  so 
negligently  built  that  during  a 
freshet  it  was  carried  away,  causing 
injury  to  the  plaintiff  's  property.  On 
the  trial,  plaintiff  was  nonsuited, 
principally  upon  the  ground  that 
the  water  commissioners,  having 
been  appointed  by  the  state,  were 
not  subject  to  the  control  of  the  city, 
and  that  the  latter  was  not,  there- 
fore, liable  for  their  negligence. 
Held,  error.  In  Deyoe  v.  Saratoga 
Springs  (1  Hun,  341),  commissioners 
appointed  by  the  legislature  had 
charge  of  a  village  water-works. 
The  village  held  liable  for  their  neg- 
ligence s.  P..  Toledo,  v.  Cone,  41 
Ohio  St.  149  ;  Ironton  v.  Kelley,  38 
Id.  50;  Appleton  v.  Water  Commrs. , 
2  Hill,  433  ;  Conrad  v.  Ithaca.  16 
N.  Y.  158  [unskillful  construction  of 
bridge]. 

13  Highway  officers  whose  duties 
are  prescribed  by  general  statute, 
whose  authority  is  not  derived  from 


the  town,  and  who  are  not  under 
the  control  of  the  town,  are  not 
agents  of  the  town.  Their  powers 
cannot  be  enlarged  or  abridged  by 
any  action  of  the  town,  and  what 
they  do,  or  omit  to  do,  in  the  proper 
exercise  of  their  authority,  is  done 
or  omitted  because  the  law  enjoins 
and  prescribes  their  duties,  inde- 
pendent of  municipal  control  or  au- 
thority (Ball  v.  Winchester,  32  N.  H. 
435  ;  Hardy  v.  Keene,  52  Id.  370  ; 
Pratt  y.  Weymouth,  147  Mass.  245  ; 
17  N.  E.  538  [highway  surveyor]  ; 
Barney  v.  Lowell,  98  Mass.  570 ; 
McCarthy  v.  Boston,  135  Id.  197 
[street  superintendent]  ;  Walcott  v. 
Swampscott,  1  Allen,  101  [highway 
surveyor]  ;  Bates  v.  Horner,  65  Vt. 
471 ;  27  Atl.  134 ;  Anne  Arundel 
county  v.  Duval,  54  Md.  350  [road 
supervisor]  ;  Caspary  v.  Portland, 
19  Oreg.  496  ;  24  Pac.  1036  [health 
officer].  A  town  is  not  the  superior 
of  its  assessors  and  collectors  of 
taxes  so  as  to  be  liable  to  a  tax- 
payer for  their  mistakes  in  assessing 
too  much  taxes  (Lorillard  v.  Monroe, 
11  N.  Y.  392  ;  Rossire  v.  Boston,  4 
Allen,  57  ;  Dunbar  v.  Boston,  112 
Mass.  75  ;  Alger  v.  Easton,  119  Id. 
77).  Compare  Commonwealth  Bank 
v.  New  York,  43  N.  Y.  184.  The 
statute  must  detei  mine  the  liability 
of  the  corporation  for  the  torts  of 
its  officers  (Little  Rock  v.  Willis,  27 
Ark.  572). 
14  See  §  157,  ante. 


§290 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


532 


answerable  for  the  negligence  of  persons  lawfully15  appointed 
or  employed  by  its  officers  to  perform  ministerial  duties10  or 
labor17  in  its  service.  It  is,  of  course,  not  liable  for  the  negli- 
gence of  its  agents  when  engaged  in  the  service  of  a  third  per- 
son.18    But  putting  an  agent  to  work  in  another  department  of 


15  Where  the  general  duty  of 
abating  nuisances  is  cast  upon  a 
particular  department  of  the  city 
government  with  which  the  mayor 
has  nothing  to  do,  the  latter,  in  em- 
ploying a  person,  in  an  emergency, 
to  remove  a  nuisance,  does  not  bind 
the  city  so  as  to  make  it  liable  for 
the  employee's  negligence  in  trying 
to  remove  the  nuisance  (Hilsdorf  v. 
St.  Louis,  45  Mo.  94).  s.  P. ,  Cumber- 
land v.  Willison,  50  Md.  138. 

16  An  authority  to  do  acts  merely 
ministerial  or  mechanical  may  be 
delegated  ;  but  not  so  where  the  act 
involves  the  exercise  of  judgment  or 
discretion  (Powell  v.  Tuttle,  3  N.  Y. 
396  ;  and  cases  cited). 

11  Thus,  a  municipal  corporation  is 
liable  for  injuries  caused  by  the  care- 
lessness of  the  laborers  employed  by 
its  street  commissioner,  or  other 
proper  officer,  in  corporation  work 
(Delmonico  v.  New  York,  1  Sandf. 
222  ;  Barney  Boat  Co.  v.  New  York, 
40  Fed.  50,  and  note  [employees  of 
street-cleaning  commissioner]  ;  Day- 
ton v.  Pease,  4  Ohio  St.  80  ;  Smith 
v.  Milwaukee,  18  Wise.  69 ;  see 
Memphis  v.  Lasser,  9  Humph.  757  ; 
Detroit  v.  Corey,  9  Mich.  165 ;  Cin- 
cinnati v.  Stone,  5  Ohio  St.  38 ; 
Meares  v.  Wilmington,  9  Ired.  Law, 
73;  McCaughey  v.  Tripp,  12  R.  I. 
449).  s.  P.,  Worden  v.  New  Bed- 
ford, 131  Mass.  23  [janitor  of  a  public 
building,  let  out  with  services  of  the 
janitor]  ;  Vincent  v.  Brooklyn,  31 
Hun,  122  [keeper  of  a  municipal 
building,  whose  negligence  caused 
an  explosion  of  gas].  In  Sullivan  v. 
Holyoke  (135  Mass.  273),  a  city  wa3 


held  liable  for  the  negligence  of  an 
agent  employed  to  take  care  of 
naphtha  used  in  lighting  street 
lamps. 

18  The  fact  that  a  city  engineer 
plans  a  defective  drain,  to  be  con- 
structed by  private  parties,  which 
caves  in,  and  causes  injury,  does  not 
impose  any  liability  on  the  city 
(Kansas  City  v.  Brady,  52  Kans.  297; 
34  Pac.  884;  36  Id.  726).  A  city  is 
not  liable  for  the  fault  of  its  engi- 
neer in  incorrectly  reporting  to  a  lot- 
owner  the  grade  of  street  in  front  of 
owner's  lot,  although  by  an  ordi- 
nance of  the  city  it  is  made  the 
engineer's  duty  to  make  such  reports 
to  the  lot-owner.  Benefit  of  per- 
formance of  such  duty  accrues  to 
lot-owner,  not  to  city  in  its  corpo- 
rate capacity  (Waller  v.  Dubuque, 
69  Iowa,  541  ;  29  N.  W.  456).  s.  P., 
Martin  v.  Brooklyn,  1  Hill,  545 
[filing  a  report  of  assessment  of 
damage  for  a  street  opening  by  vil- 
lage trustees,  as  required  by  general 
statute,  not  a  corporate  duty]  ; 
Anne  Arundel  county  v.  Duvall, 
54  Md.  350  [road  supervisor]. 
The  mere  granting  of  a  license  to  a 
plumber  to  connect  service  pipes  for 
conducting  water  from  the  distribut- 
ing pipes  of  the  city  to  private 
houses,  or  the  giving  of  a  special 
permit  to  him,  to  connect  with  a  city 
sewer,  under  the  direction  of  the 
city  inspectors,  does  not  not  make 
the  plumber  a  servant  of  the  city 
when  employed  by  private  parties 
(Dorlon  v.  Brooklyn,  46  Barb.  604). 
See  §  263,  ante.  In  Harvey  v.  Hills- 
dale (86  Mich.  330  ;  49  N.  W.  141),  an 


533 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§  295 


public  business  than  that  to  which  he  was  specially  assigned, 
will  not  terminate  his  agency  so  as  to  relieve  the  corporation 
from  liability  for  his  negligence  in  such  work.19 

§§  292,  293,  294.   [consolidated  with  §  291.] 

§  295.  Departments  of  government,  not  agents  of  city. — 

The  members  of  an  independent  department  of  municipal 
government  created  by  the  legislature,  not  for  the  purpose  of 
managing  the  corporation's  property,  but  of  providing  for  the 
general  welfare,  are  not  agents  of  the  corporation,  although 
appointed  and  removable  by  it,  and  under  its  control  and  pay, 
but  are  officers  and  agents  of  the  state,  for  governmental  pur- 
poses, like  the  corporation  itself.  The  latter  is  not  answerable, 
therefore,  for  the  conduct  of  such  officers,  in  the  discharge 
of  their  statutory  duties,  nor  for  the  negligence  of  their  sub- 
ordinates  and   servants,  in   the    business   of  the   department.1 

employee  of  the  city  -while  engaged 
in  work  for  the  city  under  contract, 
was  taken  from  that  work  and  placed 
upon  work  for  a  third  person  by  the 
mayor's  direction.  Held,  that  while 
so  engaged,  he  was  not  the  city's 
agent  for  whose  negligence  it  was 
liable.  In  Wilson  v.  Troy  (135  N. 
Y.  96  :  32  N.  E.  44),  the  city's  water 
commissioners  had  prohibited  any 
person  except  their  superintendent 
and  those  employed  by  him,  or  hav- 
ing his  permission,  to  tap  or  make 
connection  with  the  water  mains. 
A  plumber  who  was  employed  to 
make  a  connection  with  a  house, 
knowing  of  this  rule,  applied  to  the 
superintendent,  who  directed  work- 
men employed  by  the  city  to  make 
an  excavation  in  the  street  for  the 
connection,  the  plumber  agreeing  to 
reimburse  the  city  for  the  cost  of 
the  men's  labor.  The  workmen  neg- 
ligently left  the  excavation  un- 
guarded, and  plaintiff's  horse  fell 
into  it.  Held  (by  one  majority), 
whether  the  workmen  were  at  the 
time  servants  of  the  city,  was  for  the 

jury- 


19  Stoddard  v.  Winchester,  157 
Mass.  567  ;  32  N.  E.  948. 

1  Russell  v.  New  York,  2  Denio, 
461,  distinguishing  Bailey  v.  New 
York,  2  Id.  443.  In  Maximilian  v. 
New  York  (62  N.  Y.  160) ,  the  driver 
of  an  ambulance  wagon  belonging 
to  the  city  ran  over  and  caused  the 
death  of  plaintiff's  intestate.  The 
driver  was  an  employee  of  the  com- 
missioners of  charities  —  a  depart- 
ment of  the  city  government. 
Held,  corporation  not  liable,  s.  p., 
Ham  v.  New  York,  70  N.  Y.  460  [de- 
partment of  public  instruction;  de- 
fective school-house  plumbing]; 
Donovan  v.  Board  of  Education,  85 
N.  Y.  117  ;  Murphy  v.  Commission- 
ers of  Emigration,  28  N.  Y.  134 
[board  not  liable  for  emigrant's  loss 
of  baggage  in  its  charge] ;  New 
York,  etc.  Lumber  Co  v.  Brooklyn, 
71  Id.  580  ;  Tone  v.  New  York,  70  N. 
Y.  157  [board  of  revision  and  correc- 
tion of  tax  assessments]  ;  Gottsber- 
ger  v.  New  York,  9  N.  Y.  Misc.  349  ; 
29  N.  Y.  Supp.  592  [dock  depart- 
ment]. In  O'Meara  v.  New  York  (1 
Daly,    425),    plaintiff,  while  on  the 


§2961 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


534 


This  principle,  however,  does  not  govern  the  case  of  a  public 
■work,  c.  g.,  a  bridge  authorized  by  the  legislature  to  be  built 
and  maintained  at  the  expense  of  a  city,  by  a  board  of  trus- 
tees appointed  by  the  latter,  to  which  the  structure,  together 
with  its  revenues,  belong.  There,  it  is  held,  the  trustees,  and 
their  servants,  are  agents  of  the  city,  for  whose  negligence  in 
the  management  of  its  property  the  city  is  liable.2 

§  296.  When  departments  are  city's  agents.  —  The  fact 
that  the  legislature  has  imposed  upon  an  independent  depart- 
ment of  a  city  government,  e.g.,  a  police  or  street  department, 
a  special  duty,  such  as  enforcing  ordinances  against  nuisances, 
or  repairing  its  streets,  as  the  case  may  be,  will  not  relieve  the 
corporation    from    its    primary    obligation    in    regard    to    the 


sidewalk,  was  knocked  down  and 
run  over  by  a  fire-engine  in  charge 
of  firemen.  Held,  city  was  not  lia- 
ble. The  mere  fact  that  the  firemen 
had  at  the  time  an  engine  in  their 
possession,  by  the  authority  of  the 
common  council,  did  not  create  the 
relation  of  master  and  servant.  An 
action  would  lie  against  the  fire  de- 
partment itself  (Clarissy  v.  Fire 
Department,  7  Abb.  Pr.  [N.  S  ]  352). 
A  city  charter  gave  the  board  of  al- 
dermen power  to  elect  street  com- 
missioners, but  denied  it  the  right 
to  superintend  and  direct  them. 
Held,  that  an  assistant  superin- 
tendent of  streets,  acting  under 
such  board  of  street  commissioners, 
■was  not.  by  virtue  of  his  office,  an 
agent  of  the  city,  for  whose  negli- 
gence it  was  liable  (McCann  v.  Wal- 
tham,  163  Mass.  344  ;  40  N.  E.  20); 
S.  P.,  Gross  v.  Portsmouth,  N.  H. 
;  33  Atl.  25G  [water-works  com- 
mission] ;  Dodge  v.  Granger,  17  R.  I. 
664;  24  Atl.  ICO  [fire  department]; 
Condict  v.  Jersey  City,  46  N.  J. 
Law,  157  [negligence  of  an  employee 
of  the  board  of  public  w^orks  charged 
with  the  duty  of  cleaning  streets]  ; 
Finch  v.  Board  of  Education,  30 
Ohio  St.  37  ;  Alvater  v.   Baltimore, 


31  Md.  462  [police  department]; 
Campbell  v.  Montgomery,  53  Ala. 
527  [police  duties]).  It  has  been  held, 
in  admiralty,  under  a  charter,  provid- 
ing that,  "  for  all  purposes,  the  local 
administration  and  government  of 
the  city  shall  continue  to  be  in,  and 
to  be  performed  by,  the  corpora- 
tion," creating  the  fire  depart- 
ment, and  declaring  its  powers  and 
duties  to  be  "  admistrative  and  gov- 
ernmental," the  city  is  liable  for  in- 
juries to  a  vessel  caused  by  the  negli- 
gence of  the  department  (Workman 
v.  New  York,  63  Fed.  298).  In 
Edgerton  v.  New  York  (27  Fed.  230), 
following  the  rule  of  the  state  courts, 
the  city  was  held  liable,  in  admiralty, 
for  the  negligence  of  an  employee  of 
the  department  of  public  parks  in 
managing  the  di~aw  of  a  bridge  un- 
der the  control  of  that  department. 
s.  P.,  Allen  v.  Boston,  159  Mass.  324, 
34  N.  E.  519.  Compare  Haight  v. 
New  York  (24  Fed.  93),  where  city 
was  declared  not  liable  for  careless 
management  of  steam  tug  by  em- 
ployees of  board  of  charities. 

2  Walsh  v.  New  York,  107  N.  Y. 
220;  13  N.  E.  911  :  Toomey  v.  New 
York,  12  Hun,  542.  See  Walsh  v. 
Trustees,  etc.,  96  N.  Y.  427. 


535  MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS.  [§  298 

removal  of  nuisances  and  the  repair  of  its  streets.  The  fact 
that  a  dangerous  excavation  in  a  street  was  authorized  by  an 
executive  board  having  control  thereof,  will  not  relieve  the 
city  from  liability  for  the  negligence  of  the  department's  serv- 
ants, in  leaving  it  unguarded  and  unlighted  at  night  ; x  the 
board's  duty  in  the  premises  is  merely  auxiliary  to  the  general 
duty  of  the  corporation,  and  not  exclusive  of  it.2  The  fact 
that  officers  are  specially  charged  by  the  law  with  the  enforce- 
ment of  corporation  ordinances,  is  no  excuse  for  the  neglect 
of  the  corporation  to  enforce  them,  so  long  as  it  has  any  other 
means  of  securing  their  observance  3  A  statute  which  gives  to 
a  particular  department  of  a  city  government  exclusive  power 
to  lay  out,  and  exclusive  control  of,  certain  streets  within  the 
city  limits,  does  not  indicate  a  legislative  intention  to  excuse 
the  corporation  itself  from  a  performance  of  its  primary  duty 
to  care  for  all  its  streets ;  the  exclusive  control  given  the 
department  means  exclusive  of  any  other  officers  of  the  city, 
not  exclusive  of  the  city  itself.4 

§  297.  [Omitted.] 

§298.  Independent  contractors  not  agents.  —  The  rule 
that  an  independent  contractor  is  not  the  servant  or  agent  of 
his  employer,  except  in  relation  to  the  specific  results  which 
he  undertakes  to  produce,  Applies,  of  course,  to  the  case  of 
a  contractor  with  a  municipal  corporation,  for  the  execution  of 
a  public  work.  Hence  the  contractor  is  alone  responsible  to 
third  persons  for  the  negligence  of  himself,  and  for  that  of  his 
servants  or  subcontractors,  in  carrying  out   the   undertaking.2 

1  Graves  v.  Rochester,  39  Hun,  5.        3  Reinhard   v.  New  York,  2  Daly, 

2  Kunz  v.  Troy,  104  N.  Y.  344  ;  10    243. 

N.  E  442  ;  rev'g  36  Hun,  615;  Barnes  4  Ehrgott  v.  New  York,   93  N.   Y. 

v.  District  of  Columbia.  91  U.  S.  540.  264  [dep't  of  parks].    See  Connors  v. 

It  is  upon  this   principle   that  a  city  New  York,  11  Hun,  439;  Richards  v. 

is  not  relieved    from  the    duty    of  New  York,  48  N.  Y.  Sup.  315  [bridge 

repairing  a  street,  on  the  plea  that  under  the  control  of  department  of 

the  disrepair  was   caused  by   a  rail-  parks], 

road   company     laying     its      track  '  See  §§  164-170.  ante. 

therein,   the  company   being  under  2  Besides  the  cases  cited  under  §§ 

statutory    obligation    to    restore   to  168-170,  ante,  see  Water  Company  v. 

their  former  condition  streets  which  Ware,  16  Wall.    566;  Pack   v.    New 

it  bad  torn  up  in  constructing  its  road  York,  8  N.  Y.  222  [blasting  in  street] ; 

(Tierney  v.  Troy,  41  Hun,  120).  Kelly  v.  New  York,  11  Id.  432  [same]  ; 


29S] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


53^ 


The  fact  that  the  contract  reserved  superintendence  by  the 
city's  agents  is  immaterial.3  If  the  work  contracted  for  is,  per 
sc,  a  nuisance,  or  is  necessarily  dangerous,  the  corporation  is 
bound  not  only  to  require  the  contractor  to  take  every  reason- 
able and  proper  precaution  to  prevent  any  mischief  ensuing, 
but  to  see  that  such  precautions  are  taken  by  the  contractor,4 


Brusso  v.  Buffalo,  90  Id.  679  [un- 
guarded excavation  in  street  in  build- 
ing sewer] ;  Reed  v.  Allegheny,  79 
Pa.  St.  300  [trespass  of  contractor]  ; 
School  District  v.  Fuess,  98  Id.  600 ; 
Erie  v.  Caulkins,  85  Id.  247  ;  Wilson 
v.  Wheeling,  19  W.  Va.  323  ;  Logans- 
port  v.  Dick,  70  Ind.  65  ;  Leeds  v. 
Richmond,  102  Id.  372  ;  Fuller  v. 
Grand  Rapids,  105  Mich.  529  ;  63  N. 
W.  530 ;  Wood  v.  School  District,  44 
Iowa,  27 ;  Fink  v.  St.  Louis,  71  Mo. 
52  ;  Deford's  Case,  30  Md.  179  ;  Anne 
Arundel  county  v.  Duvall,  54  Id. 
350 ;  Sutton  v.  Board  of  Police,  41 
Miss.  236).  In  Herrington  v.  Lan- 
singburgh  (110  N.  Y.  145  ;  17  N.  E. 
728)  plaintiff's  team,  standing  in  a 
street, was  frightened  by  the  noise  of 
a  blast  fired  by  contractors  for  lay- 
ing a  sewer,  and  plaintiff  was  injured. 
Held,  the  village  was  not  liable. 
"  If  it  was  a  prudent  thing  to  notify 
persons  in  the  vicinity  of  the  blast 
before  it  was  fired,  then  the  con- 
tractors should  have  given  the  no- 
tice ;  but  the  duty  to  give  it  did  not 
devolve  upon  the  village."  A  fire- 
works company  contracted  with  a 
city  to  purchase  and  set  off  a  display 
of  fireworks  for  a  certain  sum  for 
the  entire  service,  and  to  pay  all 
claims  for  personal  injuries  resulting 
from  the  fireworks,  the  city  having 
no  control  whatever  over  the  prep- 
aration or  execution  of  the  work. 
Held,  the  city  was  not  liable  for  the 
negligence  of  an  employee  of  the 
company  (Heidenwag  v.  Philadel- 
phia. 168  Pa.  St.  72  ;  31  Atl.  10631. 
Property  owners  engaged,  in  obedi- 


ence to  an  ordinance,  in  paving  and 
curbing  the  sidewalk  in  front  of 
their  properties,  are  not  contractors 
so  as  to  relieve  the  borough  from 
liability  for  the  dangerous  condition 
of  the  street  caused  by  them  (Trego 
v.  Honeybrook,  160  Pa.  St.  76;  28 
Atl.  639). 

3  Erie  v.  Caulkins,  85  Pa.  St.  247  ; 
Charlock  v.  Freel,  50  Hun,  395  ;  3 
N.  Y.  Supp.  226  ;  Detroit  v.  Chaffee. 
68  Mich.  635  ;  37  N.  W.  19  ;  Cary  v. 
Chicago,  60  111.  App.  341  ;  Blumb  v. 
Kansas  City,  84  Mo.  112. 

4Storrs  v.  Utica,  17  N.  Y.  104; 
Brusso  v.  Buffalo,  90  Id.  679  ;  Hawx- 
hurst  v.  New  York,  43  Hun,  588. 
Although  the  work  contracted  for 
was  not  a  nuisance  per  se,  if  properly 
done,  yet  if  it  becomes  so,  by  reason 
of  the  manner  in  which  the  con- 
tractor did  it,  and  the  city  accepted 
it  in  that  condition,  it  is  liable 
(Vogel  v.  New  York,  92  N.  Y.  19). 
In  that  case,  the  contractor  after 
making  an  excavation,  which  turned 
surface  water  on  adjoining  land, 
abandoned  the  work,  and  the  city  did 
not  avail  itself  of  the  right,  under  the 
contract,  to  take  charge  of  the  work 
in  case  of  its  abandonment.  Earl,  J. , 
said:  "  The  excavations  were  made 
by  agencies  put  in  motion  by 
the  city,  in  the  execution  of  a  con- 
tract for  it,  upon  its  lands.  The  ex- 
cavations were  not  necessarily  dam- 
aging to  the  plaintiff.  If  the  work 
had  been  carried  to  completion  in  a 
reasonable  time,  no  serious  damage 
would  have  been  done;  but  the  dam- 
age came  because  the  excavations 


537 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§299 


especially  where  the  contract  fails  to  provide  for  the  contrac- 
tor's taking  precautionary  measures,  e.  g.,  to  guard  the  street 
excavation  contracted  for,  as  in  that  case  a  person  injured  by  the 
absence  of  a  guard  would  have  no  remedy  against  the  contractor.5 
Want  of  notice  of  the  contractor's  failure  to  guard  or  light  a 
street  excavation  is  not  a  defense.  It  was  the  duty  of  the 
city  to  see  that  such  barriers  were  erected  and  kept  up.6  It 
cannot  escape  liability  for  the  consequences  of  a  breach  of 
duty,  for  example,  to  maintain  the  public  streets  so  as  to  be 
reasonably  safe  for  travel,  by  the  fact  of  having  contracted 
with  another  for  the  performance  of  such  duty.7 

§  299.  Liability  limited  to  matters  within  jurisdiction.  — 

To  establish  the  corporation's  liability  for  the  act  of  its  agent, 
it  is  necessary,  of  course,  to  show  that  the  act  was  either 
expressly  or  impliedly  authorized  by  it,  or  by  some  branch  of 
its  government  having  jurisdiction  of  the  subject  to  which  the 
act  relates,  or  that  it  was  done,  bona  fide,  in  pursuance  of  a 

were  needlessly,  negligently  and 
heedlessly  suffered  to  remain  in  the 
street  for  an  unreasonable  length  of 
time,  and  for  that,  responsibility  at- 
tached to  the  city."  In  Circleville  v. 
Neuding  (41  OliioSt.  465),  a  city  con- 
tracted for  the  construction  of  a 
cistern  20  feet  deep  in  a  street.  The 
corporation  did  not  reserve  or  exer- 
cise any  control  or  direction  over 
the  manner  of  doing  the  work  except 
to  see  that  it  was  done  according  to 
the  contract.  The  cistern  was  un- 
guarded while  in  course  of  construc- 
tion, and  was  only  partially  covered. 
Plaintiff's  horse  fell  through  the 
covering.  Held,  city  liable.  See 
Bauer  v.  Rochester,  59  Hun,  616  ;  12 
N.  Y.  Supp.  418  ;  Cincinnati  v.  Stone, 
5  Ohio  St.  38  ;  Harrisburgh  v.  Taylor, 
87  Pa.  St.  216  ;  Harrison  v.  Collins, 
86  Id.  153;  Painter  v.  Pittsburgh,  46 
Id.  221  ;  Welsh  v.  St.  Louis.  73  Mo. 
71  ;  Springfield  v.  Le  Claire.  49  111. 
476  ;  Scammon  v.  Chicago,  25  Id.  424  : 
Palmer  v  Lincoln.  5  Neb.  136  ;  James 
v.  San  Francisco,  6  Cal.  529 ;  Brooks 


v.  Somerville,  106  Mass.  271.  A  city 
is  liable  when  the  work  is  intrinsi- 
cally dangerous,  though  done  under 
contract  (Birmingham  v.  McCary, 
84  Ala.  469  ;  4  So.  630). 

5  Storrs  v.  Utica,  supra ;  Cotter  v. 
Lindgren,  106  Cal.  602 ;  39  Pac.  950. 
See  Charlock  v.  Freel,  50  Hun,  395  ; 
3  N.  Y.  Supp.  226. 

6  Omaha  v.  Jensen,  35  Neb.  68  ;  52 
N.  W.  833.  Compare  New  York  v. 
Brady,  81  Hun,  440  ;  30  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1121. 

1  Besides  cases  cited  under  §  176, 
ante,  see  Turner  v.  Newburgh,  109  N. 
Y.  301  ;  16  N.  E.  344  ;  Dressell  v. 
Kingston,  32  Hun.  533;  Groves  v. 
Rochester,  39  Id.  5 ;  Pettengill  v. 
Yonkers,  39  Id.  449  ;  affi'd,  116  NT.  Y. 
558  ;  22  N.  E.  1095  ;  Logansport  v. 
Dick,  70  Ind.  65  ;  Welsh  v.  St.  Louis, 
73  Mo  71  ;  Broad  well  v.  Kansas 
City,  75  Id.  213;  Jacksonville  v. 
Drew,  19  Fla  106  ;  Pearson  v.  Zable. 
78  Ky.  170  ;  Wilson  v.  Wheeling,  19 
W.  Va.  323  ;  Mayor  v.  O'Donnell,  53 
Md.  110. 


§^99] 


MUNICIPAL    CORPORATIONS. 


538 


general  authority  to  act  for  the  corporation  in  the  matter.1 
A  common  council's  powers  are  limited  and  defined  by  law, 
and  it  can  no  more  transcend  them  than  an  agent  in  any  other 
case  can,  and  bind  his  principal  beyond  the  scope  of  the 
authority  conferred  upon  him.  It  is  not  liable,  therefore,  for 
acts  of  its  agents  outside  the  scope  of  its  powers.2  A  common 
council,  for  example,  has  no  authority,  under  a  general  charter- 
power  to  remove  nuisances,  to  direct  the  removal  of  a  person 
sick  of  an  infectious  or  contagious  disease  from  his  own  house 
without  his  consent,  or  to  forcibly  take  and  occupy  another's 


1  In  Gilmartin  v.  New  York  (55 
Barb.  239),  the  city's  park-keeper,  in 
attempting  to  take  down  a  liberty- 
pole  in  a  public  park,  which  had 
become  dangerous,  did  it  so  negli- 
gently that  it  broke  a  telegraph  pole 
which  fell  upon  and  killed  a  person 
passing  on  the  street.  Held,  that  in 
taking  down  the  pole  the  park-keeper 
was  acting,  though  without  express 
orders,  within  the  scope  of  his  em- 
ployment, and  the  city  was  liable. 
Otherwise,  where  the  flagstaff  was 
not  owned  by  the  town  (Wakefield 
v.  Newport,  60  N.  H.  374).  s.  P., 
Carman  v.  New  York,  14  Abb.  Pr. 
301  [plaintiff's  trees  cut  down  by  de- 
fendant's servants ;  defendant  liable 
for  not  properly  superintending  serv- 
ants] ;  McCarthy  v.  Boston,  135 
Mass.  197 ;  Thayer  v.  Boston,  19 
Pick.  516  [city  liable  for  the  acts  of 
officers  having  general  authority 
over  its  streets,  in  erecting  fences 
and  building  a  passage-way  leading 
to  plaintiff's  premises,  cutting  off 
access  to  it].  Compare  Bryant  v. 
Westbrook,  86  Me.  450  ;  29  Atl.  1109  ; 
Sheffield  v.  Harris,  101  Ala.  564  ;  14 
So.  357.  S.  p.,  Chicago  v.  McGraw, 
75  111.  566  ;  Sherman  v.  Grenada,  51 
Miss.  186  :  Hanvey  v.  Rochester,  35 
Barb.  177  ;  Orlando  v.  Pragg,  31 
Fla.  Ill  ;  12  So.  368  [abating  nui- 
sance]. Where  village  trustees,  by 
a  formal  resolution,   directed  their 


highway  officers  to  enter  upon  plain- 
tiff's premises,  and  remove  a  fence 
therefrom,  the  act  of  the  officer  in 
obeying  the  command  was  held  to 
be  a  trespass  for  which  the  corpora- 
tion was  liable,  no  matter  how  hon- 
estly the  trustees  may  have  believed 
the  fence  to  be  an  encroachment 
upon  the  highway  (Lee  v.  Sandy 
Hill,  40  N.  Y.  442).  See  Buffalo,  etc. 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Buffalo,  58  N.  Y. 
639  [tortiously  taking  possession  of 
private  bridge];  Woodcock  v.  Calais, 
66  Maine,  234 ;  Loyd  v.  Columbus,  90 
Ga.  20 ;  15  S.  E.  818  [cutting  ditch 
outside  city  limits]. 

2  Hildreth  v.  Lowell,  11  Gray,  345  ; 
Flagg  v.  Worcester,  13  Id.  601  ;  Don- 
nelly v.  Tripp,  12  R.  I.  97  ;  Danbury, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Norwalk,  37  Conn. 
109;  Tilford  v.  New  York,  1  N  Y. 
App.  Div.  199;  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  185; 
Kreger  v.  Bismarck,  59  Minn.  3;  60  N. 
W.  675  ;  Allison  v.  Richmond,  51  Mo. 
App.  133  ;  Hanvey  v.  Rochester,  35 
Barb.  177  ;  Chicago  v.  Turner,  80  111. 
419  ;  Cuyler  v.  Rochester,  12  Wend. 
165  [city  not  liable  for  the  damages 
caused  by  widening  of  a  street,  for 
want  of  jurisdiction  to  make  the 
alteration] ;  Horn  v.  Baltimore,  30 
Md.  218  [same]  ;  Cavanagh  v.  Bos- 
ton, 139  Mass.  426  [city  not  liable  for 
work  done  negligently  or  otherwise 
under  a  supposed  authority  of  illegal 
and  void  votes  of  common  council]. 


539 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


[§300 


house  as  a  pest-house.3  So  it  is,  strictly  speaking,  no  part  of 
the  proper  business  of  a  municipal  corporation  to  call  meetings 
of  citizens  to  consider  political  or  philanthropic  matters,  or  to 
inaugurate  celebrations  in  which  its  officers  take  part.  For 
the  acts  of  its  officers  in  such  undertakings,  it  is  not  respon- 
sible, they  being  done  with  respect  to  matters  unconnected 
with  the  purposes  of  the  corporation,  and  wholly  outside  the 
course  of  such  officers'  employment.4  Subject  to  the  proviso 
that  the  act  complained  of  was  in  or  about  a  subject-matter  of 
which  the  corporation  has  jurisdiction,  it  is  liable  for  every 
such  act  of  its  agents  committed  by  its  express  command  or 
direct  authorization,  however  unlawful  the  act  itself  may  be.5 
A  city  cannot  by  subsequent  ratification  make  good  an  act  of 
its  agent,  which  legally  it  could  not  have  directly  empowered 
him  to  do.6 

§  300.   [consolidated  with  §  299]. 


3  Boom  v.  Utica,  2  Barb.  104.  In 
Barbour  v.  Ellsworth  (67  Me.  294),  a 
city  was  held  not  liable  for  the  acts 
of  its  officers  in  their  official  capac- 
ity in  carrying  a  healthy  person, 
together  with  sick  ones,  to  a  small- 
pox hospital,  where  he  contracted 
the  disease.  See  ante,  §  260.  A  town 
will  not  be  bound,  even  by  the  ex- 
press vote  of  the  majority,  to  the 
performance  of  contracts,  or  other 
legal  duties,  not  coming  within  the 
scope  of  the  objects  and  purposes  for 
which  it  was  incorporated  (Stetson 
v.  Kempton,  13  Mass.  272  ;  Norton 
v.  Mansfield,  16  Mass.  48  ;  Parsons  v. 
Goshen,  11  Pick.  396;  Anthony  v. 
Adams,  1  Mete.  284). 

4  Smith  v.  Rochester,  76  N.  Y.  506  ; 
Boyland  v.  New  York,  1  Sandf .  27  ; 
Love  v.  Raleigh,  116  N.  C.  296  ;  21  S. 
E.  503  [Fourth  of  July  celebration]. 

6  In  Leman  v.  New  York  (5  Bosw. 
414),  the  common  council  had  au- 
thority to  change  the  grade  of  cer- 
tain streets,  only  on  the  consent  of 
two-thirds  of  the  abutting  owners. 
Having    made  a  change    of    grade 


without  such  consent,  held,  the  city 
was  liable  to  an  abutting  owner  for 
damage  to  his  premises  in  conse- 
quence of  such  change.  "The  tres- 
pass and  damage  were  the  acts  of 
immediate  agents  of  the  corporation 
who  acted  under  its  direct  authoriza- 
tion." Compare  Browning  v.  Owen 
County,  44  Ind.  11.  Where  work 
was  not  ordered  by  two-thirds  vote 
of  council,  as  required  by  statute, 
the  corporation  is  liable  for  the  dam- 
ages  caused  (Prot.  Epis.  Church  v. 
Anamosa,  76  Iowa,  538  ;  41  N.  W. 
313). 

6  Hodges  v.  Buffalo,  2  Denio,  110  ; 
Mitchell  v.  Rockland,  52  Me.  118. 
See  Morrison  v.  Lawrence,  98  Mass. 
219;  Thayer  v.  Boston,  19  Pick.  511  ; 
Kavanagh  v.  Brooklyn,  38  Barb. 
232 ;  Halstead  v.  New  York,  3  N.  Y. 
430  ;  Peterson  v.  New  York,  17  Id. 
449  ;  Hanvey  v.  Rochester,  35  Barb. 
177  ;  Richardson  v  Crandall,  47  Id. 
335  ;  Boom  v.  Utica,  2  Id.  104  ;  Mc- 
Garry  v.  Lafayette,  12  Rob.  (La.) 
668  ;  Ross  v.  Madison,  1  Ind.  281. 


§3Qi] 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


54O 


§  301.  Recovery  over  by  corporation.  —  Although  the 
primary  liability  for  injuries  caused  by  a  breach  of  corporate 
duty  or  the  tortuous  acts  of  its  agents  rests  on  the  corpora- 
tion, its  agents  or  third  persons,  who  proximately  caused  the 
injury,  are  jointly  liable  with  it,  and  if  it  is  obliged  to  pay 
damages  for  an  injury  so  caused,  it  has  a  right  of  recovery 
over  against  the  actual  wrongdoer.1  It  is  not  necessary  to 
allege  or  prove,  in  such  an  action,  all  the  facts  which  would 
justify  a  recovery  by  the  person  injured  against  the  city.2 
Likewise,  where  two  cities  or  counties  are  equally  technically 
in  fault,  and  jointly  liable  for  the  non-repair  of  a  highway,  the 
one  which  is  compelled  to  pay  damages  for  the  omission  to 
repair,  may  recover  contribution  from  the  other.3  But  a 
municipal  corporation  cannot  recover  from  its  contractor  dam- 
ages which  it  has  been  compelled  to  pay  to  a  person  injured 
by  the  contractor's  neglect  to  guard  against  accidents  while 
prosecuting  a  public  work,  unless  the  contract  bound  him  to 
do  so.4     Otherwise,  where  the  contractor   had  failed  to    com- 


1  As  to  a  servant's  liability  to  mas- 
ter, see  J?  242,  ante.  As  to  liability 
of  strangers  for  unlawfully  using  or 
obstructing  highways  to  the  injury 
of  travelers,  see  §  884,  post. 

s  New  York  v.  Dimick,  49  Hun 
241  ;  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  46  [demurrer]. 

3  Armstrong  county  v.  Clarion 
county,  66  Pa.  St.  218.  See  Perkins 
v.  Oxford,  66  Me.  545;  Brown  v. 
Fairhaven,  47  Vt.  3S6.  Where  the 
expense  of  keeping  a  bridge  in  repair 
is  imposed  by  statute  upon  several 
towns  and  a  railroad  company 
jointly,  with  a  provision  that  the 
municipal  authorities  of  one  of  the 
towns  shall  have  the  care  and  super- 
intendence of  it,  and  shall  employ 
all  services  necessary  in  the  care 
thereof,  no  action  lies  against  such 
town  in  favor  of  the  railroad  com- 
pany, to  recover  damages  sustained 
by  the  latter  in  consequence  of  a 
defect  in  the  bridge  (Maiden,  etc  R. 
Co.  v.  Charlestown,  8  Allen,  245). 


4  Buffalo  v.  Hollo  way.  7  N.  Y. 
493;  affi'g,  14  Barb.  101.  In  that 
case,  a  person  was  injured  by  falling 
into  a  public  sewer  in  course  of  con- 
struction by  a  contractor,  and  by 
him  left  unguarded  Held,  that  un- 
less the  contract  imposed  upon  the 
contractor  the  duty  of  putting  up 
barriers,  etc.,  and  protecting  pas- 
sengers against  injury,  no  action 
would  lie.  Otherwise  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  city  to  do  this,  and  it 
was  their  neglect  that  it  was  not 
clone.  In  New  York  v.  Brady  (81 
Hun,  440 ;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  1121),  a 
contractor  for  constructing  a  sewer, 
with  the  consent  of  the  city  office rs, 
placed  an  obstruction  on  the  side- 
walk, but  failed  to  guard  it  so  as  to 
protect  the  public  from  injury. 
Held,  liable  to  the  city  for  damages 
which  it  was  compelled  to  pay  for 
an  injury  from  want  of  guard. 


54i 


MUNICIPAL   CORPORATIONS. 


LS  5 


OI 


ply  with  the  notice  of  the  city  to   remove  the   obstructions  in 
the  street,  which  subsequently  caused  the  accident.5 


5  Rochester  v.  Montgomery,  72  N. 
Y.  65.  In  that  case,  the  city  had 
given  the  contractor  notice  of  the 
action  brought  against  it  by  the  per- 
son injured,  with  a  claim  that  he 
would  be  held  liable  to  indemnify 
against  any  recovery  therein.  Held, 
that  a  judgment  against  the  city 
was  conclusive  in  an  action  over  by 
the  city,  both  as  to  the  city's  liability 


to  the  person  injured,  and  as  to  any 
other  matter  which  might  have  been 
urged  as  a  defense,  including  the  con- 
tributory negligence  of  the  injured 
person  ;  provided  it  was  shown  that 
the  contractor  unlawfully  created  or 
negligently  left  the  obstruction,  s. 
p.,  Campbell  v.  Somerville,  114 
Mass.  334. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 


PUBLIC  OFFICERS. 


§  302.  Immunity  of  political  officers. 
303.  Immunity  of  judicial  officers. 
304  to  309.  [Omitted.] 

310.  Qttasi-judicial    officers,    how 

far  protected. 

311.  [Consolidated  with  §310.] 

312.  Non-judicial     public     officers 

classified. 

313.  Negligent      performance      of 

ministerial  duties. 

314.  Liability  for  nonfeasance. 

315.  [Consolidated  with  §  313.] 

316.  [Consolidated  with  §  314.] 

317.  Presumption  in  favor  of  officer. 


§  318.  [Consolidated  with  §  313.] 

319.  Liability    for     negligence    of 

subordinates. 

320.  [Omitted] 

321.  Liability  of  post-masters  for 

subordinates. 

322.  Liability   of   army  and   navy 

officers. 

323.  Public- school      officers      and 

boards. 

324.  [Consolidated  with  §  340.] 

325.  Liability  of    government-con- 

tractors. 


§  302.  Immunity  of  political  officers.  —  For  our  present 
purpose,  civil  offices  may  be  conveniently  classified  as  political, 
judicial,  and  ministerial.1  The  functions  of  the  first  class  are 
performed  by  the  executive  and  legislative  departments  of 
government,  and  by  a  variety  of  subordinate  governmental 
officers  and  administrative  agents,  who  owe  duties,  in  the  exer- 
cise of  their  trusts,  to  the  public,  and  to  the  public  alone,  and 
who,  consequently,  are  not  answerable  to  individuals,  either  for 
a  failure  to  perform,  or  for  a  negligent  performance  of,  such 
public  duties,  where  no  corruption  or  malice2  is  imputable, 
and  they  keep  strictly  within  the  limits  of  their  powers.  We 
have  already  stated  and  illustrated  the  rule  that  such  officers, 
exercising  the  governmental  powers  of  the  state,  and  repre- 
senting its  sovereignty,  enjoy  the  state's  immunity  from  pri- 
vate prosecution  for  a  neglect  to  exercise  such  powers,  as  well 
as  for  the  consequences  of  a  lawful  exercise  of  them.3 


1  See  Waldo  v.  Wallace,  12  Ind. 
569. 

5  In  Sutherland  v.  Murray,  cited 
in  Johnston  v.  Sutton  (1  T.  R.  538), 
an  action  on  the  case  was  held  to  lie 


against  a  governor  for  maliciously 
suspending    another    from    a    civil 
office. 
3  See  §  253,  ante. 


[542] 


543 


PUBLIC   OFFICERS. 


[§303 


§  303.  Immunity  of  judicial  officers.  — Judges  of  courts  of 
record,  of  general  jurisdiction,  are  not  answerable  in  damages 
for  a  judicial  act,1  within  their  jurisdiction,2  however  corrupt 
or  oppressive3  their  action.  If  a  judge  fails  to  do  justice,  in 
a  particular  case,  he  violates  a  public  duty,  for  which  he  is 
answerable  to  the  public  by  impeachment  or  otherwise;  but 
the  individual  suitor,  who  may  have  suffered  loss  by  such  a 
violation  of  duty,  has  no  legal  remedy ;  his  particular  contro- 
versy being  only  the  occasion  of  the  wrong  done  to  the  public.4 
The  "jurisdiction,"  on  which  the  judicial  privilege  is  limited, 
means  jurisdiction  of  the  person  and  of  the  subject-matter, 
and  "jurisdiction  of  the  subject-matter"  means,  that  the  gen- 
eral or  abstract  question  involved  in  the  controversy  is  within 
the  judge's  judicial  power  to  decide.  Whether  it  is  or  not,  is 
a  question  of  law,  not  calling  for  proof  of  facts  establishing  a 
cause  of  action  in  the  particular  case ;  and  for  deciding  that  he 
has  jurisdiction,  and  the  extent  to  which  he  will  exercise  it,  he 


1  "  Judicial  officers  "  and  "judicial 
acts  "  defined  (Waldo  v.  Wallace,  12 
Ind.  569  ;  Flournoy  v.  Jeffersonville, 
17  Id.  173  ;  Matter  of  Cooper,  22  N. 
Y.  82  ;  People  v.  Faulkner,  107  Id. 
477  [action  on  surrogate's  bond]). 
The  action  of  a  judge  in  approving 
the  certificate  of  physicians  for  the 
confinement  of  a  lunatic,  as  provided 
by  statute,  is  judicial,  and  he  is  not 
liable  in  damages  for  error  in  judg- 
ment, though  a  lack  of  due  care  and 
prudence  be  alleged  (Ayers  v.  Rus- 
sell, 50  Hun,  282;  3  N.  Y.  Supp. 
338).  See  Hughes  v.  McCoy,  11  Colo. 
591. 

2  Cases  cited  under  notes  6  and  7  of 
this  section. 

3  A  declaration  in  an  action  against 
a  judge  for  damages  for  the  making 
of  an  order  disbarring  plaintiff, 
which  admits  the  jurisdiction  of  de- 
fendant, though  it  avers  that  the 
order  was  made  without  just  or  prob- 
able cause,  tyrannically,  oppres- 
sively, maliciously  and  corruptly,  is 
fatally  defective  (Bradley  v.  Fisher, 


13  Wall.  335  ;  affi'g  7  D.  C.  32).  See 
Randall  v.  Brigham,  7  Wall.  523.  S. 
p.,  Lange  v.  Benedict,  73  N.  Y.  12; 
Rains  v.  Simpson,  50  Tex.  495. 

4 This  principle  "has  a  deep  root 
in  the  common  law,"  per  Kent,  C.  J., 
in  Yates  v.  Lansing,  9  Johns.  395. 
See  generally  Vanderheyden  v. 
Young,  11  Johns.  150  ;  Moor  v.  Ames, 
3  Caines,  170  ;  Tompkins  v.  Sands, 
8  Wend.  468  ;  Pratt  v.  Gardner,  2 
Cush.  68 ;  Dillingham  v.  Snow,  5 
Mass.  547  ;  Briggs  v.  Wardwell,  10 
Id.  356;  Lincoln  v.  Hapgood,  11  Id. 
350  ;  Evans  v.  Foster,  1  N.  H.  374 ; 
Young  v.  Herbert,  2  Nott.  &  M.  172  ; 
Ely  v.  Thompson,  3  A.  K.  Marsh.  76; 
Busteed  v.  Parsons,  54  Ala.  393 
[granting  order  of  arrest  on  insuffi- 
cient affidavit]  ;  Olmstead  v.  Brewer, 
91  Ala.  124  ;  8  So.  345  [issuing  writ 
of  restitution  after  notice  of  in- 
tention to  appeal];  Smith  v.  Hol- 
land [Tex.].  16  S.  W.  424  [same]; 
State  v.  Whitaker,  45  La.  Ann. 
1299  ;  14  So.  66. 


§303] 


PUBLIC   OFFICERS. 


544 


is  not  personally  liable  in  damages,  if  he  is  in  error.5  This  im- 
munity, with  two  qualifications,  is  enjoyed  by  judges  of  inferior 
courts,  whether  of  record  or  not.6  Being  statutory  courts  of 
expressly  defined  and  limited  jurisdiction,  they  are  bound  to 
know  and  to  keep  within  these  limits.  There  is  no  presump- 
tion of  jurisdiction  in  their  favor,7  and  their  process  is  no  pro- 


5  In  Lange  v.  Benedict,  supra,  the 
judge  before  whom  plaintiff  was 
convicted  of  an  offense,  punishable 
by  fine  or  imprisonment,  sentenced 
him  to  fine  and  imprisonment. 
Plaintiff  paid  the  fine,  and  then  ap- 
plied by  habeas  corpus  for  a  dis- 
charge from  the  imprisonment.  The 
application  was  heard  by  the  same 
judge,  who  vacated  the  entire  sen- 
tence and  sentenced  the  accused 
anew  to  imprisonment.  Further 
proceedings  in  behalf  of  the  accused 
resulted  in  a  decision  by  the  U.  S. 
Supreme  Court  that  the  re-sentence 
was  unauthorized  ;  and  plaintiff  was 
discharged  on  habeas  corpus.  He 
then  brought  suit  to  recover  dam- 
ages from  the  judge.  Held,  action 
not  maintainable.  Though  the  re- 
sentence was  unlawful,  yet  the 
judge  had  authority  to  adjudicate 
upon  the  question  whether  it  was 
lawful  or  not  ;  and  if  so,  an  errone- 
ous adjudication  was  an  error  to  be 
redressed  by  review,  not  a  personal 
wrong  to  be  redressed  by  action.  For 
the  history  of  this  interesting  case, 
see  18  Wall.  163  [discharging  plain- 
tiff from  imprisonment  under  the 
second  sentence]  ;  8  Hun,  362  [de- 
cision of  the  state  court  denying  him 
a  right  of  action],  and  99  U.  S.  68 
[dismissing  a  writ  of  error  taken  to 
review  the  decision  of  state  Court  of 
Appeals]. 

6  People  v.  Stocking,  50  Barb.  573 
Weaver  v.  Davendorf.  3  Denio,  117 
Bailey  v.  Wiggins,  5  Harringt.  462 
Roderick  v.  Whitson,  51    Hun,   620 
mem;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  112;  Burns  v. 
Norton,  59  Hun,  616,  mem.;  15  N.  Y. 


Supp.  75  ;  Atwood  v.  Atwater,  43 
Neb.  147  ;  61  N.  W.  574.  The  con- 
tinuance or  postponement  of  a  cause 
is  a  judicial  act  (Pratt  v.  Gardner,  2 
Cush.  63  ;  see  Wheeler  v.  Nesbitt, 
24  How.  U.  S.  544).  Though  a 
statute  requires  a  justice,  on  the  ser- 
vice of  a  summons  and  verified  com- 
plaint on  a  defendant,  to  render 
judgment,  without  proof,  on  the 
return  day,  for  want  of  an  answer, 
yet  the  adjournment  of  the  action 
over  plaintiff's  objection  is  a  judicial 
error,  and  plaintiff  cannot  recover 
damages  sustained  by  reason  of 
other  creditors  securing  liens  on 
defendant's  property  pending  the 
adjournment,  whereby  plaintiff  lost 
his  debt  (Merwin  v.  Rogers,  15  Daly, 
334  ;  6  N.  Y.  Supp.  882).  Excluding 
a  spectator  from  the  court-room 
(Williamson  v.  Lacy,  86  Me.  80 ; 
29  Atl.  943),  and  refusing  to  take  the 
testimony  of  a  witness  (Banister  v. 
Wakeman,  64  Vt.  203 ;  23  Atl.  585) 
are  judicial  acts.  In  Harrison  v. 
Redden  (53  Kans.  265  ;  36  Pac.  325) 
a  judge  warned  prospective  defend- 
ant of  a  threatened  suit  against  him 
in  his  court,  and  advised  his  leaving 
the  state.  Held,  on  demurrer,  no 
cause  of  action. 

'Houlden  v.  Smith,  14  Q.  B.  841 
[county  court  judge].  "  It  is  clear, 
therefore,  that  a  judge  is  not  liable 
to  trespass  for  want  of  jurisdiction, 
unless  he  knew  or  ought  to  have 
known  of  the  defect ;  and  it  lies  on 
the  plaintiff  in  every  such  case  to 
prove  that  fact"  (per  Parke,  B., 
Calder  v  Hacket,  3  Moore  P.  C.  78). 
Jurisdiction  cannot  be  inferred  (Her- 


545 


PUBLIC    OFFICERS. 


U  3^3 


tection  to  any  one.8  If  such  a  judge  exercises  a  jurisdiction 
which  he  knows  he  does  not  possess,9  or  in  the  face  of  facts 
which  admit  of  no  reasonable  doubt  of  want  of  jurisdiction,  he 
is  answerable  in  damages.10  Another  qualification  of  the  rule 
of  immunity  of  inferior  judges  is,  that  though  acting  within 
their  jurisdiction,  yet  if  a  judge's  judicial  action  is  prompted 
by  malicious  or  corrupt  motives,  he  is  liable.11     Proof  of  mere 


som's  case,  39  Me .  476  ;  Matlock  v. 
Strange,  8  Ind.  57  ;  Wiley  v.  Strick- 
land, 8  Ind.  453  ;  Williams  v.  Bower, 
26  Mo.  601  ;  Lane  v.  Crosby,  42  Id. 
327;  Call  v.  Mitchell,  39  Id.  465). 
Compare  Mooney  v.  Williams,  15 
Mo.  442  ;  Wright  v.  Hazen,  24  Vt. 
143  ;  Nichols  v.  Thomas,  4  Mass.  232). 
The  members  of  a  court-martial  are 
not  answerable  to  a  party  aggrieved 
by  their  sentence.  But  their  juris- 
diction is  limited,  and,  in  a  case 
clearly  without  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  court,  its  sentence  will  be  no  pro- 
tection, and  the  court  and  the  officer 
are  alike  trespassers  (Vanderheyden 
v.  Young,  11  Johns.  150;  Wise  v. 
Withers,  :i  Cranch,  311). 

8  Cable  v.  Cooper,  15  Johns.  157, 
per  Van  Ness,  J.;  Blood  v.  Sayre,  17 
Vt.  609 ;  Savacool  v.  Boughton,  5 
Wend.  170;  Parker  v.  Walrod,  16 
Wend.  514:  Earl  v.  Camp,  16  Wend. 
562 ;  Pierson  v.  Gale,  8  Vt.  512 ; 
Beach  v.  Furman,  9  Johns.  229  ;  Lat- 
tin  v.  Smith,  Breese,  361  ;  Nichols  v. 
Thomas,  4  Mass.  232;  Pratt  v.  Hill, 
16  Barb.  303;  Revill  v.  Pettit,  3  Mete. 
[Ky.]  314.  If  the  process  is  void,  it 
furnishes  no  protection  to  the  person 
at  whose  suit  it  was  issued  (Earl  v. 
Camp,  16  Wend.  562),  nor  to  the  offi- 
cer serving  it,  if,  on  its  face,  it  ap- 
pears to  be  illegal,  or  is  known  to  be 
so  by  the  officer  (Campbell  v.  Webb, 
11  Md  471  :  Kelly  v.  Bemis,  4  Gray, 
83  ;  Reynolds  v.  Orvis,  7  Cow.  269  ; 
Evertson  v.  Sutton,  5  Wend.  281  ; 
Lewis  v.  Palmer,  6  Id.    367  ;  Merritt 

[Law  op  Neg.  Vol.  I  —  35] 


v.  Read,  5  Denio,  352;  Tate  v.  Cham- 
bers, 3  Nott  &  M.  52;J.). 

9  A  justice  is  liable  to  one  arrested 
under  a  warrant  issued  under  a  stat- 
ute theretofore  adjudged  unconsti- 
tutional (Kelly  v.  Bemis,  4  Gray,  83). 

10  Houlden  v.  Smith,  14  Q.  B.  841. 
But  a  justice  of  the  peace  is  not  civ- 
illy liable  for  entering  in  good  faith 
a  judgment  void  for  want  of  juris- 
diction (Thompson  v.  Jackson  [Iowa] 
61  N.  W.  1004 ;  Morton  v.  Crane,  39 
Mich.  526  ;  Anderson  v.  Roberts, 
Tex.  Civ.  App.         ;  35  S.  W.  416). 

11  Briggs  v.  Wardwell,  10  Mass. 
356  ;  Lincoln  v.  Hapgood,  11  Id.  350; 
Dillingham  v.  Snow,  5  Id.  547 ;  Col- 
man  v.  Anderson,  10  Id.  105;  Down- 
ing v.  Herrick,  47  Me.  462  ;  Garfield 
v.  Douglass,  22  111.  100 ;  Irion  v. 
Lewis,  56  Ala.  190  ;  Gregory  v. 
Brown,  4  Bibb,  28;  Morgan  v.  Dud- 
ley, 18  B.  Monr.  693;  Bullitt  v. 
Clement,  16  Id.  193  ;  Bevard  v.  Hoff- 
man, 18  Md.  479  ;  Hetfield  v.  Tows- 
ley,  3  Greene  [Iowa],  584  ;  Howe  v. 
Mason,  14  Iowa,  510.  Thus  malici- 
ously refusing  to  grant  an  appeal 
(Tompkins  v.  Sands,  8  Wend.  462  ; 
Jones  v.  Werden,  12  Cush.  132)  or 
granting  a  warrant  of  arrest  with- 
out information  (Pratt  v.  Gardner, 
2  Cush.  63 ;  Wasson  v.  Canfield,  6 
Blackf.  406);  or  maliciously  convict- 
ing an  innocent  prisoner  (Burley  v. 
Bethune,  1  Marsh,  220) ,  are  action- 
able. See  Neighbour  v.  Trimmer,  16 
N.  J.  Law,  58  [deceitfully  concealing 
fact  of  decision  until  expiration  of 
time  to  appeal]. 


§  303] 


PUBLIC    OFFICERS. 


546 


negligence  or  unintentional  mistake  in  assuming  jurisdiction,  is 
not  enough :  fraud  or  evil  intent  must  be  shown.12  A  judicial 
officer  upon  whom  the  law  casts  purely  ministerial  duties,  such 
as  issuing  process  in  the  first  instance,13  issuing  execution  after 
judgment,14  and  the  like,  is  liable,  like  every  ministerial  officer, 
for  the  consequences  of  his  negligence,  or  that  of  his  clerk.15 


§§  304-309.  [Omitted.1] 

15  No  action  will  lie  for  negligence 
or  carelessness  in  giving  to  a  party 
about  to  prosecute  an  appeal,  erro- 
neous information  as  to  the  amount 
of  a  judgment  rendered  by  him  by 
means  whereof  the  appeal  was  lost 
(Wickware  v.  Bryan,  11  Wend.  545), 
or  for  failure  to  decide  a  case  within 
the  statutory  time  (Evarts  v.  Kiehl, 
102  N.  Y.  296  ;  6  N.  E.  592).  Hon- 
estly making  a  false  return  on  appeal 
is  not  actionable  (Millard  v.  Jenkins, 
9  "Wend.  298 ;  Chickering  v.  Robin- 
son, 3  Cush.  543:  Way  v.  Townsend, 
4  Allen,  114;  Howe  v.  Mason,  14 
Iowa,  510;  see  Home  v.  Pudil,  88 
Iowa,  533;  55  N.  W.  485)  s.  P.,  Mc- 
Teer  v.  Lebow,  85  Tenn.  121  ;  2  S. 
W.  18  [approving  guardian's  bond]. 

13  Smith  v.  Trawl,  1  Root,  165  [is- 
suing a  writ  of  replevin  without  re- 
quiring security].  And  see  Rogers 
v.  Mulliner,  6  Wend.  597  ;  Mayberry 
v.  Kelly,  1  Kans.  116 ;  Alexander  v. 
Card,  3  R.  I.  145.  Justice  not  liable 
for  trifling  errors  in  drawing  up  legal 
process  (Taylor  v.  Alexander,  6  Ohio, 
144  :  Wallsworth  v.  McCullough,  10 
Johns.  93). 

14  Percival  v.  Jones,  2  Johns.  Cas. 
49 ;  Taylor  v.  Trask,  7  Cow.  249 ; 
Voorhees  v.  Martin,  12  Barb.  508 ; 
Briggs  v.  Wardwell,  10  Mass.  356 ; 
Sullivan  v.  Jones,  2  Gray,  570;  Tyler 
v.  Alvord,  38  Me.  530;  Noxon  v. 
Hill.  2  Allen,  215  ;  Gaylor  v.  Hunt, 
23  Ohio  St.  255.  Compare  Werthei- 
mer  v.  Howard,  30  Mo.  420  [execu- 
tion returnable  in  60  instead  of  30 


days,  as  required  by  statute;  judge 
not  liable]. 

15  In  Kinnison  v.  Carpenter  (9 
Bush,  599),  a  county  judge  who  ap- 
proved and  accepted  a  guardian's 
bond,  prepared  by  the  county  clerk, 
who  omitted  to  fill  up  the  neces- 
sary blanks  in  the  form,  was  held 
liable  to  the  ward.  In  Wood  v. 
Farnell  (50  Ala.  546),  in  which 
a  judge  was  held  liable,  under 
statute,  for  his  clerk's  issuing  a 
marriage-license,  though  done  with- 
out his  knowledge,  and  contrary  to 
his  general  instructions,  the  court 
said  :  "  The  public,  knowing  the 
powers  of  a  clerk  in  that  office,  and 
seeing  some  one  exercising  them, 
with  the  evident  knowledge  of  the 
judge,  may  reasonably  deal  with 
him  as  such,  and  hold  the  judge 
responsible  for  what  he  does  amiss." 
The  issuing  of  a  mittimus  is  a  min- 
isterial act  (Banister  v.  Wakeman, 
64  Vt.  203  ;  23  Atl.  585  ;  s.  P.  State 
v.  Carrick,  70  Md.  586  ;  17  Atl.  559  ; 
Cosby  v.  Commonwealth,  91  Ky. 
235  ;  15  S.  W.  514.) 

1  These  sections,  in  the  last  edition, 
being  mere  amplifications  of  the  gen- 
eral rule  of  judicial  immunity,  are 
here  omitted,  not  only  for  want  of 
space,  but  because  the  subject  more 
properly  belongs  to  the  general  law 
of  torts  than  to  that  branch  of  it  here 
treated.  Most  of  the  cases  cited  un- 
der these  sections  will  be  found  in 
the  notes  to  §  303. 


547 


PUBLIC   OFFICERS. 


[§3IO 


§  3*0.  Quasi-judicial  officers,  how  far  protected. — Persons 
exercising  judicial  functions,  by  whatever  name  they  may  be 
called,  enjoy  the  protection  of  the  judicial  privilege.  Indeed 
any  officer,  sworn  to  act  faithfully,  according  to  the  best  of  his 
ability,  and  according  as  things  shall  appear  to  him,  is  a  judicial 
officer  within  the  rule.1  Officers  who  preside  at  elections, 
unless  they  are  made  the  sole  and  final  judges  of  the  qualifi- 
cations of  persons  offering  to  vote,  do  not  exercise  a  strictly 
judicial  function  in  determining  the  qualifications  of  a  voter.2 
In  determining  whether  they  will  receive  or  reject  a  vote,  they 


1  Harmon  v.  Agnew,  96  N.  Y. 
439.  "  When  the  law  confides  a 
discretion  to  its  officers,  it  will  never 
allow  their  acts,  done  in  good  faith, 
within  the  limits  of  that  discretion, 
to  be  questioned  "  (Griffith  v.  Follett, 
20  Barb.  620  [state-canal  officer]). 
"  Whenever  the  law  vests  any  per- 
son with  a  power  to  do  an  act,  and 
constitutes  him  a  judge  of  the  evi- 
dence on  which  the  act  may  be  done, 
and  at  the  same  time  contemplates 
that  the  act  is  to  be  carried  into 
effect  through  the  instrumentality  of 
agents,  the  person  thus  clothed  with 
power  is  invested  with  discretion, 
and  is,  quoad  hoc,  a  judge"  (Vander- 
heyden  v.  Young,  11  Johns.  150, 
158).  s.  P.,  Seaman  v.  Patten,  2 
Caines,  312  [provision  inspector]  ; 
Cunningham  v.  Bucklin,  8  Cow.  178 
[bankruptcy  commissioners]).  The 
refusal  of  a  license  to  keep  an  inn 
has  been  held,  in  England,  to  be  a 
judicial  act  (Bassett  v.  Godschall,  3 
Wils.  121).  But  see  Grider  v.  Tally, 
77  Ala.  422  ;  State  v.  Commissioners, 
45  Ind.  501  ;  Burton  v.  Fulton.  47  Pa. 
St.  151  ;  Huthsing  v.  Bousquet,  7  Fed. 
833  [board  of  supervisors] ;  compare 
Wasson  v.  Mitchell, 18  Iowa,153;  Peo- 
ple v.  Stocking.  50  Barb.  573  ;  Dow- 
ner v.  Lent,  6  Cal.  94  [board  of  pilot 
commissioners] .  As  to  tax  assessors, 
see  Brown  v.  Smith,  24  Barb.  419; 
Perry  v.  Buss,  15  N.  H.  222  ;  Fawcett 
t.  Dole,        N.  H.         ;  29  Atl.  693  ; 


Wilson  v.  Marsh,  34  Vt.  352.  Private 
arbitrators,  or  persons  who  are  called 
in  to  decide  disputes,  without  having 
the  powers  of  arbitrators,  are  not 
liable  to  any  action  for  their  want  of 
skill  (Pappa  v.  Rose,  L.  R.  7  C.  P. 
32,  525),  or  of  care  (Tharsis  Sulphur 
Co.  v.  Loftus,  L.  R.  8  C.  P.  1),  or  for 
including  in  an  award  an  item  of 
demand  which  ought  not  to  have 
been  allowed  (Phelps  v.  Dolan,  75 
111.  90).  A  city-attorney,  who,  at 
the  request  of  the  mayor,  gives  an 
official  opinion  that  a  certain  build- 
ing does  not  comply  with  the  fire 
ordinance  of  the  city,  is  not,  in  the 
absence  of  proof  of  malice,  respon- 
sible in  damages  because  the  build- 
ing is  afterwards  torn  down  by  the 
marshal  in  accordance  with  his  erro- 
neous opinion  (Thompson  v.  Evans, 
49  111.  App.  289).  s.  P.,  as  to  a  city- 
engineer,  in  passing  on  the  work  of 
street  improvements,  and  determin- 
ing whether  a  contract  has  been 
substantially  complied  with  (St. 
Joseph  v.  McCabe,  58  Mo.  App.  542); 
as  to  a  mayor,  conducting  examina- 
tions on  criminal  charges  (Hommert 
v.  Gleason,  60  Hun,  579,  mem.;  14 
N.  Y.  Supp.  568 ;  State  v.  Hastings, 
37  Neb.  96;  55  N.  W.  774). 

2  Ashby  v.  White,  2  Ld.  Raym. 
938  ;  Harman  v.  Tappenden,  1  East, 
555 ;  Drew  v  Coulton,  1  Id.  563, 
note ;  State  v.  Deliesseline,  1  Mc- 
Cord,  52. 


3io] 


PUBLIC    OFFICERS. 


548 


act  ministerially  ;  and  the  qualification  of  a  person  offering  to 
vote  is  open  to  examination  in  subsequent  proceedings  upon 
any  competent  evidence.3  Where  the  statute  makes  the  oath 
of  the  elector  the  test  of  his  right  to  vote,  and  the  oath  is 
taken,  the  inspectors  of  election,  in  refusing  to  receive  the 
vote,  clearly  act  ministerially,  and  they  are  liable  to  an  action.4 
In  some  states,  even  where  the  inspectors  are  made  judges  of 
the  qualifications  of  a  voter,  they  have  been  held  liable  for 
refusing  to  receive  the  vote,  though  no  corruption  or  malice 
-was  charged  ;5  but  the  courts  of  other  states  have  construed 
their  statutes  as  conferring  judicial  powers  upon  election- 
inspectors,  and  have  consequently  extended  to  them  the  pro- 
tection given  to  judicial  officers,  and  held  them  to  be  not  liable 
to  an  action  for  refusing  an  elector's  vote,  unless  in  doing  so 
they  acted  corruptly  or  maliciously.6     But  in  making  a  return, 


3  People  v.  Pease,  27  N.  Y.  45  ; 
affi'g  30  Barb.  588  ;  People  v.  Bristol, 
■etc.  Turnpike  Co.,  23  Wend.  228; 
Matter  of  Murphy,  7  Cow.  153  ;  Mat- 
ter of  Heath,  3  Hill,  42  ;  People  v. 
Seaman,  5  Denio,  409 ;  Sudbury  v. 
Stearns,  21  Pick.  148. 

4  Goetcheus  v.  Matthevvson,  61 
N.  Y.  420  ;  rev'g  5  Lans.  214 ; 
Spragins  v.  Houghton,  3  111.  377 ; 
State  v.  Robb,  17  Ind.  536  ;  Gillespie 
v.  Palmer,  20  Wise.  572. 

5  Lincoln  v.  Hapgood,  11  Mass. 
350  ;  Lombard  v.  Oliver,  3  Allen,  1  ; 
Gates  v.  Neal,  23  Pick.  308  ;  Capen 
v.  Foster,  12  Id.  485  ;  Bacon  v.  Bench- 
ley,  2  Cush.  100.  See  Blanchard  v. 
Stearns,  5  Mete.  298.  In  Anderson 
v.  Milliken  (9  Ohio  St.  568),  the  elec- 
tion-inspectors were  held  liable  for 
refusing  to  receive  the  vote  of  an 
elector,  whom  they  decided  not  to 
be  "white,"  within  the  meaning  of 
the  constitution,  as  the  evidence 
showed  that  the  elector  was  white, 
though  no  malice  was  shown.  8.  P. , 
Monroe  v.  Collins,  17  Id.  665 

6  Jenkins  v.  Waldron,  11  Johns. 
114;  Wheeler  v.  Patterson,  1  N.  H. 
88  ;  Weckerley  v.  Geyer,  11  Serg.  & 


R.  35  ;  Gordon  v.  Farrar,  2  Doug. 
[Mich.]  411  ;  Rail  v.  Potts,  8  Humph. 
225;  Bevard  v.  Hoffman,  18  Md. 
479 ;  Elbin  v.  Wilson,  33  Id.  135  ; 
Friend  v.  Hamill,  34  Id.  298;  Pike 
v.  Megoun,  44  Mo.  492 ;  Peavey  v. 
Robbins,  3  Jones  Law,  339  ;  Caul- 
field  v.  Bullock,  18  B.  Monr.  494; 
Miller  v.  Rucker,  1  Bush,  135 ; 
Wheeler  v.  Patterson,  1  N.  H.  88; 
Turnpike  Co.  v.  Champney,  2  Id. 
199;  State  v.  Daniels,  44  Id.  383. 
No  action  lias  against  the  selectmen 
of  a  town  for  refusing  to  put  upon 
the  list  of  voters  tberein  the 
name,  and  rejecting  the  vote, 
of  one  who  was  not  a  legal  voter, 
although  the  proof  produced  by 
him  to  them  was  sufficient  to 
establish  prima  facie  his  right  to 
vote ;  and  they  may  prove  at  the 
trial  that  in  fact  he  was  not  a  legal 
voter  (Lombard  v.  Oliver,  3  Allen,  1). 
But  compare  Oakes  v.  Hill,  10  Pick. 
333  ;  Gardner  v.  Ward.  2  Mass  244,  n.; 
Lincoln  v.  Hapgood,  11  Id  850  ;  Keith 
v.  Howard,  24  Pick.  292 ;  Gates  v. 
Neal,  23  Pick.  308 ;  and  Spear  v. 
Cummings,  Id.  224,  227,  per  Shaw, 
C.  J.;  Anderson  v.  Milliken,  9  Ohio 


549  PUBLIC    OFFICERS.  [§  313 

election-inspectors  clearly  act  ministerially,  and  an   action  will 
lie  for  a  false  return.7 

§  311.   [consolidated  with  §  310J. 

§  312.  Non-judicial  public  officers  classified. — In  speaking 
of  the  liability  of  non-judicial  public  officers  to  a  private 
action,  it  is  necessary  to  make  a  distinction  between  those 
officers  whose  duties  are  of  a  general  public  nature,  and  who 
act  for  the  public  at  large,  and  that  other  class  of  officers 
appointed  to  act,  not  for  the  public  in  general,  but  for  such 
individuals  as  may  have  occasion  to  employ  them  for  a  specific 
fee  paid.  Of  the  latter  class  are  such  officers  as  sheriffs,  con- 
stables, notaries  public,  and  the  like,  who  do  not  receive  com- 
pensation from  the  public  treasury,  but  from  individuals  who 
compensate  them  for  particular  services  rendered.  There  has 
never  been  any  question  that  officers  belonging  to  this  class 
are  liable  in  damages  for  any  act  of  negligence  or  abuse  of 
office,  to  any  individual  specially  injured  thereby.1 

§  313.  Negligent  performance  of  ministerial  duties. — As 
to  officers  belonging  to  the  former  class,  so  far  as  their  duties 
are  absolute,  certain  and  imperative,  and  involve  the  execution 
of  a  set  task  —  in  other  words  are  merely  ministerial1  —  they 
are  liable  in  damages  to  any  one  who  can  show  that  he  has 

St.    568.       By    malice,    which    will  (Freidman  v.  Mathes,  8  Ileisk.  502  ; 

render  an   officer  liable   in   such  a  Mississippi  v.  Johnson,  4  Wall.  498). 

case,  is  meant  the  refusal  of  a  vote,  A  ministerial  act  is  one  which  a  per- 

for  improper  motives,  and  contrary  son  performs  on  a  given  state  of  facts, 

to  his  own  opinions  (Weckerley  v.  in  a  prescribed  manner,  in  obedience 

Geyer,  11  Serg.  &  R.  35  ;  Christman  to  the  mandate  of  legal  authority, 

v.  Bruce,    1    Duvall,    63;    Drewe  v.  without  regard  to,  or  the  exercise  of , 

Coulton,    1    East,    563,   note).      See  his  own  judgment,  upon  the  propri- 

Oakes  v.  Hill,  10  Pick.  333.  ety  of  the  act  being  done  (Penning- 

1  Regina  v.  Heathcote,  10  Mod.  48.  ton  v.  Streight,  54  Ind.  377).      The 

See  Prideaux  v.  Morrice,  7  Id.  14.  action  of  an  oil  inspector  in  testing 

1  See,  as  to    clerks  and  recording  oil  to  determine  at  what  temperature 

officers,  ^  590-593,  po*t ;  as  to  notaries  it  will  emit  a  combustible  vapor,  the 

public,  §£  594-602,  post ;  as  to  sheriffs  manner  of  doing  so  being  specifically 

and  constables,  §£  616-625.  post.  prescribed    by    statute,    compliance 

'A    "ministerial*'   act   or  duty  is  with  which  is  certain  to  lead  to  a 

one  done  under  orders  of  a  superior;  correct  test,  is  ministerial  (Hatcher 

a  simple,  definite  duty,  with  respect  v.   Dunn,    [Iowa]  ;    66    N.    W.  905). 
to  which  nothing  is  left  to  discretion 


§3i3] 


PUBLIC   OFFICERS. 


550 


suffered  a  special  injury  through  their  neglect  in  respect  to 
some  right  which  the  law  assures  to  him.2  It  is  settled  law  that 
a  public  officer  who  acts  maliciously3  towards  another,  or  who, 
in  abuse  of  his  office  and  in  violation  of  his  duty,  omits  to  act,4 
or   acts   negligently,5   or    proceeds    without    or    in   excess   of 


- ' '  Whenever  an  action  is  brought 
for  a  breach  of  duty  imposed  by 
statute,  the  party  bringing  it  must 
show  that  he  had  an  interest  in  the 
performance  of  the  duty,  and  that 
the  duty  was  imposed  for  his  bene- 
fit "  (Strong  v.  Campbell,  11  Barb. 
135).  s.  P.,  Harrington  v.  Ward,  9 
Mass.  251  ;  Woolley  v.  Baldwin,  101 
N.  Y.  688  ;  5  N.  E.  573  [county  treas- 
urer] ;  Kendall  v.  Stokes,  3  How.  TJ. 
S.  87 ;  Robinson  v.  Chamberlain,  34 
N.  Y.  389  ;  Hover  v.  Barkhoof ,  44 
Id.  113  ;  Clark  v.  Miller,  54  Id.  528  ; 
Kennedy  v.  Ryall,  67  Id.  379  ;  Ben- 
nett v.  Whitney,  94  Id.  302  ;  Shep- 
herd v.  Lincoln,  17  Wend.  250  ;  Jen- 
ner  v.  Joliffe,  9  Johns.  381  ;  Piercy  v. 
Averill,  37  Hun,  360.  Bronson,  J., 
in  Adsit  v.  Brady  (4  Hill,  630) .  said  : 
"  When  an  individual  sustains  an  in- 
jury by  the  misfeasance  or  nonfeas- 
ance of  a  public  officer,  who  acts  or 
omits  to  act  contrary  to  his  duty, 
the  law  gives  redress  to  the  injured 
party  by  an  action  adapted  to  the 
nature  of  the  case."  This  broad 
statement  was  critised  by  Wright, 
J.,  in  Garlinghouse  v.  Jacobs  (29  N. 
Y.  297,  312).  See  McCord  v.  High, 
24  Iowa,  336  (per  Dillon,  Ch.  J.)  ; 
Moss  v.  Cummings,  44  Mich.  359  ; 
Raynsford  v.  Phelps.  43  Id.  342  ;  and 
cases  cited  under  £  8,  ante. 

3  Members  of  a  school  board  have 
been  held  liable  for  removing  a 
teacher  through  malice  (Burton  v. 
Fulton,  49  Pa.  St.  151).  See  Hog- 
gatt  v.  Bigley,  6  Humph.  236  ; 
Walker  v.  Hallock,  32  Ind.  239  ;  Lili- 
enthal  v.  Campbell,  22  La  Ann.  600, 
and  cases  cited  in  note  3,  t;  323,  i)Ost. 


4 Amy  v.  Supervisors,  11  Wall. 
136 ;  Percy  v.  Averill,  37  Hun,  360, 
and  cases  cited  under  next  section. 

5  Adsit  v.  Brady,  4  Hill,  630  [canal 
superintendent   negligently  permit- 
ted a  sunken  boat  to  remain  in  canal]; 
approved,     Hutson   v.    New    York, 
9  N.  Y.  169  ;  Robinson  v.  Chamber- 
lain, 34  Id.  389  ;  Hover  v.  Barkhoof, 
44  Id.  113  ;  Fulton   Fire   Ins.  Co.  v, 
Baldwin,  37  Id.  648  ;  Conroy  v.  Gale, 
47  Id.  665  ;  Johnson  v.  Belden,  47  Id. 
130 ;  Stack   v.  Bangs,  6   Lans.    262  ; 
Kennedy    v.    Ryall,    67     N.    Y.   379 
[child  killed  by  drinking  from  a  cup 
containing  poisonous  materials,  neg- 
ligently left  in  its  way  by  a  health 
officer  after  fumigating  steerage  of 
vessel  at  quarantine  ;  officer  liable] ; 
Morse  v.  Sweenie,  15   111.    App.   486 
[city  fire  marshal,  driving  carelessly 
around  a  corner   of  street,  ran  over 
plaintiff]  ;  Hayes  v.  Porter,  22  Me. 
371    [negligence     of     inspector     of 
meats]  ;  Barry  v.  Arnould,  10  Adol. 
&   El.    646  [negligence   of  customs- 
collector  in    appraising  goods].     A 
marshal  of  a  county  fair,  wishing  to 
clear  a  track   for  a   race,   turned  a 
team  off  from  the  track  in  such  a 
manner  that  the  horses  broke  loose, 
and    the    driver    was  thrown    out. 
Held,  liable,    if  his   act  was  negli- 
gent (Stevens  v.  Dudley,  56  Vt.  158). 
s.  P.,    Kolb  v.    O'Brien,  86  111.    210  ; 
Chouteau  v.  Rowse,    56  Mo.  65  [tax- 
collector  who  received  a  good  check 
for  taxes,  but  neglected  to  present  it 
until  the  drawer  had  failed]  ;  Nowell 
v.  Wright,  3  Allen,  166  [draw- bridge 
tender]. 


55i 


PUBLIC   OFFICERS. 


[§3H 


authority,6  is  answerable  in  damages  to  any  one  who  is  specially 
injured  thereby.  A  de  facto  officer  will  not  be  allowed  to  urge, 
in  defense  of  an  action  against  him  by  a  third  person  for  his 
official  acts,  that  he  is  not  an  officer  de  jure.  Though  his 
office  may  be  void  as  to  himself,  it  is  valid  as  to  strangers;7 
and  if  one  assumes  the  duties  of  an  office,  his  acts  will  operate 
by  way  of  admission  against  him,  and  strict  proof  of  his  elec- 
tion or  appointment  will  not  be  required.8  And  generally,  one 
who  assumes  the  duties,  and  is  invested  with  the  powers,  of  a 
public  officer,  is  liable  for  a  neglect  properly  to  perform  those 
duties.9 


§  314.  Liability  for  nonfeasance.  —  An  officer  who  is  made 
the  sole  judge  of  the  necessity  of  official  action  on  his  part, 
in  a  given  case,  is  not  liable  for  the  consequences  of  his  judg- 
ing no  action  to  be  necessary,  no  matter  how  erroneous  his 
judgment  may  turn  out  to  have  been.1  Before  he  can  be  made 
liable  for  omitting  to  do  something,  the  obligation  to  do  it 


6  An  officer  issuing  a  tax  warrant 
is  bound  to  know  its  contents,  and 
is  responsible  for  any  defects  of 
authority  appearing  on  its  face,  and 
for  acts  thereunder  (Atwell  v.  Ze- 
luff.  26  Mich.  118).  Not  being  per- 
tinent to  the  subject  of  negligence, 
we  omit  numerous  cases,  cited  in 
former  editions,  on  the  liabilities  of 
tax  assessors  and  collectors,  for  un- 
authorized official  acts. 

■"Per  Duncan,  J.,  Riddle  v.  Bed- 
ford county,  7  Serg.  &  R.  386  ;  see 
Dean  v.  Gridley,  10  Wend.  255; 
Green  v.  Burke,  23  Id.  490,  502; 
Bently  v.  Phelps,  27  Barb.  524; 
Burke  v.  Elliott,  4  Ired.  Law,  355  ; 
Gilliam  v.  Reddick,  4  Id.  368; 
Schlenckner  v.  Risley,  3  Scam. 
483  ;  Plymouth  v.  Painter,  17  Conn. 
585  ;  Hoagland  v.  Culvert,  20  N.  J. 
Law,  387  ;  Farmers'  Bank  v.  Chester, 
6  Humph.  458.  Compare  Vaccari  v. 
Maxwell,  3  Blatchf.  368  ;  Far  man  v. 
Ellington,  46  Hun,  41. 


8  Where  a  public  officer  is  sued  for 
neglect,  his  act3  may  be  given  as 
evidence  of  his  holding  the  office, 
though  there  be  record  evidence  of 
his  appointment  (Dean  v.  Gridley  10 
Wend.  255).  Giving  a  bond  of  office 
is  an  admission  of  appointment 
(Barada  v.  Carondelet,  8  Mo.  644  ; 
Lawrence  v.  Sherman,  2  McLean, 
488).  See  State  v.  Allen,  21  Ind. 
516  ;  Satterlee  v.  San  Francisco,  23 
Cal.  314.  An  officer  de  facto  is  one 
who  executes  the  duties  of  an  officer 
under  some  color  of  right,  some  pre- 
tense of  title,  either  by  selection  or 
appointment  (Hooper  v.  Goodwin, 
48  Me.  79).  Proof  that  an  individual 
has  acted  notoriously  as  a  public 
officer  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  his 
official  character,  without  producing 
his  appointment  (Colton  v.  Beardsley, 
38  Barb.  29 ;  Allen  v.  State,  21  Ga. 
2171. 

9  Bennett  v.  Whitney,  94  N.  Y. 
302  ;  State  v.  Goss,  69  Me.  22. 

1  Cases  cited  in  note  1,  §  310,  ante. 


§3i7l 


PUBLIC   OFFICERS. 


552 


must  be  absolute,  specific  and  imperative.2  The  duty  must 
also  be  one  owing  to  the  person  injured  by  his  nonfeasance.3 
Hence  an  inferior  officer,  like  an  overseer  of  highways,  charged 
by  law  with  the  duty,  under  the  general  directions  of  a  super- 
ior officer,  to  repair  bridges,  is  not  liable  to  a  third  person  for 
injuries  caused  by  his  neglect  to  repair  a  particular  bridge,4 
because  his  official  duty  was  due  to  the  public,  whose  servant 
he  was,  and  not  to  the  injured  person,  except  as  one  of  the 
public.  It  is  no  excuse  for  a  superior  officer's  nonfeasance  of  a 
ministerial  duty  imposed  on  him  individually  that  he  intrusted 
its  performance  to  a  subordinate  officer  who  also  neglected  it.5 

§  315.   [consolidated  with  §  313] 

§  316.   [consolidated  with  §  314] 

§  317.  Presumption  in  favor  of  officer.  —  There  is  always 
a  strong  presumption  that  a  sworn  public  officer  has  per- 
formed the  duties  of  his  office  faithfully  ; *  and  with  respect 
to  acts  done  in  excess  of  authority,  it  is  a  general  rule  that, 
where  a  public  duty  is  assigned  to  an  officer,  the  acts  of  the 
officer,  within  the  scope  of  that  duty,  are  prima  facie  taken  to 
be   within   his  power.2     The   presumption    is,  that  no  official 


2  A  town  supervisor  who  neglected 
to  present  to  the  board  a  property- 
owner's  claim  for  damages  assessed 
for  land  taken  for  highway,  held 
liable  for  consequent  loss  of  claim 
(Clark  v.  Miller,  54  N.  Y.  528).  s.  P., 
Olmsted  v.  Dennis,  77  Id.  378  [claim 
against  city].  The  superintendent 
of  buildings,  whose  duty  it  was  to  see 
that  all  unsafe  buildings  were  taken 
down  or  made  secure,  and  who  was 
furnished  ample  means  necessary  to 
fulfill  such  duty,  may  be  liable  for 
neglecting  to  remove  a  building 
rendered  unsafe  by  fire  it  having, 
in  consequence  of  such  neglect, 
fallen  and  killed  plaintiff 's  intestate. 
So  held  on  demurrer  (Connors  v. 
Adams,  13  Hun,  427).  For  other 
illustrations  of  the  rule,  see  §§  269, 
270,  ante,  and  §§  590-91,  post  [court- 
clerks,  etc]. 

3  See  cases  cited  in  note  2,  §  313. 


4  Bartlett  v.  Crozier,  17  Johns.  -139 
[overseer  of  highways]  ;  see  Hover 
v.  Barkhoof,  44  N.  Y.  113  ;  Bennett 
v.  Whitney,  94  Id.  302. 

5  Pickard  v.  Smith,  10  C.  B.  N.  S. 
480,  and  cases  cited  under  §  176,  ante. 

1  Dunlop  v.  Monroe,  1  Cranch  C. 
C.  336 ;  affi'd  on  other  grounds, 
7  Cranch,  242 ;  People  v.  Auditor,  2 
Scam.  567 ;  Vaughn  v.  Biggers,  6 
Ga.  188. 

2  Strother  v.  Lucas,  12  Peters,  410  ; 
Ross  v.  Reed,  1  Wheat.  482  ;  United 
States  v.  Arredondo,  6  Peters,  691  ; 
Philadelphia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Stimpson, 
14  Id.  448  ;  Delassus  v.  United  States, 
9  Id.  117 ;  Wilkes  v.  Dinsman,  7 
How.  U.  S.  89  ;  Minter  v.  Crommelin, 
18  la.  87  ;  Russell  v.  Beebe,  Hempst. 
704  ;  Den  v.  Hill,  1  McAll.  C.  C.  480. 
Compare  Ruggles  v.  Bucknor,  1 
Paine,  358  ;  Bottomley  v.  United 
States,  1  Story  C.  C.  135. 


553  PUBLIC   OFFICERS.  [§  319 

person,  acting  under  oath  of  office,  will  do  aught  against  his 
official  duty,  or  will  omit  to  do  whatever  his  official  duty 
requires.3 

§  318.   [consolidated  with  §  313.] 

§319.    Liability  for  negligence    of  subordinates. —The 

distinction  between  that  class  of  officers  whose  duties  are  of  a 
general  and  public  nature,  and  the  other  class,  like  sheriffs, 
etc.,  whose  duties  are  of  a  more  private  character,  depending 
upon  special  employment,  is  to  be  borne  in  mind  in  determin- 
ing the  liability  of  public  officers  for  the  misconduct  and  neg- 
ligence of  their  subordinates  in  office.1  All  public  officers  who 
have  the  power  of  appointing  their  subordinates2  are  bound 
to  exercise  ordinary  care  in  selecting  proper  persons  for  the 
position,  and  to  superintend  their  conduct;3  and  they  are 
bound  not  to  assign  to  them  tasks  for  which  they  know  such 
subordinates  to  be  incompetent,  and  in  the  execution  of  which 
it  is  reasonable  to  infer  that  disastrous  consequences  will 
ensue.4  But  the  first  class  of  officers,  if  they  are  guiltless  of 
personal  negligence  in  the  selection  of  their  subordinates,  are 
not  answerable  to  third  person  for  the  negligence  or  misfeas- 
ance of  the  clerks,  servants  or  agents,  necessarily  and  properly 
employed  by  or  under  them5  in  the  discharge   of  their  official 

3  Mandeville  v.  Reynolds,  68  N.  Y.  assigned  to  an  inspector  over  whom 

528,  and  cases  cited  under  §  273,  ante,  he  had  no  official  control,    he   was 

1  See  §  312,  ante.  not  required  to  look  after  the  work 

2  In  People  v.  Campbell  (82  N.  Y.  himself,  or  to  detail  others  for  that 
247),  the  relator,  as  engineer  of  the  purpose,  and  was  not  responsible  for 
department  of  public  works,  had  the  neglect  of  the  inspectors  ap- 
supervisory  charge  of  a   street  im-  pointed. 

provement.     In    the    contract    pro-        3  Dunlop  v.  Munroe,  7  Cranch,  242 

vision  was  made  for  an  inspector  to  [postmaster]. 

inspect  the  material  and  work  of  4  Castle  v.  Duryee,  32  Barb.  480  ! 
this  improvement,  to  be  appointed  affi'd,  1  Abb.  Ct.  App.  327  [militia 
by  the  head  of  the  department,  to  colonel] ;  see  §  322,  post. 
whom  he  was  to  report  Such  an  5  Lane  v.  Cotton,  1  Ld.  Raym.  646; 
inspector  was  appointed;  and  the  s.  c,  11  Mod.  13;  Whitfield  v.  De- 
improvement  fell  by  reason  of  bad  spencer.  2  Cowper,  754  ;  Rownino-  v. 
workmanship  and  materials.  Held,  Goodchild,  3  Wilson,  443;  Stock  v. 
as  it  was  impossible  for  the  relator  Harris.  5  Burr.  2709  ;  McMillan  v. 
to  watch  all  the  work  in  the  city  Eastman,  4  Mass.  378;  Schroyer  v. 
personally,  and  as  the  duty  of  in-  Lynch.  8  Watts,  455 ;  United  States 
spection  in  this  case  was  expressly  v.   Collier,    3    Blatch.    325.      School 


32i] 


PUBLIC   OFFICERS. 


554 


duties.  The  rule  of  respondeat  superior  does  not  apply  to 
them,  because  the  sub-agents  which  they  are  allowed  or  re- 
quired to  appoint  become,  by  such  appointment,  like  them- 
selves, agents  of  the  government;6  and  the  liability  of  a  serv- 
ant of  the  public  is  no  greater  than  the  liability  of  the  servant 
of  any  other  principal,  though  recourse  against  the  principal, 
the  public,  cannot  be  had  by  an  action.7  But  where  the  ap- 
pointment is  not  made  pursuant  to  authority,  the  appointee  is 
a  mere  agent  or  servant  for  whose  default  or  negligence  the 
appointing  officer  is  liable.8 


§  320.  [Omitted]. 

§  321.  Liability  of  postmasters  for  subordinates.— A  post- 
master, though  answerable  for  his  own  negligence,  whereby  a 
letter  is  lost,  is  not  liable  if  the  loss  ensues  from  the  negli- 
gence of  his  clerks  or  other  subordinates,1  who  are  agents  of  the 
government  and  not  of  the  postmaster.2     An   action  has  been 


trustees  are  not  liable  to  one  injured 
by  the  negligent  acts  or  omissions  of 
workmen  employed  to  make  repairs 
to  school  buildings,  unless  they  can 
be  shown  to  have  been  knowingly  or 
acquiescently  parties  to  the  wrong 
(Donovan  v.  McAlpine,  85  N.  Y.  185; 
and  see  Donovan  v.  Board  of  Educa- 
tion, 85  N.  Y.  117). 

6  Dunlopv.  Munroe,  7  Cranch,  242. 

1  Per  Blackburn,  J.,  Mersey  Docks 
v.  Gibbs,  L.  R.  1  H.  L.  93,  111  ;  11 
H.  L.  Cas.  686  ;  see  §  299,  ante,  and 
§  327,  post. 

8  Raisler  v.  Oliver,  97  Ala.  710  ;  12 
So.  238  [postmaster] ;  see  §  321,  post. 

1  Schroyer  v.  Lynch,  8  Watts,  458  ; 
Wiggins  v.  Hathaway,  6  Barb.  632  ; 
Dunlop  v.  Munroe,  7  Cranch,  242  ; 
Bolan  v.  Williamson,  1  Brevard,  181  ; 
See  Franklin  v.  Low,  1  Johns.  396  ; 
Carey  v.  Lawless,  13  Upper  Canada, 
Q.  B.  285.  Case  will  lie  against  a 
postmaster  for  not  delivering  a  let- 
ter on  request,  but  not  if  postage  was 
not  paid  on  tender  of  the  letter  (Ed- 
wards v.  Dickinson,  12  Mod.  C\  Tro- 


ver has  also  been  held  maintainable 
(Teall  v.  Felton,  1  N.  Y.  537).  Where 
issue  is  taken  on  the  negligence  of 
the  postmaster  himself,  it  is  not  com- 
petent to  give  in  evidence  the  negli- 
gence of  his  assistants  (Dunlop  v. 
Munroe,  7  Cranch,  242). 

2  Lane  v.  Cotton,  1  Ld.  Raym.  646. 
In  Whitfield  v.  Despencer  (2  Cowp. 
765),  Lord  Mansfield  said:  "  As  to 
an  action  on  the  case  lying  against 
the  party  really  offending,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  of  it ;  for  whoever  does 
an  act  by  which  another  person  re- 
ceives an  injury  is  liable  in  an  action 
for  the  injury  sustained.  If  the  man 
who  receives  a  penny  to  carry  the 
letters  to  the  post-office  loses  any  of 
them,  he  is  answerable  ;  so  is  the 
sorter  in  the  business  of  his  depart- 
ment :  so  is  the  postmaster  for  any 
fault  of  his  own."  In  Keenan  v. 
Southworth  (110  Mass.  474),  Gray.  J., 
said  :  "  It  is  well  settled  in  England 
and  America  that  the  postmaster- 
general,  the  deputy  postmasters,  and 
their  assistants  and  clerks,  appointed 


555 


PUBLIC    OFFICERS.  [§  322 


maintained  against  a  postmaster  for  the  acts  of  one  whom  he 
permitted  to  have  the  care  and  custody  of  the  mail  in  his 
office,  not  having  been  sworn  according  to  law;3  and  for  the 
purpose  of  establishing  negligence  on  the  part  of  a  post- 
master, it  is  competent  to  prove  how  the  office  was  kept,  its 
exposed  position  and  the  probability  arising  therefrom  that 
the  loss  was  the  consequence  of  such  exposure.4  The  particu- 
lar act  of  negligence  which  caused  the  loss  need  not  be 
shown.5 

§322.  Liability  of  army  and  navy  officers. —Officers  of 
the  army  and  navy  are  within  the  protection  of  the  rule,  and 
are  not  responsible  for  the  misfeasances  or  negligence  of  the 
subordinate  officers  under  them.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that 
the  captain  of  a  sloop  of  war  is  not  answerable  for  damage 
done  by  her  running  down  another  vessel ;  the  mischief 
appearing  to  have  been  done  during  the  watch  of  the  lieu- 
tenant, who  was  upon  deck,  and  had  the  actual  direction  and 
management  of  the  steering  and  navigating  of  the  sloop  at  the 
time,  and  when  the  captain  was  not  upon  deck,  and  was  not 
called    by  his  duty   to  be  there.1     The  rule  is  otherwise,  of 

and  sworn  as  required  by  law,  are  carrier,  and  proof  that  letters  con- 
public  officers,  each  of  whom  is  re-  taining  money  were  delivered  to  him 
sponsible  for  his  own  negligence  or  his  agent,  in  his  presence,  and  by 
only,  and  not  for  that  of  any  of  the  his  direction  for  registration,  and  of 
others,  although  selected  by  him  and  their  loss,  without  evidence  of  negli- 
subject  to  his  orders."  gence  resulting  in  their  loss,  was  in- 

3  Bishop  v.  Williamson,  11  Me.  sufficient  to  authorize  a  recovery 
495  ;  Hutchins  v.  Brackett,  22  N.  H.  against  him. 

252.     And  of  course  a  deputy  post-  '  Nicholson  v.  Mouncey,   15  East, 

master  is  liable  for  a  loss  sustained  384.     No  action  can  be  maintained 

by  his  personal  negligence  in  office  against  the  owners  of  a  transport 

(Maxwell  v.  Mcllvoy,  2   Bibb.  211  ;  vessel,  employed  by  the  government, 

Rowning  v.    Goodchild,    3  Wilson,  for  damages  done  in  the  execution 

443).     See  Dox  v.    Postmaster-Gen-  of  positive  orders  of  an  officer  of  the 

eral,  1  Pet.  318).     As  to  the  liability  royal  navy,  under  whose  command 

of  contractors  for  carrying  the  pub-  she  was.     "This  immunity  does  not 

lie  mail,  see  post,  §  324.  depend  upon  martial  law,  but  on  the 

4  Ford  v.  Parker,  4  Ohio  St.  576.  ground  that  persons  acting  under 

5  Raisler  v.  Oliver,  97  Ala.  710  ;  12  such  orders  cannot  be  said  to  be 
So.  238.  It  was  there  held  that  a  guilty  of  negligence "  (Hodgkinson 
postmaster's  liability  for  moneys  or  v.  Fernie,  2  C.  B.  N.  S  415).  In 
Letters  received  by  him  in  his  official  Scott  v.  United  States  (18  Ct.  of  CI. 
capacity  was  not  that  of  a  common  1),  a  safe  containing  money,  and  be- 


§  3-o 


3] 


PUBLIC    OFFICERS. 


556 


course,  where  the  act  of  the  subordinate  was  done  in  obedience 
to  the  direct  orders  of  the  superior  officer.  In  such  case  the 
latter  is  liable  for  the  consequences  of  the  act.2 

§323.  Public-school  officers. — The  various  officers  and 
boards  to  whom  are  committed  the  care  and  control  of  public 
schools,  are  public  officers  ;  they  have  the  power,  and  it  is  their 
duty,  to  adopt  appropriate  rules  and  regulations  for  the  govern- 
ment of  schools  under  their  control,  but  such   rules  must  be 


longing  to  a  disbursing  officer,  was 
stolen  from  his  tent  in  the  center  of 
camp,  while  he  was  asleep.  The 
usual  guard  surrounded  the  camp. 
Held,  that  the  officer  was  not  charge- 
able with  negligence.  So  a  commis- 
sary is  not  responsible  for  the  mis- 
feasance of  his  subagents,  unless  he 
co-operated  in  or  authorized  them 
(Tracy  v.  Cloyd,  10  W.  Va.  19). 

2  In  Castle  v.  Duryee  (1  Abb.  App. 
Dec.  327,  affi'g  32  Barb.  480),  a  regi- 
ment, under  the  command  of  de- 
fendant, its  colonel,  was,  pursu- 
ant to  official  orders,  going  through 
the  evolutions  of  drill  in  the  presence 
of  a  large  number  of  spectators. 
Defendant  ordered  his  men  to  level 
their  muskets  and  aim  in  the  direction 
of  the  crowd  in  front.  He  then  gave 
orders  to  fire;  whereupon  the  guns, 
supposed  to  be  loaded  only  with 
blank  cartridges,  were  discharged, 
and  plaintiff's  wife  was  wounded 
by  a  musket  ball.  The  court 
charged,  among  other  things,  that 
no  action  could  be  maintained 
against  defendant  for  an  act  done 
by  him  in  the  execution  of  his  office, 
and  within  the  scope  of  his  authority, 
if  done  with  all  reasonable  care  and 
caution  ;  nor  was  he  responsible  for 
the  negligence  of  those  under  his 
command,  unless  he  made  himself  a 
party  to  the  negligence  by  giving  an 
improper  order,  or  by  neglecting 
some  precaution  which  prudence 
required  him  to  adopt.  Held,  no 
error,  and  a  verdict  for  plaintiff  was 


sustained.  So  the  commander  of  a 
war-vessel  who  seizes  a  vessel  on 
the  high  seas,  and  sends  her  in  for 
adjudication  for  a  breach  of  a  par- 
ticular law,  is  liable  for  damages, 
unless  there  was  reasonable  ground 
of  suspicion  that  she  was  violating 
the  laws  (Murray  v.  The  Charming 
Betsy,  2  Cranch,  64  ;  Little  v.  Bar- 
reme,  2  Id.  170  ;  Maley  v.  Shattuck, 
3  Id.  458  ;  The  Eleanor,  2  Wheat. 
345 ;  and  see  Burke  v.  Trevitt,  1 
Mason,  96  ;  Stoughton  v.  Dimick,  3 
Blatchf.  356;  s.  c,  29  Vt.  535).  In 
Buron  v.  Denman  (2  Exch.  167),  the 
defendant,  a  captain  in  the  navy, 
was  sought  to  be  made  liable  for 
burning  certain  barracoons  on  the 
west  coast  of  Africa,  and  releasing 
the  slaves  contained  in  them.  His 
conduct  in  so  doing  had  been  ap- 
proved by  a  letter  written  by  the 
secretary  of  state.  Held,  that  the 
owner  of  the  slaves  (not  a  Bi-itisJt 
subject),  could  not  recover  for  his 
loss,  as  the  effect  of  the  ratification 
of  defendant's  act  was  to  con- 
vert what  he  had  done  into  an  act  of 
state,  for  which  no  action  would  lie. 
Referring  to  this  case,  Justice 
Stephen  (Hist,  of  Crirn.  Law,  vol.  II, 
p.  64)  says  :  "As  between  the  sov- 
ereign and  his  subjects,  there  can  be 
no  such  thing  as  an  act  of  state. 
Courts  are  established  for  the  ex- 
press purpose  of  limiting  public 
authority  in  its  conduct  towards  in- 
dividuals." 


557 


PUBLIC   OFFICERS. 


[§325 


not  only  reasonable,1  but  their  enforcement  must  also  be  rea- 
sonable, in  the  light  of  existing  circumstances.2  The  recog- 
nized rule  is  that  a  school  officer  is  not  personally  liable  for  a 
mere  mistake  of  judgment  in  the  government  of  his  school;  to 
make  him  so,  it  must  be  shown  that  he  acted  in  the  matter 
complained  of  wantonly,  willfully  and  maliciously.3  A  mem- 
ber of  a  school-board,  who  has  not  been  charged  by  the  latter 
with  a  duty  owing  by  it,  e.  g.,  keeping  school-buildings  in 
repair,  is  not  individually  liable  for  a  breach  of  such  duty;4 
nor  for  the  negligence  of  persons  employed  by  them.5  A 
school  superintendent  whose  duty  it  is  to  superintend  school- 
house  repairs  is  not  the  superior  of  persons  employed  by  the 
board  to  make  repairs.6 

§  324.   [consolidated  with  §  340.] 

§  325.  Liability  of  government-contractors.— Independent 
contractors  with  the  government   are  not   the   agents  of  the 


1  Danenhoffer  v.  State,  69  Ind.  295  ; 
State  v.  Webber,  108  Id.  31  ; 
Thompson  v.  Beaver,  63  111.  353 ; 
Roberts  v.  Boston,  5  Cush.  198  ; 
Sherman  v.  Charlestown,  8  Id.  160 ; 
Spiller  v.  Woburn,  12  Allen,  127; 
Hodgkins  v.  Rockport,  105  Mass. 
475  ;  State  v.  Burton,  45  Wise.  150  ; 
Ferriter  v.  Tyler,  48  Vt.  444;  Peo- 
ple v.  Medical  Soc. ,  24  Barb.  570.  As 
to  what  constitutes  a  reasonable  rule 
for  the  government  of  a  school,  see 
Burdick  v.  Babcock,  31  Iowa,  562. 
The  reasonableness  of  a  rule  is  for  the 
court,  and  not  for  the  jury  (Fertich 
v.  Michener,  111  Ind.  472  ;  11  N.  E. 
605). 

*  Fertich  v.  Michener,  111  Ind. 
472  ;  11  N.  E.  605.  "  A  school  regu- 
lation must  be  not  only  reasonable 
in  itself,  but  its  enforcement  must 
also  be  reasonable  in  the  light  of  ex- 
isting circumstances.  The  habit  of 
locking  the  doors  of  the  school-room 
during  the  opening  exercises,  ob- 
served by  the  appellee's  teacher,  was 
not  an  unreasonable  enforcement  of 


the  rule  under  consideration,  in 
moderate  weather  and  under  ordi- 
nary circumstances.  But  to  so  lock 
the  doors  on  an  extremely  and  un- 
usually cold  morning,  without  caus- 
ing special  care  and  attention  to  be 
given  to  the  comfort  of  such  pupils 
as  might  thereby  be  required  to  re- 
main in  some  other  part  of  the 
building,  was  undoubtedly  both  an 
unreasonable  and  a  negligent,  and 
hence  an  improper  enforcement  of 
the  rule." 

3  Cooper  v.  McJunkin,  4  Ind.  290  ; 
Gardner  v.  State,  Id.  633  ;  Danen- 
hoffer v.  State,  79  Id.  75  ;  Elmore  v. 
Overton,  104  Id.  548;  Churchill  v. 
Fewkes,  13  111.  App.  520;  McCor- 
mick,  v.  Burt,  95  111.  263  ;  Dritt  v. 
Snodgrass,  66  Mo.  286 ;  and  cases 
cited  in  note  3,  §  313,  ante. 

4Bassett  v.  Fish,  75  N.  Y.  303  ;  see 
§  329,  post. 

6  Donovan  v.  McAlpin,  85  N.  Y. 
185. 

6  Donovan  v.  McAlpin,  supra.  See 
§  267,  ante. 


§325] 


PUBLIC    OFFICERS. 


558 


government,  so  as  to  exempt  them  from  the  operations  of  the 
rule  of  respondeat  superior.  They  are  liable  to  the  same  extent 
as  other  masters  for  the  negligence  or  malfeasance  of  their 
servants.  Thus,  a  contractor  for  carrying  the  mail,  who 
employs  either  a  faithless  or  incompetent  servant,  or  one 
through  whose  negligence  a  letter  is  lost,  is  liable  to  the  sender 
of  the  letter.1  He  is  also  liable,  as  a  carrier,  to  the  agent  in 
charge  of  the  mail.2  So  one  who  contracts  with  the  state  to 
keep  in  repair  certain  sections  of  a  state  canal  is  liable  to  indi- 
viduals for  any  damages  sustained  through  his  neglect  to  do 
so.3  It  is  not  even  necessary  that  he  should  have  had  notice 
of  the  defect  which  caused  the  injury.4 


1  Sawyer  v.  Corse,  17  Gratt.  230; 
overruling  Conwell  v.  Voorhees,  13 
Ohio,  523.  See  Hutchins  v.  Brackett, 
2  Foster,  252. 

2  Cases  cited  under  §  492,  post. 

3  Robinson  v.  Chamberlain,  34  N. 
Y.  389;  Fulton  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Baldwin,    37    Id.    648 ;    Conroy    v„ 


Gale,  47  Id.  665  ;  affi'g  5  Lans.  344  ; 
Johnson  v.  Belden,  47  N.  Y.  130 ; 
Hicks  v.  Dorn,  42  Id.  47  ;  St.  Peter 
v.  Denison,  58  Id.  416  ;  Stack  v. 
Bangs,  6  Lans.  262  ;  see  §  298,  ante. 
4  Conroy  v.  Gale,  5  Lans.  344. 
Compare  Phillips  v.  Commonwealth, 
44  Pa.  St.  197. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 


INCORPORATED  PUBLIC  TRUSTEES. 


§  326.  Former    rule    of    liability    of 
statutory  trustees. 

327.  Present    rule    of   liability    in 

England. 

328.  Incorporated     administrative 

boards. 


§  329.  Voluntary   corporations    per- 
forming public  functions. 

330.  Trustees     not    liable      when 

agents  only. 

331.  Trustees     of     public     chari- 

ties. 


§  326.  Former  rule  of  liability  of  statutory   trustees.— 

In  England,  many  works  tending  to  the  benefit  and  conven- 
ience of  the  public,  and,  in  that  sense,  public  works,  such  as 
docks,  river  and  harbor  improvements,  light-houses  and  the 
like,  are  vested  in  trustees  created  and  incorporated  by  statute. 
They  are  required,  in  substance,  to  apply  all  moneys  received 
by  them  by  way  of  rates  or  tolls  to  the  proper  maintenance  of 
the  works,  and  then  to  pay  the  principal  and  interest  of  the 
debt  contracted  for  their  construction.  It  was  for  some  time 
held1  that,  inasmuch  as  these  statutory  trustees  did  not  main- 
tain these  works  for  profit,  or  receive  rates  or  tolls  therefrom 
to  their  own  use,  that  is,  to  be  divided  among  themselves  or 
their  shareholders,  but  acted  gratuitously,  in  the  administra. 
tion  of  a  public  trust,  and  the  application  of  funds  appropri- 
ated by  statute  to  particular  purposes  —  they  were  to  be 
regarded  as  public  servants;  and  the  funds  in  their  hands  were 
not  to  be  subject  to  the  claims  of  individuals  suffering  dam- 
ages in  consequence  of  a  negligent  discharge  of  official  duties 
by  the  trustees  or  their  agents,  in  the  absence  of  a  clear  indi- 
cation of  the  intention  of  the  legislature  that  they  should  be 
so  subject.2 

'See  Metcalfe  v.  Hetherington,  11  rev'd,  L.  R.  1  Q.  B.  711;  Holliday 
Exch.  257;  s.  c,  again,  5  Hurlst.  &  v.  St.  Leonards,  11  C.  B.  N.  S.  192. 
N.  719  ;  British  Cast  Plate  Co.  v.  2  Duncan  v.  Findlater  (6  CI.  &  Fin. 
Meredith,  4  T.  R.  794;  Humphreys  894).  This  was  an  action  [a  Scotch 
v.  Mears.  1  Man.  &  Ryl.  187;  Boul-  appeal  decided  in  1839]  against  pub- 
ton  v.  Crowther,  2  Barn.  &  C.  703  ;  lie  trustees  of  a  turnpike  road,  for 
0>e    v.    Wise,    5   Best    &    S.     440;  injuries  in  consequence  or  laborers, 

/5591 


§  327] 


INCORPORATED    PUBLIC    TRUSTEES. 


560 


§  327.  Present   rule    of  liability   in   England.  —  But    this 
theory  has  been  wholly  rejected  by  the  highest   authority1  in 


employed  by  them,  leaving  a  quan- 
tity of  stones  in  the  road,  thus  form- 
ing a  dangerous  obstruction  to  trav- 
elers at  night.  Held,  that  the  funds 
raised  by  the  statute,  which  ordained 
that  they  should  be  applied  to  the 
purposes  set  forth,  and  "  to  no  other 
purpose  whatsoever,''  could  not  be 
charged  with  compensation  for  such 
an  injury.  "  It  is  impossible  to  sup- 
pose," said  Lord  Chancellor  Cotten- 
ham,  "that  the  framers  of  this  stat- 
ute contemplated  that  any  part  of 
this  fund  would  be  appropriated  for 
the  purposes  of  affording  compensa- 
tion for  any  act  of  the  persons  who 
might  be  employed  under  the  au- 
thority of  the  trustees."  Referring 
to  the  overruling  of  this  case  by 
Mersey  Docks  v.  Gibbs  {infra),  an 
eminent  Scotch  judge,  in  a  recent 
case,  said  :  "During  the  thirty  years 
which  have  elapsed  since  the  judg- 
ment in  Duncan  v.  Findlater,  sev- 
eral actions  have  been  dismissed  as 
irrelevant,  which  would  have  been 
sustained  if  this  court  had  been  act- 
ing on  the  principle  which  must  now 
guide  them.  But  an  infinitely  larger 
number  of  claims  against  statutory 
trustees  or  commissioners  for  in- 
juries sustained  through  the  wrong- 
doing or  negligence  of  themselves  or 
their  servants  have  never  seen  the 
light,  in  deference  to  the  judgment 
in  Duncan  v.  Findlater.  Many  of 
them  must,  from  various  accidents, 
be  now  incapable  of  resuscitation, 
and  no  one  can  calculate  what  an 
amount  of  injustice  has  been  suf- 
fered by  the  suppression  of  these 
claims  for  a  long  period,  even  where 
they  can  still  be  brought  forward  " 
(per  Lord  President  Inglis  in  Virtue 
v.  Police  Commissioners,  1  R.  285). 
1  Mersey   Docks  v.    Gibbs,    L.    R. 


1  H.  L.  93  ;  11  H.  L.  Cas.  686.  That 
was  the  case  of  the  Liverpool  docks, 
built  and  maintained  by  the  mem- 
bers of  the  town-council  of  Liver- 
pool, who,  with  their  successors, 
were  created  a  corporation  for  such 
purpose  ;  all  the  revenues  from  the 
docks  to  be  applied,  in  the  first  in- 
stance, to  making  and  maintaining 
the  docks,  and  then  to  the  payment 
of  interest  on  the  debt,  etc.  The  neg- 
ligence complained  of  was  in  not 
properly  maintaining  a  dock,  which 
vessels  were  invited  to  enter,  so  that 
plaintiff's  ship  struck  a  bank  of  mud 
as  she  was  endeavoring  to  enter  the 
dock.  See  note  3,  §  281.  In  Mersey 
Docks  v.  Cameron  (11  H.  L.  Cas. 
443),  which  was  an  action  to  re- 
cover poor  rates  from  the  trustees  of 
these  docks,  Lord  Westbury  said  : 
"The  Mersey  Docks  are,  in  truth, 
property  used  and  occupied  for  the 
profit  and  benefit  of  a  number  of 
persons,  and  it  is  the  same  thing  in 
substance  as  if  the  docks  had  been 
demised  by  the  subscribers  to  the 
trustees,  on  the  terms  of  maintaining 
the  docks  and  paying  to  the  sub- 
scribers a  rent  equivalent  to  the  inter- 
est on  their  bonds.  They  are,  there- 
fore, occupiers,  and  ratable  as  such." 
In  Winch  v.  Conservators  of  the 
Thames  (L.  R.  7  C.  P.  458),  defend- 
ants were  incorporated  with  powers 
to  maintain  and  repair  a  towing- 
path  along  the  upper  Thames  for  the 
use  of  which  they  were  entitled  to 
take  toll.  Held,  that  having  invited 
the  public  to  use  it,  they  were  bound 
to  take  reasonable  care  that  it  was  in 
a  fit  condition  to  be  used  as  a  towing- 
path  and  were  liable  for  injuries 
resulting  from  its  defective  condi- 
tion. The  fact  that  defendants  did 
not  collect  tolls  for  their  own  advan- 


5<Si 


INCORPORATED  PUBLIC  TRUSTEES. 


[§  327 


Great   Britain,  and   the  rule   is  now  fixed  that  such  statutory- 
bodies  are  not  servants  of  the  crown,  so  as  to  be  exempt  from 
liability  for  the  negligence  of  their  employees ;   that,  although 
not  organized  for  purposes  of  profit,  and  administering  a  fund 
raised  by  statute,  by  its  terms  made  applicable  to  a  particular 
purpose,  they  are  nevertheless  liable  to  make  good  out  of  such 
fund,  any  damage  which  may  be  sustained  by  an  individual  by 
reason  of  the  negligence  of  themselves  or  their  employees  in 
the  line  of  their  duty.     The  statute  creating  them  being  silent 
on  the  subject  of  their  liability,  the  legislature  is  deemed  to 
have  intended  that  they  should  have  the  same  duties,  and  that 
their   funds   should   be   subject   to  the  same  liabilities,  as  the 
general  law  casts  upon  private  persons  who  maintain  for  profit 
works  of  a  similar  character.     It  makes  no  difference,  it  is  said, 
whether  they,  as  a  corporate  body,  were  created  for  a  bene- 
ficial or  for  a  fiduciary  purpose.2     Having  undertaken,  or  being 
bound,   to   perform   certain   duties,   it    is    immaterial   whether 
these  duties  are  imposed  by  reason  of  the  possession  of  prop- 
erty, or  by  the  assumption  of  an  office,  or  however  they  may 


tage,  but  merely  as  trustees  for  the 
public,  made  no  difference  with 
respect  to  liability  in  such  cases. 
"  The  intention  of  the  legislature  in 
such  cases  is  that  the  corporation 
shall  have  the  same  duties,  and  its 
funds  shall  be  subject  to  the  same 
liabilities,  as  the  general  law  would 
impose  upon  a  private  person  having 
and  exercising  the  same  rights."  On 
appeal  (L.  R.  9  C.  P.  378)  judgment 
was  affirmed,  Brain  well,  B.,  saying: 
"  Since  Mersey  Docks  v.  Gibbs 
(supra)  we  must  hold  that  the  funds 
of  this  corporation  (though  estab- 
lished for  public  purposes)  are  liable 
to  make  good  the  damages  sustained 
by  a  private  person  from  any  breach 
of  duty  on  their  part,  and  that  there 
is  nothing  in  these  statutes  to  exempt 
this  corporation  from  the  duties 
which  the  common  law  would  cast 
upon  a  private  person  or  a  trading 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  I  —  36] 


corporation  who  maintained  a  simi- 
lar towing-path  along  a  public  navi- 
gation and  levied  tolls  for  its  use." 
In  Southampton,  etc.  Bridge  Co.  v. 
Southampton  L.  Board  (8  El.  &  Bl. 
812)  it  was  said :  ' '  Since  Mersey  Docks 
Case  it  is  useless  to  contend  that 
commissioners  are  not  liable  simply 
on  the  ground  that  they  are  trustees 
for  the  public.  The  decision  of  each 
case  must  turn  on  the  construction  of 
the  particular  statute  under  which 
the  commissioners  are  appointed." 

'-'  Gibbs  v.  Liverpool  Docks,  3 
Hurlst.  &  N.  164,  per  Coleridge,  J.: 
"The  fact  that  a  public  body  acts 
gratuitously  for  the  benefit  of  the 
public,  is  no  reason  for  exempting  it 
from  liability  for  damages  resulting 
from  the  negligent  performance  of 
a  duty  intrusted  to  it"  (Clothier  v. 
Webster,  12  C.  B.  N.  S.  790). 


§  328] 


INCORPORATED    PUBLIC    TRUSTEES. 


562 


arise,  the  trustees  are  held  to  be  liable  to  a  private  action  for 
neebsence.3 


§  328.  Incorporated  administrative  boards. —  We  are  not 
aware  that  this  system  of  constructing  and  maintaining  public 
works  by  statutory  trustees,  administering  funds  for  particu- 
lar purposes  under  statutory  directions,  not  for  profit,  but  for 
the  public  benefit,  has  any  precise  parallel  in  this  country.  It 
is  not  uncommon  for  statutes  to  endow  particular  administrative 
boards,  organized  for  public  purposes,  with  a  corporate  char- 
acter, and  entrust  them  with  funds  to  be  applied  to  particular 
purposes,  in  the  interest  of  the  public.  Whether,  in  a  given 
case,  such  a  corporate  body  is  a  public  servant,  exempt  from 
liability  for  the  negligence  of  its  employees  in  the  line  of  their 
employment,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  is  an  independent  body, 
only  auxiliary  to,  and  not  a  part  of,  the  government,  and  hence 
liable,  must  be  determined  by  the  language  of  the  statute 
creating  it,  as  indicating  the  intention  of  the  legislature.1  In 
Mississippi,  the  legislature  created  a  corporation  consisting  of 
two  persons  from  each  of  three  counties  bordering  on  the 
Mississippi  River,  and  their  successors,  elected  every  two  years 


3  The  superintendence  and  man- 
agement of  all  lighthouses  and 
beacons  in  England  are  vested  by 
statute  in  the  corporation  of  Trinity 
House,  to  which  extensive  powers 
are  given,  to  be  exercised  with  the 
consent  of  the  government  Board  of 
Trade.  The  light-dues  levied  by  it 
are  directed  to  be  carried  to  the 
account  of  a  fund,  out  of  which  are 
to  be  paid  the  expenses  of  the  service 
of  lighthouses  and  beacons,  the  cor- 
poration accounting  to  the  Board  of 
Trade  for  all  receipts  and  expendi- 
tures, and  the  accounts  are  to  be 
audited  by  the  Commissioners  of 
Audit.  Held,  that  this  corporation 
was  not,  by  virtue  of  the  statute,  a 
servant  of  the  Crown  so  as  to  be  ex- 
empt from  liability  for  negligence  in 
the  performance  of  the  duties  with 
which  it  was  charged  ;  and  where, 
therefore,  in  removing  a  partially  de- 


stroyed beacon,  vested  in  the  corpo- 
ration, its  servant  negligently  left 
standing  under  water  an  iron  stump, 
on  which  plaintiff's  ship  struck,  the 
corporation  was  liable  (Gilbert  v. 
Trinity  House,  L.  R.  17  Q.  B.  Div. 
795). 

1  It  has  been  uniformly  held  that 
when  the  trustees  of  a  village  are 
created  a  body  corporate  (and  not  till 
then),  they  become  liable  in  their 
corporate  character  for  the  negligent 
acts  and  omissions  of  their  servants 
and  agents  in  the  line  of  their  em- 
ployment (Hickok  v.  Plattsburgh,  16 
N.  Y.  161,  note  ;  Conrad  v.  Ithaca, 
Id.  158  ;  Peck  v.  Batavia,  32  Barb. 
634).  See  ante,  §  256.  As  to  the 
liabilities  of  local  boards  in  Eng- 
land, see  Smith  v.  West  Derby,  L. 
E.  3  C.  P.  Div.  423  ;  White  v.  Hind- 
ley  Local  Board,  L.  R.  10  Q.  B.  219 ; 
Ruck  v.  Williams,  3  Hurlst.  &  N.  308. 


563  INCORPORATED    PUBLIC   TRUSTEES.  [j  329 

by  the  governing  boards  of  the  three  counties.  It  was 
made  their  duty  to  rebuild,  strengthen  and  elevate  old  levees, 
and  make  new  ones,  and  "  do  all  acts  necessary  in  their  opinion 
to  secure  the  counties  under  their  charge  from  overflow;"  and 
to  this  end,  they  were  empowered  to  raise  a  fund  by  levying 
a  tax.  It  was  claimed  that  the  commissioners  so  negligently 
and  unskillfully  constructed  a  levee  that  it  gave  way  before 
the  pressure  of  high  water,  whereby  the  plaintiff 's  lands  were 
inundated,  and  his  crops  destroyed.  In  an  action  against  the 
board,  it  was  held  that  the  commissioners  were  simply  public 
officers,  clothed  with  corporate  capacity  solely  for  the  con- 
venience of  administration,  and  that  the  tax  was  for  a  special 
purpose,  and  could  not  be  appropriated  to  pay  damages  for 
the  default  of  the  commissioners.2  This  decision  is  in 
harmony  with  the  principles  already  stated  (§  253);  the  board 
was  not  a  voluntary  corporation  representing  the  inhabitants 
of  certain  territory,  but  a  contrivance  of  the  state  to  assist  in 
its  government. 

§  329.  Voluntary  corporations  performing  public  func- 
tions.—  The  case  is  different  from  that  of  a  corporation 
organized  voluntarily  by  the  inhabitants  of  a  particular  terri- 
tory, under  the  authority  of  a  general  statute,  with  powers  to 
perform  certain  public  duties,  and  to  that  end,  to  raise  a  fund 
by  taxation.  Thus,  in  New  York,  under  a  statute  which 
authorizes  the  inhabitants  of  two  or  more  school  districts  to 
consolidate  them  into  a  union-district,  and  to  elect  trustees, 
who,  with  their  successors,  are  created  a  corporation,  and 
intrusted  with  a  fund  to  further  the  objects  contemplated,  it 
has  been  held  that  such  a  corporation  is  liable  for  injuries 
resulting  from  the  negligence  of  the  trustees  in  the  discharge 
of  their  duties,  e.g.,  in  not  taking  reasonable  care  that  the  floor 

2  Nugent  v.  Mississippi  Levee  fund  to  be  used  in  preventing  the 
Coin'rs,  58  Miss.  197.  In  that  case,  recurrence  of  damages.  "To  entail 
the  Mersey  Docks  Case  (supra)  was  so  alarming  a  liability  on  property- 
urged  in  support  of  the  action,  but  holders,  without  their  free  consent, 
was  held  not  to  apply  :  the  court  say-  ought  to  require  a  very  plain  expres- 
ing  that  to  hold  the  fund  chargeable  sion  of  the  legislative  will."  s.  P., 
with  such  damages  would  make  the  Peart  v.  Meeker,  45  La.  Ann.  421  ;  12 
tax-payers  liable  as  insurers  against  So.  490  [levee  commissioners], 
damages,  instead  of  contributors  to  a 


§  330] 


INCORPORATED    PUBLIC   TRUSTEES. 


564 


of  a  school-house  in  their  charge  was  in  a  fit  state  of  repair.1 
It  is  obvious  that  the  character  of  such  an  independent  corpo- 
ration differs  widely  from  that  of  a  board  of  education, 
connected  with  municipal  government,  having  no  treasury, 
and  created  by  the  sovereign  authority  of  the  state  to  exercise 
a  purely  public  function  and  agency.  Such  boards  enjoy  the 
immunity  of  government  agents.2 

§  330.  Trustees  not  liable  when  agents  only.  —To  render 
the  trustees  of  a  public  work  liable  as  a  corporate  body,  it  must 
appear  not  only  that  the  legislature  intended  to  constitute 
them  a  corporation,  but  also  to  cast  upon  them  the  burdens 
incident  to  ownership  or  control.  Where  the  ownership  is 
vested  in  a  municipal  corporation,  by  whose  appointment  the 
trustees  act,  they  themselves  owning  no  property,  and  holding 
and  managing  the  work  solely  for  the  benefit  of  the  munici- 
pality, to  which  they  are  accountable  for  all  receipts  there- 
from, the  trustees  are  mere  representatives  and  agents ;  conse- 
quently they  are  not  liable  for  the  negligence  of  their  employees 
in  the  management  of  the  work.1 


1Bassett  v.  Fish,  75  N.  Y.  303; 
rev'g  12  Hun,  209.  The  action  was 
against  the  trustees  individually,  and 
judgment  was  had  for  the  plaintiff  ; 
but  it  was  held,  on  appeal,  that  the 
action  lay,  if  at  all,  against  the  cor- 
poration, as  such;  Folger,  J.,  saying: 
"  It  may  be  that  if  one  of  the  trus- 
tees had  been  duly  charged  by  the 
corporate  body,  as  its  agent  or  serv- 
ant, distinct  from  his  relation  as  a 
corporator,  with  a  duty  and  respon- 
sibility, the  neglect  of  which  brought 
damage  to  another,  he  would  be 
liable  as  a  private  person  therefor. 
But  it  is  not  seen  how  a  member  of 
a  corporate  body,  upon  which  body 
a  duty  rests,  can  be  held  individually 
liable  for  the  neglect  of  its  duty  by 
that  body.  There  is  no  duty  upon 
him  to  act  individually.  If  there  is 
neglect  to  exert  its  powei-s  or  all  its 
means,  it  is  the  neglect  of  the  body 


and  not  of  the  individuals  compos- 
ing it." 

*  Donovan  v.  Board  of  Education.. 
85  N.  Y.  117  :  Finch  v.  Board  of  Edu- 
cation, 30  Ohio  St.  37.  See  ante, 
§£  295,  296. 

1  On  an  interpretation  of  the  stat- 
ute providing  for  the  appointment  of 
trustees  of  the  New  York  and  Brook- 
lyn bridge,  it  was  held  that  they 
were  mere  representatives  and 
agents  of  the  two  cities,  and  not  the 
legal  superiors  of  a  laborer  injured 
while  working  on  the  bridge,  and 
the  doctrine  of  respondeat  superior 
did  not  apply  (Walsh  v.  Brooklyn 
Bridge  Trustees.  96  N.  Y.  427).  In 
an  action  subsequently  brought  for 
the  same  injury  against  the  cities  of 
New  York  and  Brooklyn,  held,  on 
demurrer,  that  plaintiff  was  entitled 
to  recover  (Walsh  v.  New  York,  41 
Hun,  299  ;  affi'd,  96  N.  Y.  426).     See 


565 


INCORPORATED  PUBLIC  TRUSTEES. 


[§331 


§331.  Trustees  of  public  charities. —  Corporate  trustees, 
instituted  for  the  purpose  of  extending  charitable  relief  and 
administering  funds  contributed  for  that  object  from  the  pub- 
lic treasury  or  by  private  bounty,  without  the  expectation  or 
right  on  their  part  to  receive  compensation  for  their  own  benefit, 
having  no  capital  stock  and  no  provision  for  making  dividends 
or  profits,  are  public  servants  ;  and  as  such,  having  exercised  due 
care  in  the  selection  of  their  agents,  are  not  liable  as  a  corpora- 
tion for  the  negligence  of  such  agents  in  the  line  of  their 
employment,  resulting  in  an  injury  to  another.  Their  funds 
are  not  to  be  diminished  by  any  such  casualties,  it  is  held, 
unless  a  contrary  legislative  intention  can  be  gathered  from 
the  statute.1     The  rule  will  not  apply,  of  course,  to  a  private 


Walsh  v.  New  York,  107  N.  Y.  220  ; 
13  N.  E.  911  ;  Hannon  v.  Agnew,  96 
N.  Y.  439 ;  Reid  v.  New  York,  139 
Id.  534;  34  N.  E.  1102. 

1  McDonald  v.  Massachusetts  Gen- 
eral Hospital,  120  Mass.  432.  In  that 
case,  plaintiff  was  brought  to  de- 
fendant's hospital  with  a  fractured 
limb,  and  he  offered  to  prove  on  the 
trial  that  the  fractured  bone  was 
not  properly  set,  by  reason  either  of 
the  incompetency  and  negligence  of 
a  house  pupil  who  attended  him,  or 
of  the  negligence  of  the  attending 
surgeon.  The  defendant  was  a  pub- 
lic, charitable  institution,  organized 
under  the  statute,  and  deriving  its 
funds  from  legislative  grants,  and 
donations  and  bequests  from  private 
persons.  Held,  that  the  offer  was 
properly  refused,  and  a  direction  of  a 
verdict  for  defendant  was  not  error. 
s.  P.,  Downes  v.  Harper  Hospital,  101 
Mich.  555 ;  60  N.  W.  42  ;  William- 
son v.  Louisville  Reform  School,  95 
Ky.  251  :  24  S.  W.  1065.  In  New  York, 
the  doctrine  has  been  applied  to  the 
case  of  a  religious  corporation  organ- 
ized under  a  statute  providing  that  it 
shall  not  be  lawful  to  divert  the 
property  to  any  purpose  except  the 
support  of  an  object  connected  with 
the    denomination    to    which    such 


corporation  shall  belong.  Held,  it 
was  not  liable  for  the  negligence  of 
an  employee,  where  due  care 
was  used  in  his  selection  (Haas 
v.  Missionary  Soc.  6  N.  Y.  Misc. 
281  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  868).  The 
leading  English  case  is  Heriot's 
Hospital  v.  Ross  (12  CI.  &  Fin. 
507),  where  plaintiff  sought  to  re- 
cover damages  for  the  refusal  of  the 
trustees  of  the  hospital  (founded  for 
the  maintenance  and  education  of 
poor,  fatherless  boys)  to  admit  the 
plaintiff  to  its  benefits.  The  court 
below  held  the  plaintiff  eligible,  and 
the  action  well  brought.  But  the 
House  of  Lords,  on  appeal,  held  that 
the  action  would  not  lie.  Lord  Camp- 
bell said  :  "  It  seems  to  be  thought 
that  if  charity  trustees  are  guilty  of 
a  breach  of  trust,  the  persons  dam- 
nified have  a  right  to  be  indemnified 
out  of  the  trust  funds.  This  is  con- 
trary to  all  reason,  justice  and  com- 
mon sense.  The  trustees  would  in 
that  case  be  indemnified  against  the 
consequences  of  their  own  miscon- 
duct, and  the  real  object  of  the 
charity  would  be  defeated .  If  there 
has  been  a  wrong  committed  by  the 
charity  trustees  .  .  .  damages 
are  to  be  paid  from  the  pocket  of  the 
wrongdoer,  not  from  a  trust  fund." 


§ 


JJ 


INCORPORATED    PUBLIC   TRUSTEES. 


566 


corporation  exercising  a  public  function,  or  engaged  in  a  work 
of  charity,  if  its  operations  are  carried  on  for  the  private  gain 
of  its  members.  It  is  not  the  object  alone  of  a  corporation 
which  makes  it  charitable  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule ;  it  is 
the  mode  in  which  that  object  is  sought  to  be  attained  as  well 
as  the  purpose  for  which  it  is  pursued.2 


TheHeriot's  Hospital  case  was  relied 
upon,  however,  in  Boyd  v.  Insur- 
ance Patrol  (113  Pa.  St.  269),  where 
the  defendant  was  a  corporation 
whose  object,  declared  by  its  char- 
ter, was  to  "  protect  and  save  life 
and  property  in  or  contiguous  to 
burning  buildings,  and  to  remove 
and  take  charge  of  such  property  or 
any  part  thereof,  when  necessary." 
A  fire  occurring,  officers  of  the  Pa- 
trol, in  order  to  protect  the  property 
from  injury  by  water,  spread  tar- 
paulins upon  the  upper  floor  of  the 
building  ;  coming  a  few  days  after- 
wards to  remove  the  tarpaulins,  one 
of  the  officers  threw  them  from  the 
upper  story  to  the  sidewalk,  and  a 
passer-by  was  struck  and  killed. 
Held,  that  such  a  corporation,  in 
order  to  establish  its  exemption 
from  the  general  rule  of  a  mas- 
ter's liability  for  the  negligence  of  a 
servant,  must  show  (the  charter  be- 
ing silent  on  the  subject)  that  it  was, 


in  fact,  conducted  as  a  public  char- 
ity ;  that  its  services  were  gratui- 
tously rendered  to  the  public  for  the 
public  good  ;  and  that  the  charter 
alone  was  inadequate  for  that  pur- 
pose. Having  failed  to  do  so,  a  dis- 
missal of  the  complaint  on  the 
ground  of  such  exemption  was 
error. 

2  Per  Clark,  J.,  Boyd  v.  Insurance 
Patrol,  supra ;  Newcomb  v.  Boston 
Protective  Dep't,  151  Mass.  215  ;  24 
N.  E.  39.  But  the  facts  that  the 
corporation,  by  its  rules,  required 
patients  to  pay  for  their  board  ac- 
cording to  their  circumstances  and 
the  accommodation  they  received, 
and  that  no  person  had,  individually, 
a  right  to  demand  admission,  and 
that  the  trustees  were  to  determine 
who  were  to  be  received,  did  not 
render  it  the  less  a  public  charity 
(McDonald  v.  Mass.  Gen.  Hospital, 
supra ;  Gooch  v.  Asso.  for  Relief  of 
Aged  Females,  109  Mass.  558). 


PART  IV. 

PUBLIC    WAYS. 


Chapter  XV.  Highways. 

XVI.  Turnpike  Roads. 
XVII.  Bridges. 
XVIII.  Canals. 
XIX.  Construction  and  Maintenance  of  Rail- 
roads. 
XX.  Railroad  Injuries  to  Animals. 
XXI.  Railroad  Injuries  to  Persons. 


CHAPTER    XV. 


HIGHWAYS. 


i  332.  Highways  are  public  works.    §  344. 

333.  What  are  highways  within  the       345. 

rule. 

334.  WThen   liability  in  respect  to       346. 

highway  attaches. 
334a.  Obligation  dependent  on  ju-      347. 
risdiction  of  structure.  348. 

335.  Liability     pending    construc- 

tion of  way.  349. 

336.  When  obligation  ceases.  350. 

337.  No  common-law  duty  to  repair      351. 

highways.  352. 

338.  Statutory   liability  for  defec- 

tive ways.  353. 

339.  Implied  liability.  354. 

340.  Liability  of  road-officers. 

341.  Contract  obligations  to  repair.       355. 

342.  [Consolidated  with  §  359.] 

343.  Obligations  of  abutting  own-       356. 

ers  as  to  highway. 

T5671 


[Omitted.] 

Joint  and  several  liability  for 

defective  way. 
Defects    in     way    concurring 

with  other  causes. 
[Omitted.] 
Duty     to     rebuild     destroyed 

highway. 
[Consolidated  with  §  356.] 
What  are  statutory  ' '  defects. " 
Defects  in  margins  of  way. 
When  whole  width  must  be 

passable. 
Sidewalks  and  street-crossings. 
Overhanging  roofs,   awnings, 

trees,  etc. 
Objects  on  highway  likely  to 

frighten  horses. 
Duty  to  guard  and  light  de- 
fective highway. 


§33^] 


HIGHWAYS. 


56S 


§  357. 
358. 

359. 

360. 
361. 

362. 

363. 

364. 
365. 

366. 
367. 

368. 
369. 


[Consolidated  with  §  359.] 

Authorized  interference  with 
highway. 

Liability  of  licensee  of  use  of 
street. 

[Consolidated  with  §  359.] 

Obstructions  incident  to  build- 
ing operations. 

Obstructions  incident  to  traf- 
fic. 

Obstructions  from  natural 
causes. 

[Consolidated  with  §  363.] 

Individual  liability  for  wrong- 
ful obstruction. 

[Consolidated  with  §  367.] 

Ground  of  liability  for  defec- 
tive ways. 

Actual  notice  of  defect. 

When  notice  will  be  implied. 


§  370.  Who  may  maintain  action. 

371.  Damages  must  be  special. 

372.  [Omitted.] 

373.  Notice  of  injury   preliminary 

to  action. 

374.  Defenses. 

375.  Contributory  negligence. 

376.  Traveler's  knowledge  of  defect. 

377.  Care  required  in  traveling  at 

night. 

378.  Defect  in  plaintiff's  carriage, 

harness  or  horses. 

379.  Unskillful  or  improper  driving. 

380.  Negligent  stowing  and  exces- 

sive weight  of  load. 

381.  Sunday  traveling. 

382.  [Consolidated.] 

383.  [Consolidated.] 

384.  Action  over  against  third  per- 

son. 


§  332.  Highways  are  public  works. —  Highways  are  public 
works  for  the  use  of  the  public  at  large,  not  merely  for  the 
residents  of  the  particular  locality  in  which  they  lie,1  and  hence 
are  subject  to  the  paramount  control  of  the  state,2  which  may 
determine,  by  statute,  subject  to  constitutional  limitations, 
when  and  where,  on  what  plan,3  at  what  cost,  and  at  whose 
charge,4  they  shall  be  built,  and  the  uses  to  which  they  may  be 
put.5    Their  construction  and  subsequent  maintenance  in  repair 


1  Streets  belong  to  the  general  pub- 
lic, not  merely  to  the  local  public  of 
the  city  in  which  they  lie  (O'Con- 
nor v.  Pittsburgh,  18  Pa.  St.  187 
People  v.  Kerr,  27  N.  Y.  188;  Kane 
v.  N.  Y.  Elevated  R.  Co.,  125  Id.  164 
26  N.  E.  278;  Egerer  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  130  N.  Y.  108  ;  29  N.  E  95 
Thomas  v.  Brooklyn,  58  Iowa,  438) 

2  Perry  v.  New  Orleans,  etc.  R 
Co.,  55  Ala.  413 ;  and  cases  cited 
infra.  See  Dillon,  Municipal  Corp., 
§  656  et  seq. 

3  Litchfield  v.  Vernon,  41  N.  Y. 
123  ;  Matter  of  Sackett  Street,  74  Id. 
95:  Tifft  v.  Buffalo,  82  Id.  204; 
Thomas  v.  Leland,  24  Wend.  65  [an 
extreme  case]. 


4  State  v.  Williams,  68  Conn.  131 t 
and  cases  in  last  note. 

6  ' '  The  streets  of  a  city  are  not  the 
private  property  of  the  corporation 
in  such  a  sense  that  the  legislature 
cannot,  so  far  as  regards  the  cor- 
poration, authorize  the  same  to  be 
used  for  any  public  purpose  for 
which  it  may  seem  fit "  (per  Dillon, 
C.  J.,  Clinton  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  24  Iowa,  455).  "  There  is  no  sub- 
stantial difference  between  streets 
in  which  the  legal  title  is  in  private 
individuals,  and  those  in  which  it 
is  in  the  public,  as  to  the  rights  of 
the  public  therein  "  (Barney  v.  Keo- 
kuk, 94  U.  S.  324).  s.  P.,  Storm- 
feltz  v.  Manor  Turnpike  Co.,  13  Pa. 


569 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§332 


so  as  to  be  reasonably  safe  for  travel  are  usually  delegated 
by  the  state  to  local  government  agencies,  such  as  cities, 
towns,  counties,  road  districts,  or  particular  municipal  officers, 
under  statutes  which  either  impose  on  them  mandatory  duties 
in  respect  thereto,  or  else  confer  powers  of  control  from  which 
a  duty  to  use  ordinary  care  to  make  them  safe  for  travel  will  be 
implied.  Any  breach  of  such  duty,  express  or  implied, 
whether  by  nonfeasance  or  misfeasance,  is  a  public  offense,  for 
which  the  officer  or  corporation  owing  it  is  primarily  answer- 
able to  the  state  by  criminal  indictment.6  It  is  likewise  a 
criminal  offense,  punishable  by  indictment,  for  a  third  person 
to  encumber  or  obstruct  a  highway  without  authority.7  The 
extent  to  which  such  public  offenses,  — chargeable  either  to 
municipalities,  their  officers,  or  to  individuals, — will  sustain  a 
private  action  for  damages  suffered  thereby,  forms  the  subject 
of  this  chapter.  The  general  rule  governing  the  liability  of 
local  government  agencies  for  neglect  of  duty  in  the  construc- 


St.  555  ;  Plant  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co., 
10  Barb.  26).  The  legislature  may 
legalize  that  which  would  otherwise 
be  a  nuisance.  That  which  the  legis- 
lature constitutionally  (Leigh  v. 
Westervelt,  2  Duer,  618)  authorizes, 
as  the  erection  of  a  dam  on  a  navi- 
gable river  (Harris  v.  Thompson,  9 
Barb.  350),  or  building  a  railroad 
(People  v.  Kerr,  27  N.  Y.  188)  or 
sewer  (Brooks  v.  Boston,  19  Pick. 
174)  in  a  public  street,  cannot  be  a 
nuisance  per  se. 

6  Rex  v.  Stoughton,  2  Saund.  158; 
Commonwealth  v.  Newburyport, 
103  Mass.  129;  Commonwealth  v. 
Deer  field,  6  Allen,  449  ;  State  v.  Gor- 
haru,  37  Me.  451  ;  State  v.  Yarrell,  12 
Ired.  130 ;  State  v.  Murfreesboro,  11 
Humph.  217  ;  Chattanooga  v.  State,  5 
Sneed,  578  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Hop- 
kinsville,  7  B.  Monr.  38;  State  v. 
Shinkle,  40  Iowa   131. 

1  It  is  an  indictable  offense  for 
a  timber  merchant  to  cut  logs  in  the 
street  adjoining  his  lumber  yard  ; 
though  he  should  not  be  able  other- 
wise to  get  them  into  his  premises, 


or  to  carry  on  his  business  there. 
' '  He  is  not  to  eke  out  the  incon- 
venience of  his  own  premises  by  tak- 
ing in  the  public  highway  into  his 
timber  yard ;  and  if  the  street  be 
narrow,  he  must  remove  to  a  more 
commodious  situation  to  carry  on 
his  business  "  (per  Ld.  Ellenborou^h, 
Rex  v.  Jones,  3  Camp.  229) .  Nearly 
the  same  language  is  used  in  People 
v.  Cunningham,  1  Denio,  529.  S.  P., 
Commonwealth  v.  Milliman,  13  Serg. 
&  R.  403  [constable  making  sales 
under  execution  in  a  highway]  ; 
Hart  v.  Albany,  9  Wend.  571  [canal- 
boat  permanently  stationed  in  canal 
basin]  ;  State  v.  Laverack,  34  N.  J. 
Law,  201  [holding  unauthorized  mar 
ket  in  street].  The  unauthorized  con- 
struction of  a  railroad  across  a  high- 
way is  an  indictable  offence  (Com- 
monwealth v.  Nashua,  etc.  R.  Co., 
2  Gray,  54  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Ver- 
mont, etc.  R.  Co.,  4  Id.  22  ;  Common- 
wealth v.  Old  Colony,  etc.  R.  Co., 
14  Id.  93  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Erie, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  27  Pa.  St.  339).  s.  P., 
Washington    Natural    Gas    Co.    v. 


§333] 


HIGHWAYS. 


570 


tion    and    maintenance   of  their    public    works   is  stated   and 
illustrated  in  the  chapter  on  Municipal  Corporations.8 

§  333-  What  are  highways,  within  the  rule.  —  The  term 
"  highway  "  is  generic,  inclusive  of  all  public  ways,  and  means 
a  public  road  which  every  person  has  a  right  to  use  for  passage 
and  traffic.1  The  term  will,  therefore,  include  streets  in  cities,2 
footways  or  sidewalks,3  turnpikes,  plank-roads  and  bridges. 
These  different  kinds  of  highways  are  only  distinguished  from 
each  other  by  the  mode  of  their  use,  the  material  employed  in 


Wilkinson  [Penn.],  2  AtL  338;  Davis 
v.  New  York,  14  N.  Y.  506,  524. 

8  Chapter  XII,  ante. 

1  Per  Cooley,  J.,  Macomber  v. 
Nichols,  34  Mich.  212.  In  Holdane 
v.  Cold  Spring  (23  Barb.  102 ;  affi'd 
21  N.  Y.  474),  held,  notwithstanding 
a  dictum  to  the  contrary  in  Wiggins 
v.  Tallmadge  (11  Barb.  457),  that  it 
was  essential  to  a  public  right  or 
public  use  of  a  road  that  it  should 
be  a  thoroughfare,  or  open  at  both 
ends.  In  People  v.  Kingman  (24 
N.  Y.  559),  the  whole  question  was 
reviewed  by  Denio,  J.,  with  the  con- 
clusion that  it  is  not  essential  to  a 
highway,  either  at  common  law  or 
under  the  statute  of  New  York, 
that  it  be  a  thoroughfare.  This 
principle  was  adopted  in  Peckham 
v.  Lebanon  (39  Conn.  235).  See 
State  v.  Frazer,  28  Ind.  196  ;  Schatz 
v.  Pfiel,  56  Wise.  429.  This  is  un- 
doubtedly the  English  doctrine  on 
the  subject  (see  Bateman  v.  Bluck, 
14  Eng.  Law  &  Eq.  69  ;  21  Law 
J.  [N.  S.J  406).  The  mode  of  its 
creation,  whether  by  prescription, 
by  dedication,  or  under  the  right 
of  eminent  domain,  does  not,  in 
general,  determine  the  right  of 
the  public  therein  (People  v.  Loeh- 
felm,  102  N.  Y.  1;  5  N.  E.  783; 
Cohoes  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal  Co., 
134  N.  Y.  397  ;  31  N.  E.  887 ;  Pitts- 
hurgh,etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Commonwealth, 


104  Pa.  St.  583  ;  Stackpole  v.  Healy, 
16  Mass.  33  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Wil- 
kinson, 16  Pick,  175  ;  Washington 
Ice  Co.  v.  Lay,  103  Ind.  48  ;  2  N.  E. 
222 ;  State  v.  Proctor,  90  Mo.  334). 

2  Drake  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co.,  7 
Barb.  508  ;  Brace  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R. 
Co.,  27  N.  Y.  269,  271  ;  State  v.  Wil- 
kinson, 3  Vt.  480. 

3  Providence  v.  Clapp,  17  How.  U. 
S.  161  ;  McSherry  v.  Canandaigua, 
129  N.  Y.  612 ;  29  N.  E.  612  ;  Pom- 
frey  v.  Saratoga,  104  N.  Y.  459; 
Drake  v.  Lowell,  13  Mete.  293  ; 
Hixon  v.  Lowell,  13  Gray,  59 ; 
Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Boston,  140 
Mass.  87  ;  Tyler  v.  Sturdy,  108  Id. 
196;  Hall  v.  Manchester,  40  N. 
H.  410 ;  Manchester  v.  Hartford, 
30  Conn.  118 ;  Young  v.  Waterville, 
39  Minn.  196  ;  39  N.  W.  97  ;  Houfe 
v.  Fulton,  34  Wise.  608 ;  James  v. 
Portage,  48  Id.  375 ;  5  N.  W.  31  ; 
Cronin  v.  Delavan,  50  Wise.  677  ;  7 
N.  W.  249  ;  Taber  v.  Grafmiller,  109 
Ind.  206  ;  State  v.  Berdetta,  73  Id. 
185  ;  Debolt  v.  Carpenter,  31  Id.  355  ; 
Bloomington  v.  Bay,  42  111.  503  ; 
Himmelman  v.  Satterlee,  50  Cal. 
69.  A  foot-path  across  uninclosed 
commons,  held  not  a  sidewalk  (Goo- 
din  v.  Des  Moines,  55  Iowa,  671). 
Whether  a  sidewalk  is  a  part  of  the 
highway,  repairable  by  the  public,  is 
a  question  for  the  jury.  (Weare  v. 
Fitchburg,  110  Mass.  334). 


5/i 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§333 


their  construction,  or  by  the  manner  in  which  the  expense  of 
their  construction  and  maintenance  is  defrayed.  So  railroads,4 
canals,5  ferries,6  and  navigable  rivers7  have  been  declared  to  be 
public  highways.  The  public  have  likewise  a  right  to  travel 
on  the  ice  covering  a  public  river;  and  one  who  cuts  holes 
therein,  near  a  waterway  which  has  been  used  for  twenty 
years,  is  liable  in  damages  to  a  traveler  injured  thereby.8  But 
the  public  have,  at  common  law,  no  right  of  way  along  the 
margin  of  navigable  rivers,  except  as  acquired  by  express 
grant,9  or  prescription.  Public  piers,10  or  landing-places,11  pub- 
lic squares,  parks,12  etc.,  are  within  the  legal  definition  and  sub- 
ject to  the  principles  and  rules  applicable  to  highways. 


4  See  Beekman  v.  Saratoga,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  3  Paige,  45,  74;  Rex  v.  Severn, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  2  Barn.  &  Ad.  64G. 

5  A  canal  basin,  for  the  lading  and 
unlading  of  boats,  is  a  highway 
(Hart  v.  Albany,  3  Paige,  213  ;  Bar- 
nett  v.  Johnson,  15  N.  J.  Eq.  481). 
The  towing-path  of  a  canal  is  a  high- 
way for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
constructed  (per  Bayley,  J.,  Rex  v. 
Severn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2  Barn.  &  Ad. 
646,  648).     See  §  403,  post. 

6  See  Peter  v.  Kendall,  6  Barn.  & 
Cr.  703  ;  Garner  v.  Green,  8  Ala.  96  ; 
Pomeroy  v.  Donaldson,  5  Mo.  36 ; 
Cohen  v.  Hume,  1  McCord,  439.  In 
South  Carolina,  a  ferry  operated  by 
a  county  is  not  a  highway  within 
the  meaning  of  a  statute  making 
counties  liable  for  damages  caused 
by  defects  in  "  a  highway  "  (Chick 
v.  Newbury  county,  27  S.  C.  419  ;  3 
S.  E.  787). 

1  Georgetown  v.  Alexandria  Canal 
Co.,  12  Peters,  91  ;  Wilson  v.  Black- 
bird Creek  Co.,  2  Id.  245;  Hart  v. 
Hill.  1  Whart.  136  ;  Morgan  v.  King, 
35  N.  Y.  454;  Varick  v.  Smith,  9  Paige, 
547 ;  Scott  v.  Wilson,  3  N.  H.  321  ; 
Moor  v.  Veazie,  32  Me.  343  ;  Treat  v. 
Lord,  42  Id.  552;  Memphis  v.  Overton, 
3  Yerg.389;  Hogg  v.  Zanesville  Canal 
Co.,  5  Ohio,  410 ;  Lorman  v.  Benson, 
8  Mich.  18 ;   Moore  v.  Sanborne,    2 


Id.  519 ;  McManus  v.  Carmichael,  3 
Iowa,  1  ;  Rhodes  v.  Otis,  33  Ala.  578  ; 
Stuart  v.  Clark,  2  Swan,  9;  Dal- 
rymple  v.  Mead,  1  Grant,  197  ;  Post 
v.  Munn,  4  N.  J.  Law,  61 .  What 
use  of  the  stream  makes  it  a  public 
highway  is  one  of  fact  for  the  jury 
(Olive  v.  State,  86  Ala.  88  ;  5  So.  653). 
It  does  not  follow,  from  a  river  being 
a  highway,  that  land  appropriated 
from  its  bed  must  remain  a  highway 
(Wetmore  v.  Atl.  Lead  Co.,  37  Barb. 
70). 

8  French  v.  Camp,  18  Me.  433.  The 
doctrine  that  a  traveler  on  a  city 
street  may  rely  on  the  assumption 
that  the  streets  are  kept  safe,  is  not 
applicable  to  a  skater  on  a  water- 
highway,  as  against  one  having  the 
right  to  cut  ice  therefrom  (Sickles 
v.  N.J.  Ice  Co.,  153  N.  Y.  83  ;  rev'g 
80  Hun,  213). 

9  Ball  v.  Herbert,  3  T.  R.  253  ;  Led- 
yard  v.  Ten  Eyck,  36  Barb.  102.  It 
is  otherwise  by  the  civil  law  (Just. 
Inst.  L.  2,  tit.  1,  §4),  adopted  by  the 
Louisiana  Code. 

10  Wendell  v.  Baxter,  12  Gray,  494. 
See  Radway  v.  Briggs,  37  N.  Y.  256 ; 
People  v.  Lambier,  5  Denio,  9. 

"  Fowler  v.  Mott,  19  Barb.  204. 

12  Mayor  v.  Sheffield,  4  Wall.  189. 
"  If  a  way  is  used  for  passing  and 
repassing,  and  is  common  to  all  the 


§334] 


HIGHWAYS. 


5/2 


§  334-    When  liability  in  respect  to  highway  attaches.  — 

No  obligation  to  maintain  a  particular  highway  attaches  until 
it  is  shown  to  have  been  established  by  regular  legal  proceed- 
ings,1 or  by  user  and  acquiesence  for  a  sufficient  period,2  or  by 


people,  it  is  a  highway,  whether  it 
is  called  a  road,  street  or  public 
square"  (per  Prentiss,  C.  J.,  in  State 
v.  Wilkinson,  2  Vt.  480).  See  State 
v.  Atkinson,  24  Id.  459 ;  Common- 
wealth v.  Fisk,  8  Mete.  238  ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Bowman,  3  Pa.  St. 
203  ;  Watertown  v.  Cowen,  4  Paige, 
510. 

1  Page  v.  Weathersfield,  13  Vt.  424  ; 
Vermont  v.  Leicester,  33  Id.  653 ; 
Todd  v.  Rome,  2  Me.  55  ;  Haywood 
v.  Charlestown,  43  N.  H.  61 ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Low,  3  Pick.  408  ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Newbury,  2  Id. 
51  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Charlestown, 
1  Id.  180.  A  town  is  not  liable  for 
defects  in  a  foot- way  lying  out  of  the 
highway  limits,  though  used  by 
reason  of  its  neglect  to  repair  a 
bridge,  with  the  consent  of  the  land- 
owner, if  not  opened  according  to 
statute,  or  dedicated  to,  and  accepted 
by,  the  town  (Hyde  v.  Jamaica,  27 
Vt.  443  ;  Sampson  v.  Goochland,  5 
Gratt.  211).  Compare  Potter  v. 
Castleton,  53  Vt.  435  ;  Henderson  v. 
Davis,  106  N.  C.  88  ;  11  S.  E.  573. 

2  As  to  what  is  a  sufficient  period  of 
user,  the  rule  is  not  uniform  in  the 
different  states.  Immemorial  usage 
has  always  been  held  to  be  proof 
of  the  existence  of  a  highway 
(Commonwealth  v.  Low,  3  Pick. 
408  ;  Jones  v.  Andover,  9  Id.  146 ; 
Ward  v.  Folly,  5  N.  J.  Law,  482 ; 
Hampson  v.  Taylor,  15  R.  I.  83;  8 
Atl.  331  ;  23  Id.  732),  and,  as  a 
general  rule,  the  use  of  a  road 
for  twenty  years  or  more  is  evi- 
dence, in  most  of  the  states,  of  its 
being  a  public  highway  (Matter  of 
Bridge,  100  N.  Y.  642  :  3  N  E.  679  ; 
Hull  v.  Richmond.  2  Woodb.  &  M. 
337;   Smith  v.   Northumberland,    36 


N.  H.  38  ;  Hall  v.  Manchester,  39  Id. 
295  ;  Chadwick  v.  McCausland,  47 
Me.  342  ;  Williams  v.  Cummington, 
18  Pick.  312).  Twenty  years'  user  ia 
conclusive  in  Wisconsin  (Lemon  v. 
Hayden,  13  Wise.  159  ;  Wyman  v. 
State,  Id.  663)  ;  but  it  must  be  adverse 
(State  v.  Joyce,  19  Wise.  90).  In  Ver- 
mont and  Illinois,  a  less  period  seems 
sufficient  (Whitney  v.  Essex,  42  Vt. 
520  ;  see  Champaign  v.  Patterson,  50 
111.  62).  In  New  Y^ork,  twelve  years' 
user  has  been  held  prima  facie  evi- 
dence that  the  highway  was  open  by 
authority  (Colden  v.  Thurber,  2 
Johns.  424).  In  Maine,  ten  years' 
user  is  not  sufficient  to  oblige  a  town 
to  keep  it  in  repair  (Estes  v.  Troy,  5 
Me.  368) ,  though  twenty  years'  user 
is  (Todd  v.  Rome,  2  Me.  55;  Souther- 
land  v.  Jackson,  30  Id.  462).  In  Mas- 
sachusetts, the  fact  that  the  owner 
of  land  on  a  highway  had  erected  a 
building  or  solid  Avail  standing  back 
from  the  highway  and  that  the  strip 
between  such  building  or  wall  and 
the  highway  had  been  used  by  the 
public  for  more  than  twenty  years, 
was  held  not  conclusive  evidence 
that  the  strip  has  become  a 
part  of  the  highway  (Fall  River 
Works  v.  Fall  River,  110  Mass.  428). 
As  to  highways  becoming  such  by 
prescription,  see  Stockwell  v.  Fitch- 
burg,  110  Mass.  305.  In  Pennsylva- 
nia, fifteen  years'  acquiescence  in 
abutting  owner's  changing  street 
grade,  will  bind  city  (Jones  v.  WTes- 
terhausen,  131  Pa.  St.  62 ;  18  Atl. 
1072).  In  Kansas,  the  mere  use  of 
vacant  land  by  individuals  as  a 
road,  for  more  than  fifteen  years i 
does  not  constitute  a  highway  (State 
v.  Horn,  35  Kans.  717). 


573 


HIGHWAY-. 


[§  334 


dedication  and  acceptance,3  and  has  been  actually  opened  for 
public  use.4  Its  character  as  a  public  highway,  when  collater- 
ally raised,  as  in  an  action  for  its  negligent  maintenance,  is 
sufficiently  shown,  so  as  to  shift  the  burden  of  proof,5  by  the 


3  As  to  what  constitutes  a  valid 
dedication,  and  a  sufficient  accept- 
ance, see  Morgan  v.  Railroad  Co.,  96 
U.  S.  716  ;  Cook  v.  Harris,  61  N.  Y. 
448  ;  Spier  v.  New  Utrecht,  121  Id. 
4'20  ;  24  N.  E.  692  ;  Wilder  v.  St. 
Paul,  12  Minn.  192  ;  Downer  v.  St. 
Paul,  etc.  R.  Co.,  23  Id.  271  ;  Red- 
wood Cemetery  v.  Bandy,  93  Ind. 
240  ;  Indianapolis  v.  Kingsbury,  101 
Id.  201 ;  Tucker  v.  Conrad,  103  Id.  349; 
2  N.  E  803  ;  Fisk  v.  Havana,  88  111. 
208  ;  State  v.  Welpton,  34  Iowa,  144  ; 
Edenville  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  77 
Id.  69 ;  41  N.  W.  568  ;  Gamble  v. 
St.  Louis,  12  Mo.  617;  Elizabeth- 
town,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Combs,  10  Bush, 
382 :  Denver  v.  Clements,  3  Colo. 
484  ;  Lamar  county  v.  Clements,  49 
Tex.  347  ;  Indianapolis  v.  McClure, 
2  Ind.  147 ;  Milwaukee  v.  Davis,  6 
Wise.  377.  The  mere  removal  of  a 
fence  by  the  owner  of  land  so  as  to 
leave  it  open,  does  not  operate  as  a 
dedication  of  the  land  as  a  highway; 
an  intent  so  to  dedicate  and  accept- 
ance by  the  public  are  both  essential 
to  such  dedication(Rozell  v.  Andrews, 
103  N.  Y.  150  ;  8  N.  E.  513 ;  Murphy 
v.  Brooklyn,  118  N.  Y.  575  ;  23  N.  E. 
887).  To  the  same  effect,  Harding 
v.  Hale,  61  111.  192.  In  Donahue  v. 
State  (112  N.  Y.  142  ;  19  N.  E.  419), 
the  state  constructed  a  feeder  on  its 
land  for  a  canal,  covered  with  tim- 
bers and  several  feet  of  earth.  Its 
surface  was  used  by  the  public  as  a 
highway  for  more  thantwenty  years, 
but  was  never  laid  out  as  a  street. 
Held,  no  legal  dedication  to  the  pub- 
lic could  be  inferred  by  prescription. 

4  Hutson  v.  New  York,  5  Sandf. 
289.  302.  See  Southerland  v.  Jack- 
son. 30  Me.  462,  per  Wells,  J.     Any 


question  as  to  the  utility  of  the  road 
is  not  to  be  regarded  (Washington 
Ice  Co.  v.  Lay,  103  Ind.  48  ;  2  N.  E. 
222) .  See  cases  cited  in  note  6,  infra. 
5  Logan  v.  People  [Ind.]  6  N.  E. 
475.  Where  a  town  has  taken  charge 
of  a  public  way,  and  regulated  it  in 
the  same  manner  as  other  highways, 
it  cannot,  when  sued  for  defects  in 
the  way,  defend  by  alleging  an 
original  want  of  authority  to  estab- 
lish the  way  as  a  highway,  or  the 
want  of  statutory  formalities  in  lay- 
ing it  out  (Mayor  v.  Sheffield,  4  Wall. 
189  ;  Houfe  v.  Fulton,  34  Wise.  608 
Stark  v.  Lancaster,  57  N.  H.  88 
Haywood  v.  Charlestown,  43  Id.  61 
State  v.  Raymond,  27  Id.  383  ;  Aurora 
v.  Colshire,  55  Ind.  484  ;  Aston  v. 
Newton,  134  Mass.  507).  A  failure 
to  have  the  road  recorded,  if  it  has 
actually  been  dedicated  and  accepted 
by  public  user,  is  immaterial  (Driggs 
y.  Phillips,  103  N.  Y.  77;  8  N.  E. 
514).  The  duty  of  keeping  a  public 
street  in  a  safe  condition  does  not  in 
the  least  depend  upon  hoiv  the  street 
became  a  public  highway  (Phelps  v. 
Mankato,  23  Minn.  276).  Where  a 
street  had  been  open  to  its  full  width 
for  forty  years,  was  extensively  used 
by  the  public;  the  sidewalk  had  been 
laid  out  and  used  during  all  of  that 
time  ;  water-mains  had  been  laid 
through  the  street;  and  curb-stones 
had  been  placed  along  the  sidewalks 
at  the  expense  of  the  village ;  Held ,  t  he 
jury  could  properly  find  that  the 
street,  for  its  whole  width,  was  le- 
gally one  of  the  streets  of  the  village 
(Pomfrey  v.  Saratoga  Springs,  104 
N.  Y.  459;  11  N.  E.  43;  Cook  v.  Harris, 
61  N.  Y.  448;  People  v.  Loehfelm,  102 
Id.  1).    Adoption  by  ordinance  is  not 


334] 


HIGHWAYS. 


574 


facts  that  it  has  been  opened,  and  the  public  permitted  or 
invited  to  use  it  for  travel,6  though  the  work  is  only  partially- 
finished.7  Where  the  facts  that  a  town  has  paid  for  a  road  or 
bridge,8  or  has  repaired  it  from  time  to  time,9  are  relied  on  to 


essential  (Seymour  v.  Salamanca, 
137  N.  Y.  364  ;  33  N.  E.  304  ;  Walker 
v.  Pt.  Pleasant,  49  Mo.  App.  244), 
unless  required  by  statute  (Imperial 
v.  Wright,  34  Neb.  732  ;  52  N.  W. 
374).  A  statutory  requirement  that 
every  dedicated  street  shall  be  ac- 
cepted by  an  ordinance  passed  for 
such  purpose,  does  not  forbid  the 
assumption  of  control,  without  the 
acceptance  by  ordinance  (Byerly  v. 
Anamoso,  79  Iowa,  204;  44  N.  W.  359). 
6  Ivory  v.  Deerpark,  116  N.  Y. 
476  ;  22  N.  E.  1080 ;  Schafer  v.  New 
York,  12  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  384;  Brad- 
bury v.  Benton,  69  Me.  194  ;  Kling 
v.  Kansas  City,  27  Mo.  App.  231; 
Garnett  v.  Slater,  56  Id.  207;  Waxa- 
hachie  v.  Connor,  [Tex.  Civ.  App.] 
35  S.  W.  692.  An  indictment,  and 
conviction  thereon,  against  a  town  for 
the  non-repair  of  a  highway  is  very 
strong,  if  not  conclusive,  evidence 
that  such  a  highway  has  been 
adopted  by  the  town  (Blodgett  v. 
Royalton,  14  Vt.  288).  Putting  a 
highway  in  the  rate  bills,  expending 
money  thereon  and  shutting  up  the 
old  road,  are  proofs  of  adoption 
(Tower  v.  Rutland,  56  Vt.  28).  A 
village  having  permitted  a  sidewalk, 
unsafe  in  construction  and  built 
without  its  authority,  to  remain  for 
a  year,  Held,  liable  for  its  unsafe 
condition  (Saulsbury  v.  Ithaca,  94  N. 
Y.  27).  So  where  a  city  passed  an 
ordinance  to  construct  a  sidewalk, 
where  the  adjacent  land-owners  had 
laid  a  plank  walk,  the  city  is  liable 
for  a  defect  in  the  plank  walk 
(Oliver  v.  Kansas  City,  69  Mo.  79). 
A  town  is  liable  for  injuries  from 
a  defect  in  a  bridge  which  had 
formerly  been  a  toll-bridge,  but  had 


been  permitted  to  remain  open  for  a 
year  as  a  part  of  the  ordinary  line 
of  travel  (Bradbury  v.  Benton,  69 
Me.  194).  See  cases  cited  under  note 
4,  supra. 

7  Seymour  v.  Salamanca,  137  N.  Y. 
364  ;  33  N.  E.  304  ;  Schafer  v.  New 
York,  12  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  3S4  ;  and 
cases  cited  under  next  section. 

8  Bliss  v.  Deerfield,  13  Pick.  102  ; 
Davis  v.  Jackson,  61  Mich.  530;  28 
N.  W.  526. 

9  Rex  v.  Leake,  5  Barn.  &  Ad.  469, 
482  ;  Triese  v.  St.  Paul,  36  Minn.  526  ; 
32  N.  W.  857  ;  Greenberg  v.  Kings- 
ton, 67  Hun,  653  ;  22  N.  Y.  Supp. 
511  ;  Goshen  v.  Myers,  119  Ind.  196  ; 
21  N.  E.  657  ;  Phillips  v.  Huntington, 
35  W.  Va.  406  ;  14  S.  E.  17.  Reso- 
lution of  common  council,  after  the 
accident,  directing  the  removal  of 
the  alleged  defect  (Sewell  v.  Cohoes, 
75  N.  Y.  45)  or  repairs,  without  reso- 
lution (Clapper  v.  Waterford,  62 
Hun,  170;  16  N.  YT.  Supp.  640),  are 
competent  to  show  control.  To 
same  effect,  Brennan  v.  St.  Louis,  92 
Mo.  482  ;  2  S.  W.  481 ;  Folsom  v. 
Underbill,  36  Vt.  580  ;  Whitney  v. 
Essex,  42  Id.  520 ;  Hayden  v.  Attle- 
borough,  7  Gray,  338 ;  Kellogg  v. 
Northampton,  8  Id.  504  ;  Common- 
wealth v.  Petersham,  4  Pick.  119  ; 
Codner  v.  Bradford,  3  Pinney,  259  ; 
Milwaukee  v.  Davis,  6  Wise.  377  ; 
Champaign  v.  Patterson,  50  111.  62 ; 
Springfield  Milling  Co.  v.  Lane 
county,  5  Oreg.  265  ;  Munn  v.  Pitts* 
burgh,  40  Pa.  St.  364  [case  of  a 
sewer]  ;  Kennedy  v.  Cumberland, 
65  Md.  514  ;  9  Atl.  234  ;  Wallace  v. 
Evans,  43  Kans.  509  ;  23  Pac.  596. 
In  Maine  and  Massachusetts,  the 
statute  provides  that  a  town  which 


575 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§334 


show  its  public  character  and  the  town  s  responsibility  there- 
for, it  is  competent  to  show  that  the  repairs  were  begun  and 
continued  under  a  mistaken  belief  that  it  was  the  town's  duty 
to  do  so,10  or  that,  at  the  time  the  repairs  were  made,  the  duty 
of  making  them  was  owing  exclusively  by  another  town  or  a 
private  person.11  It  is  no  excuse  for  permitting  an  obstruction 
to  remain  in  a  street,  that  the  obstruction  existed  before  the 
street  came  under  the  control  of  the  defendant.12  Whether 
there  has  been  a  common-law  dedication  and  adoption  13  of  a 
highway,  or  whether  any  part  of  it  has  been  opened  or  closed  14 
to  the  public  are  generally  questions  for  the  jury.  In  western 
cities,  streets  are  often  laid  out  for  future  rather  than  for  present 
use ;  and  the  courts  of  Missouri  have  held  that  all  a  city 
is  bound  to  do,  in  such  cases,  is  to  see  that,  as  the  streets  are 


has  made  repairs  upon  a  highway  at 
any  time  within  six  years,  cannot 
be  heard  to  deny  the  location  thereof, 
in  an  action  against  it  for  injuries 
caused  by  its  non-repair. 

10  Rex  v.  Edmonton,  1  Mood.  & 
R.  24. 

11  The  fact  that  a  village  has  occa- 
sionally made  slight  repairs  upon  a 
bridge  which  the  town  is  bound  to 
maintain,  will  not  relieve  the  town 
from  liability  (Spearbracker  v.  Larra- 
bee,  64  Wise.  573  ;  25  N.  W.  555). 
As  to  duty  of  town  with  respect  to 
an  abandoned  turnpike,  see  Reed  v. 
Cornwall,  27  Conn.  48;  Barton  v. 
Montpelier,  30  Vt.  650 ;  Bryant  v. 
Biddeford,  39  Me.  193. 

12  Nelson  v.  Canisteo,  100  N.  Y.  89  ; 
2N.  E.  473  [a  hatchway  projecting 
over  a  sidewalk].  When  municipal 
boundaries  are  extended  so  as  to 
take  in  other  territory,  the  corpora- 
tion is  under  the  same  obligation 
with  respect  to  the  streets  of  the  an- 
nexed district  as  of  other  parts  of  its 
territory  (Richards  v.  New  York,  48 
N.  Y.  Superior,  315;  Hanley  v.  Hun- 
tington, 37  W.  Va.  578  ;  10  S.  E.  807  ; 
Wabasha  R.  Co.  v.  Defiance,  10  Ohio 


Cir.  Ct.  27).  The  city  continued  to 
treat  as  a  highway  a  county  road 
through  land  annexed  to  the  city. 
Held  a  public  highway,  although 
never  formally  accepted  as  such 
(Steubenville  v.  King,  23  Ohio  St. 
610).  s.  P.,  Scranton  v.  Catterson,  94 
Pa.  St.  202  [water-plug  placed  in  a 
street  by  a  water  company  prior  to 
the  city's  incorporation  :  city  liable]  ; 
Mead  v.  Derby,  40  Conn.  205  [town 
liable  for  road,  though  lying  within 
a  chartered  borough]. 

13  Flack  v.  Green  Island,  122  N.  Y. 
107  ;  25  N.  E.  267  ;  Eastland  v.  Fogo, 
58  Wise.  274  ;  16  N.  W.  632  ;  Ward  v. 
Farwell,  6  Colo.  66  ;  Harding  v.  Jas- 
per, 14  Cal.  643.  Whether  a  public 
highway,  which  has  become  such  by 
user,  extended  outside  of  the  traveled 
path,  is  for  the  jury  (Lawrence  v. 
Mount  Vernon,  35  Me.  100). 

14  Clapper  v.  Waterford,  62  Hun, 
170  ;  16  N.  Y.  Supp.  640.  See  Pitten- 
ger  v.  Hamilton,  85  Wise.  356  ;  Det- 
wiler  v.  Lansing,  95  Mich.  484 ;  55 
N.  W.  361  ;  55  Id.  423 ;  Hunter  v. 
Weston,  111  Mo.  176 ;  19  S.  W.  1098  ; 
Austin  v.  Ritz,  72  Tex.  391;  9  S.  W. 
884. 


§  334*1 


HIGHWAYS. 


576 


required   for  use,  they  shall  be  placed   in  a  reasonably  safe 
condition.15 


§  334a.  Obligation  dependent  onjurisdiction  of  structure. — 

The  fact  that  the  technical  fee  of  a  road-bed  is  not 
vested  in  the  municipality  within  which  it  lies,  in  no  way 
affects  the  corporation's  responsibility  for  defects  therein,1 
or  its  right  to  prosecute  third  persons,  civilly  and  criminally, 
for  unlawfully  obstructing  the  highway,2  provided  it  had  legal 
control  and  jurisdiction  of  the  structure3  at  the  time  of  the 
injury;4  though  exclusive  control  is  not  essential.3  Where  a 
town  has  no  control  of,  or  right  to  interfere  with,  a  structure, 
e.g.,  a  canal-bridge  belonging  to  and  built  on  land  of  the  state, 
it  is  not  answerable  for  defects  therein,  though  used  by  the 
public  as  a  highway,  in  continuation  of  its  own  streets  within 
its  territorial  limits.  The  owner's  mere  acquiescence  in  such 
public  use  of  the  structure  imposes  no  duty  upon  the  town  to 


15  Tritz  v.  Kansas  City,  84  Mo.  632  ; 
Bassett  v.  St.  Joseph,  53  Id.  290; 
Brown  v.  Glasgow,  57  Id.  157;  Craig 
v.  Sedalia,  63  Id.  417. 

1  A  city  which  maintains  a  side- 
walk partly  on  the  highway  and 
partly  on  abutting  land,  is  bound  to 
repair  both  parts  (Jewhurst  v.  Syr- 
acuse, 108  N.  Y.  303 ;  15  N.  E.  409). 
s.  P.,  Will  v.  Mendon  [Mich.],  66  N. 
W.  58  ;  Roodhouse  v.  Christian,  55 
111.  App.  107.  The  fact  that  a  town- 
bridge  over  a  street  is  on  the  right  of 
way  of  a  railroad  company  whose 
duty  it  is  to  keep  it  in  repair  will  not 
relieve  the  town  (Fowler  v.  Straw- 
berry Hill,  74  Iowa,  644  ;  38  N.  W. 
521). 

*  A  town  lias  such  an  interest  in 
the  maintenance  of  its  bridges  as  will 
sustain  a  recovery  by  it  for  their  in- 
jury or  destruction  (Bidelman  v. 
State,  110  N.  Y.  232;  18  N.  E.  115: 
Covington  v.  United  States,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  8  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  223  ;  40  N. 
Y.  Supp.  313).  s.  P.,  People  v.  Van- 
derbilt,  26  N.  Y.  287 ;   O'Connor  v. 


Pittsburgh,  18  Pa.  St.  187  ;  State  v. 
Atkinson,  24  Vt.  448  ;  State  v.  Mor- 
ris, etc.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  J.  Law,  360; 
People  v.  Jackson,  7  Mich.  432 ; 
Shawbut  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  R  Co.,  21 
Minn.  502  ;  Columbus  v.  Jacques,  30 
Ga.  506. 

3  A  city  is  not  answerable  for  a 
defective  sidewalk,  outside  of  the 
limits  of  a  street,  and  not  built  by 
the  city,  nor  under  its  control  (Jew- 
burst  v.  Syracuse,  108  N.  Y.  303 ;  15 
N.  E.  409).  See  cases  cited  under 
§  356,  post.  Compare  Mansfield  v. 
Moore,  124  111.  133;  16  N.  E.  246; 
Chadron  v.  Glover,  43  Neb.  732 ;  62 
N.  W.  62. 

4  The  fact  that  after  defendant 
town's  commissioners  were  elected, 
but  before  the  accident,  part  of  the 
town  was  incorporated  into  a  city, 
does  not  render  the  city  liable  for  a 
defective  highway  (Embler  v.  Wall- 
kill.  132  N.  Y.  222 ;  30  N.  E.  404). 
See  Barton  v.  McDonald,  81  Cal.  265  ; 
22  Pac.  855. 

5  Cases  cited  in  note  3,  supra. 


577 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§335 


remedy  a  structural  defect  therein.6  Such  a  case  is  to  be  dis- 
tinguished from  one  where  the  town  itself  actually  appropriates 
a  strip  of  land  belonging  to  the  state  within  the  municipal 
limits,  to  the  use  of  a  public  street,  taking  charge  of  it,  regu- 
lating and  paving  it.  It  cannot  excuse  itself  for  defects  therein 
on  the  plea  that  it  had  not  obtained  title  to  the  land  or 
legally  laid  it  out  as  a  street,7  or  that  it  did  not  build  the  way 
originally.8 

§  335-  Liability  pending  construction  of  way.  —  Responsi- 
bility for  the  condition  of  a  highway  begins  the  moment  the 
way  is  actually  opened  for  public  travel,1  though  the  time 
allowed  by  statute  for  its  construction  may  not  have  expired.2 
It  is  the  opening  of  the  road  to  the  public  use,  and  not  the 
expiration  of  the  period  allowed  for  its  completion,  which 
determines  the  commencement  of  any  liability  for  its  unsafe 
condition.  Hence  a  town  is  not  liable  for  a  defective  road, 
even  after  the  time  limited  for  its  completion,  provided  the 
public  was  notified,  by  barriers  or  other  sufficient  means,  that 
the  way  was  not  open  for  public  use.3  Where  the  making  of 
the  entire  road   is  a  condition   precedent  to    any  part    of    it 


6  Carpenter  v.  Cohoes,  81  N.  Y.  21  ; 
Veeder  v.  Little  Falls,  100  Id.  343  ;  3 
N.  E.  306. 

7  Sewell  v.  Cohoes,  75  N.  Y.  45  ; 
distinguishing  Albany  v.  Cunliff,  2 
Id.  165.  See,  to  the  same  effect, 
Schomer  v.  Rochester,  15  Abb.  N. 
Cas.  57  ;  Mayor  v.  Sheffield,  4  Wall. 
189. 

8  Saulsbury  v.  Ithaca,  94  N.  Y.  27  ; 
Law  v.  Kingsley,  82  Hun,  76  ;  31  N. 
Y.  Supp.  88  ;  Lambert  v.  Pembroke, 
66  N.  H.  280;  23  Atl.  81;  Flora  v. 
Naney,  136  111.  45;  26  N.  E.  645; 
Chicago  v.  Martin,  95  111.  241  ; 
Aurora  v.  Bitner,  100  Ind.  396  ;  Ful- 
ler v.  Jackson.  82  Mich.  480  ;  46  N. 
W.  721;  Face  v.  Ionia,  90  Mich.  104  ; 
51  N.  W.  184 ;  Weber  v.  Creston,  75 
Iowa,  16;  39  N.  W.  126  ;  Shannon  v. 
Tama  City,  74  Iowa,  22 ;  36  N.  W. 
776  ;  Chapman  v.  Milton,  31  W.  Va. 
384  ;  7  S.  E.  22  ;  Hill  v.  Fond  du  Lac, 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  II  —  37] 


56  Wise.  242  ;  14  N.  W.  25  ;  McDon- 
ald v.  Ashland,  78  Wise.  251;  47  N. 
W.  434;  Kinney  v.  Tekemah,  30 
Neb.  605  ;  46  N.  W.  835  ;  Young  v. 
Waterville.  39  Minn.  196  ;  39  N.  W. 
97  ;  Graham  v.  Albert  Lea,  48  Minn. 
201  ;  50  N.  W.  1108 ;  Rosedale  v. 
Golding,  55  Kans.  167 ;  40  Pac.  284 ; 
Topeka  v.  Sherwood,  39  Kans.  690 ; 
18  Pac.  933.     See  §  345,  post. 

1  Nelson  v.  Canisteo,  100  N.  Yr.  89  ; 
2  N.  E .  473  ;  Seymour  v.  Salamanca, 
137  N.  Y.  364;  33  N.  E.  304.  S.  P., 
Sewell  v.  Cohoes,  75  N.  Y.  45; 
Saulsbury  v.  Ithaca,  94  Id.  27  ;  and 
cases  cited  in  notes  4  and  6,  §  334, 
ante. 

2  Blaisdell  v.  Portland,  39  Me.  113  ; 
Bradbury  v.  Benton,  69  Id.  194.  See 
Bliss  v.  Deerfield,  13  Pick.  102. 

3Drury  v.  Worcester,  21  Pick.  44  ; 
Lowell  v.  Moscow,  12  Me.  300. 


§336] 


HIGHWAYS. 


57& 


becoming  a  highway,  reparable  by  the  public,  no  liability 
attaches  until  the  whole  road  is  completed  ;  and  where  only  a 
part  of  it  is  completed,  the  district  in  which  such  completed 
part  lies  is  not  liable  for  its  non-repair.4 

§  336.  When  obligation  ceases. — The  obligation  of  a 
town  to  maintain  a  highway  in  repair  ceases  on  the  discon- 
tinuance of  the  road  as  a  highway,1  or  on  the  transfer  of 
the  road  to,  and  the  assumption  of  the  duty  of  its  repair  by, 
another,  under  a  lawful  authority,2  as  when  a  plank-road  is  laid 
upon  a  highway  by  a  private  corporation,  taking  toll.     The 


4  Rex  v.  Cumberworth,  3  Barn.  & 
Ad.  108.  In  Pennsylvania,  one  who 
obstructs  a  road  approved  of  by  the 
court,  though  only  partially  opened, 
is  liable  to  the  penalty  under  the 
statute  (Calder  v.  Chapman,  8  Pa. 
St.  522).  In  New  York,  a  highway 
has  not  been  "opened  and  worked 
within  six  years  from  the  time  of  its 
being  so  laid  out,"  within  the  mean- 
ing of  L.  1861,  ch.  311  unless  it  has 
been  opened  over  its  entire  route, 
and  worked  sufficiently  to  be  pass- 
able for  public  travel  (Beckwith  v. 
Whalen,  70  N.  Y.  430).  But  when 
about  one-half  of  the  length  of  a  road, 
as  laid  out,  was  opened  and  worked 
60  as  to  be  passable  for  teams,  and 
was  placed  in  a  road  district,  and 
the  adjoining  owners  were  assessed 
for  labor  thereon,  held,  a  highway, 
though  the  other  half  had  never 
been  opened  or  worked  (Vandemark 
v.  Porter,  40  Hun,  397).  Compare 
Horey  v.  Haverstraw,  124  N.  Y.  273  ; 
26  N.  E.  532. 

1  And  this,  although  the  road, 
after  its  discontinuance,  was  re- 
Paired  by  the  town  surveyor  (Tinker 
v.  Russell,  14  Pick.  279;  and  see 
State  v.  Broyles,  1  Bailey,  Law,  135). 
Notice  of  discontinuing  a  road  need 
not  be  given  under  the  Vermont 
statute  (Ex  parte  Bostwick,  1  Aik. 
216).     In  New  York,  highways  dis- 


used for  six  years  cease  to  be  high- 
ways (L.  1861,  ch.  311  ;  see  Amsbey 
v.  Hinds,  46  Barb.  622  ;  Drake  v. 
Rogers,  3  Hill,  604).  The  statute 
applies  to  a  street  in  a  village  (Ex- 
celsior Brick  Co.  v.  Haverstraw,  142 
N.  Y.  146;  36  N.  E.  819).  It  does 
not  follow  that  because  a  portion  of 
that  which  was  originally  laid  out 
as  a  continuous  highway  remains 
such  that  all  of  it  does.  If  a  part 
of  it  cease  to  be  traveled  and  used 
for  a  period  of  six  years,  the  public 
in  the  meantime  using  some  other 
route,  such  part  is  no  longer  a  high- 
way (Horey  v.  Haverstraw,  124  N. 
Y.  273 ;  26  N.  E.  532). 

2  A  highway  once  established  does 
not  cease  to  be  such  until  it  has  been 
discontinued  by  the  proper  authori- 
ties ;  the  occupation  of  it  by  an  in- 
dividual is  a  nuisance,  and  though 
it  continues  twenty  years,  it  does 
not  give  him  title  (Driggs  v.  Phillips, 
103  N.  Y.  77  ;  8  N.  E.  514) ;  but  if 
such  occupation  be  acquiesced  in 
for  twenty  years,  it  will  create  such 
a  presumption  of  abandonment  by 
the  public  authorites  as  may  estop 
them  from  prosecuting  for  obstruct- 
ing the  highway  (Hamilton  v.  State, 
106  Ind.  364  ;  7  N.  E.  9).  As  to  what 
will  operate  as  an  abandonment  of 
highway,  see  Peoria  v.  Johnston,  56 
111.  45  ;  Gilbraith  v.  Littiech,  73  Id. 


579 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§337 


town  in  which  it  lies  then  ceases  to  be  responsible  for  its  defects.3 
But  in  such  case,  the  substitution  must  be  completed  before 
the  liability  of  the  town  ceases,  and,  in  the  meantime,  the  duty 
of  maintaining  the  highway  rests  upon  the  town.4  It  is  gen- 
erally held  that  the  erection  of  a  municipality  within  a  town- 
ship or  county  ousts,  ipso  facto,  the  county  or  township  officers 
of  jurisdiction  over  existing  highways  within  the  corporate 
limits,  and   hence   terminates  its  responsibility  therefor.5 

§  337-  No  common-law  duty  to  repair  highways.  —  At 
common  law,  no  action  would  lie  for  an  injury  caused  by  the 
non-repair  of  a  highway.1     The  duty  of  constructing  and  main- 


210 ;  Jeffersonville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
O'Connor,  37  Ind.  95 ;  Davies  v. 
Huebner,  45  Iowa,  574 ;  Lathrop  v. 
Central,  etc.  R.  Co.,  69  Id.  105.  As 
to  what  will  not,  see  Hughes  v. 
Bingham,  135  N.  Y.  347 ;  32  N.  E. 
78;  State  v.  Culver,  65  Mo.  607; 
Watkins  v.  Lynch,  71  Cal.  21  ;  11 
Pac.  808  ;  McRose  v.  Bottyer,  81  Id. 
122 ;  22  Pac.  393 ;  Reilly  v.  Racine, 
51  Wise.  526  ;  8  N.  W.  417  ;  Law- 
renceburgh  v.  Wesler,  10  Ind.  App. 
153  ;  37  N.  E.  956.  A  town,  bound  to 
keep  a  road  in  repair,  cannot  escape 
from  its  obligation  by  turning  over 
the  control  of  the  road  to  other  local 
authorities  (Mechanicsburg  v.  Mere- 
dith, 54  111.  84). 

3  Davis  v.  Lamoille  Plank  Road 
Co.,27Vt.  602;  but  compare  Reed 
v.  Cornwall,  27  Conn.  48.  County 
commissioners  permitted  a  railroad 
company  to  occupy  a  highway  for 
thirty  years,  the  cuts  and  fills  in 
some  places  covering  the  entire  way, 
and  the  authorities  exercised  no 
supervision  over  it,  and  the  public 
did  not  usually  travel  it.  Held,  that 
a  finding  that  it  was  abandoned  as  a 
highway  was  justified,  and  the  com- 
pany should  maintain  the  fences 
(Louisville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Shanklin, 
98  Ind.  573). 


4  Barber  v.  Essex,  27  Vt.  62  ;  and 
cases  cited  under  §  358,  post. 

5  Ottawa  v.  Walker,  21  111.  605  ; 
Knowles  v.  Muscatine,  20  Iowa,  248  ; 
McCullom  v.  Blackhavvk  county,  21 
Id.  409  ;  Baldwin  v.  Green,  10  Mo. 
410  ;  Pope  v.  Commissioners,  etc.,  12 
Rich.  Law  (S.  C),  407;  State  v. 
Jones,  18  Tex.  874  ;  and  cases  cited 
in  note  12,  §  334,  ante.  Compare 
O'Kane  v.  Treat,  25  111.  458  ;  State  v. 
Mainey,  65  Ind.  404 ;  Sparling  v. 
Dwenger,  60  Id.  72. 

1  Whitaker's  Smith  on  Negl.,  108, 
and  cases  cited.  More  frequently  in 
England  than  this  country,  the  bur- 
den of  repairing  a  highway  is  cast 
upon  a  particular  person  or  corpora- 
tion, by  prescription  or  immemorial 
usage  (Regina  v.  Birmingham,  etc. 
R.  Co. ,  3  Q.  B.  223 ;  Rex  v.  Eccles- 
field,  1  Barn.  &  Ad.  359;  Rex  v. 
Hendon,  4  Barn.  &  Ad.  628 ;  Rex 
v.  Yorkshire,  2  East,  253,  note). 
Where  the  lands  charged  are  occu- 
pied by  a  person  not  the  owner,  such 
occupier  is  primarily  responsible  to 
the  public  for  the  repairs,  but  may 
demand  reimbursement  from  the 
owner  (Baker  v.  Greenfield,  3  Q.  B. 
148).  In  Massachusetts,  a  town  may 
become  liable  by  prescription  for  the 
repair  of  a  highway,  and  for  an  in- 


3§] 


HIGHWAYS. 


580 


taining  highways  is  cast  by  the  statute,  either  expressly  or  by 
necessary  implication,  upon  municipal  or  ^«#i7-municipal  cor- 
porations, or  upon  public  officers,  or  it  is  assumed  by  private 
parties  as  a  condition  of  the  grant  of  a  franchise,  such  as  turn- 
pikes, plank-roads,  etc.  If  no  such  duty  is  expressly  or  im- 
pliedly imposed  or  assumed,  there  is  no  liability  for  its  violation.2 

§  33%-  Statutory  liability  for  defective  ways.  —  Statutes 
imposing  upon  municipal  corporations  an  absolute  liability 
exist  in  Maine,1  where  recovery  may  be  had  for  an  injury 
through  "any  defect  or  want  of  repair"  of  any  highway;  in 
New  Hampshire,2  for  damages  by  reason  of  "any  obstruction, 
defect,  insufficiency  or  want  of  repair  which  renders  the  high, 
way  unsuitable  for  travel ;  "  in  Rhode  Island,3  for  injuries  to 
any  person   by   reason  of  neglect   to   keep   the  highway  "  in 


jury  resulting  to  a  traveler  from  a 
failure  to  repair  (Stockwell  v.  Fitch- 
burg,  110  Mass.  305).  There  the 
highway  had  been  re-located  ;  held 
that  the  time  in  which  to  create  lia- 
bility by  prescription  did  not  begin 
to  run  until  after  the  relocation  of 
the  highway. 

2  Monk  v.  New  Utrecht,  104  N.  Y. 
557;  11 N.  E.  268;  People  v.  Supervis- 
ors, etc.,  93  N.  Y.  397;  Hill  v.  Super- 
visors, etc.,  12  Id.  52  ;  People  v. 
Commissioners,  etc.,  7  Wend.  474 ; 
Riddle  v.  Proprietors  of  Locks,  etc. , 
7  Mass.  160 ;  Mower  v.  Leicester,  9 
Id.  247 ;  Hill  v.  Boston,  122  Id.  344 ; 
Bigelow  v.  Randolph,  14  Gray,  541  ; 
Chidsey  v.  Canton,  17  Conn.  475 ; 
Reed  v.  Belfast,  20  Me.  246 ;  Ball  v. 
Winchester,  32  N.  H  435  ;  Eastman 
v.  Meredith,  36  Id.  295  ;  Noble  v. 
Richmond,  31  Gratt.  271  ;  Hull  v. 
Richmond,  2  Woodb.  &  M.  337  ; 
Commonwealth  v.  Hopkinsville,  7 
B.  Monr.  38  ;  Commissioners  v.  Mar- 
tin, 4  Mich.  557  ;  Fort  Smith  v. 
York,  52  Ark.  84;  12  S.  W.  157; 
McGrath  v.  Bloomer,  73  Wise  29  ; 
40  N.  W.  585;  Wilson  v.  Jefferson 
county,  13  Iowa,  181  ;  Chope  v. 
Eureka,  78   Cal.    588 ;  21   Pac.    364 ; 


and  cases  cited  under  §§8,  256,  281, 
ante. 

1  3  Rev.  Stat.  1883,  ch.  18,  §  80. 
No  town  is  liable  to  a  person  on  foot, 
for  injuries  on  account  of  snow  or 
ice  on  any  sidewalk  or  cross-walk, 
nor  on  account  of  its  slippery  con- 
dition (lb.  §  83).  The  liability  of  the 
town  depends  upon  its  officers  hav- 
ing had  twenty-four  hours'  actual 
notice  of  the  defect  or  want  of 
repair  causing  the  injury,  and 
the  recovery  is  limited  to  $2,000. 
In  case  of  death  resulting  from 
injury,  "  such  sum  as  the  jury 
may  deem  reasonable  as  dam- 
ages," may  be  recovered.  Liability 
under  the  statute  will  not  be  ex- 
tended by  construction  (Brown  v. 
Skowhegan,  82  Me.  273  ;  19  Atl.  399). 

2  Pub.  Stat.  1891,  ch.  76,  §§  1-6 
"  The  duty  of  towns  in  this  state,  to 
build  and  keep  in  repair  roads  with- 
in their  limits  has  long  been  estab- 
lished .  The  most  ancient  provincial 
statutes  on  the  subject  seem  rather 
to  recognize  than  to  create  the  duty  '' 
(Wheeler  v.  Troy,  20  N.  H.  78). 

3  Gen.  Laws,  1896,  tit.  10,  ch.  72, 
§  11.  See  McCloskey  v.  Moies  [R.  I.] 
33  Atl.  225. 


58i 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§338 


good  repair"  and  "safe  and  convenient;"  in  Connecticut,4 
for  injuries  "by  means  of  a  defective  road  or  bridge;"  in 
Wisconsin,5  for  any  damage  "  by  reason  of  the  insufficiency  or 
want  of  repair  of  any  bridge,  sluice-way  or  road."  Similar 
provisions  were  contained  in  the  statute  of  Massachusetts6 
until  1877,  and  in  that  of  Vermont7  until  1880.  In  New  Jer- 
sey,8 townships  are  made  liable  for  "  any  damage  "  happening 
"by  means  of  the  insufficiency  or  want  of  repairs"  of  their 
respective  roads  and  bridges.  In  New  York,  every  town  is 
declared  "  liable  for  all  damages  to  person  or  property  sus- 
tained by  reason   of  any  defect    in  its  highways  or  bridges, 


4  Gen.  Stat.  1888,  §  267.  See  Hall  v. 
Norwalk,  65  Conn.  310 ;  32  Atl.  400. 

6  Rev  Stat.  1878,  §  1339,  as  am- 
ended, L.  1885,  ch.  454.  Tbe  rem- 
edy will  not  be  extended  by  con- 
struction (Smalley  v.  Appleton,  75 
Wise.  18  ;  43  N.  W.  826). 

6  By  tbe  statute  in  force  in  1877,  a 
town's  liability  for  a  defect  in  a 
highway  was  limited  to  cases  where 
it  had  notice  of  the  particular  de- 
fect, or  such  defect  had  existed  for 
twenty-four  hours  previous  to  the 
accident  (Mass.  Gen.  Stat.  ch.  44, 
§  22).  Under  the  statute,  the  town's 
liability  was  absolute,  if  the  de- 
fects had  existed  twenty-four  hours 
(Monies  v.  Lynn,  124 Mass.  165).  The 
present  statute  gives  aright  of  action 
for  an  injury  to  person  or  property 
"  through  a  defect  or  want  of  repair, 
or  of  sufficient  railing  in  or  upon 
a  highway,  [etc.],  which  might  have 
been  prevented  by  reasonable  care 
and  diligence  on  the  part  of  the 
county,  town,"  etc.,  provided  it  had 
"  reasonable  notice  of  the  defect,  or 
might  have  had  notice  thereof  by 
the  exercise  of  proper  care  and  dili- 
gence" (Gen.  Stat.  ch.  52,  §  18 ;  L. 
1888,  ch.  114;  L.  1891,  ch.  170). 
Recovery  cannot  exceed  one-fifth 
of  one  per  cent,  of  the  state  valua- 
tion of  the  town,  etc.,  "nor  a 
greater  sum  than  $4,000  (§  20).    See 


Bowes  v.  Boston,  155  Mass.  344  ;  29 
N.  E.  633 ;  Harrigan  v.  Clarksburg, 
150  Id.  218  ;  22  N.  E.  897  ;  Rooney  v. 
Randolph,  128  Mass.  580 ;  Hayes  v. 
Cambridge,  136  Id.  402  ;  s.  c.  138  Id. 
461  ;  Hanscom  v.  Boston,  141  Id.  242  ; 
5  N.  E.  249  ;  Post  v.  Boston,  141 
Mass.  189 ;  4  N.  E.  815  ;  Olson  v. 
Worcester,  142  Mass.  536  ;  8  N.  E. 
441. 

7  In  1880,  the  statute  of  Vermont 
which  imposed  a  liability,  was  re- 
pealed (L.  1880,  No.  62,  am'd  L. 
1882,  No.  13)  ;  but  it  was  provided 
that  "this  act  shall  not  release 
towns  from  liability  for  damages 
arising  from  the  insufficiency  of 
any  bridge,  culvert,  or  sluice  "  (Stats. 
1894,  §  3490).  There  is,  therefore, 
now  no  statutory  liability  in  Ver- 
mont for  defective  highways,  ex- 
cept such  parts  of  them  as  consist 
of  bridges,  culverts  and  sluices  (see 
Wilkins  v.  Rutland,  61  Vt.  336 ;  17 
Atl.  735  ;  Willard  v.  Sherborne,  59 
Vt.  361  ;  8  Atl.  735). 

8  Gen.  Stat.  1895,  p.  2844,  pars.  192, 
194.  Townships  in  certain  named 
counties  are  excepted  from  the 
operation  of  the  statute  (lb.).  This 
statute  does  not  give  a  right  of  action 
on  account  of  a  defective  municipal 
street  (Rahway  v.  Carter  [N.  J.],  26 
Atl.  96),  or  sidewalk  (Dupuy  v. 
Union,  46  N.  J.  Law,  269). 


§338] 


HIGHWAYS. 


582 


existing  because  of  the  neglect  of  any  commissioner  of  high- 
ways of  such  town;"  the  town  being  given  a  right  of  action 
against  any  commissioner  for  the  amount  of  any  judgment 
recovered  against  it  for  his  neglect.9  In  South  Carolina,10  each 
county  is  declared  liable  for  any  injury  or  damage  through  "a 
defect  in  the  repair  of  a  highway,  causeway  or  bridge,"  and  in 
West  Virginia,11  damages  sustained  "  by  reason  of  a  public  road 
or  bridge  in  a  county,  or  of  a  street,  sidewalk  or  alley  in  an 
incorporated  city,  village  or  town,  being  out  of  repair,"  are 
recoverable  against  the  county,  city,  village  or  town  in  which 
the  road,  street,  etc.,  may  be :  except  that  incorporated  cities, 
villages  and  towns  are  not  subject  to  such  liability,  unless  their 
charters  require  them  to  keep  their  streets,  etc.,  in  repair.     In 


9  In  New  York,  prior  to  1881,  towns 
in  their  gwasi'-corporate  character 
had  no  control  over  highways  and 
were  not  liable  for  defects  therein 
(People  v.  Little  Valley,  75  N.  Y. 
•616;  People  v.  Esopus,  74  Id.  310). 
All  highways,  the  control  of  which 
was  not  given  to,  or  assumed  by,  in- 
corporated cities  and  villages,  were 
reparable  by  highway  commissioners, 
who  were,  of  course,  liable  for  their 
own  negligence  in  the  discharge  of 
official  duty  in  that  regard  (Adsit 
v.  Brady,  4  Hill,  630  ;  Garlinghouse 
v.  Jacobs,  29  N.  Y.  297  ;  Warren  v. 
Clement,  24  Hun,  472).  But  by  the 
statute  of  1881,  the  several  towns 
were  declared  to  be  liable  for  all 
damages  to  person  or  property  by 
reason  of  defective  highways  or 
bridges,  "in  cases  in  which  the  com- 
missioner or  commissioners  of  high- 
ways of  said  towns  are  now  liable  in 
law  therefor,  instead  of  such  com- 
missioner or  commissioners  of  high- 
ways" (Laws of  1881,  ch.  700,  §  1;  Gen. 
Highway  Law,  §  16).  This  statute  has 
been  held  not  unconstitutional  (Bid- 
well  v.  Murray,  40  Hun,  190).  Under 
this  statute,  a  town  is  not  liable 
unless  the  negligence  of  the  com- 
missioner was  such  as  would  render 


him  liable,  under  the  act,  to  an  action 
over  by  the  town  for  a  recovery  had 
against  it  (Lane  v.  Hancock,  142 
N.  Y.  510;  37  N.  E.  473).  s.  p.,  Waller 
v.  Hebron,  5  N.  YT.  App.  Div.  577  ;  39 
N.  Y.  Supp.  381 ;  Young  v.  Macomb, 
11  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  480;  42  N.  Y. 
Supp.  35.  Hence  the  town  is  not 
liable  to  its  commissioner's  em- 
ployee, injured  while  engaged  in  re- 
pairing a  road  (Robinson  v.  Fowler, 
80  Hun,  101;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  25).  See 
generally,  Ivory  v.  Deerpark,  116 
N.  Y.  476  ;  22  N.  E.  1080 ;  Monk  v. 
New  Utrecht,  104  N.  Y.  552;  11  N.  E. 
268;  Lorillard  v.  Monroe,  11  N.  Y. 
392;  People  v.  Supervisors,  93  Id.  397; 
Bidwell  v.  Murray,  40  Hun,  190; 
Morey  v.  Newfane,  8  Barb.  645  [lead- 
ing case].  The  statute  applies  to  ob- 
structions placed  in  the  highway  as 
well  as  to  acts  of  physical  disturbance 
or  injury  to  the  bed  of  the  roadway 
(Whitney  v.  Ticonderoga,  127  N.  Y. 
40  ;  27  N.  E.  403). 

10  Rev.  Stat.  1893,  §  1169. 

»  Code,  1891,  ch.  43,  §  53.  See 
Biggs  v.  Huntington,  32  W.  Va.  55  ; 
9  S.  E.  51 ;  Chapman  v.  Milton,  31 
W.  Va.  384  ;  7  S.  E.  22  ;  Phillips  v. 
County  Court,  31  W.  Va.  477  ;  7  S. 
E.  427. 


583  HIGHWAYS.  [§  339 

Michigan,12  each  township,  village,  city  or  corporation,  whose 
corporate  authority  extends  over  highways,  and  whose  duty  it 
is  to  keep  the  same  in  good  repair,  is  liable  for  an  injury  "  by 
reason  of  the  neglect  to  keep  such  public  highways,  etc.,  in 
good  repair,  and  in  a  condition  reasonably  safe  and  fit  for 
travel."  It  has  been  held  in  Maine,13  New  Hampshire,14  Massa- 
chusetts 15  and  Connecticut,16  that  under  their  statutes  towns  are 
liable  only  for  injuries  suffered  by  persons  using  the  highway, 
and  not  for  damages  sustained  in  consequence  of  not  being 
able  to  use  it,  nor  in  consequence  of  not  being  able  to  use  it 
without  additional  trouble. 

§  339.  Implied  liability  for  defective  ways.—  In  states  which 
do  not  impose  a  liability  by  statute,  the  liability  of  municipal 
corporations  proper,  for  injuries  from  defects  in  their  highways, 
is  held  to  be  necessarily  implied  on  a  construction  of  their 
respective  charters,  or  some  general  statute,  by  which  they  are 
either  expressly  required  to  maintain  their  highways  in  a  rea- 
sonable state  of  repair,  or  else  are  authorized  to  build  and 
maintain  them,  and  are  given  exclusive  control  of  them,  to- 
gether with  power  to  raise  money  for  that  purpose.1  In  a  few 
states,  ^^'-corporations,  like  counties,  townships  and  road- 
districts,  are  likewise  held  impliedly  liable,  under  similar 
impositions  of  duty  and  grants  of  power,  the  question  being, 
in  each  case,  determinable  on  a  construction  of  some  general 
or  particular  statute.  Having  elsewhere  considered  the  sub- 
ject generally,  it  is  unnecessary  to  pursue  it  further  here.2 

"  Howell's  Stats.  §§  1442-45.     The  13  The  remedy  is  for   "  travelers  " 

statute    applies  to    defects   in  con-  only  (McCarthy  v.  Portland,  67  Me. 

struction  as  well  as  neglect  to  repair,  167  ;    Reed  v.    Belfast,  20   Id.    248  ; 

and  requires  safety  by  night  as  well  Sandford  v.    Augusta,    32   Id.   536  ; 

as  by  day  (Sebert  v.  Alpena,  78  Mich.  Weeks  v.  Shirley,  33  Id.  271). 

165  ;    43    N.   W.    1098).      A  city    is  M  Ball  v.  Winchester,  32  N.  H.  435; 

liable  under  the  statute,  though  its  Griffen  v.  Sanbornton,  44  Id.  246. 

charter  does  not  impose  on   it  the  !5Harwoodv.  Lowell,  4  Gush.  310; 

duty  of  keeping  its  walks  in  repair,  Smith  v.  Dedham.  8  Id.  522  ;  Brailey 

or  authorize  it  to  levy  a  tax  for  tbat  v.  Southborough,  6  Id.  141 ;  Holman 

purpose  (Campbell  v.  Kalamazoo,  80  v.  Townsend,  13  Mete.  297. 

Mich.  655  ;  45  N.  W.  652).    See  South-  16  Chidsey  v.  Canton,  17  Conn.  475. 

well  v.  Detroit,  74  Mich.  438 ;  42  N.  Otherwise,  under  the  Rhode  Island 

W.  118  ;  Quinlan   v.   Manistique,  80  statute  (Williams  v.  Tripp,   11  R.  I. 

Mich.  22  ;  48  N.  W.  172 ;  Sharp  v.  447) 

Evergreen,  67  Mich.   443  ;  35  N.  W.  '  See  cases  cited  under  §  289,  ante. 

67,  [state  road].  »  See  §§  256,  257,  ante. 


§34o] 


HIGHWAYS. 


584 


§340.  Liability  of  road-officers.— The  duties  of  road-offi- 
cers are  prescribed  by  statute  in  general  but  comprehensive 
terms;  and  for  a  breach  of  duty,  they  are  usually  declared  to 
be  subject  to  indictment x  and  punishment,  usually  by  a  fine. 
They  are  not  bound  of  common  right  to  repair  the  roads 
under  their  charge.2  Outside  of  the  statute,  by  which  their 
duties  are  prescribed,  they  have  no  authority,  and  are  under 
no  obligation  to   the  public ; 3  and  when   a  highway  is  out  of 


1  So  in  Tennessee  (State  v.  Barks- 
dale,  5  Humph.  154  ;  Hill  v.  State,  4 
Sneed,  443) .  In  South  Carolina,  the 
whole  board  of  commissioners,  and 
not  one  alone,  should  be  indicted,  in 
case  of  neglect  to  repair  highways 
(State  v.  Chapped,  2  Hill  [S.  C],  391. 
See  State  v.  Broyles,  1  Bailey  Law, 
134).  In  Alabama,  a  remedy  for  in- 
juries, sustained  by  reason  of  de- 
fects in  highways,  is  given  on  the 
bond  of  the  contractors,  or  in  case 
of  no  bond,  against  the  county 
(Code,  §  1203).  And  the  corporate 
officers  of  incorporated  towns  and 
cities  are  indictable  for  a  misde- 
meanor, if  streets  are  out  of  repair 
more  than  ten  days  (Code,  §  1175). 
In  North  Carolina  (Code,  §  1054), 
willful  neglect  of  duties  is  a  mis- 
demeanor (see  State  v.  Miller,  100 
N.  C.  543 ;  5S.  E.  925).  In  Missouri, 
overseers  of  highways  are  required 
to  spend  in  the  repair  of  roads  all 
the  money  coming  into  their  hands, 
and  are  liable  for  the  amount  of 
damages  caused  by  neglect,  after 
having  notice  "  (Gen.  Stat.  296,  §  46). 
In  North  Carolina,  overseers,  for 
neglect  to  keep  roads  and  bridges 
clear  and  in  repair,  are  subject  to 
forfeiture,  and  "  liable  for  such  dam- 
ages as  may  be  sustained"  (Rev. 
Code,  537,  ch.  101,  §  21  ;  see  Hath- 
away v.  Hinton,  1  Jones'  Law,  243  ; 
Kinsey  v.  Jones,  8  Id.  186).  In  Ohio, 
supervisors  are  liable  to  a  fine  for 
neglect  to  perform  the  duties  of 
their  office  (2  Rev.   Stat.  1316,  §  40). 


So  in  Mississippi  (Code,  §  253),  and 
in  Delaware  (Rev.  Code,  178,  £  32). 
In  Georgia,  overseers,  for  neglect  to 
repair  roads,  are  subject  to  fine,  and 
action  for  damages  at  the  suit  of 
any  person  injured  by  such  neglect 
(Cobb's  Stat.  500,  §5  4  ;  504,  §  6).  In 
New  York,  overseers  of  highways 
are  subject  to  penalties  for  neglect 
of  duty,  recoverable  by  highway 
commissioners  (L.  1890,  ch.  568,  £§ 
22,  23).  In  Illinois,  each  supervisor 
is  "to  cause  all  the  public  roads  in 
his  district  to  be  kept  well  cleared, 
smooth,  and  in  good  repair,"  and, 
for  failure  to  do  so,  is  liable  to  indict- 
ment (1  111.  Rev.  Stat.  562,  §  14).  In 
Indiana,  nearly  the  same  statute 
exists  (see  Lynn  v.  Adams,  2  Ind. 
143  ;  State  v.  Hogg,  5  Ind.  515).  In 
Iowa,  supervisors  notified  in  writing 
that  any  bridge  or  other  portion  of 
the  public  road  is  unsafe  or  impass- 
able, are  liable  for  all  damages 
resulting  after  a  reasonable  time 
(Iowa  Laws,  144,  §  902).  In  Mary- 
land, supervisors  are  liable  for  ne- 
glect or  malfeasance  to  indictment 
and  fine  (1  Rev.  Code,  p.  610,  §§  1, 
15,  17). 

2  State  v.  Halifax,  4  Dev.  (N.  C.) 
Law,  345.  See  People  v.  Ulster  Co. 
93  N.  Y.  397;  Monk  v.  New  Utrecht, 
104  Id.  553 ;  11  N.  E.  268. 

s  Austin  v.  Carter,  1  Mass.  231 ; 
Winslow  v.  Pleasant  Prairie,16  Wise. 
613;  Worden  v.  Witt  [Idaho]  39  Pac. 
1114. 


585  HIGHWAYS.  [§  340 

repair,  they  can  take  only  such  measures  for  repairing  it  as  are 
pointed  out  by  the  statute  ;4  they  cannot  repair  a  way  at  their 
own  expense,  and  then  call  upon  the  public  for  an  indemnity  ; 5 
nor,  without  statute  authority,  can  they  contract  a  debt  for  the 
town  to  enable  them  to  make  needed  repairs.6  Unless,  as  in 
some  states,  they  are  expressly  declared  to  be  liable  in  dam- 
ages for  the  unsafe  condition  of  their  roads,  their  liability  can 
be  founded  only  upon  some  negligent  act  or  omission."  If  such 
an  officer  has  no  funds,  or  has  inadequate  funds,  and  no  means 
of  obtaining  any  more,  he  cannot  be  said  to  be  guilty  of  neg- 
ligence in  not  doing  a  work  which  requires  the  expenditure  of 
money.  He  owes  no  duty  to  any  one  to  undertake  more  than 
the  funds  in  his  hands  will  pay  for,  and  he  may  exercise  a  dis- 
cretion as  to  what  repairs  he  will  undertake  to  make  with  such 
funds  as  he  has  ; 8  he  is  not  responsible  for  an  error  of  judg- 
ment in  applying  deficient  funds  to  repairs  less  urgently  needed 
than  others,9  nor  for  such  mistakes  as  selecting  unsuitable  tim- 
ber for  repairing  a  bridge.10  Under  the  principle  already 
stated,  road  officers  are  not  the  superiors  of  their  subordinates 
or  employees,  so  as  to  be  liable  for  their  negligent  acts,  within 
the  scope  of  their  employment.11     Like  every  agent,  he  is  lia- 

4  Loker  v.  Brookline,  13  Pick.  343.  quired   by  statute   to  maintain   the 

6  Jones  v.  Lancaster,  4  Pick.  149;  roads  "  in  as  good  repair  as  the  means 

Wood  v.  Waterville,   5  Mass.  294;  at   his    command   will    permit"    (2 

Winslow  v.  Mt.  Pleasant,  16  Wise.  Gen.  Laws,  6535,  §  15). 

613.  9  Monk  v.  New  Utrecht,  104  N.  Y. 

6  People  v.   Ulster  Co.,    93  N.  Y.  557  ;  11  N.  E.  268. 

397  ;  Van  Alstyne  v.  Freeday  41  Id.  10  Loar  v.  Heinz,  28  111.  App.  584.  ' 

177  ;  Barker  v.   Loomis,  6  Hill,  463.  »  Hall  v.  Smith,  2  Bing.  156 ;  and 

7  Hover  v.  Barkhoof,  44  N.  Y.  113  ;  cases  cited  under  §  319,  ante.  The 
Nowell  v.Wright,  3  Allen,  166  ;  Com-  relative  and  respective  duties  of 
missioners  v.  Duckett,  20  Md.  468;  commissioners,  and  of  overseers,  of 
Tearney  v.  Smith,  86  111.  391.  An  highways  in  New  York  are  stated 
action  may  be  maintained  against  in  Farman  v.  Ellington,  46  Hun,  41. 
one  of  several  highway  commission-  See  also  Bartlett  v.  Crozier,  17  Johns, 
ers  for  an  act  of  negligence  imput-  439  ;  Smith  v.  Wright,  27  Barb.  621 ; 
able  to  all  (Babcock  v.  Gifford,  29  McFadden  v.  Kingsbury,  11  Wend. 
Hun,  186).  See  Boots  v.  Washburn,  667  ;  Day  v.  Day,  94  N.  Y.  159  ;  Ho- 
79  N.  Y.  207  [must  be  sued  in  name  ver  v.  Berkoff,  44  Id.  113  ;  Bostwick 
of  office].  v.  Barlow,  14  Hun,  177  ;  Babcock  v. 

8  Case?  cited  under  §  367,  post.  Gifford,  29  Id.  186  ;  Maxim  v.  Cham- 
In  California,  the  road-master  is  re-  pion,  50  Hun,  88  ;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  515. 


§343] 


HIGHWAYS. 


586 


ble  for  acts  outside  the  scope  of  his  authority,  whether  done 
by  himself,12  or  by  his  authority.13 

§  341.  Contract  obligations  to  repair.  —  One  who  contracts 
with  the  public  authorities  to  keep  in  repair  a  highway,  canal, 
or  other  public  work,  is  liable  to  any  one  who  is  especially 
injured  by  his  failure  to  perform  his  contract,  or  his  negligent 
performance  thereof.1  Contracting  to  have  the  work  done  will 
not  absolve  the  corporation  from  its  primary  liability.2  Both 
the  contractor  and  the  corporation  are  liable  for  a  failure  to 
repair,  as  contracted  for,  the  latter  only  after  notice  of  the 
defective  condition  of  the  highway.3 

§  342.  [consolidated  with  §  359.] 

§  343-  Obligations  of  abutting  owners  as  to  highway. — 

No  obligation  rests  upon  the  dedicator  of  a  way  to  improve  or 
repair  it.  The  public  adopting  a  way  dedicated  to  its  use  must 
take  it  in  statu  quo,1  and  the  duty  of  adapting  it  to  safe  public 


12  The  owner  of  the  fee  in  a  high- 
way can  recover  damages  for  the  re- 
moval of  soil  therefrom  hy  the  road 
officers  for  the  purpose  of  mending 
the  road  elsewhere,  when  such  re- 
moval was  not  required  to  reduce 
the  surface  to  the  proper  grade 
(Ladd  v.  French,  53  Hun,  635.  mem.; 
6  N.  Y.  Supp.  56).  Compare  Wolf  v. 
Holton,  61  Mich.  550  ;  28  N.  W.  524  ; 
Cockrum  v.  Williamson,  53  Ark. 
131;  13  S.  W.  592. 

13  Where  commissioners  undertake 
(abandoning  the  method  prescribed 
by  charter  for  repairs)  to  carry  out 
the  work  by  means  of  a  committee 
and  superintendent,  they  cease  to  act 
as  officers  exercising  judicial  and 
legislative  powers,  and  become  liable 
individually  for  injuries  received  by 
a  workman  through  their  negligence 
(Robinson  v.  Rohr,  73  Wise.  436  ;  40 
N.  W.  668).  See  Parks  v.  Greenville, 
44  S.  C.  168 ;  21  S.  E.  540 ;  Butler  v. 
Ashworth,  102  Cal.  663;  36  Pac. 
922. 

1  Robinson  v.  Chamberlain,  34  N. 


Y.  389 ;  Fulton  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bald- 
win, 37  Id.  648  ;  Brooklyn  v.  Brook- 
lyn, etc.  R.  Co.,  47  Id.  475;  McMahon 
v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.,  75  Id.  231; 
Phillips  v.  Commonwealth,  44  Pa. 
St.  197  ;  Kollock  v.  Madison,  84  Wise. 
458 ;  54  N.  W.  725  ;  Weymouth  v. 
New  Orleans,  40  La.  Ann.  344  ;  4  So. 
218 ;  and  cases  cited  under  §  325, 
ante. 

2  Cases  cited  under  §§176,  298, 
ante. 

3  Union  R.  Co.  v.  Stone,  54  Kans. 
83  ;  37  Pac.  1012  ;  Bentley  v.  Atlanta, 
92  Ga.  623 ;  18  S.  E.  1013  ;  Byrne  v. 
Syracuse,  79  Hun,  555,  29  N.  Y.  Supp. 
912 ;  and  cases  cited  under  §  345, 
post.  In  Georgia,  if  a  bond  is  not 
required  from  a  bridge-contractor 
(Code,  §  691)  the  county  is  liable  for 
injuries  occasioned  by  a  defect  in 
the  bridge,  of  which  it  had  notice 
(Dekalb  county  v.  Cook,  97  Ga.  415  ; 
24  S.  E.  157). 

1  Thus,  where  a  highway  was 
raised  several  feet  above  the  level  as 
it  stood  when  the  defendant's  house 


587 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§343 


travel  is  upon  the  public,  and  not  upon  the  dedicator.2  The 
owner,  much  less  a  mere  occupant,3  of  land  fronting  on  a  high- 
way owes  no  duty,  as  such,  to  repair  any  part  of  the  highway, 
or  otherwise  make  it  safe  for  travel  ;4  and  it  is  immaterial  that 
it  was  originally  built  by  him,  if  subsequently  adopted  by  the 
municipality.5  It  is  not  competent  for  a  city  to  transfer  to  a 
lot-owner,  by  ordinance,  its  own  duty  in  regard  to  the  safety 
of  its  streets,  so  as  to  make  him  liable  to  individuals  for  injuries 
caused  by  a  defective  street  in  front  of  his  premises,6  or,  on  the 


was  built,  and  the  defendant  bridged 
over  the  space  between  the  highway 
and  the  upper  story  with  gratings, 
which  were  used  by  the  public  as 
part  of  the  highway,  held,  that  he 
was  not  liable  for  the  non-repair  of 
such  gratings.  It  was  the  duty  of 
the  parish  to  keep  them  in  repair 
(Robbins  v.  Jones,  15  C.  B.  N.  S.  221. 
243).  s.  P. ,  Fisher  v.  Prowse,  2  Best 
&  S.  770  ;  Mercer  v.  Woodgate,  L.  R. 

5  Q.  B.  26  ;  Arnold  v.  Blaker,  L.  R. 

6  Q.  B.  433  ;  Arnold  v.  Holbrook,  L. 
R.  8  Q.  B.  96  ;  Fox  worthy  v.  Hast- 
ings, 25  Neb.  133;  41  N.  W.  132 
[sidewalk  from  street  to  hotel  set 
back  from  street-line  ten  feet  ;  city 
liable  for  defects  therein]. 

2  State  v.  Society,  etc.,  44  N.  J. 
Law,  502.  In  that  case,  an  abutting 
owner  who  had  dedicated  a  way 
through  his  premises,  accepted  by 
the  public  authorities,  was  indicted 
for  a  dangerous  excavation  on  his 
land  near  the  highway,  existing  be- 
fore and  continued  since  the  dedica- 
tion. Indictment  quashed,  but  query, 
whether  it  would  not  have  been  good 
if  the  highway  had  not  been  acquired 
by  condemnation. 

3  Avery  v.  Syracuse,  29  Hun,  537. 
The  common-law  rule  that  an  occu- 
pant of  land  next  adjoining  to  a 
highway  who  encloses  his  land  on 
both  sides,  and  so  prevents  a  traveler 
from  going  on  it,  when  the  highway 
becomes  impassable  or  even  danger- 
ous or  inconvenient,  was  bound,  so 


long  as  his  enclosure  lasted,  to  keep 
the  highway  in  good  order  (Rex  v. 
Flecknow,  1  Burr.  461;  3  Salk.  182; 
Regina  v.  Ramsden,  El.  B.  &  El.  949  ; 
explaining  Duncombe's  Case,  Cro. 
Car.  366)  does  not  prevail  in  this 
country  (Weller  v.  McCormick,  47 
N.  J.  Law,  397  ;  1  Atl.  516). 

4  Moore  v.  Gadsden,  93  N.  Y.  12  ; 
Rochester  v.  Campbell,  123  Id.  405  ; 
25  N.  E.  937;  Fulton  v.  Tucker,  3 
Hun,  529  ;  Law  v.  Kingsley,  82  Id. 
76  ;  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  88  ;  Kerby  v. 
Boylston  Market  Asso.,  14  Gray,  249  ; 
State  v.  Gorham,  37  Me.  457 ;  Char- 
tiers,  etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Nester 
[Penn.],  7  Atl.  162  ;  Vandyke  v.  Cin- 
cinnati, 1  Disney  [Ohio],  532  ;  Grid- 
ley  v.  Bloomington,  88  111.  554 ; 
Taylor  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  R.  Co., 
45  Mich.  74  ;  7  N.  W.  728  ;  Sommers 
v.  Marshfield,  90  Wise.  59  ;  62  N.  W. 
937 ;  Betz  v.  Limingi,  46  La.  Ann. 
1113  ;  15  So.  385 ;  Jansen  v.  Atchison, 
16  Kans.  358 ;  Topeka  v.  Sherwood, 
39  Id.  690;  18  Pac  933;  Norton  v. 
St.  Louis,  97  Mo.  537  ;  11  S.  W.  242. 
The  fact  that  an  abutter  makes  use  of 
a  public  pump  in  front  of  his  pre- 
mises, casts  on  him  no  liability  for 
ice  formed  from  water  dripping  from 
the  pump  (Eckhart  v.  Wickwire,  87 
Ind.  77). 

6  Cases  cited  in  note  8,  §  334a,  ante. 

6  Hartford  v.  Talcott,  48  Conn. 
525  ;  Heeney  v.  Sprague,  11  R.  I. 
456  ;  Kerby  v.  Boylston  Market  Asso., 
14  Gray,  249;  Moore  v.  Gadsden,  93 


§  343] 


HIGHWAYS. 


588 


other  hand,  to  make  him  liable  over  to  the  city  for  damages 
paid  by  it,  at  the  suit  of  the  injured  person.7  Subject  to  con- 
stitutional limitations,  it  is  competent  for  the  legislature  to  lay 
upon  lot-owners  or  occupiers  the  duty  to  keep  their  adjacent 
sidewalks  in  repair  and  free  from  ice  and  snow,  and  to  enforce 
obedience  by  fines  and  penalties,8  and  even,  as  in  some  states, 
to  impose  a  liability  to  private  actions  for  injuries  from  such 
defects,  or  to  the  city  for  such  damages  as  it  may  have  been 
compelled  to  pay  the  injured  person.9  But  such  statutes  will 
be  construed  strictly  in  favor  of  the  lot-owner.10  The  extent 
of  his  obligation,  with  reference  to  adjacent  highways,  is  to  use 
and  keep  his  own  premises  so  as  not  to  render  such  highways 
unsafe  for  ordinary  travel,  culpably  failing  in  which  he  is  liable 


N.  Y.  12  [water  from  roof  froze  on 
sidewalk]  ;  Law  v.  Kingsley,  82 
Hun,  76  ;  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  88  ;  Flynn 
v.  Canton  Co.,  40  Md.  312;  Norton 
v.  St.  Louis,  97  Mo.  537 ;  11  S.  W. 
242  ;  Eustace  v.  Jahns,  38  Cal.  3  ;  and 
cases  cited  under  §  13a,  ante. 

1  Keokuk  v.  Dist.  of  Keokuk,  53 
Iowa,  353  ;  5  N.  W.  589  ;  Chicago  v. 
Crosby,  111  111.  538 ;  Woodard  v. 
Boscobel,  84  Wise.  226;  54  N.  W.  332. 

8  In  Pennsylvania,  borough  au- 
thorities have  power  to  impose  upon 
lot-owners  the  duty  of  relaying  and 
repairing  sidewalks  at  their  own  ex- 
pense (Smith  v.  Kingston,  120  Pa.  St. 
357  [action  for  fine];  Wilkinsburg  v. 
Home  for  Aged  Women,  131  Pa.  109  ; 
18  Atl.  937).  On  the  other  hand,  it 
is  held  in  Illinois  that  an  ordinance 
imposing  a  fine  upon  lot-owners  for 
not  removing  snow  from  their  adja- 
cent sidewalks  is  invalid.  (Gridley 
v.  Bloomington,  88  111.  554).  Fol- 
lowed, Chicago  v.  O'Brien,  111  111. 
532).  In  Minnesota,  a  city  charter's 
provision  that  lot-owners  ' '  shall  be 
liable  from  damages  to  whomsoever 
resulting  from  their  default  or  evi- 
dent neglect  in  not  keeping  [their 
adjacent  sidewalks]  in  good  repair," 
etc.,  is  not  constitutional (Noonan  v. 


Stillwater,  33  Minn.  198  ;  22  N.  W. 
444).  It  is  generally  held  that  ordi- 
nances imposing  a  fine  or  penalty 
are  within  granted  police  powers 
(Matter  of  Goddard,  16  Pick.  504 ; 
Heeney  v.  Sprague,  11  R.  I.  456 ; 
Rochester  v.  Campbell,  123  N.  Y. 
405 ;  25  N.  E.  937  ;  Moore  v.  Gads- 
den, 93  N.  Y.  12;  Knupfle  v.  Knicker- 
bocker Ice  Co.,  84  Id.  488  ;  Reed  v. 
New  York,  31  Hun,  311  ;  Paxson 
v.  Sweet,  13  N.  J.  Law,  196;  Bonsall  v. 
Lebanon,  19  Ohio,  418 ;  Mayor,  etc. 
v.  Maberry,  6  Humph.  368  ;  Wash- 
ington v.  Nashville,  1  Swan,  177 ; 
Whyte  v.  Nashville,  2  Id.  364). 

9  So  in  Michigan  (Lynch  v.  Hub- 
bard, 101  Mich.  43  ;  59  S.  W.  443  ; 
Gavitt  v.  Jackson,  Mich.  ;  <i7 
N.  W.  517 ;  Detroit  v.  Chaffee,  70 
Id.  80),  and  in  Wisconsin  (Hiner  v. 
Fond  du  Lac,  71  Wise.  74  ;  36  N.  W. 
632  ;  Morton  v.  Smith,  48  Wise.  265  ; 
4  N.  W.  330  ;  Cooper  v.  Waterloo,  88 
Wise.  433 ;  60  N.  W.  714 ;  Fife  v. 
Oshkosh,  89  Wise.  540;  62  N.  W. 
541  ;  Sommers  v.  Marshfield,  90 
Wise.  59 ;  62  N.  W.  937  ;  Toutloff 
v.  Green  Bay,  91  Wise.  490  ;  65  N. 
W.  169). 

10  Cases  cited  in  last  two  notes. 


589 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§343 


to  travelers  thereon.11  One  who  makes,  and  leaves  unprotected, 
an  excavation  on  his  land  near  a  highway,  so  that  a  passer-by, 
using  ordinary  care,  falls  into  it ; 12  or  one  who  permits  a  ruinous 
wall  or  other  structure  to  remain  after  the  lapse  of  a  reasonable 
time  to  repair  or  remove  it,  so  that  it  falls  on  a  traveler  in  the 
street ; 13  or  one  who  neglects  to  take  ordinary  and  reasonable 


11  Swords  v.  Edgar,  59  N.  Y.  28 
Rochester  v.  Montgomery,  72  Id.  65 
Wenzlick  v.  McCotter,  87  Id.  122 
Ahern  v.  Steele,  115  Id.  203  ;  22  N. 
E.  193.  A  lot-owner  who,  with  con- 
sent of  the  city,  constructed  a  vault 
under  the  sidewalk  in  front  of  his 
lot,  is  not  answerable  to  travelers,  ex- 
cept for  actual  negligence  on  his  part 
(Babbage  v.  Powers,  130  N.  Y.  281;  29 
N.  E.  132).  Otherwise,  if  constructed 
without  authority  (Barry  v.  Ter- 
kildsen,  72  Cal.  254;  13  Pac.  657). 
A  complaint  alleging  that  defendant 
allowed  snow  or  ice  to  melt  on  her 
premises,  the  water  from  which 
flowed  over  the  adjacent  sidewalk, 
and  froze,  rendering  the  walk  icy, 
by  reason  of  which  plaintiff  was 
injured,  Held,  bad,  on  demurrer 
(Brown  v.  Wysong,  1  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  423 ;  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  281).  In 
Bennett  v.  Kelly  (132  Pa.  St.  218  ;  19 
Atl.  69),  plaintiff  was  injured  by 
slipping  on  the  sidewalk  and  strik- 
ing, in  falling,  his  hand  on  a  pointed 
iron  fence  about  four  feet  high, 
erected  by  defendant  to  protect  his 
area-way  and  the  front  of  his  house. 
Held,  defendant  was  not  liable.  S.  P. , 
Garland  v.  Towne,  55  N.  H.  55  [snow 
falling  from  roof]  ;  Smethurst  v. 
Cong.  Church,  148 Mass.  281  ;  19 N.  E. 
387 [same];  Kerby  v.  Boylston Market 
Asso.,  14  Gray,  249;  Salisbury  v. 
Herschenroder,  106  Mass.  458  [swing- 
ing sign  over  sidewalk  blown  down]  ; 
Shipley  v.  Fifty  Associates,  101  Id. 
251  [snow  falling  from  roof]  :  Walsh 
v.  Mead,  8  Hun,  387  [snow  falling 
from  roof  which  had  no  snow-guard  ; 


abutter  liable]  ;  Hannem  v.  Pence,  40 
Minn.  127  ;  41  N.  W.  657  [snow  from 
roof].  A  telegraph  company  sus- 
pended wires  to  a  chimney  of  a 
house,  causing  it  to  fall  into  the 
street.  As  the  owner  of  the  house 
had  allowed  the  wire  causing  danger 
to  the  chimney  to  remain  for  some 
time,  he  was  held  liable  (Gray  v. 
Boston  Gaslight  Co.,  114  Mass.  149>. 
In  Tarry  v.  Ashton  (1  Q.  B.  Div.  314), 
a  heavy  lamp  had  been  suspended  by 
a  private  owner  over  a  highway  in 
such  a  way  as  to  be  dangerous  to  the 
public.  Held,  that  he  was  bound  to 
make  the  overhanging  lamp  abso- 
lutely safe  for  travelers  passing  by 
beneath  it,  and  was  liable  for  its 
fall.  See  Durgin  v.  Neal,  82  Cal. 
595  ;  23  Pac.  133 ;  and  cases  cited 
under  §§  703,  703,  post. 

u  Hardcastle  v.  South  Yorkshire  R. 
Co.,  4  Hurlst.  &  N.  67  ;  Coupland  v. 
Hardingham,  3  Camp.  398 ;  Barneg 
v.  Ward,  9  C.  B.  392  ;  Hadley  v.  Tay- 
lor, L.  R.  1  C.  P.  53  ;  Beck  v.  Carter, 
68  N.  Y.  283  ;  Victory  v.  Baker,  67 
Id.  366  ;  Irwin  v.  Sprigg,  6  Gill,  200  ; 
Sanders  v.  Reister,  1  Dak.  151  ; 
Haughey  v.  Hart,  62  Iowa,  96  ;  17 
N.  W.  189  [unguarded  well],  s.  P., 
Young  v.  Harvey,  16  Ind.  314. 

13  Regina  v.  Watts.  1  Salk.  357 . 
Church  of  Ascension  v.  Buckhart.  3 
Hill,  193  [part  of  wall  left  standing 
after  a  fire]  ;  Mullen  v.  St.  John.  57 
N.  Y.  569  ;  Lowell  v.  Spaulding,  4 
Cush.  277  ;  Oakham  v.  Holbrook,  11 
Id.  299.  In  Murray  v.  McShane,  (52 
Md.  217),  plaintiff,  passing  along  the 
street,  stopped  on  the  door  sill  of  de- 


§345] 


HIGHWAYS. 


59O 


precautions  to  prevent  the  falling  into  the  street  of  a  building 
in  the  course  of  erection,14  is,  in  each  case,  liable  for  the  injury 
proximately  caused  to  the  traveler,  provided  negligence  is 
shown.15 

§  344.  [omitted.] 

§  345-  Joint  and  several  liability  for  defective  way.  — The 

obligation  to  repair  may  be,  and  frequently  is,  imposed  upon 
two  or  more  towns  or  counties  —  as,  for  example,  the  repair  of 
a  bridge  which  spans  a  stream  dividing  two  towns.  In  such 
case  (depending,  of  course,  on  a  true  construction  of  the 
statute  imposing  the  duty1),  the  towns  are  severally,  as  well  as 
jointly,  liable  for  its  non-repair,2  whether  the  defect  which 
caused  the  injury  was  within  the  territorial  jurisdiction  of  the 


fendant's  house,  fronting  on  the 
street,  for  the  purpose  of  adjusting 
his  shoe,  and  while  thus  occupied, 
his  head  being  within  the  line  of  the 
street,  a  brick  fell  upon  his  head 
from  the  wall  of  the  house,  which 
was  in  a  ruinous  condition.  Held, 
owner  was  liable. 

14  Vincett  v.  Cook,  4  Hun,  318. 

15  Negligence  must  be  shown  to 
warrant  a  recovery  (Mahoney  v.  Lib- 
bey,  123  Mass.  20 ;  Gray  v.  Harris, 
107  Id.  492;  Scullin  v.  Dolan,  4  Daly, 
163  ;  Cross  v.  Koster,  17  N.  Y.  App. 
Div.  402  ;  45  N.  Y.  Supp.  215  ;  Kirk- 
patrick  v.  Knapp,  28  Mo.  App.  427). 

1  See  Lapham  v.  Rice,  55  N.  Y.  472, 
478  ;  Theall  v.  Yonkers,  21  Hun,  265  ; 
Hawxhurst  v.  New  York,  43  Id.  588. 

2  Reid  v.  New  York,  139  N.  Y.  534; 
34  N.  E.  1102  :  affi'g  68  Hun,  110  ; 
22  N.  Y.  Supp.  623  ;  Shaw  v.  Madrid, 
11  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  508  ;  42  N.  Y. 
Supp.  779;  Lane  v.  Syracuse,  12  N.  Y. 
App  Div.  118;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  219 
[action  against  city  and  railroad 
company  jointly].  A  railroad  com- 
pany from  whose  tank  water  drips 
on  the  sidewalk  and  forms  ice,  is 
liable  to  persons  injured  by  slipping 
thereon  ;  the  liability  is  not  wholly 


on  the  city  (Thuringer  v.  N.  Y.  Cen- 
tral R.  Co.,  82  Hun.  33;  31  N.  Y. 
Supp.  419).  See  cases  cited  in  note 
8,  §  334,  ante;  Peoria  v.  Simpson, 
110  111.  294  [city  and  lot-owner]  ; 
Peckham  v.  Burlington,  Brayt.  (Vt.) 
134  [two  towns].  Where  the  duty 
of  two  towns  to  build  a  bridge  is 
joint  and  not  several,  either  may  re 
build,  on  the  refusal  of  the  other  to 
join,  and  sue  the  other  for  contribu- 
tion (Day  v.  Day,  94  N.  Y.  153).  The 
expense  of  keeping  a  bridge  in  re- 
pair being  imposed  by  statute  upon 
several  towns  and  a  railroad  com- 
pany jointly,  with  a  provision  that 
one  of  the  towns  should  have  the 
care  and  superintendence  of  it, 
held,  the  company  could  not  re- 
cover against  the  latter  town  for  a 
defect  in  the  bridge  (Maiden,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Charlestown,  8  Allen,  245). 
The  fact  that  a  railroad  company 
has  built  a  bridge  over  a  public 
crossing  (as  required  by  statute)  does 
not  relieve  the  city  from  its  duty  to 
keep  such  bridge  in  a  safe  con- 
dition for  public  travel  (Tierney  v. 
Troy,  41  Hun,  120  ;  People  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 65  N.  Y.  349  :  Bryant  v.  Ran- 
dolph, 133  Id.  70 ;  30  N.  E.  657). 


59i 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§346 


one  or  the  other.3  Where  several  persons  are  concerned  in 
the  creation  of  an  unauthorized  obstruction  in  a  highway,  they 
are  jointly  and  severally  liable  for  the  entire  damages  proxi- 
mately caused  thereby.4 

§  346.   Defects  in  way  concurring  with  other  causes.  — 

It  is  settled  in  Maine,1  Massachusetts,2  New  Hampshire3  and 
Rhode  Island4  that  a  person  cannot  be  said  to  be  injured  "  by 
reason  of  "  or  "  through  "  a  defect  in  a  highway,  as  those  words 
are  used  in  their  respective  statutes,  if  any  other  cause  contrib- 
uted to  the  injury,  e  g.  the  unlawful  or  careless  act  of  a 
stranger  or  a  culpable  defect  in  premises  adjoining  the  place  of 
the  accident.5  The  same  interpretation  is  given  to  the  Michi- 
gan statute  ; 6  and  the  rule  appears  to  have  been  adopted  in 


3  Hawxhurst  v.  New  York,  43  Hun, 
588.  There  held  that  defendant 
county  was  severally  liable  for  the 
failure  of  the  joint  contractor  of 
itself  and  adjoining  county  to  place 
barriers  on  a  bridge  approach  in  the 
adjoining  county  ;  the  duty  relating 
to  the  whole  structure,  including 
bridge  approaches  at  both  ends. 

4  Cases  cited  under  §§  31,  120  and 
122,  ante. 

1  Moulton  v.  Sanford,  51  Me.  127  ; 
Perkins  v.  Fayette,  68  Id.  152; 
Farrar  v.  Greene,  32  Id.  574. 

8  Shepherd  v.  Chelsea,  4  Allen,  113 
[boys  coasting  on  road] ;  Alger  v. 
Lowell,  3  Id.  402  [plaintiff  crowded 
off  unrailed  sidewalk]  ;  Palmer  v. 
Andover,  2  Cush.  600  ;  Kidder  v. 
Dunstable,  7  Gray,  104  ;  Richards  v. 
Enfield,  13  Id.  344  ;  Rowell  v.  Lowell, 
7  Id.  100.  In  Flagg  v.  Hudson 
(142  Mass.  280;  8  N.  E.  42),  one 
driving  a  buggy  turned  aside  to 
avoid  contact  with  a  hack,  but, 
in  consequence  of  a  defect  in  the 
highway,  could  not  turn  suffi- 
ciently, and  a  collision  ensued. 
Held,  that  in  the  absence  of  negli- 
gence on  the  part  of  the  hack- 
driver,  the  defect  was  the  sole  cause 
of  the  injury,  and  the  town  was 
liable.     S.  p.,  Bourget  v.  Cambridge, 


159  Mass.  388 ;  34  N.  E.  455  ;  Yeaw 
v.  Williams.  15  R.  I.  20.  See  cases 
cited  under  §  350,  post. 

3  Lavery  v.  Manchester,  58  N.  H. 
444  [unfenced  cellarway]  ;  Palmer 
v.  Portsmouth,  43  Id.  265.  "It 
makes  no  difference  whether  the 
injury  was  caused  by  the  act  of 
Providence,  by  inevitable  accident 
or  by  the  negligent  or  malicious  act 
of  man,  or  all  these  combined,  if  the 
town  could  not  have  had  notice  of 
it,  or  could  not  have  remedied  it 
before  the  accident "  (Chamberlain 
v.  Enfield,  43  N.  H.  356  [pile  of  lum- 
ber on  adjacent  premises  frighten- 
ing horse  on  highway]). 

4  Where  one  was  compelled,  in 
consequence  of  B's  violation  of 
the  law  of  the  road,  to  drive 
upon  the  side  of  the  road,  and 
was  injured  by  colliding  with  a  post 
standing  close  to  the  traveled  car- 
riage-way, held,  the  wrongful  act 
of  B.  was  the  proximate  cause  of 
the  injury  (Mahogany  v.  Ward,  16 
R.  I.  479  ;  17  Atl.  860  ;  s.  P.,  Yeaw  v. 
Williams,  15  R.  I.  20  ;  23  Atl.  33). 

5  Lavery  v.  Manchester,  58  N.  H. 
444. 

6  Hembling  v.  Grand  Rapids,  99 
Mich.  292,  58  N.  W.  310. 


346] 


HIGHWAYS. 


592 


Iowa,  though  it  has  no  similar  statutes  to  interpret.7  In 
Vermont8  and  Connecticut,9  the  share  of  a  stranger  in  produc- 
ing the  injury,  if  merely  negligent,  is  not  to  be  considered  ; 
and  this  doctrine  is  accepted  by  all  courts,  when  not  embar- 
rassed by  statutory  interpretation.10  The  general  rule  in  all 
states,  is,  that  where  two  causes  combine  to  produce  an 
injury  to  a  traveler  upon  a  highway,  both  of  which  are  in  their 
nature  proximate  —  the  one  being  a  culpable  defect  in  the 
highway,  and  the  other  some  occurrence  for  which  neither 
party  is  responsible  —  the  municipality  is  liable,  provided  the 
injury  would  not  have  been  sustained  but  for  such  defect;11 
otherwise  is   it  exempt.13      Municipalities    are    not    bound    to 


1  De  Camp  v.  Sioux  City,  74  Iowa, 
392;  37  N.  W.  971  [one  driving 
along  a  street,  attempted  to  turn  out 
for  butcher's  team  approaching  at 
unlawful  speed,  but  was  unable  to 
do  so  on  account  of  street-car  track 
being  out  of  repair,  and  was  thrown 
out ;  city  not  liable]. 

8  See  Hunt  v.  Pownal,  9  Vt.  411. 

9  See  Baldwin  v.  Greenwood  Turn- 
pike Co.,  40  Conn.  238;  Ward  v. 
North  Haven,  43  Id.  148. 

10  A  city  is  liable  for  negligently 
maintaining  an  obstruction  in  a 
street,  whether  created  by  a  public 
or  private  agency  (Pettengill  v. 
Yonkers,  116  N.  Y.  558  ;  22  N.  E. 
1095  ;  Kunz  v.  Troy,  104  N.  Y.  344  ; 
10  N.  E.  442  ;  Bullock  v.  New  York, 
99  N.  Y.  654  ;  Todd  v.  Troy,  61  Id. 
506 ;  Tiers  v.  New  Y^ork,  74  Hun, 
452  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  688  ;  Bunch  v. 
Edenton,  90  N.  C.  431 ;  Centerville 
v.  Woods,  57  Ind.  192  ;  Elkhart  v. 
Eitter,  66  Id.  136  ;  Senhenn  v. 
Evansville,  140  Ind.  679;  40  N.  E.  69  ; 
Caton  v.  Sedalia,  1  Mo.  App.  528  ; 
Galveston  v.  Pasnainsky,  62  Tex.  118 
[broken  glass  in  bottom  of  open 
street-excavation]  ;  and  see  Goeltz 
v.  Ashland,  75  Wise.  642  ;  44  N.  W. 
770 ;  Smalley  v.  Appleton,  75  Wise. 
18  ;  43  N.  W.  826. 


11  Ivory  v.  Deerpark,  116  N.  Y.  476; 
22  N.  E.  1080  ;  Ring  v.  Cohoes,  77  N. 
Y.  83  ;  Ehrgott  v.  New  York,  96  Id. 
264  ;  Lynch  v.  New  Rochelle,  78  Hun. 
207  ;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  962  ;  Hunt  v. 
Pownal,  9  Vt.  411 ;  Palmer  v.  Ando- 
ver,  56  Mass.  600  ;  Houfe  v.  Fulton, 
29  Wise.  296,  per  Dixon,  C.  J.  ;  Mc- 
Namarav.  Clintonville,  62  Id.  207; 
Chicago  v.  Schmidt,  107  111.  186  [de- 
fect in  sidewalk  prevented  plaintiff 
avoiding  approaching  railroad  train]; 
Carterville  v.  Cook,  129  111.  152  ;  22 
N.  E.  14  [plaintiff  pushed  off  unrailed 
sidewalk].  One  who,  in  attempting 
to  extricate  his  horse  from  a  hole  in 
a  defective  bridge,  into  which  the 
horse  had  stepped,  was  injured  by 
the  animal,  may  recover  against  the 
town  (Stickney  v.  Maidstone,  30 
Vt.  738  ;  Page  v.  Bucksport,  64  Me. 
51  ,  La  Duke  v.  Exeter,  97  Mich.  450  ; 
56  N.  W.  851). 

12  Kieffer  v.  Hummelstown,  151  Pa. 
St.  304,  24  Atl.  1060;  [horse  frightened 
by  boy's  shooting  pigeons  in  adjoin- 
ing field  ;  "no  accident  would  have 
happened  but  for  the  shooting "]  ; 
Schaeffer  v.  Jackson,  150  Pa.  St.  145; 
24  Atl.  629  [hole  in  highway  ;  plain- 
tiff's horse  frightened  by  donkey ; 
buggy  caught  in  hole].  In  West  Ma- 
honey  v.  Watson  (116  Pa.  St.  344  ;  9 


593 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§346 


furnish  roads  upon  which  it  will  be  safe  for  horses  to  run 
away,  but  they  are  bound  to  furnish  reasonably  safe  roads  ; 
and  if  they  do  not,  and  a  traveler  is  injured  by  culpable  defects 
in  the  road,  it  is  no  defense  that  his  horse  at  the  time  was 
running  away,  or  was  beyond  his  control.13  Even  where  this 
doctrine  is  not  accepted  it  is  held  that  the  momentary  swerv- 
ing, shying,14  or  stumbling,15  or  the  starting  into  a  quick  trot 


Atl.  430)  horses  driven  after  dark, 
struck  an  ash-heap  negligently  left 
in  the  road,  whereby  the  vehicle  was 
overturned  and  the  horses  fright- 
ened. They  ran  upon  a  railroad, 
were  driven  from  the  track,  then 
ran  along  the  track,  in  an  opposite 
direction,  for  over  a  mile,  when  they 
were  struck  by  an  engine,  and 
killed.  Held,  that  the  ash-heap 
in  the  road  was  the  remote,  not 
proximate,  cause  of  the  injury,  s. 
p..  Childrey  v.  Huntington,  34  W. 
Va.  457;  12  S.  E.  536  [policeman, 
struggling  with  a  prisoner,  caught 
his  foot  in  hole  in  sidewalk,  and  the 
prisoner  fell  on  him  ;  hole  not  proxi- 
mate cause] ;  Gonzales  v.  Galveston, 
84  Tex.  3  ;  19  S.  W.  284  [pile  of  tim- 
ber in  street  knocked  down  by  dray- 
man, injuring  child;  held,  his  negli- 
gence, not  the  city's,  was  proximate 
cause].  A  town  is  not  liable  to  one 
injured  by  falling  into  an  excava- 
tion when  the  fall  was  wholly  occa- 
sioned by  another,  who  willfully 
threw  him  into  the  pit  (Alexander 
v.  New  Castle,  115  Ind.  51  ;  17  N.  E. 
200). 

13  Ring  v.  Cohoes,  77  N.  Y.  83 ; 
Ivory  v.  Deerpark,  116  N.  Y.  476  ;  22 
N.  E.  1080  ;  Smith  v.  Clarkstown,  69 
Hun,  155  ;  23  N.  Y.  Supp.  245  ;  Lane 
v.  Wheeler,  35  Hun,  606  ;  Houghtal- 
ing  v.  Shelly,  51  Id.  598  ;  3  N.  Y. 
Supp.  904  ;  Baltimore  Turnpike  Co. 
v.  Bateman,  68  Md.  389  ;  13  Atl.  54 ; 
Hey  v.  Philadelphia,  81  Pa.  St.  44 
[fright  from  locomotive]  ;  Wellman 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  II  —38.] 


v.  Susquehanna  Depot,  167  Pa.  St. 
239  ;  31  Atl.  566  [same] ;  Atlanta  v. 
Wilson,  59  Ga.  544  ;  Augusta  v.  Hud- 
son, 94  Ga.  135  ;  21  S.  E.  289 ;  Brad- 
ford v.  Anniston,  92  Ala.  349  ;  8  So. 
683  ;  Smith  v.  County  Court,  33  W. 
Va.  713  ;  11  S.  E.  1  [illegally  narrow 
road  ;  horse,  frightened  by  animals, 
backed  wagon  over  bank]  ;  Fowler  v. 
Linquist,  138  Ind.  566  ;  37  N.  E.  133  ; 
Centerville  v.  Woods,  57  Ind.  192 ; 
Brooksville  v.  Pumphrey,  59  Id.  78 ; 
Ross  v.  Ionia,  104  Mich.  320  ;  62  N.  W. 
401  ;  Hull  v.  Kansas  City,  54  Mo.  599 
[horse  for  moment  beyond  control] ; 
Barr  v.  Kansas  City,  105  Id.  550  ;  16 
S.  W.  483  ;  Union  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Stone, 
54  Kans.  83  ;  37  Pac.  1012  ;  Baldridge 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Cartrett,  75  Tex.  628  ; 
13  S.  W.  8 ;  Eads  v.  Marshall,  [Tex. 
Civ.  App.]  ;  29  S.  W.  170  ;  Camp- 
bell v.  Stillwater,  32  Minn.  308 
[frightened  by  moving  street-car]. 
Horses,  frightened  by  the  overturn- 
ing of  their  load,  caused  by  defect 
in  highway,  escaped  from  driver,  ran 
ninety  rods  and  collided  with  another 
traveler  :  Held,  the  town  was  liable 
(Merrill  v.  Claremont,  58  N.  H.  468). 
S.  P.,  Winship  v.  Enfield,  42  Id.  197  ; 
Fulsome  v.  Concord,  46  Vt.  135. 

14  Aldrich  v.  Gorham,  77  Me.  287  ; 
Carleton  v.  Caribou,  88  Id.  461 ;  34 
Atl.  269  ;  Johnson  v.  Philadelphia, 
139  Pa.  St.  646  ;  21  Atl.  316  ;  Rohr- 
bough  v.  Barbour  County  Court,  39 
W.  Va.  472  ;  20  S.  E.  565. 

15  Willey  v.  Belfast,  61  Me.  569 ; 
Clark  v.  Lebanon,  63  Id.  393. 


§  348]  highways.  594 

or  even  run,16  of  a  safe  horse,  by  which  it  is  brought  into  contact 
with  a  defect  in  the  road,  is  not  the  proximate  cause  of  a 
resulting  injury.  A  defect  which  causes  the  derangement  or 
breaking  of  a  safe  and  proper  vehicle,  so  that,  in  consequence, 
a  reasonably  well-broken  horse  gets  beyond  the  control  of  a 
reasonably  skilful  driver,  is  the  proximate  cause  of  an  ensuing 
injury,  though  happening  on  a  part  of  the  highway  which  is 
not  defective.17 

§  347.  [omitted.] 

§  348.  Duty  to  rebuild  destroyed  highway.  —  At  common 
law,  a  parish  is  excused  from  rebuilding  a  highway  which  has 
been  wholly  destroyed  by  the  elements  or  by  the  operation  of 
natural  causes,  over  which  it  has  no  control,  as  where  the  soil 
of  a  road-bed  has  been  entirely  swept  away  by  a  flood,  or  a 
bridge  totally  destroyed  by  fire.1  On  the  other  hand,  the  duty 
of  turnpike  companies  and  other  owners  of  road  franchises 
being  to  make  their  roads  and  bridges  passable,  it  is  no  excuse 
for  their  failure  to  do  so,  that  they  were  rendered  impassable 
by  a  sudden  flood  or  other  irresistible  causes.  They  are  bound 
to  build  within  a  reasonable  time.2  Under  a  statute  requiring 
the  maintenance  of  roads  and  bridges,  and  imposing  a  liability 
for  the  consequences  of  "  defects  "  therein,  it  is  held  immaterial 
how  the  defect  was  produced,  whether  by  natural  causes,  or  by 

16  Stone  v.  Hubbardstown,  100  Mass.  Otherwise,  under  Massachusetts  stat- 
49  ;  Babson  v.  Rockport,  101  Id.  93  ;  ute  (Scannal  v.  Cambridge,  163 
Yeaw  v.  Williams,  15  R.  I.  20  [team  Mass.  92  ;  39  N.  E.  790.  See  cases 
coming  up  behind].  Under  the  cited  under  §  378,  post. 
Massachusetts  statute  it  is  held  that  '  Regina  v.  Hornsea,  1  Dear.  C.  C. 
if  the  driver  loses  control  of  his  291  ;  18  Jur.  315  ;  25  Eng.  Law  & 
horse,  the  town  is  not  liable  for  the  Eq.  582.  In  Regina  v.  Paul  (2  Mood, 
injury  occasioned  by  a  defect  in  the  &  Rob.  307),  Maule,  J.,  said  :  "  The 
highway,  though  no  other  cause  in-  interruption  of  the  passage  is  not 
tervened  between  the  defect  and  the  from  the  want  of  repair,  but  from 
injury  (Marble  v.  Worcester,  4  Gray,  the  sea  having  washed  away  the 
395 ;  Titus  v.  Northbridge,  97  Mass.  wall  or  embankment,  and  there  is 
258  ;  Fogg  v.  Nahant,  98  Id.  578).  no  longer  anything  for  them  to  re- 

17  Goshen  Tump.  Co.  v.  Sears,  7  pair."  s.  p.,  Rex  v.  Montague, 
Conn.  86  ;  Ward  v  North  Haven,  43  4  Barn.  &  Cr.  598  ;  Regina  v.  Bam- 
Id.  148 ;  Scheunke  v.  Pine  River,  84  ber,  5  Q.  B.  279 ;  Rex  v.  Landulph, 
Wise.  669  ;  54  N.  W.  1007 i  Sherwood  1  Mood.  &  Rob.  393. 

v.  Hamilton,  37  Upp.  Can.  [Q.  B.]  s  People  v.  Hillsdale  Tump.  Co.,  23 
410;  Toms  v.   Whitby,   35  Id.   195.    Wend.  254. 


595 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§350 


human  agency ;  and  the  total  destruction  of  the  highway  is 
a  defect  which  the  town  is  bound  to  remedy  by  rebuild- 
ing without  unreasonable  delay.3  It  is  no  justification  for  an 
unreasonable  delay  in  rebuilding  that  there  is  a  contiguous 
road,  in  good  repair,  which  the  traveler  might  have  taken.4 

§  349.  [consolidated  with  §  356.] 

§  350.  What  are  "  defects"  under  statutes. —  As  a  general 
rule,  the  defects  in  highways,  whether  structural  or  otherwise, 
for  which  towns  are  declared  liable  by  statute,  are  those,  and 
only  those,  the  maintenance  of  which,  as  common-law  nui- 
sances, would  subject  a  town  to  indictment.1  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  not  every  nuisance  which  obstructs,  hinders, 
or  endangers  travelers  upon  a  highway  that  constitutes  "  a 
defect,"  within  the  meaning  of  a  statute.2  The  question,  what 
is  a  "  safe  and  convenient  "  road  or  bridge,  or  what  is  a  "  defect 
or  want  of  repair  "  therein,  or  "  an  insufficiency,"  within  the 
meaning  of  those  terms  as  used  in  the  statutes  is,  generally, 
one  of  fact  for  the  jury  upon  the  circumstances  of  each  par- 


3  Palmer  v.  Portsmouth,  43  N.  H. 
285  ;  Briggs  v.  Guilford,  8  Vt.  264 ; 
Clark  v.  Corinth,  41  Id.  449. 

4  State  v.  Fryeburg,  15  Me.  405  ; 
Frost  v.  Portland,  11  Id.  271.  As  to 
what  will  be  held  an  unreasonable 
delay,  see  Boxford  v.  Essex,  7  Pick. 
337. 

1  So  held  in  Massachusetts  (Howard 
v.  North  Bridgewater,  16  Pick.  189) 
and  in  Maine  (Merrill  v.  Hampden, 
26  Me.  234).  In  Goldthwaite  v.  East 
Bridgewater  (5  Gray.  61),  the  real 
question  was  said  to  be,  not  whether 
an  indictment  could  be  maintained 
against  the  town  for  the  alleged  de- 
fect, but  whether  it  was  legally  an- 
swerable to  plaintiff  for  the  injury 
received  therefrom. 

2  Hewison  v.  New  Haven,  34  Conn. 
136,  per  Carpenter,  J.  In  Hixon  v. 
Lowell  (13  Gray,  59),  Hoar,  J.,  said: 
"It  is  obvious  that  there  may  be 
nuisances  upon  traveled  ways  for 
which  there   is   no  remedy  against 


the  town  which  is  bound  by  law  to 
construct  and  maintain  the  way. 
If  the  owner  of  a  distillery,  for  ex- 
ample, or  of  a  manufactory  adjoin- 
ing the  street  of  a  city,  should 
discharge  continuously,  from  a  pipe 
or  orifice  opening  toward  the  street, 
a  quantity  of  steam  or  hot  water,  to 
the  nuisance  and  injury  of  passers- 
by,  they  must  certainly  seek  redress 
in  some  other  mode  than  by  an  action 
for  a  defective  way.  If  the  walls  of 
a  house  adjoining  a  street  in  a  city 
were  erected  in  so  insecure  a  man- 
ner as  to  be  liable  to  fall  upon  per- 
sons passing  by,  or  if  the  eaves- trough 
or  water-conductor  was  so  arranged 
as  to  throw  a  stream  from  the  roof 
upon  the  sidewalk,  there  being  in 
either  case  no  structure  erected  with- 
in or  above  the  traveled  way,  it 
would  not  constitute  a  defect  in  the 
way."  Held,  therefore,  that  a  city 
was  not  liable  for  injury  to  passers- 
by  on  a  sidewalk  for  the  fall  on  him 


§35o] 


HIGHWAYS. 


596 


ticular  case,3  such  as  the  season  of  the  year,  the  hour  of  the 
day  or  night  the  accident  occurred,  the  location  of  the  way 
and  the  use  to  which  it  is  to  be  put,4  as  well  as  the  nature 
of  the  accident  itself.5  Under  the  Maine  statute,  it  has  been 
held  that  a  "  defect  or  want  of  repair  "  is  either  inert  matter 
left  encumbering  the  street,  either  upon  or  over  it,  or  a  struct- 
ural defect  endangering  the  public  travel.6  In  Connecticut,  a 
defect  in  a  highway,  under  the  statute  of  that  state,  is  "  any 


of  an  overhanging  mass  of  snow  and 
ice  from  an  abutting  building.  See 
Barber  v.  Roxbury,  11  Allen,  318, 
per  Gray,  J.  The  overflow  of  a  high- 
way by  a  swollen  river  is  not  "  an 
insufficiency  or  want  of  repair"  of 
the  highway  under  the  New  Hamp- 
shire statute  (Farnum  v.  Concord, 
2  N.  H.  392). 

3  Providence  v.  Clapp,  17  How. 
U.  S.  161;  Green  v.  Danby,  12  Vt.  338; 
Rice  v.  Montpelier,  19  Id.  470  ;  Cas- 
sedy  v.  Stockbridge,  21  Id.  391 ;  Ses- 
sions v.  Newport,  23  Id.  9  ;  Kelsey  v. 
Glover,  15  Id.  708  ;  Merrill  v.  Hamp- 
den, 26  Me.  234  ;  Tripp  v.  Lyman, 
37  Id.  250  ;  Lawrence  v.  Mt.  Vernon, 
35  Id.  100  ;  Fitz  v.  Boston,  4  Cush. 
365  ;  Johnson  v.  Haverhill,  35  N.  H. 
74  ;  Winship  v.  Enfield,  42  Id.  197  ; 
Yeaw  v.  Williams,  15  R.  I.  20  ;  23 
Atl.  33.  Whether  the  town  had 
done  all  that  could  be  reasonably 
required  to  make  the  road  safe,  and 
whether  a  pile  of  rocks  by  the  road- 
side was  a  defect,  is  for  the  jury 
jLee  v.  Bai-khampton,  46  Conn.  213). 
So  whether  the  condition  of  a  rail- 
ing erected  to  mark  out  a  traveled 
way,  and  which  had  fallen  out  of 
repair,  constituted  a  defect  (Pratt  v. 
Amherst,  140  Mass.  167  ;  2  N.  E.  777). 
s  P.,  Hickey  v.  Waltham,  159  Mass. 
460  ;  34  N.  E.  681  [pile  of  dirt  from 
street  excavation]  ;  Farley  v.  Phila- 
delphia, 15  Phila.  290  [pile  of  stones 
suffered  to  remain  on  street  a  week]  ; 
Jackson  v.  Wagner  [Pa.],  17  Atl. 
903  ;  Lane  v.  Hancock,  67  Hun,  623  ; 


22  N.  Y.  Supp.  470  [question  of 
proximate  cause]  ;  Whitney  v.  Mil- 
waukee, 57  Wise.  639  ;  16  N.  W.  12  ; 
Troxel  v.  Vinton,  77  Iowa,  90;  41  N. 
W.  580.  Whether  the  absence  of  a 
hand-rail  on  a  bridge  is  a  defect 
(Dale  v.  Webster  county,  76  Iowa, 
370  ;  41  N.  W.  1),  or  whether  a  side- 
walk should  have  had  thi'ee  stringers 
instead  of  two  (Smith  v.  Pella,  86 
Iowa,  236  ;  53  N.  W.  226),  are  ques- 
tions for  the  jury. 

4  A  municipal  corporation  must 
keep  a  street  in  a  reasonably  safe  con- 
dition, considering  the  use  to  which 
it  is  to  be  put ;  and  where  a  street  is 
in  constant  use  in  a  crowded  part  of 
the  city,  it  is  for  the  jury  to  say 
whether  a  considerable  depression  in 
the  pavement  created  a  condition 
from  which  a  prudent  person  would 
anticipate  an  injury  to  one  using  the 
street  (Smith  v.  New  York,  17  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  438). 

5  Hutchinson 
271  ;  Cleveland 
259  ;  32  Atl.  892. 

6  Therefore,  a  team  temporarily 
stationed  in  the  street,  under  the 
charge  of  the  owner  or  driver,  is  not 
a  defect  or  obstruction  within  the 
meaning  of  the  statute  (Davis  v. 
Bangor,  42  Me.  522).  See  Bigelow 
v.  Weston,  3  Pick.  267;  Snow  v. 
Adams,  1  Cush.  443  ;  Frost  v.  Port- 
land, 11  Me.  271;  Hutchinson  v.  Con- 
cord, 41  Vt.  271;  Ray  v.  Manchester, 
46  N.  H.  59. 


v.    Concord,  41  Vt. 
v.    Bangor,   87  Me. 


597 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§350 


object  in,  upon,  or  near,  the  traveled  path,  which  would  neces- 
sarily obstruct  or  hinder  one  in  the  use  of  the  road  for  the 
purpose  of  traveling  thereon,  or  which,  from  its  nature  and 
position,  would  be  likely  to  produce  that  result."  7  It  is  gen- 
erally held  that  a  statutory  requirement  to  maintain  roads  in 
good  and  sufficient  repair,  or  safe  and  convenient,  and  the  like, 
refers  to  the  surface  of  a  road,  and  to  objects  within  its  bound- 
ary lines,  calculated  to  interfere  with  its  safe  and  convenient 
use,  and  not  to  objects  or  causes  of  interference  outside  the 
highway  on  adjacent  premises.8  Though  such  objects,  if  they 
overhang  the  highway  are  nuisances,  they  are  not  defects  in 
the  highway  which  render  travel  on  it  necessarily  unsafe, 
within  the  meaning  of  the  statute.9  Hence  towns  are  held 
not  liable  to  a  traveler  injured  by  ice  and  snow  falling  on  him 
from   the   roof  of  an   abutting  building,10   or  by  the  fall    of  a 


7  Therefore,  any  object  upon  or 
near  the  traveled  path  (but  within 
the  highway  limits)  which,  in  its 
nature,  is  calculated  to  frighten 
horses  of  ordinary  gentleness,  and 
likely  to  obstruct  the  right  of  way, 
may  constitute  a  defect  in  the  way 
itself  (Hewison  v.  New  Haven,  34 
Conn.  186 ;  and  cases  cited  under 
§  355,  post).  In  Jones  v.  New  Haven 
(34  Conn.  1),  a  dead  limb,  which 
the  city  officers  had  negligently  al- 
lowed to  remain  upon  a  tree  in  a 
public  square,  fell  upon  plaintiff. 
Held,  city  was  liable.  Under  the 
present  Massachusetts  statute  it  is 
held  that  a  city  is  liable  to  one  in- 
jured by  the  falling  of  a  tree  stand- 
ing in  a  public  street,  when  the 
authorities  knew,  or  might  have 
known,  its  dangerous  condition,  and 
took  no  steps  to  remove  it,  or  to 
guard  passers-by  against  it  (Chase 
v.  Lowell,  151  Mass.  422;  24  N.  E. 
212).  Under  the  South  Carolina 
statute;  (Rev.  St.  1893,  §  1582),  a  city 
is  only  liable  for  injuries  caused  by 
"  defects  "  in  the  street,  or  by  its  mis- 
management in   making  repairs  of 


the  street,  and  not  for  injuries  to  a 
horse  caused  by  its  becoming  fright- 
ened at  merchandise  negligently  al- 
lowed to  be  displayed  on  the  street 
(Dunn  v.  Barnwell.  43  S.  C.  398;  21 
S.  E.  315). 

8  Knowlton  v.  Pittsfield,  62  N.  H. 
535;  Hebbard  v.  Berlin,  66  N.  H.  623; 
32  Atl.  229  [horse,  frightened  by 
noise  of  engine  on  adjoining  prop- 
erty, ran  away],  s.  P.,  Farrell  v. 
Oldtown,  69  Me.  72  ;  Keith  v.  Easton, 
2  Allen,  553  [object  outside  traveled 
path  frightened  horse] ;  Chamberlain 
v.  Enfield,  43  N.  H.  356 ;  Hawks  v. 
Northampton,  116  Mass.  420  [defect 
in  a  highway  occasioned  by  the  care- 
less, negligent,  or  unskillful  conduct 
of  a  street  railway  corporation].  A 
town  is  not  liable  for  injuries  occa- 
sioned to  a  traveler  on  the  highway 
by  a  locomotive  engine,  run  fry  a 
railroad  corporation  on  their  track, 
illegally  laic  across  the  highway 
(Vinal  v.  Dorchester,  7  Gray,  421). 

9  Hewison  v.  New  Haven,  34  Conn. 
136. 

10  Hixon  v.  Lowell,  13  Gray,  59. 


§350 


HIGHWAYS. 


598 


sign-board,11  or  awning12  projecting  from  such  building  over 
the  sidewalk,  unless  the  projection  was,  to  some  extent  at 
least,  supported  on  the  sidewalk.13  A  different  rule  prevails 
where  the  liability  of  municipal  corporations  for  defective  high- 
ways is  not  expressly  defined  by  statute.14 

§  351.  Defects  in  margin  of  way.—  Defects  for  which  a  stat- 
ute imposes  a  liability  need  not  be  in  the  wrought  or  usually  trav- 
eled track  of  a  rural  road.  While  all  the  land  over  the  whole 
width  of  such  a  road,  as  laid  out,  need  not  furnish  an  equally 
safe  and  free  passage,1  the  highway  cannot  be  said  to  be  free 
from  "defects  or  want  of  repair,"  or  "safe  and  convenient," 
if  anything  within  the  limits  of  the  highway,  though  outside 
the  traveled  track,  is  calculated  to  interfere  with  or  endanger 
a  traveler  on  the  main  path.2  If  a  traveler,  in  order  to  avoid 
dangerous  defects  or  obstructions  in  the  traveled  path, 
diverges  to  the  margin  of  the  road,  he  is  entitled  to  presume 
it  safe,3  and  the  town    is   liable   for   injuries  sustained  by  him 


11  Jones  v.  Boston,  104  Mass.  75; 
Salisbury  v.  Hershenroder,  106  Id. 
458  [owner  liable  ;  city  not] ;  Taylor 
v.  Peckham,  8  R.  I.  849  [same]. 

12  Hewison  v.  New  Haven,  supra; 
Day  v.  Milford,  5  Allen,  98  ;  Milford 
v.  Holbrook,  9  Id.  17 ;  Drake  v. 
Lowell,  13  Mete.  292. 

13  West  v.  Lynn,  110  Mass.  514; 
Drake  v.  Lowell,  13  Mete.  292. 

14  See  §  354,  post. 

1  Brown  v.  Skowhegan,  82  Me.  273  ; 
19  Atl.  399;  and  cases  in  next  note. 

2  Stinson  v.   Gardner,  42  Me.   248  ; 
Bryant   v.    Biddeford,    39    Id.    193; 
Johnson  v.  Whitefield,    18  Id.  286; 
Morse  v.  Richmond,  41  Vt.  435  ;  Rice 
v.  Montpelier,  19  Id.  470  ;  Dimock  v. 
Suffield,    30     Conn.     129;    Howard 
v.  North  Bridgewater,  16  Pick.  191 
Shepardson  v.  Colerain,  13  Mete.  56 
Bigelow  v.    Weston,    3  Pick.    267 
Cogswell  v.  Lexington,  4  Cush.  307. 
Compare    Young    v.    Yarmouth,    9 
Gray,  386.     If   an  obstruction   out- 
side of  the  traveled  part  renders  the 
road  unsafe,  the  town  will  be  liable 


unless  it  has  made  proper  safeguards 
or  railings  (Willey  v.  Portsmouth, 
35  N.  H.  303).  Accumulations  of 
snow  on  the  margin  of  a  road,  ren- 
dering travel  unsafe,  may  be  a  de- 
fect (Barton  v.  Montpelier,  30  Vt. 
650).  They  are  not,  if  there  is  a  rea- 
sonably safe  and  convenient  path 
anywhere  within  the  limits  (Seeley 
v.  Litchfield,  49  Conn.  134  ;  Willey 
v.  Ellsworth,  64  Me.  57).  Plaintiff's 
horses  becoming  frightened,  got  be- 
yond his  control  and  collided  with  a 
post  several  feet  from  the  traveled 
road.  Held,  that,  though  plaintiff 
knew  of  the  post,  he  could  recover 
(Fowler  v.  Linguist,  138  Ind.  566;  37 
N.  E.  133).  Shade  trees  from  twenty- 
five  to  forty  feet  high,  and  twelve 
feet  in  diameter,  standing  within  a 
sidewalk,  from  eight  to  fifteen  inches 
from  the  curb,  are  obstructions. 
(Chase  v.  Oshkosh,  81  Wise.  313;  51 
N.  W.  560). 

3  Buck  v.  Biddeford,  82  Me.  433  ; 
19  Atl.  912  ;  Steward  v.  Milford,  21 
Wise.  491  ;    Austin  v.  Ritz.  72  Tex. 


599 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§351 


from  pitfalls,  or  other  defects  therein.4  If  such  divergence  is 
unnecessary  and  voluntary,5  as  where  it  is  merely  to  obtain  a 
better  road  at  the  side,  or  where  his  horse  takes  that  direction 
from  natural  instinct,  or  from  inability  to  see  the  road  on 
account  of  the  darkness,  he  cannot  recover  for  injuries 
received.6  If  the  margin  of  a  road  has,  by  use  or  otherwise, 
been  made  a  part  of  the  road,  and  suffered  to  be  used  as  such 


391  ;  9  S.  W.  884.  Where  there  is 
no  visible  sign  to  indicate  that  any 
portion  of  a  road-bed  is  unsafe,  a  per- 
son is  not  obliged  to  follow  the 
beaten  track,  but  has  a  right  to 
travel  over  any  part  of  the  road, 
worked  and  prepared  as  a  road-bed 
(Wakeham  v.  St.  Clair,  91  Mich.  15  ; 
51  N.  W.  696). 

4  If  snow  obstructs  the  usually 
traveled  path,  and  the  only  way 
broken  out  is  at  the  side  over  a 
frozen  ditch,  a  traveler  is  entitled  to 
take  it,  and  the  town  is  liable  for  an 
injury  sustained  (Savage  v.  Bangor, 
40  Me.  176).  If  he  is  forced  into  a 
ditch  by  accident,  and  injury  ensues 
by  reason  of  an  obstruction  placed 
there,  the  town  will  be  liable  (Cas- 
sedy  v,  Stockbridge,  531  Vt.  391  ; 
Chapman  v.  Cook,  10  R.  I.  304.  See 
Stone  v.  Attleborough,  140  Mass.  328  ; 
Pomeroy  v.  Westfield,  154  Id.  462  ; 
28  N.  E.  899). 

5  If  a  traveler  errs  in  judgment  in 
taking  a  side  track  upon  a  highway 
when  the  main  track  is  passable  and 
safe,  although  the  side  track  is  gen- 
erally used,  the  town  is  not  liable 
(Burr  v.  Plymouth,  48  Conn.  460  ; 
O'Laughlin  v.  Dubuque,  42  Iowa, 
539).  In  Smith  v.  Wendell  (7  Cush. 
498),  a  town  was  held  not  liable  to  a 
traveler  passing  from  a  public  high- 
way to  a  railway  station  through  a 
road  opened  by  the  proprietors  of  the 
railroad  for  that  purpose,  for  an  in- 
jury occasioned  by  a  block  of  stone 
lying  within  the  limits  of   the  high- 


way as  located,  and  obstructing  the 
entrance  to  the  road  to  the  station, 
if  it  did  not  obstruct  the  road-bed  of 
the  highway. 

6  Rice  v.  Montpelier,  19  Vt.  470. 
And  see  Dickey  v.  Maine  Telegraph 
Co.,  46  Me.  483;  and  Macomber  v. 
Taunton,  100  Mass.  255,  in  which  a 
town  was  held  not  liable  for  collision 
with  a  hitching  post.  In  Farnum  v. 
Concord  (2  N.  H.  392),  the  injury 
was  occasioned  by  an  excavation  by 
the  side  of  the  road,  although  the 
traveled  way  was  only  twelve  feet 
wide,  and  another  excavation  existed 
on  the  opposite  side,  and  the  whole 
vicinity,  by  the  side  of  the  river, 
was  covered  by  nearly  two  feet  of 
water.  Held,  town  not  liable,  s.  P., 
Joyner  v.  Great  Barrington,  118 
Mass.  463 ;  Marshall  v.  Ipswich,  110 
Id.  522  ;  Ramsey  v.  Rushville  R.  Co., 
81  Ind.  394  ;  Biggs  v.  Huntington, 
32  W.  Va.  55  ;  9  S.  E.  51.  In  Moch- 
ler  v.  Shaftesbury  (46  Vt.  580)  it  was 
held  to  be  the  duty  of  the  town  to 
keep  a  highway  in  sufficient  repair 
for  the  passing  of  teams  going  in  the 
same  direction.  Though  there  was 
no  necessity  for  plaintiff  to  deviate 
from  the  traveled  path,  to  pass  the 
team  in  front  of  him,  and  in  doing  so 
he  was  influenced  by  a  desire  to  keep 
in  company  with  the  party  with 
whom  he  was  traveling,  the  town  was 
liable  for  a  defect  in  the  margin, 
the  liability  of  the  town  not  being 
limited  to  cases  of  absolute  necessity. 


§352] 


HIGHWAYS. 


600 


by  the  town  authorities,  the  town  is  responsible  for  defects   in 
such  part.7 

§  352.  When  whole  width  must  be  passable. —  It  is  obvi- 
ous that  what  would  constitute  a  serious  defect  in  a  highway 
of  a  certain  character  and  location,  might  be  a  very  inconsid- 
erable defect,  or  none  at  all,  in  another  highway.1  What 
would  be  a  safe  and  convenient  road  in  the  country  might  be 
a  very  unsafe  and  inconvenient  street  in  a  city.  The  neces- 
sity in  a  city  street  of  a  smooth  pavement  and  even  grade, 
and  of  a  sufficient  width  to  accommodate  the  exigencies  of 
increased  travel,  does  not   exist  in   a  country  road.2     Hence, 


1  Potter  v.  Castleton,  53  Vt.  435  ; 
Aston  v.  Newton,  134  Mass.  507.  A 
side  of  a  street  rnay  be  in  such  form, 
and  so  used,  with  the  knowledge  and 
acquiescence  of  the  town,  as  to  be  a 
portion  of  the  traveled  part  of  the 
way,  though  no  work  has  been  done 
on  it  to  fit  it  for  the  use  of  pedes- 
trians (Moran  v.  Palmer,  162  Mass. 
196  ;  38  N.  E.  442).  Where  an  open 
and  well-beaten  path  led  from  the 
traveled  path  to  an  apparently  safe 
and  convenient  watering-place  by 
the  side  of  the  road,  but  within  its 
limits,  which  was,  in  fact,  a  deep 
and  miry  pit  covered  with  water, 
into  which  a  traveler's  horse,  being 
turned  there  to  drink,  fell  and  was 
drowned.  Held,  the  town  was  liable 
(Cobb  v.  Standish,  14  Me.  198).  In  that 
case,  Weston,  C.  J.,  said:  "Towns 
are  not  obliged  to  furnish  watering 
places  for  the  public  convenience, 
but,  when  they  are  provided  by 
nature  in  the  highway,  they  ought 
not  to  be  suffered  to  become  pit-falls, 
first  to  allure,  and  then  to  destroy 
horses  or  other  animals  turned  aside 
to  partake  the  refreshment  to  which 
they  are  thus  invited."  Compare 
Hall  v.  Unity,  57  Me.  529. 

1  ' '  The  duty  of  cities  to  keep  their 
streets  and  highways  safe  and  con- 
venient is  not  that  all  parts  of  all 


highways  shall  be  kept  in  like  re- 
pair, and  alike  smooth  and  free 
from  obstruction,  but  that  all  high- 
ways shall  be  kept  in  such  a  con- 
dition as  shall  be  deemed  reason- 
ably safe  and  convenient  "  (per  Colt, 
J.,  Street  v.  Holyoke,  105  Mass.  82, 
84).  A  refusal  to  charge  that,  "the 
duty  of  a  municipal  corporation  to 
keep  its  streets  in  a  reasonably  safe 
condition  for  the  passage  of  pedes- 
trians and  vehicles  extends  to  whole 
width  of  the  street,"  is  proper,  since 
a  city's  duty  is  not  to  keep  every 
street  safe  throughout  its  entire 
width,  regardless  of  location,  amount 
of  travel,  and  other  circumstances 
(Fulliam  v.  Muscatine,  70  Iowa,  436; 
30  N.  W.  861).  Compare  Crystal  v. 
Des  Moines,  65  Iowa,  502  ;  22  N.  W. 
646. 

2  Hull  v.  Eichmond,  2  Woodb.  & 
M.  337  ;  Fitz  v.  Boston,  4  Cush.  365. 
In  the  last  case,  the  court  charged 
that,  "a  different  state  of  repair 
would  be  required  in  a  city,  where 
a  large  amount  and  variety  of  travel 
was  constantly  passing,  than  in  a 
country  place,  where  the  state  of 
things  was  different."  Held,  that 
understanding  "  a  city "  to  be  a 
closely  built  place,  with  a  great 
amount  of  travel,  as  distinguished 
from  a  place  of  opposite  character, 


6oi 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§353 


while  it  will  not  be  required  of  a  country  road  that  its  whole 
width  should  be  wrought  so  as  to  be  everywhere  passable  for 
wheeled  vehicles,3  this  will  be  required  of  a  street  in  a  city.4 
It  may  even  be  doubted  whether  width  for  the  passage  of 
more  than  one  carriage  will  be  required  on  a  country  road, 
in  places  where  ledges  of  rock  or  other  great  natural  obstacles 
interpose.  The  most  that  can  be  required,  in  a  road  of  so 
difficult  a  nature,  is  that  the  sides  should  be  in  such  a  state 
as  would  admit,  without  unusual  delay  or  trouble,  of  the  pass- 
ing of  carriages  when  they  meet,5  or  when  going  in  the  same 
direction.6 

§  353-  Sidewalks  and  street-crossings.  —  Sidewalks *    and 
street-crossings2  being  parts  of  the  public  streets,  the  duty  of 


the  charge  was  not  open  to  excep- 
tion, s.  P.,  Providence  v.  Clapp,  17 
How.  TJ.  S.  161 ;  Loker  v.  Brookline, 
13  Pick.  343,  Drake  v.  Lowell,  13 
Mete.  292  ;  State  v.  Beeman,  35  Me. 
242;  Church  v.  Cherryfield,  33  Id. 
460. 

3  Hull  v.  Richmond,  supra ;  Morse 
v.  Belfast,  77  Me.  41  ;  Perkins  v. 
Fayette,  60  Id.  152  ;  Blake  v.  New- 
field,  Id.  365;  Keyes  v.  Marcellus, 
50  Mich.  439;  15  N.  W.  542  ;  Scran- 
ton  v.  Hill,  102  Pa.  St.  378  ;  Monon- 
gahela  City  v.  Fischer,  111  Id.  9. 

4  A  traveler  has  the  right  to  pre- 
sume that  he  may  drive  with  safety 
over  all  parts  of  a  public  street,  and 
he  is  not  required  to  leave  his  team 
in  the  middle  of  the  street  while 
stopping,  but  may  drive  to  the  side 
of  the  street,  and  near  the  curbing 
(Buck  v.  Biddeford.  82  Me.  433  ;  19 
Atl.  912).  "The  street  and  every 
part  of  it,  by  force  of  the  common 
law,  is  so  far  dedicated  to  the  pub- 
lic that  any  act  or  obstruction  that 
unnecessarily  incommodes  or  im- 
pedes its  lawful  use  by  the  public  is  a 
nuisance"  (per  Haines,  J.,  Durant 
v.  Palmer,  29  N.  J.  L.  544).  s.  P., 
Raymond  v.  Lowell,  6  Cush.  524. 


5  Howard  v.  North  Bridgewater, 
16  Pick.  189  ;  Hull  v.  Richmond,  2 
Woodb.  &  M.  337,  343 ;  Kelsey  v. 
Glover,  15  Vt.  708  ;  Green  v.  Danby, 
12  Id.  338 ;  Loberg  v.  Amherst,  87 
Wise.  634  ;  58  N.  W.  1048. 

6  Mochler  v.  Shaftesbury,  46  Vt. 
580. 

1  See  cases  cited  in  note  3,  §  333, 
ante. 

2  Hines  v.  Lockport,  60  Barb.  378 
Walker  v.  Lockport,  43  How.  Pr.  366 
Barker  v.    Savage,    45   N.    Y.    191 
Brady    v.    Lowell,    3     Cush.     121 
Coombs  v.  Purrington,  42  Me.  332 
Robinson  v.  Western  Pacific  R.  Co., 
48  Cal.  410;    O'Neil  v.    Detroit,  50 
Mich.   133  ;  Shippy  v.  Au  Sable,  85 
Id.  280;  48  N.  W.  584;  Champaign 
v.  Patterson,  50  111.  61.     Under  the 
Massachusetts  statute,  that  part  of 
the  street  which  lies  between  the 
carriage-way    and      the      sidewalk 
should  be  kept  in  such  repair  that 
foot-passengers  may  cross  any  part 
thereof  with  a  reasonable  assurance 
of  safety  ;    and  establishing  raised 
crossings  at  proper  distances  is  not 
sufficient    (Raymond    v.    Lowell,   6 
Cush.  524). 


§353] 


HIGHWAYS. 


602 


municipal  corporations  in  respect  to  their  proper  maintenance, 
so  as  to  be  reasonably  safe  for  pedestrians,  is  the  same  as  the 
duty  in  respect  to  the  traveled  way  for  the  use  of  carriages.3 
When  devoted  to  the  common  use  of  vehicles  and  foot-pas- 
sengers, the  way  must  be  made  reasonably  safe  for  both  classes 
of  travelers.4  It  is  no  part  of  the  duty  of  a  city  to  provide  a 
safe  way,  or  any  way,  by  which  one  may  reach  the  sidewalk 
from  adjoining  premises.5  But  the  entire  width  of  a  sidewalk 
must  be  made  and  kept  reasonably  safe,6  including  the  curb ; 7 
and  if  any  part  of  it  is  taken  up  by  an  open  area,  or  cellar- 
way  connecting  adjoining  premises,  with  or  without  license,  it 
is  an  obstruction  for  negligently  permitting  which  to  remain 
open  or  unguarded,  the  city  is  liable.8     A  sidewalk  must  have 


3  As  to  the  general  duty  to  re- 
pair sidewalks  and  the  degree  of 
care  required,  see  Bacon  v.  Boston, 
3  Gush.  174  ;  Lowell  v.  Spaulding,  4 
Id.  277 ;  Drake  v.  Lowell,  13  Mete. 
292;  Weare  v.  Fitchburg,  110  Mass. 
334  ;  Hall  v.  Manchester,  40  N.  H. 
410  ;  Hubbard  v.  Concord,  35  Id.  54  ; 
Stack  v.  Portsmouth,  52  Id.  221  ; 
Manchester  v.  Hartford,  30  Conn. 
118;  Boucher  v.  New  Haven,  40  Id. 
456  ;  Clemence  v.  Auburn,  66  N.  Y. 
334 ;  Barker  v.  Savage,  45  Id.  191  ; 
Kirk  v.  Homer,  77  Hun,  459  ;  28  N. 
Y.  Supp.  1009  ;  Barstow  v.  Berlin,  34 
Wise.  357 ;  Studley  v.  Oshkosh,  45 
Id.  380;  Furnell  v.  St.  Paul,  20 
Minn.  117 ;  Moore  v.  Minneapolis, 
19  Id.  300 ;  Chicago  v.  Crooker,  2 
111.  App.  279  ;  Warren  v.  Wright,  3 
Id.  602  ;  Rockford  v.  Hildebrand,  61 
III.  155  ;  Chicago  v.  Herz,  87  Id.  541 
Chicago  v.  Langlass,  66  Id.  361 
Chicago  v.  McCarthy,  75  Id.  602 
Higert  v.  Greencastle,  43  Ind.  574 
Market  v.  St.  Louis,  56  Mo.  189 
Barnes  v.  Newton,  46  Iowa,  567 
Hall  v.  Manson,  90  Id.  585  ;  58  N.  W. 
881  ;  Plattsmouth  v.  Mitchell,  20 
Neb.  228 ;  Lincoln  v.  Smith,  28  Id. 
762 ;  45  N.  W.  41  ;  Atlanta  v.  Per- 
due, 53  Ga.  607  ;  Y^earance  v.  Salt 
Lake  City,  6  Utah,  398  ;  24  Pac.  254. 


4Lacon  v.  Page,  48  111.  499. 

6Goodin  v.  Des  Moines,  55  Iowa, 
67  ;  7  N.  W.  411.  A  city  is  not  bound 
to  lay  a  plank  from  each  man's  house 
across  a  ditch  to  the  street,  and  to 
keep  such  planks  in  repair  (McCarthy 
v.  Oshawa,  19  Upper  Canada,  Q.  B. 
245). 

6  Durant  v.  Palmer,  29  N.  J.  Law, 
544  ;  Pittenger  v.  Hamilton,  85  Wise. 
356 ;  55  N.  W.  423 ;  Springfield  v. 
Burns,  51  111.  App.  595  ;  Roe  v.  Kan- 
sas City,  100  Mo.  190  ;  13  S.  W.  404 ; 
Goins  v.  Moberly,  127  Mo.  116;  29  S. 
W.  985  :  Atlanta  v.  Milam,  95  Ga. 
135;  22  S.  E.  43 ;  and  cases  cited 
under  last  section. 

7  Bishop  v.  Goshen,  120  N.  Y.  337  ; 
24  N.  E.  720.  See  Harrigan  v.  Brook- 
lyn, 67  Hun,  85  ;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  39. 

8  McNerney  v.  Reading,  150  Pa.  St. 
611  ;  25  Atl.  57  [unguarded  area,  ex- 
tending into  sidewalk]  ;  Feather  v. 
Reading,  155  Pa.  St.  187  ;  26  Atl.  212  ; 
Lombard  v.  Chicago,  4  Biss.  460  ; 
Evanston  v.  Fitzgerald,  37  111.  App. 
86.  A  city  which  permits  a  cellar- 
way  to  be  constructed  in  the  side- 
walk, not  guarded  in  any  manner, 
except  by  a  trap-door,  which  it  per- 
mits the  persons  occupying  the  ad- 
joining lot  to  open  and  close  at  their 
option,   is  liable  for  any  injury  to  a 


6o3 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§354 


a  smooth  and  even  surface  to  make  it  reasonably  safe,  and  it 
is  no  excuse  for  its  being  otherwise  that  its  surface  was,  in 
part,  a  natural  rock  which  had  been  so  used  for  fifty  years ;  it 
must  be  made  safe  by  removing  its  irregularities;9  or  if  an 
iron  gutter-crossing 10  or  a  sidewalk  made  of  glass  and  iron  u 
has  become  dangerously  smooth  and  slippery  by  long  use,  it  is 
negligence  to  permit  it  to  remain  in  that  condition.  If  the 
sidewalk  is  raised  above  the  grade  of  the  rest  of  the  street,  or 
of  the  adjoining  premises,  it  should  have  guard-rails,  if  neces- 
sary for  the  protection  of  travelers.12  The  liability  for  fail- 
ure to  keep  sidewalks  free  from  snow  and  ice  is  stated  in 
§  363,  post. 

§  354-  Overhanging  roofs,  awnings,  trees,  etc.  —  In 
some  states,  objects  which  do  not  encumber  the  surface  of 
a  highway,  but  merely  overhang,  without  being  supported 
by  it,  are  held  not  to  be  "defects"  under  their  statutes.1 
Elsewhere  the  general  rule  is,  that  if  such  objects  interfere 
with  the  safe  and  convenient  use  of  the  way,  they  are  nuis- 
ances, for  culpably  neglecting  to  abate  which,  having  power 

passer-by  falling  into  the  cellar-way 
when  the  trap-door  is  left  open  (Smith 
v.  Leavenworth,  15  Kans.  81).  To 
same  effect,  Abilene  v.  Cowperth- 
wait,  52  Kans.  324  ;  34  Pac.  795  [trap- 
door over  cellar-way  defectively 
constructed]  ;  Sweeney  v.  Butte,  15 
Mont.  274:  39  Pac.  286  [same]  ;  Mc- 
Clure  v.  Sparta,  84  Wise.  269;  54  N.W. 
337  [hatchway  improperly  located]; 
Bowen  v.  Huntington,  35  W.  Va.  682; 
14  S.  E.  217  [excavation  in  sidewalk 
by  lot-owner  to  lay  pavement  as 
directed  by  city];  Langan  v.  Atchi- 
son, 35  Kans.  318  ;  11  Pac.  38  [show- 
board  partly  on  sidewalk].  It  is  for 
the  jury  to  say  whether  a  town  is 
negligent  in  allowing,  in  a  nine- foot 
sidewalk,  a  cellar-way  more  than 
four  feet  each  way,  without  perma- 
nent guards,  and  with  a  plank  trap- 
door often  left  open  when  the  way  is 
not  in  use  (Lichtenberger  v.  Meri- 
den,  91  Iowa,  45;  58  N.  W.  1058). 
9Higginsv.  Glens  Falls,  57  Hun, 


594  ;  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  289  ;  affi'd,  124 
N.  Y.  666  ;  27  N.  E.  855. 

10  Lyon  v.  Logansport,  9  Ind.  App. 
21;  35  N.  E.  128. 

11  Cromarty  v.  Boston,  127  Mass. 
329.  s.  P.,  Chicago  v.  McGiven,  78 
111.  347  [plate  glass  set  into  sidewalk]; 
Quincy  v.  Barker,  81  Id.  300 ;  Chi- 
cago v.  Bixby,  84  Id.  82 ;  Cook  v. 
Milwaukee,  24  Wise.  270  ;  Perkins 
v.  Fond  du  Lac,  34  Id.  435  ;  Grossen- 
back  v.  Milwaukee,  65  Id.  31  ;  23  N. 
W.  86  ;  Broburg  v.  Des  Moines,  63 
Iowa,  523  ;  19  N.  W.  340 ;  McKellar 
v.  Detroit,  157  Mich.  158 ;  23  N.  W. 
621  ;  Roe  v.  New  Y^ork,  56  N.  Y. 
Superior,  298;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  447 
[iron  gutter-plate]. 

19  Smith  v.  Clarkstown,  69  Hun,  155; 
23  N.  Y.  Supp.  245  ;  Mt.  Vernon  v. 
Brooks,  39  111.  App.  426 ;  Kansas 
City  v.  Manning,  50  Kans.  373  ;  31 
Pac.  1104 ;  and  cases  cited  under 
§  356,  post. 

1  See  §  350,  ante. 


§354] 


HIGHWAYS. 


604 


to  do  so,2  the  municipality  is  liable  to  one  on  the  highway- 
injured  by  their  falling  on  him,  or  otherwise.  It  is,  there- 
fore, actionable  negligence  for  a  city  to  permit  an  obvi- 
ously defective  awning,3  cornice,4  tree,5  or  banner6  to  remain 
overhanging  a  highway,  or  a  ruinous  wall7  to  stand  on  or  near 
the  edge  of  a  street,  which  is  likely  to  fall  into  it.  The  question 
in  every  case  is,  whether  the  city  was  culpably  negligent  in  per- 
mitting the  wall  or  other  thing  to  remain;  for  it  is  not  a  guar- 
antor to  travelers  against  falling  walls  or  other  objects  outside 
the  highway,  not  belonging  to  it.8  Of  course,  the  owner,  as 
supporting  a  nuisance,  is  also  liable  for  the  damages  occasioned 
by  it.9     Under  its  general  obligation  to  use  diligence  to  secure 


"  In  Grove  v.  Fort  Wayne  (45 
lnd.  439),  a  cornice  of  a  building, 
projecting  over  a  sidewalk,  was  so 
constructed  as  to  be  dangerous  to 
passers-by  on  the  sidewalk ;  Held  a 
nuisance  ;  and  as  the  city  had  power 
to  abate  it,  failure  to  do  so  rendered 
it  liable  to  a  passenger  on  the  side- 
walk, injured  by  the  fall  of  the  cor- 
nice. See  Watkins  v.  County  Court, 
30  W.  Va.  657;  5  S.  E.  654.  There 
held,  defendant  not  liable  because 
without  power  to  remove  an  over- 
hanging tree. 

3  Bieling  v.  Brooklyn,  120  N.  Y.  98  ; 
24  N.  E.  389  [awning  not  securely 
attached  to  the  adjoining  building 
had  been  permitted  to  remain  in 
that  condition  for  a  long  time  under 
a  heavy  accumulation  of  snow]  ; 
Hume  v.  New  York,  74  N.  Y,  264. 
On  the  first  appeal  in  this  case  (47 
N.  Y.  639  ;  affi'g  9  Hun,  674) ,  it  was 
held  that  as  the  awning  fell  by 
reason  of  a  latent  defect,  no  negli- 
gence was  shown.  On  a  new  trial, 
the  defect  was  shown  to  be  obvious, 
and  city  held  liable  (74  N.  Y.  264). 
s.  p.,  Bohen  v.  Waseca,  32  Minn. 
176;  Duffy  v.  Dubuque,  63  Iowa, 
171  ;  18  N.  W.  900. 

4  Grove  v.  Fort  Wayne,  supra. 

5  Jones  v.  New  Haven,  34  Conn.  1; 


Chase  v.    Lowell,  151  Mass.  422 ;  24 
N.  E.  212. 

6Champ1.ain  v.  Penn  Yan,  34  Hun, 
33. 

7  Kiley  v.  Kansas  City,  69  Mo. 
102 ;  Parker  v.  Macon,  39  Ga.  725  ; 
Savannah  v.  Waldner,  49  Id.  324,  and 
Hardy  v.  Keene,  52  N.  H.  370  [fall  of 
a  derrick].  These  cases  are  dis- 
tinguished in  Cain  v.  Syracuse,  95 
N.  Y.  83.  See,  also,  Anderson  v. 
East,  117  lnd.  126. 

8  Cain  v.  Syracuse,  95  N.  Y.  83  ; 
Hume  v.  New  York,  47  Id.  639  ;  74 
Id.  264  (see  note  3,  supra) ;  Norri6- 
town  v.  Moyer,  67  Pa.  355  [fall  of 
rotten  liberty  pole,  erected  by  third 
persons  years  before]. 

9  Bemis  v.  Temple,  162  Mass.  342 ; 
38  N.  E.  970  [flag  hung  over  street 
frightening  horses].  Defendant  neg- 
ligently ran  a  guy  wire  from  a  tele- 
graph pole  across  the  street,  and 
plaintiff's  horse,  becoming  fright- 
ened, ran  into  and  broke  the  wire, 
causing  it  to  strike  and  injure  plain- 
tiff. Held,  defendant's  negligence 
was  the  proximate  cause  of  the 
injury  (Lundeen  v.  Livingston 
Electric  Light  Co.,  17  Mont.  32  ;  41 
Pac.  995).  To  same  effect,  Albany  v. 
Watervliet,  etc.  R.  Co.,  76  Hun.  136  ; 
27  N.  Y.  Supp.  848.  See  other  cases 
cited  in  notes  11  to  15,  §  343,  ante. 


605 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§355 


the  safety  of  its  highways,  or  as  the  owner10  of  trees  standing 
within  a  street  or  public  place,  a  town  is  bound  to  see  that 
such  trees  are  kept  trimmed,11  or  if  likely  to  fall  from  decay, 
to  remove  them,12  and  is  liable  to  persons  on  the  high- 
way for  injuries  from  overhanging  or  falling  branches.  An 
abutting  owner  is  certainly  not  responsible  for  the  condition 
of  trees  on  the  highway,13  although  originally  planted  by  him.14 

§  355-  Objects  on  highway  likely  to  frighten  horses.  — 
Whether  an  object  in  a  highway  which  is  calculated  to  frighten 
horses  of  ordinary  gentleness  is  a  "defect"  in  the  highway, 
or  renders  it  "  unsafe  and  insufficient "  within  the  meaning 
of  a  particular  statute,  for  which  a  town  is  liable,  depends 
upon  the  meaning  to  be  given  these  words.  The  courts 
of  Vermont,1  New  Hampshire,2  Connecticut,3  Rhode  Island,4 
Michigan  5  and  Wisconsin  6  have  held,  under  their  respective 
statutes,  that   any  such  object  in  a  highway,  the  natural  effect 


10  Jones  v.  New  Haven,  34  Conn.  1 
[ownership  emphasized] . 

11  It  is  negligence,  for  which  a  town 
is  liable,  to  allow,  for  a  long  period, 
the  branches  of  a  tree  at  the  side  of 
a  road  to  overhang  its  traveled  part 
so  low  as  to  cause  one  driving  a  load 
of  hay  thereunder  to  be  pulled  off 
and  injured  (Embler  v.  "Wallkill, 
132  N.  Y.  222  ;  30  N.  E.  404  ;  Jones 
v.  New  Haven,  supra). 

12  Chase  v.  Lowell,  151  Mass.  422  ; 
24  N.  E.  212  [fall  of  decayed  tree]  ; 
Vosper  v.  New  YTork,  49  N.  Y\  Su- 
perior, 296  ;  Gubasco  v.  New  York, 
12  Daly,  183. 

13  Weller  v.  McCormick,  52  N.  J. 
Law,  470. 

14  Graves  v.  Shattuck,  35  N.  H. 
257. 

1  Morse  v.  Richmond,  41  Vt.  435 
[burning  piles  of  hay]. 

'Winship  v.  Enfield,  42  N.  H. 
199  ;  Chamberlain  v.  Enfield,  43  Id. 
358 ;  Littleton  v.  Richardson,  32  Id. 
59  [piles  of  lumber] ;  Bartlett  v. 
Harksett,  48  Id.  18  [a  pig-stye  occu- 
pied by  swine  whose  "starting  and 
running    about"    frightened    plain- 


tiff's horses].     Compare  Ray  v.  Man- 
chester, 46  Id.  59. 

3  Dimock  v.  Suffield,  30  Conn. 
129 ;  Hewison  v.  New  Haven,  34  Id. 
136  ;  Y'oung  v.  New  Haven,  39  Id. 
435  ;  Goshen  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Sears, 
7  Conn.  86  [harness  broke  by  reason 
of  obstruction  in  turnpike,  causing 
horse  through  fright  to  run  away 
with  the  wagon,  which  collided  with 
plaintiff's  vehicle;  latter  may  re- 
cover] :  Hunt  v.  Pownall,  9  Vt.  411. 

4  Bennett  v.  Lovell,  12  R.  I.  166 
[machinery  left  on  roadside]  ;  Ben- 
nett v.  Fifield,  13  Id.  139. 

5  See  Agnew  v.  Corunna,  55  Mich. 
428  ;  21  N.  W.  873  ;  Beall  v.  Athens, 
81  Mich.  536  ;  45  N.  W.  1014  ;  Simons 
v.  Casco,  105  Mich.  588  ;  63  N.  W.  500. 

6  Foshay  v.  Glen  Haven,  25  Wise. 
288;  Jackson  v.  Bellevieu,  30  Id. 
250  ;  Hawes  v.  Fox  Lake,  33  Id.  438  ; 
Bloor  v.  Delafield,  69  Id.  273  ;  34  N. 
W.  115  ;  Cairncross  v.  Pewaukee,  86 
Wise.  181 ;  56  N.  W.  648  ;  Laird  v. 
Otsego,  90  Wise.  25  ;  62  N.  W.  1042. 
For  interpretation  of  South  Carolina 
statute  on  this  point,  see  Dunn  v. 
Barnwell,  23  S.  C.  398  ;  21  S.  E.  315. 


§355] 


HIGHWAYS. 


606 


of  which  is  to  frighten  horses,  is  an  obstruction  of  the  highway 
which  the  town  is  bound  to  remove,  and  failing  to  do  so,  is 
liable  for  the  damages  proximately  caused  thereby.  Appar- 
ently the  statutes  of  Maine  and  Massachusetts  have  been 
interpreted  differently.7  When  there  is  no  question  of  statu- 
tory construction,  the  true  rule  is,  in  the  first  place,  that  any 
object  in  a  highway  naturally  calculated8  to  frighten  horses  is 
a  public  nuisance,  for  negligently  omitting  to  remove  which,  or 
to  prevent  its  doing   an   injury,  the  corporation  charged  with 


'  See  Card  v.  Ellsworth,  63  Me. 
547  ;  Clark  v.  Lebanon,  63  Id.  393 ; 
Perkins  v.  Fayette,  68  Id.  152  ; 
Anderson  v.  Bath,  42  Id.  346  ;  Moul- 
ton  v.  Sanford,  51  Id.  127  ;  Keith  v. 
Easton,  2  Allen,  552  [horse  fright- 
ened by  itinerant  daguerrean  saloon 
standing  on  margin  of  road]  ;  Kings- 
bury v.  Dedharn,  13  Id.  186  [pile  of 
gravel  fifteen  inches  high]  ;  Cook  v. 
Charlestown,  98  Mass.  80  [carcase  of 
dead  horse  in  highway].  See  Lund 
v.  Tyngsborough,  11  Cush.  563  ;  Hor- 
ton  v.  Taunton,  97  Mass.  563.  But 
more  recent  decisions  seem  to  ac- 
cept the  New  Hampshire  rule  (Stone 
v.  Hubbardston,  100  Mass.  49  ;  Davis 
v.  Charlton,  140  Id.  422  [horse  fright- 
ened at  the  flapping  of  a  cloth  which 
had  been  placed  over  a  hay-cock  by 
the  side  of  the  road,  and  from  five 
to  eight  feet  from  the  traveled  part ; 
evidence  for  jury]).  Compare  Cole 
v.  Newburyport,  129  Id.  594  [a  van 
four  feet  from  highway] ;  Bemis  v. 
Arlington,  114  Id.  507  [large  stones 
left  in  highway]  ;  Cook  v.  Montague, 
115  Id.  517  [piece  of  stone]  ;  Bowes 
v.  Boston,  155  Mass.  344  ;  29  N.  E. 
633. 

8  The  complaint  must  aver  that 
defendant's  act  would  naturally 
frighten  a  roadworthy  horse  (Keeley 
Brewing  Co.  v.  Parnin,  13  Ind.  App. 
588  ;  41  N.  E.  471).  A  town  is  not  lia- 
ble for  a  horse's  shying  in  conse- 
quence of  ordinary  stones,  such  as 
are  used  to  build  stone  walls,  lying 


by  the  side  of  the  road,  outside  of 
the  travel  path,  and  with  nothing 
strange  or  peculiar  in  their  appear- 
ance (McCord  v.  Ossining,  45  Hun, 
592  ;  10  N.  Y.  State  407).  An  in- 
struction that,  to  warrant  a  finding 
of  negligence,  the  stones  must  have 
been  so  placed  as  "  necessarily  "  to 
frighten  horses,  is  properly  refused 
(Wilson  v.  Spafford,  57  Hun,  589; 
10  N.  Y.  Supp.  649).  Evidence  that 
other  horses  had  been  frightened  by 
the  same  stones  at  about  the  time  of 
the  accident  is  admissible  as  bearing 
on  the  question  whether  or  not  the 
stones  were  calculated  to  frighten 
horses  (lb.).  Instead  of  removing  a 
natural  boulder  whose  only  pecu- 
liarity was  its  large  size,  and  which 
was  imbedded  in  the  earth  in  the 
line  of  a  highway,  the  town  con- 
structed a  road  of  sufficient  width 
around  it,  the  road  being  straight  on 
each  side,  and  the  rock  visible  for  a 
quarter  of  a  mile.  Held,  town  not 
liable  to  a  traveler  injured  because 
of  his  horse  taking  fright  at  the 
boulder  (Barrett  v.  Walworth,  64 
Hun,  526  ;  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  557).  Al- 
lowing two  lumber  wagons  to  stand 
in  front  of  a  wagon  shop,  upon  the 
side  of  a  street  three  rods  wide,  is 
not  negligence  which  will  make  vil- 
lage liable  to  one  whose  horse  is 
frightened  by  coming  upon  the 
wagons  at  night  (Studeor  v.  Gouver- 
neur,  15  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  229  ;  44 
N.  Y.  Supp.  122). 


607 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§355 


the  safe  condition  of  the  highway  is  responsible ; 9  and,  in  the 
next  place,  that  any  individual  who  does  anything  likely 10  to 
frighten  a  traveler's  horse  —  e.  g.,  exploding  fire-crackers  in 
the  street  (even  on  the  Fourth  of  July11)  — is  liable  for  any 
damage  which  may  result  from  the  fright  of  the  horse,  either 
to  the  owner  of  the  horse,12  or  to  any  other  person  whom  the 
frightened  horse  may  injure.13 


9  Chicago  v.  Hoy,  75  111.  530 
[dead  animal  left  to  remain  in 
street]  ;  McKee  v.  Bidwell,  74  Pa. 
St.  218).  s.  P.,  Baker  v.  North 
East,  151  Id.  234;  24  Atl.  1079 
[water  escaping  from  water  pipe  in 
street  with  hissing  sound] ;  North 
Manheim  v.  Arnold,  119  Pa.  St.  380  ; 
13  Atl.  444  [pile  of  lumber  on  mar- 
gin of  highway] ;  Topeka  v.  Tuttle, 
5  Kans.  311 ;  Stanley  v.  Davenport, 
54  Iowa,  463  ;  2  N.  W.  1064  ;  6  Id.  706  ; 
Crawfordsvillev.  Smith,  79  Ind.  308  ; 
Rushville  v.  Adams,  107  Ind.  475  ;  8 
N.  E.  292;  Campbell  v.  Stillwater, 
32  Minn.  308  ;  20  N.  W.  320  ;  Van- 
dalia  v.  Huss,  41  111.  App.  517  [pile 
of  shavings,  three  or  four  feet  high, 
on  the  side  of  the  road]  ;  Sullivan 
county  v.  Sisson,  2  Ind.  App.  311  ; 
28  N.  E.  374.  Compare  Cole  v.  New- 
buryport,  129  Mass.  594 ;  Little  v. 
Madison,  49  Wise.  605  [horses  fright- 
ened by  animals  exhibited  in  street 
under  license] ;  and  cases  cited  under 
§  263,  ante.  The  mere  use  of  a 
steam-roller  does  not  render  a  street 
"  defective  "  within  the  meaning  of 
the  statute,  but  it  is  negligence  not 
to  give  warning  of  its  approach,  and 
otherwise  use  reasonable  care  in 
operating  (Mullen  v.  Glens  Falls,  11 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  275  ;  42  N.  Y.  Supp. 
1129. 

10  Negligence  cannot  be  predicated 
upon  the  mere  fact  that  a  person 
engaged  in  making  a  lawful  exca- 
vation in  the  street  shoveled  dirt 
out  of  the  same  while  horses  were 
passing,  and  they  were  thereby 
caused  to  shy  (Nilan  v.  Richmond 


Gas  Co.,  1  App.  Div.  234;  37  N.  Y. 
Supp.  259).  To  same  effect,  Rowell 
v.  Stamford  R.  Co.,  64  Conn.  376; 
30  Atl.  131  ;  Kyne  v.  Wilmington, 
etc.  R.  Co.  (Del.),  14  Atl.  922  [rail- 
road car  standing  on  highway  at 
night,  not  calculated  to  frighten  an 
ordinarily  gentle  horse].  Compare 
Ohio,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Trowbridge,  126 
Ind.  391  ;  26  N.  E.  64  [hand-car  left 
on  road  ;  defendant  liable]. 

11  Conklin  v.  Thompson,  29  Barb. 
218;  Cole  v.  Fisher,  11  Mass.  137 
[discharging  fire-arm]  ;  Hill  v.  Char- 
lotte, 72  N.  C.  55  [fireworks]. 

»  Baxter  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  87 
Iowa,  488  ;  54  N.  W.  350  [steer  killed 
by  train,  left  on  highway]  ;  Hindman 
v.  Timme,  8  Ind.  App.  416  ;  35  N.  E. 
1046  [sick  cow,  likely  to  die,  left  on 
road  ;  horse  frightened  by  its  car- 
case] ;  Ouverson  v.  Grafton,  5  N. 
Dak.  281  ;  65  N.  W.  676  [steam 
thrashing  machine]  ;  Turner  v.  Bu- 
chanan, 82  Ind.  147  [steam  engine  in 
street].  The  fact  that  the  fright  was 
increased  by  the  rattle  of  the  wagon 
and  its  contents  will  not  prevent  a 
recovery  (lb.).  One  who,  driving 
along  a  street  beside  railway  tracks, 
was  injured  by  his  horses  taking 
fright  at  a  passing  train,  may  re- 
cover, if  defendant  could,  by  the  ex- 
ercise of  ordinary  care,  have  pre- 
vented the  injury  (Moore  v.  Kansas 
City,  etc.  R.  Co..  126  Mo.  265:  29  S. 
W.  9).  As  to  liability  of  railroad 
companies  for  frightening  animals 
on  highways,  see  §  426,  post. 

,3Lowery  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  99 
N.  Y.  158  :   1  N.  E.  608  ;   Marble  v. 


§356] 


HIGHWAYS. 


608 


§  356.  Duty  to  guard  and  light  defective  way.  —  A  town 
is  not  bound  to  fence  its  highway  so  as  to  prevent  travelers 
from  straying  out  of  its  limits  j1  yet,  where  the  limits  of  a  high- 
way are  not  indicated  by  any  visible  objects,  and  there  is 
nothing  to  show  a  traveler  in  the  evening  that  the  course  he 
is  pursuing  is  not  within  the  way  intended  for  public  travel,  the 
town  is  liable  for  injuries  resulting  from  a  defect  within 
the  general  course  and  direction  of  travel,  although  without  the 
limits  of  the  located  way,  if  so  near  the  located  way  as  to 
render  traveling  there  dangerous,  and  there  is  nothing  to  give 
travelers  notice  of  the  defect  until  too  late  to  avoid  it.2  Where 
a  rail  or  barrier  is  necessary  for  the  proper  security  of  travelers 
at  places  on  the  road  which  from  their  nature  would  be  other- 
wise unsafe,3  the  maintenance  of  which  would  have  prevented 

dark  night  turned  on  a  curve.  In- 
stead of  following  the  curve,  the 
horses  continued  straight  ahead, 
falling  into  an  excavation  just  off 
the  highway,  within  eleven  feet  of 
the  beaten  path.  Held,  that  the 
absence  of  a  ditch  or  barrier  at  the 
curve  was  proof  of  negligence.  A 
town  changed  the  course  of  a  river- 
crossing  and  erected  a  new  bridge, 
leaving  the  old  bridge  in  a  defective 
condition,  but  failed  to  maintain  a 
barrier  warning  travelers  of  the 
change.  Held,  the  town  was  liable 
for  a  defect  in  the  old  bridge 
(Schuenke  v.  Pine  River,  84  Wise. 
669  ;  54  N.  W.  1007).  A  city  is  liable 
for  a  defective  bridge  built  by  mill- 
owners  in  a  public  highway,  and  by 
the  side  of  a  public  bridge,  where 
the  public  are  allowed  to  use  both 
indiscriminately,  without  notice  that 
both  are  not  public  (Detwiler  v. 
Lansing,  95  Mich.  484  ;  55  N.  W. 
361).  s.  p.,  Ireland  v.  Oswego,  etc. 
Turnpike  Co.,  13  N.  Y.  526  ;  Cobb  v. 
Standish,  14  Me.  198.  See  the  last 
case  commented  on  in  Rice  v.  Mont- 
pelier,  19  Vt.  470. 

3  Kimball  v.  Bath,  38  Me.  219; 
Palmer  v.  Andover,  2  Cush.  600; 
Britton  v.  Cummington,  107   Mass. 


Worcester,  70  Mass.  395 ;  Lee  v. 
Union  R.  Co.,  12  R.  I.  383  ;  Piollet 
v.  Simmers,  106  Pa.  St.  95  ;  and  cases 
cited  under  §  37,  ante.  A  person 
who  drives  a  wagon  covered  with 
flags,  as  an  advertising  medium, 
through  the  principal  streets  of  a 
city,  is  liable  if  a  horse  of  ordinary 
gentleness  runs  away  from  fright 
thereat,  and  injures  another  (Jones 
v.  Snow,  56  Minn.  214  ;  57  N.  W.  478). 

1  Sparhawk  v.  Salem,  1  Allen,  30 ; 
Adams  v.  Natick,  13  Id.  429 ;  War- 
ner v.  Holyoke,  112  Mass.  362  ;  Ran- 
dall v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  106  Id.  276  ; 
Marshall  v.  Ipswich,  110  Id.  522  ; 
Dailey  v.  Worcester,  131  Id.  452  ; 
Chapman  v.  Cook,  10  R.  I.  304  ; 
Keyes  v.  Marcellus,  50  Mich.  439  ;  15 
N.  W.  542. 

2  Hay  den  v.  Attleborough,  7  Gray, 
338 ;  Davis  v.  Hill,  41  N.  H.  329  ; 
Willey  v.  Portsmouth,  35  Id.  303  ; 
Morris  v.  Litchfield,  35  Id.  271  ; 
Coggswell  v.  Lexington,  4  Cush.  307  ; 
see  Tuttle  v.  Holyoke,  6  Gray,  447 ; 
Blake  v.  Newfield,  68  Me.  365  ;  Willey 
v.  Ellsworth,  64  Id.  57  ;  Jewhurst  v. 
Syracuse,  108  N.  Y.  303  ;  15  N.  E. 
409.  In  Ivory  v.  Deerpark  (116  N. 
Y.  476  ;  22  N.  E.  1080),  the  road  on 
which   plaintiff   was  driving   on    a 


6og  HIGHWAYS.  [§  356 

the  happening  of  injury,4  it  is  negligence  not  to  construct  and 


347 ;  Hunt  v.  Pownal,  9  Vt.  411  ; 
Bronson  v.  Southbury,  37  Conn.  199. 
Compare  Morgan  v.  Hallo  well,  57 
Me.  375  ;  Collins  v .  Dorchester,  6 
Cush.  396.  It  is  negligence  not  to 
fence  a  sand-pit  when  it  is  so  near  a 
street,  and  its  surroundings  are  such, 
that  the  city  authorities,  in  the  exer- 
cise of  reasonable  judgment,  should 
anticipate  that  children  would  enter 
the  pit  to  play,  and  would  excavate 
in  the  bank  to  such  an  extent  as  to 
endanger  their  lives  (Talty  v.  Atlan- 
tic, 92  Iowa,  135 ;  60  N.  W.  516  ; 
Haw  ley  v.  Atlantic,  92  Iowa,  172  ; 
60  N.  W.  519  ;  Denver  v.  Soloman, 
2  Colo.  App.  534  ;  31  Pac.  507  ;  Au- 
rora v.  Seidelman,  34  111.  App.  285 
[ditch  in  street] ;  see  §  370,  post). 
' '  The  law  has  nowhere  undertaken 
to  define  at  what  distance  in  feet 
and  inches  a  dangerous  place  must 
be  from  the  highway  in  order  to 
cease  to  be  in  close  proximity  to  it. 
It  must  necessarily  be  a  practical 
question,  to  be  decided  on  the  good 
sense  and  experience  of  the  jury" 
(Warner  v.  Holyoke,  112  Mass.  362). 
Railings  are  necessary  only  when 
defects  are  in  such  close  proximity 
as  to  make  it  unsafe  to  travel 
reasonably  near  the  boundary  of 
the  traveled-way  (Stockwell  v. 
Fitchburg,  110  Mass.   305  ;  Murphy 


v.  Gloucester,  105  Id.  470;  Potter 
v.  Castleton,  53  Vt.  435  ;  Scott  v. 
Montgomery,  95  Pa.  St.  444 ;  Pitts- 
ton  v.  Harts,  89  Id.  389).  It  has 
been  held  that  a  barrier  was  not 
necessary  when  the  defect  was 
thirty-four  feet  from  the  traveled 
way  (Barnes  v.  Chicopee,  138  Mass. 
67) ;  twenty-five  feet  (Murphy  v. 
Gloucester,  105  Id  470);  twenty  to 
thirty  feet  (Puffer  v.  Orange,  122  Id. 
389);  twenty-eight  feet  (Daily  v. 
Worcester,  131  Id.  452);  Kelly  v. 
Columbus,  41  Ohio  St.  263) ;  fifty  to 
100  feet  (Chapman  v.  Cook,  10  R.  I. 
304).  Held,  that  a  barrier  was  neces- 
sary when  the  defect  was  fourteen 
inches  from  the  traveled  way  (Woods 
v.  Groton,  111  Mass.  357) ;  twenty- 
eight  inches  (Halpin  v.  Kansas  City, 
76  Mo.  335) ;  six  inches  (Drew  v. 
Sutton,  55  Vt.  586).  See  Puffer 
v.  Orange,  122  Mass.  389  ;  Warner  v. 
Holyoke,  112  Id.  362.  No  railing  is 
necessary  along  a  sidewalk  which  is 
level  with  the  adjacent  land,  and 
the  city  is  not  liable  to  one  injured 
by  walking  off  the  sidewalk  and 
slipping  on  ice  covered  with  snow, 
on  such  land,  and  it  is  immaterial 
that  the  line  of  the  highway  is  not 
marked  (Damon  v.  Boston,  149  Mass. 
147 ;  21  N.  E.  235).  Guard-rails  along 
an  embankment,  which  is  separated 


4  See  cases  cited  under  §§  26, 31  and 
32,  ante;  Miller  v.  Boone  county. 
95  Iowa,  5;  63  N.  W.  352:  plain- 
tiff pushed  from  street  down  an  un- 
guarded and  dangerous  declivity  by 
a  crowd];  Durgin  v.  Lowell,  3  Allen, 
398.  Compare  Shepherd  v.  Chelsea, 
4  Allen,  113;  Richards  v.  Enfield,  13 
Gray,  344  ;  Rowell  v.  Lowell,  7  Id. 
100  ;  Hinckley  v.  Sumerset,  115  Mass. 
826 ;  14  N.  E.  166 :  Stacy  v.  Phelps, 
47  Hun,  54  ;  O'Rourke  v.  Monroe.  98 
[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  11  —  39] 


Mich.  520  ;  57  N  W.  738  :  Gilchrist 
v.  South  Omaha,  36  Neb.  163  ;  54  N. 
W.  258  ;  Omaha  v.  Jenson,  35  Neb. 
68  ;  52  N.  W.  833.  The  mere  fact 
of  an  accident  occurring  by  reason 
of  a  failure  to  place  railings  on  a 
highway  is  not  sufficient  evidence  of 
negligence  to  go  to  the  jury  (Lane  v. 
Hancock,  142  N.  Y.  510;  37  N.  E. 
473  ;  and  cases  cited  under  §  316, 
ante). 


§  356]  HIGHWAYS.  610 

properly  maintain  such  a  barrier.5     During  the  progress  of  the 


from  the  carriageway  by  a  wide 
6ide-walk,  are  not  necessary  for  the 
6afety  of  travelers  by  carriage  (Hub- 
bell  v.  Yonkers,  104  N.  Y.  434  ;  10 
N.  E.  858).  In  Glasier  v.  Hebron 
(131  N.  Y.  447  ;  30  N.  E.  239  ;  rev'g 
62  Hun,  137),  plaintiff's  horse  becom- 
ing frightened,  backed  down  an  em- 
bankment into  a  pond.  The  road 
had  been  used  for  nearly  fifty  years, 
during  which  time  no  similar  acci- 
dent had  ever  happened,  and  the 
break  in  the  woods  skirting  the 
boundary  between  the  pond  and  the 
highway,  through  which  the  horse 
backed,  was  only  from  eight  to  twelve 
feet  long.  Held,  that  failure  to  guard 
such  a  short  distance  under  the  cir- 
cumstances, was  not  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  negligence  to  submit  the 
case  to  a  jury.  A  road,  dug  out 
upon  a  hillside,  ascending  on  a 
grade  of  one  foot  in  ten,  sixteen  feet 
wide,  level  from  side  to  side,  and 
not  shown  to  be  dangerous,  and 
otherwise  in  good  condition,  held 
not  defective  for  want  of  a  guard  on 
its  outer  edge  (Patchen  v.  Walton, 
17  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  159;  45  N.  Y. 
Supp.  145).  To  same  effect,  Maxim 
v.  Champion,  50  Hun,  88 ;  4  N.  Y. 
Supp.  515  [embankment  ten  feet  wide 
eleven  feet  high  across   a  ravine]  ; 


Hyatt  v.  Rondout,  44  Barb.  385; 
Logan  v.  New  Bedford,  157  Mass. 
534  ;  32  N.  E.  910  [embankment  three 
feet  high ;  barrier  unnecessary]  ; 
Glasier  v.  Hebron,  82  Hun,  311  ;  31 
N.  Y.  Supp.  236  [barrier  unneces- 
sary on  embankment  where  high- 
way is  seventeen  feet  wide  and 
level]  ;  Waller  v.  Hebron,  5  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  577  ;  39  N.  Y.  Supp. 
381  [embankment  nineteen  inches 
high ;  guard  unnecessary].  The 
question  whether  a  guard-rail  or 
barrier  was  necessary  at  any  part 
of  a  road  is  generally  for  the  jury 
(Drew  v.  Sutton,  55  Vt.  586  ;  War- 
ner v.  Holyoke,  112  Mass.  362;  Van 
Gaasbeck  v.  Saugerties,  82  Hun,  415  ; 
31  N.  Y.  Supp.  354  ;  Burns  v.  Yonk- 
ers, 83  Hun,  211 ;  31  N.  Y.  Supp. 
757  ;  Plymouth  v.  Graver,  125  Pa. 
St.  24  ;  17  Atl.  249  ;  Wellman  v. 
Susquehanna  Depot,  167  Pa.  St.  239  ; 
31  Atl.  566  ;  Day  v.  Mt.  Pleasant,  70 
Iowa,  193  ;  30  N.  W.  853  ;  Atlanta  v. 
Wilson,  59  Ga.  544  ;  Indianapolis  v. 
Scott,  72  Ind.  196  ;  Freeport  v.  Isbell, 
83  111.  440).  See  Roblee  v.  Indian 
Lake,  11  N.Y.  App.  Div.  435  ;  42  N.  Y. 
Supp.  326  [sufficiency  of  complaint 
on  lack  of  barrier  between  road  and 
lake  to  prevent  waters  dashing  upon 
road]. 


5  Carville  v.  Westford,  163  Mass. 
544:  40  N.  E.  893  [rounded  road- 
way eleven  feet  wide  on  steep  slop- 
ing embankment];  Trexler  v.  Green- 
wich, 168  Pa.  St.  214;  31  Atl.  1090 
[steep  declivity  at  side  of  a  narrow 
road];  Joliet  v.  Verley,  35  111.  58; 
Chicago  v.  Gallagher,  44  Id.  295  ; 
Chicago  v.  Hesing,  83  Id.  204  ;  Chi- 
cago v.  Wright,  58  Id .  586  ;  Danville 
v.  Makemson,  32  111.  App.  112  [em- 
bankment fourteen  feet  high  and 
thirty  feet  wide  at   the  top.  on  one 


side  of  which  was  a  street  car  track, 
with  the  rails  projecting  three  inches 
above  the  surface]  ;  Byerly  v.  Ana- 
mosa,  79  Iowa,  204  ;  44  N.  W.  359  ; 
Fletcher  v.  Ellsworth.  53  Kans.  751; 
37  Pac.  115  [excavation  seventeen 
feet  long  and  nine  feet  deep];  South 
Omaha  v.  Cunningham,  31  Neb.  316; 
47  N.  W.  930 ;  Crowther  v.  Yonkers, 
60  Hun,  586,  mem.  15  N.  Y.  Supp. 
588  [excavation  eight  feet  deep]  ; 
Van  Vranken  v.  Clifton  Springs,  86 
Hun,  67;  33  N.  Y.  Supp.  329,  [build- 


6n 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§356 


work  of  altering  or  repairing  a  highway,  ordinary  care6  must 
be  used  to  prevent  injuries  to  travelers  thereon.  If,  in  altering 
the  grade  of  a  street  previously  passable,  or  otherwise  working 
upon  it,  the  way  becomes  impassable  or  dangerous  for  travel, 
it  is  negligence  to  omit  to  warn  the  public  of  danger  by  erect- 
ing fences,  barriers,  lights,  or  the  like,7  having  reference  to  such 
accidents  as  may  reasonably  be  expected  to  happen  from  the 
condition  of  the  road.8  If  necessary,  it  should  be  effectually 
closed  to  the  public.9  Under  its  general  duty  to  maintain  its 
streets  so  as  to  be  reasonably  safe  for  travel,  a  city  is  bound  to 
see  that  excavations  and  other  dangerous  obstructions  to 
travel  in  a  street,  whether  made  by  its  own  servants  or  by  its 
contractor  10  or  licensees,11  or  wrongfully  by  third  persons,12  are 
guarded   by  barriers  and  lights,  and   is  liable   for    injuries  to 


ing  material  piled  in  roadway  at 
night  without  light];  Birmingham 
v.  Lewis,  92  Ala.  352;  9  So.  243  [un- 
guarded excavation  four  feet  across, 
four  to  six  feet  deep].  Other  cases 
are  cited  in  notes  5  and  6,  §  272, 
ante. 

6  Where  a  street  is  rendered  unsafe 
during  course  of  improving  it,  the 
city  is  only  liable  for  failure  to  ex- 
ercise reasonable  care  to  protect 
the  public  (Lincoln  v.  Calvert,  39 
Neb.  305  ;  58  N.  W.  115  ;  Dooley  v. 
Sullivan,  112  Ind.  451  ;  14  N.  E. 
566.  In  Childs  v.  West  Troy  (23 
Hun,  68),  it  was  held  that,  in  digging 
a  pit  in  a  street,  the  city  officials 
must  so  guard  it  against  passers-by 
that  no  accident  can  happen  except 
by  such  extreme  negligence  as  may 
almost  be  called  willful.  But  this  is 
too  strong  a  statement.  See  Bunch 
v.  Edenton,  90  N.  C.  431  ;  Spring- 
field  v.  LeClare,  49  111.  476  [failure  to 
guard  an  open  sewer  in  process  of 
construction];  Collins  v.  Leafey,  124 
Pa.  St.  203  :  16  Atl.  765  (see  note  4,  § 
356,  post) ;  James  v.  San  Francisco, 
6  Cal.  528  ;  Conrad  v.  Ithaca,  16  N. 
Y.  161 .  Allowing  a  boulder  removed 
from  road-bed  to  remain  there  from 


two  to  five  days,  held,  not  negligence 
(Agnew  v.  Corunna,  55  Mich.  428  ; 
21  N.  W.  873  [horse  frightened]). 

7  Storrs  v.  Utica,  17  N.  Y.  104 ; 
Buffalo  v.  Holloway,  7  Id.  493 ;  Grant 
v.  Brooklyn,  41  Barb.  381 ;  Kiernan  v. 
New  YTork,  14  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  156;  43 
N.Y.  Supp.  538;  Silvers  v.  Nerdlinger, 
30  Ind.  53  ;  Chicago  v.  Johnson,  53 
111.  91  ;  Milwaukee  v.  Davis,  6  Wise. 
377  ;  Prideaux  v.  Mineral  Point,  43 
Id.  513  ;  Covington  v.  Bryant,  7 
Bush,  248 ;  Americus  v.  Chapman, 
94  Ga.  711  ;  20  S.  E.  3  ;  Fletcher  v. 
Ellsworth,  53  Kans.  751  ;  Alexander 
v.  Big  Rapids,  76  Mich.  282  ;  42  N. 
W.  1071  ;  Mt.  Carmel  v.  Guthridge, 
52  111.  App.  632;  Omaha  v.  Ran- 
dolph, 30  Neb.  699;  46  N.  W.  1013. 

8Kelsey  v.  Glover,  15  Vt.  708; 
Finnegan  v.  Moore,  46  N.  J.  Law, 
602  ;  Chicago  v.  McDonald,  57  111. 
App.  250  [swing  bridge  temporarily 
opened]. 

9  Pettengill  v.  Yonkers,  116  N.  Y. 
558  ;  22  N.  E.  1095. 

10  Cases  cited  in  notes  4  to  7,  §  298, 
ante. 

11  Cases  cited  under  §  358, post. 

12  Cases  cited  under  §  366,  post. 


356] 


HIGHWAYS. 


6l2 


travelers  proximately  caused  by  the  lack  or  insufficiency  13  of 
such  protective  means,  where  it  has,  or  by  diligence  might 
have  had,  knowledge  of  it.14  If  the  barriers  or  lights  placed 
by  the  city  are  subsequently  wrongfully  removed  by  third  per- 
sons, negligence  will  not  be  imputed  to  the  city,  until  it  has 
had  a  reasonable  time,  after  notice,  to  replace  them.15  A  city 
is  under  no  obligations  to  light  its  streets  ;  and  its  mere  neglect 
to  do  so  is  not  a  ground  of  liability,  unless  its  charter  expressly 
imposes  the  duty.16  But  inasmuch  as  a  street  partially 
obstructed  or  out  of  repair  may  be  reasonably  safe  if  lighted, 
but  dangerous  if  unlighted,  the  fact  that  it  was  or  was  not 
lighted  may  be  material  on  the  question  of  negligence.17 


§  357-   [consolidated  with  §  359], 


13  A  loose  plank,  resting  at  one  end 
on  a  barrel,  and  supported  at  the 
other  by  a  board  fastened  to  a  post 
near  the  edge  of  the  sidewalk, 
Held,  insufficient  (Sutton  v.  Snoho- 
mish, 11  "Wash.  St.  24;  39  Pac.  273.) 
Whether  the  stretching  of  a  rope 
around  an  open  trench  in  the  street, 
two  feet  from  the  edge,  and  three 
feet  above  the  ground,  supported  by- 
iron  posts  driven  into  the  ground, 
and  with  lanterns  on  the  posts  suffi- 
ciently near  each  other  to  give  no- 
tice of  an  obstruction,  would  be  a 
sufficient  barrier,  is  for  the  jury 
(Norwood  v.  Somerville,  159  Mass. 
105  ;  33  N.  E.  1108). 

14  Where  a  diligent  performance  of 
the  duty  of  supervision  in  the  con- 
struction of  a  covering  over  a  peril- 
ous excavation  in  a  street  would 
bring  knowledge  to  the  officers  of  a 
city  of  its  dangerous  character,  a 
want  of  such  knowledge  is  negli- 
gence (Abilene  v.  Cowperthwait, 
52  Kans.  324;  34  Pac.  795).  See  cases 
cited  under  §  369,  post. 

15  Senestre  v.  New  York,  47  N.  Y. 
Superior,  341  ;  Seward  v.  Milford,  21 
Wise.  485  ;  Klatt  v.  Milwaukee,  53 
Id.  196 ;  10  N.  W.  162  ;  Meyers  v. 
Kansas  City,  108  Mo.  480 ;  18  S.  W. 


914.  Under  an  absolute  statutory  lia- 
bility, the  wrongful  removal  of  bar- 
riers has  been  held  not  to  relieve  the 
city  (Prentiss  v.  Boston,  112  Mass. 
43 ;  see  Doherty  v.  Waltham,  4 
Gray,  596). 

16  McNish  v.  Peekskill,  91  Hun, 
324;  36  N.  Y.  Supp.  1022;  Miller  v. 
St.  Paul,  38  Minn.  134  ;  36  N.  W.  271. 
Omission  to  light  a  city  street  is 
not  a  defect  in  the  way  for  which 
the  city  is  liable  under  the  Massa- 
chusetts statute  (Lyon  v.  Cam- 
bridge, 136  Mass.  419 ;  see  Ran- 
dall v.  Eastern  R.  Co.,  106  Id.  276). 
A  charter  requirement  of  a  toll- 
bridge  company,  that  the  bridge 
should  "  at  all  times  be  kept  in  good, 
safe  and  passable  repair,"  requires 
the  company  to  light  the  bridge,  if 
such  lighting  is  necessary  to  make 
the  bridge  safe  and  convenient  for 
passage  at  night  (Commonwealth 
v.  Central  Bridge  Co.,  12  Cush.  242  ; 
see  Worcester  v.  Canal  Bridge  Co. 
16  Pick.  541). 

11  Miller  v.  St.  Paul,  supra ;  Jeffer- 
son v.  Chapman,  127  111.  438,  20  N.  E. 
33.  A  city  that  is  under  no  statutory 
obligation  to  light  its  streets  but 
does  so  voluntarily,  is  not  liable  be- 
cause the  lighting  is  insufficient  to 


613 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§358 


§  358.  Authorized  interference  with  highway.  —  A  muni- 
cipal corporation  which,  in  the  exercise  of  a  special  or  general 
statutory  power,  authorizes  a  temporary  interference  with  its 
highway  for  a  legitimate  use  J  by  third  persons,  such  as  the 
laying  of  a  railroad  over  or  upon  them,  or  gas  and  water-pipes 
beneath  the  surface,  and  like  uses,  is  bound  to  see  that  while 
the  highway  is  disturbed  by  the  construction  of  such  works, 
a  passage  is  kept  open,  so  far  as  practicable  without  interfer- 
ing with  the  undertaking,2  and  made  reasonably  safe  for 
travel,  by  barriers,  lights,  or  other  protective  measures.3     It  is 


enable  persons  to  see  a  hydrant  in 
the  street  (Columbus  v.  Sims,  94 
Ga.  483  ;  20  S.  E.  332  ;  see  Chicago 
v.  Apel,  50  111.  App.  132  ;  Chicago  v. 
McDonald,  57  Id.  250). 

1  Under  express  authority  over 
streets,  a  municipal  corporation  may 
use  the  streets  for  gas-pipes  or  sewers 
(Norwich  Gas  Co.  v.  Norwich  City 
Gas  Co.,  25  Conn.  18;  State  v.  Gas 
Co.,  18  Ohio  St.  262;  State  v.  Gas 
Co.,  29  Wise.  454),  or  water-pipes 
and  mains  (Memphis  v.  Water- works 
Co.,  5  Heisk.  [Tenn.]  495),  and  for 
the  running  of  railway  trains  pro- 
pelled by  steam  (Railroad  Co.  v. 
Richmond,  96  U.  S.  521),  or  for  use 
of  street  cars  ( Vinal  v.  Dorchester,  7 
Gray,  421  ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Hartley, 
67  111.  439),  or  placing  of  telegraph 
poles  (Commonwealth  v.  Boston,  97 
Mass.  555  ;  Young  v.  Yarmouth,  9 
Gray,  386).  See  cases  cited  under 
§  332,  ante. 

3  Willard  v.  Newbury,  22  Vt.  458  ; 
Phillips  v.  Veazie,  40  Me.  96  ;  Davis 
Leominster,  1  Allen,  182.  There  held 
that  the  town  was  liable  for  an  in- 
jury from  a  pile  of  sleepers  placed 
within  that  portion  of  the  highway 
covered  by  the  location  of  the  rail- 
road by  the  company,  upon  the 
ground  that  the  sleepers  could  have 
been  removed  by  the  town  without 
interfering  with  the  authorized  con- 
struction and  operation  of  the  rail- 


road.    See  Brooks  v.  Somerville,  106 
Mass.  271. 

3  The   most  that  ought  to  be  re- 
quired of  the  town  in  such  a  case, 
however,  is  to  provide  a  suitable  by- 
way for  the  public,  and  warn  trav- 
elers against  passing  upon  the  high- 
way while  it  remains  unsafe  by  the 
construction  of  the  railroad.     If  the 
town  has  made  the  crossing  safe  and 
convenient,  except  so  far  as  it  was 
impracticable  to  do  so  without  inter- 
fering with  the  railroad,  it  is  not 
liable  (Jones  v.  Waltharn,  4  Cush. 
299;    Vinal  v.    Dorchester,  7  Gray, 
421 ;  Batty  v.  Duxbury,  24  Vt.  155  ; 
Barber  v.  Essex,  27  Id.  62.  See  Kim- 
ball v.   Bath,   38  Me.  219).      Under 
statutes    imposing  a  liability  upon 
towns    for    defective    highways,    a 
town  is  liable  for  an  obstruction, 
either  lawfully  or  unlawfully  placed 
in    a  highway  by  a    third    person, 
which  it  allows  to  remain  and  in- 
cumber the  way  (Elliott  v.  Concord, 
7  Foster,  204  ;   Willard  v.  Newbury, 
22  Vt.  458  ;   Batty  v.  Duxbury,    24 
Id.  155  ;  Barber  v.  Essex,  27  Id.  62  ; 
Merrill  v.  Wilbraham,  11  Gray,  154  ; 
Sides  v.  Portsmouth,  59  N.  H.  24). 
See  Lee  v.  Barkhampsted,  46  Conn. 
213  ;  State  v.  Gorham,   37  Me.  451. 
See  Fink  v.  St.  Louis,  71   Mo.  52; 
Kansas    City    v.    Bermingham,    45 
Kans.   212  ;  25  Pac.  569  ;  Russell  v. 
Columbia,  74  Mo.  480  [gas  company's 


§358] 


HIGHWAYS. 


614 


bound  to  use  the  same  degree  of  care  for  the  protection  of 
travelers  as  if  the  work  were  being  done  by  its  own  agents, 
for  its  own  benefit  ;4  and  if  the  interference  authorized  is  intrin- 
sically dangerous,  if  left  unguarded — c.  g.,  an  extensive  street 
excavation  —  it  is  liable,  without  notice,  for  an  injury  due  to 
the  absence  of  guards.5  A  city  is  not  relieved  from  responsi- 
bility for  the  safe  condition  of  a  street,  by  allowing  a  railroad 
company  to  lay  and  operate  a  track  through  it.6  It  is  bound 
to  make  it  safe ;  and  if  it  cannot  otherwise  be  done,  the  city 
has  the  right  to  interfere  with  the  regular  running  of  cars.7    It  is 


negligence  in  laying  gas-pipes]  ;  Erie 
v.  Schwingle,  22  Pa.  St.  384 ;  Stuart 
v.  Havens,  17  Neb.  211  ;  22  N.  W. 
419  ;  King  v.  Oshkosh,  75  Wise.  517; 
44    N.   W.    745    [private    hydrant]. 
A     railway    company,    under    au- 
thority  from    the    city,    raised   the 
grade  of  a  street  so  as  to  leave  a 
dangerous    pit,    which    it    left    un- 
guarded  by  fence  or  light.     Held, 
city  was  liable  to  a  traveler  injured 
thereby  (McCarroll  v.  Kansas  City, 
2  Mo.  App.  993).     s.  p.,  McCoull  v. 
Manchester,  85  Va.  579  ;  8  S.  E.  379  ; 
Augusta  v.  Cone,  91  Ga.  714  ;  17  S. 
E    1005 ;    McAllister   v.   Albany,    18 
Greg.  426  ;  23  Pac.  845  ;  Sullivan  v. 
Helena,   10  Mont.  134  ;  25  Pac.  94 ; 
and  cases  cited  in  note  8,  §  353,  ante. 
4  Wendell  v.  Troy  4  Abb.  Ct.  App. 
351  ;    Storrs  v.  Utica,  17  N.  Y.  104; 
Hickok  v.   Plattsburg,    16  Id.    161; 
Hutson  v.  New  York,  9  N.  Y.  163 ; 
affi'g  5  Sandf.   289;   Springfield   v. 
LeClare,    49    111.    476  ;    Detroit    v. 
Corey,   9  Mich.   165;    Baltimore  v. 
Pennington,  15  Md.  12.     A  city  is 
bound   to  see  that  a  platform   per- 
mitted by  it  to  be  put  up  by  a  private 
person  in  a  public  street,  and  used 
as  a  part  of  the  street,  though  not  in 
the  usually  traveled  portion  of  the 
street,  is  in  a  safe  condition  (Estelle 
v.  Lake  Crystal,  27   Minn.  243).    In 
Boucher  v.  New  Haven    (40  Conn. 
457),  a  city   ordered  a  lot-owner  to 


perform  a  work  necessarily  danger- 
ous to  travelers,  upon  the  sidewalk 
opposite  his  lot.  The  city  being 
charged  with  notice,  held  liable, 
because  it  did  not  superintend  the 
work. 

5  Haniford    v.   Kansas    City,    103 
Mo.  172  ;    15  S.  W.  753  ;     Abilene  v. 
Cowperthwait,    52    Kans.    324  ;    34 
Pac.  795.     Compare  McDermott  v. 
Kingston,  19  Hun,  198.  A  city  which 
permits  an  open  trench  to  be  dug 
across  a  street,   guarding    it    by   a 
wooden  fence  and  a  wooden  horse, 
which  has  to  be  moved  many  times 
during  the  hour,  to  permit  horse-cars 
to  pass,  and  is  so  moved  by  employees 
of   the  car  company   placed  at  the 
crossing   for  that  purpose,  is  liable 
for  their  momentary  negligence  in 
not    replacing    the    guard,    causing 
injury  to  a  traveler  (Blessington  v. 
Boston,  153  Mass.  409  ;  26  N.  E.  1113). 
6  Campbell  v.  Stillwater,  32  Minn. 
308;   20   N.  W.   320;    Zanesville  v. 
Fannan,  53  Ohio  St.  605  ;   42  N.   E. 
703.     A  license  to  a  builder  to  de- 
posit material    upon   a   street  does 
not  relieve  the  city  from  the  duty 
of  so  guarding  or  lighting  the  pile 
as  to   leave    the    street    reasonably 
safe  for  the  traveler  by  night  as  well 
as  by  day  (Magee  v.  Troy,  48  Hun, 
383).     See  cases  under  last  section. 

1  Lawrence  v.  New  Bedford,    160 
Mass.  227  ;  35  N.  E.  459. 


6i5 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§358 


immaterial  that  the  statute  or  ordinance  granting  the  right  to 
occupy  the  highway  imposed  on  the  grantee  the  duty  to  pro- 
tect travelers,  during  the  time  of  interference,8  or  that  the 
grantee  was  stopped  in  the  work  by  injunction.9  Unless  the 
particular  use  of  a  street  authorized  by  a  city  is  either  unlaw- 
ful ; 10  or  is  a  nuisance  per  se  (in  which  cases  the  latter  is  liable 
without  proof  of  negligence11),  the  mere  facts  of  permitting  a 
private  user  of  a  street  and  an  injury  therefrom,  do  not  estab- 
lish its  liability.12  In  general,  the  city  is  not  liable  without 
notice  for  the  abuse   or  misuse   of   its  license  by  the  licensee, 


8  Wellcome  v.  Leeds,  51  Me.  313. 
In  Currier  v.  Lowell  (16  Pick.  170), 
the  statute  provided  that  the  select- 
men of  the  town  might  require  any 
alteration  or  amendment  which  they 
might  think  necessary,  and  if  the 
company  did  not  comply  with  the 
requirements,  might  make  the  alter- 
ation or  amendment  themselves,  and 
have  a  remedy  over  against  the  rail- 
road corporation  for  the  expenses. 
Held,  the  town  was  liahle,  notwith- 
standing it  had  given  notice  to  the 
superintendent  of  the  work  that  a 
barrier  must  be  put  up  for  the  pro- 
tection of  travelers  on  the  highway, 
which  the  latter  had  promised,  but 
neglected  to  do.  See  Bacon  v.  Bos- 
ton, 3  Cush.  174  ;  Batty  v.  Duxbury, 
24  Vt.  155  ;  Philadelphia  v.  Weller, 
4  Brewster,  24  ;  Rowell  v.  Williams, 
29  Iowa,  210  ;  Landru  v.  Lund,  38 
Minn.  538  ;  38  N.  W.  699.  In 
Massachusetts,  where  a  railroad 
crosses  a  highway  at  grade,  the 
company  is  required  by  statute  to 
make  the  passage  across  its  tracks 
safe  and  easy,  and  for  its  neglect  to 
do  so,  it,  and  not  the  town,  is  liable 
(Scanlan  v.  Boston,  140  Mass.  84  ;  2 
N.  E.  787).  See  Rouse  v.  Somerville, 
130  Id.  361  ;  Sawyer  v.  Northfield,  7 
Cush.  490  [railroad  bridge  over 
highway]. 


9  Dale  v.  Syracuse,  71  Hun,  449  ; 
24  N.  Y.  Supp.  968. 

10  When  a  city,  without  authority 
and  in  direct  violation  of  statute, 
grants  to  an  individual  the  right  to 
obstruct  the  public  highway  while  in 
the  transaction  of  his  private  busi- 
ness, it  is  liable  for  all  damages  proxi- 
mately caused  by  such  obstruction 
(Cohen  v.  New  York,  113  N.  Y.,  532  ; 
21  N.  E.  700).  s.  p.,  Farley  v.  New 
York,  152  N.  Y.  222 ;  46  N.  E.  506 
[collision  with  truck  licensed  to  stand 
in  street  during  night-time]  ;  Stan 
ley  v.  Davenport,  54  Iowa,  463 
[steam- motor  unlawfully  licensed  to 
be  run  in  streets].    See  §  263,  ante. 

1!  See  §  263,  ante,  and  gg  359,  361, 
post. 

12  Giving  permission  to  place  in 
the  street  a  stepping-stone  (Dubois 
v.  Kingston,  102  N.  Y.  219  ;  6  N.  E. 
273),  or  a  hitching-post  (Macomber 
v.  Taunton,  100  Mass.  255),  on  the 
curb  of  the  sidewalk,  will  not  render 
the  corporation  liable  to  one  injured 
thereby,  s.  p.,  Wellington  v.  Greg- 
son,  21  Kans.  99  [post  at  street  corner, 
to  protect  a  shade  tree] ;  Beetz  v. 
Brooklyn,  10  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  382  ;  41 
N.Y.  Supp.  1009:  Loberg  v.  Amherst, 
87  Wise.  634:  58  N.  W.  1048:  Miller 
v.  St.  Paul,  38  Minn.  134;  36  N.  W- 
271. 


359] 


HIGHWAYS. 


6l6 


nor  for  his  negligence,13  unless  the  thing  licensed  was  intrin- 
sically dangerous.14 

§359.  Liability  of  licensee  of  use  of  street. — The  fact 
that  one  has  lawful  license  to  interfere  with  a  highway  only 
relieves  him  from  the  imputation  of  creating  a  public  nuisance, 
for  the  consequences  of  which  he  would  otherwise  be  liable 
without  proof  of  negligence.1  No  license  will  relieve  him  from 
the  consequences  of  carelessness  or  unskillfulness.2  It  is  an  im- 
plied condition  of  every  such  license  that  the  licensee  will  use 
ordinary  care  in  prosecuting  his  work,3  and  diligence  in  complet- 
ing it.4  A  right  given  to  lot-owners  to  encroach  on  the  sidewalk 
by  making  coal-holes  therein,  or  cellar-ways  thereto,5  or  to  a  rail- 


13  Susquehanna  Depot  v.  Simmons, 
112  Pa.  St.  384  ;  5  Atl.  434  ;  Kennedy 
v.  Lansing,  99  Mich.  518  ;  58  N.  W. 
470  [trolley-pole  fixed  in  gutter]  ; 
Michigan  City  v.  Boeckling,  122  Ind. 
39  ;  23  N.  E.  518  ;  Warsaw  v.  Dun- 
lap,  112  Ind.  576 ;  14  N.  E.  568.  A 
lot-owner,  notified  by  a  city  to  build 
a  sidewalk  in  front  of  his  premises, 
is  neither  the  agent  nor  licensee  of 
the  city,  and  for  his  negligence,  the 
city  is  not  liable  (Davis  v.  Omaha,  47 
Neb.  836;  66  N.  W.  859). 

14  A  municipal  corporation  is  not 
liable  for  the  acts  of  its  licensees,  un- 
less the  act  authorized  was  danger- 
ous in  itself  (Wheeler  v.  Plymouth, 
116  Ind.  158  ;  18  N.  E.  532  ;  Dooley  v. 
Sullivan,  112  Ind.  451  ;  14  N.  E.  566). 
Compare  Lincoln  v.  Boston  (148  Mass. 
578  ;  20  N.  E.  329),  where  it  was  held 
that  a  person  licensed  to  fire  cannon 
on  public  grounds,  was  not  the  city's 
agent,  so  as  to  make  the  city  liable 
for  damages  caused  by  a  horse  tak- 
ing fright  at  the  firing.  See  §  263, 
ante. 

1  Clifford  v.  Dam,  81  N.  Y.  52 ; 
Robinson  v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co.,  27 
Barb.  512,  and  cases  cited. 

5  Selden  v.  Delaware,  etc.  Canal 
Co.,  29  N.  Y.  634;  Brine  v.  Great 
Western  R.  Co.,  2  Best  &  S.    402  ; 


Stevens  v.  Stevens,  11  Mete.  251 ; 
Lincoln  Rapid  Transit  Co.  v.  Nich- 
ols, 37  Neb.  332;  55  N.  W.  872; 
Houston  St.  R.  Co.  v.  De  Lesdernier, 
84  Tex.  82  ;  19  S.  W.  366.  See  Bir- 
mingham Union  R.  Co.  v.  Alexan- 
der, 93  Ala.  133  ;  9  So.  525. 

3  In  Jones  v.  Bird  (5  Barn.  &  Aid. 
837),  held  that  one  actually  engaged 
in  laying  a  sewer,  authorized  by 
statute,  was  not  protected  merely 
because  acting  bona  fide  and  to  the 
best  of  his  skill  and  judgment. 
See  Whitehouse  v.  Fellows,  10  C. 
B.  N.  S.  765  ;  Brownlow  v.  Metro- 
politan Board,  13  Id.  768;  16  Id. 
546. 

4  Cushing  v.  Adams,  18  Pick.  110  ; 
Stuart  v.  Havens,  17  Neb.  211;  22  N. 
W.  419. 

5  The  license  to  the  owner  of  prem- 
ises, to  put  a  coal-hole  in  the  side- 
walk, simply  changes  the  character 
of  the  act  of  interfering  with  the 
sidewalk  from  an  absolute  nuisance 
to  one  involving  care  in  the  con- 
struction and  maintenance  of  the 
coal-hole  ;  and  to  avail  the  defend- 
ant when  sued  for  injuries  sustained 
by  reason  of  it,  he  must  justify  the 
structure  by  alleging  and  proving 
the  permit,  and  a  compliance  with 
its  terms,  and  that  the  structure  was 


oi7 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§  359 


road  company 6  to  lay  tracks  and  run  trains  upon  a  highway,  or 
to  a  telegraph  company  7  to  place  poles  therein  and  string  wires 
along  or  across  it,  is  subject  to  public  convenience,  and  is  to 
be  exercised  so  as   not  to  expose  travelers  on  the  highway  to 


so  made  and  kept  as  to  make  the 
sidewalk  as  safe  to  the  public  as  it 
would  have  been  without  it  (Clifford 
v.  Dam,  81  N.  Y.  52).  s.  P.,  Jennings 
v.  Van  Schaick,  108  N.  Y.  530  ;  15 
N.  E.  424  [coal-hole  in  sidewalk]; 
Potter  v.  Bunnell,  20  Ohio  St.  150. 

6  The  obligation  of  railroad  com- 
panies to  use  care  and  skill  in  laying 
and  maintaining  their  tracks  upon  a 
public  highway,  so  as  to  save  harm- 
less persons,  animals  and  vehicles 
passing  along  it,  is  treated,  in  con- 
nection with  the  subject  of  railroad 
construction,  in  §§  408,  414  and  417, 
post.  As  to  care  required  of  rail- 
roads on  or  near  highways  to  pre- 
vent frightening  animals,  see  §  426, 
post ;  and  injuring  persons,  see  § 
461,  post. 

1  Postal  Tel.  Co.  v.  Zopfi,  19  C.  C. 
A.  605  ;  73  Fed.  609  [telegraph  pole 
fell]  ;  Wolfe  v.  Erie  Tel.  Co.,  33  Fed. 
320  [collision  with  telegraph  pole]  ; 
Kyle  v.  Southern  Electric,  etc.  Co., 
174  Pa.  St.  570 ;  34  Atl.  323  [falling 
of  electric  light  pole]  ;  Quill  v.  Em- 
pire State  Tel.  Co.,  92  Hun,  539;  34 
N.  Y.  Supp.  470  [unsound  telegraph 
pole  in  street].  The  company  must 
exercise  reasonable  care  in  the  loca- 
tion of  its  poles,  so  as  not  to  incom- 
mode public  travel,  but  is  not  re- 
quired so  to  locate  them  ar,  to  pro- 
vide against  all  possible  injuries  that 
might  happen  under  extraordinary 
circumstances  (Sheffield  v.  Central 
Union  Tel.  Co.,  36  Fed.  164).  If  its 
wires  hang  so  low  as  to  interfere 
with  a  vehicle  on  the  highway,  it  is 
liable  (Dickey  v.  Maine  Telegraph 
Co.,  46  Me.  483).  The  fact  that  such 
a  wire  is  found  swinging  across  a 
public  way,  so  low  down  as  to  en- 


danger travel,  is  itself,  unexplained 
and  unaccounted  for,  sufficient  evi- 
dence of  negligence  (Thomas  v. 
Western  Union  Tel.  Co.,  100  Mass. 
156).  Compare  Western  Union  Tel. 
Co.  v.  Eyser,  91  U.  S.  495.  In  Shel- 
don v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.  (51  Hun, 
591;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  526),  a  telegraph 
company  sank  a  stone  near  the  trav- 
eled part  of  a  highway,  to  which  it 
attached  a  wire,  which  was  fastened 
to  a  pole  to  hold  the  pole  up- 
right. The  road  was  narrow,  the 
wire  was  not  easily  seen.  Held,  com- 
pany was  liable  for  injuries  to  a 
traveler  by  the  wire  catching  on  his 
vehicle.  In  maintaining  electric 
wires  in  public  streets,  persons  are 
bound  to  exercise  that  care  which 
a  reasonably  prudent  person  would 
exercise  under  similar  circum- 
stances, and,  as  the  business  is 
attended  with  great  peril  to  the 
public,  the  care  to  be  exercised  is 
commensurate  with  the  increased 
danger  (Denver  Consolidated  Elec- 
tric Co.  v.  Simpson,  21  Colo.  371  ;  41 
Pac.  499).  s.  P.,  Cook  v.  Wilmington 
Electric  Co.,  9  Houst.  306  ;  32  Atl. 
643  [electric  wire  broke  and  fell  into 
street].  A  telegraph  company  negli- 
gently allowing  its  wires  to  fall  on 
the  wires  of  an  electric  light  com- 
pany, and  to  remain  there  hanging 
down,  is  liable  to  a  passenger  on  the 
street  injured  by  coming  in  contact 
therewith  (Henning  v.  Western  U. 
Tel.  Co.,  41  Fed.  864  ;  Southwestern 
Tel.  Co.  v.  Robinson,  1  C.  C.  A.  684 ; 
50  Fed.  810 ;  McKay  v.  Southern 
Bell  Tel.  Co.,  Ill  Ala.  337  ;  19  So. 
695  ;  Ahem  v.  Oregon  Co.,  24  Oreg. 
276  ;  35  Pac.  549). 


359] 


HIGHWAYS. 


6l8 


unnecessary  hazard  either  from  defects  in,  or  negligent  manage- 
ment of,  its  property  and  appurtenances.8  It  is  incompetent 
for  a  city  either  to  excuse  the  licensee  from  taking  reasonable 
precautions  for  the  safety  of  travelers,  while  the  work  is  in 
progress,9  or  to  permit  a  permanent  interference  with  the  pub- 
lic use  of  a  street.10  Where  the  manner  of  interference  is  pre- 
scribed by  the  terms  of  the  license,  interference  in  any  other 
mode  is  to  create  a  nuisance.11  All  excavations  are  to  be 
guarded  for  the  protection  of  travelers; 12  and  the  street  should 
be  restored  within  a  reasonable  time  to  at   least  as  good  con- 


8  Veazie  v.  Penobscot  R.  Co. ,  49 
Me.  119  ;  Howard  v.  Union  Freight 
R.  Co.,  156  Mass.  159  ;  30  N.  E.  479 
[dummy-engine];  Fulton  St.  R.  Co. 
v.  McConnell,  87  Ga.  756 ;  13  S.  E. 
828  [unnecessarily  obstructing  street 
by  laying  loose  rails  on  surface  far 
in  advance  of  the  work]. 

9  Sexton  v.  Zett,  44  N.  Y.  430; 
McCamus  v.  Citizens'  Gas  Co.,  40 
Barb.  380. 

10  Commonwealth  v.  Erie,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  27  Pa.  St.  339;  Green  v.  Port- 
land, 32  Me.  431  ;  Milhau  v.  Sharp, 
15  Barb.  193  ;  affi'd,  27  N.  Y.  611  ; 
Brown  v.  Duplessis,  14  La.  Ann.  854  ; 
State  v.  Mobile,  5  Porter,  279  ;  Lack- 
land v.  North  Missouri  R.  Co.,  31  Mo. 
180 ;  Dubach  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  89  Id.  483  ;  1  S.  W.  86  ;  Pome- 
roy  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co.,  16 
Wise.  640. 

11  The  obstruction  of  a  highway  by 
the  construction  of  a  railroad  across 
it  in  a  manner  not  authorized  by  law, 
is  a  nuisance,  and  renders  the  cor- 
poration liable  to  indictment  (Com- 
monwealth v.  Nashua,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2 
Gray,  54;  Commonwealth  v.  Ver- 
mont, etc.  R.  Co. ,  4  Gray,  22  ;  Com- 
monwealth v.  Erie,  etc.  R.  Co.  27  Pa. 
St.  339),  and  to  a  private  action  for 
injuries  resulting  from  the  violation 
of  the  license  (Wood  v.  Mears,  12 
Ind.  515;  Hundhausen  v.  Bond,  36 
Wise.  29;  Weick  v.  Lander,   75  111. 


93).  See  Hughes  v.  Providence,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  2  R.  I,  493;  McLaughlin  v. 
Charlotte,  etc.  R.  Co.,  5  Rich.  Law, 
583.  If  there  is  any  excess  or  irregu- 
larity in  the  exercise  of  the  power 
conferred,  it  becomes  a  public  nuis- 
ance pro  tanto  (Renwick  v.  Morris, 
3  Hill,  621  ;  affi'd,  7  Id.  575).  A 
railroad  company  operating  its  cars 
on  a  street  has  a  right  to  remove 
snow  front  its  track  to  another  part 
of  the  street,  but  is  bound  to  use 
care  to  avoid  interfering  with  trav- 
elers on  the  highway  by  causing  ac- 
cumulations of  snow  (Dixon  v. 
Brooklyn,  etc.  R.  Co.,  100  N.  Y.  170 ; 
3  N.  E.  65  ;  Short  v.  Railroad  Co.,  50 
Md.  73  ;  McDonald  v.  Toledo  St.  R. 
Co.  20  CCA.  322;  74  Fed.  104; 
Somerville  v.  City  R.  Co.,  63  Hun, 
628  ;  17  N.  Y.  Supp.  719  ;  Canfield  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  R,  Co.  78  Mich.  356  ; 
44  N.  W.  385  [throwing  water  on 
sidewalk  where  it  froze.] )  It  is 
under  no  duty  to  keep  the  space 
between  its  tracks  free  from  ice  and 
snow,  and  is  not  liable  for  their  exist- 
ence to  a  person  slipping  and  falling 
thereon  (Silberstein  v.  Houston,  etc. 
R.Co  117N.Y.293;  22  N.  E.  951). 

13  Charlock  v.  Freel,  125  N.  Y.  357  ; 
26  N.  E.  262  ;  Sexton  v.  Zett,  44  N.  Y. 
430  ;  Steivermann  v.  White,  48  N.  Y. 
Superior,  523;  Pfau  v.  Reynolds,  53 
111.  212. 


6ig 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§359 


dition  as  it  was  before  the  interference,13  subject  to  necessary 
impairment  by  any  permanent  structure  authorized  by  the 
license.14  His  liability  for  leaving  the  street  in  a  dangerous 
state  is  not  conditioned  on  his  having  notice  of  the  fact ;  it 
was  his  duty  to  know  it.15  If  the  occupation  of  a  highway 
renders  it  necessary,  for  the  convenience  or  safety  of  the  pub- 
lic, that  bridges,  guards  or  other  structures  should  be  erected, 
the  party  interfering  is  bound  not  only  to  provide  them,  but 
to  maintain  them  so  long  as  rendered  necessary,16  even  to  the 
extent  of  providing,  from  time  to  time,  additional  facilities 
for  the  necessities  of  an  increased  population  or  traffic,17  or  of 


13  McCamus  v.  Citizens'  Gas  Co.,  40 
Barb.  380 ;  Georgia,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Parks,  93  Ga.  228  ;  18  S.  E.  652  ;  Atchi- 
son, etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  39  Kans. 
419 ;  18  Pac.  486 ;  Dillingham  v. 
Fields,  9  Tex.  Civ.  App.,  1  ;  29 
S.  W.  214;  Galveston,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  White,  [Tex.  Civ.  App.], 
32  S.  W.  186.  In  New  York  the 
statute  (L.  1884,  ch.  252  §  9)  re- 
quires street  car  companies  "  to 
have  and  keep  "  the  space  between 
their  tracks  in  "permanent  repair'' 
(Snell  v.  Rochester  R.  Co.,  64  Hun, 
476  ;  19  N.  Y.  Supp.  496  ;  Worster  v. 
Forty-second  St.,  etc.  R.  Co.,50N. 
Y.  203  ;  Masterson  v.  N.  Y.  Central 
R.  Co.,  84  Id.  247;  Currier  v.  Ogdens- 
burg,  etc.  R.  Co.,  53  Hun,  635,  mem.; 
6  N.  Y.  Supp.  615.)  See  Citizens'  R. 
Co.  v.  Ketcham,  122  Pa.  St.  22S;  15 
Atl.  733.  When  replacing  the  soil  of 
a  highway  the  licensee  must  antici- 
pate and  provide  for  the  natural 
effect  of  rain  on  earth  excavated 
and  replaced  (Johnson  v.  Friel,  50 
N.  Y.  679;  Southern  Express  Co.  v. 
Texarkana  Water  Co.,  54  Ark.  131; 
15  S.  W.  361).  If,  in  relaying  pave- 
ment which  he  has  disturbed,  his 
workmen  so  lay  the  stones  as  to  give 
such  an  appearance  of  security  as 
would  induce  a  careful  person,  using 
reasonable  caution,  to  tread  upon 
them   as  safe,  when,  in  fact,  they 


are  not  so,  he  will  be  answerable 
for  any  injury  (Drew  v.  New 
River  Co. ,  6  Carr.  &  P.  754  ;  Hyams 
v.  Webster,  L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  264). 
s.  P.,  Reeves  v.  Larkin,  19  Mo.  192; 
Dillon  v.  Washington  Gas  Light  Co., 
1  McArthur,  626.  One  is  not  re- 
quired to  make  a  crossing  where  the 
city  has  not  made  one  (Thieme  v. 
Gillen,  41  Hun,  443).  As  to  duty  of 
railroad  companies  to  restore  roads, 
streams  and  bridges  appropriated  or 
interfered  with  by  them,  see  cases 
cited  under  §  i\5,  post. 

14  Kyne  v.  Willmington,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  8  Houst.  185;  14  Atl.  922. 

15  Southern  Exp.  Co.  v.  Texarkana 
Water  Co.,  54  Ark.  131  ;  15  S.  W. 
361  ;  Bradwell  v.  Pittsburgh,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  25  Atl.  623  ;  153  Pa.  St.  105  ;  25 
Atl.  623  [upturned  rail]. 

16  Bryant  v.  Randolph,  133  N.  Y. 
70;  30  N.  E.  657  [unguarded  approach 
to  railroad  crossing]. 

17  Homan  v.  Stanley,  66  Pa.  St.  464. 
If  a  bridge,  or  a  substituted  road,  be 
necessary  to  prevent  the  obstruction, 
the  railroad  company  must  build  it 
immediately,  or  in  a  reasonable 
time,  and  cannot  delay  it  until  the 
completion  of  the  road  (Louisville, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  State,  3  Head,  523). 
Where  permission  to  lay  a  railroad 
track  upon  a  county  bridge  provided 
it  should  construct  a  convenient  and 


§36i] 


HIGHWAYS. 


620 


conforming  its  structure  to  changes  subsequently  made  in  the 
highway.18  This  duty  attaches  to  his  grantee  or  successor  in 
interest.19  It  is  no  defense  that  another  occupier  of  the  same 
street  was  equally  bound  to  keep  it  in  repair,20  or  that  the  work 
was  done  by  an  independent  contractor.21 

§  360.  [consolidated  with  §  359.  J 

§  361.  Obstructions  incident  to  building  operations. —  It  is 

lawful  within  certain  limits,  not  necessary  to  be  defined  here, 
to  obstruct  a  highway  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  or  repair- 
ing a  building  on  land  adjoining.1  The  mere  fact  of  such 
obstruction,  therefore,  is  not  conclusive  evidence  of  negligence. 
The  person  by  whom  or  under  whose  control  the  work  is  done 
must  use  ordinary  diligence  to  complete  it,  so  as  to  remove  the 
obstructions  to  the  road  as  soon  as  is  reasonably  possible,  and 
is  liable  to  all  persons  specially  injured  by  his  failure  to  do  so.2 
While  the  obstruction  continues,  he  is  bound  to  use  ordinary 


substantial  footway  over  the  creek, 
the  company  is  bound  to  maintain  a 
footway  (Phcenixville  v.  Phoenix 
Iron  Co.,  45  Pa.  St.  135).  A  company 
lawfully  cutting  a  canal  across  a 
highway  is  bound  to  build  and  main- 
tain a  bridge,  so  as  to  preserve  a  pass- 
age (Heacock  v.  Sherman,  14  Wend. 
58) ;  and  a  water-power  company, 
carrying  a  trench  across  a  highway 
in  such  a  manner  as  renders  a  bridge 
necessary  for  passage,  may  be  com- 
pelled to  erect  and  maintain  such 
bridge  (Matter  of  Trenton  Water- 
PowerCo.,  20  N.  J.  Law,  659).  s.  P., 
State  v.  Wilmington  Bridge  Co.,  3 
Harringt.  312  ;  State  v.  St.  Paul,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  35  Minn.  131;  28  N.  W.  3; 
Oshkosh  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  R.  Co., 
74  Wise.  534  ;  43  N.  W.  489  ;  Cooke 
v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.,  133  Mass.  185. 
See  English  v.  New  Haven,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  32  Conn.  241. 

18  Carter  v.  Boston,  etc.  R.  Co.  139 
Mass  525  ;  2  N.  E.  101. 

19  Allen  v.  Buffalo,  etc.  R.  Co.  151 
N.  Y.  434  :  45  N.  E.  845. 

80  Webster  v.  Hudson  River  R.  Co., 


33  N.  Y.  260;  Masterson  v.  N.  Y. 
Central  R.  Co.,  84  Id.  247. 

21  Woodman  v.  Metropolitan  R.Co., 
149  Mass.  335  ;  21  N.  E.  482  ;  Hawver 
v.  Whalen,  49  Ohio  St.  69  ;  29  N.  E. 
1049  ;  Rich  v.  Minneapolis,  37  Minn. 
423  ;  35  N.  W.  2  ;  Sterling  v.  Schiff- 
macher,  47  111.  App.  141  ;  Benjamin 
v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  133  Mo.  274  ; 

34  S.  W.  590 ;  Beatrice  v.  Reid,  41 
Neb.  214  ;  59  N.  W.  770  ;  Kollock  v. 
Madison,  84  Wise.  458  ;  54  N.  W.  725; 
Hepburn  v.  Philadelphia,  149  Pa.  St. 
335  ;  24  Atl.  279  ;  Colegrove  v.  Smith, 
102  Cal.  220  ;  36  Pac.  411 ;  and  cases 
cited  under  §§  165,  298,  ante. 

1  Moving  a  house  along  a  street  is 
not  within  the  rights  to  which  the 
public  is  entitled,  as  to  the  use  of  the 
public  streets  (Dickson  v.  Kewanee 
Electric  Light  Co.,  53  III.  App.  379). 
See  note  14,  §  370,  post. 

2  Ellis  v.  McNaughton,  76  Mich. 
237;  42  N.  W.  1113;  Stuart  v. 
Havens,  17  Neb.  211  ;  22  N.  W.  419 ; 
Cushing  v.  Adams,  18  Pick.  110; 
Ster  v .  Tuety,  45  Hun,  49  ;  and  cases 
infra. 


621 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§  3*1 


care  to  warn  and  protect  passers-by  from  any  danger  to  which 
they  are  exposed3  by  means  of  a  formal  notice,  such  as  could 
not  escape  the  attention  of  the  traveler,  or  by  an  effectual 
barricade,  or  in  any  other  manner  reasonably  likely  to  accom- 
plish the  purpose.  There  is  no  rule  of  law  which  limits  the 
builder  to  the  use  of  any  one  or  more  of  the  modes  here  sug- 
gested.4 The  mode  adopted  must,  however,  be  sufficient  for 
that  purpose,  so  that,  if  any  accident  happens  to  a  traveler,  he 
shall  be  in  fault.5  One  does  not,  by  going  on  a  street,  though 
it  is  little  used  and  largely  occupied  with  buildir.g  material  for  a 
building  in  course  of  construction,  assume  the  risk  of  building 
material  falling  on  him.6  If  the  obstruction  is  perfectly  obvious, 
e.  v.,  a  temporary  bridge  built  over  a  vault  in  the  course  of  its 
excavation  beneath  the  sidewalk,  and  necessarily  above  the 
street  level,  a  traveler  is  bound  to  observe  its  presence,  and  to 
exercise  a  care  and  prudence  which  might  be  unnecessary  upon 
the  sidewalk.  The  builder  of  such  a  bridge  is  not  required  to 
make  it  as  perfectly  safe  as  was  the  sidewalk  before  its 
removal.7 


3  Vanderpool  v.  Husson,  28  Barb. 
196;  Jackson  v.  Schmidt,  14  La. 
Ann.  818.  Making  repairs  to  a  roof, 
by  a  contractor,  from  a  scaffold 
hanging  therefrom  composed  of  a 
ladder  with  planks  tied  to  it  by  a 
rope  is  not  so  intrinsically  dangerous 
as  to  authorize  a  recovery  against 
the  owner  for  the  cutting  of  the.  rope 
by  rubbing  against  the  building,  and 


Dawson,  84  Hun,  110  ;  32  N.  Y.  Supp. 
59).  SeeWitte  v.  Dieffenbach,  54N. 
Y.  Super.  508  [fall  of  a  hammer]; 
and  cases  cited  under  §§  59  and  60, 
ante. 

4  Vanderpool  v.  Husson,  supra; 
Eccles  v.  Darragh,  48  N.  Y.  Super. 
528. 

5  Jackson  v.  Schmidt,  14  La.  Ann. 
818  ;  Jones  v.  Chantry,  4  Thomp     & 


the  consequent  fall  of  a  plank  to  the    C.  63  [piles  of  sand  and  wagons^ un 
street  below  (Hexamer  v.  Webb,  101 


N.  Y.  377 ;  4  N.  E.  755).  A  builder 
is  liable  for  negligently  stretching  a 
guy-rope  across  a  street  so  low  that 
plaintiff  was  swept  off  his  wagon  on 
the  street  (Larson  v.  Tobin,  43  Minn. 
88  ;  44  N.  W.  1078).  See  Rosenhain 
v.  Galligan,  5  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  49; 
38  N.  Y.  Supp.  713  [duty  to  examine 
derrick,  cables,  and  erect  shed  over 
sidewalk].  Where  the  sidewalk  was 
not  covered  or  in  any  way  guarded, 
the  falling  of  articles  from  the  build- 
ing to  the  sidewalk  raises  a  pre- 
sumption of  negligence    (Dohn    v. 


lighted  at  night] .  A  wooden  scaffold- 
ing was  being  erected  over  the  side- 
walk on  a  bridge,  and  both  ends  of 
the  sidewalk  were  barred,  but  the 
roadway  was  open  to  travel.  Held, 
not  negligence  in  not  having  some 
one  at  each  end  of  the  bridge  to  warn 
passers-by  of  the  danger  (Heiden wag 
v.  Philadelphia,  168  Pa.  St.  72  ;  31 
Atl.  1063). 

6  Bunnell  v.  Berlin  Bridge  Co.,  66 
Conn.  24  :  33  Atl.  533  ;  Dohn  v.  Daw- 
son, 90  Hun,  271  ;  35  N.  Y.  Supp. 
984. 

1  Nolan  v.  King,  97  N.  Y.  565. 


§362] 


HIGHWAYS. 


622 


§  362.  Obstructions  incident  to  traffic.  —  The  temporary 
use  of  a  street,  when  reasonably  necessary  for  the  bona  fide 
carrying  on  of  an  adjoining  owner's  business,  as  by  the  dis- 
charging and  receiving  of  goods,  etc.,  is  lawful.1  The  neces- 
sity required  to  justify  such  use  need  only  be  reasonable,  and 
the  question  of  reasonable  necessity  is  for  the  jury.3  The 
right  to  load  and  unload  carriages  in  the  highway  is  entirely 
subordinate  to  the  right  of  passage,  and  must  be  exercised  in 
such  a  manner  as  not  unreasonably  to  abridge  or  incommode 
that  right.3  When  so  exercised,  the  occupant  of  the  premises 
is  not  required  to  furnish  passers-by  with  a  safe  passage 
around  the  obstruction.4     But  the  inconvenience  to  the  public 


'Welsh  v.  Wilson,  101  N.  Y.  254  ; 
4  N.  E.  633  ;  Commonwealth  v.  Pass- 
more,  1  Serg.  &  R.  219;  Rex  v. 
Carlisle,  6  Carr.  &  P.  636,  per  Parke, 
J.  Streets  are  fairly  subject  to 
many  purposes  to  which  a  road  in 
the  country  would  not  be,  and  may 
be  used  for  the  temporary  deposit 
of  goods  in  their  transit  to  its  store- 
house, or  for  wharfage,  regard  being 
had  to  their  evident  object  and  pur- 
pose (Haight  v.  Keokuk,  4  Iowa,  199). 
s.  P.,  Hand  v.  Klinker,  54  N.  Y. 
Superior,  433 ;  Jackson  v.  Kiel,  13 
Colo.  378  ;  22  Pac.  504. 

2  Shook  v.  Cohoes,  108  N.  Y.  648  ; 
15  N.  E.  531.  Defendant,  in  unload- 
ing sugar  into  his  store,  placed  a 
skid  across  the  sidewalk,  over  which 
plaintiff  fell.  There  was  an  alley 
leading  to  the  rear  of  the  store,  but 
the  unloading  could  not  have  been 
there  accomplished  without  great 
inconvenience,  and  defendant  fol- 
lowed the  customary  method  of 
handling  such  goods.  Held,  that 
the  question  of  reasonable  necessity 
was  for  the  jury  (Jochem  v.  Robin- 
son, 72  Wise.  199;  39  N.  W.  383). 
To  same  effect,  Denby  v.  Miller,  59 
Wise.  240  ;  18  N.  W.  169  ;  Gerdes  v. 
Christopher  Foundry  Co.  [Mo.],  25 
S.  WT.  557. 

3  Rex  v.  Russell,  6  East,  427  ;  Rex 
v.  Cross,  3  Campb.  224.     In  Merritt 


v.  Fitzgibbons  (102  N.  Y.  362  ;  7  N.  E. 
179),  plaintiff,  while  passing  along 
a  street  in  front  of  defendant's  store, 
slipped  upon  the  icy  cover  of  a  coal- 
hole, slippery  with  snow  just  fallen, 
and  fell  under  and  was  injured  by 
defendant's  horse,  attached  to  his 
truck  standing  upon  the  sidewalk, 
near  its  edge.  The  street  was  nar- 
row, in  part  occupied  by  a  double- 
track  horse  railroad,  so  that  there 
was  not  room  for  a  truck  to  stand  in 
the  roadway  and  allow  passage  of  a 
car,  and,  at  the  time,  one  horse  was 
standing  upon  the  sidewalk,  and  the 
other  in  the  street,  leaving  just  room 
for  the  cars  to  pass  :  sufficient  space 
was  left  on  the  sidewalk  for  way- 
farers. Held,  no  negligence  was 
shown  on  defendant's  part  in  occu- 
pying the  sidewalk.  In  Mathews  v. 
Kelsey  (58  Me.  56).  held,  that  the 
owner  of  a  warehouse  located  on  a 
street  through  which  a  railroad 
runs,  has  the  right  to  unload  goods 
from  a  car  standing  on  the  track, 
by  means  of  skids  extending  from 
the  car  to  the  warehouse,  providing 
there  is  ample  room  to  accommodate 
travel  on  the  other  side  of  the  street, 
and  the  time  occupied  in  unloading 
is  reasonably  short. 

4  Welsh  v.  Wilson,  101  N.  Y.  254  ; 
4  N.  E.  633  [slippery  steps  in  front 
of  store,  on  which  plaintiff  stepped  to 


623 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§362 


must  not  be  prolonged  for  an  unreasonable  time.5  To  use 
a  street  for  storing  goods,  for  months  or  weeks,  is  unreason- 
able and  actionable,  as  matter  of  law  :6  the  rule  being  general 
that  no  one  can  legally  carry  on  any  part  of  his  business  in  a 
public  street,  to  the  annoyance  of  the  public.7  It  is  likewise 
actionable  for  a  city  to  allow  bulky  goods  deposited  by  the 
owner  in  one  of  its  streets,  much  used  for  travel,  to  remain 
there  an  unreasonable  time,  e.g.,  twenty-four  hou^s.8 

get  around  skids  placed  across  side-  for  a  nuisance."  s  P.,  Rex  v.  Ward, 
walk].  Whether  rolling  hogsheads 
down  skids  froni  a  truck  to  the  side- 
walk, without  using  danger  signals 
or  stationing  any  one  to  warn  pe- 
destrians, was  negligent,  is  for  the 
jury  (Blaustein  v.  Guindon,  83 
Hun,  5  ;  31  N.  Y.  Supp.  559).  It  is 
error  to  charge  that  e  very  one  who  oc- 
cupies the  highway  should  do  so  with 
such  care  that  no  injury  can  happen 
to  any  one,  where  the  legal  standard 
of  negligence  is  nowhere  clearly  de- 
fined (Collins  v.  Leafey,  124  Pa.  St. 
203;  16  Atl.  765).  Persons  walking 
in  a  city  are  bound  to  take  notice  of 
such  obstructions  as  the  necessities 
of  commerce  and  the  convenient 
occupation  of  adjacent  premises 
render  common  (Buesching  v.  St. 
Louis  Gas  Light  Co.,  6  Mo.  App.  85). 
5  In  Rex  v.  Jones  (3  Campb.  230) . 
the  defendant,  who  was  a  lumber- 
dealer,  occupied  a  small  yard  close 
to  the  street,  and  was  in  the  habit, 
owing  to  the  small  size  of  his  yard, 
of  depositing  the  long  pieces  of 
timber  in  the  street,  and  there  saw- 
ing them  up  before  carrying  them 
into  the  yard.  Lord  Ellenborough 
said  :  "A  cart  or  wagon  may  be  un- 
loaded at  a  gateway,  but  this  must 
be  done  with  promptness.  So  as  to 
the  repairing  of  a  house  ;  the  public 
must  submit  to  the  inconvenience 
occasioned  necessarily  in  repairing 
the  house  :  but  if  this  inconvenience 
be  prolonged  for  an  unreasonable 
time,  the  public  have  a  right  to  com- 
plain, and  the  party  may  be  indicted 


s  P.. 

4  Ad.  &  El.  384  ;   Rex  v.  Russell,  6 
Barn.  &  Cr.  566  ;  Bradbee  v.  London, 

5  Scott,  N.  R.  79. 
6  Gerdes  v.  Christopher,  etc.  Simp 

son  Foundry  Co.  [Mo.],  27  S.  W.  615. 

1  "  If  the  nature  of  the  defendant's 
business  and  the  condition  of  his 
premises  are  such  as  to  require  a 
congregation  of  wagons  in,  and  an 
obstruction  of,  the  adjoining  street, 
he  must  enlarge  his  premises,  or  re- 
move to  some  more  convenient 
spot "  (People  v.  Cunningham,  1  Den. 
524).  The  frequent  and  continuous 
obstruction  of  a  street  and  sidewalk 
by  unreasonably  stopping  wagons 
thereon,  thus  inconveniencing  plain- 
tiff and  others  passing  on  the  street, 
and  rendering  his  place  of  business 
less  accessible  to  the  public,  is  a 
nuisance,  remediable  by  damages 
(Flynn  v.  Taylor,  53  Hun,  167 ;  6 
N.  Y.  Supp.  96).  s.  P.,  Todd  v.  Min- 
neapolis, etc.  R.  Co.,  39  Minn.  186; 
39  N.  W.  318  [loading  railroad  cars 
in  front  of  plaintiff's  premises]  ; 
Marine  Ins.  Co.  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  41  Fed.  643.  A  railroad  com- 
pany cannot,  without  clear  necessity, 
place  its  depot  so  that  the  receiving 
and  discharging  of  passengers  in- 
juriously interferes  with  the  use  of 
the  highway  (State  v.  Morris,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  44  N.  J.  Law,  437  :  State  v. 
Vermont  Central  R.  Co.,  27  Vt.  103  ; 
and  see  Lackland  v.  North  Missouri 
R.  Co.,  31  Mo.  180). 

8  Birmingham  v.  Tayloe,  105  Ala. 
170  ;  16  So.  576  [box  seven  feet  long 


§363] 


HIGHWAYS. 


624 


§  363.  Obstructions  from  natural  causes.  —  Obstructions  of 
a  highway,  occasioned  by  some  natural  cause,  such  as  a  flood,1 
or  frost,2  or  snow  or  ice,  blocking  the  way  or  impeding  travel, 
are  as  much  defects  as  any  other  which  towns  and  cities  are 
bound  to  remove  or  render  harmless  with  reasonable  dili- 
gence.3 It  is  generally  held  that  such  obligation  does  not 
extend  to  the  removal  of  ice  formed  in  smooth  surfaces,  so  as 
to  constitute  no  other  defect  than  a  slippery  condition  of  the 
way,4  unless  the  formation  or  accumulation  of  ice  upon  it  was 
proximately  caused  by  a  structural  defect  in  the  street  or 
sidewalk,5  or  by  a  culpable  neglect  by  the   city  of  its  general 


two  and  one-half  feet  wide,  and  two 
feet  high,  with  handles  extending 
one  foot  beyond  its  length].  The 
piling  of  lumber  in  a  public  street, 
prima  facie,  constitutes  negligence, 
and  the  owner  is  liable  for  injuries 
caused  thereby,  though  not  knowing 
that  it  was  piled  in  a  dangerous 
manner  (Senhenn  v.  Evansville,  140 
Ind.  675;  40  N.  E.  69).  Compare 
Mattimore  v.  Erie,  144  Pa.  St.  14  ; 
22  Atl.  817. 

1  If  earth  under  the  sidewalk  had 
for  more  than  twenty-four  hours 
been  washed  away,  so  as  to  make 
ordinary  travel  presently  perilous,  it 
is  a  defect  under  the  statute  (Monies 
v.  Lynn,  121  Mass.  442).  Compare 
Allen  v.  Chippewa  Falls,  52  Wise. 
430  ;  WTiltsie  v.  Tilden,  77  Id.  152 ; 
46  N.  W.  234;  Bush  v.  Geneva, 
3  Thomp.  &  C.  409  ;  Seely  v.  Litch- 
field, 49  Conn.  134  ;  see  ante,  %  348. 

2  Tripp  v.  Lyman,  37  Me.  250  [frost, 
causing  the  sinking  of  stones  below 
the  surface].  A  town  is  not  respon- 
sible for  an  accident  caused  by  the 
miry  condition  of  a  country  road, 
where  such  condition  is  the  result  of 
the  weather  and  the  nature  of  the 
soil  (Brendlinger  v.  New  Hanover, 
148  Pa.  St.  93  ;  23  Atl.  1105).  Com- 
pare Atlanta  v.  Martin,  88  Ga.  21  ; 
13  S.  E.  805. 

3  Providence  v.  Clapp,  17  How.  IT. 


S.  161  [under  R.  I.  statute]  ;  Loker 
v.  Brookline,  13  Pick.  343 ;  Holman 
v.  Townsend,  13  Mete.  297  ;  Dutton  v. 
Weare,  17  N.  H.  34,  and  cases  cited 
infra. 

4  Mere  slipperiness  of  a  highway 
or  sidewalk,  caused  by  either  ice  or 
snow,  is  not  a  defect  for  which  towns 
are  liable  (Smyth  v.  Bangor,  72  Me. 
249  ;  Stanton  v.  Springfield,  12  Allen, 
566  ;  Nason  v.  Boston,  14  Id.  508 ; 
Johnson  v.  Lowell,  12  Id.  572,  note  ; 
Stone  v.  Hubbardston,  100  Mass.  49  ; 
Gilbert  v.  Roxbury,  Id.  185  ;  Landolt 
v.  Norwich,  37  Conn.  615  ;  Buck  v. 
Glens  Falls,  4  App.  Div.  323  ;  38  N. 
Y.  Supp.  582  ;  Mauch  Chunk  v. 
Kline,  100  Pa.  St.  119  ;  Kannenberg 
v.  Alpena,  96  Mich.  53;  55  N.  W. 
614 ;  Calder  v.  Walla  WTalla,  6  Wash. 
377  ;  33  Pac.  1054  ;  Ringland  v.  To- 
ronto, 23  Upper  Canada  [C.  P.J,  93). 

5  Hughes  v.  Lawrence,  160  Mass. 
474  ;  36  N.  E.  485  [gutter  fourteen 
inches  wide  and  one  and  one- 
half  inches  deep,  extending  across 
sidewalk]  ;  Adams  v.  Chicopee, 
147  Mass.  440  ;  18  N.  E.  231  ;  Mc- 
Closkey  v.  Moies  [R.  I.J,  33  Atl.  225 
[depression  in  bridge,  from  which 
rainwater  could  not  escape,  and 
freezing]  ;  Clemence  v.  Auburn,  66 
N.  Y.  334  [sudden  slope  of  six  inches 
in  three  and  a  half  feet  in  a  sidewalk 
having  a  grade  of  three-quarters  of 


625 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§363 


duty  to  keep  its  streets  reasonably  safe,6  in  which  cases  the  ice, 
though  smooth,  is  an  actionable  defect.  The  duty  rest- 
ing upon  municipal  corporations  to  remove  accumulations 
of  ice  and  snow,  as  it  falls  from  time  to  time,  upon 
their  streets,  is  a  qualified  one,  and  becomes  imperative 
only  when  dangerous  formations  or  obstacles  have  been  cre- 
ated, of  whose  existence  actual  or  constructive  notice  has 
been  received.7  This  duty  is  not  affected  by  the  fact 
that  the  ice  is  in  part  the  result  of  artificial  causes,  as  of 
water  escaping    from    hose,8    or    an    adjacent    roof,9  or    other 


an  inch  to  a  foot,  covered  with  snow  ; 
city  liable].  See  Taylor  v.  Yonkers, 
105  N  .  Y.  202  ;  11  N.  E.  642  ;  Ayres 
v.  Hammondsport,  130  N.  Y.  665  ;  29 
N.  E.  265  ;  Urquhart  v.  Ogdensburg, 
91  N.  Y.  67  ;  McQueen  v.  Elkhart, 
14  Ind.  App.  671;  43  N.  E.  460; 
Chamberlain  v.  Oshkosh,  84  "Wise. 
289  ;  54  N.  W.  618  [depression  at  the 
crossing  of  two  sidewalks  ;  city  not 
liable]  ;  McCarty  v.  Lockport,  13  N. 
Y.  App.  Div.  494 ;  43  N.  Y.  Supp. 
693. 

6  The  slippery  condition  of  a  side- 
walk was  due  to  the  freezing  on  it 
of  melting  snow  overflowing  from  a 
gutter  known  to  be  choked,  and  neg- 
ligently allowed  to  remain  uncleared. 
Held,  city  liable  (Gay lord  v.  New 
Britain.  58  Conn.  398  ;  20  Atl.  365  ; 
Bishop  v.  Goshen,  120  N.  Y.  337  ;  24 
N.  E.  720).  s.  P.,  Gillrie  v.  Lock- 
port,  122  N.  Y.  403 ;  25  N.  E.  357. 
When  so  caused,  the  city  cannot  es- 
cape liability  on  the  ground  that  the 
ice  had  not  so  accumulated  in  hills 
and  ridges  as  to  form  an  obvious 
physical  obstruction  to  travel  (Decker 
v.  Scranton,  151  Pa.  St.  241  ;  25  Atl. 
86) .  When  ice  was  formed  from 
water  from  the  city's  hydrant  known 
to  be  leaky,  it  is  immaterial  that  it 
had  no  knowledge  of  the  ice  forma- 
tion (Corbett  v.  Troy,  53  Hun,  228 ; 
6N.  Y.  Supp.  381). 

7  Harrington  v.  Buffalo,  121  N.  YT. 
147.     "  The  rule  is  that  where  there 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  II  —  40] 


has  accumulated  a  mass  of  rough  ice 
in  some  one  place  upon  a  sidewalk, 
which  has  been  there  for  a  time  long 
enough  to  give  constructive  notice 
to  the  city,  then  the  city  may  be  lia- 
ble ;  but  when  the  ice  on  the  side- 
walk is  the  result  of  some  rain  or 
snow  which  has  made  all  the  side- 
walks slippery,  then  it  cannot  be 
negligence  for  the  city  not  to  remove 
it"  (Masters  v.  Troy,  50  Hun,  485  ;  3 
N.  Y.  Supp.  450).  But  it  has  been 
held  in  Connecticut,  that  where  a 
sidewalk  has  become  dangerous  by 
an  accumulation  of  ice,  and  the  city 
has  had  ample  notice  of  its  condi- 
tion, and  might  have  rendered  it 
safe  by  reasonable  expenditure,  it  is 
liable  for  an  injury  to  a  traveler 
falling  thereon,  although  there  was 
no  structural  defect  in  the  sidewalk, 
and  the  ice  was  smooth,  and  the  icy 
condition  extended  throughout  the 
city  (Cloughessey  v.  Waterbury,  51 
Conn.  405). 

8  Henckes  v.  Minneapolis,  42  Minn. 
530  ;  44  N.  W.  1026. 

9  Pomfrey  v.  Saratoga  Springs, 
104  N.  Y.  459  ;  Kaveny  v.  Troy,  108 
Id.  571  ;  Weston  v.  Troy,  139  Id. 
281 ;  Gillrie  v.  Lockport,  122  Id.  403  ; 
25  N.  E.  357  ;  Stone  v.  Poughkeepsie, 
15  N.  Yx.  App.  Div.  582 ;  44  N.  Y. 
Supp.  609  ;  Hausman  v.  Madison,  85 
Wise.  187  ;  55  N.  W.  167  ;  Scoville 
v.  Salt  Lake  City,  11  Utah,  60  ;  39 
Pac .  481.    Compare  Clark  v.  Chicago, 


363] 


HIGHWAYS. 


626 


than  purely  natural  causes,  such  as  the  fall  of  rain.  It 
is  the  settled  rule  in  New  York  that  if  the  proximate 
cause  of  the  injury  was  slipping  on  ice  newly  formed  or  snow 
recently  fallen,  concealing  an  obstruction  in  the  way,  whether 
of  old  ice,  stones  or  the  like  which  had  been  negligently 
allowed  to  accumulate,  the  concurrence  of  such  negligence  in 
producing  the  injury  will  not  warrant  a  recovery,  unless  the  city 
was  negligent  in  failing  seasonably  to  remove  the  new  ice 
or  snow.10  Where  the  new  snow  concealing  the  defect  has 
remained  long  enough  to  apprise  the  city  of  its  existence, 
the  city  is  liable  for  having  neglected  to  remove  it.11  In 
other  states,  where  the  statutory  liability  for  defective  high- 
ways is  absolute,  it  is  held  that  if  a  sidewalk  was  so  defec- 
tive as  to  render  the  town  liable  in  case  an  accident  had  hap- 
pened by  reason  of  the  defect,  in  the  absence  of  ice,  and  if 
plaintiff's  injuries  were  caused  by  such  defect,  and  would  not 
have  happened  but  for  it,  then  the  town  was  liable,  though 
the  ice  contributed  to  causing  the  accident.12     But  it  is  every- 


4  Bliss.  486  ;  Baltimore  v.  Marriott, 
9  Md.  160  ;  Hausman  v.  Madison,  85 
Wise.  187;  55  N.  W.  167. 

10  A  slight  incline  of  sidewalk 
towards  the  curb,  one  inch  to  the 
foot,  caused  by  debris  negligently- 
suffered  to  accumulote,  on  which  ice 
formed  over  night  from  rain,  held 
not  proximate  cause  of  slipping 
thereon  (Taylor  v.  Yonkers,  105  N.  Y. 
202  ;  11  N.  E.  642).  S.  P.,  Kaveny  v. 
Troy,  108  N.  Y.  571  ;  15  N.  E.  726  [ice 
formed  over  night  from  drippings 
or  overflow  from  adjacent  eaves  in 
severe  weather,  had  been  so  for  a 
month  ;  city  not  liable]  ;  Kinney  v. 
Troy,  108  N.  Y.  567  ;  15  N.  E.  728; 
Tobey  v.  Hudson,  49  Hun,  318  ;  2  N. 
Y.  Supp.  180.  The  failure  for  several 
weeks  to  remove  snow  from  side- 
walk not  the  proximate  cause  of  an 
injury  from  slipping  on  ice,  formed 
the  night  before  out  of  slush  from 
warm  weather  prevailing  for  several 
days  previous  (Harrington  v.  Buf- 
falo, 121  N.  Y.  147 ;  24  N.  E.  186). 


11  Todd  v.  Troy.  61  N.  Y.  506  ; 
Gillrie  v.  Lockport,  122  Id.  403  ;  25 
N.  E.  3i7  ;  Keane  v.  Waterford,  130 
N.  Y.  188  [ice  a  week  old  formed 
from  snow  of  two  snow  storms  un- 
removed ;  city  liable]. 

12  Hampson  v.  Taylor,  15  R.I.  83  ; 
8  Atl.  331  ;  23  Id.  732.  In  Barton  v. 
Montpelier  (30  Vt.  650) ,  it  was  held 
that  a  town  is  liable  for  the  accumu- 
lation of  a  snow-drift  on  a  highway, 
if,  notwithstanding  the  drift,  the  in- 
jury would  not  have  happened  had 
the  traveled  path  in  the  highway 
been  kept  sufficiently  wide  and  in 
proper  condition;  and  if  it  was  not 
in  that  condition,  or  of  a  proper 
width,  when  the  accident  happened, 
the  fact  that  sufficient  time  had  not 
elapsed  after  the  accumulation  of 
the  drift  to  allow  of  its  removal  be- 
fore the  accident  happened,  will  not 
excuse  the  town  from  liability.  See 
Green  v.  Danby,  12  Vt.  338 ;  State  v. 
Fryeburg,  15  Me.  405 ;  Church  v. 
Cherryfield,  33  Id.   460.     Under  the 


62/ 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§  363 


where  held  that  accumulations  of  ice  or  snow  in  drifts  or 
ridges  in  a  highway,  so  as  to  obstruct  a  reasonably  free  pass- 
age, or  render  it  by  its  unevenness  or  roughness  unsafe 
for  travelers,  constitute  a  defect,  for  which  the  municipality 
is  responsible  whether  under  the  statute,13  or  at  common  law.14 
In  regard  to  that  part  of  the  way  traveled  by  vehicles,  it 
would  seem  that  when  snow  has  fallen  in  great  depth,  or  has 
drifted,  the  treading  down  of  it,  so  that  the  way  is  not  actually 
blocked  up,  uneven,  or  incumbered,  may,  in  some  sense,  and 
for  the  time  being,  have  the  effect  to  remove  the  obstruction.15 
But,  in  the  case  of  sidewalks,  this  cannot  be  said  to  be  a  suffi- 
cient remedy  for  the  evil.16  Whether  anything  less  than  abso- 
solute   and  total  removal   of  the  snow   from  the  sidewalk,  or 


Michigan  statute,  held  that  a  city  is 
not  liable  for  an  obstruction  formed 
by  snow  thrown  from  the  sidewalk, 
together  with  that  thrown  from  the 
street- car  tracks  (McKeller  v.  De- 
troit, 57  Mich.  158  ;  23  N.  W.  621  ; 
Hutchinson  v.  Ypsilanti,  103  Mich. 
12  ;  61  N.  W.  279),  or  by  a  ridge  of 
ice  formed  by  the  tramping,  freezing, 
and  melting  of  snow  until  the  sur- 
face becomes  uneven  (Rolf  v.  Green- 
ville, 102  Mich.  544;  61  N.  W.  3).  For 
rule  as  to  contributing  causes,  see 
§  346,  ante. 

13  Luther  v.  Worcester,  97  Mass.  268; 
Stone  v.  Hubbardston,  100  Id.  49; 
Street  v.  Holyoke,  105  Id.  82  ;  Bil- 
lings v.  Worcester,  102  Id.  329  ;  Pink- 
ham  v.  Topsfield,  104  Id.  78  ;  Morse 
v.  Boston,  109  Id.  446 ;  McAuley  v. 
Boston,  113  Id.  503  ;  Dooley  v.  Meri- 
den,  44  Conn.  117  ;  Clark  v.  Corinth, 
41  Vt.  449;  Cook  v.  Milwaukee,  24 
Wise.  270 ;  Koch  v.  Ashland,  88  Id. 
603 ;  60  N.  W.  990. 

14  Evidence  that  there  was  on  the 
sidewalk  a  ridge  of  snow  and  ice 
five  or  six  inches  high,  which 
was  uneven  and  very  slippery; 
that  the  ridge  had  been  there  for  a 
week  before  the  accident,  and  was 
formed  in  part  of  snow  that  had 
fallen  more  than  two  weeks  before  ; 


and  that  no  attempt  to  remove  the 
ridge  had  been  made,  is  sufficient 
to  justify  a  refusal  to  grant  a  non- 
suit (Keane  v.  Waterford,  130  N. 
Y.  188;  29  N.  E.  130).  Snow  as  it  fell 
from  time  to  time  during  the  winter 
had  not  been  cleaned  off,  but  had 
been  trodden  down,  and  had  become 
an  uneven  or  humpy  surface,  and  so 
remained  for  about  six  weeks.  Held, 
city  was  liable  (Jones  v.  Troy,  52 
Hun,  610,  mem.;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  792). 
s.  P.  Collins  v.  Council  Bluffs,  32 
Iowa,  324;  Caswell  v.  St.  Mary's, 
etc.  Road  Co. ,  28  U.  Can.  247.  See 
McLaughlin  v.  Corry,  77  Pa.  St.  109; 
Wyman  v.  Philadelphia  [Pa.],  34  Atl. 
621,  and  cases  supra. 

16  Providence  v.  Clapp,  17  How.  U. 
S.  161.  See  Vass  v.  Waukesha,  90 
Wise.  337  ;  63  N.  W.  280. 

16  Providence  v.  Clapp,  supra.  The 
full  extent  of  the  duty  to  remove  ice 
from  sidewalks  cannot  be  definitely 
defined  by  law,  but  "  must  in  each 
case  depend  upon  all  the  circum- 
stances of  it;  the  general  rule  being 
that  towns  and  cities  must  use  rea- 
sonable care  to  make  their  streets 
safe  for  public  travel,  whether  on 
foot  or  in  carriages "  (Landolt  v. 
Norwich,  37  Conn.  615). 


§363] 


HIGHWAYS. 


628 


whether  the  use  of  adequate  means  to  make  the  way  safe 
and  convenient,  such  as  the  sprinkling  of  ashes  on  a  slippery 
sidewalk,17  would  be  a  compliance  with  a  statutory  require- 
ment, is  generally  a  question  for  the  jury.18  Negligence 
in  not  removing  or  remedying  the  obstruction  can  be 
imputed  only  after  the  lapse  of  a  reasonable  time,  after 
its  existence  was  known  or  ought  to  have  been  known,19 
and    then  only   if   such  removal  was  reasonably  practicable.20 


11  Under  a  statute  requiring  ways 
to  be  kept  reasonably  safe  and  con- 
venient for  travel,  there  is  no  specific 
duty  on  the  part  of  the  city  to  sand 
its  sidewalks,  and  a  refusal  to  charge 
that,  if  sanding  would  have  pre- 
vented the  injury,  plaintiff  could 
recover  was  proper  (McGuinness  v. 
Worcester,  160  Mass.  272  ;  35  N.  E. 
1068).  The  fact  that  sand  had  been 
sprinkled  on  the  slippery  portion  of 
the  walk  on  the  day  of  the  accident 
is  material  on  question  of  negli- 
gence (Buck  v.  Glens  Falls,  38  N.  Y. 
Supp.  582). 

18  Whether  snow  or  ice  had  accu- 
mulated to  a  dangerous  extent  is  one 
of  fact,  dependent  upon  all  the  cir- 
cumstances (Congdon  v.  Norwich,  37 
Conn.  414).  Negligence  on  part  of 
town  is  not  to  be  inferred  from  the 
fact  that  a  highway  has  been  impas- 
sable from  snow-drifts  for  three 
months.  All  the  circumstances  of 
the  case  are  to  be  considered  (Burr 
v.  Plymouth,  48  Id.  460). 

19  Where  a  considerable  quantity  of 
snow  has  fallen,  which,  from  the  na- 
ture of  the  case,  must  have  caused 
some  obstruction  on  the  sidewalks, 
the  falling  of  snow  is  sufficient  no- 
notice  (Foxworthy  v.  Hastings,  25 
Neb.  133 ;  41  N.  W.  132  ;  Corts  v. 
Dist.  of  Columbia,  7  Mack.  277). 
On  the  day  of  the  accident  about 
one-tenth  of  an  inch  of  snow  had 
fallen,  and  in  the  ten  days  preceding 
not  more  than  five-tenths  of  an  inch 
had  fallen.     It  had  thawed  in  the 


first  portion  of  this  period  of  ten  days. 
The  ice  at  the  place  of  the  accident 
was  rough  and  uneven,  looked  like 
old  ice,  extended  the  width  of  the 
walk,  and  had  been  so  a  week  or  ten 
days.  Held,  the  city  had  construc- 
tive notice  (Masters  v.  Troy,  50  Hun, 
485;  3N.  Y.  Supp.  450  ;  Ney  v.  Troy, 
50  Hun,  604,  mem.;  3  N.  Y.  Supp. 
679  [alternately  thawed  and  frozen 
for  two  or  three  weeks  ;  notice  pre- 
sumed] ;  Walsh  v.  Buffalo,  17  N. 
Y.  App.  Div.  112  [four  or  five  inches 
of  snow  on  sidewalk  for  about  two 
weeks]).  A  week  immediately  before 
the  accident  the  temperature  had  re- 
mained below  the  freezing  point, 
and  there  was  snow  a  week  before 
the  accident,  but  none  during  the  in- 
terval. Held,  insufficient  to  charge 
the  city  with  constructive  notice  of 
ice  on  sidewalk  (Foley  v.  Troy,  45 
Hun,  396).  In  following  cases,  held, 
no  inference  of  constructive  notice  : 
Grimm  v.  Greenbush,  50  Hun,  605, 
mem. ;  3  N.  Y.  Supp.  76 ;  Davis  v. 
Kingston,  52  Hun,  615,  mem.;  5  N.  Y. 
Supp.  506  ;  Betts  v.  Gloversville,  56 
Hun,  639,  mem.;  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  795  ; 
Tracey  v.  Poughkeepsie,46Hun,  569; 
Anthony  v.  Glens  Falls,  38  N.  Y. 
Supp.  536  [two  weeks].  See  Stanton 
v.  Salem,  145  Mass.  476  ;  14  N.  E.  519. 
For  general  rule  as  to  notice,  actual 
or  constructive,  see  £§  368,  369  post. 
20  It  is  not  negligence  in  a  town  to 
fail  to  remove  from  its  sidewalks  ice 
formed  by  a  sudden  fall  of  tempera- 
ture, and  which  it  is  practically  im- 


629 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§363 


In  determining  what  is  a  reasonable  time,  after  notice,  actual 
or  constructive,  local  climatic  conditions  should  be  considered.21 
A  municipal  corporation  may  impose  the  duty  of  clearing 
sidewalks  of  snow  and  ice  upon  the  householders,  and  is  not 
guilty  of  negligence,  if,  observing  that  the  work  is  being  gen 
erally  done,  it  awaits  their  action  for  a  reasonable  period. 
When,  however,  such  reasonable  time  has  expired,  the  corpo- 
ration must  either  compel  a  householder  to  act,  or  do  the  work 
itself,  and  if  it  suffers  the  obstruction  to  remain  thereafter, 
with  notice,  it  will  be  responsible.22 

§  364.  [consolidated  with  §  363.] 


possible  to  remove ;  or  to  fail  to 
compel  its  citizens  to  sprinkle  such 
ice  with  ashes  or  sand  to  prevent  it 
from  being  slippery,  but  the  city 
may  await  a  change  of  temperature, 
which  will  remove  the  danger  (Tay- 
lor v.  Yonkers,  105  N.  Y.  202  ;  11 
N.  E.  642).  S.  P.,  Harrington  v. 
Buffalo,  121  N.  Y.  147  ;  24  N.  E.  186. 
A  city  is  not  liable  where  the  severity 
of  the  weather,  and  the  sudden  and 
frequent  changes,  rendered  it  practi- 
cally impossible  to  remove  the  ice 
(Kleng  v.  Buffalo,  72  Hun,  541 ;  25 
N.  Y.  Supp.  445  ;  Duncan  v.  Buffalo, 
50  Hun,  600,  mem. ;  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  503 
[heavy  fall  of  snow  ended  twenty- 
four  hours  before  accident] ;  Grimm 
v.  Greenbush,  50  Hun,  605 ;  3  N.  Y. 
Supp.  76  [had  rained,  snowed  and 
frozen  for  four  or  five  days  before 
accident];  O'Connor  v.  New  YTork,  16 
Daly,  58 ;  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  492  [delay 
of  forty-eight  hours  after  snow  ceased 
falling,  no  negligence] ;  Peard  v.  Mt. 
Vernon,  83  Hun,  250  ;  31  N.  Y.  Supp. 
395  [snow  fell  nearly  every  day  for 
about  two  weeks  before  the  acci- 
dent, with  occasional  rains,  which 
froze  as  they  fell,  rendering  the  snow 
a  solid  mass  of  ice]  ;  Safford  v.  Green 
Island,  74  Hun,  306 ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp. 
669  ;  Dorn  v.  Oyster   Bay,  84   Hun, 


510;  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  341.  A 
city  is  not  liable,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  law,  for  failing  to  remove 
snow  which  fell  during  an  unusual 
storm  to  the  depth  of  four  feet,  and 
was  piled  up  by  street-car  companies 
in  clearing  their  tracks,  and  allowed 
to  so  remain  for  seven  days  (McDon- 
ald v.  Toledo,  63  Fed  60).  The  neg- 
lect of  a  city  to  remove,  before  one 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  ice  wdiich 
had  formed  on  sidewalks  in  the  pre- 
ceding night,  not  actionable  (Blake- 
ley  v.  Troy,  18  Hun,  167).  Compare 
Darling  v.  New  York,  Id.  340  ;  Smith 
v.  Brooklyn,  36  Id.  224  ;  Piercy  v. 
Averill,  37  Id.  360  ;  Evers  v.  Hudson 
River  Bridge  Co.,  18  Id.  144;  Bat- 
tersby  v.  New  York,  7  Daly,  16.  A 
refusal  to  instruct  the  jury  that  if 
the  film  of  ice  was  formed  on  the 
afternoon  or  evening  of  the  day  of 
the  accident  plaintiff  could  not  re- 
cover, and  leaving  it  open  to  the 
jury's  discretion,  is  error  (Keane  v. 
Waterford,  49  Hun,  609,  mem.  ;  2 
N.  Y.  Supp.  182). 

5;  Lumley  v.  Backus  Mfg.  Co.  20 
C.  C.  A.  1;  73  Fed.  76;  Scoville  v. 
Salt  Lake  City,  11  Utah,  60;  39Pac. 
481. 

M  Taylor  v.  Yonkers,  105  N.  Y. 
202;  11  N.  E.  642. 


§  365] 


HIGHWAYS. 


630 


§  365.  Individual    liability  for  wrongful    obstructions.  — 

The  rule  is  universal  that  whoever,  without  lawful  authority, 
obstructs  a  highway  so  as  to  render  its  use  hazardous,  is  liable 
to  one  who  sustains  a  special  damage  *  thereby.  It  is  immaterial 
whether  negligence  caused  the  nuisance.2  The  unathorized 
digging  of  a  ditch  across,  or  laying  logs  or  other  material  upon 
a  highway  though  but  for  temporary  convenience,3  or  doing 
anything  which  renders  the  highway  less  commodious  or  safe 
for  the  traveler,  is  a  nuisance,  the  author  of  which  is  liable  for 
the  consequences.4     Although  the  owner  of  the  soil  over  which 


1  See  §  371,  post, 

■ ' '  Any  act  of  an  individual  done  in 
a  highway  which  detracts  from  the 
safety  of  travelers,  is  a  nuisance " 
(per  Cowen,  J.,  Dygert  v.  Schenck, 
23  Wend.  446  [bridge  over  a  race- 
way through  highway]).  S.  P., 
Congreve  v.  Smith,  18  N.  Y.  79  [un- 
covered excavation  in  street  without 
license].  ''The  liability  does  not 
depend  upon  negligence  "  (Congreve 
v.  Morgan,  18  Id.  84);  hence  it  is  im- 
material that  a  third  person  removed 
the  covering  without  defendant's 
knowledge  ;  the  only  material  fact  is 
that  defendant's  interference  made 
the  way  unsafe  (lb.).  S.  P.,  Linsley  v. 
Bushnell,  15  Conn.  225  [load  of  wood 
left  on  margin  of  road,  dragged  into 
traveled  path  by  stranger;  not  re- 
moved by  defendant];  Robbins  v. 
Chicago,  4  Wall.  657:  Davenport  v. 
Ruckman,  37  N.  Y.  574;  Irvine 
v.  Wood,  51  Id.  224;  Clifford  v.  Dam, 
81  Id.  52;  Portland  v.  Richardson,  54 
Me.  46;  Perley  v.  Chandler,  6  Mass. 
453  ;  Lowell  v.  Short,  4  Cush.  277; 
Stoughton  v.  Porter,  95  Mass.  191; 
Fisher  v,  Thirkell,  21  Mich.  1;  Ste- 
phani  v.  Brown,  40  111.  428  ;  Severin 
v.  Eddy,  52  Id.  189;  Gridley  v.  Bloom- 
ington,  68  Id.  47.  See  Davis  v. 
Michigan  Bell  Tel.  Co.,  61  Mich. 
307,  28  N.  W.  108.  No  question 
of  negligence  or  unskillfulness  is 
involved  in  the  case  of  a   railroad 


company  laying  its  tracks  in  a 
highway,  when  it  fails  to  restore  it 
to  its  former  condition  as  required 
by  general  or  special  statute  (Robin- 
son v.  N.  Y.  &  Erie  R.  Co.,  27  Barb. 
512 ;  and  cases  cited).  See  other 
cases  ciied  under  §§  358,  359.  ante. 

3  Dunsback  v.  Hollesfcer,  49  Hun, 
352;  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  94  [deposit  of 
sand  in  street]  ;  Schiff  macher  v. 
Kircher,  59  111.  App.  113  [temporary 
removal  of  sidewalk], 

4  Dygert  v.  Schenck,  supra ;  Lan- 
sing v.  Smith,  8  Cow.  146  ;  Clinton 
v.  Howard,  42  Conn.  294  [trespass 
for  piling  stones  on  margin  of  way, 
frightening  horse  ]  ;  Brunner  v. 
American  Tel.  Co.,  160  Pa.  St.  300  ; 
28  Atl.  690  [testing  dynamite  on 
highway],  s.  P.,  Osage  City  v.  Lar- 
kins,  40  Kans.  206  ;  19  Pac.  658  ;  Fas- 
sion  v.  Landrey,  [Ind.]  24  N.  E.  96  ; 
Milarkey  v.  Foster,  6  Oreg.  378  [un- 
lawful toll-gate]  ;  Barton  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 81  Cal.  265;  22  Pac.  855 
[unguarded  excavation].  The  estab- 
lishment of  a  toboggan  slide  across 
one  of  the  principal  streets  of  a  pop- 
ulous city  is  of  itself  sufficient  to 
create  liability  for  injuries  caused 
thereby  (Hayden  v.  Clarke,  10  N.  Y. 
Supp.  291).  As  to  difference  between 
an  encroachment  and  a  nuisance, 
see  Wetmore  v.  Tracy,  14  Wend. 
250 ;  Peckham  v.  Henderson,  27 
Barb.  207. 


631 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§367 


a  highway  is  laid  out  may  not  be  guilty  of  trespass  in  digging 
a  ditch  across  it  and  arching  it  with  a  bridge,5  he  is  bound  to 
see  that  the  bridge  does  not  become  a  nuisance  by  hazarding 
the  convenience  or  safety  of  travelers,  and  is  responsible  if  it 
does.6  And  while,  in  the  absence  of  any  statutory  inhibition, 
the  presence  of  an  unattended  domestic  animal  on  a  highway 
may  not  be  unlawful,  yet  its  owner  has  no  right  to  so  secure  it 
as  to  obstruct  the  highway.7 

§  366.  [consolidated.] 

§  367.  Ground  of  liability  for  defective  highways.  —  The 

extent  of  the  duty  of  a  municipal  corporation  with  reference  to 
the  construction  and  maintenance  of  its  highways  is  to  use  ordi- 
nary care  l  to  make  them  reasonably  safe  and  convenient  for 


5 ''All  the  land  within  a  [rural] 
highway  fence  is  not  subject  to  the 
public  right  of  way  ; ?'  and  if  not,  it 
may  be  occupied  by  the  owner  of 
the  fee,  and  he  is  not  liable  as  a  tres- 
passer (Harlow  v.  Humiston,  6  Cow. 
189  [depositing  logs  and  brush  in 
highway,  frightening  horse]). 

6  He  is  bound  to  keep  the  bridge 
in  repair  (Perley  v.  Chandler,  6  Mass. 
454 ;  Dygert  v.  Schenck,  23  Wend. 
446 ;  Woodring  v.  Forks  Township, 
28  Pa.  St.  355 ;  Phoenixville  v.  Phoe- 
nix Iron  Co.,  45  Id.  135  ;  Manley  v. 
Helen's  Canal  Co.,  2  Hurl.  &  N.  840). 

'  In  Gulliver  v.  Blauvelt  (14  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  523  ;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  935), 
a  cow  on  one  side  of  the  highway 
was  fastened  to  a  stake  on  the  other 
by  a  chain,  drawn  taut  by  the  cow 
and  thus  raised  from  the  ground, 
over  which  a  riding  horse  stumbled 
and  was  injured.  Held,  the  owner 
of  the  cow  was  liable.  The  owner 
of  a  horse,  allowed  to  run  at  large 
on  the  highway,  may  be  liable  for 
injuries  caused  by  it,  whether  vicious 
or  not  (Baldwin  v.  Ensign,  49  Conn. 
113  ;  Decker  v.  Gannon,  44  Me.  322 ; 
Lyons  v.  Merrick,  105  Mass.  71 ;  Fal- 
lon v.  O'Brien,  12  R.  I.  518  :  Holden 


v.  Shattuck,  34  Vt.  336  ;  Dickson  v. 
McCoy,  39  N.  Y.  400  ;  Lee  v.  Riley, 
18  C.  B.  N.  S.  722).  See  §  626,  post. 
1  Lane  v.  Hancock,  142  N.  Y.  510  ; 
37  N.  E.  473  (see  note  6,  §  356, 
ante).  An  instruction  that  it  was 
the  duty  of  the  borough  officers  "  to 
exercise  proper  supervision  or  make 
proper  examination  of  this  pave- 
ment, by  going  upon  and  testing  it, 
to  discover,  if  by  the  eye  they  could 
do  so,  whether  the  pavement  was 
defective  or  not,"  is  too  strict  a  rule 
of  responsibility  (Lohr  v.  Phillips- 
burg,  156  Pa.  St.  246  ;  27  Atl.  133). 
See  Shaw  v.  Philadelphia,  159  Pa. 
St.  487  ;  28  Atl.  354  ;  Burrell  v.  TJn- 
campher,  117  Pa.  St.  353;  11  Atl. 
619 ;  Harrigan  v.  Wilmington,  8 
Houst.  140  ;  12  Atl.  779  [such  as  a 
good  business  man  would  use  under 
like  circumstances]  ;  Kent  v.  Wil- 
mington, 7  Houst.  397  ;  32  Atl.  464  ; 
Moore  v.  Richmond,  85  Va.  538 ;  8 
S.  E.  387  ["  reasonable  care "  ]  ; 
Lafayette  v.  Larson,  73  Ind.  367; 
Michigan  City  v.  Boeckling,  122  Id. 
39;  23  N.  E.  518;  Columbus  v. 
Strassner,  124  Ind.  482  ;  25  N.  E.  65  ; 
Roodhouse  v.  Christian,  158  111.  137  ; 
41  N  E.  748  [reasonable  care]  ;  Olney 


§367] 


HIGHWAYS. 


632 


ordinary2  travel.  It  does  not  warrant  meir  absolute  or  even 
their  reasonable  safety.3  It  is  therefore  not  enough,  in  order 
to  charge  it  with  liability  for  an  injury,  to  show  the  existence 
of  the  particular  defect  which  caused  the  injury;4  it  must 
appear  affirmatively  either  that  the  corporation  caused  it,  or 
illegally  assented  to  its  creation  by  another  (in  which  cases  no 
question  of  notice  is  involved5),  or  that  the  defect  in  question 
could  have  been  prevented  or  cured 6  by  the  exercise  of  ordi- 
nary care  on  the  part  of  its  officers  or  agents.     Its  liability  to 


v.  Riley,  39  111.  App.  401 ;  Moore  v. 
Kalamazoo,  109  Mich.  176  ;  66  N.  W. 
1089;  Shelley  v.  Austin,  74  Tex.  608  ; 
13  S.  W.  753  ;  Lorenee  v.  Ellensburgh, 
13  Wash.  St.  341;  43  Pac.  20.  See 
Shaw  v.  Sun  Prairie,  74  Wise.  105  ;  42 
N.  W.  271  ;  Lindsey  v.  Des  Moines, 
74  Iowa,  111  ;  37  N.  W.  9  ;  Mansfield 
v.  Moore,  124  111.  133  ;  16  N.  E.  246. 

2  See  cases  cited  under  §  370,  post. 

3  "  The  duty  cast  upon  a  municipal 
corporation  to  keep  its  streets  in  a 
safe  condition  for  travel  is  not  abso- 
lute, so  as  to  impose  liability  upon 
the  corporation  in  eveiy  case  where 
a  traveler,  without  fault  on  his  part, 
sustains  injury  from  a  defective 
street.  Its  liability  depends  in  all 
cases  upon  negligence,  that  is,  upon 
the  fact  whether  it  has  omitted  to 
exercise  due  care,  under  the  circum- 
stances, in  their  maintenance  or 
reparation.  The  mere  existence  of  a 
defect  from  which  a  traveler  sus- 
tains injury  does  not,  independently 
of  negligence,  establish  a  culpable 
breach  of  duty  on  the  part  of  a  mu- 
nicipality "  (Hunt  v.  New  York,  109 
N.  Y.  134 ;  16  N.  E.  320  [gas-explo- 
sion in  manhole]).  S.  P.,  Burns  v. 
Bradford,  137  Pa.  St.  361;  20  Atl. 
997;  Pool  v.  Jackson,  93  Tenn.  10  ; 
23  S.  W.  57  ;  Duthie  v.  Washburn, 
87  Wise.  231 ;  58  N.  W.  380. 

4  Cases  in  last  note. 

1  The  defect  being  created  by  the 
city,  it  is  liable  without  notice  (Tur- 


ner v.  Newburgh,  109  N.  Y.  301  ;  16 
N.  E.  344  [excavation]  ;  Wilson  v. 
Troy,  135  N.  Y.  96  ;  32  N.  E.  44  ;  Hil- 
ler  v.  Sharon  Springs,  28  Hun,  344  ; 
Riddle  v.  Westfield,  65  Hun,  432 ;  20 
N.  Y.  Supp.  359  [water-main]). 

6  A  city  which  permits  the  occupa- 
tion of  part  of  a  street  for  depositing 
building  materials,  and  fails  to  exer- 
cise reasonable  diligence  to  prevent 
such  obstruction  from  becoming  dan- 
gerous to  passers-by  is  liable  for 
damages  sustained  by  the  obstruction 
(Cleveland  v.  King,  132  U.  S.  295  ; 
10  S.  Ct.  90).  s.  P.,  Wendell  v.  Troy, 
39  Barb.  329  ;  affi'd  4  Abb.  Ct.  App. 
351  [drain  built  by  lot  owner  ;  lack 
of  supervision]  ;  Hunt  v.  New  York, 
109  N.  Y.  134 ;  16  N.  E.  320  :  Hoyer  v. 
North  Tonawanda,  79' Hun,  39;  29 
N.  Y.  Supp.  650  ;  Buck  v.  Biddeford, 
82  Me.  433;  19  Atl.  912  [cess-pool 
cover]  ;  Holmes  v.  Paris,  75  Me.  559  ; 
Gay  v.  Cambridge,  128  Mass.  387; 
Lee  v.  Buckhampton,  46  Conn.  213  ; 
Bloomington  v.  Annett,  16  111.  App. 
199  ;  Rockford  v.  Hildebrand,  61  111. 
155  ;  Chicago  v.  McGiven,  78  Id.  347; 
Alexander  v.  Oshkosh,  33  Wise.  277; 
Holmes  v.  Hamburg,  47  Iowa, 
348 ;  Doulon  v.  Clinton,  33  Id.  397 ; 
Smith  v.  Leavenworth,  15  Kans.  81; 
Wellington  v.  Gregson,  31  Id.  99  ; 
Nesbitt  v.  Greenville,  69  Miss.  22  ; 
10  So.  452  ;  Far  man  v.  Ellington,  46 
Hun,  41  ;  and  other  cases  cited  under 
§  358,  ante. 


633 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§367 


a  private  action  for  an  injury  from  the  disrepair  or  obstruction 
of  a  highway  is  not  for  maintaining  or  permitting  a  nuisance,7 
but  for  culpable  neglect  of  a  duty  ;  and  such  neglect  can  only 
be  predicated  on  the  fact  that  its  officers  either  knew,  or  by 
ordinary  diligence  might  have  known,  the  existence  of  the 
defect,8  and  that  the  character  of  the  defect  was  such  that   in- 


1  Where,  after  notice,  a  city  negli- 
gently suffers  an  obstruction  and 
nuisance  to  remain  on  the  street,  it 
is  liable  in  damages  on  the  theory  of 
negligence  and  not  for  maintaining 
a  nuisance  (Hume  v.  New  York, 
47  N.  Y.  639  ;  Congreve  v.  Smith,  18 
Id.  79 ;  Congreve  v.  Morgan,  Id. 
84  ;  Frankel  v.  New  York,  2  N.  Y. 
Supp.  294)  See  Donohue  v.  Syracuse, 
etc.  R.  Co.,  11  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  525  ; 
42  N.  Y.  Supp.  808  ;  Nevins  v.  Pe- 
oria, 41  111.  502  ;  Shawneetown  v. 
Mason,  82  Id.  337  ;  Whitfield  v.  Car- 
rollton,  50  Mo.  App.  98;  and  cases 
cited  under  S  299,  ante. 

8  "  It  is  certainly  true,  as  a  general 
proposition,  that  before  the  corporate 
authorities  can  be  held  liable  in  this 
class  of  cases,  it  must  be  shown  that 
they  knew  of  the  existence  of  the 
cause  of  injury,  or  had  been  notified 
of  it,  or  such  a  state  of  circumstances 
must  be  shown  that  notice  would  be 
implied  "  (Mayor  v.  Sheffield,  4  Wall. 
189,  per  Miller,  J.),  s.  P.,  District 
of  Columbia  v.  Woodbury,  136 
U.  S.  450;  10  S.  Ct.  990;  Hart 
r.  Brooklyn,  36  Barb.  229;  Mc- 
Ginity  v.  New  York,  5  Duer,  674 ; 
Griffin  v.  New  York,  9  N.  Y.  456 ; 
Wood  v.  Watertown,  58  Hun,  298  ; 
11  N.  Y.  Supp.  864  ;  Sherman  v.  One- 
onta,  66  Hun,  629 ;  21  N.  Y.  Supp. 
137;  Colley  v.  Westbrook,  57  Me. 
181  ;  Hoey  v.  Natick,  153  Mass.  528  ; 
27  N.  E.  595;  Bill  v.  Norwich,  39 
Conn.  222  ;  Boucher  v.  New  Haven, 
40  Id.  457  ;  Scran  ton  v.  Catterson,  94 
Pa.  St.  202 ;   Strawbridge  v.    Phila- 


delphia, 13  Phila.  173  [escape  of  gas 
from  a  street-main] ;  Burns  v.  Brad- 
ford, 137  Pa.  St.  361 ;  20  Atl.  997 
[sidewalk]  ;  Boyle  v.  Hazleton,  171 
Pa.  St.  167  ;  33  Atl.  142  [wrongful 
obstruction  by  third  person] ;  At- 
lanta v.  Perdue,  53  Ga.  607 ;  Brown 
v.  Atlanta,  66  Id.  71  ;  Lewis  v.  At- 
lanta, 77  Id.  756  ;  Columbus  v.  Ogle- 
tree,  96  Id.  177;  22  S.  E.  709; 
Atchison  v.  King,  9  Kans.  550 ;  Os- 
borne v.  Hamilton,  29  Id.  1  ;  Stafford 
v.  Oskaloosa,  57  Iowa,  748 ;  Doulon 
v.  Clinton,  33  Id.  397 ;  Rosenberg  v. 
Des  Moines,  41  Id.  415 ;  Weirs  v. 
Jones  county,  80  Id.  351  ;  45  N.  W. 
883  ;  Fort  Wayne  v.  De  Witt,  47  Ind. 
391  ;  Chicago  v.  Hoy,  75  111.  530 ; 
Fahey  v.  Harvard,  62  Id.  28  ;  Aurora 
v.  Hillman,  90  111.  61  ;  Ward  v. 
Jefferson,  24  Wise.  342 ;  Blank  v. 
Livonia,  79  Mich.  1  ;  44  N.  W.  157 ; 
McKellar  v.  Monitor,  78  Mich.  485  ; 
44  N.  W.  412;  Pottner  v.  Minneapolis, 
41  Minn.  73 ;  42  N.  W.  784 ;  Cun- 
ningham v.  Denver,  23  Colo.  18 ;  45 
Pac.  356;  Dixon  v.  San  Antonio 
[Tex.  Civ.  App.],  30  S.  W.  359.  It  is 
not  liable  for  the  breaking  of  a  rail- 
ing around  an  excavation  which  had 
been  made  secure  two  days  before 
the  accident,  in  the  absence  of  no- 
tice that  the  railing  had  again  be- 
come defective  (Jackson  v.  Boone, 
93  Ga.  662 ;  20  S.  E.  46  ;  Thiessen  v. 
Belle  Plaine,  81  Iowa,  118  ;  46  N.  W. 
854).  As  to  necessity  of  notice  of 
accumulations  of  snow  or  ice,  see 
cases  cited  in  note  7,  §  363,  ante. 


§3&7J 


HIGHWAYS. 


634 


juries  to  travelers  therefrom  might  reasonably  be  anticipated.9 
While  the  fact  that  no  accident  from  the  defect  complained  of 
ever  happened  before  is  not  conclusive,10  it  is  to  be  considered 
on  the  question  of  negligence  in  not  anticipating  and  providing 
against  the  danger  of  accident.11     A  town  is  not  liable  for  a 


9  Remote  contingencies  need  not 
be  provided  against  (Lof  tus  v.  Union 
Ferry  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  455;  Cleveland 
v.  N.  J.  Steamboat  Co.,  68  Id.  306; 
Dougan  v.  Champlain  Transport. 
Co.,  56  Id.  1  ;  Smith  v.  New  York, 
66  Id.  295  [sewer  choked  by  extra- 
ordinary rain] ;  Wright  v.  Wilming- 
ton, 92  N.  C.  156  [same]  ;  Rowe  v. 
Portsmouth,  56  N.  H.  291  [same]). 
Other  sewer  cases  are  cited  under 
§  287,  ante ;  but  note  that  the  liabil- 
ity for  defective  sewers  is  placed 
upon  corporate  ownership  of  them, 
and  the  duty  to  anticipate  their  ob- 
structions is  more  stringent  than 
that  for  the  safety  of  streets.  The 
obstruction  must  be  dangerous  ;  and 
"the  burden  is  on  the  plaintiff  to 
prove  either  that  the  thing  was 
originally  dangerous,  or  had  become 
so,  long  enough  before  the  accident 
for  the  authorities  to  have  known 
it,  so  as  to  impose  on  them  the  obli- 
gation to  put  it  in  proper  condition  " 
(per  Harlan,  J.,  District  of  Columbia 
v.  Woodbury,  136  U.  S.  450  ;  10  S. 
Ct.  990).  In  following  cases,  the 
defendant  was  held  not  liable,  the 
defect  or  obstruction  not  being 
dangerous  ;  Dubois  v.  Kingston,  102 
N.  Y.  219  ;  6  N.  E.  273  [stepping 
stone  on  edge  of  sidewalk] ;  Ring  v. 
Cohoes,  77  N.  Y.  83  [hydrant  set  in 
curb] ;  Beltz  v.  Yonkers,  148  Id.  67 ; 
42  X.  E.  401  [depression  in  center  of 
sidewalk  two  feet  long  by  seven 
inches  wide,  caused  by  the  breaking 
of  adjoining  flagstones,  which  had 
caused  no  previous  accident];  Wit- 
ham  v.  Portland,  72  Me.  539  [slight 
depression  in  sidewalk]  :  Macomber 
v.  Taunton,  100  Mass.  255  [hitching 


post]  ;  dishing  v.  Boston,  128  Mass. 
330  [door  step]  ;  Burns  v.  Bradford, 
137  Pa.  St.  361  ;  20  Atl.  997  [tilting 
of  board  sidewalk  by  action  of  frost]; 
Kornetzski  v.  Detroit,  94  Mich.  341; 
53  N.  W.  1106  [ruts  outside  rails  of 
street  railroad]  ;  Gosport  v.  Evans, 
112  Ind.  133  ;  13  N.  E.  256  [bricks  in 
sidewalk  displaced  by  frost]  ;  Oak 
Harbor  v.  Kallager,  52  Ohio  St.  183  ; 
39  N.  E.  144  [bill-board  on  sidewalk 
blown  over  by  extraordinary  wind]; 
Gray  v.  Emporia,  43  Kans.  704  ;  23 
Pac.  944  [falling  sign].  See  Shelley 
v.  Austin,  74  Tex.  608  ;  12  S.  W.  753. 

10  Lane  v.  Hancock,  142  N.  Y.  510  ; 
see  Lutton  v.  Vernon,  62  Conn.  1; 
23  Atl.  1020  ;  Birmingham  v.  Tayloe, 
105  Ala.  170;  16  So.  576;  Barrett  v. 
Hammond,  87  Wise.  654  ;  58  N.  W. 
1053  ;  Bloomington  v.  Legg,  151  111. 

9  ;  37  N.  E.  696 ;  Smith  v.  Pella,  86 
Iowa,  236  ;  53  N.  W.  226  ;  Newport 
v.  Miller,  93  Ky.  22  ;  18  S.  W.  835. 

11  "The  fact  that  for  ten  years  or 
more  this  embankment  had  been  in 
the  same  condition,  and  that  no 
similar  accident  had  occurred,  is 
most  cogent  evidence  of  the  lack  of 
any  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
city  in  failing  to  guard  this  spot. 
That  which  never  happened  before, 
and  which  in  its  character  is  such  as 
not  to  naturally  occur  to  prudent 
men  to  guard  against  its  happening 
at  all,  cannot,  when  in  the  course 
of  years  it  does  happen,  furnish  good 
ground  for  a  charge  of  negligence  in 
not  foreseeing  its  possible  happening, 
and  guarding  against  that  remote 
contingency"  (per  Peckham,  J., 
Hubbell  v.  Yonkers,  104  N.  Y.  434 ; 

10  N.    E.   858).     s.    P.,    Dougan    v. 


'635 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§368 


latent  defect  in  a  highway,  not  discoverable  by  ordinary  care 
and  prudence,  until  a  reasonable  time  after  actual  notice.13 
Statutes  which  impose  a  liability  upon  towns  for  injuries  from 
their  unsafe  highways  usually  provide  either  that  the  town 
shall  have  had  "  reasonable  notice"  of  the  defect  causing  the 
particular  injury,  or  that  the  defect  shall  have  existed  a  specified 
length  of  time  previous  to  the  occurrence.13  In  the  absence 
of  such  provision,  the  town's  liability  is  absolute,  and  proof  of 
notice  is  not  necessary  to  a  recovery.14 

§  368  Actual  notice  of  defect.  —  Under  the  Maine  statute, 
notice  of  a  defect  need  not  be  given  to  the  town  in  its  corpo- 
rate capacity,  nor  to  its  officers;  if  given  to  two  of  the  inhabit- 

Champlain  Transp.  Co.,  56  N.  Y.  1  ;  Morrill  v.  Deering,  3  X.  H.  53;  and 

Beltz  v.  Yonkers,  148  Id.  67.  The  fact,  cases  cited  under  next  section, 
however,  that  the  highway  had  been        I4  Chapman  v.  Milton,  31  W.  Va. 

substantially  in  the  same  condition  38-1;   7  S.  E.  22;  Evans  v.  Hunting- 

for  sixty-eight  years,  and  that  no  ton,  37  W.  Va.  601  ;    16  S.  E.  801  ; 

accident  had  occurred   before,   did  McNally  v.  Cohoes,  53  Hun,  202  ;  6 

not    of    itself    exonerate  the  town  N.  Y.  Supp.  842  ;  affi'd  27  X.  Y.  350. 

from  negligence   in  continuing  the  In     Nebraska,    a    county   is   liable, 

highway     in     its     then     condition  without  notice,  for  a  defective  county 

(Maxim  v.  Champion,  50  Hun,  88 ;  bridge  (Raasch  v.  Dodge  county,  43 

4  N.  Y.  Supp.  515).  Neb.  508  ;  61  N.  W.  725).    The  statute 

12  Prindle  v.  Fletcher,  39  Yt.  225;  of  Wisconsin  "does  not  make  the 
Hanscom  v.  Boston,  141  Mass.  242  ;  liability  depend   upon  the  question 

5  N.  E.  249  ;  Hume  v.  New  York,  47  of  diligence  or  want  of  it  on  the 
N.  Y.  639;  s.  c.,  on  second  appeal,  part  of  the  town"  (Ward  v.  Jeffer- 
74  Id.  264  [see  note  3,  §  354]  ;  see  son  24  Wise.  342  ;  Burns  v.  Elba,  32 
Stein  v.  Council  Bluffs,  72  Iowa,  180;  Id.  610).  In  Massachusetts,  negli- 
33  N.  W.  455  [street-crossing]  ;  La  gence  is  now  the  gist  of  the  action. 
Salle  v.  Porterfield,  138  111.  114;  27  In  Flanders  v.  Norwood  <  141  Mass.  17; 
N.  E.  937  [culvert]  ;  Ford  v.  Uma-  5  N.  E.  256),  a  town  was  held  not 
tilla,  15  Oreg.  313 ;  16  Pac.  33  answerable  for  an  obstruction  of  a 
[bridge].  As  to  defects  from  natural  highway  by  a  railroad  bridge,  be- 
decay,  see  cases  cited  in  note  12,  cause  the  selectmen  had  done  all 
§  369,  post.  they  could  legally   do  to  have   the 

13  See  Springier  v.  Bowdoinham,  7  obstruction  removed.  Under  the 
Me.   442  ;    Bragg  v.   Bangor,   51   Id.     former  statute,  it  was  only  necessary 


532  ;  French  v.  Brunswick,  21  Id.  29  ; 
Howe  v.  Plainfield,  41  N.  H.  135; 
Bard%vell  v.  Jamaica,  15  Yt.  438 ; 
Prindle  v.  Fletcher,  39  Id.  255  ;  Lob- 
dell  v.  New  Bedford,  1  Mass.  153  ; 
Reed  v.  Northfield,  13  Pick.  94; 
Bigelow  v.  Weston,  3  Id.  267  ;  Man- 


to  prove  the  defect,  and  that  the  in- 
jury was  occasioned  thereby  (Billings 
v.  Worcester,  102  Mass.  329  ;  Hutch- 
ing v.  Littleton,  124  Id.  289  ;  Hodg- 
kins  v.  Rockport,  116  Id.  575  ;  Horton 
v.  Ipswich,  12  Cush.  488).  So  in 
Maine  (Merrill  v.  Hampden,  26  Me. 


Chester  v.  Hartford,   30  Conn.   118  ;     234  ;  Tripp  v.  Lyman,  37  Id.  250). 


§363] 


HIGHWAYS. 


636 


ants  of  a  town,  capable  of  communicating  the  information, 
though  such  persons  are  not  among  the  principal  men  of  the 
town,  and  are  not  assessed  for  public  taxes,  it  is  held  suffi- 
cient.1 In  most  states,  notice  of  a  defect  to  an  officer  or 
servant 2  who  is  charged  generally  or  specifically  with  the  care 
of  its  highways  3  is  notice  to  the  corporation,  e.  g.,  the  mayor 
of  a  city,4  the  president  of  a  village,5  an  individual  member  of 
the  common-council,6  board  of  trustees,7  or  board  of  county- 
supervisors  (where  such  board  has  authority  to  provide  a 
remedy8),  a  city  marshal,9    street    superintendent,10    chief    of 

'Mason  v.  Ellsworth,  32  Me.  271  ; 
modified  by  later  statute,  Rogers  v. 
Shirley,  74  Id.  144.  But  notice  to 
a  foreman  employed  by  road  com- 
missioners of  a  defect  in  a  street  is 
not  notice  to  the  city,  though  the 


5  Edwards  v.  Three  Rivers,  9& 
Mich.  625 ;  55  N.  W.  1003.  It  is  im- 
material whether  he  called  the  at- 
tention of  the  chairman  of  the  street 
committee  to  the  defect  (lb.). 

*  So  held,  where  the  members  are, 
defect  arose  through  his  negligence    ex    officio,    commissioners    of    high- 


(Rich  v.  Rockland,  87  Me.  188;  32 
Atl.  872 ;  Tuell  v.  Paris,  23  Me. 
556).  See  as  to  Massachusetts  — 
Lobdell  v.  New  Bedford,  1  Mass. 
153  ;  Winn  v.  Lowell,  1  Allen,  177. 


ways  (Dundas  v.  Lansing.  75  Mich. 
499  ;  42  N.  W.  1011  ;  Logansport  v. 
Justice,  74  Ind.  378;  Columbus  v. 
Strassner,  124  Ind.  482  ;  25  N.  E.  65  ; 
Fife  v.  Oshkosh,  89  Wis.  540  ;  62  N. 


Knowledge  will  be  imputed  to  the    W.   541  ;   Trapnell  v.   Red  Oak,    76 
town   from   the   fact   that   a  rotten     Iowa,  744  ;  39  N.  W.   881 ;  Owen  v. 
plank  in  a  sidewalk  on  a  principal    Ft.  Dodge,  98  Iowa,  281  ;  67  N.  W. 


street,  much  traveled,  was  passed 
over  daily  by  one  of  the  selectmen  ; 
though  the  defect  had  not  been  ob- 
served, the  general  bad  condition  of 
the  walk  being  apparent  (Noyes  v. 
Gardner,  147  Mass.  505;  18  N.  E. 
423).  Same  ruling  under  Michigan 
statute  (Malloy  v.  Walker,  77  Mich. 
448  ;  43  N.  W.  1012). 

2  Smith  v.  Des  Moines,  84  Iowa, 
685;  51  N.  W.  77.  Compare  cases 
cited  in  note  15,  infra. 

3  Notice  to  officers  not  so  charged 
is  not  notice  to  city  (Austin  v.  Col- 


281).  See  Aurora  v.  Hellman,  90  111. 
61.  To  the  contrary,  Jordan  v.  Peck- 
ham  [R.  I.]  31  Atl.  305  ;  Vanderslice 
v.  Philadelphia,  103  Pa.  St.  102  ;  Mc- 
Dermott  v.  Kingston  19  Hun,  198  ; 
Bush  v.  Geneva,  3  Thomp.  &  C.  409  ; 
see  Donaldson  v.  Boston,  16  Gray, 
508). 

1  Weed  v.  Ballston  Spa.,  76  N.  Y., 
329  ;  Whipple  v.  Fair  Haven  (Vt.),  21 
Atl.  533  ;  Sorento  v.  Johnson,  52  111. 
App.  659. 

8  Morgan  v.  Fremont  county,  92 
Iowa,  644;  61 N.  W.  231  [each  member 


gate  [Tex.  Civ.  App.]  27  S.  W.  896.)     being  under  duty  to  report  defective 
See   Kansas   City   v.    Bradbury,    45    bridges]. 


Kans.  381 ;  25  Pac.  889  ;  Pool  v.  Jack- 
son, 93  Tenn.  62  ;  23  S.  W.  57. 

4  Michigan  City  v.  Ballance,  123 
Ind.  334;  24  N.  E.  117  [defect  in 
front  of  mayor's  house]  ;  Sutton  v. 
Snohomish,ll  Wash.  St.  84  ;  39  Pac. 
273. 


9  Hayes  v.  West  Bay,  91  Mich.  418  ; 
51  N.  W.  1067;  Toledo  R.  Co.  v. 
Sweeney,  8  Ohio  C.  C.  298. 

10  Shook  v.  Cohoes,  108  N.  Y.  648  ; 
15  N.  E.  531  ;  Bly  v.  Whitehall,  120 
N.  Y.  506  ;  24  N.  E.  943  ;  Michels  v. 
Syracuse,   92  Hun,    365;  36  N.    Y. 


637 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§368 


police,11  or  a  patrolman  on  his  beat,  whose  duty  it  is  to  report 
defects,12  though  he  fails  to  report  the  observed  defect  which 
caused   the   injury.13     It  is  sufficient    if  the  one  receiving  the 


Supp.  507  ;  Bradford  v.  Anniston,  92 
Ala.  349  ;  8  So.  683  [street  overseer]  ; 
Whitfield  v.  Meridian,  66  Miss.  570  ; 
6  So.  244  ;  Scranton  v.  Catterson,  94 
Pa.  St.  202  [road  overseer]  ;  Osborne 
v.  Hamilton,  29  Kans.  1  ;  Savior  v. 
Montesano,  11  Wash.  St.  328  ;  39  Pac. 
653  ;  Fuller  v.  Jackson,  82  Mich.  480  ; 
46  N.  W.  721  ;  Moon  v.  Ionia,  81  Mich. 
635;  46  N.  W.  25;  Ledgerwood  v. 
Webster  City,  93  Iowa,  726;  61  X.  W. 
1089  ;  Parish  v.  Eden,  62  WTisc.  272  ; 
22  X.  W.  399  [street  commissioner]. 

11  Denver  v.  Dean,  10  Colo.  375  ;  10 
Pac.  30 ;  Osborne  v.  Detroit,  32  Fed. 
36  [defect  in  front  of  police  station]. 
' '  There  can  be  no  occasion  to  notify 
defendants  of  their  own  acts" 
(Brooks  v.  Somerville,  106  Mass.  271  ; 
Monies  v.  Lynn,  119  Id.  273;  Whit- 
ney v.  Lowell,  151  Id.  212  ;  24  X.  E. 
47).  s.  P. ,  Erie  v.  Schwingle,  22  Pa. 
St.  384  ;  Crawfordsville  v.  Bond,  96 
Ind.  236  ;  Fort  Wayne  v.  Coombs,  107 
Id.  75  ;  7  N.  E.  743  ;  Michigan  City  v. 
Boeckling,  122  Ind.  39  ;  23  X.  E.  518  ; 
Jefferson  v.  Chapman,  127  111.  438  ; 
20  X.  E.  33  ;  Mansfield  v.  Moore,  124 
111.  132  ;  16  X.  E.  246  ;  Noble  v.  Rich- 
mond, 31  Gratt.  271  ;  Poole  v.  Jack- 
son, 93  Tenn.  62  ;  23  S.  W.  57  ;  Hughes 
v.  Fond  du  Lac,  73  Wise.  380  ;  41  N. 
W.  407;  Moore  v.  Platteville,  78 
Wise  644  ;  47  N.  W.  1055  ;  Russell  v. 
Columbia,  74  Mo.  480  ;  Stephens  v. 
Macon,  83  Id.  345  ;  Haniford  v.  Kan- 
sas City,  103  Id.  172  ;  15  S.  W.  753 ; 
Ban-  v.  Kansas  City,  105  Id.  550  ;  16 
S.  W.  483:  Lincoln  v.  Calvert,  31  Neb. 
305;  58  N.W.  115;  Houston  v.  Isaacks, 
68  Tex.  116;  3  S.  W.  693;  Klein  v. 
Dallas,  71  Tex.  280  ;  8  S.  W.  90  ;  Aus- 
tin v.  Ritz,  72  Tex.  391  ;  9  S.  W.  884. 
See,  also,  Larsh  v.  Des  Moines,  74 
Iowa,  512 ;  38  N.  W.  384  ;  Shippy  v. 


Au  Sable,  65  Mich.  494 ;  32  N.  W. 
741  ;  Ludlow  v.  Fargo,  3  N.  Dak.  485  ; 
57  N.  W.  506  ;  and  cases  cited  under 
§  358,  ante. 

,a  Rehberg  v.  New  York,  91  N.  Y. 
137  ;  Goodfellow  v.  New  York,  100 
Id.  15  ;  2  N.  E.  462  ;  Hawley  v. 
Gloversville,  4  X.  Y.  App.  Div.  343  ; 
38  N.  Y.  Supp.  647  ;  Columbus  v. 
Ogletree,  96  Ga.  177  ;  22  S.  E.  709  ; 
Looney  v.  Joliet,  49  111.  App.  621; 
Lappread  v.  Detroit,  95  Mich.  255. 
A  patrolman  had  observed  the  icy 
condition  of  the  sidewalk  for  eight 
consecutive  days  prior  to  the  acci- 
dent, and  had  reported  the  condition 
of  the  street  to  the  inspector  at  the 
station-house,  the  custom  being  for 
such  reports  to  be  forwarded  to 
headquarters,  and  thence  to  the  cor- 
poration counsel.  Held,  notice  to  the 
corporation  (Twogood  v.  New  YTork, 
102  N.  Y.  216  ;  6  N.  E.  275).  s.  P., 
Carrington  v.  St.  Louis,  89  Mo.  208  ; 
1  S.  W.  240. 

13  A  city  cannot  instruct  its  subor- 
dinates to  see  whether  any  of  its 
streets  are  in  a  defective  condition, 
and  then  shield  itself  from  liability 
for  accidents  behind  the  fact  that 
such  subordinates  failed  to  perceive 
or  to  report  the  dangerous  condition 
of  a  certain  sidewalk  (Goodfellow  v. 
New  York,  100  N.  Y.  15  ;  2  N.  E. 
462).  s.  p.,  New  York  v.  Furze,  3 
Hill,  612,  618  ;  Martin  v.  Brooklyn, 
1  Id.  545  ;  Chicago  v.  Major,  18  111. 
349  ;  Clark  v.  Epworth,  56  Iowa, 
462.  See  Anne  Arundel  county  v. 
Duval,  54  Md.  350 ;  Tice  v.  Bay  City, 
84  Mich.  461  ;  47  N.  W.  1062  ;  Moore 
v.  Richmond,  85  Va.  538  ;  8  S.  E. 
387  ;  Stephani  v.  Manitowoc,  89 
Wise.  467 ;  62  N.  W.  176. 


§  368]  HIGHWAYS.  63$ 

notice  was  acting  as  street-commissioner  and  admitted  of 
record  to  be  such,  though  not  de  jure  such  officer.14  But 
notice  to  a  subordinate  of  the  chief  officer  having  charge  of 
streets  has  been  held  not  actual  notice  to  the  city  15  though 
knowledge  of  an  employee  sent  to  repair  a  way,  known  to  be 
generally  defective,  is  notice.16  The  knowledge  of  a  defect 
acquired  by  an  officer  before  his  election  has  been  held  not 
imputable  to  the  corporation,  on  the  happening  of  an  injury 
from  such  defect,  after  his  election.17  Pertinent  entries  in 
books  of  city  departments  and  officers  may  be  admissible  as 
evidence  of  notice  of  a  defect,  though  not  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  the  defect.18  And  an  order  given  to  an  abutting  lot- 
owner  19  to  repair  the  sidewalk  in  front  of  his  premises,  or  to  a 
railroad  company  to  repair  street  crossings,20  is  an  admission  of 
notice  of  need  of  repair.  It  should  be  added,  that  the  doctrine 
of  notice  does  not  apply  to  the  case  of  a  defect  directly 
created  by  the  city  itself;  and  this,  notwithstanding  a  charter 
provision  exempting  it  from  liability  except  on  actual  notice.21 
Much  less  is  the  individual  author  of  an  unauthorized  obstruc- 
tion entitled  to  notice  as  a  condition  of  liability  therefor.22 

>«McSherry  v.   Canandaigua,    129  bus,  168  Pa.   St.  382;  31  Atl.   1076). 

N.  Y.  612  ;  29  N.  E.  821.  See  Bullock  It  is  not,  as  matter  of  law,  an  ad- 

v.    Durham,  64  Hun,  380  ;  19  N.  Y.  mission  of   notice  of  any  other  de- 

Supp.  635.  feet  than  the  one  stated  in  the  notice, 

15  Sprague  v.  Rochester,  88  Hun.  or  of  one  so  related  to  it  that  the 
613  ;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  1126.  existence  of  the  latter,  according  to 

16  Smith  v.  Pella,  86  Iowa,  236  ;  53  the  usual  course  of  affairs,  may  be 
N.  W.  226  ;  Atlanta  v.  Buchanan,  76  reasonably  inferred  from  the  former 
Ga.  585.  (Shelby  v.  Clagett,  46  Ohio  St.  549  ; 

"  Lohr  v.  Philipsburg,  156  Pa.  St.     22  N.  E.  407). 
246  ;  27  Atl.  133.  20  Butler  v.  Malvern,  91  Iowa,  397  ; 

18  Blake  v.  Lowell,  143  Mass.  296  ;    59  N.  W.  50. 

9  N.    E.    627.       Resolutions  of    the        21Stedman   v.  Rome,  88  Hun,  279  ; 

council  passed  during  the  previous  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  737  ;  Denver  v.  Aaron, 

two  years  ordering  the  repair  of  a  6  Colo.  App.  232 ;  40  Pac.  587,  and 

sidewalk    are  admissible    to    show  cases  in  note  11,  supra. 
knowledge  of    its    defective  condi-        ™  Clifford   v.  Dam,    81    N.  Y.  52 ; 

tion,  when  connected  with  evidence  Wells  v.   Sibley  56  Hun,  644  mem.; 

that    the    repairs  were    not    made  9  N.  Y.  Supp.  343  ;  and  cases  cited 

(Thompson  v.  Quincy,  83  Mich.  173  ;  in  note  2,   §  365,  ante.     Ignorance 

47  N.  W.  114).  that  a  coal-hole  in  sidewalk  had  no 

19  Haskell  v.  Penn  Yan,  5  Lans.  43.  fastenings,  does  not  excuse  the  per- 
But  such  an  order  is  no  evidence  of  son  responsible  for  it  (Irvine  v.  Wood, 
an  "express  notice"  (Fee  v.  Colum-  51  N.  Y.  224). 


639 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§  369 


§  369.  When  notice  will  be  implied.  —  Unless  some  statute 
requires  it,1  actual  notice  is  not  a  necessary  condition  of  cor- 
porate liability  for  the  defect  which  caused  the  injury.  Under 
its  duty  of  active  vigilance,  a  municipal  corporation  is  bound  to 
know  the  condition  of  its  highways,  and  for  practical  purposes, 
the  opportunity  of  knowing  must  stand  for  actual  knowledge.2 
Hence,  where  observable  defects  in  a  highway  have  existed  for  a 
time  so  long  that  they  ought  to  have  been  observed,  notice  of 
them  is  implied,  and  is  imputed  to  those  whose  duty  it  is  to  re- 
pair them  ; 3  in  other  words,  they  are  presumed  to  have  notice  of 
such  defects  as  they  might  have  discovered  by  the  exercise  of 
reasonable  diligence.4     Such  notice  may  be  imputed  also  where 


1  See  McNally  v.  Cohoes,  127  N. 
Y.  350;  27  N.  E.  1043;  Smith  v. 
Rochester,  79  Hun,  174;  29  N.  Y. 
Supp.  539  ;  Hurley  v.  Bowdoinham, 
88  Me.  293  ;  34  Ail.  72 ;  Peacock  v. 
Dallas  [Tex.],  35  S.  W.  8. 

8  Want  of  knowledge  may  be  re- 
garded as  negligence  (Woodbury  v. 
Owosso,  69  Mich.  479  ;  37  N.  W.  547  ; 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  State  [Md.],  33 
Atl.  265 ;  and  all  cases  cited  under 
this  section). 

3  "  They  owe  to  the  public  the  duty 
of  active  vigilance ;  and  when  a 
street  or  sidewalk  has  been  out  of 
repair  for  any  considerable  length  of 
time,  so  that  by  reasonable  diligence 
they  could  have  notice  of  the  defect, 
such  notice  may  be  imputed  to 
them  "  (Pomf  rey  v.  Saratoga  Springs, 
104  N.Y.  459;  11  N.  E.  43).  S.  P., 
Turner  v.  Newburgh,  109  N.  Y.  301  ; 
16  N.  E.  344 ;  Weed  v.  Ballston,  76 
N.  Y.  329  ;  Olson  v.  Worcester,  142 
Mass.  536 ;  8  N.  E.  441  ;  Springfield 
v.  Doyle,  76  111.  202  ;  Chicago  v. 
Dalle,  115  111.  386  ;  Lincoln  v.  Wood- 
ward, 19  Neb.  259  ;  27  N.  W.  110  ; 
Duffy  v.  Dubuque,  63  Iowa,  171  ; 
Case  v.  Waverly,  36  Id.  545.  In- 
dianapolis v.  Scott,  72  Ind.  196  ; 
Indianapolis  v.  Murphy,  91  Id.  382 ; 
Madison  v.  Baker,  103  Id.  41  ;  2  N.  E. 
236  ;  Hembling  v.  Grand  Rapids,  99 


Mich.  292  ;  58  N.  W.  310  ;  Tice  v.  Bay 
City,  84  Mich.  461 ;  47  N.  W.  1062  ; 
Squires  v.  Chillicothe,  89  Mo.  226; 
1  S.  W.  23  ;  Birmingham  v.  Starr 
[Ala.],  20  So.  424  ;  Poole  v.  Jackson, 
93  Tenn.  62  ;  23  S.  W.  57  ;  Galveston 
v.  Smith,  69  Tex.  80  ;  15  S.  W.  589  ; 
and  cases  cited  in  next  note. 

4Kibele  v.  Philadelphia,  105  Pa. 
St.  41;  Vanderslice  v.  Philadelphia, 
103  Id.  102  ;  Cusick  v.  Norwich,  40 
Conn.  375  ;  Boucher  v.  New  Haven, 
Id.  456.  Notice  was  presumed  from 
the  existence  of  defect  for  a  ' '  con- 
siderable time,"  in  the  following 
cases  :  Ten  hours  (Parsons  v.  Man- 
chester, N.  H.  ;  27  Atl.  88  [pile 
of  dirt  in  much  traveled  street]); 
four  days  (Kunz  v.  Troy,  104  N.  Y. 
344;  10  N.  E.  442  [heavy  counter 
standing  tilted  on  sidewalk]);  five  to 
twenty  days  (Griffin  v.  Johnson, 
84  Ga.  279;  10  S.  E.  719  [hole  in 
bridge] ;  Naylor  v.  Salt  Lake  City,  9 
Utah,  491;  35  Pac.  509  [pile  of 
stone  three  to  twelve  days]);  nine 
days  (Fortin  v.  Easthampton,  145 
Mass.  196  ;  13  N.  E.  599 ;  [ice 
and  snow]  ;  see  other  ice  and 
snow  cases  cited  in  note,  11  §  363, 
ante)  ;  ten  days  (Grand  Rapids 
v.  Wyman,  46  Mich.  516  [hole  in 
street]) ;  two  or  three  weeks  (Pomfrey 
v.  Saratoga   Springs,  101  N.  Y.  459  ; 


369] 


HIGHWAYS. 


640 


a  defect,  though  temporary,  has  been   of  frequent  occurrence 
during  a  long  period,  e.g.,  where  an  individual  has  habitually 


11  N.  E.  43  [ice  and  snow]  ;  Foels  v. 
Tonawanda,  75  Hun,  363  ;  27  N.  Y. 
Supp.  113  [hole  in  sidewalk]) ;  two 
weeks  (Dempsey  v.  Rome,  94  Ga.  420  ; 
20  S.  E.  335  [same]) ;  two  or  three 
weeks  (Logansport  v.  Justice,  74  Ind. 
378  [bridge]) ;  three  weeks  (Atlanta  v. 
Champe,  66  Ga.  659  [hole  in  cross- 
ing]) ;  four  weeks  (Ronn  v.  Des 
Moines,  78  Iowa,  63 ;  42  N.  W.  582 
[broken  sidewalk]);  four,  six,  and 
eight  xoeeks  (Evansville  v.  Wilter,  86 
Ind.  414  ;  Indianapolis  v.  Murphy,  91 
Id.  382;  Porter  county  v.  Dombke, 
94  Id.  72  ;  Washington  v.  Small, 
86  Id.  462  ;  Bloomington  v.  Annett, 
16  111.  App.  199  ;  Smith  v.  Leaven- 
worth, 15  Kans.  81);  tivo  months 
(Sutton  v.  Snohomish,  11  Wash.  St. 
24;  39  Pac.  273  [excavation];  Robin- 
son v.  Wilmington,  8  Houst.  409 ;  32 
Atl.  347);  six  months  (West  v.  Eau 
Claire,  89  Wise.  81;  61  N.  W.  313; 
[hole  in  sidewalk]  ;  McVee  v.  Water- 
town,  92  Hun,  306  ;  36  N.  Y.  Supp. 
870  [same] ;  Waud  v.  Polk  county, 
88  Iowa,  617;  55  N.  W.  528  [bridge 
openly  out  of  repair];  Michigan  City 
v.  Boeckling,  122  Ind.  39  ;  23  N.  E. 
518  [iron  rails  projected  four  inches 
above  surface  of  street]) ;  several 
months  (Lincoln  v.  Smith,  28  Neb. 
762  ;  45  N.  W.  41  ;  Schuenke  v.  Pine 
River,  84  Wise.  669  ;  54  N.W.  1007); 
a  year  (Saulsbury  v.  Ithaca,  94  N.  Y. 
27  [slant  of  sidewalk]);  one  year 
(Diamond  v.  Brooklyn,  36  N.  Y. 
Supp.  97  [hole  in  crosswalk]  ;  Kirk 
v.  Homer,  77  Hun,  459  ;  28  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1009  [same] ;  Burrows  v.  Lake 
Crystal,  61  Minn.  357  ;  63  N.  W.  745  ; 
Alberts  v.  Vernon,  96  Mich.  549  ;  55 
N.  W.  1022  [sidewalk  not  repaired]); 
four  years  (Beltz  v.  Yonkers,  74 
Hun,  73  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  106  [hole  in 
sidewalk]);  seven  years  (Lane  v.  Han- 


cock, 67  Hun,  623  ;  22  N.  Y.  Supp. 
470) ;  ten  years  (Sebert  v.  Alpena, 
78  Mich.  165  ;  43  N.  W.  1093  [stump 
close  to  traveled  path]);  several  years 
(Halpin  v.  Kansas  City,  76  Mo.  335). 
In  the  following  cases,  held,  notice 
from  existence  of  defect  was  not  im- 
plied: Stoddard  v.  Winchester,  154 
Mass.  149 ;  27  N.  E.  1014  [an  hour 
before  accident]  ;  Sikes  v.  Manches- 
ter, 59  Iowa,  65  ;  12  N.  W.  755  [sleigh 
left  standing  for  ten  or  fifteen  min- 
utes]; Butler  v.  Oxford,  69  Miss.  618; 
13  So.  626  [horse  frightened  by 
articles  deposited  in  street  an  hour 
or  two  before] ;  Klatt  v.  Milwaukee, 
53  Wise.  196  [barrier  up  at  four  p. 
M. ;  removed  by  stranger;  accident 
at  nine  P.  M.  same  day];  Herrington 
v.  Phoenix,  41  Hun,  270;  Dotton  v. 
Albion,  55  Mich.  575;  24  N.  W.  786; 
Sheel  v.  Appleton,  49  Wise.  125;  5  N. 
W.  27  [one  day] ;  Dittrich  v.  Detroit, 
98  Mich.  245;  57  N.  W.  125  [day  after 
thorough  repair  of  sidewalk]; 
Muller  v.  Newburgh,  32  Hun,  24 
[snowed  on  Thursday,  then  rained 
and  froze;  plaintiff  fell  on  ice  Sun- 
day]; Blakely  v.  Troy,  18  Hun,  167; 
[fell  on  ice  one  P.  M.  formed  night 
before];  Dorn  v.  Oyster  Bay,  84 
Hun,  510;  32  N.  Y.  Supp.  341  [five 
days  previously  a  snowstorm  com- 
menced, and  continued  until  the 
afternoon  of  the  day  before  the  acci- 
dent]; Chatsworth  v.  Ward,  10  111. 
App.  75  [two  days];  Chicago  v. 
McCarthy,  75  111.  602  [sidewalk  laid 
but  seven  days].  There  being  no 
averments  or  proof  as  to  the  length 
of  time  the  excavation  had  been 
opened,  notice  cannot  be  implied 
(Fort  Wayne  v.  DeWitt,  47  Ind.  391; 
Madison  v.  Baker,  103  Id.  41;  2  N. 
E.  236). 


641 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§369 


used  an  unguarded  cellar  door  in  the  sidewalk;5  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  it  is  not  to  be  imputed  where  a  lawful  structure  has 
been  proved  to  be  exceptionally  safe,  during  a  long  period.6  If 
the  corporation  has  notice  (unless  it  is  too  remote  7)  that  the 
highway  is  generally  defective,  it  is  charged  with  notice  of  the 
particular  defect  in  question  ; 8  provided  it  is  of  such  a  character 
as  to  be  usually  concomitant  of  general  disrepair.9  It  is  only 
reasonable  that  notice  of  latent  defects  should  not  be  so  readily 


5  Chapman  v.  Macon,  55  Ga.  566 ; 
Augusta  v.  Hafers,  61  Id.  48  ;  McGaf- 
figan  v.  Boston,  149  Mass.  289;  21  N. 
E.  371  [cover  of  coal  hole].  A  manu- 
facturer was  accustomed  to  deposit 
castings  on  sidewalk  in  front  of  his 
place  of  business ;  shipments  and 
removals  were  frequent,  and  there 
were  always  some  castings  there. 
A  passer-by  fell  over  them,  after 
dark.  Held,  whether  the  obstruc- 
tions had  been  so  continuous  as  to  be 
unlawful,  and  so  charge  the  city 
with  notice,  should  have  been  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury  (Davis  v.  Corry, 
154  Pa.  St.  598,  26  Atl.  621).  See 
Mattimore  v.  Erie,  144  Pa.  St.  14;  22 
Atl.  817. 

6  In  Littlefield  v.  Norwich  (40 
Conn.  406),  a  removable  iron  grating 
over  a  basement  was  so  fitted  by 
slots  into  the  stone  work,  that  it 
could  not  be  left  insecure,  except  by 
gross  carelessness  ;  it  had  never  been 
known  to  be  out  of  place  in  forty 
years,  but  a  stranger  failed  to  replace 
it,  and,  a  few  minutes  after,  plaintiff 
fell  in.     Held,  city  not  liable. 

1  Notice  a  year  before  the  injury 
is  not  too  remote  (Brownlee  v. 
Alexis,  39  111.  App.  135). 

8  Plaintiff  need  not  show  that  de- 
fendant had  any  knowledge  of  the 
particular  defect  which  caused  the 
accident,  but  may  recover  on  show- 
ing that  the  sidewalk  had  been  in  a 
rotten  and  dangerous  condition,  and 
that  defendant  knew,  or  ought  to 
have  known  thereof,  and  had  had 
[Law  of  Neo.  Vol.  11—41] 


sufficient  time,  with  reasonable  dili- 
gence, to  repair  it  (Fuller  v.  Jack- 
son, 92  Mich.  197  ;  52  N.  W.  1075). 
S.  P.,  Shaw  v.  Sun  Prairie,  74  Wise. 
105  ;  42  N.  W.  271  ;  Weisenberg  v. 
Appleton,  26  Wise.  56  ;  Spearbracker 
v.  Larrabee,  64  Wise.  573  ;  25  N.  W. 
555 ;  Aurora  v.  Hellman,  90  111.  61  ; 
Joliet  v.  Weston,  123  HI.  641;  14  N. 
E.  665  ;  Galesburg  v.  Benedict,  22 
111.  App.  Ill  ;  Armstrong  v.  Ackley, 
71  Iowa,  76 ;  32  N.  W.  180  ;  Bur- 
rows v.  Lake  Crystal,  61  Minn.  357  ; 
63  X.  W.  745  ;  Chacey  v.  Fargo,  5 
N.  Dak.  173;  64  N.  W.  932).  The 
condition  of  the  sidewalk  in  the  vi- 
cinity is  admissible  to  show  notice 
(Aryman  v.  Marshalltown,  90  Iowa, 
350  ;  57  N.  W.  867  ;  Edwards  v. 
Three  Rivers,  102  Mich.  153;  60  N.  W. 
454;  Smallwood  v.  Tipton,  1  Mo.  App. 
764.  Compare  Tice  v.  Bay  City,  84 
Mich.  461  ;  47  N.  W.  1062).  Notice 
of  the  defective  condition  of  the 
sidewalks  generally  for  one  or  two 
blocks  each  way  from  a  street  cross- 
ing, and  not  as  to  the  particular  de- 
fect in  that  crossing  which  caused 
the  injury,  is  not  sufficient  notice. 
Dundas  v.  Lansing,  75  Mich.  499;  42 
N.  W.  1011). 

9  Shelby  v.  Clagett,  46  Ohio  St.  543; 
22  N.  E.  407.  The  court's  judicious 
suggestion,  in  this  case,  of  a  qualifi- 
cation of  the  text  of  our  last  edition, 
on  this  point,  is  accepted.  The  quali- 
fication is  implied  in  other  cases 
cited  in  last  note. 


§369] 


HIGHWAYS. 


642 


presumed  from  their  continuance  as  open  and  obvious  defects.10 
If  these  were  so  dangerous  as  to  challenge  immediate  attention, 
the  jury  is  justified  in  finding  a  very  short  continuance  of  such 
condition  to  constitute  sufficient  notice.11  Active  vigilance  is 
required  to  detect  defects  from  natural  decay  in  wooden 
structures,  like  bridges,  plank  sidewalks  and  the  like,  which  will 
necessarily  become  unsafe  from  age,  but  the  most  that  ought 
to  be  required  is  the  use  of  ordinary  diligence  by  making  tests 
and  examinations,  with  reasonable  frequency,  to  ascertain 
whether  they  are  safe  or  not.12  It  has  been  held  that  notice 
will  not  be  implied  unless  the  defect  was  so  open  and  notice- 
able as  to  attract  the  attention  of  passers-by.13  But  travelers 
are  not  charged  with  any  duty  to  search  for  defects  in  a  high- 
way, as  road  officers  are,  and  the  better  rule,  in  our  judgment, 


10  Wakeham  v.  St.  Clair,  91  Mich. 
15  ;  51  N.  W.  696  ;  and  cases  cited  in 
note  11  under  §  367,  ante. 

11  Harriman  v.  Boston,  114  Mass. 
241  ;  Albrittin  v.  Huntsville,  60  Ala. 
486  [un  fenced  precipice  at  side  of 
roadj :  Kiley  v.  Kansas  City,  69  Mo. 
102  [overhanging  wall].  See  Rug- 
gles  v.  Nevada,  63  Iowa,  185;  18  N. 
W.  866;  also  Bradford  v.  Anniston, 
92  Ala.  349  ;  8  So.  683  [bridge  ap- 
proach washed  out  nine  o'clock 
A.  M. ;  injury  at  one  P.  M.;  no  warn- 
ing posted  ;  city  liable] ;  and  cases 
cited  in  note  4,  supra. 

12  Hunt  v.  New  York,  109  N.  Y. 
134  ;  16  N.  E.  320  ;  Pettingill  v.  Olean, 
65  Hun,  624;  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  367; 
Sherwood  v.  District  of  Columbia,  3 
Mackey,  276  [wood  cover  of  well, 
with  brick  pavement  over  it ;  not 
inspected  for  nine  years]  ;  Rapho  v. 
Moore,  68  Pa.  St.  404  [bridge]  ;  How- 
ard county  v.  Legg,  110  Ind.  479  ;  11 
N.  E.  612  [bridge];  Bonebrake  v. 
Huntington  county,  141  Ind.  62  ;  40 
N.  E.  141  [same] ;  Allen  county  v. 
Creviston,  133  Ind.  39  ;  32  N.  E.  735 
[bridge  not  inspected  for  eight  years] ; 
Wheaton  v.  Hadley,  131  111.  640  ;  23 
N.  E.  422  [plank  sidewalk  fourteen 


years  old]  ;  Joliet  v.  McCraney,  49 
111.  App.  381  [same] ;  Moore  v.  Kenoc- 
kee,  75  Mich.  332;  42  N.  W.  944 
[bridge] ;  Blank  v.  Livonia,  95  Mich. 
229  ;  54  N.  W.  877  [bridge]  ;  McKeller 
v.  Monitor,  78  Mich.  485  ;  44  N.  W. 
412  [stringer  of  bridge].  See  Spaul- 
ding  v.  Sherman,  75  Wise.  77  ;  43  N. 
W.  558.  "  A  city  is  not  required  to 
take  up  and  examine,  from  time  to 
time,  all  its  plankwalks,  when  the 
same  are  apparently  in  good  condi- 
tion "  (Jackson  v.  Pool,  91  Tenn.  450  ; 

19  S.  W.  324). 

13  Tice  v.  Bay  City,  84  Mich.  461 ; 
47  N.  W.  1062;  McGrail  v.  Kalama- 
zoo, 94  Mich.  52  ;  53  N.  W.  955  ;  Lohr 
v.  Philipsburg,  165  Pa.  St.  109;  30 
Atl .  822.  Witnesses  may  testify  to 
having  frequently  passed  over  the 
walk,  and  that,  if  there  had  been  a 
defect  there,  they  would  have  no- 
ticed it  (McGrail  v.  Kalamazoo,  94 
Mich.  52 ;  53  N.  W.  955).  A  defect 
discoverable  by  only  one  in  a  thou- 
sand, held  not  notorious  enough  to 
require  a  city  to  take  notice  of  it 
(Burns  v.  Bradford,  137  Pa.  St.  361 ; 

20  Atl.  997).  See  Broburg  v.  Des 
Moines,  63  Iowa,  523  ;  19  N.  W.  340 ; 
Shipley  v.  Bolivar,  42  Mo.  App.  401 . 


643 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§  369 


is  that  knowledge  of  a  defect  maybe  inferred,  notwithstanding 
it  may  have  escaped  the  attention  of  all  travelers,  or  even  of  an 
officer,  frequently  passing  by.  It  is  not  a  question  whether  all 
passers-by  actually  noticed  a  defect,  but  whether  it  was  notice- 
able.14 Evidence  of  previous  accidents,  occurring  at  the  same 
place,  is  admissible  as  showing  that  the  authorities  had  notice 
of  its  dangerous  character ; 15  and  so  is  evidence  as  to  the  con- 
dition of  the  street  and  the  absence  of  lights  prior  to  the  acci- 
dent as  tending  to  show  knowledge  of  the  defect,  if  it  was 
created  by  a  third  person,  and  left  unguarded  by  the  city.1" 
Upon  the  circumstances  of  each  case,  it  is  for  the  jury  to 
determine  whether  the  continuance  of  a  defect  amounted  to  a 
notice  of  its  existence ; 17  and  in  doing  so  it  should  consider 
that  municipal  authorities  cannot  ordinarily  act  with  the 
promptness  of  individuals.18 

14  "  It  is  the  duty  of  the  city,  and  Branch,  81  Mich.  544;  45  N.  W. 
not  of  '  passers  by,'  to  notice  defects  1023  [injury  by  other  defects  in 
in  streets  and  sidewalks,  and  repair  close  proximity  to  one  in  ques- 
them  "  (Squires  v.  Chillicothe,  89  Mo.  tion]  ;  Moore  v.  Kalamazoo  [Mich.], 
226  ;  1  S.  W.  23).  "  It  is  not  a  ques-  66  N.  W.  1089  [another  hole  in  close 
tion  whether  all  passengers  actually  vicinity]  ;  Golden  v.  Clinton,  54  Mo. 
noticed  the  defect,  but  whether  it  App.  100 ;  Grundy  v.  Janesville,  84 
was  noticeable  "(Rosevearv.  Osceola  Wise.  574;  54  N.  W.  1085;  Barrett 
Mills,  169  Pa.  St.  555  ;  32  Atl.  548).  v.  Hammond,  87  AVisc.  654  ;  58  N.  VV. 
Notice  of  a  defect  in  a  highway  is  1053  ;  Johnson  v.  St.  Paul,  52  Minn, 
notice  of  that  condition  of  things  364  ;  54  N.  W.  735  ;  Burrows  v.  Lake 
which  constitutes  a  defect,  although  Crystal,  61  Minn.  357  ;  63  N.  W.  745  ; 
the  town  authorities  may  think  it  Smith  v.  Des  Moines,  84  Iowa,  685  ; 
does  not  constitute  a  defect  (Hinck-  51 N.  W.  77  ;  Goshen  v.  England,  119 
ley  v.  Somerset,  145  Mass.  326 ;  14  Ind.  368;  21  N.  E.  977.  Compare 
N.  E.  166).  In  Weber  v.  Creston  (75  Johnson  v.  Manhattan  R.  Co.,  52 
Iowa,  16  ;  39  N.  W.  126),  notice  of  a  Hun,  111  ;  4  N.  Y.  Supp.  848  (note  5, 
defect  in  a  board  walk  was  implied,  §  60  b,  ante). 

though   the   walk   appeared   to  the        I6  Pettengill  v.  Yonkers,  116  N.  Y. 

ordinary  observer  to  be  safe.  558  ;  22  N.  E.  1095  ;  Poole  v.  Jackson, 

15  District  of  Columbia  v.  Armes,  93  Tenn.  62  ;  23  S.  W.  57.  Compare 
107  U.  S.  519  ;  2  S.  Ct.  840  ;  Quinlan  Weirs  v.  Jones  county,  80  Iowa,  351 ; 
v.    Utica,    74  N.  Y.  603;    Avery   v.  45  N.  W.  883. 

Syracuse,  29  Hun,  537  ;    Darling  v.  »  Colley  v.  Westbrook,  57  Me.  181; 

Westmoreland,  52  N.  H.  401;  Marvin  Sheel  v.  Appleton,  49  Wise.  125  ;  5 

v.   New  Bedford,  158  Mass.  464  ;  33  N.  W.   27 ;    Enright  v.  Atlanta,    78 

N.  E.  605  ;  Chicago  v.  Powers,  42  111.  Ga.  288  ;  Newport  v.  Miller,  93  Ky. 

169  ;   Bloomington  v.  Legg,  151  111.  22  ;  18  S.  W.  835. 

9  ;  37  N.  E.  696  ;   Alberts  v.  Vernon,  ls  Turner  v.  Newburgh,  109  N.  Y. 

96  Mich.  549  ;  55  N.  W.  1022  [eight  301  ;  16  N.  E.  344  ;  Kunz  v.  Troy,  104 

months    before];    O'Neil    v.    West  N.  Y.  344  ;  10  N.  E.  442.   "The  danger 


§37o] 


HIGHWAYS. 


644 


§370.  Who  may  maintain  action.  —  Where  the  obligation 
of  towns  is  limited  by  the  terms  of  the  statutes  imposing  it,  to 
the  making  of  their  highways  safe  and  convenient  for  travelers, 
their  horses,  etc.,  towns  are  not  liable  to  the  owner  of  adjoin- 
ing land,  as  such,  for  injuries  caused  by  a  defect  in  a  highway;1 
their  only  duty  being  to  those  who  are  actually  traveling  on 
their  highway;2  and,  of  course,  if  persons  voluntarily  leave  the 
highway  they  cease  to  be  travelers  upon  it.3  And  they  are  not 
travelers  upon  a  highway  while  racing  horses  upon  it,  though 
not  at  the  time  at  a  high  rate  of  speed.4  In  Massachusetts  and 
Maine,  under  peculiar  statutes,  a  child  playing  upon  the  street 5 


is  that  courts  and  juries  may  not 
sufficiently  take  into  account,  in  de- 
termining the  question  of  negli- 
gence, the  extent  of  roadways  in  a 
city,  under  the  supervision  of  the 
city  authorities,  the  unavoidable  de- 
lay often  attending  the  action  of 
municipal  authorities,  and  financial 
and  other  embarrassments  "  (lb., 
per  Andrews,  J.),  s.  p.,  Roach  v. 
Ogdensburg,  91  Hun,  9;  36  N.  Y. 
Supp.  112  ;  Lambert  v.  Pembroke, 
66  N.  H.  280;  23  Atl.  81 ;  Laue  v. 
Madison,  86  Wise.  453 ;  57  N.  W.  93  ; 
Say  lor  v.  Montesano,  11  Wash.  St. 
328;  39  Pac.  653. 

1  Ball  v.  Winchester,  32  N.  H.  435. 
See  Stinson  v.  Gardiner,  42  Me.  248  ; 
Brojks  v.  Boston,  19  Pick.  174  ;  and 
see  Willard  v.  Cambridge,  3  Allen, 
574  ;  Peck  v.  Ellsworth,  36  Me.  393  ; 
Conway  v.  Jefferson,  46  N.  H.  521  ; 
Smith  v.  Dedham,  8  Cush.  Z~i1\  Gil- 
man  v.  Laconia,  55  N.  H.  130  ;  limit- 
ing Ball  v.  Winchester,  supra. 

2  Sykes  v.  Pawlet,  43  Vt.  446  ;  and 
cases  supra.  Persons  in  public 
parks  or  commons  are  not  "  upon  " 
highways,  under  the  Mass.  statute 
(Clark  v.  Waltham.  128  Mass.  567  ; 
Steele  v.  Boston,  128  Id.  583)  nor  are 
those  on  a  vessel  passing  through  a 
draw-bridge  (McDougall  v.  Salem, 
110  Id.  21).  One  unloading  a  wagon 
in  a  street  is  rightfully  there  as  a 


traveler  (Smethurst  v.  Congrega- 
tional Church,  148  Mass.  261  ;  19  N. 
E.  387).  Where  a  pregnant  woman 
was  prematurely  delivered  of  a  child 
by  reason  of  falling  upon  a  defective 
highway,  the  child,  though  living 
for  several  minutes,  is  not  a  traveler, 
for  whose  death  an  action  will  lie 
(Dietrich  v.  Northampton,  138  Mass. 
14).  The  mother  had  already  recov- 
ered for  her  own  injury.  Towns  are 
not  bound  to  make  their  roads  safe 
for  a  horse  escaped  from  adjacent 
land  (Richards  v.  Enfield,  13  Gray, 
344),  or  from  his  driver  (Davis  v. 
Dudley,  4  Allen,  557).  Compare 
Verrill  v.  Minot,  31  Me.  299;  and 
cases  cited  under  §  346,  ante. 

3  Brown  v.  Skowhegan,  82  Me.  273  ; 
19  Atl.  399. 

4  McCarthy  v.  Portland,  67  Me.  167; 
and  cases  cited  in  note  2,  §  379,  post. 
s.  P.,  Sindlinger  v.  Kansas  City,  126 
Mo.  315  ;  28  S.  W.  857  [a  foot-race  by 
moonlight]. 

5  Stinson  v.  Gardiner,  42  Me.  248 
[railing  gave  way  J;  Tighe  v.  Lowell, 
119  Mass.  472;  Lyons  v.  Brookline, 
Id.  491  [child  sitting  upon  sidewalk, 
injured  by  fall  of  curb-stone]  ;  Blod- 
gett  v.  Boston,  8  Allen,  237.  The 
fact  that  just  before  the  injury  the 
child  had  been  playing  on  the  street 
did  not  divest  him  of  the  character 
of  a  traveler  (Graham  v.  Boston,  156 


64S 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§370 


or  a  person  stopping  by  the  wayside  to  converse6  is  not  making 
such  a  use  of  the  highway  as  entitles  him  to  complain  of  its 
defects.7  In  other  jurisdictions,  not  embarrassed  by  statutory 
construction,  the  rule  is  that  the  same  duty  is  owing  to  a  child 
at  play  on  the  street8  as  to  one  passing  over  it  for  business  or 
pleasure.  A  person  driving  on  a  highway  may  stop  and  alight, 
and,  for  a  reasonable  time,  employ  himself  in  acts  unconnected 
with  his  journey,  without  losing  his  rights  as  a  traveler.9  Mere 
loitering,  or  stopping  to  watch  a  public  spectacle,  is  not  such  a 
use  of  the  street  as  will  prevent  a  recovery.10  A  policeman  on 
his  beat,11  a  fireman  running  to  a  fire 12  and  a  laborer  working  on 
the  street,13  do  not  assume  any  risks  incident  to  their  employ- 
ment, and  are  entitled,  though  not  technically  travelers,  to  the 
protection  afforded  by  safe  streets.  No  reasonable  and  proper 
use  of  a  highway  will  bar  a   recovery  for  defects   therein,  for 


Mass.  75:  30  N.  E.  170).  A  child 
twenty  months  old,  sent  out  for  air 
and  exercise,  is  protected  by  the 
statute  (Bliss  v.  South  Hadley,  145 
Mass.  91  ;  13  N.  E.  354). 

6  Stickney  v.  Salem,  3  Allen,  374. 
To  the  contrary,  Langlois  v.  Cohoes, 
58  Hun,  226  ;  11  N    Y.  Supp.  908. 

'Railings  on  bridges  are  not  de- 
signed for  persons  to  lean  against  or 
rest  upon,  and  one  using  them  for 
such  purposes  takes  the  risk  (Stick- 
ney v.  Salem,  3  Allen,  374  ;  Orcutt  v. 
Kittery  Bridge  Co.,  53  Me.  500). 

8  McGuire  v.  Spence,  91  N.  Y.  303  ; 
McGarry  v.  Loomis,  63  Id.  104  ;  Chi- 
cago v.*  Keefe,  114  111.  222  ;  In- 
dianapolis v.  Emmelman,  108  Ind. 
530  ;  Donoho  v.  Vulcan  Iron  Works, 
75  Mo.  401  ;  Gibson  v.  Huntington, 
38  W.  Va.  177;  18  S.  E.  447  ;  Reed  v. 
Madison,  83  Wise.  171,  53  N.  W.  547. 
Bridges,  however,  are  not  intended 
for  playgrounds,  and  need  not  be 
furnished  with  guards  or  mechan- 
ical contrivances  to  keep  children  off 
the  same  (Gavin  v.  Chicago,  97  111.  66). 

9  Duffy  v.  Dubuque,  63  Iowa,  171; 


18  N.  W.  900  [stopping  to  drink  at  a 
hydrant]  ;  Britton  v.  Cummington, 
107  Mass.  347  [stopping  to  pick  ber- 
ries at  roadside] ;  Babson  v.  Rock- 
port,  101  Id.  93  [stopping  to  fill  hole 
in  road]. 

10  Hunt  v.  Salem.  121  Mass.  294 
[boy  of  eight,  having  carried  dinner 
to  his  father,  stopped  four  or  five 
minutes  to  look  at  boys] ;  Gulline  v. 
Lowell,  144  Mass.  491  ;  11  N.  E.  723 
[child  of  seven  walking  on  the  street 
with  his  father  did  not  ' '  cease  to  be 
a  traveler  when  he  stepped  aside  for 
one  instant  to  clasp  in  play  a  post  in 
the  highway  "  ];  Varney  v.  Manches- 
ter, 58  N.  H.  430  [stopping  to  watch 
a  procession]. 

11  Kimball  v.  Boston,  83  Mass.  417; 
Galveston  v.  Hemniis,  72  Tex.  558; 
11  S.  W.  29. 

"  Palmer  v.  Portsmouth,  43  N.  H. 
265  ;  Farley  v.  New  York,  152  N.  Y. 
222  ;  46  N.  E.  506  ;  Coots  v.  Detroit, 
75  Mich.  628  ;  43  N.  W.  17;  Turner  v. 
Indianapolis,  96  Ind.  51. 

13  Rehberg  v.  New  York,  91  N.  Y. 
137. 


37i] 


HIGHWAYS. 


646 


example,  the  moving  of  a  house,14  or  driving  an  elephant 15  along 
it.  In  general,  however,  roads  are  made  and  maintained  for 
ordinary  travel  in  ordinary  vehicles,  and  are  not  required  to  be 
made  fit  and  convenient,  from  side  to  side,  for  riders  by 
bicycle.16 

§371.  Damage  must.be  special. —  He,  and  he  only,  can 
maintain  an  action  for  a  defect  in  a  highway,  who  has  sustained 
some  damage  peculiar  to  himself,  his  trade  or  calling.  If  all  other 
persons  using  or  entitled  to  use  the  highway  suffer  the  same 
kind  of  damage,  though  in  a  less  degree,  an  individual  sufferer 
has  no  right  of  action,1  but  he  has,  on  showing  damage  beyond 


14  Graves  v.  Shattuck,  35  N.  H. 
257.  Compare  Dickson  v.  Kewanee 
Electric  Light  Co.,  53  111.  App.  379 
(note  1,  §  361,  ante). 

16  Gregory  v.  Adams,  14  Gray,  242. 
It  is  a  question  for  the  jury  whether, 
from  the  time,  place,  and  other  cir- 
cumstances, it  was  reasonably  proper 
to  take  such  an  animal  over  a  high- 
way (lb.). 

16  Sutphen  v.  North  Hempstead,  80 
Hun,  409;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  128. 

1  The  leading  case  is  Iveson  v. 
Moore,  1  Ld.  Raym.  486.  The  dam- 
age must  be  "something  substan- 
tially more  injurious"  to  the  indi- 
vidual than  to  other  people  (Rose  v. 
Miles,  4  Maule  &S.  102).  Inconven- 
ience, although  great,  will  not 
suffice  (Oldstein  v.  Firemen's  Bldg. 
Ass'n,  44  La.  Ann.  492;  19  So.  923). 
Erections  in  a  river,  whereby  plain- 
tiff's docks  were  rendered  inaccessi- 
ble, or  less  easy  of  approach,  do  not 
authorize  an  action  (Lansing  v. 
Smith,  8  Cow.  146  ;  Butler  v.  Kent, 
19  Johns.  223).  A  decrease  of  rental 
value  of  adjacent  property  by  ob- 
struction of  street,  being  common  to 
all  property  in  the  neighborhood,  is 
not  a  ground  of  action  (Dougherty 
v.  Bunting,  1  Sandf.  1).  s.  p.  ,  as  to  a 
consequential  loss  to  business  result- 
ing   from    non -repair    of   the    way 


(Gold  v.  Philadelphia,  115  Pa.  St. 
184  ;  8  Atl.  386;  Hale  v.  Weston,  40 
W.  Va.  313  ;  21  S.  E.  742),  and  in- 
ability to  get  to  market  by  reason  of 
obstructions  placed  in  highway  (Sohn 
v.  Cambern,  106  Ind.  302;  6  N.  E. 
813  ;  Holman  v.  Townsend,  13  Mete. 
297  [total  obstruction  of  way  by 
snowj ,  Griffin  v.  Sanbornton,  44  N. 
H.  246;  Willard  v.  Cambridge,  3 
Allen,  574 ;  Harvard  College  v. 
Stearns,  15  Gray,  1  ;  Quincy  Canal 
v.  Newcomb,  7  Mete.  276  [non-repair 
of  canal]  ;  Holmes  v.  Corthell,  80  Me. 
31;  12  Atl.  730  [wall  across  road]; 
Baxter  v.  Winooski  Tump.  Co.,  22  Vt. 
114  ;  Marini  v.  Graham,  67  Cal.  130  ; 
Houck  v.  Wachter,  34  Md.  265  ;  Bal- 
timore v.  Marriott,  9  Id.  160;  Pennsyl- 
vania Canal  Co.  v.  Graham,  63  Pa. 
St.  296  ;  Dunsbach  v.  Hollister,  49 
Hun,  352  ;  2  N.  Y.  Supp.  94  ;  Moore 
v.  "Wabash,  etc.  Canal,  7  Ind.  462; 
Pekin  v.  Brereton,  67  111.  477  ;  Clark 
v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  70  Wise.  593; 
36  N.  W.  326  [railroad  bridge  ob- 
structing navigation]  ;  Brant  v.  Plu- 
mer,  64  Iowa,  33;  19  N.  W.  842 
[obstruction  of  road]  ;  Swanson  v. 
Mississippi,  etc.  Boom  Co.,  42  Minn. 
532;  44  N.  W.  986  [obstruction  of 
river]  :  Central  Branch  R.  Co.  v. 
Andrews,  41  Kans.  370  ;  21  Pac.  276 
[railroad  in  street]). 


647 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§373 


and  in  excess  of  what  others  have  suffered  from  the  same 
cause.2  As  to  what  damages  will  be  considered  special,  it  is 
now  well  settled  that,  whether  the  delay  be  caused  by  the  time 
consumed  in  going  a  longer  way,  or  in  removing  the  obstruc- 
tion, the  action  will  lie.3  Where,  by  the  blocking  up  of  a  street 
for  an  unreasonable  time,  customers  are  diverted  from  the  plain- 
tiff's shop,  his  loss  of  business  is  a  special  damage.4 

372.  [omitted]. 

§373-  Notice  of  injury  preliminary  to  action.  —  In  order 
to  protect  municipal  corporations  from  unnecessary  litigation,1 
it  is  often  provided  by  their  charters,  or  general  statute,  that 
actions  shall  not  be  brought  to  enforce  claims  against  them 
until  the  expiration  of  a  certain  time  after  the  claims  shall 
have  been  presented  to  their  common  council,  or  to  some 
specified  officer.  Such  provisions  are  valid;  and,  though  some 
of  them  apply  only  to  claims  arising  out  of  contracts,2  others 


5  Iveson  v.  Moore,  supra  [highway 
obstruction  preventing  customers/ 
access  to  colliery]  ;  and  cases  in  next 
note. 

3  It  was  held  in  an  early  English 
case  that  being  put  to  the  necessity 
of  taking  a  more  circuitous  route 
was  not  a  special  damage  (Hubert  v. 
Groves,  1  Esp.  148) ;  and  this  rule 
was  adopted  in  Kentucky  (Barr  v. 
Stevens,  1  Bibb,  293) ;  otherwise  now 
in  England  (Rose  v.  Miles,  4  Maule 
&  S.  101 ;  Greasly  v.  Codling,  2  Bing. 
263  ;  Wiggins  v.  Boddington,  3  Carr. 
&  P.  544)  and,  in  this  country,  it  is 
held  that  "  the  least  injury  to  an  in- 
dividual, as  an  expense  of  time 
or  money  [in  removing  the  obstruc- 
tion] entitles  him  to  an  action " 
(Pierce  v.  Dart,  7  Cow.  609).  Reme- 
dy by  action  not  barred  by  abating 
the  nuisance  (lb.) ;  Renwick  v.  Mor- 
ris, 7  Hill,  575  [dam  obstructed  navi- 
gation], s.  P.,  Seymour  v.  Cummins, 
119  Ind.  148  ;  21  N.  E.  549  [lot-owner 
deprived  of  access  to  dwelling  by 
street  obstruction  ;  city  liable]  ;  Mil- 
arkey   v.   Foster,   6   Oreg.    378  [five 


days  delayed  by  an  unlawful  toll- 
gate]  ;  Brown  v.  Watson,  47  Me.  161 
[trees  felled  across  way]  ;  Stetson  v. 
Faxon,  19  Pick.  147 ;  Savannah  v. 
Welson,  49  Ga.  476. 

4  Wilkes  v.  Hungerford  Market  Co., 
2  Scott,  446  ;  2  Bing.  N.  C.  281  ;  May- 
nell  v.  Saltmarsh,  1  Keb.  847  [plain- 
tiff's corn  was  corrupted  and  spoiled, 
he  being  unable  to  carry  it  away]. 

1  See  Fisher  v.  New  York,  67  N.  Y. 
73,  75. 

2  Brusso  v.  Buffalo,  90  N.  Y.  679  ; 
Pomfrey  v.  Saratoga  Springs,  104 
N.  Y.  459  [construing  L.  1875,  ch.  517, 
§  2]  ;  Shields  v.  Durham,  118  N.  C. 
450  ;  24  S.  E.  794 ;  Sutton  v.  Sno- 
homish, 11  Wash.  St.  24  ;  30  Pac. 
273.  The  words  "  claim  or  demand  " 
in  a  statute,  required  to  be  presented 
before  action,  apply  to  actions  upon 
contract  only,  and  not  to  those  for 
injuries  caused  by  defective  high- 
ways (Sommers  v.  Marshfield,  90 
Wise.  59  ;  62  N.  W.  937).  See  Van 
Frachen  v.  Ft.  Howard,  88  Wise. 
570  ;  60  N.  W.  1062  ;  Mackie  v.  West 
Bay  City  [Mich.],  64  N.  W.  25  ;  Chad- 


§373] 


HIGHWAYS. 


648 


are  applicable  to  claims  for  injuries  suffered  by  defective  high- 
ways. If  such  a  preliminary  demand  be  in  the  nature  of  a 
condition  precedent,  as  it  ordinarily  is,  it  cannot  for  any  pur- 
pose be  presumed  to  have  been  made ;  it  is  essential  not  only 
that  it  should  have  been  made,  as  required,  but  should  be 
affirmatively  alleged  and  proved  by  plaintiff.3  A  substantial 
variance,  in  the  preliminary  statement,  from  the  material 
facts,  e.  g.,  a  wide  discrepancy  as  to  the  time,4  place5  or  nature6 
of  the  injury,  will  invalidate  the  statement.  It  is  not,  however, 
essential  that  the  cause  of  action  should  be  set  forth  in  the 
complaint  in  the  exact  terms  of  the  preliminary  claim,  and  a 
variance  between  them,  as  to  the  amount  of  damages  claimed, 
is  not  material  if  the  facts  are  otherwise  substantially  the  same.7 


ron  v.  Glover,  43  Neb.  732  ;  62  N.  W. 
62 ;  Jones  v.  Albany,  151  N.  Y.  223 ; 
45  N.  E.  557. 

3  Reining  v.  Buffalo,  102  N.  Y.  308; 
6  N.  E.  792  ;  Foley  v.  New  York,  1 
N.  Y.  App.  Div.  586  ;  37  N.  Y.  Supp. 
465.  See  Howland  v.  Edmonds,  24 
N.  Y.  307;  Minick  v.  Troy,  83  N.  Y. 
514  ;  Dorsey  v.  Racine,  60  Wise.  292 ; 
18  N.  W.  928  ;  Benware  v.  Pine  Val- 
ley, 53  Wise.  527;  10  N.  W.  695; 
Maddox  v.  Randolph  county,  65  Ga. 
216.  In  Massachusetts,  the  notice 
being  a  condition  precedent  to  the 
right  of  action,  cannot  be  waived 
(Gay  v.  Cambridge,  128  Mass.  387). 
So,  in  Maine  (Haines  v.  Lewiston,  84 
Me.  18 ;  24  Atl.  430  ;  Clark  v.  Tre- 
mont,  83  Me.  426  ;  22  Atl.  378).  So, 
in  Iowa  (Starling  v.  Bedford,  94 
Iowa,  194  ;  62  N.  W.  674).  In  Ver- 
mont, such  notice  is  held  to  be  no 
part  of  the  cause  of  action,  but  per- 
tains merely  to  the  remedy  and  evi- 
dence (Kent  v.  Lincoln,  32  Vt.  591  ; 
Babcock  v.  Guilford,  47  Id.  519). 
Under  Wisconsin  statute,  held,  the 
city  was  liable  for  the  nuisance, 
without  regard  to  whether  notice 
of  the  injury  had  been  given  as  re- 
quired by  its  charter  (Hughes  v. 
Fond  du  Lac,  73  Wise.  380 ;  41  N.  W. 
407). 


4  Shaw  v.  Waterbury,  46  Conn. 
263  ;  Beisiegel  v.  Seymour,  58  Conn. 
43;  19  Atl.  372;  Shalley  v.  Dan- 
bury,  etc.  R.  Co.,  64  Conn.  381;  30 
Atl.  135. 

6  Cloughessey  v.  Waterbury,  51 
Conn.  405  ;  Rogers  v.  Shirley,  74 
Me.  144  ;  Dalton  v.  Salem,  139  Mass. 
91;  28  N.  E.  576.  A  statement  of 
the  place  is  sufficient  which  enables 
the  officers,  with  reasonable  dili- 
gence, to  find  it  (Carr  v.  Ashland,  62 
N.  H.  665  ;  Laird  v.  Otsego,  90  Wise. 
25;  62  N.  W.  1042;  Owen  v.  Ft. 
Dodge,  Iowa,  ;  67  N.  W.  281; 
Harder  v.  Minneapolis,  40  Minn.  446; 
42  N.  W.  350  ;  Stedman  v.  Rome,  88 
Hun,  279  ;  34  N.  Y.  Supp.  737;  Cross 
v.  Elmira,  86  Hun,  467;  33  N.  Y. 
Supp.  947).  A  difference  of  sixty-five 
feet  between  the  place  of  the  acci- 
dent, as  proved,  and  the  place  as 
stated  in  the  claim  filed,  is  imma- 
terial (Masters  v.  Troy,  50  Hun,  485; 
3  N.  Y.  Supp.  450).  So  is  fifteen  or 
twenty  feet  (Coffin  v.  Palmer,  162 
Mass.  192 ;  38  N.  E.  509). 

6Willard  v.  Sherburne,  59  Vt.  361; 
8  Atl.  735. 

'Minick  v.  Troy,  83  N.  Y.  514. 
A  notice  which  specifically  describes 
the  location,  but  designates  it  as  a 
bridge,  is  sufficient,  though  the  evi- 


649 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§374 


The  notice  must  be  of  such  form  and  manner  as  to  indicate 
an  intention  to  make  a  claim  on  account  of  the  injury,  and 
not  a  mere  communication  of  information  of  the  accident.8 
Notice  is  sufficient,  if  it  reaches  the  proper  officer  in  due  time, 
though  not  handed  directly  to  him.9 

§  374.  Defenses.  — It  is  no  defense  to  an  action  for  injuries 
sustained  by  the  non-repair  or  obstruction  of  a  highway,  that 
it  had  been  in  that  condition  for  a  long  time,1  or  that  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  the  roads  within  the  town  had  similar 
imperfections  from  the  same  cause,  as  the  freezing  and  thaw- 
ing of  the  ground,2  or  that  the  road,  if  repaired,  would  be  of 
no  immediate  practical  use  in  consequence  of  the  destruction 
of  a  connecting  bridge  repairable  by  another.3  It  is  no  defense 
that  there  were  other  streets  by  which  the  person  injured  might 
have  reached  the  point  he  was  aiming  at  when  injured,  if  but 
for  culpable  neglect  to  give  notice  and  warning,  by  closing  the 
street,    or   in    some    other   way,    the    injury   would  not  have 


dence  shows  it  to  be  a  culvert  (Wall 
v.  Highland,  72  Wise.  435  ;  39  N.  W. 
560).  The  rule  is  more  rigid  in 
Massachusetts  (Spoonerv.  Freetown, 
139  Mass.  235  ;  29  N.  E.  662). 

8  Harris  v.  Newbury,  128  Mass. 
321;   Kenady  v.  Lawrence,  Id.  318. 

9  Wormwood  v.  Waltham,  144 
Mass.  184.  A  claim  is  sufficiently 
presented  to  the  common  council  if 
presented  to  its  clerk  (Murphy  v. 
Buffalo,  38  Hun,  49  ;  Walsh  v.  Buf- 
falo, 92  Hun,  438 ;  36  N.  Y.  Supp. 
997;  Paulson  v.  Pelican,  79  Wise. 
445 ;  48  N.  W.  715) :  not  so,  if  pre- 
sented to  a  member  of  it  (Denver  v. 
Saulcey,  5  Colo.  App.  420 ;  38  Pac. 
1098).  The  notice  must  be  in  writ- 
ing (Foley  v.  New  York,  1  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  586 ;  37  N.  Y.  Supp.  465). 

]  Dygert  v.  Schenck,  23  Wend. 
446.  s.  P  ,  Driggs  v.  Phillips.  103  N. 
Y.  77  ;  8  N.  E.  514. 

8  Tripp  v.  Lyman,  37  Me.  250.  De- 
fendant cannot  show  that  the  road 


in  question  was  in  the  same  con- 
dition as  any  other  road  of  that 
kind  (McLaughlin  v.  Philadelphia 
Traction  Co.  [Pa.],  34  Atl.  863).  Com- 
pare Jessup  v.  Osceola  county,  92 
Iowa,  178  ;  60  N.  W.  485  ;  Shelby 
county  v.  Blair,  8  Ind.  App.  574. 
The  number  of  miles  of  sidewalk  in 
the  city  cannot  be  considered  on  the 
question  whether  the  walk  in  ques- 
tion was  safe  (Wichita  v.  Coggshall, 
3  Kan.  App.  540  ;  43  Pac.  842  ;  Barr 
v.  Kansas  City,  105  Mo.  550 ;  16  S. 
W.  483). 

3  Commonwealth  v.  Deerfield,  6 
Allen,  449.  Compare  State  v.  Rye, 
35  N.  H.  368.  A  refusal  to  repair,  on 
the  pretense  of  a  belief  that  repairs 
were  not  immediately  necessary, 
is  not  excused,  though  expressed 
in  a  written  resolution,  however 
formally  or  even  honestly  adopted 
(Hover  v.  Barkhoof,  44  N.  Y.  113: 
Fitzgerald  v.  Binghamton,  40  Hun, 
332). 


§375] 


HIGHWAYS. 


650 


occurred.4  The  want  of  funds,  and  of  power  to  raise  money, 
or  to  enforce  contributions  of  labor,5  or  to  assess  the  expense 
of  repair  upon  abutters,6  is  a  good  defense  to  a  charge  of 
negligence  for  non-repair ;  provided  it  is  shown  that  all  the 
funds  applicable  to  such  use,  and  all  means  of  raising  more, 
have  been  exhausted.7  But  want  of  funds  is  not  available  as  a 
defense  to  a  charge  of  negligence  in  not  erecting  barriers  on  a 
dangerous  street,  or  not  closing  the  street  altogether,  when 
necessary.8 

§  375-  Contributory  negligence.  —  The  application  to 
actions  for  defective  highways  of  the  rule  as  to  contributory 
negligence  requires  some  further  illustration  than  that  given 
in  the  chapter  on  the  general  subject.1  In  the  first  place,  the 
rule  does  not  apply  to  an  action  against  one  who  unlawfully 
created  the  defect  in  the  highway  which  caused  the  injury, 
such  an  action  being  founded  on  nuisance,  not  on  negligence.2 


*  Erie  v.  Schwingle,  22  Pa.  St.  384; 
Stuart  v.  Havens,  17  Neb.  211;  22  N. 
W.  419 ;  Weathered  v.  Bray,  7  Ind. 
706.  Compare  Cook  v.  Atlanta,  94 
Ga.  613;  19  S.  E.  987. 

5  Whitfield  v.  Meridian,  66  Miss. 
570  ;  6  So.  244. 

6  New  Albany  v.  McCulloch,  127 
Ind.  500  ;  26  N.  E.  1074  ;  Lombar  v. 
East  Tawas,  86  Mich.  14  ;  48  N.  W. 
947. 

7  Hutson  v.  New  York,  9  N.  Y.  163  ; 
Hines  v.  Lockport,  50  Id.  236  ;  Hyatt 
v.  Rondout,  44  Barb.  385  ;  Peach  v. 
Utica,  10  Hun,  477  ;  Wendell  v.  Troy, 
39  Barb.  329,  338  ;  Ivory  v.  Deerpark, 
116  N.  Y.  476  ;  22  N.  E.  1080  ;  Young 
v.  Macomb,  11  N.  Y.  App.  Div.  480  ; 
42  N.  Y.  Supp.  351  ;  Burns  v.  Elba, 
32  Wise.  605  ;  Erie  v.  Schwingle,  22 
Pa.  St.  384  ;  Shartle  v.  Minneapolis, 
17  Minn.  308  ;  Winship  v.  Enfield,  42 
N.  H.  197;  Baltimore,  etc.  Turn- 
pike Co.  v.  State,  63  Md.  573;  1 
Atl.  285 ;  Birmingham  v.  Lewis, 
92  Ala.  352;  9  So.  243;  Mt.  Ver- 
non v.  Brooks,  39  111.  App.  426. 
The  want  of  funds  is  a   matter  of 


defense,  and  burden  of  proving  it 
is  on  defendant  (Weed  v.  Ballston 
Spa.,  76  N.  Y.  329  ;  Hines  v.  Lock- 
port,  50  Id.  238  ;  Bullock  v.  Durham, 
64  Hun,  380  ;  Netzer  v.  Crookston, 
59  Minn.  244;  61  N.  W.  21).  Evi- 
dence that  the  road  was  repaired 
several  days  after  the  accident  is  not 
competent  to  prove  possession  of 
funds  at  the  time  of  the  accident 
(Clapper  v.  Waterford,  131  N.  Y.  382  ; 
30  N.  E.  240).  See  Getty  v.  Hamlin, 
55  Hun,  603  ;  8  N.  Y.  Supp.  190  ; 
Bryant  v.  Randolph,  53  Id.  631  ;  6  N. 
Y.  Supp.  438  [fact  of  repairs  day 
after  accident,  admissible]. 

8  Carney  v.  Marseilles,  136  111 
26  N.  E.  491. 

1  See  §  61  et  seq. ,  ante. 

5  Clifford  v.  Dam,  81  N.  Y.  52 
Guire  v.  Spence,  91  Id.  303. 
cases  cited  under  §  64,  ante. 
negligence  of  a  driver  in  not  having 
his  coach-lamps  lighted  at  night,  so 
that  he  could  see  that  a  toll-gate  was 
closed,  will  not  exempt  a  turnpike 
company  from  liability  for  a  colli- 
sion of  the  coach  with  the    gates, 


401; 


Mc- 
See 
The 


65 1 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§375 


It  is,  however,  applicable  to  actions  founded  on  statutory,  as 
well  as  common-law,  liability.3  In  either  case,  the  standard  of 
care  required  of  a  traveler  on  a  highway  is,  in  general,  simply 
such  as  persons  of  common  prudence  ordinarily  exercise  under 
the  same  circumstances.4  When  ignorant  of  any  defects  in 
the  way,  he  has  a  right  to  presume,  and  to  act  upon  the 
presumption,  that  a  highway  is  reasonably  safe5  for  ordinary 
travel.6     He  is  not  bound  to  have  the  most  perfect  vision,  nor 


which  it  was  required  by  law  to  fas- 
ten open  at  night  (Danville  Turnp. 
Co.  v.  Stewart,  2  Mete.  [Ky.]  119). 

3  Farrer  v.  Green,  32  Me.  574  :  Mer- 
rill v.  Hampden.  26  Id.  234  ;  Gleason 
v.  Bremen,  50  Id.  222;  Fallon  v. 
Boston,  3  Allen,  38  ;  Lane  v.  Crom- 
bie,  12  Pick.  177 ;  Raymond  v.  Low- 
ell, 6  Cush.  524;  Kelsey  v.  Glover, 
15  Vt.  711;  Laney  v.  Chesterfield 
county,  29  S.  C.  140  ;  7  S.  E.  57; 
Houfe  v.  Fulton,  29  Wise.  296. 

4  Morrill  v.  Peck,  88  N.  Y.  398 
[walking  on  unguarded  side  of 
bridge).  Evidence  that  plaintiff 
knew  nothing  of  the  defect,  and 
that  the  night  of  the  accident  was 
very  dark,  is  sufficient  to  show  ab- 
sence of  contributory  negligence 
(Chisholm  v.  State,  141  X.  Y.  246  ; 
36  X.  E.  184).  A  refusal  to  charge 
that  if  the  hole  in  the  sidewalk  might 
have  been  seen  and  readily  avoided 
by  ordinary  exercise  of  plaintiff's 
eyes,  failure  to  avoid  it  was  negli- 
gence, held  proper  (Minick  v.  Troy, 
83  X.  Y.  514.)  A  charge  that  "plain- 
tiff was  not  required  to  use  all  pos- 
sible care  to  avoid  danger  "  from  an 
excavation,  held  correct  (Erd  v.  St. 
Paul,  22  Minn.  443).  s.  P.,  St.  Paul 
v.  Kuby,  8  Minn.  154;  Baltimore  v. 
Brannan,  14  Md.  227;  Aurora  v.  Pul- 
fer,  56  111.  270;  Wood  v.  Bridgeport, 
143  Pa.  St.  167;  22  Atl.  752; 
Gschwend  v.  Millvale,  159  Pa.  St. 
257;  28  Atl.  139  ;  Wall  v.  Highland, 
72  Wise.  435  ;  39  N.  W.  560  ;  Duthie 
v.  Washburn,   87  Wise   231;   58  N. 


W.  380;  Schonhoff  v.  Jackson  R. 
Co.,  97  Mo.  151  ;  10  S.  W.  618  ;  Aus- 
tin v.  Ritz,  72  Tex.  391;  9  S.  W.  884. 

5  Jennings  v.  Van  Schaick,  108  X. 
Y.  530  ;  15  X.  E.  424  ;  Beltz  v.  Yon- 
kers,  74  Hun,  73 ;  26  X.  Y.  Supp. 
106;  Lutton  v.  Vernon  [Conn.], 
23  Atl.  1030  :  Birmingham  v.  Starr, 
112  Ala.  98:  20  So.  424;  Centralis 
v.  Baker,  36  111.  App.  46 ;  Chicago 
v.  Morse,  33  111.  App.  61.  The 
degree  of  care  and  caution  re- 
quired of  one  passing  over  a  dan- 
gerous sidewalk  depends  upon  his 
knowledge  or  information  concern- 
ing its  defective  or  unsafe  condition 
(Gordon  v.  Richmond,  83  Va.  436  ;  2 
S.  E.  727).  A  traveler,  while  trying 
to  avoid  an  injury  from  a  known 
cause  (a  locomotive  at  a  railroad 
crossing),  is  not  held  to  so  high  a 
degree  of  watchfulness,  as  usual,  for 
unknown  defects  in  the  highway, 
e.  g.,  an  unguarded  embankment 
(Gillespie  v.  Xewburgh,  54  X.  Y.  468). 

6  In  the  following  cases,  plaintiff 
was  held  not  engaged  in  ordinary 
travel :  Casey  v.  Maiden,  163  Mass. 
507;  40  X.  E.  849  [a  boy  of  ten 
walking  backward  and  looking  in 
another  direction]  ;  Gaughan  v. 
Philadelphia,  119  Pa.  503  ;  13  Atl. 
300  [boy  of  seven  climbing  up  and 
sliding  down  awning-post,  fell  into 
gutter]  ;  Clarke  v.  Richmond,  83  Va 
355  ;  5  S.  E.  369  [child  walking  on 
adjoining  coping,  fell  into  hole  in 
sidewalk] ;  Jackson  v.  Greenville,  72 
Miss.  220;  16  So.  382  [adult  playing 


§375] 


HIGHWAYS. 


652 


to  look  far  ahead  to  avoid  defects  which  ought  not  to  exist ; 7 
nor  to  keep  his  eyes  constantly  on  the  pavement  before  him.8 
He  need  have  only  a  reasonable  assurance  of  safety  before 
venturing  upon  the  highway;9  and  whether  such  assurance, 
under  the  circumstances,  is  well  founded,  is  a  question  for  the 
jury  to  determine.  The  mere  fact  of  stepping  into  an  open 
excavation  in  a  sidewalk,  in  the  daytime,  is  not  conclusive  of 
negligence.10  A  traveler  is  bound  to  observe  the  presence  of 
lawful  obstructions11  and  notorious  defects;12  and,  if  there  is 
anything  about  them  to  apprise  him  of  danger,  he  must  exer- 
cise greater  care  in  passing  over  or  by  them,  than  if  they  did 
not  exist.13  If  there  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  way  is 
dangerously  defective,  he  is  only  bound  to  use  ordinary  care.14 


with  dog  on  sidewalk].     See  other 
cases  cited  under  §  370,  ante. 

'Gillespie  v.  Newburgh,  54  N.  Y. 
468 ;  Thompson  v.  Bridgewater,  7 
Pick.  188. 

8  Woods  v.  Boston,  121  Mass.  337. 
A  pedestrian  must  use  his  senses 
and  the  care  and  precaution  com- 
mon to  persons  of  ordinary  prudence, 
but  he  is  not  bound,  at  his  peril,  to 
discover  every  defect,  though  it  may 
be  an  open  one  (Barnes  v.  Marcus, 
9G  Iowa,  G7o;  65  N.  W.  984).  Com- 
pare Gordon  v.  Richmond,  83  Va. 
436  ;  2  S.  E.  727  ;  Moore  v.  Richmond, 
85  Va.  538  ;  8  S.  E.  387  ;  Le  Beau  v- 
Telephone,  etc.  Co  ,  109  Mich.  302;  67 
N.  W.  339  [plaintiff's  failure  to  look, 
held  negligence   as  matter  of  law]. 

9  Ren  wick  v.  N.  Y.  Central  R.  Co., 
36  N.  Y.  133.  "A  person  may  walk 
or  drive  in  the  darkness  of  the  night, 
relying  upon  the  belief  that  the  cor- 
poration has  performed  its  duty, 
and  that  the  street  or  the  walk  is  in 
a  safe  condition.  He  walks  by  a 
faith  justified  by  law,  and  if  his 
faith  is  unfounded,  and  he  suffers 
an  injury,  the  party  in  fault  must 
respond  in  damages"  (Davenport  v. 
Ruckman,  37  N.  Y.  568. 

10  Chicago  v.  Babcock,  143  111.  358  ; 
32  N.  E.  271  ;   Cantwell  v.  Appleton, 


71  Wise.  463  ;  37  N.  W.  813  ;  Jennings 
v.  Van  Schaick,  108  N.  Y.  530  ;  15  N. 
E.  424. 

11  Nolan  v.  King,  97  N.  Y.  565 
[bridge  over  excavation  in  sidewalk]; 
Vicksburg  v.  Hennessy,  54  Miss.  391. 

12  Hill  v.  Seekonk,  119  Mass.  85 ; 
Lovenguth  v.  Blooniington,  71  111. 
238  ;  Wakeman  v.  St.  Clair,  91  Mich. 
15 ;  51  N.  W.  696. 

13  Travelers  are  not  required  to  use 
greater  care  and  caution  than  before, 
in  crossing  a  street,  opened  to  the 
public,  soon  after  excavations  have 
been  made  therein,  unless  there  is 
something  to  apprise  them  of  danger 
(Turner  v.  Newburgh,  109  N.  Y.  301; 
16  N.  E.  344). 

14  Creed  v.  Hartmann,  29  N.  Y.  591 
[walking  over  boards  covering  exca- 
vation in  sidewalk]  ;  Evans  v.  Utica, 
69  Id.  166  [walking  on  ice  on  side- 
walk] ;  Weston  v.  Troy,  139  Id.  281  ; 
34  N.  E.  780  [same]  ;  Bly  v.  White- 
hall, 120  N.  Y.  506;  24  N.  E.  943 
[walking  at  night  on  sidewalk 
covered  with  water] .  A  person  has 
a  right  to  assume  the  safety  of  the 
sidewalk  on  which  he  is  walking 
until  warned  of  danger  ;  and  where 
the  jury  finds  that  a  person  who  in 
broad  day  falls  into  an  open  coal-hole 
unguarded,    is    not  guilty   of    con- 


653 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§375 


If  they  were  not  observed  because  he  was  not  looking,15  or 
was  stepping  backward,16  or  was  running  too  fast  to  notice 
anything,17  or  allowed  his  attention  to  be  momentarily  di- 
verted,18 or  was  intoxicated,19  it  is  for  the  jury  to  say  whether 
he  was  guilty  of  contributory  negligence.20  If  ignorant  of 
any  dangerous  obstructions,  he  may  cross  a  street  at  any  point 
that  suits  his  convenience,  without  imputation  of  negli- 
gence.21    The  blind  and  the  halt  are  entitled,  like  other  trav- 


tributory  negligence,  such  finding  is 
conclusive  (Jennings  v.  Van  Schaick, 
108  N.  Y.  530  ;  15  N.  E.  424).  s.  P., 
Mathews  v.  Cedar  Rapids,  80  Iowa, 
459  ;  45  N.  W.  894  [looking  at  an 
attractive  show-window].  The  ques- 
tion of  plaintiff's  contributory  negli- 
gence in  attempting  to  drive  along  a 
submerged  road  is  for  the  jury  (Jung 
v.  Stevens  Point,  74  Wise.  547  ;  43  N. 
W.  513). 

15  Fuller  v.  Hyde  Park,  162  Mass. 
51 ;  37  N.  E.  782  ;  Peetz  v.  St.  Charles 
R.  Co.,  42  La.  Ann.  541  ;  7  So.  688. 

,6  See  Barnes  v.  Snowden,  119  Pa. 
St.  53;  12  Atl.  804. 

11  Barr  v.  Kansas  City,  105  Mo. 
550  ;  16  S.  W.  483  ;  McCormick  v. 
Monroe,  2  Mo.  App.  1062. 

18  Dale  v.  Syracuse,  71  Hun.  449; 
24  N.  Y.  Supp.  968;  West  v.  Eau 
Claire,  89  Wise.  31  ;  61  N.  W.  313  ; 
Simons  v.  Baraboo,  93  VTisc.  40  ;  67 
N.  W.  40  [temporary  forgetfulness 
of  defect]  ;  Barry  v.  Terkiklsen,  72 
Cal.  254  ;  13  Pac.  657  ;  Osborne  v. 
Detroit.  32  Fed.  36  [sidewalk  noto- 
riously rotten;  plaintiff  paid  no  atten- 
tion]. But  in  Stackhouse  v.  Vendig 
(160  Pa.  St.  582  ;  31  Atl.  349)  heldtbat 
one  who,  in  the  daytime,  stumbled 
over  a  partly  open  cellar  door  in  the 
sidewalk,  not  seen  from  want  of 
attention,  was  negligent  as  matter 
of  law.  To  same  effect,  Robb  v. 
Connellsville,  137  Pa.  St.  42  ;  20  Atl. 
564  ;  Barnes  v.  Snowden,  119  Pa. 
St.  53  ;  12  Atl.  804  ;  and  see  Kelly  v. 
Doody,    116   N.   Y.    575;    22   N.  E. 


1084  [mere  inattention  may  bar  re- 
covery] . 

19  Lynch  v.  New  Y'ork,  47  Hun, 
524  ;  Parris  v.  Green  Island,  60  Ii. 
580,  mem.;  14  N.  Y.  Supp.  703  ;  and 
cases  cited  under  §§  93,  110,  ante. 

•>(1  Mackie  v.  WTest  Bay  City,  106 
Mich.  242  ;  64  N.  W.  25.  See  Byrne 
v.  Syracuse,  79  Hun,  555  ;  29  N.  Y. 
Supp.  912  ;  Lyon  v.  Logansport,  9 
Ind.  App.  21  ;  Beardstown  v.  Smith, 
150  111.  169;  37  N.  E.  211;  Cumisky 
v.  Kenosha,  87  Wise.  286  ;  58  N.  W. 
395  ;  Hazzard  v.  Council  Bluffs,  87 
Iowa,  51;  53  N.  W.  1083;  Ely  v. 
Des  Moines,  86  Iowa,  55 ;  52  N.  W. 
475. 

'n  It  has  been  held  that  a  pedes- 
trian is  negligent  who,  without  suffi- 
cient reason,  walks  upon  a  street 
elsewhere  than  on  the  sidewalks  and 
crosswalks  (O'Laughlin  v.  Dubuque, 
42  Iowa,  539).  See  Dubuque,  etc.  Ass. 
v.  Dubuque,  30  Iowa,  176 ;  McClary 
v.  Sioux  City,  etc.,  R.  Co.,  3  Neb.  44  ; 
Houston  v.  Isaacks,  68  Tex.  110  ;  3 
S-  W.  693.  The  better  rule  is  that 
such  an  act  is  not  at  all  conclusive, 
but  it  is  to  be  considered  with  othei-s, 
by  the  jury,  in  determining  the 
question  of  contributory  negligence 
(Gerald  v.  Boston,  108  Mass.  580 
Raymond  v.  Lowell,  6  Cush.  524 
Coombs  v.  Purrington,  42  Me.  332 
Belton  v.  Baxter,  54  N.  Y.  245  ;  Tay- 
lor v.  Mt.  Vernon,  58  Hun,  384  ;  12 
N.  Y.  Supp.  25  ;  Forker  v.  Sandy 
Lake.  130  Pa.  St.  123  ;  18  Atl  609 ; 
Atlanta  v.   Buchanan,   76   Ga.    585  ; 


§376] 


HIGHWAYS. 


654 


elers,  to  presume  that  a  highway  in  constant  use  is  reasonably 
safe  for  ordinary  travel,  and  he  is  not  in  fault  in  neglecting  to 
observe  and  avoid  a  defect  therein  which  is  not  so  plain  and 
obvious  as  to  be  necessarily  observable  by  one  in  the  posses- 
sion of  ordinary  faculties,  traveling  at  an  ordinary  pace.22 
Under  the  principle  stated  in  §  93,  ante,  the  traveler's  neg- 
ligence, in  order  to  defeat  his  action,  must  have  proximately 
contributed  to  the  causing  of  his  injury.23 

§376.  Traveler's  knowledge  of  defect. —The  rule  that  a 
traveler  on  a  highway  may  presume  that  it  is  safe  for  travel 


Zettler  v.  Atlanta,  66  Id.  195  ;  Col- 
lins v.  Dodge,  37  Minn.  503  ;  35  N. 
W.  368  ;  Crowther  v.  Yonkers,  60 
Hun,  586,  mem.;  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  588  ; 
Olathe  v.  Mizee,  48  Kans.  435;  29 
Pac.  754).  SeeHarrigan  v.  Brooklyn, 
67  Hun,  85  ;  22  N.  Y.  Supp.  39. 

22  Davenport  v.  Ruckman,  37  N.  Y. 
568  ;  affi'g  10  Bosw.  20.  A  blind  man 
walking  on  the  street  is  bound  to  use 
ordinary  care  only,  considering  all 
circumstances  bearing  on  the  ques- 
tion as  to  what  care  was  reasonably 
necessary  to  insure  his  safety  (Neff 
v.  Wellesley,  148  Mass.  487  ;  20  N.  E. 
Ill  ;  Robbins  v.  Springfield  St.  R. 
Co.,  165  Mass.  30;  42  N.  E.  334). 
s.  p.,  Cox  v.  Westchester  Turnp.  Co., 
33  Barb.  413  ;  Frost  v.  Waltham,  12 
Allen,  85 ;  Gilbert  v.  Boston,  139 
Mass.  313  ;  31  N.  E.  734  [blind  in  one 
eye]  ;  Higginsv.  Glens  Falls,  57  Hun, 
594;  11  N.  Y.  Supp.  289  [infirm 
knee] ;  Franklin  v.  Harter,  127  Ind. 
446  ;  26  N.  E.  882  [blind  man]  ;  Mt. 
Vernon  v.  Brooks,  39  111.  App.  426 
[cripple  on  crutches]  ;  Smith  v. 
Cairo,  48  111.  App.  166  [astigmatism 
and  rheumatism]  ;  Stewart  v.  Nash- 
ville, 66  Tenn.  50;  33  S.  W.  613 
[blind  and  unattended] ;  Sweeney  v. 
Butte,  15  Mont.  274  ;  39  Pac.  286 
[short  sightedness].  A  blind  man's 
habit  of  going  about  alone,  and  his 
acquaintance  with  the  locality,  must 


be  considered  by  the  jury  (Smith  v. 
Wildes,  143  Mass.  556  ;  10  N.  E.  446) ; 
also  the  increased  acuteness,  fidelity 
and  power  of  his  other  senses  (Sleeper 
v.  Sandown,  52  N.  H.  244). 

23  O'Bryan  v.  Amsterdam,  74  Hun, 
136  ;  26  N.  Y.  Supp.  1123  [plaintiff's 
stumbling  or  tripping,  proximate 
cause  of  fall]  ;  Roanoke  v.  Harri. 
son,  [Va.]  ;  19  S.  E.  179  [jumping 
over  defective  crossing  ;  nonsuit] ; 
Sheats  v.  Rome,  92  Ga.  535  ;  17  S.  E. 
922  [same].  The  court  cannot  say, 
as  matter  of  law,  that  one  who,  slip- 
ping on  an  icy  sidewalk,  fell  upon  a 
large,  sharp  knife  which  he  was  car- 
rying for  use  in  his  trade,  fatally 
injuring  him,  was  negligent  in  car- 
rying the  knife  as  he  did  (McGoldrick 
v.  New  York  Central,  etc.  R.  Co., 
66  Hun,  629;  20  N.  Y.  Supp.  914). 
See  Lund  v.  Tyngsborough,  11  Cush. 
563  [passenger  leaped  from  carriage 
on  seeing  dangerous  defect,  though 
carriage  not  in  contact  with  it ;  town 
liable]  ;  and  cases  cited  under  §§  93, 
94,  ante.  Where  the  defect  which 
caused  the  injury  was  due  to  plain- 
tiff's default  as  a  highway  officer, 
he  cannot  recover  of  the  town 
(Wood  v.  Waterville,  4  Mass.  422  ;  5 
Id.  294).  See  Taylor  v.  Constable,  57 
Hun,  371  ;  10  N.  Y.  Supp.  607  [high- 
way overseer]. 


655 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§376 


does  not  apply,  where  he  approaches  an  obstruction  with 
knowledge  of  its  existence  and  location.1  The  mere  fact, 
however,  that  a  traveler  is  familiar  with  the  road,  and  knows 
of  the  existence  of  a  defect  therein,  will  not  impose  upon  him 
the  duty  to  use  more  than  ordinary  care  in  avoiding  it,2  and 
does   not,  per  se,  establish    negligence.3     Such  knowledge  is  a 

[icy  sidewalk];  Wilson  v.  Syracuse, 
21  Hun,  411  ;  Reed  v.  Northfield,  13 
Pick.  94  ;  Smith  v.  Lowell,  6  Allen, 
39 ;  Frost  v.  Waltham,  12  Id.  85  ; 
Whitaker  v.  West  Boylston,  97  Mass. 
273 ;  Kavanaugh  v.  Janesville,  24 
Wise.  618;  Smith  v.  St.  Joseph,  45 
Mo.  449  ;  Kinsley  v.  Morse,  40  Kans. 
577 ;  20  Pac.  217  ;  Langan  v.  Atchi- 
son, 35  Kans.  318  ;  11  Pac.  38  [danger- 
ous condition  of  street] ;  Ellis  v. 
Peru,  23  111.  App.  35  [dangerous 
sidewalk]  ;  Flora  v.  Naney,  136  111. 
45  ;  26  N.  E.  645  [sidewalk]. 

3  Weed  v.  Ballston  Spa,  76  N.  Y. 
329  ;  Wooley  v.  Grand  St.  R.  Co.,  83 
Id.  121  [ignorant  of  precise  location 
of  defective  street-railroad  switch, 
covered  by  snow]  ;  Bond  v.  Smith, 
44  Hun,  219  [unprotected  area] ; 
Mahoney  v.  Metropolitan  R.  Co.,  104 
Mass.  73 ;  Lyman  v.  Amherst,  107 
Id.  339  ;  Lyman  v.  Hampshire,  140 
Id.  311  ;  3  N.  E.  211  ;  Humphreys 
v.  Armstrong  county,  56  Pa.  St.  204  ; 
Corts  v.  District  of  Columbia,  7 
Mackey,  277  ;  Samples  v.  Atlanta, 
95  Ga.  110  ;  22  S.  E.  135  [dangerously 
defective  bridge] ;  Elyton  Land  Co. 
v.  Mingea,  88  Ala.  434 ;  7  So.  666 ; 
Fort  Wayne  v.  Breese,  123  Ind.  581 ; 
23  N.  E.  1038 ;  Posey  ville  v.  Lewis, 
126  Ind.  80  ;  25  N.  E.  593  [sidewalk]  ; 
Evansville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Carvener, 
113  Ind.  51  ;  14  N.  E.  738;  St.  Louis 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Miller,  138  111.  465  ;  28 
N.  E.  1091  [bridge  known  to  be  with- 
out barriers]  ;  Sandwich  v.  Dolan, 
141  111.  430  ;  31  N.  E.  416  [dangerous 
sidewalk]  ;  Argus  v.  Sturgis,  86 
Mich.  344  ;  48  N.  W.  1085  ;  Troxel  v. 
Vinton,  77  Iowa,  90 ;   41    N.  W.  580 


1  Griffin  v.  New  York,  9  N.  Y.  456  ; 
Scanlon  v.  Watertown,  14  N.  Y. 
App.  Div.  1  ;  43  N.  Y.  Supp.  618 ; 
Hopkins  v.  Rush  River,  70  Wise.  10  ; 
34  N.  W.  909  ;  Mullen  v.  Owosso,  100 
Mich.  103;  08  N.  W.  663  [driving  over 
a  pile  of  sand];  Phillips  v.  Ritchie 
county,  31  W.  Va.  477;  7  S.  E.  427 
[visible  and  dangerous  landslide]; 
Galesburg  v.  Hall,  45  111.  App.  290  ; 
and  cases  infra.  A  bridge  known 
to  plaintiff  to  have  been  without  a 
railing  for  two  years,  cannot  be  pre- 
sumed by  him,  after  an  absence  of 
several  months,  to  have  been  sup- 
plied with  them  in  the  meantime 
(Dale  v.  Webster  county,  76  Iowa, 
370  ;  41  N.  W.  1).  But  a  traveler 
has  a  right  to  presume  that  a  wagon 
obstructing  a  road  in  the  daytime 
would  have  been  removed  before 
night  (Fox  v.  Sackett,  10  Allen,  535). 

2  The  fact  that  plaintiff  knew  of 
the  dangerous  condition  of  an  icy 
pavement  did  not  require  him  to  ex- 
ercise extraordinary  care,  but  only 
such  care  as  an  ordinarily  prudent 
man  would  have  used  under  the  cir- 
cumstances (Koch  v.  Ashland,  88 
Wise.  603  ;  60  N.  W.  990  ;  Birming- 
ham v.  Starr,  112  Ala.  98;  20  So. 
421).  Plaintiff's  knowledge  enjoins  a 
degree  of  care  on  his  part  commen- 
surate therewith  (Dittrich  v.  Detroit, 
98  Mich.  245  ;  57  N.  W.  125  ;  Ger- 
maine  v.  Muskegon,  105  Mich.  213 ; 
63  N.  W.  78  ;  Bedford  v.  Neal,  143 
Ind.  425;  41  N.  E.  1029  ;  Holloway  v. 
Lockport,  54  Hun,  153  ;  7  N.  Y. 
Supp.  363).  s.  P  ,  Bullock  v.  New 
York,  99  N.  Y.  654  ;  [temporary  flag- 
stones] ;  Evans   v.   Utica,  69  Id.  166 


§376] 


HIGHWAYS. 


656 


circumstance,  and,  perhaps,  a  strong  circumstance ;  but  it 
should  be  submitted,  with  the  other  facts  of  the  case,  to  the 
jury,  for  them  to  determine  whether,  with  such  knowledge,  the 
plaintiff  exercised  ordinary  care  in  proceeding  on  a  way  known 
to  be  dangerous,  or,  in  proceeding,  used  ordinary  care  to  avoid 
injury.4     If  the  defect  was  of  such  a  character  that  men  of  ordi- 


[sidewalk  out  of  repair  but  not  dan- 
gerous] ;  Larsh  v.  Des  Moines,  74 
Iowa,  512  ;  38  N.  W.  384  ;  Flynn  v. 
Neosho,  114  Mo.  567 ;  21  S.  W.  903  ; 
Denison  v.  Sanford,  2  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
661;  21  S.  W.  784;  Ouverson  v. 
Grafton,  5  N.  Dak.  281  ;  65  N.  W. 
676  ;  Neddo  v.  Ticonderoga,  77  Hun, 
524;  28  N.  Y.  Supp.  887  [slippery 
sidewalk]  ;  and  all  other  cases  cited 
under  this  section. 

4  Whether  proceeding  on  a  way 
known  to  be  defective  is  consistent 
with  reasonable  care  is  generally  for 
the  jury,  depending  upon  the  nature 
of  the  obstruction,  or  insufficiency 
of  the  highway,  and  all  the  surround- 
ing circumstances  (Lyman  v.  Am- 
herst, 107  Mass.  339;  Whitford  v. 
Southbridge,  119  Id.  564;  Parker  v. 
Springfield,  147  Id.  391  ;  18  N.  E.  70  ; 
Griffin  v.  Auburn,  58  N.  H.  121; 
Coates  v.  Canaan,  51  Vt.  131  [snow- 
drift] ;  Dooley  v.  Meriden,  44  Conn. 
117  [accumulation  of  snow]  ;  Harnp- 
son  v.  Taylor,  15  R.  I.  83  ;  8  Atl.  331  ; 
23  Id.  732;  Pomfrey  v.  Saratoga 
Springs,  104  N.  Y.  459  ;  11  N.  E.  43 
Niven  v.  Rochester,  76  N.  Yr.  619 
Weed  v.  Ballston  Spa,  Id.  329 
Kelly  v.  Doody,  116  N.  Y.  575  ;  22  N. 
E.  1084;  Taylor  v.  Yonkers,  105 
N.  Y.  202;  11  N.  E.  642;  Merri- 
mann  v.  Phillipsburg,  158  Pa.  St.  78  ; 
28  Atl.  122  ;  Baltimore  v.  Holmes,  39 
Md.  243  [ridge  of  stones  on  the  high- 
way] ;  Montgomery  v.  Wright,  72 
Ala.  411  [washout  in  sidewalk  and 
no  walk  on  other  side  of  street]  ; 
Phillips  v.  Huntington,  35  W.  Va. 
406;    14     S.     E.     17;     Dempsey     v. 


Rome,  94  Ga.  420  ;  20  S.  E.  335  ;  Wil- 
son v.  Trafalgar,  etc.  Road,  93  Ind. 
287  ;  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Jackson,  86  Id. 
Ill  [defective culvert ;  no  other  safe 
way] ;  Albion  v.  Hetrick,  90  Id.  545 
[gully  across  road  ;  no  other  way]  ; 
Richmond  v.  Mulholland,  116  Ind. 
173;  18  N.  E.  832;  Columbus  v. 
Strassner,  124  Ind.  482  ;  25  N.  E.  65  ; 
Aurora  v.  Dale,  90  111.  46  [hole  in 
sidewalk]  ;  Clayton  v.  Brooks,  150 
111.  97;  37  N.  E.  574;  Nichols  v. 
Minneapolis,  33  Minn.  430  ;  McKenzie 
v.  Northfield,  30  Id.  456;  Hart  v. 
Red  Cedar,  63  Wise.  634;  24  N.  W  410; 
Erd  v.  St.  Paul,  22  Id.  443  [covered 
excavation  in  the  sidewalk]  ;  Wright 
v.  Kansas  City,  18  Mo.  App.  436 
[loose  planks  in  a  sidewalk]  ;  Perkins 
v.  Fond  du  Lac,  34  Wise.  435  [slop- 
ing sidewalk  on  a  starlight  night]  ; 
Cumisky  v.  Kenosha,  87  Wise.  286 ; 
58  N.  W.  395;  Waud  v.  Polk 
county,  88  Iowa,  617  ;  55  N.  W. 
528 ;  Fulliam  v.  Muscatine,  70 
Iowa,  436  ;  30  N.  W.  861  ;  Lan- 
gan  v.  Atchison,  35  Kans.  318;  11 
Pac.  38  ;  Emporia  v.  Schmidling, 
33  Id.  485  ;  6  Pac.  893  ;  Plattsmouth 
v.  Mitchell,  20  Neb.  228 ;  29  N  W. 
593  ;  Orleans  v.  Perry,  24  Neb.  831  ; 
40  N.  W.  417;  Omaha  v.  Ayer,  32  Neb. 
375;  49  N.W.  445;  Smith  v.  St.  Joseph, 
45  Mo.  449.  In  general,  plaintiff's 
knowledge  will  raise  a  presumption 
of  negligence  on  his  part  so  as  to  re- 
quire proof  to  negative  the  presump- 
tion (Achtenhagan  v.  Watertown,  18 
Wise.  331  ;  Folsom  v.  Underbill,  36 
Vt.  580;  Fox  v.  Glastenbury,  29 
Conn.  204;   Wilson  v.  Charlestown. 


•557 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§376 


nary  prudence,  having  knowledge  of  it,  would  not,  under  ordi- 
nary circumstances,  have  attempted  to  pass  at  their  own  risk, 
a  traveler  has  no  right  to  try  the  experiment  at  the  risk  of  the 
public ;  the  risk  is  his  own.5  But  if  persons  of  ordinary  pru- 
dence would  have  believed  it  safe  to  attempt  the  passage  in  the 
mode  adopted  by  the  plaintiff,  he  can  recover.6  The  rule 
which  precludes  a  recovery  should  especially  hold  in  a  case 
where,  by  taking  another  side  of  the  road,  the  defect  might 
have    been    easily    avoided;7  but    the    mere    fact    that  the 


8  Allen,  137).  See  Jacobs  v.  Bangor, 
16  Me.  187 ;  Cornelius  v.  Appleton, 
22  Wise.  635  ;  Hanlon  v.  Keokuk,  7 
Iowa,  4^8  ;  Brown  v.  Jefferson,  16 
Id.  339. 

5  Whittaker  v.  West  Boylston,  97 
Mass.  273  [knowledge  of  obstruction 
for  two  years] ;  Casey  v.  Fitchburg, 
162  Mass.  321 ;  38  N.  E.  499  [open 
unlighted  trench] ;  Norwood  v.  Som- 
erville.  159  Mass.  105  ;  33  N.  E.  1108  ; 
Hubbard  v.  Concord,  35  N.  H.  52; 
Fox  v.  Glastenbury,  29  Conn.  204 
[driving  across  washout  during 
freshet]  ;  Whalen  v.  Citizens'  Gas 
Co.,  151  N.  Y.  70;  45  N.  E.  363  [dis- 
placed flagstone] ;  Haven  v.  Pitts- 
burgh Bridge  Co.,  151  Pa.  St.  620  ;  25 
Atl.  311  [bridge  notoriously  danger- 
ous and  ' '  danger  "  posted] ;  Hill  v. 
Tionesta,  146  Pa.  St.  11 ;  23  Atl.  204  ; 
Winner  v.  Oakland,  158  Pa.  St.  405  ; 
27  Atl.  1110  ;  Acker  v.  Anderson,  20 
S.  C.  495  ;  Laney  v.  Chesterfield,  29 
S.  C.  140 ;  7  S.  E.  56 ;  Conneaut  v. 
Naef,  54  Ohio  St.  529;  44  N.  E.  236 ; 
Morrison  v.  Shelby  county,  116  Ind. 
431  :  19  N.  E.  316  ;  Bloomington  v. 
Rogers,  9  Ind.  App.  230;  36  N.  E. 
439  ;  Black  v.  Manistee,  107  Mich.  60  ; 
64  N.  W.  868  [icy  sidewalk] ;  Weirs 
v.  Jones  county,  86  Iowa,  625 ;  53  N. 
W.  321  [notice  of  danger  posted,  but 
plaintiff  could  not  read  English  ;  no 
recovery] ;  Galveston  v.  Hemmis, 
72  Tex.  558;  11  S.  W.  29. 

6  Though  one  use  a  street  known 
to  be  defective,  he  is  not  guilty  of 

[Law  of  Neg.  Vol.  II  —  42] 


contributory  negligence  if  he  be- 
lieves, and  as  a  reasonably  prudent 
man  has  the  right  to  believe,  that  he 
will  pass  in  safetjr  by  the  exercise  of 
ordinary  care,  and  uses  such  care. 
(Nichols  v.  Laurens,  96 Iowa,  388;  65 
N.W.  335 ;  Kendall  v.  Albia,  73  Iowa, 
241  ;  34  N.  W.  833).  A  charge  that 
"if  an  ordinarily  careful  driver  would 
reasonably  infer,  from  the  fact  of 
water  being  there,  that  it  was  dan- 
gerous to  go  over,  he  was  negligent, 
but  if  there  was  nothing  to  indicate 
that  the  hole  was  dangerous,  then 
he  had  the  right  to  take  chances  of 
crossing"  is  correct  (McLaughlin  v. 
Philadelphia  Traction  Co.,  175  Pa.  St. 
565  ;  34  Atl.  863  [hole  in  street  cov- 
ered by  water)],  s.  P.,  Taylor  v.  Con- 
stable, 131  N.  Y.  597  ;  30  N.  E.  63 ; 
Thomas  v.  Western  U.  Tel.  Co.,  100 
Mass.  156 ;  Kenworthy  v.  Ironton,  41 
Wise.  047  ;  Kelley  v.  Fond  du  Lac, 
31  Id.  179;  Chilton  v.  Carbondale, 
160  Pa.  St.  463  ;  28  Atl.  833  ;  Finn  v. 
Adrian,  93  Mich.  504  ;  53  N.  W.  614; 
Maus  v.  Springfield,  101  Mo.  613;  14 
S.  W.  630  ;  Gulf,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Gass- 
camp,  69  Tex.  545  ;  7  S.  W.  227. 

7  Whether  walking  on  one  part  of 
a  sidewalk  rather  than  another  is 
negligence  is  for  the  jury  (Lincoln 
v.  Power,  151  U.  S.  436  ;  14  S.  Ct. 
387).  Whether  plaintiff  was  bound 
to  go  around  an  obstruction  into  a 
muddy  street  is  for  the  jury  (Shook 
v.  Cohoes,  108  N.  Y.  648;  15  N.  E. 
531).     So  is  the  question   whether 


§  376] 


HIGHWAYS. 


658 


obstructed  street  was  out  of  the  way  of  the  point  at  which  a 
traveler  was  aiming,  or  that  he  might  have  taken  a  nearer  way  is 
immaterial.8  It  is  generally,9  though  not  uniformly,10  held 
that  taking  a  highway,  in  ordinary  use  by  the  public,  with 
knowledge  of  a  defect  therein,  instead  of  another  route,  is  not 
negligence.  A  traveler  is  not  required  at  all  times  to  have  his 
thoughts  fixed  on  a  defect  in  the  way,  though  having  had  notice 
of  it ;  his  mere  inattention  or  forgetfulness  will  not,  therefore, 
necessarily  preclude  his  recovery.11  The  fact,  however,  that 
there  was  no  guard  or  light  at  the  place  will  not  excuse  his 
contributory  negligence.12 


venturing  upon  an  icy  sidewalk  is 
negligence,  when  all  danger  could 
have  been  avoided  by  crossing  to  the 
other  side  of  the  street  (Twogood  v. 
New  York,  102  N.  Y.  216 ;  6  N.  E. 
275  ;  Todd  v.  Troy,  61  N.  Y.  506  ; 
Evans  v.  Utica,  69  Id.  166).  S.  P., 
Whalen  v.  Citizens'  Gas  Co.,  151  N. 
Y.  71  ;  45  N.  E.  663;  Bullock  v.  New 
York,  99  N.  Y.  651 ;  2  N.  E.  1  ;  Kling 
v.  Buffalo,  72  Hun,  541  ;  25  N.  Y. 
Supp.  445  ;  Hubbard  v.  Concord,  35 
N.  H.  52  ;  Griffin  v.  Auburn,  58  Id. 
121  ;  Wilson  v.  Charlestown,  8  Allen, 
137;  Packard  v.  New  Bedford,  9 
Allen,  200  ;  Horton  v.  Ipswich,  12 
Cush.  488  ;  Congdon  v.  Norwich,  37 
Conn.  414 ;  Forks  v.  King,  84  Pa.  St. 
230;  Erie  v.  Magill,  101  Id.  616; 
Lynch  v.  Erie,  151  Pa.  St.  380  ;  25 
Atl.  43 ;  Schaefler  v.  Sandusky,  33 
Ohio  St.  246 ;  CentraUa  v.  Krouse, 
64  I1L  19  ;  Lovenguth  v.  Blooming- 
ton,  71  Id.  238  ;  Madison  county  v. 
Brown,  89  Ind.  48  ;  Prince  George's 
county  v.  Burgess,  61  Md.  29 ;  Me- 
ridian v.  Hyde  [Miss.],  11  So.  108; 
Welsh  v.  Argyle,  89  Wise.  649;  62  N. 
W.  517;  Wright  v.  St.  Cloud,  54 
Minn.  94;  55  N.  W.  819;  Parkhill 
v.  Brighton,  61  Iowa,  103  ;  15  N.  W. 
853  ;  Cosner  v.  Centerville,  90  Iowa, 
33;  57  N.  W.  636  ;  Cohn  v.  Kansas 
City,  108  Mo.  387;  18  S.  W.  973; 
Corlett   v.   Leavenworth,   27   Kans. 


673  ;  James  v.  San  Francisco,  6  Cal. 
528. 

8  Sandwich  v.  Dolan,  133  111.  177  ; 
24  N.  E.  526.  See  Erie  v.  Schwingle, 
22  Pa.  St.  384. 

9  Apple  v.  Marion  county,  127  Ind. 
553;  27  N.  E.  166;  Fowler  v.  Lin- 
quist,  138  Ind.  566;  37  N.  E.  133  ;  Gos- 
port  v.  Evans,  112  Ind.  133  ;  13  N.  E. 
256  [question  for  jury]  ;  Cairncross 
v.  Pewaukee,  86  Wise.  181;  56  N.  W. 
648  [question  not  to  be  considered] ; 
Ball  v.  El  Paso,  5  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
221  ;  23  S.  W.  835.  See  Gerdes  v. 
Christopher  Foundry  Co.,  124  Mo. 
347  ;  25  S.  W.  557. 

10  See  Wellman  v.  Susquebanna 
Depot,  167  Pa.  St.  239  ;  31  Atl.  566  ; 
Mechesney  v.  Unity,  164  Pa.  St.  358  ; 
30  Atl.  263  ;  Biggs  v.  West  Newton, 
164  Pa.  St.  341  ;  30  Atl.  204  ;  Barnes, 
v.  Marcus,  96  Iowa,  675;  65  N.W.  984; 
Fulliam  v.  Muscatine,  70  Iowa,  436; 
30  N.  W.  861  ;  Cook  v.  Atlanta,  94 
Ga.  613  ;  19  S.  E.  987. 

11  Maloy  v.  St.  Paul,  54  Minn.  398  ; 
56  N.  W.  94  ;  Simonds  v.  Baraboo.  93 
Wise.  40  ;  67  N.  W.  40 ;  Dundas  v. 
Lansing,  75  Mich.  499;  42  N.  W. 
1011  ;  Springfield  v.  Rosenmeyer,  52 
111.  App.  301;  Gibbons  v.  Phoenix.  61 
Hun,  619,  mem.  ;  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  410. 

"Hesser  v.  Grafton,  33  W.  Va. 
548  ;  11  S.  E.  211  ;  Vance  v.  Franklin, 
4  Ind.  App.  515  ;  30  N,  E.  149  ;  Davis 


659 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§377 


§  377-  Care  required  in  traveling  at  night.  —  On  the  other 
hand,  it  is  not,  as  matter  of  law,  negligence  for  one  to  travel, 
even  in  a  dark  night,  over  a  road  with  which  he  is  wholly  un- 
acquainted, and  which  is  without  a  light  or  guard.1  In  walk- 
ing or  driving  at  night,  however,  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care 
requires  greater  vigilance  than  in  the  day,2  particularly  in  a 
strange  locality,3  and  the  question  of  care  in  such  cases  is  for 
the  jury.4     But  it  has  been  held   to   be   negligence,  per  se,  for 


v.  California  St.  R.  Co.,  105  Cal.  131  ; 
38  Pac.  647.  See  Horton  v.  Troni- 
peter,  53  Kans.  150  ;  35  Pac.  1106  ; 
Goddard  v.  Mcintosh,  161  Mass.  253  ; 
37  N.  E.  169. 

1  A  traveler  may  assume  that  a 
street  on  a  dark  night  is  in  a  pass- 
able condition,  and  he  is  not  guilty 
of  contributory  negligence  for  fail- 
ing to  search  for  defects  (Robinson 
v.  Wilmington,  8  Houst.  409  ;  32 
Atl.  347  ;  Crowther  v.  Yonkers.  60 
Hun,  5»6,  mem.;  15  N.  Y.  Supp.  588). 
S.  P.,Blyv.  Whitehall,  120  N.  Y. 
506;  24  N.  E.  943).  Ordinary  care  is 
all  that  is  required  (Russell  v.  Mon- 
roe, 116  N.  C.  720;  21  S.  E.  550;  Ott 
v.  Buffalo.  131  N.  Y.  594;  30  N.  E. 
67;  Williams  v.  Clinton,  28  Conn. 
264  :  Normal  v.  Gresham,  49  111. 
App.  196 ;  Elgin  v.  Renwick,  86  111. 
498;  Jefferson  v.  Chapman,  127  Id. 
438 ;  20  N.  E.  33  ;  Owen  v.  Ft.  Dodge, 
98  Iowa,  281  ;  67  N.  W.  281).  Con- 
tributory negligence  is  not  shown  by 
proof  that,  after  knowing  condition 
of  street,  plaintiff  traveled  on  it 
after  dark  (Maultby  v.  Leavenworth, 
28  Kans.  745  ;  Rector  v.  Pierce,  3 
Thomp.  &  C.  416,  420  ;  Milwaukee 
v.  Davis,  6  Wise.  377  [driving  in 
violent  storm];  Noblesville  Gas  Co. 
v.  Loehr,  124  Ind.  79;  24  N.  E.  579 
[running  to  a  fire]  ;  Sias  v.  Reed 
City,  103  Mich.  312  ;  61  N.  W.  502) ; 
and  therefore  could  not  comprehend 
the  danger  (McGuinness  v.  Worces- 
ter, 160  Mass.  272;  35  N.  E  1068). 
In   Allegany  county  v.  Broadwater 


(69  Md.  533;  16  Alt.  233),  held  proper 
to  refuse  to  charge  that  plaintiff 
could  not  recover  if,  knowing  the 
condition  of  the  road,  he  failed  to 
carry  a  light.  Compare  Daniels  v. 
Lebanon,  58  N.  H.  284. 

2  Splittorf  v.  State,  108  N.  Y.  205  ; 
15  N.  E.  322  [crossing  a  swinging 
bridge  over  dangerous  stream].  A 
charge  that  greater  caution  might 
be  required  at  night  than  in  the  day- 
time, is  proper  (Hall  v.  Manson,  90 
Iowa,  585;  58  N.  W.  881).  "Driving 
in  the  dark  without  thinking  of  dan- 
ger, is  not  ordinary  care  "  (Prideaux 
v.  Mineral  Point,  43  Wise.  513). 
Plaintiff  knew  of  the  existence  of 
the  pit,  into  which  he  fell  while  walk- 
ing along  at  night,  absorbed  in 
thought,  and  not  looking  where  he 
was  going.  Held,  contributory  neg- 
ligence (Walker  v.  Reidsville,  96  N. 
C.  382;  2 S.  E.  74).  s.  P.,  Indianapolis 
v.  Cook,  99  Ind.  10  ;  McLaury  v.  Mc- 
Gregor, 54  Iowa,  717;  7  N.  W.  91; 
Stier  v.  Oskaloosa,  41  Iowa,  353. 

3  Cummins  v.  Syracuse,  100  N.  Y. 
637;  3  N.  E.  680.  A  stranger  seeing 
people  traveling  on  a  certain  street 
at  night  may  assume  that  it  is  rea- 
sonably safe  for  that  purpose  (Vieths 
v.  Skinner,  47  111.  App.  325).  See 
Parcells  v.  Auburn,  77  Hun,  137; 
28  N.  Y.  Supp.  471  [comparative 
stranger]. 

4  Daniels  v.  Lebanon,  58  N.  H. 
284  [traveling  without  a  light];  Hart 
v.  Red  Cedar,  63  Wise.  634  :  24  N. 
W.   410  [plaintiff  mistook  his  loca- 


§373] 


HIGHWAYS. 


660 


one,  having  notice  of  the  dangerous  condition  of  a  road  on 
an  embankment,  to  drive  over  it,  at  a  point  where  it  was  so 
dark  that  he  could  not  see  where  he  was  going.5 

§  378.  Defect  in  traveler's  carriage,  harness  or  horses. — 

The  traveler  is  not  bound,  before  venturing  on  a  highway,  to 
see  that  his  carriage  and  harness  are  in  perfect  repair,  and  his 
team  perfectly  trained  and  manageable.1  All  that  can  be 
required  of  him  in  this  regard  is  the  exercise  of  ordinary  care 
and  prudence.  If  he  did  not  know  and  was  not  in  fault  for  not 
discovering  the  particular  defect  or  vice  in  his  vehicle  or  team 
which  concurred  with  the  defect  in  the  highway  in  causing  the 
injury,  he  is  not  barred  of  his  remedy  against  the  town.2     On 


tion]  ;  Byrne  v.  Syracuse,  79  Hun, 
555;  29  N.  Y.  Supp.  912  [had  not 
been  on  street  since  railroad  was 
laid  ;  injured  in  crossing  it].  Plain- 
tiff proceeded  cautiously  because  it 
was  slippery;  the  sidewalk  was  in 
common  use,  and  another  person  be- 
sides was  using  it  at  the  time.  Held, 
question  for  jury  (Coffin  v.  Palmer, 
162  Mass.  192;  38  N.  E.  509).  See 
also  Slee  v.  Lawrence,  162  Mass.  405; 
38  N  E.  708;  Jefferson  v.  Chapman, 
127  111.  438  ;  20  N.  E.  33;  Berg  v. 
Milwaukee,  83  Wis.  599  ;  53  N.  W. 
890  ;  McQuillan  v.  Seattle.  10  Wash. 
464  ;  38  Pac.  1119  ;  Jackson  v.  Buena 
Vista,  88  Ga.  466;  U  S.  E.  866.  S.  P., 
Totten  v.  Phipps,  52  N.  Y.  354  [en- 
tering premises  after  dark  without  a 
light,  knowing  of  a  hatchway]. 
The  defense  of  contributory  negli- 
gence for  not  lighting  carriage-lamps 
at  night  is  not  available  by  a  turn- 
pike company  which  neglected,  as 
required  by  statute,  to  keep  its  gates 
fastened  open  at  night  so  that  plain- 
tiff drove  against,  without  seeing 
them  (Danville,  etc.,  Turnp.  Co.  v. 
Stewart,  2  Mete.  [Ky.]  119). 

6  Perry  v.  Cedar  Falls,  87  Iowa, 
315  ;  54  N.  W.  225.  s.  P.,  McNish  v. 
Peekskill,  91  Hun.  324:  36  N.  Y. 
Supp.  1022.    But  compare  Titus  v. 


New  Scotland,  11  N.  Y.  App.  Div. 
266 ;  42  N.  Y.  Supp.  152.  In  Reed  v. 
Deerfield  (8  Allen,  522),  held,  not 
negligence  per  se,  for  one  to  drive 
at  night  ten  miles  an  hour  over  a 
road  which  was  clear  when  he  went 
over  it  an  hour  before. 

1  "  In  every  case  of  damage  occur- 
ring on  the  highway,  we  could  sup- 
pose a  state  of  circumstances  in 
which  the  injury  would  not  have 
occurred.  If  the  team  had  not  been 
too  young  or  restive,  or  too  old,  or 
too  headstrong,  or  the  harness  had 
not  been  defective,  or  the  carriage 
insufficient,  no  loss  would  have  in- 
tervened. It  is  against  these  con- 
stantly occurring  accidents  that 
towns  are  required  to  guard  in 
building  highways."  (Per  Redfield, 
J.,  Hunt  v.  Pownal,  9  Vt.  411).  It  is 
not,  as  matter  of  law,  contributory 
negligence  to  drive  a  blind  horse 
(Brackenridge  v.  Fitchburg,  145 
Mass.  160;    13  N.  E.  457). 

2  Plaintiff  may  recover  if  he  shows 
that  he  did  not  know  and  had  no 
reason  to  suppose  the  existence  of 
the  particular  vice  in  question, 
whether  in  the  horse  or  the  carriage, 
and  that  he  was  in  no  fault  for  not 
knowing  (Winship  v.  Enfield,  42  N. 
H.  199  [vicious  habits  of  horse  and 


66 1 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§378 


this  principle,  it  is  generally  held  that  the  fact  of  losing  control 
of  a  reasonably  manageable  horse,  without  the  driver's  fault, 
will  not,  as  matter  of  law,  relieve  the  municipality  from 
responsibility  for  a  defect  in  the  highway,  with  which  the  run- 
away horse  came  in  contact.3     Otherwise,  if  the  loss  of  control 


defects  in  wagon]),  s.  P.,  Clark  v. 
Barrington,  41  N.  H.  44  [carriage]  ; 
Tucker  v.  Henniker,  Id.  319  [back- 
ing horse]  ;  Tuttle  v.  Farmington,  58 
Id.  13  ;  Allen  v.  Hancock,  16  Id. 
230  [smooth-shod  horse]  ;  Hunt  v. 
Pownal,  9  Vt.  411  ;  Fletcher  v.  Bar- 
net,  43  Id.  192  [gig  broke  down, 
passing  depression] ;  Davis  v.  Guil- 
ford, 55  Conn.  351  ;  11  Atl.  350 
[chained  wheel,  and  wagon  improp- 
erly loaded] .  '  'There  cannot  be  a  non- 
suit where  the  carriage  is  of  a  kind 
in  common  use  and  not  out  of  re- 
pair "  (Hammond  v.  Mukwa,  40 
Wise.  35  ;  Jennings  v.  Albion,  90 
Wise.  22  ;  62  N.  W.  926  [seat  not 
anchored  to  the  wagon]).  See  Luedke 
v.  Mukwa,  90  Wise.  57  ;  62  N.  W. 
931.  It  is  for  the  jury  to  determine 
whether  the  kind  of  vehicle  used  was 
suitable  and  road- worthy  (Malloy  v. 
Walker,  77  Mich.  448;  43  N.  W. 
1012).  The  statutes  of  Maine  and 
Massachusetts,  though  worded  like 
those  of  New  Hampshire  and  Ver- 
mont, are  interpreted  so  as  to  defeat 
a  traveler's  action,  if  any  defect  in 
his  carriage,  horse,  etc.,  concurred 
in  producing  the  injury,  without  re- 
gard to  his  knowledge,  actual  or  im- 
puted. In  Maine,  it  must  be  shown 
that  "the  injury  was  entirely  occa- 
sioned through  want  of  repair,"  and 
plaintiff's  not  being  in  fault  for  not 
knowing  of  a  concurring  defect  in 
his  own  carriage,  etc.,  will  not  save 
him  (Moore  v.  Abbot,  32  Me.  46 
Coombs  v.  Topsham,  38  Id.  204 
Farrar  v.  Greene.  32  Id.  574  [wagon] 
Anderson  v.  Bath,  42  Id.  346  [har- 
ness] :  see  Lake  v.  Mil  liken,  62  Id. 
240).     The  New  Hampshire  interpre- 


tation was  followed  in  Massachusetts 
in  Palmer  v.  Andover  (2  Cush.  600) , 
where  it  was  held  that  if  the  injury 
would  not  have  been  sustained  but 
for  a  defect  in  the  highway,  the 
town  would  be  liable,  although  the 
primary  cause  of  the  injury  was 
the  failure  of  some  part  of  the  car- 
riage, without  plaintiff's  fault.  But 
this  decision  has  been  explained 
away  and  its  authority  greatly 
shaken  by  later  cases  in  the  same 
court  (see  Rowell  v.  Lowell,  7  Gray, 
100  ;  Jenks  v.  Wilbraham,  11  Id.  142  ; 
Davis  v.  Dudley,  4  Allen,  557  ;  Titus 
v.  Northbridge,  97  Mass.  265).  In 
Murdock  v.  Warwick  (4  Gray,  178), 
held,  that  a  charge  that  plaintiff 
might  recover  "  although  the  action 
of  the  horse,  from  some  vicious  habit, 
occasionally,  operating,  might  have 
contributed  to  the  result,"  was  error. 
These  Massachusetts  cases  are  not 
authority  in  courts  where  the  ques- 
tion is  determined  on  common-law 
principles,  except  in  Pennsylvania, 
where  they  appear  to  be  esteemed. 
3  Joliet  v.  Shufelt,  144  111.  403 ;  32 
N.  E.  969  ;  Olson  v.  Chippewa  Falls, 
71  Wise.  558;  37  N.  W.  575  ;  Stacy  v. 
Phelps,  47  Hun,  54;  and  cases  cited  in 
note  13,  §  346.  An  instruction  that  if 
the  horses  drawing  the  vehicle  were 
balky  or  otherwise  unmanageable  it 
was  negligence  to  drive  them,  held, 
properly  refused  (Chamberlain  v. 
Wheatland,  54  Hun,  635,  mem.;  7  N. 
Y.  Supp.  190).  An  instruction  that  if 
plaintiff  was  driving  a  fractious 
horse,  or  was  unable  to  control  his 
horse  because  of  a  weakness  of  his 
arm,  he  was  not  entitled  to  recover, 
held,    properly   refused   (Baltimore, 


§  379 \ 


HIGHWAYS. 


662 


was  due  to  some  known  vice  of  the  horse,4  or  defect  in  the 
vehicle  or  harness,  maddening  the  horse;5  and,  in  some  courts, 
the  exemption  of  towns  is  extended  to  cases  of  uncontrollable 
horses,  without  regard  to  whether  that  condition  was  or  was 
not  due  to  a  known  vicious  habit,  or  any  negligence  on  the 
part  of  the  driver.6 

§  379-   Unskillful  or  improper  driving. —  A  driver's  unskill- 
fulncss  in  managing  his  horse,1  or  his  driving  at  high  speed,2  or 


etc.  Turnpike  Co.  v.  Cassell,  66  Md. 
418).  s.  p.,  Baldridge,  etc.  Bridge  Co. 
v.  Cartrett,  75  Tex.  628 ;  13  S.  W.  8 
[team  became  unmanageable  be- 
cause whipped  ;  question  for  jury]. 

4  Wellman  v.  Susquehanna  Depot, 
167  Pa.  St.  239  ;  31  Atl.  566  [horse 
having  blind  staggers  threw  rider 
over  an  unrailed  embankment];  Bliss 
v.  Wilbraham,  8  Allen,  564  [horse 
young  and  balky  ;  backed  against 
railing  of  bridge  with  such  force  as 
to  break  it  and  precipitate  horse  and 
driver  into  stream].  Whether  plain- 
tiff was  in  fault  for  driving  horses 
which  to  his  knowledge  had  often 
run  away  before  is  for  the  jury 
(Centralia  v.  Scott,  59  111.  129).  See 
Mitchell  v.  Turner,  149  N.  Y.  39;  43 
N.  E.  403. 

5  Kingsley    v.     Bloomingdale, 
Mich.         ;  67  N.  W.  333  [tight  check- 
rein]  ;  Chartiers  v.  Phillips,  122  Pa. 
St.  601 ;  16  Atl.  26  [tight  collar  chok- 
ing horse]. 

6  In  Titus  v.  Northbridge  (97  Mass. 
258),  a  horse,  being  taken  sick,  ceased 
to  obey  the  rein  and  pitched  over  an 
unfenced  embankment ;  held,  town 
not  liable,  because  the  accident 
would  not  have  occurred  if  the  horse 
had  been  controllable,  s.  P. ,  Higgins 
v.  Boston,  148  Mass.  484  ;  20  N.  E. 
105  ;  Houfe  v.  Fulton,  29  Wise.  296 
[horse  stopped,  staggered  and  fell 
off  unrailed  bridge  ;  no  recovery] ; 
Jackson  v.  Bellevieu,  30  Id.  250.  The 
Pennsylvania  courts  follow  those  of 


Massachusetts  in  this  hard  doctrine. 
In  Herr  v.  Lebanon  (149  Pa.  222  ;  24 
Atl.  207),  horse  drawing  an  omni- 
bus fell,  and  in  its  struggles  to  get 
up  fell  repeatedly,  until  it  went  over 
an  uni'ailed  declivity  on  the  side  of 
the  street,  taking  the  omnibus  and 
plaintiff  with  it.  Held,  the  fall  of 
the  horse  was  the  proximate  cause  of 
the  injury,  and  the  city  was  not 
liable,  s.  p.,  Trexler  v.  Greenwich, 
168  Pa.  St.  214  ;  31  Atl.  1090  ;  Butler 
v.  Oxford.  69  Miss.  618 ;  13  So.  626. 
But  a  horse  is  not  to  be  considered 
uncontrollable  because  it  merely 
shies  or  starts,  or  is  momentarily  out 
of  control  of  the  driver  (Horton  v. 
Taunton,  97  Mass.  266,  note  ;  Houfe 
v.  Fulton,  29  Wise.  296  ;  see  cases 
cited  in  notes  14,  15,  16,  §  346,  ante; 
also  §  355,  ante).  It  is  a  question 
for  the  jury  whether  driver's  loss  of 
control  was  more  than  momentary, 
or  was  so  complete  as  to  relieve  the 
town  from  liability  (Britton  v.  Cum- 
mington,  107  Mass.  347). 

1  For  a  woman  to  drive  a  horse  is 
not  necessarily  want  of  ordinary 
care  (Cobb  v.  Standish,  14  Me.  198 ; 
Bigelow  v.  Rutland,  4  Cush.  247 ; 
Babson  v.  Rockport,  101  Mass.  93 ; 
Blood  v.  Tyngsborough,  103  Id.  509  ; 
Snow  v.  Provincetown,  120  Id.  580; 
Hassenyer  v.  Railroad  Co.,  48  Mich. 
205  ;  Daniels  v.  Clegg,  28  Id.  33). 

2  Butterfleld  v.  Forrester,  11  East, 
60  [leading  case].  One  who,  while 
traveling,  merely  speeds  his  horse  is 


663 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§379 


faster  than  allowed  by  ordinance,3  or  on  the  wrong  side  of  the 
road,4  though  competent  and  even  strong,  is  not  conclusive, 
evidence  of  contributory  negligence.  But  getting  the  reins 
crossed  or  entangled  so  that  the  horse  is  guided  upon  an 
obstruction,  which  otherwise  it  would  not  have  come  in 
contact  with,5  or  slackening  the  reins  and  allowing  the  horse 
to  go  at  will  on  a  dark  night,6  or  driving  in  one  direction 
and  looking  in  another,7  or  so  recklessly  as  to  be  indiffer- 
ent to  consequences,8  has  been  held  to  be  contributory 
negligence  as  matter  of  law.  The  driver  of  a  horse  not  entirely 
gentle  or  manageable  should  use  a  degree  of  caution  commen- 
surate with  that    circumstance,  in  passing  an   object  likely  to 


within  the  protection  of  the  statute 
(Blodgett  v.  Boston,  8  Allen,  237, 
241).  But  persons  racing  horses  are 
not ;  because  that  is  a  purpose  for 
which  highways  are  not  designed  to 
be  used,  not  because  horse  racing  is 
unlawful  (McCarthy  v.  Portland,  67 
Me.  167).  On  the  same  ground,  a 
traveler  who  drove  at  a  trot  over  a 
bridge  was  held  barred,  the  bridge 
being  good  and  sufficient  except  in 
the  matter  of  its  springing  when 
driven  upon  at  a  trot  (Abbott  v. 
Wolcott,  38  Vt.  666).  See  Weeks  v. 
Lyndon,  54  Id.  638  ;  Reed  v.  Deer- 
field,  8  Allen,  522, 

3  Baker  v.  Portland,  58  Me.  199  ; 
Cullman  v.  McMinn,  109  Ala.  614 ; 
19  So.  981 ;  Pueblo  v.  Smith,  3  Colo. 
App.  386;  33  Pac.  685.  Compare 
Mullen  v.  Owosso,  100  Mich.  103;  58 
N.  W.  663  ;  Stebbins  v.  Keene,  60 
Mich.  214  ;  26  N.  W.  885.  The  mere 
fact  that  plaintiff,  to  reach  a  bridge, 
drove  over  a  foot-path,  contrary  to 
ordinance,  does  not  justify  a  non- 
suit in  an  action  for  the  fall  of  the 
bridge  (Fisher  v.  Cambridge,  133  N. 
Y.  527 ;  30  N.  E.  663).  Under  the 
Massachusetts  doctrine  (see  note  6, 
last  section),  one  driving  faster  than 
a  by-law  allowed,  cannot  recover  for 
a  defect  in  the  road,  although  his  fast 
driving  in  r.o  way  contributed  to  his 


injury  (Heland  v.  Lowell,  3  Allen, 
470).  See  Hill  v.  Seekonk,  119  Mass. 
85;  Hall  v.  Ripley,  Id.  135.  In  Arey 
v.  Newton  (148  Mass.  598  :  20  N.  E. 
327),  plaintiff  came  into  collision 
with  a  hitching-post  on  the  sidewalk 
on  which  he  drove  (in  violation  of 
ordinance)  on  attempting  to  pass  a 
team  in  front  of  him  ;  verdict  for 
defendant  sustained.  In  Tuttle  v. 
Lawrence  (119  Mass.  276),  held,  that 
plaintiff  must  show  that  in  driving 
more  than  six  miles  an  hour,  he  was 
not  violating  a  city  ordinance.  The 
general  rule  is  stated  and  illustrated 
in  §  104,  ante. 

4  Damon  v.  Scituate,  119  Mass.  66; 
Norris  v.  Litchfield,  35  N.  H.  271. 

5  Bigelow  v.  Rutland,  4  Cush.  247; 
Hull  v.  Kansas  City,  54  Mo.  598 
[reins  under  horse's  tail];  Fogg  v. 
Nahant,  106  Mass.  278  [same]. 

6  Mueller  v.  Ross,  152  Pa.  St.  399  ; 
25  Atl.  604. 

1  Tuffree  v.  State  Center,  57  Iowa, 
538 ;  11  N.  W.  1. 

8  Abernethy  v.  Van  Buren,  52 
Mich.  383  ;  18  N.  W.  116  ;  Forks  v. 
King,  84  Pa.  St.  230 ;  Pittsburgh  R. 
Co.  v.  Taylor,  104  Id.  306  ;  McCool  v. 
Grand  Rapids,  58  Mich.  41;  24  N.  W. 
631  :  Corlett  v.  Leavenworth,  27 
Kans.  673;  Sowles  v.  Moore,  65  Vt. 
322  ;  26  Atl.  629. 


§38o] 


HIGHWAYS. 


664 


frighten  horses.9  In  hitching  a  horse  in  the  street,  only  ordi- 
nary care  is  required  to  secure  it ;  and  if,  notwithstanding  such 
care,  the  horse  gets  loose,  and,  while  straying  on  the  highway, 
is  injured  by  a  defect  therein,  the  owner  is  not  barred.10 

§  380.  Negligent  stowing  and  excessive  weight  of  load. — 

If  plaintiff's  negligence  in  stowing  his  load  insecurely  was  the 
proximate  cause  of  its  falling  off,  on  the  vehicle  coming  in  con- 
tact with  a  defect  in  the  highway,  he  cannot  recover,  as  matter 
of  law.1  In  paving  a  street,  or  building  a  bridge,  municipali- 
ties are  bound  to  anticipate  and  provide  for  ordinary  travel 
only,  and  hence  are  not  liable  for  the  giving  way  of  a  pavement 
or  the  fall  of  a  bridge  under  the  excessive  weight  of  a  wagon- 
load2  or  of  unusual  machines,  e.  g.,  traction-engines,3  or  other 


»  Dirnock  v.  Suffield,  30  Conn.  129. 
See  Dennett  v.  Wellington,  15  Me. 
27;  Tutis  v.  Northbridge,  97  Mass. 
258 ;  Stone  v.  Hubbardston,  100  Id. 
49  ;  Houfe  v.  Fulton,  29  Wise.  297  ; 
Pittsburgh,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor, 
104  Pa.  St.  306  ;  Kuhn  v.  Walker, 
97  Mich.  306 ;  56  N.  W.  556. 

10  Tallahassee  v.  Fortune,  3  Fla. 
19  ;  Cummings  v.  Center  Harbor,  57 
N.  H.  17.  It  is  not  negligence,  per  se, 
to  leave  a  horse  unfastened  in  the 
street,  if  the  driver  is  so  near  that  he 
may  reasonably  expect  to  control 
him  by  his  voice,  or  to  reach  him 
before  he  can  escape  (Wasmer  v. 
Delaware,  etc.  R.  Co.,  80  N.  Y.  212; 
Southworth  v.  Old  Colony,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  105  Mass.  342).  In  Richards  v. 
Enfield  (13  Gray,  344),  the  horse  was 
hitched  outside  the  highway  and 
escaped  thence  to  the  highway. 
Held,  town  not  liable. 

1  Fisher  v.  Franklin,  89  Wise.  42  ; 
61  N.  W.  80  [insecure  load  of  hay]. 

2  Megargee  v.  Philadelphia,  153  Pa. 
St.  340  ;  25  Atl.  11?0  [plaintiff's 
"heavy  hauling"  displaced  pave- 
ment]. Where  the  weight  of  plain- 
tiff's wagondoad  exceeded  the  weight 
prescribed  by  statute,  he  is  barred  of 
an  action  against  the  town  (Howe  v. 


Castleton,  25  Vt.  162).  In  determin- 
ing what  constitutes  a  statutory 
"load,"  in  Vermont,  only  the  mate- 
rial placed  upon  the  carriage,  and 
not  the  carriage  itself,  or  anything 
used  or  employed  in  the  transporta- 
tion of  the  material  is  to  be  consid- 
ered (lb.).  In  Maine,  the  weight  of 
the  driver  is  to  be  taken  into  account 
(Dexter  v.  Canton  Toll-bridge  Co., 
79  Me.  563  ;  12  Atl.  547). 

3  It  cannot  be  required  or  expected 
that  a  town  shall  construct  and 
maintain  bridges  which  will  insure 
the  safety  of  persons  passing  over 
them  in  a  manner  involving  peculiar 
and  special  danger  arising  from  un- 
usual weight  of  vehicles  —  traction- 
engines  (Gregory  v.  Adams,  14  Grey, 
242, 248  ;  McCormick  v.  Washington, 
112  Pa.  St.,  185  ;  Coulter  v.  Pine,  164 
Id.  543  ;  30  Atl.  490  [steam  thrasher]; 
Clulow  v.  McClelland,  151  Pa.  St. 
583  ;  25  Atl.  147  ;  Clapp  v.  Elling- 
ton, 51  Hun,  58 ;  3  N.  Y.  Supp.  516 
[traction-engine  propelled  by  steam]; 
Vermillion  county  v.  Chipps,  131  Ind. 
56  ;  29  N.  E.  1606  [same]  ;  Laporte 
county  v.  Ellsworth,  9  Ind.  App. 
566  ;  Fulton  Iron  Works  v.  Kimball, 
52  Mich.  146  :  17  N.  W.  733  [same]  ; 
Woodbury  v.  Owosso,  64  Mich.  239  ; 


665 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§38l 


like  uses  unknown  or  not  common  when  the  street  or  bridge 
was  constructed  ;  otherwise  when  such  use  becomes  common.4 

§  381.  Sunday  traveling. —  Under  the  statutes  of  Maine, 
Vermont,  and  (until  1887 1 )  Massachusetts,  which  expressly  pro- 
hibit "traveling"  on  Sunday,  an  ordinary  traveler  has  no 
remedy  for  an  injury  received  on  that  day  from  a  defective 
highway.  In  states  having  statutes  which  merely  prohibit 
all  manner  of  business  or  work,  etc.,  on  Sunday,  all  courts 
have  refused  to  include,  by  construction,  ordinary  traveling. 
The  fact,  therefore,  that  the  plaintiff,  when  injured,  was  trav- 
eling on  Sunday  is  nowhere  a  defense  to  his  action  for  the 
injury,  except  in  the  two  first  mentioned  states.2 

§  382.  [consolidated.*  ] 
§  383-   [consolidated.!  J 

31  N.  W.  130  [same]  ;  Yordy  v. 
Marshall  county,  80  Iowa,  405  ;  45 
N.  W.  1042  ;  s.  c.  [after  new  trial]  86 
Iowa,  340 ;  53  N.  W.  298  [thrashing 
outfit]).  The  character  and  weight 
of  the  vehicle  and  load,  and  the 
manner  it  is  moved,  and  the  effect 
of  its  movement,  are  to  be  taken  into 
consideration  in  crossing  a  bridge, 
and  may  require  greater  or  less  care, 
and  when  these  facts  are  shown, 
whether  any  or  what  additional  care 
is  required,  are  properly  submitted 
to  the  jury  (Bidwell  v.  Murray,  40 
Hun,  190  ;  and  cases  supra).  In  New 
York,  "  no  town  shall  be  liable  for 
any  damage  resulting  to  a  person  or 
property  by  reason  of  the  breaking 
of  any  bridge  by  a  traction-engine 
in  crossing  the  same,  of  the  weight 
of  four  tons  or  over"  (L.  1887,  c. 
526).  The  fact  that  a  bridge,  which 
fell  while  plaintiff  was  crossing  it, 
had,  two  hours  before,  stood  twice 
as  much  weight,  as  that  under  which 
it  went  down,  does  not  conclusively 
show  that  defendant  could  not 
reasonably  have  known  its  unsafe 
condition  (Murray  v.  Usher,  46  Hun, 
404). 

4  Where  traction-engines  had  been 


in  use  in  the  neighborhood  for  many 
years  before  the  construction  of  a 
bridge,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the 
crossing  of  such  engine  was  antici- 
pated in  the  construction  of  the 
bridge  (Bonebrake  v.  Huntington 
county,  141  Ind.  62  ;  40  N.  E.  141  ; 
Wabash  v.  Carver,  129  Ind.  552;  29 
N.  E.  25).  See  Allen  county  v.  Crev- 
iston,  133  Ind.  39  ;  32  N.  E.  735.  It 
ought  to  be  strong  enough  to  support 
a  drove  of  cattle  (Richardson  v.  Roy- 
alton  Tump.  Co.,  6  Vt.  496). 

1  Stat.  1887,  ch.  391  [word  "  travel " 
stricken  from  Pub.  Stat.  ch.  98,  §  13]. 

2Platz  v.  Cohoes,  89  N.  Y.  219; 
Piollet  v.  Simmers,  106  Pa.  St.  95 ; 
Sharp  v.  Evergreen,  67  Mich.  443  ; 
35  N.  W.  67  ;  and  cases  cited  in  notes 
3  to  10,  §  104,  ante. 

*  The  substance  of  this  section  in 
the  last  edition  on  burden  of  proof, 
so  far  as  the  scope  of  this  work  per- 
mits any  treatment  of  the  law  of 
evidence,  will  be  found  in  chapter  v, 
ante. 

f  Damages  in  highway  cases,  the 
subject  of  this  section  in  the  last 
edition,  are  now  treated  in  chapter 
xxxviii,  on  the  general  subject  of 
Damages. 


§  384]  HIGHWAYS.  666 

§384.  Action  over  against  third  person.  —  Under  the  gen- 
eral principle  stated  in  £301,  ante,  one  who  maintains  a  law- 
ful structure  in  a  highway,  which  a  third  person,  by  his  interfer- 
ence, has  made  dangerous,  e.g.,  by  removing  guards  around  a 
hatchway  in  a  sidewalk,  has  a  right  of  action  against  the  latter 
for  the  damages  he  has  been  compelled  to  pay  a  traveler  falling 
into  such  unguarded  hatchway.1  So  a  municipal  corporation 
has  a  right  of  action  for  reimbursement  against  the  immediate 
creator  of  an  obstruction  or  other  nuisance  in  a  highway,  for 
the  damages  paid  by  it,  under  a  legal  liability,  to  a  person 
injured  thereby;2  provided  always  that  the  dangerous  condition 
of  the  highway  which  caused  the  injury  was  not  due  to  its  own 
fault;  in  which  case,  as  being  in  pari  delicto,  it  cannot  recover.3 
At  common  law,  the  third  person's  liability  over  depends  upon 
his  original  liability  to  the  injured  person.  Hence  a  lot- 
owner,  inasmuch  as  he  owes  no  duty  to  maintain  the  highway 
in  front  of  his  premises,4  is  under  no  obligation  to  reim- 
burse the  corporation  (whose  duty  it  was  to  repair)  the 
damages  paid  by  it  to  a  traveler  injured  by  a  defective 
sidewalk.5     Otherwise,   where    the  statute    imposes    the    duty 

1  Churchill  v.  Holt,  127  Mass.  165  ;  (see  note  4,  §301,  ante);  and  cases 
131  Id.  67.  infra. 

2  Chicago  v.  Robbins,  2  Black,  418 ;        4  Cases  cited  under  §  343,  ante. 

4  Wall.  679  ;  District  of  Columbia  v.  5  Rochester  v.  Campbell,  123  N.  Y. 

Washington  Gaslight  Co.,  20  D.  C.  405;  25    N.    E.    937.     In  that  case, 

39.     "  The  liability  grows  out  of  the  plaintiff's  charter  made  it  the  duty  of 

affirmative  act  of  defendant  which  lot-owners  to    keep    the    adjoining 

renders  him  liable  not   only  to  the  sidewalks  in  good  repair  and  remove 

party  injured,  but  also  mediately  to  obstructions  therefrom,  with  power 

any  party  who  has  been  damnified  to    the  city   to  repair,   on  adjacent 

by  his  neglect "  (Port  Jervis  v.  First  owner's  neglect  to  do  so  after  notice, 

Nat'l  Bank,  96  N.  Y.  550  ;  New  York  and  to  collect  the  expense  from  the 

v.  Brady,  151  Id.  611  ;  45  N.  E.  1122  ;  lot-owner.     Held,   not  to   impose    a 

Rochester  v.  Montgomery,  72  N.  Y.  primary  liability  upon  the  lot  owner, 

65  ;  Canandaigua  v.  Foster,  81  Hun,  and  not  sufficient  to  sustain  an  action 

147;  30  N.  Y.  Supp.  686;  Gridley  v.  to  recover  over  by  the  city.     s.  p., 

Bloomington,    68  111.    47  ;  Fahey   v.  Fulton  v.  Tucker,  3  Hun,  529  ;  Keo- 

Harvard,     62    Id.    28  ;    Centerville  kuk  v.  District  of  Keokuk,  53  Iowa, 

v.  Woods,  57  Ind.  192  ;  Wabasha  v.  352  ;  St.   Louis  v.   Connecticut  Mut. 

Southworth,    54     Minn.   79;  56    N.  Life   Ins.  Co.,  107  Mo.  92;  17  S.  W. 

W.   818  [trap-door  in  sidewalk]  ;  St.  637  [ordinance  prescribed  penalty  on 

Joseph  v.    Union   R.    Co.,    116    Mo.  lot-owners  for  not  keeping  sidewalks 

636  ;  22  S.  W.  794).  free  from  ice  and  snow].     Compare 

3  Buffalo  v.  Holloway,  7  N.  Y.  493  Detroit  v.   Chaffee,  70  Mich.  80  ;  37 


657 


HIGHWAYS. 


[§384 


to  repair  upon  the  lot-owner,  and  gives,  expressly  or  impliedly, 
a  right  of  action  over,  by  the  corporation,  against  him.  In 
such  a  statutory  action,  it  is  no  defense  that  the  injury  would 
not  have  happened  but  for  the  plaintiff's  neglect  of  its  general 
duty  to  repair.6  In  neither  class  of  actions  is  it  a  defense  that 
the  corporation  authorized  the  defendant's  interference  with  the 
the  highway,  e.  g.,  making  an  excavation,  or  placing  a  tele- 
graph pole  therein,  —  if  the  injury  was  caused  by  the  defend- 
ant's negligent  manner  of  using  the  license.7  Unless  otherwise 
provided  by  statute,  it  is  not  a  condition  of  plaintiff's  right  of 
recovery  over,  that  a  judgment  by  the  injured  person  has  been 
recovered  and  satisfied;  but  in  case  of  no  judgment  fixing 
plaintiff's  original  liability,  it  is  for  him  to  plead  and  prove  his 
legal  liability  for  the  sum  paid  the  third  person.8     A  recovery 


N.  W.  882  (see  next  note).  For  the 
rule  in  Pennsylvania,  see  Reading  v. 
Reiner,  167  Pa.  St.  41  ;  31  Atl.  357. 
In  Brookville  v.  Arthurs  (130  Pa.  St. 
501 :  18  Atl.  1076),  an  action  over 
was  maintained  against  a  lot-owner, 
on  an  ordinance  requiring  adjacent 
owners  to  repair  their  sidewalks, 
and  his  promise  to  repair,  in  consid- 
eration of  an  extension  of  time  —  an 
injury  occurring  meanwhile. 

6  Veazie  v.  Penobscot  R.  Co. ,  49  Me. 
119  ;  Littleton  v.  Richardson,  32  N.  H. 
59  ;  Milford  v.  Holbrook,  9  Allen,  17  ; 
Lowell  v.  Short,  4  Cush.  275 ;  Low- 
ell v.  Boston  &  Lowell  R.  Co.,  23 
Pick.  24 ;  Woburn  v.  Boston,  etc.  R. 
Co.  109  Mass.  283  ;  Lowell  v.  Glid- 
den,  159  Id.  317  ;  34  N.  E.  459  ;  De- 
troit v.  Chaffee,  70  Mich.  80  ;  37  X. 
W.  882  [lot-owner  liable  over  to  city 
for  nonrepair  of  sidewalk,  under  city 
charter  ;  owner  and  it  not  joint  tort- 
feasors] ;  Raymon  1  v.  Sheboygan, 
76  Wise.  335 ;  45  N.  W.  125 

1  Chicago  v.  Robbins.  2  Black,  418 
[excavation]  ;  Seneca  Falls  v.  Zalin- 
ski,  8  Hun,  571  ;  Canandaigua  v. 
Foster.  81  Hun,  147  ;  30  N.  Y.  Supp. 
686  [coal-hole  in  sidewalk] ;  Center- 
ville  v.  Woods,  57  Ind.  192  ;  Wick- 


wire  v.  Angola,  4  Ind.  App.  253  ;  30 
N.  E.  917  [area  opening  on  sidewalk]  ; 
Ottawa  v.  Parks,  43  Iowa,  119  [exca- 
vation] ;  Independence  v.  Yakel,  38 
Id.  427.  On  the  other  hand,  where 
the  jury  found  that  a  telegraph  pole 
erected  in  a  street,  under  plaintiff's 
license,  was  a  nuisance,  and  a  trav- 
eler's injury  was  caused  by  its  loca- 
tion, and  not  its  use,  held,  the  city 
was  a  joint  wrong-doer,  and  had  no 
right  of  action  over  against  the 
licensee  (Geneva  v.  Brush  Electric 
Co.,  50  Hun,  581  ;  3N.  Y.  Supp.  595). 
So  of  a  city  which,  with  notice,  per- 
mitted defendant  for  years  to  pile 
lumber  in  a  street,  which  fell  on  a 
passer-by  (Galveston  v.  Gonzales,  6 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  538  ;  25  S.  W.  978). 

8Fahey  v.  Harvard,  62  111.  28.  In 
New  York  v.  Dimick  (49  Hun,  241; 
2  N.  Y.  Supp.  46),  held,  on  demur- 
rer that  a  complaint  which  stated 
facts  from  which  notice  and  conse- 
quent liability  might  be  inferred, 
was  sufficient.  "  The  only  effect  of 
the  city's  settling  the  claim,  without 
judgment,  is  to  leave  open  all  ques- 
tions upon  which  defendant's  liabil- 
ity depends "  (Wabasha  v.  South- 
worth,  54  Minn.  79). 


§384] 


HIGHWAYS. 


668 


against  the  city  by  the  injured  person  is  conclusive  in  its  favor 
in  an  action  over  by  it,  of  the  existence  of  the  defect  which 
caused  the  injury  and  its  own  liability  therefor,  as  well  as  of 
the  injured  person's  freedom  from  negligence  and  the  amount 
of  damages ; 9  provided  defendant  had  notice  of  the  action  in 
which  the  judgment  was  had,  and  was  afforded  an  opportunity 
to  defend.10 


» New  York  v.  Brady,  151  N.  Y. 
611 ;  45  N.  E.  1122;  St.  Joseph  v.  Union 
R.  Co.,  116  Mo.  636 ;  22  S.  W.  794. 

10  The  failure  of  city  to  give  ex- 
press notice  to  defend  the  action 
against  it  by  the  injured  person,  does 
not  affect  the  former's  right  of  action 
against  the  wrong-doer  ;  it  simply 
imposes  on  it  the  burden  of  estab- 
lishing all  the  actionable  facts  (Chi- 
cago v.  Robbins,  2  Black,  418 ;  Port 


Jervis  v.  First  Nat.  Bk.,  96  N.  Y. 
550  ;  Warner  v.  McGarry,  4  Vt.  507  ; 
Chatterton  v.  Frankfort,  79  Ind. 
547).  Where  defendant  joined  in  the 
defense  of  the  suit  against  plaintiff, 
all  that  plaintiff  is  required  to  prove 
is  that  defendant's  negligence  caused 
the  injury,  and  that  it  has  paid  the 
judgment  recovered  against  it  (Mc- 
Donald v.  Lockport,  28  111.  App.  157.> 


9 


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